Realism and Semantics

Michael Devi tt

Noûs, Volume 17, Issue 4 (Nov., 19831, 669-68 1.

Stable URL:
198311%2917%3A4%3C669%3ARAS%3E2.O.C0%3B2-4
http://links.jstor.orglsici?sici=0029-4624%28

Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, availabIe at
http:l/www.jstor.orglaboutlteims.html.JSTOR' s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unIess you
have obtained prior permission, you may not downIoad an entire issue of a journaI or muItipIe copies of articIes, and
you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Each copy of any part of a ISTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or
printed page of such transmission.

Noûs is published by Blackwell PubIishers. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding
the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/joumalslblack.htmI.

Noûs
01983 BIackweIl PubIishers

ISTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
For more information on ISTOR contact jstor-info@umich.edu.

02002 JSTOR

http:l/www.jstor.org/
Tue Iun 25 0 3 5 8 5 2 2002
 Realism and Semantics
Part I1 of a critical study of Midwest SStudks in Philosophy
V: Studies in Epistewurlogy (Minneapolis, MN : University
of Minnesota Press, 19801, 568 pp., $35.00 (cloth),
$15.00 (paper).
MICHAEL DEVITT
UNTVERSTTY OF SYDNEY

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

In Part I of this critical study of [17], John Bacon discusses the papers on
epistemology. I shall discuss the papers o n realism (in I),o n understanding and
truth conditions (in 2), on reference (in 3), and on intentionality (in 4).

1. REALISM
T h e volume contains three papers on realism: Nicholas Rescher'f "Conceptual
Schemes," Simon Blackburn's "Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of
Theory," and Joseph Margolis' "Cognitive Issues in the Realist-Idealist Dis-
pute." Rescher represents one regrettable trend in contemporary discussions
of realism, B-lackburn another. Margolis struggles with both trends.
Margolis starts well with a clear statement of realism and the epistemic
problems it poses. He rightly describes "current versions of realism" as
"Kantian-like" (373). His discussion of Kuhn (374-376) is illuminating. We
might put the position it reveals as follows: insofar as there is a world indepen-
dent of our theories, it is a mere Kantian thing-in-itself, beyond reach of
knowledge or reference. Such a world is one that Nelson Goodman would say is
"not orth fighting for" ([18]: 20),There is a strong trend towardjust this sort
7
of rea ism amongst contemporary epistemologists.
Rescher exemplifies this trend. He begins his paper by arguing effectively
that Donald Davidson [ 5 ] is wrong to reject the very idea of a conceptual
scheme. He goes on to consider how conceptual schemes can differ, They
"embody different theories. . . about different things. T o move from one
conceptual scheme to another is in some way to change the subject." T h e
difference "does not lie in disagreement and conflict" (331). It is "a matter of
difference in orientation rather than one of disagreement in doctrins" (333).
After much of this, and approving references to Feyerabend (332), Goodman
(336) and Rorty (337) Rescher claims that it is "inappropriate to say that there is
a n identifiable something . . . that is prior to and independent of any and all
scheme-based conceptualization" (337),
 What is realism? One of the unfortunate legacies of positivism is the
current confusion over this question: a mystification of metaphysics. Two of
the most influential contemporary philosophers, Michael Dummett [I51 and
Hilary Putnam [24] have added to the apparent difficulties.' Blackburn's paper
does so too. This mystification is the second trend I regretted.
Margolis tackles this trend in a lengthy treatment of Putnam's views
(379-388). So far as I can see he sinks without trace in those difficult waters,
losing the issue in a maze of talk about truth, reference, convergence, Boyd, the
principle of charity, indeterminacy, etc. Clarity is not aided by his conflation of
early ([23]), middle ([24]: Part One), and late (/24]: Part Four) Putnam.
The Kantian trend is certainly a worry for the realist. Nevertheless the
realist's most pressing problem is the strengthening Oxford-based trend to-
ward mystification. Blackburn's paper is typical of the trend (not least in its
difficulty). I shall therefore devote the rest of this section to that paper.
Blackburn takes "our metaphysics" to be "a general theory of what it is that
marks a statement as true." He doubts "whether familiar ways of characterizing
debates in the theory of knowledge will help." He pursues these doubts
"through the figure of thequasi-realist, a person who, starting from a recogniz-
ably anti-realist position, finds himself progressively able to mimic the intellec-
tual practices supposedly definitive of realism." We need "a practice the quasi-
realist cannot imitate" to give meaning to the debate;" otherwise realism is mere
"images" and perhaps attitudes to our discourse. . . not so much subjects for
decision as for nostalgia" (353).
Blackburn discusses four "intellectual practices" or "thoughts" which he
thinks might distinguish the realist from the quasi-realist. The first, suggested
by the work of Putnam, "is the thought that a theory to which one is committed
could. . . be false," which perhaps a quasi-realist must reject (356). The second,
suggested by the work of Dummett (360), "is the thought that reality must be
determinate," which perhaps "a quasi-realist must deny himself' (356). T h e
third, suggested by the works of FZamsey and Dummett (364), "is that an
anti-realist can, or must, . . . [deny] a distinction between a regulative and a
constitutive status for principles, in Kant's sense," whereas the realist will want
to make that distinction (356). "The fourth and currently most discussed view is
that realism is the best way of explaining our scientific success," an explanation
that "seems to carry with it a n ontological commitment. . . problematic to the
quasi-realist" (356). Blackburn hnds all of these thoughts inadequate for the
task and so leaves us with the idea that the dispute about realism is pseudo, a
matter of "old pictures and metaphors" (370).
Blackburn is not concerned with any particular realism dispute. His aim is
to cast doubt o n them all (modal, moral, mental, mathematical, etc.). One of the
disputes that his argument is clearly meant to cover is the most basic one: the
traditional dispute between realism about the external physical world and
idealismlinstrumentalism. Call that realism "PR." I shall attempt to bring out
the failings of Blackburn's discussion by considering its bearing on PR. I shall
not attempt to show that his discussion fails similarly with other realisms.
However I do mean to suggest that it does so fail, though not perhaps always so
comprehensively.
My approach tocharacterizing PR is old-fashioned. I think we can state the
doctrine simply, if a bit vaguely, along the following lines:

