CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY GUARANTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

RIGHT TO LIFE

DND Sec vs Manalo

FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to
the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days aftertheir
escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop
the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of
the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports
as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military
officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while
under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:I n upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by
private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been
under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty,
and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR
No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search warrant.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should
not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened to the production of documents
or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion of
any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order
any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control.” (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS : On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s
ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the
constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for
the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it
unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice
and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and
its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon
City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a
motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death
penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other
countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice
. Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE : WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being
an undue delegation of legislative power

HELD: THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.”
(what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and
one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of
the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b)
fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying
out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

RIGHT TO LIBERTY

People vs Cortez

FACTS: Prosecution October 26, 2003, at about 2 oclock in the morning, a confidential
informant reported to the Pasig City Police SDEU that a certain Archie was selling shabu in the
vicinity of Brgy. Buting, Pasig City. Upon being apprised of this bit of information, SDEU Chief
P/Insp. Melbert Esguerra held a briefing, formed a four-man team to conduct a buy-bust
operation, and designated SPO2 Zipagan to act as team leader poseur-buyer. Two (2) PhP 100
bills to be used as buy-bust money were handed to SPO2 Zipagan who then put his initials DZ
on the bill notes. A pre-operation report was made and submitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency which then gave it control number 2610-03-01. Thereafter, the team,
composed of, among others, PO1 Espares and SPO2 Zipagan, with the informant, proceeded to
the target area. SPO2 Zipagan and the informant proceeded ahead of the group. At the corner
of San Guillermo and E. Mendoza streets, they located the target person whereupon the
informant introduced the poseur-buyer to Archie. When asked how much he wanted to buy,
SPO2 Zipagan replied PhP 200 worth only and gave alias Archie the marked money. Thereafter,
Archie took out from his right pocket and handed to SPO2 Zipagan a heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Thereupon, SPO2 Zipagan executed the
pre-arranged signal, by removing his hat, signifying the consummation of the transaction. SPO2
Zipagan then introduced himself and announced the sellers arrest. Meanwhile, the back-up
police operatives, who were 10 meters away, upon noticing the pre-arranged signal, rushed
toward their team leader to help him hold Archie. SPO2 Zipagan then directed Archie to empty
his pocket. From his left pocket, Archie brought out with his left hand the buy-bust money. PO1
Espares later testified having witnessed this particular episode. Afterwards, the team hauled
Archie to the Pasig City Police Station for investigation. The investigator, PO1 Clarence Nipales,
then prepared a request for laboratory examination on the white crystalline substance subject of
the buy-bust operation. SPO2 Zipagan executed a sworn statement in connection with the
arrest of Archie, who was later identified as accused-appellant Cortez. The seized transparent
plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance was forwarded to the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory Office on St. Francis St., Mandaluyong City. P/Insp. Joseph M.
Perdido, Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the said specimen
weighing 0.04 gram. The examined specimen tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the buy bust operation is legal

Ruling: The buy bust operation is legal. In People v. Bongalon,the Court elucidated on the
nature and legality of a buy-bust operation, noting that it is a form of entrapment that is resorted
to for trapping and capturing felons who are pre-disposed to commit crimes. The operation is
legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. Entrapment should be
distinguished from instigation which has been viewed as contrary to public policy. The buy bust
operation is legal, because it was an entrapment not an instigation.

In People v. Bongalon,the Court elucidated on the nature and legality of a buy-bust operation,
noting that it is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons who are
pre-disposed to commit crimes. The operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken. Entrapment should be distinguished from instigation which has been
viewed as contrary to public policy.

Test of valid Entrapment

In determining the occurrence of entrapment, two tests have been developed: The subjective
test and the objective test. Under the subjective view of entrapment, the focus is on the intent or
predisposition of the accused to commit a crime. Under the objective view, on the other hand,
the primary focus is on the particular conduct of law enforcement officials or their agents and the
accused's predisposition becomes irrelevant.

The government agents act is evaluated in the light of the standard of conduct exercised by
reasonable persons generally and whether such conduct falls below the acceptable standard for
the fair and honorable administration of justice. In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows
that the police officers used entrapment to nab Cortez in the act of selling shabu. It was the
confidential informant who made initial contact with Cortez when he introduced SPO2 Zipagan
as buyer. SPO2 Zipagan then asked to buy PhP 200 worth of shabu and paid using the
previously marked money. Cortez then gave SPO2 Zipagan a plastic sachet containing what
turned out to be shabu. Then, upon the sending out of the pre-set signal, Cortez was arrested.
The established sequence of events categorically shows a typical buy-bust operation as a form
of entrapment. The police officers conduct was within the acceptable standard of fair and
honorable administration of justice.

People vs Fajardo

For review before this Court is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 4371-B[1] dated December 20, 1991 convicting herein appellants to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were charged and convicted for the crimes
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention.

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, defined and
penalized in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of use of motor vehicles without any mitigating circumstances to offset the same.
In view however, of the constitutional provision which proscribes the death penalty (Sec. 19[1]
1987 Constitution) the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories provided for by law plus the proportionate costs.

The amount of $3,000,000.00 extorted from the victim or friends of the victim shall be restored,
as it is hereby ordered returned.

For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Simplicio Atienza is hereby declared acquitted. The
bailbond posted by him for his provisional liberty is ordered canceled and his surety is relieved
of the said undertaking.

Both accused having been declared guilty of the crime charged, they are hereby ordered
immediately committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.
Biñan, Laguna."
Accused Ireneo Fajardo, Simplicio Atienza, Domingo Hinggan, Guillermo Panganiban, Julian
Tercero, Eustacio Onate, Ruperto Fajardo, Benigno Lumbres, Bonifacio Demapilis, Tirso
Maranan, Quintin Fajardo, Ben Natividad and several John Does were charged in an
information for "Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention."[2] Of the aforementioned
accused, only Ireneo Fajardo, Simpliciano Atienza and Ruperto Fajardo were arraigned and
tried.[3] All the other accused remained at large.

Accused Bonifacio Dimapilis died during the pendency of the case and the indictment against
him was dismissed. Since the other accused were still at large, the trial court declared that it
had no jurisdiction over them.[4] Accused Simpliciano Atienza was acquitted by the trial court.[5]

Hence this appeal interposed by Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo.

The undisputed facts are:

In the early morning of November 15, 1986 several Japanese executives of Mitsui & Co. and
other Japanese companies left Makati, Metro Manila to enjoy a game of golf at the Canlubang
Golf Club, Canlubang, Laguna. Nobuyuki Wakaoji headed the group of executives. The group
arrived at the Golf Club in a convoy of five cars. The drivers of the executives parked at the Golf
Club car park while the executives played golf. The round of golf lasted for about four hours,
after which the executives had lunch at the Clubhouse. It was already 3:00 p.m. when the
executives left the Golf Club. The convoy of five cars was led by the car driven by Emiliano
Ordona. In it was Nobuyuki Wakaoji. Meanwhile, the fourth car was driven by prosecution
witness Ernesto Escobar. Escobar testified that five minutes later, the convoy was overtaken by
two cars. The two cars, one of them a blue Toyota Cressida, blocked the lead car. Two men
came out of one car and approached the lead car. A third man, allegedly appellant Ireneo
Fajardo, remained standing near the door of the blue Cressida. The two men forcibly took
Wakaoji out of the car and shoved him in the blue Cressida. The Cressida then sped away in
the direction of the highway.[6]

To support its finding of "detention" the trial court relied on the testimonies of Mario Palig and
Jimmy Lasam. Lasam testified that while looking for a grass cutting job in Aya, Talisay,
Batangas at around 2:00 p.m. of November 25, 1986, he saw Wakaoji being escorted by three
armed men (supposedly accused Maranan, Dimapilis and appellant Ruperto Fajardo) from the
house of accused Lumbres to a waiting white car. He described Wakaoji as being blindfolded
with his hands tied behind his back.[7]

On the other hand, Palig testified that at around 2:00 p.m., on November 25, 1986 he was at
Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas when he saw appellant Ruperto Fajardo in the house of accused
Lumbres. Palig testified that a helicopter boarded by Japanese nationals arrived. The Japanese
nationals alighted, talked to Lumbres and took some pictures. He stated that Wakaoji was
escorted by appellant Ruperto Fajardo, accused Lumbres and Maranan to a white car, which
they boarded. Both witnesses testified that three other unidentified armed men boarded a
passenger jeep and followed the white car.[8]

From these testimonies the trial court concluded that, "…another set of kidnappers consisting of
the group of Ruperto Fajardo moved their victim from Barangay Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas to
Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas, in a wise move to evade from the clutches of the
law…"[9]

The appellants raise the following assignment of errors:[10]

I.

THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF TESTIMONIES OF PROCURRED, PERJURED AND
REHEARSED WITNESSES AND STATEMENTS OF PERSONS WHO WERE NEVER
PRESENTED AS WITNESSES FOR THE STATE.

II.