Common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist inde-

pendently of the mental.
 REALISM AND SEMANTICS 671.

(Margolis gives a similar account: 373.) It is commitment to this, not to any of

Blackburn's four "thoughts," that is the main "intellectual practice" distin-
guishing the realist about the physical world from the anti-realist.
T h e first thing to note about thischaracterization of PR is that it makes no
mention of truth. In my view no doctrine of truth is in any way constitutive of
PR. I have argued this elsewhere ([lo], 75-78) and will say no more here. The
second thing to note is that PR does not seem in the least bit metaphorical: it
seems as literal a statement as you could want.
Why suppose otherwise? Disagreements over what exists are straightfor-
ward enough: the theist thinks God does, the atheist thinks he does not, the
agnostic sits on the fence; the scientific realist thinks the unobservables of
science exist, the operationiTt~instrumentalistthinks they do not, van Fraassen
[26] sits o n the fence. Disagreements over objectivity and independence are not
so straightforward, but with careful attention to the traditional debate we
should he able to explain the disagreement so that, for example, Cocke is easily
placed in the realist camp, Berkeley easily placed firmly inthe anti-realist camp,
and Kant not so easily placed not so firmly there. We should require a powerful
argument to persuade us that, despite appearances, disagreement over PR is
really just disagreement over "images," "pictures," or "metaphors."'
Suppose it could be shown that acceptance or rejection of PR made no
dqfereme elsewhere in one's world view. Then a "quasi-realist" who rejected PR
could go along with everything else in the realist's theory: "could" not simply in
the sense of consi~teniwith Logs,
but also in the sense of compatibb with plausible
explanation. That would indeed be very persuasive evidence that, despite ap-
pearances, PR was mere froth o n the surface, a pious sentiment playing no
intellectual role. But showing this would be very hard. For what exists seems to
make an explanatory difference: ifx exists I can usex, when the chips are down,
to explain y; if it does not I cannot. And if x exists obyddiuely and independedly of
the mental then the best explanation ofx, of the knowing mind and its language,
and of the relation betweenx, mind, and language, will be different from what
it would have been had x not so existed. How could PR make no difference?
Investigating the explanatory consequences of PR is of course important
quite apart from any concern whether the dispute over it can be taken literally.
For, how are we to choose between PR and its rivals? We choose the one that
plays a role in the best explanation of the world. What we are investigating,
however, is not whatcotw&&s PR but what is theevidence for arldagainst it. It is
constituted by the doctrine set out above (or something like it).
Blackburn's interest in investigating whether realism makes a difference is
different. Initially he can find nothing but "images" distinguishing realkm
from anti-realism (355). As a result his four "thoughts" are suggestions as to
what cotwtitutes realism, what hjiws the debate (367).What is the initial diffi-
culty?
He finds two problems in telling "when we are in the presence of commit-
ment to a realm of fact" (354).

The first is that from the standpoint of the anti-realist the assertion "there really is
a fact o f the matter (often: an objective, independent, or genuine, fact o f the
matter) whether. . ." is itself suspicious. For if his puzzle arises from the thought
t h a t no kind o f thingcould possibly play the role of (moral, conditional, etc.)states
o f affairs, then he ought to translate h ~ doubt
s into difficulty about what the realist
mans to be asserting when he claims there are such things. (354)
 Perhaps it is appropriate for the anti-realist, like anybody else, to have a few
such doubts about speaker-meaning {I wonder myself about "states of affairs"),
but these can be removed easily enough: check o n what is covered by 'objective,'
'independent,' etc. Beyond that it strikes me as simply disingenuous for the
anti-realist to pursue the line Blackburn recommends. "The realist means what
he says, damn it!"
The second problem is that it is not so clear that the and-realist must rake issue
over any sentence of the kind: "there really is a fact. . ." This is because it may
belong to adiscipline to think such a thing, and it is no partofthe anti-realist's brief
..
to tamper with the internal conduct of a discipline. the threat remains that the
anti-realistblandly takes over all the things the realist wanted to say, but retaining
all the while his conviction that he atone gives an unobjectionable, or ontologically
pure, interpretation of them. (354)