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE WRITTEN STATEMENTS

OF PERSONS WHO WERE NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES, AND DRAWING
CONCLUSIONS, SURMISES AND PRESUMPTIONS EXTENTSIVELY THEREFROM.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN

THE APPELLANTS, OR WITH OTHERS, ON THE BASIS OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING AND RULING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE
APPELLANTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS MERELY OF THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE, PERJURED, PROCURED, MANUFACTURED AND UNRELIABLE
TESTIMONIES FOR THE PROSECUTION.

V.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DISCREDITING ENTIRELY THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

VI.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR LEAVE FILED BY THE
APPELLANTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MATERIAL AND NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THAT SOME OTHER PERSONS CONFESSED TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

VII.

FINALLY, THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS GUILTY, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
The appeal is without merit.

As its first assignment of error, appellants would have us believe that the prosecution witnesses,
Ernesto Escobar, Mario Palig and Jimmy Lasam were "procured, perjured, and rehearsed."
Appellants' bare statements without the presentation of evidence will not sway us. No proof was
presented to substantiate their claim that Escobar, Palig and Lasam were motivated to falsely
testify against appellants. It is a basic rule that mere allegations are not equivalent to proof.[11]
Each party must prove his affirmative allegations.[12] Appellants failed to do so in this case.
Accordingly, there being nothing in the record to show that witnesses were actuated by any
improper motive, their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit.[13]

As to the second and third assignments of error, we note that even assuming that the trial court
erroneously considered statements which were inadmissible in evidence, the convictions should
still be sustained on the basis of other evidence which are admissible. This evidence consists of
the testimonies of Escobar, Palig and Lasam.

We likewise reject appellants' fourth assignment of error. We find that appellants were positively
identified. It is true that the trial court may have erred in determining Ireneo Fajardo's actual
participation in the crime, nonetheless, Ireneo Fajardo's presence during Wakaoji's abduction
and kidnapping was sufficiently established by prosecution witness Escobar.

While we agree with appellants that the trial court's finding that the most "prominent among" the
conspirators was Ireneo Fajardo is without basis,[14] however, the records show that Ireneo
Fajardo stood by the car as two other identified men pull Wakaoji out of the first car and push
him to the back seat of the Toyota Cressida car. Ireneo Fajardo drove the Toyota Cressida.
Ireneo Fajardo stood as a look out.

On direct examination Escobar stated:[15]

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what you saw was happening in front?
A: I saw that there were three (3) men carrying arms.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what were these three (3) bearing arms doing
when you saw them?
A: Two men were approaching the car driven by Emiliano Ordona and one (1) man was
standing just near the door of the car.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what did these two (2) armed men who
approached the car of Emiliano Ordona did, if they did anything?
A: What I saw they were just holding the door of the car, sir.

Q: And, other than holding the front door of the car, what else did you see if anything?
A: A man was standing near the steering wheel of the Cressida car, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:
Now, you said you saw one (1) person standing beside the door near the steering wheel of the
Cressida car and there were two (2) armed men who approached the vehicle driven by Emiliano
Ordona, can you tell this Honorable Court if you know these three (3) men you saw?
A:
I only recognized one (1), sir.
Q:
Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person you said you can identify?
A:
Yes, sir, I can point.
Q:
Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person?
A:
Ireneo Fajardo, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

It must be remembered that a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and
consistently is a credible witness.[16] In this case, we find that Escobar testified in such a
manner.

In disputing the positive identification of Ireneo Fajardo by Escobar, appellants insist that
Escobar "admitted emphatically that he had never met Ireneo Fajardo at anytime in his life prior
to the investigation on January 12, 1987."[17] We note that the fact that they did not meet is not
a deterrent to affirming the trial court's finding of positive identification. There is nothing in the
law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a
positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter
personally.[18]

Appellants also posit that since Escobar was twenty meters away from the Toyota Cressida car,
it is unlikely that he would have been able to identify Ireneo Fajardo.[19] We are not convinced.
In People vs. Castillo,[20] we held that a "distance of forty to forty-five meters away from the
scene of the crime may, by itself," lead the Court to entertain doubts on the accuracy of what a
witness has observed, "but once a witness has gained familiarity with another, identification
becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance." In the case at bar, we find that
Escobar was able to gain familiarity with Ireneo Fajardo while they were in the parking lot of the
Canlubang Golf and Country Club, where he observed Ireneo Fajardo surveying the area for a
couple of hours prior to the abduction.[21]
We also find that Palig and Lasam categorically identified Ruperto Fajardo. Both Palig and
Lasam testified that Ruperto Fajardo was one of the armed men who escorted Wakaoji from the
house of Benigno Lubres to the white car.[22] The conditions of visibility on that day of
November 25, 1986 in Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas have not been open to serious doubt. In
People vs. Fabregas,[23] we held that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactors should
normally be accepted.

Neither can the fifth assignment of error be given serious consideration. Since appellants were
positively identified, their defenses of alibi cannot prevail. We have held time and time again that
alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
a prosecution witness.[24] Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[25]

The sixth assignment of error also cannot hold water. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the trial court correctly denied appellants' motion to re-open the case for the introduction of
"newly discovered evidence" consisting of newspaper reports which contained "confessions" of
different persons as to their participation in the Wakaoji kidnapping.[26] Such are not newly
discovered evidence. Given that the appellants have been positively identified, the admission of
the newspaper accounts will not if introduced and admitted "change the judgment."[27]
Moreover such newspaper reports are incompetent and inadmissible for being hearsay.

The seventh assignment of error is also unmeritorious. We find that the appellants' guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that all elements of the crime
charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[28] The law requires only a moral certainty
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[29] The crime
charged in this case is kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The elements of serious illegal
detention are:[30]
(1)
that the offender is a private individual;
(2)
that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3)
that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4)
in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are present:
(a)
that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days;
(b)
that it is committed simulating public authority;
(c)
that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or
(d)
that the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.
In the early case of U.S. vs. Cabanag,[31] it was held that it is essential in the crime of illegal
detention that there be actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. This
rule has not changed.

Indeed, for the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is
the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved.[32] In a prosecution for kidnapping,
the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty needs to be established by
indubitable proof.[33]

In this case, we find that detention was established by the fact that one month after the
abduction, the victim Wakaoji was seen by Palig and Lasam being transferred, blindfolded, with
his hands tied, from Benigno Lumbres' house to a waiting white car.

While the trial court erroneously relied on the testimony of Ernesto Escobar that "the Japanese
paid the kidnappers $3,000,000.00 ransom money for the release of the victim which was
delivered by Luis Santillan at the designated drop point somewhere in a cemetery in Angeles
City,"[34] the crime is still qualified as "serious illegal detention" since the transfer of Wakaoji
was witnessed a month after the abduction, and there is testimony that Wakaoji was released
only after four months. Here, there is proof that the kidnapping or detention definitely lasted for
more than five days.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that appellants Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo are found guilty of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code with the attendant aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicles, without any
mitigating circumstances to offset the same, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories provided for by law. The order to return the amount of
$3,000,000.00 to the victim or friends of the victim is DELETED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

People vs Gungon (People vs Domasian)

The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only
against the government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.
FACTS
Pablito Domasian and Dr. Samson Tan were charged with the Crime Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal detention Art. 267 of the RPC.

On March 11, 1982, Enrico Agra was taken by Pablito Domasian who managed to escape after
being pursued by some barangay tanods. On the same day, the father of Enrico Agra received
an envelope containing a ransom note which demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico.

Agra compared the ransom note with some records in the hospital and gave it to the NBI for
examination. The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson Tan, a resident physician
in the hospital owned by Enrico’s parents.

In the appeal, Tan argued that the seizure of the documents used for comparison with the
ransom note was made without a search warrant, which constitutes a violation of his
Constitutional rights against unlawful search and seizures.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Bill of Rights may be invoked against the acts of private individuals.

RULING
NO. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only
against the government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action. It
suffices to say that such documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or
other police authorities. We held in the case of People vs. Andre Marti, that the Bill of Rights
cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the
government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.

Capin - Cadiz vs Brent Hospital and Colleges

SUMMARY:
P was indefinitely suspended because she became pregnant out of wedlock. R, an institution of
the Episcopal Church, imposed suspension until she marries her bf. ISSUE: WON the condition
was valid. SC ruled that it was not valid. First, there was no showing that being pregnant out of
wedlock was grossly immoral as a sufficient ground for disciplinary action. Second (related to
the topic), the LC and Magna Carta of Women protect women against discrimination in matters
relating to marriage and family relations including the right to choose freely a spouse and
to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. In this case, the condition
was coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. There is no reason for it. It deprives her of the
freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege inherent in her as an intangible right.
FACTS: Note: Prof. Sobreviñas was said to be facts-heavy last semester.
P was the Human Resource Officer of R Brent Hospital when she was indefinitely
suspended in 2006 because of P’s unprofessionalism and unethical behavior resulting to
unwed pregnancy. She became pregnant out of wedlock so R imposed the suspension until
she marries her boyfriend
P filed with the LA a complaint for ULP, constructive dismissal, non-payment of wages and
damages with prayer for reinstatement
LA ruled that the indefinite suspension amounted to a constructive dismissal but ruled
that P was not illegally dismissed as there was just cause for dismissal, that is, she
engaged in premarital sexual relations with her bf resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock.
LA stated that the immoral conduct was magnified since Brent is an institution of the
Episcopal Church. La ruled that she was not entitled to reinstatement until she marries her
bf. But Brent manifested that it was willing to pay her 1311 month pay.
P appealed to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed. MFR was denied.
CA dismissed the petition due to technical defects: incomplete statement of dates; failure
to attach registry receipts; failure to indicate place of issue of counsel’s PTR and IBP
official receipts. MFR was denied. CA ruled that there was no GAD and held that P’s
dismissal was valid