So the disagreement comes down to one about interpretation; more precisely,

it seems, to one over the statement of truth conditions (so that, according to
Blackburn, if Ramsey's redundancy theory of truth is correct there is no
genuine issue! 354).
(i) T h e realism issue is not one over interpretations. If the anti-realist
, interprets the statements of a discipline that is apparently committed to objec-
tionable x's so that it is really committed to unobjectionabley's, then he should,
when the ontological chips are down, paraphrase away the apparent commit-
ment tox's in the first place. Heshould not take over everything the realist wants
to say on pain of making a mockery of ontological questions. Differences at the
level of metalanguage can, and should, be made differences at the level of
object language. The quasi-realist cannot have his commitments and deny
them too.
{ii) Blackburn's nothing-but-images conclusion is too strong and too
swift. T h e conclusion is supported by a brief discussion of realism about
conditionals, and by unsupported claims that some ways of drawing the
realisrnlanti-realism distinction there and elsewhere are mere images. But, (a)
even if he is right about conditionals, that is far too thin a base to generalize
about all realisms; {b)not all his unsupported claims are obuioflsly correct; (c) he
has not mentioned other plausible ways of distinguishing realism from anti-
realism. TERre is nothzng ERre that casts the Least doubt, for examfile, on the genuine
mn-mtaphorical nature of t h d k p d e ouer P R .
Because of these largely spurious initial problems, Blackburn seeks prac-
tices that define disputes about realism. We might expect that an investigation
of the four "thoughts" guided by this would lead to a different assessment of its
findings from one seeking the exblanatopy dgferences between realism and anti-
realism. We would also exnect 4
that Blackburn's mistaken association of dis-
putes about realism with problems of interpretation and truth would lead him
to look in the wrong places for differences between realism and anti-realism.
Both expectations are confirmed.
The Dummett-inspired second "thought" about determinacy is, in my
view [lo], largely irrelevant to realism. I am skeptical too of Blackburn's
discussion of the third "thought" about the distinction between regulative and
constitutive principles (362-367),but the discussion is too difhcult for a confi-
dent opinion.
The first Putnam-inspired "thought" is much more promising: a realist (of
the PR sort) thinks that a theory he is committed to might be false. Blackburn
argues (356-360), quite correctly, that this cannot constitute realism as the
REALISM A N D S E M A N T I C S 673

anti-realist can and should accept it too. However, if we are seeking an explana-
tory difference between PR and its denial, this is a good place to find one. The
best realist explanation of thk epistemic fact will be different from the best
anti-realist one. It will be different in that it will be in terms of physical entities
existing objectively and independently of the mental, whereas the anti-realist
one will not. The anti-realist explanation may, for example, appeal to physical
entities constituted by ideas or sense data (Berkeley and the phenomenalists)or
otherwise dependent on the knower (Kant, Kuhn, Rescher).
The fourth "thought" is also promising: realism is the best way of explain-
ing success. A problem with such a thought is the vagueness of talk of "success."
Sometimes what is to be explained is personal success in achieving goals ([24]:
100-1031, and sometimes it is theoretical success in predicitng observable phe-
nomena {[24]: 18-22). However what interests Blackburn is scisntqic progren:
"the way in which our knowledge expands and progresses" (356).1 think the
realist can hope to give a good explanation of each of these sorts of success,
insofar as they need explantion ([I 11: 298-299).As before, these explanations
willdiffer from any an anti-realist could give in that acommitment to PR will be
part of them. Yet Blackburn thinks that the quasi-realist can accept a realist
explanation of scientific progress.
Blackburn's discussion of this fourth "thought" is very puzzling. T h e first
puzzle is his realist explanation of scientific progress:

(RR) It is because opinion is caused, perhaps indirectly, by the fact

that p, that it converges upon p. (367)

As it stands, ihis ix mi an explanaiion of ~ceintqicprogressa . ~dl;