ISSUES:
1. WON CA committed GAD in ruling that (1) P’s petition is dismissible on the
ground of technical deficiencies; and (2) that NLRC did not commit GAD in
upholding her dismissal from employment
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT/S: Optional. You can include in “Held” part, if digest would make
more sense that way.
1. P contends that getting pregnant outside of wedlock is not grossly immoral, especially
when both partners do not have any legal impediment to marry
2. P surmises that the reason for her suspension was not because of her relationship with
ther then bf but because of the resulting pregnancy.
3. P alleges that the condition for her reinstatement violates the stipulation against marriage
under LC 136.
4. P also contends that there was substantial compliance with the rules of procedure and
that CA should not have dismissed the petition

HELD:
1. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice
ROC Rule 46 Sec 3 states that the contents of petition filed with the CA shall indicate
material dates when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed. Rational is to
enable CA to determine if it was filed within the period fixed in the rules. P’s failure to
state the date of receipt of the NLRC decision is not fatal since the more important date is
the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of MFR, which was duly complied with.
The failure to attach the registry receipt was also fatal but Courts finds that the ends of
substantial justice would be better served by relaxing the application of technical rules of
Procedure. Regarding the counsel’s failure to indicate the place where the IBP and PTR
receipts were issued, there was substantial compliance since it was indicated in the verification
and cert of non-forum shopping
2. Immorality as a just cause for termination of employment One of the grounds for disciplinary
action under Brent’s policies is immorality which is punishable by dismissal at first offense. It’s
Manual of Policies enumerates acts of immorality such as scandalous behavior, acts of
lasciviousness against any person within hospital premises. Mannual of Regulations for Private
Schools Sec 94 lists “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a cause for terminating employment
SC used the ruling in Lens vs Scholastica’s College which involved the employer as Catholic
and sectarian educational institution and the P worked as an assistant to the school’s director of
the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. P was dismissed by the school for
having borne a child out of wedlock. SC here ruled that the determination of whether a conduct
is disgraceful or immoral involves a 2-stop process:
o (a) a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and
o (b) an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct

In the case at bar, SC ruled that the facts do not equate to disgraceful and immoral
conduct. The Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define what
constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground.
Jurisprudence set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged – it is
public and secular, not religious. Determination WON it is immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct which refer to those conducts which are
proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. The fact that an act does not conform to
the traditional moral views of a sectarian institution is not sufficient. Also, there must be
substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral.
Totality does not justify that the acts are immoral. They were both single and had no legal
impediment to marry when it was committed. They actually got married. There was no
proof to support the sweeping conclusion of the labor tribunals. SC also ruled that P did
not flaunt her premarital relations and was not carried under scandalous circumstances
The fact that is was a sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its
religious standard of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel
policy prescribing such religious standard.

3. Marriage as a condition for reinstatement (related to our topic)

Doctrine of management prerogative gives ER the right to regulate all aspects of
employment. Here, Brent imposed on P the condition that she subsequently contract
marriage with her bf for her to be reinstated. This was in consonance with the policy
against encouraging common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage.
LC provides that it shall be unlawful to require as a condition of employment or
continuation that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
RA 9710 or Magna Carta of Women protects women against discrimination in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse
and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.
SC ruled that R’s condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. There is no reason
for it. It deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres
in her as an intangible right
Brent must prove 2 factors: (1) it is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and (2) there is a factual basis to believe that all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. But Brent failed to
proves these hence, Court cannot uphold validity of such.
P is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of backwages
from the time compensation was withheld to actual reinstatement. If not possible,
separation pay must be awarded.It must not go beyond the date an EE was deemed to
have been actually separated from employment, or beyond the date when reinstatement
was rendered impossible. Here, it must be pegged based on the findings that she was
employed on Aug 16, 2002 based on her complaint, she admitted being dismissed on Nov
17, 2006.
GR: Backwages is reckoned from date of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement but if
sep pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement, it is from time of dismissal until finality of the
decision. So must be from Nov 17, 2006 but because of the constitutional policy of
providing full protection to labor. Fairness and equity dictate that backwages shall be
equivalent to 1 year or P109,304.
Re moral and exemplary damages: Absent clear and convincing evidence showing that
dismissal had been carried out in an arbitrary, capricious and malicious manner, these
cannot be awarded.
Atty’s fees: Granted 10%

US vs Cabanag
8 Phil. 64

TRACEY, J.:

The accused, an Igorot, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya of the
crime of unlawful detention, under article 481 of the Penal Code, which punishes "any private
person who shall lock up or detain another or in any way deprive him of his liberty."
An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age, was taken from the possession of her
grandmother, Ultagon, in the rancheria of Anao, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, by one
Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was done with or against the will of the grandmother is not
altogether clear in the evidence. We accept the version least favorable to the accused that of
the child who testified that in the daytime Buyag came to the house and took her away, although
the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that little girl," but not speaking when she
went away. The man brought her to his house, about a half mile distant, where she was not
confined, but on the contrary was allowed to go back alone to her grandmother, with whom she
would spend a little while, returning the same day. She testified that on last leaving, the
grandmother was angry and did not wish her to go, but did not prevent her. According to her
recollection she remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her grandmother's residence, some two
or three months.

Buyag testified that more than two years before, in order to help the family after the father's
death and for the purpose of keeping the child at home, he had bought her for three pigs,
twenty-five hens, two measures of rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her mother, with whom
she remained until the third year, when (her mother presumably having died) she was brought
away by one Eusebio, at the instance of himself and another Igorot named YogYog, who had
furnished part of the purchase price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell her for a carabao
and 50 pesos. Eusebio, together with his sister, Antonia, brought her to Quiangan, in the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.

In respect to this last sale, the stories of Tomas, Antonia, and the girl substantially agree.
Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl by one Mariano Lopez of Caoayan, to
whom after a few days Gamaya was delivered in return for the price, which appears to have
been 200 pesos. In his hands she remained for about two months until she was taken away by
an officer of Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was instituted. Although Gamaya made
objection to leaving the house of Cabanag, she appears to have gone without actual constraint
and at no time in any of these places was she physically restrained of her liberty; she was not
under lock or key or guard, went into the street to play, returned at will, and was not punished or
ill used in any way, but was employed about the household tasks; in short, she appears to have
been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household servant and to have been well cared for while in
the custody of the accused.

It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to dispose of children to pay the debts of their
fathers, the transaction in the native language being termed a sale, and the defendant appears
to have engaged in the business of buying in Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of
Isabela.

In his sentence, the judge below said:

"However much may be said in extenuation of the alleged custom among the ignorant Igorots of
seizing and abducting children for sale and even in selling their own children voluntarily, there is
nothing in all this to palliate or extenuate the conduct of the accused in this case.

"The Congress of the United States has declared that human slavery shall not exist in these
Islands and while no law, so far as I can discover, has yet been passed either defining slavery in
these Islands or fixing a punishment for those who engage in this inhuman practice as dealers,
buyers, sellers, or derivers, the facts established in this case show conclusively that the child
Gamaya was by the defendant forcibly and by fraud, deceit, and threats unlawfully deprived of
her liberty and that his object and purpose was an unlawful and illegal one, to wit, the sale of the
child, for money, into human slavery. This constitutes the crime of detencion ilegal, defined and
penalized by article 481 of the Penal Code and this court finds the defendant guilty as charged
in the information.
"There are neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances found in the case.

"The court therefore sentences the accused, Tomas Cabanag, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor and to pay the costs of this instance with the accessories of the law."

This sentence can not be sustained. There can be no unlawful detention under article 481 of the
Penal Code without confinement or restraint of person, such as did not exist in the present case.
(U. S. vs. Herrera, March 28, 1904, 3 Phil. Rep., 515.)

Under the complaint for this crime it is possible to convict for coaccion upon proof of the
requisites of that offense (U. S. vs. Quevengco, 2 Phil. Rep., 412), but among those requisites is
that of violence through force or intimidation, even under the liberal rule of our jurisprudence (U.
S. vs. Quevengco, supra; U. S. vs. Vega, 2 Phil. Rep., 167; U. S. vs. Ventosa,[1] 4 Off. Gaz.,
573); consequently the charge of coaccion against the accused can not be sustained upon the
evidence.