it is an explanation
of the human practice of choosing theories that asa matter of fact converge; it is
an explanation of behavior.
Accept the explanation's implicit assumption that progress consists in
convergence. What, then, we primarily want explained is not this behavior but,
first, the nature of convergence, and second, what makes convergence pro-
gressive. RR has nothing to say on these matters. Consider what a realist might
want to say on them. O n the first, he is likely to start from the ontological base of
PR and seek to establkh some doctrine explained in terms of correspondence
truth. O n the second, he may explain why the convergence of T I , T i , . . .
accompanies their increasing observational success: say, T z gives a more truth-
ful account than TI of the entities underlying the observable world and so is
more observationally successful; on the other hand the best strategy for in-
creasing success is by finding out more about these underlying entities. This
explanation suggests a further, but subsidiary one: that of the aforementioned
human behavior. The explanation is that humans have caught on to this
strategy. In filling out this explanation the realist will have to assign a causal
rdle to the world of PR.That is what RR is getting at. But it is rather distant
from an explanation of progress.
The second puzzle is that RR is even more distant from realism. It is
bizarre to think that any doctrine about the genesis of human opinions could be
Afinitiue of realism. Indeed, is there any metaphysical position that could not
accept RR, given a suitable account of "the fact that P"?
The t h ~ r dpuzzle is Blackburn's own reason for thinking that "it may be
possible to say [RR] without being a realist." "The problem arises. . . when the
opinion or theory that we are testing itself makes causal and explanatory
claims"; for example, the claim in physics that "the decay of a radioactive
atom. . . causes" "a given experimental result." "To deny that is simply to
abandon the physics" (3681, which the anti-realist will not want to do.
(i) What has the claim about causes i n p h y ~ i cgot
~ to do with RR, a claim
about the causes of convergent opinion, causes in eptstemology ? On the face of it,
nothing at all.
(ii) It is not true that the anti-realist about physics cansimply go along with
the daims of physics. He may goalong with them initially, but he is a revisionist
about physics and, when the chips are down, he has to paraphrase away
apparent commitment to, say, a t o m became h doe3 no! think thre ard any atom.
That is, for example, what the operationists attempted.
Blackhurn sometimes writes asif we can say anything we like without ontic
commitment. We cannot, and if we could, we would not need eighteen pages to
~ e r s u a d eus that there was no difference between commitment to realist and
anti-realist ontologies.
Realism (of the PR sort) can be stated clearly and unmetaphorically.
Furthermore, it can be argued for by showing, first, that it provides a plausible
world view including a naturalized epistemology of the sort suggested by
Quine, and a naturalized semantics of the sort suggested by Field [16]; second,
that the arguments against it fail; and third, that its alternatives are completely
implausible. It is not just the best explanation in town but the only one. That's
another story, of course, but it is one on which Blackburn casts no serious
doubt. T h e failings of his paper are typical of the current tendency to mystify
the issue of r e a l i ~ m . ~

2. UNDERSTANDING AND T R U T H CONDITIONS

Herbert Heidelberger's paper, "Understanding and Truth Conditions," raises
a very good question. A received wisdom of contemporary semantics is that
understanding a sentence, or knowing its meaning, consists in knowing its
truth conditions. This is construed as knowing lhut 5 i s true in such and swh
circuwutames or knowing a "T-sentence." Heidelberger rightly remarks that this
view of understanding seems to be regarded as uncontroversial, "'harmless'
and perhaps unworthy of serious discussion." Yet it is not "obviously true"
(402). He sets out to examine the identification, though, "to avoid extraneous
problems" (402) he replaces knowledgd of truth conditions withawarenessof truth
conditions. He argues that awareness of the truth conditions of a sentence does
aot imply understanding of the sentence, but that the understanding "nearly
enough" (402) implies the awareness.
Heidelberger's argument that awareness does not imply understanding is
sound. Awareness amounts to belief in a T-sentence (402-403). Heidelberger
points out that beliefs about each side of this biconditional can give us good
ground for believing it even though we do not understand the sentence
mentioned on its left-hand side (404-405).
This alone shows the identification to he mistaken, of course. However, if
the inference from understanding to awareness were good, an important part
of the identification would remain. (That inference plays a key role, for
example, in arguments that meaning cannot be explained in terms of realist
truth conditions.) Heidelberger thinks understanding does "nearly e n o u g h
imply awareness in that it implies the awareness given three assumptions: (a)
the sentence must be "unambiguous"; @) the person must he "aware of what, in
general, it is for a sentence to be true"; (c) he must believe "the simple logical
consequences of his beliefs" (403).
REALISM A N D SEMANTICS 675

The qualification "nearly enough" is far too generous to the received

wisdom: these are three mighty strong assumptions. The ambiguity that is
ruled out by (a) must cover all indexicaliry if Heidelberger's argument (408-
409) is to go through. For all Heidelberger has shown, therefore, the implica-
tion doe3 not hLd at all for a great part of language. @) requires that the person
have the concept of truth-in-L, which is not, again so far as we have been shown,
something that comes with understanding L. (cl speaks for itself. If Heidel-
herger is Xght in thinking we need these three ass"iptions to derive awareness
of truth conditions from understanding.. ". then the imalication from under-
standing alone is simply invalid. No part of the identification remains.
In my view the identification has nothing to be said for it, despite its
popularity. Why &auld a skill in using L co&t in any aro~osationalknowledge a b o ~
L, let slow knowledge of truth conditions? Such semantic propositional knowledge
as we may have is, I suggest, the hard-won result of amateur and professional
theorizing about language not the privilege of every speaker ([ 81: 95-1 10).
Suppose it is the case that Hanson believes that 'the moon is round' is
true-in-English iff the moon is round. This requires that Hanson have some
way to represent to himself the sentence 'The moon is round' and the situation
of the moon being round. Clearly if Hanson understands the sentence in
Englkh, then that will give him a means of representing the situation. However
that alone will leave him far from his belief. He also needs a way of representing
to himself truth-in-English. Such a representation comes from semantic
theorizing about English. It comes from understanding the language of a
theory which may, but need not, be the semantic parts of English. It does not
come merely from understanding non-semantic parts like 'The moon is
round.' Heidelberger's assumption (b) is vital.
Heidelberger's argument for his "near-enough" implication from under-
standing to awareness is not a success. It starts with a lengthy discussion of three
definitions (405-408):first of "understanding" by quantifying over proposi-
tions; second of "expresses"; third of "doxastically essential." Despite this
paraphernalia, the argument proper (409)is infeliritious and overcomplicated.
(Why, e.g., does he use a schematic letter in (12) instead of the sentence 'the
moon is round,' and why does he use the letter 'p' in particular, given that (12)
already contains y' as a variable?) More seriously, the argument is invalid.
Neither of the two key inferences (from (12) to (12') and from (13) to (13')) is
good: each ignores the well-known failure of substitutivity in belief contexts.
Nevertheless, Heidelherger has raised a good question. It is time those
who subscribe to the identification made some attempt to argue for it.4

Diana Ackerman's agreeably forthright paper, "Natural Kinds, Concepts, and

Propositional Attitudes," offers a causal theory of reference of sorts starting
from criticisms of the theories of Putnam ((221, [23])and Kripke ([19], [20]).
However, she has a different focus from theirs. Where they are concerned to
describe, even if only in a rudimentary way, the nature of the causal relation
between word and object, she is concerned to fit accounts of this sod into a
certain philosophical framework. Indeed she is content to use the schematic
letter 'R' to stand for the relation in question, as she was also in her earlier
similar treatment of names ([l], [2]). Her framework for semantics is Fregean.
She is an enthusiast for "conceptual analysis" [3].
 Ackerman makes a great dealof errors she attributes to Putnam. First he is
alleged to assume "that if one's concepts of elms and beeches d o not differ in
descriptive content they do not differ at all" (472).She thinks the concepts differ
"non-descriptively" in a sort of irreducible way that can be explicated only by
means of the different analyses relm' and 'beech'] have" (473).
What precisely is Putnam's error? In a passage Ackerman cites, Putnam
says that his concepts of the two trees are the same ([22]: 704). He is not
claiming, of course, that his concepts are numerically one and the same: they
are not quatitatiuely identical. And he is obviously aware that they differ in the
trivial respect that one leads to utterances of 'elm' and the other, 'beech.' He is
claiming that, in nontrivial respects, they are qwllitatively identical. If Putnam
has erred it must be in claiming that his psychological states fail in this way to
distinguish elms and beeches.
Ackerman s e e m to think that Putnam has erred also in overlooking the
differing "non-descriptive connotations" and "meanings" of 'elm' and 'beech'
(472-474). Given her definitions of these technical terms, I think it unlikely that
Putnam has erred in these ways. He would agree with Ackerman that the terms
differ in "connotation" because, presumably, he would think they do not make
the "same semantic contribution" to determining what "proposition" is ex-
pressed (47 1). Putnam certainly does not think thk difference can be captured
by associated descriptions, and so it will be "non-descriptive," in Ackerman's
sense, i.f the difference is not simply a matter of differing extensions (472,476).
Would Putnam think that two coextensive terms with the same associated
descriptions had the same "connotation"? T h e above definition is no help in
answering, because Ackerman does not explain the identity conditions of
"propositions" and the ordinary notion is vague at just this point. T h e key to
understanding her "connotation" in difficult cases is her "propositional atti-
tude principle":
if two terms are not interchangeable salve veritate when used in propositional
attitude contexts, then the term differ in connotation. (472)

In the light of this we can see that Putnam would think the differences in
"connotation" were not simply ones of extension; for he would think 'beech'
and 'Buche' differ in "connotation" ([23]: 270). So Putnam would think that
'elm' and 'beech' differ in "non-descriptive connotations." Since, for Acker;
man, the "meaning" of a term "determines its connotation in a given context"
(47 1) it seems that this difference would carry over to "meanings."
Ackerman offers an analysis to explain the difference in conceptual con-
tent, connotation and meaning of 'elm' and 'beech.' "Analysis" itself is ex-
plained by a p a r a d i g m a h e well-known analysis of 'knowledge' that starts
from 'justified true belief-and by a theory: {i)an analysis is a necessary truth;
(ii) it is knowable a priori; (i-ii) it is arrived at and tested in an armchair by
generalizing from the speaker's "replies to questions about simple described
hypothetical situations" (473; [3]). Her analysis of natural term R is given by
'entity that is of the same kind as those (or almost all of those) that stand in
causal relation R to my use of K' (473).6
How could a difference in analyses explain the cognitzud differences between
'elm' and 'beech'? How could it explain the fact that the terms are not inter-
changeable in attitude contexts and hence differ in "connotations"? The only
answer seems to be that speakers k m w the analyses. But that is completely
implausible: at most a few philosophers know anything about the causal theory
of natural kind terms. Ackerman does not gives this answer: she holds only to
 REALISM AND SEMANTICS 677

the weaker, and more plausible, claim that analyses are knowable by speakers
(474; [ I ] : 60). Ackerman gives no answer, leaving her analyses apparently
irrelevant to the observed cognitive differences.
Return now to Putnarn's first alleged error. What Ackerman needs to show
is that Putnam was wrong in thinking his psychological states did not distin-
guish qualitatively between elms and beeches. If Ackerman's analyses were
known by Putnam (quaspeakerjshe would have succeeded. But they are not. So
Ackerman has not identified a psychological difference that Putnam over-
l~ked.~
Ackerman's analyses are intended to explain the fact that 'elm' and 'beech'
are not interchangeable in attitude contexts. It is worth noting that Putnam has
immediately available the first step in an explanation that is simpler than
Ackerrnan's, and is psychologically plausible: speakers do not believe that 'elm'
and 'beech' are c w x t e n s i ~ e . ~
Ackerman's theory has other difficulties which she sets out withadmirable
frankness. First, we must surrender certain intuitions about "rigidity": e.g., the
one that Fido is necessarily a dog; in some "possible world" he Is something else
(479-480). Second, we must accept "that if there were no word 'gold' there
would be no gold" (48 1). Since, I presume, words depend for their existence on
people, if there had been no people there would have been no gold! Third, her
'
view has "the consequence that there are generally no exact translations. . . for
names and natural kind terms hetween natural languages" (482; 1do not think
this consequence is so bad). Fourth, the view results in a certain sort of "pri-
vacy": "many of the propositions S expresses are private in the sense that it is
logically impossible for them to be expressed or entertained by anyone else"
(483).
These difficulties are of a magnitude that would make a lesser mortal
despair. Ackerman comforts herself with the thought that rival theories have
worse difficulties.
Ackerman's problems come in part from her commitment to conceptual
analysis. She writes as if the nature of R is knowable a priori. If we can learn in
that way about R then, presumably, we can also about all semantic properties
and relations: all semantic theory becomes knowable a priori. Why should
semantics be any more knowable a priori than economics, biology, or physics?
Certainly we can do a lot of semantics from a n armchair, but this is because we
bring two things with us to our chair: (i)the semantic wisdom of the ages-hard
won empirical theory; (ii) the memory of much of the phenomena that need
explaining. A lot of physics can be done from an armchair too. And if we
confine our armchair semantics to reflections o n usage-n "what we would
say"-the most we will discover is the implicit folk semantics. T h e task should
be not ro enshrine folk theory but to improve it ([8]: 87-90; 99-100).
There is nothing, I suggest, that we need an "analysis" like Ackerman's to
explain. T o progress beyond Putnam in the explanation of the differences
between 'elm' and 'beech,' we need, first, to give an account of the causal
relation R; second, to show how that account yields the required differences,
including those at the cognitive level, between 'elm' and 'beech.' Ackerman
does nor attempt these tasks.

4. INTENTIONALITY
In this section I shall consider a topic related to reference: intentionality. In
particular I shall consider, in varying degrees of depth, the following five
 papers: Fred Dretske's "The Intentionality of Cognitive States," John Pollock's
"Thinking about a n Object," Diana Ackerman's "Thinking about a n Object:
Comments on Pollock," Romane Clark's "Not Every Act of Thought Has a
Matching Proposition," and Herbert Heidelberger's "Beliefs and Propositions:
Comments on Clark."
Dretske offers a theory of intentionality for those propositional attitudes
that imply knowledge. So the theory does not apply directly to, e.g., beliefs. He
sets aside until another time the problem of developing it to-cover such other
attitudes, but thinks the problem is notUinsuperable"(292).Given the nature of
the theory this seems unduly optimistic.
His stance is materialist. So the problem for him is to explain "how purely
physical systerns could. . . occupy intentional states" (282). His theory is that
intentionality "is a pervasive feature of all reality . . . . What is distinctive, and
hence problematic, about o u r cognitive states is. . . that they have a higher or&
of intentionality" (285). Intentionality pervades reality in virtue of its role as a n
information carrier. At item, e.g., a thermometer, has this role to the extent
that there is anomkc dependence between the events occurring at the source and
a t the receiver. "Cognitive srates exhibit a n intentional structure because they
are, fundamentally, nomically dependent states" (287). T h e content of such a
state is characterized in terms of the condition on which it is nomicallv denen-
I L

dent. It is this key part of Dretske's view that makes the above thought about
belief seem optimistic. Dretske acknowledges the problem: "beliefs can be
false" (292): so their content may be one thing, the condition o n which they
nomically depend quite another. T h e essence of intentionality is surely sorne-
thing beliefs a n d knowledge have in common.
Pollock argues against "a traditional view" that "when one thinks about a n
object, one must think about it under some description which it uniquely
satisfies." He describes a "non-descriptive way of thinking about a n object"
(487). Ackerman, of course, agrees (501). However, she is critical of Pollock's
account of that way. So am I, but differently.
Pollock's argument against the traditionalview strikes me as sound, but not
as overwhelming as thoseihat can be straightforwardly derived from the classic
refutations of description theories of names by Kripke [I91 and Donnellan [I4].
For most though& involving names are paradigms of thought about an object.
Strangely enough Pollock does not mention Kripke and has only a passing
reference to Donnellan (496).
Pollock identifies his non-descriptive way of thinking about a n object, all
examples of which seem to involve names, both logically and phenornenologi-
cally (488-489). He calls that way, the representation involved in it, and the
belief employing the representation, 'de re' (490). He seems to allow that there
are also descriptive ways of thinking about a n object which, implicitly, he calls
'de dicto' (490).
Pollock raises the question: "Given a & r e representation, what determines
its representatum?'! (Like most others he does not seem bothered by the
corresponding question about descriptive representations. Apparently the link
between a description and the objects it applies to is thought to need n o
explanation.) I n answering his question Pollock distinguishes

two ways in which we come to employ de re representations: (1) we may begin

with the& &to belief that there is a unique objectexempIifying some concepts. . .
and we subsequently come to thinkofthat objectinadere way; (2) we may simply
perceive the object and rmmediately come to think of it in a k re way. (490)
REALISM A N D S E M A N T I C S 679

Set aside (2) for a moment. The move referred to in (1) requires, I take it,
that we come to have beliefs we would express wing a name for x , the object
uniquely exemplifying the concept a. Pollock does not find this sufficient fok
the belief to be aboutx: an object which is intuitively not the "particular" one the
person is thinking about might "purely by chance" exemplify the concept
(490-491).So any representatum of a "de re" representation must be something
that the representation is, in this special way, "about."
What is required for this special aboutness? Pollock claims that we need
some sort of connection between thinker and object. He suggests an "epistemic
contact" (491) that occurs when the thinker believes that there is a unique a for
"a non-defective good reason" (492). But the intuitions he is relying on show
that such contact is not sufficient for this aboutness. I have non-defective good
reasons for supposing there to be a unique object that is a shorter spy than any
other, a child born before any other in the twenty-first century, etc., yet I am
not in the position to have thoughts about such objects in particular.
He is much more on the righr lines with (2). Indeed it &ems to me that all
thought about a particular object is based on such perceptual situations, which I
call "groundings." T h e benefit of groundings can be passed on-"reference
borrowings"-thus enabling those who have never perceived an object to have
thoughts about it. T h e required connection between thinkers and objects is the
sort described by causal theories of reference ([8], 191, [l2]).
Ackerman claims (and, she says, Pollock agrees) that he is not using 'de re'
with its usual sense.
This usual sense contrasts & &to ascriptions of necessity to propositions and &
&to beliefs in propositions with& re ascriptions to entities o f necessary properties
and de re belrefs o f entities that they have certain properties, where the & re
locutions permit existential generalization. (501)
This contrast between beliefs (not ascrtplions of belief, note), whether usual or
not, strikes me as useless. Surely, all singular beliefs must permit existential
generalization,just as all singular statements do. And if any belief were belief in
a proposition, why would it not be trivially the case that they all were (particu-
larly since propositions are usually explained as the objects of belief)? I doubt if
there is any contrast between beliefs that is analogous to that between de dkta
and de re ascriptions of necessity.
The difficulties with the term 'dc re' may account for Pollock and Acker-
man being, to a degree, at cross-purposes. Ackerman asks: "Why does Pollock
make the standards for non-descriptivede r e representations higher than those
for representation by the descriptions from which they are derived?" (501).
Epistemic contact is required for the latter but not the former. She points out
that a person can have a representation that is non-descriptive, meeting Pol-
lock's initial tests for beingde re, and is intuitively abou a certain object; yet the
person may not have the required epistemic contact with the object. An "at-
tributive" name would be a good example. However, that is not the sort of
representation Pollock is discussing, for he requires a de re representationto
have speck1 aboutness : it must be ahout apartkular object the person has tn mind: it
must be "referential." He seems to have nothing to say about a case like
Ackerman's. Does he thinksuch cases are to be treated as, in his sense, eitherdc
dicta (descriptive) or de re? If so, Ackerman's discussion shows he is mistaken.
Clark, in a somewhat drawn-out paper, is refreshingly skeptical of propo-
sitions. Not so Heidelberger in his response. He distinguishes a "singular"
proposition from a "general" one.
 Adopting terminology from the recent l~terature,we can say that belief L &to is
belief with respect tb a general proposition, and belief de re is belief with respect to
a slngular proposition. (525)

We note that this definition of 'de diclo' is different from Ackerman's usual one,
though the definition of'& re' is, apparently, the same. However, we wonder
when we have "belief with respect to a singular proposition? Heidelberger says
that it is when "the object the belief is about" "enters into" the proposition
believed. When is that? When a person believing the proposition necessarily
"attributes" the property in question to the object. Yet believing that the wisest
man is morral is not, according to Heidelberger, believing a singular proposi-
tion (525).He does not explain why this belief does not attribute mortality to
the wisest man. T h e answer would rest, presumably, on intuitions like Pollock's
aboutspecial aboutness. So, Heidelberger's use of 'dere' turns out to be more like
Pollock's than Ackerman's.
It will be remembered that Ackerman evinced a liking for propositions in
her discussion of reference. A consequence of this was that many propositions
were "private" (section 3). Pollock has a similar attachment and reaches a
similar conclusion (496-498), by an argument that Ackerman criticizes (504-
507). A pressing question is: Why do we need such private entities? What do
they explain?
I n reading these papers o n reference and intentionality it is hard to avoid
thinkinglo that the terms 'de dido', 'de re,' and 'proposition,' make progress with
these difficult subjects more difficu1t.l

REFERENCES

Diana Ackerman, "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive

Connotations ," Philosophical S t A s 35(1979): 55-69.
-, "Proper Names, Essences and Intuitive BeIiefs," Theory a d Deculon
1l(1979); 5-26.
-, "The InCormativeness of Philosophical Analysis," in Peter A. French,
Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Mtdwest Studim in
Phhophy, V o ~ u m Yl:The Foundntiom of Afutl~licPhilosoph~(Minneapolis : Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1981): 313-320.
TyIer Burge, "Sinning Against Frege," Philosop&uL Revtern 87(1979): 398-432.
Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings a d
Addressa of & American Philosophical Association 47{1973-74): 5-20.
Michael Devitt, "SinguIar Terms," J o u m d of Phdosofihy 71{1974): 183-205.
, "Brian b a r o n Singular Terms," Philosokkal Studies 37(1980): 27 1-280.
, Desgnortosa (New York: Columbia University Press, 198 1).
, "Critical Notice of Contemporary Perspecties in the Philosophy of Language
(Peter A. French, Theodor E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds.),"
AwtralarianJoumal cfPh2osophy 59{i98 1): 2 11-221.
, "Durnrnett's Anti-Real~srn,"J o u d of Phdosokhy 80(1983): 73-99.
, "Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meaning and t h
Mom! Scieraces," N o w 17(1983): 291-301.
, "Thoughts and Their Ascript~on,"In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehl-
ing, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studim in Philosophy, Volunw IX
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, in Press).
, R e a h m and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming).
Keith Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,'' in Donald David-
son and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics ofNatural Lan$uage (Dordrecht, Holland:
Reidel, 1972): 356-379.
REALISM A N D SEMANTICS 68 1

[15] Michael Dummett, Truth and Other E n i p s ( C a m b r i d g e MA: Harvard University

Press, 1978).
[I61 Hartry Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth,"Jooumdof Philosophy 69(1972): 347-375.
[17] Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.),
Midwest Studks in Philo~ophyV: Sl&s in Ekutemlogy (Minneapolos: University of
Minnesota Pres, 1980).
[ 181 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Go.,
19781.
~ a u i Kripke,
~ . "Naming and Necessity," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Har-
man, eds., Semantics of Natural Langmga(Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1972):
253-355, 763-769.
,- "A Puzzle about Belief," in Avishai Margalit, ed., Meaning and Use (Dor-
drecht, HolIand: Reidel, 1979): 239-283.
Stephen Leeds, "Theories of Reference and Truth,"Erkenntnic 13(1978): 111.129.
Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference,"Joudof Philosophy 70(1973):699-71 I.
, Mind, Language and Red*: Philorophical Paksrs, Velum 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
, Meaningandth Moral Sciemes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
Kim Sterelny, "Natural Kind Terms,*' Pat+ Philoxophical Q m r ~ l y(in press).
Bas C. van Fraassen, The Stimifec Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

NOTES

'I criticize Dummett in [10] and Putnam in [ I I].

'Dummett [I51 holds what I call "the metaphor thesis": metaphysics beyond mean-
ing is mere metaphor ([lo]: 79-82).
3I offer detailed arguments for the position taken in this section in [13].
4I set out and reject what often seems to be the implicit argument for the identifica-
tion in [lo]; 85-88.
'Nous sent a draft of this study to Diana Ackerman. I have madeseveralchanges as a
result of her lengthy commenu o n this section.
6There is a problem with cha analysis: any such entity is a member of ahierarchy of
natural kinds. Kim Sterelny [25] has suggested a way for a causal theory to handle this
problem.
T y l e r Burge's criticism of views like Ackerman's ([4]: 427-430), at which she takes
umbrage (474-475; [I]: 65, 88n), may have a similar basis to mine. So also, perhaps,
DonneIlan's objection 011: 65; [2]: 19).
[ l ] and [2], and again here on pp. 477-478, Ackerman uses her technicaI
terminology to criticize Kripke's and Donnellan's views of proper names in much the
same way as she criticizes Putnam above. I am similarly dubious of such criticisms,
particularly of Kripke ([7]: part 1; [9]: 217-2 18; see also Kripke [20]: 243-244, 273n). 1
certainly think that names have what Ackerman calls "non-descriptiveconnotations"081:
152- 156; [12]),and havedone so for some time ([€I]:204, cf. Ackerman'sclaimabout what
causal theorists thought "until very recently": [2]: 6, 11).
*I would give a fuller explanation, compatible with a causal theory of reference, by
adapting the discussion of names in 1121 to natural kind terms.
1°1 deveIop this thought in [12]. See aIso ([9]: 213-2 15).
"I am indebted to the following for helpful comments o n a draft of this study: David
Armstrong, John Bacon, William Lycan, Keith Price, J. J. C. Smart, and Kim Sterelny.