The Penal Code, chapters 2 and 3, title 12, articles 484 to 490, provides punishment for those
who carry off children under 7 years of age or those who devote children under 16 years of age
to certain hazardous occupations; but none of these articles can apply to the case before us,
except article 486, which punishes him who induces a child over 7 years of age to abandon the
house of its parent or guardian. Under this article it is possible that on full proof of the facts,
Buyag might be held, but not the accused. It was not the design of the law to prevent parents or
grandparents from devoting their children to customary work, nor from receiving compensation
for such work in wages or otherwise. Such agreements binding out minors are sanctioned in
most countries, usually, however, subject to stipulations for their welfare expressly prescribed by
statute. In the absence of proof of what the agreement of the parties or the custom of the people
called for in respect of the use, treatment, and care of the child, the term of her service and her
final disposition, and particularly in respect of the maintenance of her relations with her
grandmother and the prospect of an ultimate return to her, it is not possible to hold that the
arrangement was a criminal or even an illicit one. The name applied to it by the custom of the
Igorots is not enough to establish that in truth and in effect it was a sale, or anything more than a
contract for services. While there is much in this practice to condemn, we do not feel it to be our
province to strain the law in order to bring this local custom of this mountain people to an end.
This condition may present matter for the consideration of the legislature but not for action by
the criminal courts. Not even the abhorrent species of traffic apparently carried on by the
accused justifies a sentence not authorized by law.

The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the Philippines contained in the act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in said Islands." This
constitutional provision is self-acting whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or
contract providing for the servitude of a person against his will is forbidden and is void. For two
obvious reasons, however, it fails to reach the facts before us:
First. The employment or custody of a minor with the consent or sufferance of the parents or
guardian, although against the child's own will, can not be considered involuntary servitude.

Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal charge, in relation to which
the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides no punishment. Its effects can not be carried
into the realm of criminal law without an act of the legislature.

It is not unnatural that existing penal laws furnish no punishment for involuntary servitude as a
specific crime. In the Kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula, even in remote times, slavery
appears to have taken but a surface root and to have been speedily cast out, the institution not
having been known therein for centuries. It is only in relation to Spain's possessions in the
American Indies that we find regulations in respect to slavery. In general they do not apply in
their terms to the Philippine Islands where the ownership of man by his fellow-man, wherever it
existed, steadily disappeared as Christianity advanced. Among the savage tribes in remote
parts, such customs as flourished were not the subject of legislation but were left to be dealt
with by religious and civilizing influences. Such of the Spanish laws as touched the subject were
ever humane and radical. In defining slavery, law 1, title 21 of the fourth Partida, calls it "a thing
against the law of nature;" and rule 2, title 34 of the seventh Partida says: "It is a thing which all
men naturally abhor." These were the sentiments of the thirteenth century.

To sum up this case, there is no proof of slavery or even of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it
has not been clearly shown that the child has been disposed of against the will of her
grandmother or has been taken altogether out of her control. If the facts in this respect be
interpreted otherwise, there is no law applicable here, either of the United States or of the
Archipelago, punishing slavery as a crime. The child was not physically confined or restrained
so as to sustain a conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the accused brought within
any of the provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against minors; consequently the
conviction in this case must be reversed, in accordance with the recommendation of the
Attorney-General, with costs de oficio, and the prisoner is acquitted.

After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Facts:The accused, tomas cabanag, was charged with unlawful detention whereby an act of
depriving a privateperson in his/her liberty.An orphan named Gumaya 13 yrs.of age has been
taken from possession of her grandmother in theprovince of Nueva Vizcaya. In order to pay the
debt of her family and to consider it a help on them , a guy namedeusebio sold her to tomas
Canag for 100 pesos.In respect to the sale, the testimony of Tomas, Antonia and the girl agreed
that Cabanag has beeninstructed to buy the girl by one name Mariano Lopez of Caoayan
Isabela.Gumaya has become the house servantand was deprive d with her
liberty.Issue:Whether or not the accused is guiltyof unlawful detention?Rulings:Tomas Cabanag
has been acquitted for there are no law for punishing the offense made by the accused,.Aside
from that, there can be no unlawful detention under the Art.481 without the confinement or
restraint of person, such did not exist in this case

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)

FACTS:

This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a
two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are
sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a
child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral
damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of
the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and
sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. On automatic review, the court
found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was medically consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s
guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that
could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s
case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently
furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which
took over as counsel for petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the
conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests
be conducted and it was denied with finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by
these challenges, for having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa
and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as
a sample. Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de
Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo
de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus and new trial?

HELD: No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form
of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some the legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in a very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess. This court stated the general rule that the writ of
habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.

Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial
was concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s
counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

GOVERNMENT OF USA V. PURGANAN G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department
of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO
was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17,
2000, Resolution.By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented
by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In
his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the
court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUE:

WON an extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest
WON the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

HELD:

1. NO. It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
”immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare
and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered immediate.The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on
the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears,the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available
to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding --
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons orthings to be seized.”

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires
only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of the respondent
judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage
would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be
heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure
could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to
justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different
procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in
view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.

2. NO. The court agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of the
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was
hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of
due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Right to Privacy

JESUS MORFE v. AMELITO MUTUC

DOCTRINE

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office.

FACTS

Appellee Jesus Morfe filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance (CFI) questioning the
provision under Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, whereby
government officials are required to periodically file a sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income, and liabilities. He alleged that the said provision is unconstitutional because it
violates his constitutional rights to due process, right to privacy, right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and right against self-incrimination as it compels him to disclose his
assets and liabilities while holding a position of public service, premised on the unwarranted
assumption that they are corrupt at heart unless they comply with the said requirement.

The CFI declared that the provision as unconstitutional because the requirement exceeded the
permissible limit of police power, and offensive to the due process clause. Thus, the present
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Appellants Executive Secretary and the Department of
Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision is unconstitutional.

RULING: NO. The reasonableness of the law made the law valid and within the ambit of police
power.

1. DUE PROCESS. The Supreme Court held that although any person whose rights to property
or liberty both in public or private life are deprived by a regulatory action of the State in the
exercise of police power may invoke the protection of due process, such regulatory action may
be upheld when there is clear and categorical showing that the action was made to promote the
health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The Court
said that liberty is guaranteed by the Constitution, subject to such restraints that are necessary
for the common welfare. Further, the Court held that the question of violation of due process is
anchored on the arbitrariness of the action because an official action must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.

In the present case, Republic Act 3019 was enacted by Congress to curtail and minimize
corrupt practices in the government and maintain a standard of honesty in the public service. It
is intended to promote morality in public administration considering that a public office is a public
trust. Thus, it would be unreasonable to ignore the harsh reality of public service to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive the requirement under the said law.

2. RIGHT TO PRIVACY. The Supreme Court also held that the Constitution provides freedom
from unlawful governmental restraints, which necessarily includes the right to privacy or be let
alone in a civilized society. Further, the Court held that a system of limited government
safeguards an individual from state control. However, such right may still be set aside upon
lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order requires otherwise.

In the present case, the relationship between the requirement of the law and its objective is not
so far reach because it emphasizes that in subjecting him to such further compulsory revelation
of his assets and liabilities, there is no constitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a
private sphere.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Gonzales vs COMELEC

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
copetitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render
the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.
Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed
be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine,
there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Centerand the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above
decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged
statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and
present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed
by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not
merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil
of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has
invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very
idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances.
As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congresshas a right to
prevent. The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of
interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the
solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature
or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and
NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor
President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both
recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had
been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact
discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming
possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to
investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that
airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of
the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint
press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to
nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on
the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations
against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press
release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

1. Standing to File Petition

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in
the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a
government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action
is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a
free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by
every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political
rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however,
courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to
only four categories of expression, namely:

pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A
protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus,
there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws,
on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed
amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time,
place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the
expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of
a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing
through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does
not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus
enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value

expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the
restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four
categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court
recognized false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint
on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality
of the prior restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent

punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are
disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject
to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression
does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent
punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment,
logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since
profane language or “hate speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent
punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is
subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected
expression before prior restraint on such expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present
danger test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be
grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative
regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of
benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency
regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government
agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television
stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing
of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations.”
Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may
establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive
evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and
duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of
whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not
even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process
as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful.
The NTC also concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be
established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.”
Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information
or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes
might contain “false information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be
publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any
of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The
airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner
right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always
remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of
course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers
the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may
be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject
matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would
endanger the security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the
Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the
public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the
remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent
punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC
action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of
radio and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of
the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television
stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be
subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate
on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to
prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the
courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the
presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and
television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program
standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and
television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a
compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be
subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained
how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite
imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and
television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected
expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the
chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence.
Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and
market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat
is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule
has no exception

Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC

​FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of
a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental
right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
 In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is

not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their

position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys
a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,

being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court

has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be

substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

 The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . .
. to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”
SWS VS COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”

RIGHT TO BE SILENT

Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent, GR 95770, 1 March 1993

FACTS:

Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, which refused to sing
the Philippine National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS directed
to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the
students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious
belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu
officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As
a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated
July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness
teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against
the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not
answer to their letter.

Therefore, Petitioners students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and
hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and
their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the
order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the
expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is
no warrant for their expulsion.

ISSUE:

Whether members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony or
singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge

RULING:

No. They should not be expelled.

Before, the 30-year-old ruling of the Court in Gerona case upholding the flag salute law and
approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, should be reexamined. The idea that
one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled
from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth
on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship
Hence, Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance
of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs
may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education x x x and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities.