Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gary L. Francione - Why Veganism Matters - The Moral Value of Animals-Columbia University Press (2020)
Gary L. Francione - Why Veganism Matters - The Moral Value of Animals-Columbia University Press (2020)
The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?, Gary L. Francione and Robert Garner
Animal Rights Without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligations, Alasdair Cochrane
Experiencing Animal Minds: An Anthology of Animal-Human Encounters, edited by Julie A. Smith and
Robert W. Mitchell
Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity, Colleen Glenney Boggs
Animal Oppression and Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism, and Global Conflict, David A.
Nibert
Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism, Gary Steiner
Being Animal: Beasts and Boundaries in Nature Ethics, Anna L. Peterson
Flight Ways: Life and Loss at the Edge of Extinction, Thom van Dooren
Eat This Book: A Carnivore’s Manifesto, Dominique Lestel
Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights, Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf
The Wake of Crows: Living and Dying in Shared Worlds, Thom van Dooren
Why Veganism Matters
THE MORAL VALUE OF ANIMALS
Gary L. Francione
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Conclusion
Notes
Reference/Study Guide
Acknowledgments
Many Thanks to Wendy Lochner, my editor at Columbia University Press, and to all of
her colleagues, including my copyeditor, Robert M. Demke, Lowell Frye, Susan Pensak,
and Milenda Nan Ok Lee, who designed the cover.
I very much appreciate the comments that I received from David Benatar, Daniel
Came, Cora Diamond, Joy Knight, Dave Langlois, Vance Lehmkuhl, and Frances
McCormack. I also acknowledge my colleagues in philosophy at the University of
Lincoln (UK)—Daniel Came, Mark Hocknull, Olley Pearson, Brian Pitts, and Ralph Weir
—and thank them for their support and encouragement of my work.
I am beyond grateful to my life partner, Anna Charlton, who has been with me every
step of the way over the past almost forty years of my involvement in this issue. We
teach classes together on animal ethics and animal law, we are coauthors on a number
of things, and we were codirectors of the Animal Rights Law Clinic at Rutgers
University, the first such entity of its kind at a U.S. university, where students earned
academic credit for working with us on legal cases that involved animal issues. Anna
read the manuscript multiple times and her comments were invaluable. The ideas herein
are as much hers as mine.
Finally, I must acknowledge my nonhuman family—Maya, Duncan, Maggie, Daphne,
and Finlay—who sat with me while I wrote this. (George was with us when I started the
book but he has since left us and we miss him terribly.) They, and the approximately
twenty other rescued canines and several hamsters who have shared our home and
who have passed on, are a constant reminder of the moral reality of nonhuman
personhood and of the absurdity and arrogance transparent in any claim that sentient
nonhumans do not have an interest in continuing to live or that they would lose nothing
of value if they were to be killed.
Introduction
Veganism
If nonhumans are persons and have a right not to be used as property, we must abolish
our institutionalized exploitation of them—all of which assumes that they are our
property. At the present time, social discourse focuses for the most part on treatment—
making animal exploitation supposedly more “humane.” The discourse needs to change
and to be focused instead on whether we can justify the use of nonhuman animals for
food, clothing, entertainment, sport, research, and so on.
Let’s begin with a definition of veganism. This is the one that informs the analysis in
this book: veganism involves not eating, wearing, or using animals or animal products to
the extent practicable with the goal of abolishing all animal use because such use
cannot be morally justified.
There are at least three things about this definition that require elaboration from the
outset.
First, although we can talk about a “vegan diet” as one that excludes animal products
completely, and although we usually talk about veganism in the context of eating
animals because we use and kill so many for this purpose (at least seventy billion land
animals and at least one trillion sea animals annually) and eating animals is the primary
way we relate to them, veganism is more than a diet. It involves not participating directly
in any animal exploitation to the extent practicable. Vegans do not eat, wear, or use
animal products. They do not go to circuses, zoos, or rodeos. They do not use products
that contain animal ingredients. And veganism is different from vegetarianism. There is
no morally coherent distinction between meat and other animal products. They all
involve suffering. They all involve death. In any event, being vegan and consuming a
plant-based diet are different things.
There are certainly very powerful arguments for having a plant-based diet that involve
the environment, human rights to food, and human health. I agree with those who
maintain that rejecting animal agriculture is the most important thing we can do to
mitigate the undeniable disaster of global warming. Eating only plants is something we
can all do right now—it involves no technological innovation or regulatory or legislative
action—and it would reduce global warming significantly. Without a global movement
rejecting animal agriculture, it is unlikely that we will be able to avoid climate
catastrophe. A world in which we ate plants and not animal foods is also the most
effective way to reduce human starvation and malnutrition. We could feed everyone if
we abolished all animal agriculture, and we would actually use less land to grow all the
plants we would need because it takes so many pounds of plants to produce one pound
of animal products. And the evidence of the health benefits of a plant-based diet is
increasingly clear.
But this book is not about ecology, the human right to food, or human nutrition. It is
about the moral status of nonhuman animals and our obligations to those animals not to
eat, wear, or otherwise use them as resources for our benefit.
Second, by “practicable,” I mean “feasible” or “possible.” Veganism involves not
participating directly in animal exploitation to the extent that it is feasible or possible to
not participate. Indirect participation is impossible to avoid. For example, given that we
kill so many animals every year, animal by-products are ubiquitous and cheaply
available. Therefore, there are animals in road surfaces, plastics, and just about
everything else. It is simply not possible to avoid walking on roads or coming into
contact with anything plastic. It is, however, completely possible to not eat or wear
animals. It is also completely possible to use personal care items that do not contain
animal products and to avoid rodeos, circuses, zoos, hunting and fishing, and so forth.
“Practicable” does not mean “when convenient” or “unless we really want to consume
animal products or otherwise exploit animals.” There are people who call themselves
“flexible vegans” who avoid animal products except when they don’t. For example, a
“flexible vegan” may consume animal products if they are eating out or at someone
else’s home, or dining in Paris or some other exotic place. They may be “vegan before 6
PM” but consume animals after that time. I do not regard “flexible vegans” as being
vegan. Indeed, given that no one eats animal foods 100 percent of the time or wears
animal clothing 100 percent of the time, everyone can be considered to be a “flexible
vegan,” and this in itself renders the expression meaningless.
I maintain that a vegan is someone who takes veganism seriously: that is, someone
who, whenever faced with a choice, chooses not to participate directly in animal
exploitation.
Third, as veganism represents a rejection of the unjust use of nonhuman animals and
does not depend on whether our treatment of animals is “humane,” it represents a moral
imperative. If animals matter morally, we cannot use them exclusively as resources,
irrespective of how supposedly “humanely” we treat them. Being vegan is something we
have a moral obligation to do. To not be vegan involves treating nonhuman animals
unfairly and, therefore, unjustly. There are some who maintain that we do not have an
obligation to be vegan as long as we are engaging in some activity that supposedly
reduces animal suffering. I disagree with that position. Although less suffering is better
than more suffering, I will argue that we cannot justify morally any suffering imposed
pursuant to using animals exclusively as resources.
Let me emphasize why I think it is more important to talk about the moral issue. We
know and have known for a while that there is significant evidence that animal
agriculture is harmful to the environment and that eating animal products in anything but
small quantities is detrimental to human health. Yet, animal exploitation continues pretty
much unabated. During the time that I was writing this book, we became aware of the
covid-19 virus, which has now changed our lives in all sorts of ways—and has ended
the lives of many. Covid-19, like most emerging diseases, including most pandemics,
stems from the transmission of pathogenic agents from nonhumans to humans and,
although we may not understand completely the factors that mediate this process, it is
clear that the transmission occurs because humans come into contact with nonhumans
—and contact is often facilitated by using animals for food. The environmental and
health elements may cause us to modify our behavior in that we may eat fewer animal
products (at least temporarily). But I have never met anyone who maintained a
completely vegan diet for environmental or health reasons alone. And these reasons do
not address our other uses of animals. We will not stop using and killing animals for
food and other purposes until the paradigm shifts and we recognize that our use of
animals—however supposedly “humane”—cannot be morally justified.
In the nineteenth century, a revolution in our thinking about animals ostensibly occurred.
We stopped thinking of animals as things that have no moral value.
Yet we did not recognize them as persons. They occupied a space between persons
and things. We could still use and kill them—they are not persons with a morally
significant interest in their lives—but we claimed to recognize that they have morally
significant interests in not suffering, and that we have obligations to take seriously those
interests. This way of looking at things became pervasive and uncontroversial, and has
come to describe our conventional thinking about animals. Most of us think that it is
morally acceptable to use nonhuman animals for our purposes, but that we have an
obligation to treat them “humanely” and to not inflict “unnecessary” suffering on them.
The problem, as we will see, is that this approach did not work. The revolution failed.
Animals are still things.
Bentham did not maintain that we should stop using and killing animals. On the
contrary, his view was that, although the cognitive differences between humans and
nonhumans were irrelevant insofar as animal suffering was concerned, those cognitive
differences were very relevant to the issue of killing, and that we could continue to use
and kill nonhuman animals. That is, he recognized that, although humans and
nonhumans may be different in many respects, they are relevantly similar in that they
are both sentient; they are subjectively aware and able to experience pain and pleasure,
and sentience is the only characteristic both necessary and sufficient for mattering
morally. But the fact that animals were sentient did not mean that it was wrong per se to
kill them.
Bentham focused on eating animals. He maintained that animals live in the present
and are not aware of what they lose when we take their lives. They do not care that we
use and kill them; they care only about how we treat them and kill them. If we kill and
eat them, “we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of
those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have.”9 He also
maintained that we actually do animals a favor by killing them, as long as we do so in a
relatively painless manner: “The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and
always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would
await them in the inevitable course of nature.”10 If, as Bentham maintained, animals do
not as a factual matter have an interest in continuing to live, and death is not a harm for
them, then our killing of animals would not per se raise a moral problem as long as we
took seriously the interests of animals in not suffering when we killed them. There was
nothing inherently wrong with animals being property that we owned, used, and killed as
long as we accorded protection to their interests in not suffering.
It was, according to Bentham and other welfarists, possible to minimize animal pain
and suffering so that our pleasure in using them would outweigh their pain. John Stuart
Mill (1806–73) argued that, in balancing human and animal interests, it was important to
keep in mind that humans have supposedly superior mental faculties so that they have
a higher quality of pleasure and happiness; human interests have a greater weight in
any balancing. For example, he maintained that in calculating pleasure and pain as part
of any weighing process, we must take into account that humans “have faculties more
elevated than the animal appetites,” and he expressed agreement with those ethical
views that assign “to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and
of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere
sensation.”11 According to Mill, “[a] being of higher faculties requires more to make him
happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at
more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never
really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.”12 Animals lack “a
sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other.”13 Moreover,
humans have “a more developed intelligence, which gives a wider range to the whole of
their sentiments, whether self-regarding or sympathetic.”14 As a result, “[i]t is better to be
a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”15
So although the welfarists rejected the idea that animals are things that have no
moral value, and claimed that animals have morally significant interests in not suffering,
they maintained for the most part that it was morally acceptable to use animals, at least
for food and other conventional uses, because animals are not self-aware and,
therefore, animal cognition is generally inferior to human cognition. And in assessing
interests, the idea that human interests counted for more was present right from the
outset. The welfarists did not challenge the status of animals as property because it was
precisely that institution that allowed animals to continue to be used and killed—and that
was morally acceptable because animals are not persons.
The revolution that the animal welfare approach supposedly ushered in has failed
completely. Despite two centuries of the animal welfare ethic and of our general social
acceptance that animals matter morally, animal exploitation continues unabated. We are
exploiting more animals in more horrific ways than at any time in human history. And
even the most “humanely” treated animals are subjected to what reasonable minds
cannot disagree is, plainly put, torture. “Humane” animal treatment is nothing more than
a fantasy. Animals remain “abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor”—
us.
Animals are property and they remain as things. The response of some animal
ethicists is to say that we just need to regulate property better. If animals are property, it
is folly to think that we will be able to accord their interests in not suffering any
significant protection. Moreover, the response that we just need to regulate more and
better ignores that any animal suffering that is imposed as part of a use that is
unnecessary cannot be justified if we take seriously the idea that it is morally wrong to
inflict unnecessary suffering on animals, and assumes as a general matter that our
continued denial of personhood status to animals is justifiable.
In the next chapter, we will consider how two leading contemporary animal ethicists
have dealt with the status of animals as things. Both of these ethicists propose that
some nonhuman animals are persons. Both require more than sentience for nonhuman
personhood. That is, like Bentham, they agree that if an animal is merely conscious, the
animal does not have a morally significant interest in continuing to live.
{2}
Two Contemporary Approaches to Animal Personhood
In chapter 1, we saw that, although our conventional view is that nonhuman animals
have morally significant interests in not suffering, the property status of animals means
that those interests are often ignored or undervalued. Some animal ethicists take the
position that the solution is to improve animal welfare and make animal treatment more
“humane.” But this position fails to appreciate the economic and jurisprudential realities
of property. If animals are property, welfare standards will always be low and will be
shaped more or less by what level of protection is necessary to exploit animals in an
economically efficient way. Animal welfare is about economics, not morality.
The problems that I discussed in chapter 1 may lead some who regard animals as
having moral value to the conclusion that animal use cannot be morally justified even if
animals are not persons with a morally significant interest in their lives. That is, the fact
that animal interests in not suffering will always be undervalued or ignored may be
sufficient—particularly when we consider that most animal use cannot be plausibly
described as necessary—to motivate some to decide that animal use cannot be justified
even if animals live in an eternal present and killing them per se does not harm them. I
have met many people over the years who have gone vegan because they understand
that the property status of animals means that “humane” treatment is a fantasy but who
don’t think, or may not even have considered whether, killing animals (as distinct from
making them suffer) is morally wrong. But I have met more people who cling to the idea
that, if treatment could really be made to be “humane,” animal use would be morally
acceptable. There is unlikely to be any widespread change in our thinking unless those
who care about animals and regard them as having moral value recognize that animals
are persons: that is, that using them exclusively as resources and killing them, however
supposedly “humanely,” cannot be justified.
The idea that animals are persons and that killing them is morally wrong has been a
matter that several animal ethicists have explored. In this chapter, we will meet two
philosophers—Peter Singer and Tom Regan—who are arguably the most influential
contributors to the field of animal ethics.1 Although they represent two very different
approaches to animal ethics, they both claim (contrary to Bentham) that at least some
animals are persons who have morally significant interests in their lives but (like
Bentham) both link animal personhood with cognitive characteristics beyond sentience.
We will see that reliance on these additional cognitive characteristics creates a
considerable number of problems.
Because self-aware nonhumans are not “fully” persons, we can ignore their interests
in their lives in certain cases. For example, he states that “[e]ven in the case of animals
with some self-awareness, killing for food will not always be wrong,” and he gives the
example of hunting when there are overpopulations of deer.23 He also talks about killing
animals in situations in which there is poverty, and in traditional hunting/gathering
societies. Different lives can have different values based on their levels of self-
awareness.24 This reflects the utilitarian position that beings are receptacles that contain
value; they do not have value apart from their possession of what is intrinsically valued
(pleasure, happiness, preference satisfaction, and the like). Although Singer recognizes
that a preference utilitarian can distinguish between the value of the life of a normal
person and that of a cognitively disabled one, he seems to treat all “normal mature
humans” as being “fully” persons and as having an interest in life that receives prima
facie protection. This is not the case with nonhumans, concerning whom he seems
willing to recognize many gradations of self-awareness. So although nonhumans can be
persons, it appears as though any presumption in favor of personhood does not provide
the same level of protection as it does in the human case and that nonhuman animals
who are persons may still be used as resources and killed in at least in some
circumstances.
What about animals who are not persons (or who might be persons but where we are
not willing to give the benefit of the doubt)? He argues that animal suffering, distress,
and the like must be taken into account and given proper consideration when we are
going to engage in actions that will adversely affect sentient nonhumans but animals
who are not self-aware “cannot see themselves as entities with a future” and “do not
have any preferences about their own future existence.”25 The fact that animals who are
not self-aware may struggle against being killed does not give us a reason not to kill
them but only to kill them in a way “that brings about death instantly, without first
causing pain or distress.”26
In according consideration to interests, Singer rejects discrimination based on
species, or speciesism (a term coined by Richard D. Ryder but often attributed to
Singer).27 He maintains, for instance, that, “other things being equal,” it is worse to kill a
chimpanzee than it is to kill a profoundly intellectually disabled human who “is not and
never can be a person.”28 It is also speciesist to accord a protectable interest in life to
humans who are not persons and not to do so with respect to similar nonhumans who
are not persons. Although we might decide that it is wrong to kill an animal who is not
self-aware simply because it ends the pleasurable experiences that the being may have,
he says that an animal who is merely conscious “may struggle against a threat to its life”
but has no concept of having a life or any connection with a future self, and that “it is not
easy to explain why the loss to the animal killed is not, from an impartial point of view,
made good by the creation of a new animal who will lead an equally pleasant life.”29 He
expresses “some doubts” about this position but does not see how it can be avoided in
the absence of a theory that would make killing animals wrong, and he cautions that
continuing to think of animals as food will encourage our disrespect and mistreatment of
them. He states that this position on the replaceability of animals who are not self-aware
would not support consuming factory-farmed animals because they don’t have a
pleasant life, but he acknowledges that it
could justify continuing to eat free-range animals (of a species incapable of having desires for the future), who
have a pleasant existence in a social group suited to their behavioral needs, and are then killed quickly and
without pain. I can respect conscientious people who take care to eat only meat that comes from such animals
—but I suspect that unless they live on a farm where they can look after their own animals, they will, in practice,
be very nearly vegetarian anyway.30
To the extent that Singer gives the benefit of the doubt to the animals we use for food
and accords them personhood status, that would seem to militate against using those
animals as replaceable resources, but given that such animals would still not be “fully”
persons and we can kill them in situations in which there are conflicts with humans, it is
not clear. For example, if it is morally acceptable to kill nonhuman persons to respect
tradition in hunting/gathering societies, which, particularly today, involve humans making
a cultural choice to continue to kill animals, why can’t other animal uses including, but
not limited to, using animals for food, which can be characterized as representing some
valued traditional practice, also be acceptable? In many parts of the United States, for
example, hunting is valued as a tradition and a part of culture no less than in indigenous
societies. And if the preservation of cultural tradition justifies killing, then that is an
exception that swallows the rule. In any event, it is clear that nonhuman persons do not
benefit from the presumption in favor of protecting their lives to the extent that normal
human persons do.
Despite recognizing that the male chicks of laying hens are killed after hatching and
being sexed, and the hens themselves end up in a slaughterhouse, Singer does “not, on
balance, object to free-range egg production,”31 and he maintains that we ought not to
worry about whether food we “are offered at a party was made with a factory farm
egg.”32 With respect to dairy products, he claims that we should avoid milk and cheese
because even dairy products that are not produced under factory-farm conditions
involve separating mother and baby and the male babies are killed, but we should “not
feel obliged to go to great lengths to avoid all food containing milk products.”33 He
acknowledges that “the evidence for pain in fish is as strong as the evidence for pain in
other vertebrate animals” and maintains that we should “avoid eating fish” but that
“[c]ertainly those who continue to eat fish while refusing to eat other animals have taken
a major step away from speciesism.”34 This would suggest that he regards fish as being
cognitively inferior to other nonhumans and their suffering as weighing less. Indeed, this
would have to be the conclusion unless what Singer is envisaging as “a major step
away from speciesism” is consuming the same amount of fish and no more than one ate
before and not consuming any other animals so that the total amount of animal foods is
reduced. In either case, one is not really taking a step away from speciesism; in both
cases, one is continuing to engage in speciesist behavior. As a general matter, he
maintains that we will persuade others more easily if we use “common sense” and do
not “strive for the kind of purity that is more appropriate to a religious dietary law than to
an ethical and political movement.”35
In Singer’s public advocacy, where he has an arguably greater impact in terms of
audience and influencing behavior, he clearly promotes the view that we may use
animals as resources.36 He describes himself as a “flexible” vegan who will eat dairy and
eggs when traveling or when eating in someone else’s house.37 He characterizes being
a conscientious vegan as “fanatical” and cautions against not appearing to be too
radical or serious about maintaining a vegan position.38 If a vegan is dining with
nonvegans in a restaurant and orders a vegan dish only to have it come with “a bit of
grated cheese or something on it,” the vegan should eat the food so that the others do
not think that being vegan is too difficult. We don’t want others thinking, “ ‘Oh my god,
these vegans …’ ”39 His reasoning here would also support eating the meal if it came
with “a bit” of meat on it as there is no morally coherent distinction between meat and
dairy—something we will consider further in chapter 5.
Singer maintains that, if our concern is suffering and not killing, he can “imagine a
world in which people mostly eat plant foods, but occasionally treat themselves to the
luxury of free range eggs, or possibly even meat from animals who live good lives under
conditions natural for their species, and are then humanely killed on the farm.”40 He
maintains that he does not argue for abstaining from animal products because killing
animals is wrong, but because of the suffering imposed on animals on factory farms.41
He states that, although he does not eat meat, “if you really were thorough-going in
eating only animals that had had good lives, that could be a defensible ethical
position.”42 He coined the term “conscientious omnivore” to describe those who eat only
animals who have had reasonably pleasant lives and relatively painless deaths. 43
Although Singer is very clear that it is morally wrong to consume factory-farmed animal
products, it is apparently morally acceptable to do so if one does so only infrequently: if
vegans go out to a “fancy restaurant,” he doesn’t “see anything really wrong” if “they
allow themselves the luxury of not being vegan that evening.”44 He claims that when he
does eat animal products while traveling or when visiting with others, he will eat free-
range eggs and dairy, mentioning eating ghee (clarified butter) in a curry. But given that
he tells us that we ought not to be concerned if we are offered food that contains
factory-farmed eggs, and given that he does not say that we should refuse to eat the
food with “a bit” of animal ingredients if those ingredients are factory-farm products, it is
apparently the case that we need not eschew conventional animal food in situations
where we engage in a more critical utilitarian analysis and decide that the
consequences weigh in favor of eating conventional animal products.
Singer often supports campaigns for more “humane” treatment even when they do
little, if anything, to help animals, and where whatever positive effect they may have on
animals is far outweighed by the public believing that animal exploitation has been
made more morally acceptable. He promoted and celebrated the directive of the
European Union that supposedly banned battery cages even though it allows continuing
to keep hens in cages that offer no significant welfare benefits over the conventional
battery cage that I discussed in chapter 1.45 In 2005, in what marked a crucial turning
point in the effort of animal agriculture interests to get animal advocates to support more
“humane” animal exploitation, Singer issued a public statement on his own behalf, and
on behalf of most of the large animal charities, expressing “appreciation and support” for
the “pioneering” efforts of a large U.S. retail grocery chain, Whole Foods Market, in
developing “Farm Animal Compassionate Standards” of animal exploitation.46 When
Singer was asked about his support for these standards and his use of “compassionate”
to describe them, he stated:
There might be some people who say, “You can’t be compassionate if you end up killing the animals.” I just
think that’s wrong.…
I think as long as the standards really are compassionate ones, that do as much as they can to give the
animals decent lives before they’re killed, I don’t have a problem with it.47
Singer’s action here inaugurated what I refer to as the “happy exploitation” movement in
that his statement, joined by the large animal charities, had the effect of reinforcing the
idea that the animal movement was focused primarily on making exploitation
supposedly more “humane” and not on ending animal use.
In an article about fish feeling pain, he ends with the admonition that “[w]e need to
learn how to capture wild fish humanely.”48 He maintains that veganism “does solve
more of the ethical problems about eating than any other” position but “it is not for
everyone” and he does not “want to give the impression that it is the only thing one can
do to eat ethically.” If we avoid factory-farmed products (except in those circumstances
in which he says that it is acceptable to consume even those products), and we “eat a
moderate quantity of organically produced, pasture raised, animal products,” we can still
consume animals ethically and we should “enjoy our food.”49 I could offer many more
examples of Singer promoting the idea that using animals as resources is defensible if
animals have been treated well (whatever that means). He is a vocal supporter of
improved animal welfare standards even though these standards provide little, if any,
increased protection to animals.
As a utilitarian, Singer can claim that supposedly more “humane” standards are
better than less “humane” standards because the former involve less suffering; but,
putting aside that many of the welfare reforms he supports actually do very little, he
goes beyond that and affirmatively promotes “humane” exploitation as allowing for
morally permissible animal use. That is, he does not say only that less suffering is better
than more suffering; he maintains that less suffering may make animal exploitation
morally defensible. It is impossible to deny that, when Singer praises companies like
Whole Foods for their “compassionate” standards, or commends “conscientious
omnivores,” he sends a normative message about animal use. His promotion of
supposedly more “humane” exploitation ignores the reality that these standards make
humans feel more comfortable about exploiting nonhumans and may even result in
increasing animal suffering by encouraging continued consumption. When the “father of
the animal rights movement” and the leading animal ethicist in the world promotes
supposedly more “humane” exploitation, he most certainly encourages continued animal
use. The entire modern animal movement almost without exception promotes “happy
exploitation” and “compassionate” use, and many advocates are explicit in linking their
support for this to Singer. I have had people in the United States tell me that they feel
comfortable eating the meat they buy at Whole Foods because Singer praised the
company.
In sum, Singer maintains that nonhumans can be persons if they are self-aware and
connected to their future selves. There are only a few species that Singer thinks clearly
qualify, and even with respect to those animals, Singer does not see them as “fully”
persons because they will likely be less self-aware than normal adult humans. Killing
them is not a “black and white matter” and may be permissible in situations in which
utilitarian considerations would not permit the killing of a normally functioning human
person. To the extent that we do not give the benefit of the doubt to animals who are not
clearly persons, we may use them as replaceable resources if they have had
reasonably pleasant lives and relatively painless deaths. Singer rejects the idea of
veganism as a moral imperative. Indeed, he regards being a consistent vegan as
“fanatical” and believes that, in some circumstances, vegans are obligated to consume
animal products.
Singer fails to appreciate the problems presented by the status of animals as
property. He maintains that we need to accord equal consideration to animal interests—
that is, we must treat similar interests similarly without discounting those interests solely
on the grounds of species—but he does not explain how, if animals (whether they are
persons but not “fully” persons, or quasi-persons without interests in living but with
interests in not suffering) are property, equal consideration is even possible. The
property status of animals we routinely exploit makes it difficult for us to perceive
animals as having similar interests in any situation. As we saw in chapter 1, our
institutionalized exploitation of animals almost guarantees that we will undervalue, if not
completely ignore, animal interests in any particular situation. Moreover, the property
status of animals always acts as a prima facie justification for ignoring any interests that
they have.
We saw that Bentham discussed chattel slavery and said that “[t]he day may come,
when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have
been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.”50 It seems as though Bentham
believed that humans had a right not to be enslaved and he was thinking that that right
might one day be extended to nonhuman animals, at least insofar as they would be
protected from suffering at our hands. But Bentham was a utilitarian and utilitarians
reject moral rights. What did he mean by using “rights” in this context? Singer dismisses
Bentham’s use of rights here and claims that he was not really endorsing moral rights
but was referring to equality in the sense that “ ‘Each to count for one and none for more
than one.’ ”51 But even if Bentham was talking only about equality, he was doing so in a
way that arguably involves the concept of a moral right. That is, Bentham may well have
recognized that, if some humans are slaves, their interests will never be able to be
accorded equal consideration. Their interests will always, because of their status as
property, count for less. Slavery involves creating a structural imbalance; slaves will
always be at a disadvantage. Slaves can never count for one. If we assume that there
must be one right that even a utilitarian must embrace—a right to equal consideration of
interests—property status makes equal consideration impossible. I have relied on this
interpretation of Bentham as proposing a right to equal consideration as support for my
own view, which we will discuss in chapter 4, that, if animals are to matter morally, they
must have the one right not to be property, which we accord to all humans. If a being
(human or nonhuman) is property, then, whether or not we see equal consideration as a
matter of a right or as a defeasible presumption, talking about according equal
consideration to the interests of that being is problematic.52
In any event, Bentham erred by not seeing that the property status of animals
precluded recognizing their moral value in that, as we saw in chapter 1, he did not
appreciate that, if animals are property, their interests in not suffering will necessarily be
devalued or ignored. Singer errs here as well. Although he recognizes that thinking of
animals as commodities will encourage disrespect of animals on the part of “ordinary
human beings,”53 he fails to appreciate that the property status of animals cannot help
but result in devaluing or ignoring animal interests, and make equal consideration
impossible as a practical matter. Singer can say that we should not use nonhumans,
whether they be quasi-persons or persons, in ways that we would not use similar human
quasi-persons or persons. But that is a completely empty expression of egalitarianism.
The two will never be seen as similar if one is property.
Tom Regan and The Case for Animal Rights for Some Animals
Tom Regan wrote The Case for Animal Rights in 1983. Regan presents a rights theory
that is opposed to utilitarian theory. A rights approach maintains that, if an interest is
protected by a right, then that protection must hold even if consequential considerations
suggest otherwise. For example, if we say that my interest in my life is protected by a
right, what we mean is that my interest in my life should be protected even if five other
people will benefit from killing me and taking my organs. We will consider rights more in
chapter 4. But for now, this example will suffice to illustrate the primary difference
between rights and utilitarian approaches.
The Case for Animal Rights is dense and complicated but, for our purposes, the only
issues that matter are the conditions that Regan proposes for nonhuman personhood
and what level of protection those persons receive. The good news here is that, unlike
Singer, Regan explicitly promotes animal rights. He maintains that animals who are
persons have the same right that human persons do to be treated in a respectful way,
and that excludes completely treating those animals exclusively as means to ends or as
resources based on considerations of consequences. Human and nonhuman persons—
as we will see shortly, Regan calls those who have the right to respectful treatment
“subjects of a life”—would be treated equally. Personhood is a categorical quality for
Regan. He challenges the idea that nonhuman persons should be the property of
human persons. The bad news is that Regan’s theory is, like Singer’s, unclear as to
which animals count as persons. Moreover, Regan’s position on animals who are not
persons but who are sentient is problematic. Although Regan is not entirely clear on this
point, he can be read as saying that, if a being is not a person, the being may have no
direct moral significance. This would arguably make his position with respect to beings
who are not persons and who are merely sentient less protective than Singer’s position
and reflect the idea that some animals are just things. In any event, however one reads
Regan, his position with respect to merely sentient beings is certainly no more
protective than is Singer’s, despite Regan being an advocate for animal rights. We will
also see that, although a central tenet of Regan’s view is his claim that all persons are
equal, he has an exception that threatens to swallow the rule.
First, let’s explore who counts as a person for Regan. In The Case for Animal Rights,
Regan uses the moral agent/moral patient distinction that was described in the
introduction. He maintains that moral agents, who are those normally functioning
humans properly held to account for their actions, have inherent value. That is, they
have value in their own right based on the sort of beings that they are. Their value does
not come from whether or how others value them, or to what extent they have intrinsic
value based on their experiences. Their value is not connected to the amount of
pleasure or happiness that they have. Moral agents value themselves even if no one
else values them. Moral patients—those who are not moral agents because they are the
sorts of beings who cannot be held morally responsible (such as young children, some
mentally disabled humans, and nonhuman animals)—are sufficiently like moral agents
to also have inherent value. Moral agents and moral patients can be harmed in many of
the same ways. Moral agents and those moral patients are all subjects of a life. These
are beings who
have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate
action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the
sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and
logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.54
Being a subject of a life is a sufficient condition for having inherent value and all
subjects of a life have inherent value equally. That is, they all have that value that
makes morally wrong treating any of them exclusively as a means to an end and killing
them. They don’t have more or less inherent value based on the degree to which they
have characteristics relevant to the status of being a subject of a life, or other
characteristics, such as the ability to do mathematics or write symphonies. There are no
degrees of personhood. “One either is a subject of a life … or one is not.”55 If one is a
subject of a life, one has inherent value in the same way and to the same degree that
every other subject of a life has it.
Being a subject of a life is not only a condition for having inherent value (because it
identifies those who have value in their own right) but is a criterion for what Regan calls
“making the attribution of inherent value intelligible and nonarbitrary.”56 That is, those
beings who are subjects of a life all have inherent value—they have value in their own
right simply because they are the sorts of beings they are. In having this value in their
own right, all subjects of a life are relevantly similar and, therefore, it is not arbitrary to
accord them all inherent value, which must be equal because their inherent value
comes from their being a type of being and not from whatever quantity of an intrinsic
value, such as happiness or pleasure, that they may have. If we were to use moral
patients who are subjects of a life exclusively as resources, we would act arbitrarily
because there is no morally relevant difference between moral agents and moral
patients—they are both beings with a personal identity over time—that would justify that
differential treatment. Subjects of a life may be different but, with respect to their being a
type of being who has a personal identity, they are the same. Regan says that with
respect to farm animals who are subjects of a life, the notion that they should continue
to have the status of legal property “must be challenged.”57 He claimed to be a vegan
but, like Singer, he apparently consumed animal products when they were served to him
at someone’s home or they were included in something he ordered at a restaurant.58
We can see that Regan’s subject of a life is very much like Singer’s self-aware
person, at least in terms of cognitive characteristics. Singer’s person and Regan’s
subject of a life are both self-aware, forward-looking beings who have a sense of
themselves over time. The difference is that, if a human or nonhuman is the subject of a
life, Regan accords them a right to respectful treatment that prohibits their being used
exclusively as a means to the end of others, and not just as a presumption against
being used as exclusively as a resource, as is the case for Singer. Moreover, all
subjects of a life seemingly have equal inherent value, whereas Singer talks about
degrees of self-awareness and connection to a future self that translate into different
levels of moral value.
Who are subjects of a life? The answer for Regan is, as it is for Singer, unclear, but in
Regan’s case less so. In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan maintains that the least-
controversial cases include humans “aged one year or more, who are not very
profoundly mentally retarded or otherwise quite markedly mentally impoverished (e.g.,
permanently comatose)” and “mentally normal mammals of a year or more.”59 So all
normally functioning humans, some disabled humans, and some animals are subjects of
a life.
What about others? What about the severely mentally disabled humans and all
mammals of less than a year of age? What about mammals one year or older who are
not mentally normal? What about the billions of birds and trillions of fish we kill and
consume? Do they not have any inherent value? Are they not moral patients—persons
with a morally significant interest in their lives?
Regan thinks that one is or is not a subject of a life, but he acknowledges that it may
be difficult to know where to draw the line between those who satisfy the criteria that
make up the subject-of-a-life concept and those who do not, and, in The Case for
Animal Rights, he leaves the door open to including more beings as subjects of a life.
Like Singer, he proposes a “benefit-of-the-doubt” approach and maintains that, given
what is at stake for animals if we are wrong, our default position should be to assume
that animals are subjects of a life unless we can be reasonably sure that they lack the
characteristics of a subject of a life.60 In later work published in 2004, he argues that we
should include birds and perhaps even fish as subjects of a life because there is
evidence that they also have a psychophysical identity over time.61 He ultimately
decided against including fish to avoid controversy but maintains that, with respect to
birds, the evidence is clear beyond dispute that they qualify as subjects of a life.
Although Regan claims that all subjects of a life have equal inherent value and
seems to reject Singer’s position on degrees of personhood, Regan claims that humans
have greater opportunities for satisfaction of their interests than do nonhumans and this
portends that his concept of equal inherent value is a philosophically inert idea. He
discusses the following hypothetical: Imagine that there are four normal adult human
beings and a dog on a lifeboat. The boat will support only four and one has to be thrown
overboard. Regan’s view is that the dog ought to be thrown out. Why? Because,
according to Regan, although death is a harm for the dog, it is a qualitatively lesser
harm than it is for any of the humans because the dog has fewer opportunities for
satisfaction of interests than do any of the humans. He makes it clear that numbers do
not matter here: “[a] million dogs ought to be cast overboard if that is necessary to save
the four normal humans.”62 This is based on Regan’s view that when we must decide
whether to override the rights of the few or the many, if the harm faced by the few would
make them worse off than it would make any of the many, we are obligated to override
the rights of the many.63
It may be the case that humans, given the diversity of their interests, have more or
more diverse opportunities for satisfaction of their interests than do dogs. My partner
and I live with five rescued dogs and it appears to me that they get enormous
satisfaction out of just about everything. I do not have access to dog minds so I do not
really know. I do, however, know with some certainty that some humans have more
interests than other humans and they have greater opportunities for satisfaction than do
humans who have fewer interests. It really cannot be doubted that some beings have
more, or more diverse, interests than others and may have more opportunities for
satisfaction. But it appears that Regan is making a different point—that the content of
human experience is more meaningful and significant than the content of nonhuman
experience. To the extent that that is what he is saying, his position comes close to
Singer’s view that we can distinguish between human and nonhuman persons based on
degrees of self-awareness, and that nonhumans will lose in conflicts with normal
humans.
If death is a qualitatively greater harm to humans than to nonhumans, then it is not,
as Regan maintains, arbitrary to distinguish between human subjects of a life and
animals because the former are qualitatively different from the latter in a morally
relevant way in that the content of human experience is more significant than the
content of nonhuman experience. This would justify denying equal inherent value to
animals who were otherwise subjects of a life because there is a nonarbitrary way of
distinguishing humans from nonhumans. Nonhumans are relevantly different from
humans in that human minds have morally more significant content; they have more
opportunities for satisfaction. Why does this difference not justify differential treatment of
human subjects of a life from nonhuman subjects of a life?64
Regan would say that this analysis only becomes relevant in extraordinary situations
of conflict. But if this analysis is applicable in that—or any—context, then it would seem
to undercut his claims about equal inherent value as a general matter. Regan would
most certainly rule out frivolous uses of animals as not involving any real conflicts. But if
human and nonhuman subjects of a life are different because the former have more
opportunities for satisfaction of interests, we would be obligated to choose humans over
nonhumans in any situation in which there was a genuine conflict. Regan would not
approve of vivisection as an institutionalized animal use because that would involve
using animals exclusively as resources.65 But it is difficult to see how he could, in a
situation in which killing an animal (or a million animals) was, in fact, necessary (and
there was no doubt about causal efficacy) to save a human life, maintain that it was
anything else but morally obligatory to kill the animal if the animal was not part of an
institutionalized use—e.g., a nondomesticated animal. And conceding this in conflict
situations threatens to undermine Regan’s position of equal inherent value generally.
Indeed, his position aligns with Singer’s in that animal persons may be used and killed
in certain situations, although those situations will arguably be fewer with Regan
because conflict situations must exclude any institutionalized exploitation from the
outset.
Finally, at least some of what Regan says appears to leave all of the animals who are
not subjects of a life in—literally—a no-person’s land. On one hand, his theory arguably
attempts to elevate all animals to subject-of-a-life status in that he says that we should
err in favor of concluding that animals have a psychophysical sense of identity over time
when we don’t know to the contrary. Although Singer endorses a similar benefit-of-the-
doubt approach, Regan seems more willing at least in some places to endorse a default
assumption that animals who engage in complex behavior are subjects of a life unless
there is evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, Regan very clearly links a right to
respectful treatment with a level of cognitive sophistication that goes beyond sentience
and includes preference autonomy, beliefs, and a sense of identity over time.
What about animals who are sentient but do not have, as far as we can tell, these
additional characteristics? His theory does not address whether those outside the class
of subjects of a life might still have inherent value (and, therefore, have a morally
significant interest in life). He claims that the subject-of-a-life condition is sufficient for
having inherent value; it may not be necessary. But the necessity of the criterion is “well
beyond the scope of” The Case for Animal Rights.66 Although he leaves the issue open,
he is less than optimistic about finding a basis for inherent value other than being the
subject of a life. He says that it is “radically unclear how the attribution of inherent value
to these individuals can be made intelligible and nonarbitrary.”67 He thinks that it is
difficult to attribute inherent value to merely conscious beings as it is in the case of
“nonconscious natural objects or collections of such objects,”68 such as a tree or a
forest: “It may be that animals, for example—which, though conscious and sentient (i.e.,
capable of experiencing pleasure and pain), lack the ability to remember, to act
purposively, or to have desires or form beliefs—can only properly be viewed as
receptacles of what has intrinsic value, lacking any value in their own right.”69
That is, Regan is concerned that merely sentient beings might not have inherent
value because they do not have an experiential welfare or psychophysical identity. A
sentient being may be said to have an experiential welfare if that being can (at a
moment in time) experience suffering but Regan understands experiential welfare that is
shared by all subjects of a life as personal well-being over time. Animals who are not
subjects of a life might be conscious but there would be nothing that connected one
conscious experience to another and it would be arbitrary to accord inherent value to
such beings because they lack the sort of experiential welfare that is possessed by all
subjects of a life.
He does say that, even if animals who are not subjects of a life are things, using and
killing such animals encourage social and cultural attitudes that do result in violating the
rights of nonhumans who are subjects of a life.70 He acknowledges that this argument is
similar to the position of Immanuel Kant, who, we saw in chapter 1, argued that, even
though animals were things that had no inherent value, by being cruel to animals, we
made it more likely that we would engage in acting immorally toward other humans who
did have inherent value. We can have obligations that concern animals, but we cannot
have obligations that we owe to animals.
So if an animal is not a subject of a life, then the theory he presents in The Case for
Animal Rights cannot accommodate them and they may very well be nothing more than
things. It is “radically unclear” as to how they could have rights—and, in particular, a
right to respectful treatment that would rule out using them exclusively as resources.
Singer maintains that sentience is all that is needed for quasi-personhood but that full
personhood requires that a being be rational and self-aware; he emphasizes that
persons are forward-looking. He maintains that only a few species clearly qualify for
personhood. It is, however, not clear as to what level of protection for their lives such
nonhumans would have relative to rational and self-aware humans given that Singer
differentiates personhood based on levels of self-awareness, and sees nonhuman
persons as not “fully” persons relative to normal human persons. If one does not give
the other species of animals (including the ones we routinely exploit for food) the benefit
of the doubt on personhood, it is permissible to use them as resources and kill them as
long as they have a reasonably pleasant life and a relatively painless death. We have
moral obligations to animals to accord equal consideration to their interests, but, like
Bentham, Singer does not appear to appreciate the effect that property status has on
valuing animal interests and that property status makes equal consideration
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible.
Regan maintains that all subjects of a life have rights to respectful treatment and we
cannot use these nonhuman persons exclusively as resources irrespective of
consequences, but he appears to see a qualitative difference between human subjects
of a life and nonhuman ones, and this arguably threatens the equality that Regan claims
for all subjects of a life, at least in certain situations of conflict. He claims that it is
difficult to draw the line between those animals who are subjects of a life and those who
are not, and he counsels that we err in favor of personhood but if animals are not
subjects of a life, he finds it difficult to understand how merely conscious beings can
have inherent value (and a morally significant interest in their lives). With respect to
those animals, we would have obligations that concern them but not obligations that we
owe to them. They risk remaining as things.
So neither of the leading theorists on animal ethics accepts that sentience alone is
sufficient for nonhuman personhood. In the next chapter, we will consider a theory of
personhood based on sentience alone.
{3}
Animals as Persons—a Matter of Sentience Alone
In chapter 2, we met two leading animal ethicists—Peter Singer and Tom Regan. They
both maintain that some animals can be persons but they link personhood with
characteristics beyond sentience. Singer rejects outright the idea that animals who are
merely sentient can be persons. Regan is “radically unclear” as to how merely sentient
animals can be subjects of a life.1
In this chapter, I will argue that only sentience is necessary for nonhuman
personhood and that, because animals are persons, we harm animals by killing them no
matter how supposedly “humanely” we treat and kill them.
Human Personhood
For the purpose of deciding whether it is morally justifiable to use a human as a
resource to benefit others, we don’t ask whether the human thinks about having a life in
any way that is similar to the way that normally functioning humans do. We assume that
humans have a protectable interest in life if it is in their interest to live, which we assume
is the case for any human who has conscious experience. We do not require that
humans have minds that are similar to the minds of normally functioning humans to be a
person; any human who has a mind is regarded as a person. We recognize that for a
human to be conscious at all is to be a being concerning whom there is something it is
like to be that human. We recognize that there is no nonarbitrary way to determine when
the connection to a future self is sufficient for human personhood.
There are many humans who live in an eternal present relative to normally
functioning humans. For example, there are many humans who have late-stage
dementia. They are not just forgetful or very forgetful; they have no memory of the past,
have no idea about who they once were, do not recognize people with whom they have
been very close, and have no ability to plan for the future. They have no psychophysical
sense of identity other than the one that they have in that very second. Their
experiential welfare is limited to the present. They are connected to a future self but only
in the sense of wanting to get to the next second of conscious experience. Their
cognitive abilities are very restricted. Singer and Regan would claim that such humans
are not persons. There may be reasons to treat such humans as if they were persons,
but they are not, strictly speaking, persons, and their lives have no greater value than do
the lives of similarly situated nonhumans who are not persons. And nonhumans who are
persons have greater moral value than humans who are severely cognitively disabled
and who are not persons.
Regan and Singer may take such a position but it is absolutely clear that most of the
rest of us would not. Indeed, most of us would be horrified at the suggestion that
humans who are severely cognitively disabled but still sentient and have conscious
experience are not persons and do not have a morally protectable interest in life. That
is, we do not treat humans who are sentient and who have conscious experience as if
they were persons. We treat them as persons. We do not require that humans be faint,
ghostly versions of normally functioning humans and have minds similar to normally
functioning humans in order to be persons. We just require that they have a mind. If
they have no conscious experience, they cannot have any experiential welfare and we
cannot harm them. So a mind is necessary for personhood and for having morally
significant interests at all. But it is also sufficient for personhood.
Although some philosophers argue that severely cognitively disabled humans are not
persons and that we treat them as if they were persons for reasons other than their
being persons—such as that not treating them as if they are persons will cause those
who love them to be unhappy, or cause the rest of us to be alarmed that we may be so
treated—these arguments are, literally, academic. We might discuss them in a
philosophy class but most of us would reject outright any proposal that that we treat
vulnerable humans exclusively as resources and we would see the primary reason for
this rejection being that humans are persons. We would never use criteria such as
having a continuous mental existence or a psychophysical identity over time because
such characteristics are inherently arbitrary and will necessarily produce unprincipled
results.
Let’s focus on an example that will demonstrate exactly why we link human
personhood with consciousness alone. Assume we have two adult humans: Mary and
Fred. Mary is a brilliant mathematician. Fred has late-stage dementia and, as much as
any human can, lives in an eternal present. But Fred is otherwise a very happy fellow
who enjoys every second of his life although he does not anticipate his life beyond the
next second. He is self-aware in the way that Griffin’s animal who is watching another
animal run is, or the human with profound amnesia is. We clearly are not under any
obligation to treat Mary and Fred equally in all respects; indeed, it would be morally
wrong to do so. If the local university needs a math teacher, it would be a wrong to Mary
(and to Fred and to the students) to appoint Fred.
But let us assume that the matter is different. We are not looking for a math teacher
but for someone to be used and killed in a biomedical experiment or as an organ donor.
Do we not use Fred for this purpose only because we are concerned about how Fred’s
family would feel or because we otherwise do not have a moral obligation owed directly
to Fred but only one that concerns Fred? What if Fred has no family? Do we then not
use Fred only because, if we do so, it might make others, including those who are
persons, anxious and fear that they, too, might be used in this way if they experience
dementia, or that their relatives or friends who are like Fred might be so used? What if
we could be assured that no one else would find out about what we are doing with
Fred? What if this is a truly one-off thing and we are using Fred because he is the only
human on the planet with a particular physical characteristic that is relevant for the
experiment or the organ use? Do we then not use Fred because it is difficult to draw
lines between persons and nonpersons? Fred is so severely cognitively impaired that
although he is sentient and has conscious experience, he is clearly on the nonperson
side of the line as Singer, Regan, or any other philosopher who links personhood with
cognitive characteristics beyond sentience would draw it. That is, he is very much living
in an eternal present and his only connection with his future self is the consciousness he
has from second to second. Is painlessly killing him and taking his organs a morally
acceptable thing to do?
Singer would say that although we may treat Fred as a person, he really isn’t. We
may decide to protect Fred’s life because, for example, we think that his life involves
more pleasure than pain, or for some other reason, but he is not a person. If we kill him,
we might harm him in the sense of depriving him of more pleasurable experiences he
may have in the future but we are not depriving him of his “future” because he doesn’t
have one. He lacks a continuous mental existence. If we did use him as a resource, we
would be doing no harm per se to him by killing him. Regan would say that he is
“radically unclear” as to why Singer wouldn’t be right here because Fred clearly has no
psychophysical identity over time or preference autonomy.
I submit that we do not use Fred because he is a person. There is something it is like
to be Fred. We regard that something as having moral value. We have an obligation that
we owe to Fred to not use him as a resource for others. Fred is not a moral agent, but
he is a moral patient. He may not have moral obligations to anyone, but we have moral
obligations to him. We regard Fred as having a moral right not to be used in this way.
We regard Fred as having this right not in some metaphorical way; we regard him as
actually holding a moral right not to be exploited in this way because we regard his
interest in not being used exclusively as a resource as an interest that cannot be
ignored just because it would benefit us to do so. That would be to treat Fred as a thing.
We recognize that he has interests that are morally significant. We do not protect those
interests because Fred is the sort of being (human) who would have interests in his life
and be a real person if only he were a normally functioning human. We protect those
interests because continuing to live is in Fred’s interest even if he cannot think about all
of the things he wants to do in his life. Fred is a real person. He is not a thing. And he is
not a quasi-person whose life we can take as long as we kill him “humanely.” We
assume that Fred values his life, however he values it, and we cannot second guess
him; we assume that he has an interest in continuing to live even if he is unable to
muster any sophisticated thinking about the matter. To describe it as Brophy does:
[D]ifferent though you and I may be in the mode of our being and our sentiency, and even perhaps in the
intensity of them, our rights to them have to be taken as equal. My life may seem to you a poor and limited little
affair, the loss of which you would reckon no great loss. That doesn’t, however, entitle you to make me lose it.
Since we are separate entities, the question is not what my life is worth to you, but what it is worth to me, whose
only life it is and who am the only person who lead it.22
We do not require that Fred have a psychophysical sense of self that goes beyond
the next second to some further point that would necessarily have to be arbitrarily
chosen. Fred is connected to his future self in that, because he is sentient, he has an
interest in getting to the next second of his consciousness. Fred is self-aware in that he
is aware of himself from second to second. Fred is not the same sort of person that
Mary is; there is, indeed, a qualitative difference between the two. But they are both
persons in that both have morally significant interests in not being used exclusively as
resources. We may also protect Fred’s interest in his life because we are concerned
about his family or about public perception. But the primary reason that we protect him
is that he is a person. He is not a thing. And his personhood means that we do not just
protect his interest in not suffering; we protect his interest in his life.
Once we require that Fred have additional cognitive characteristics in order to be said
to be a person, we necessarily end up in an arbitrary mess. Is there a morally relevant
difference between Fred, who has no memory and no ability to plan for the future
beyond the next second of his consciousness, and Sara, who has late-stage dementia
but who is able to remember one minute in the past and plan for one minute into the
future? Is Sara a person and Fred not a person? If the answer is that Fred is not a
person but Sara is, then personhood apparently comes into being somewhere in the
fifty-nine seconds between Fred’s one second and Sara’s one minute. And when is
that? After two seconds? Ten seconds? Forty-three seconds? If the answer is that
neither are persons and that the connection with a future self requires a greater
connection than one minute, then when, exactly, is the connection with a future self
sufficient for personhood? Three hours? Twelve hours? One day? Three days?
Singer argues that a sentient being who is not a person may have a preference for a
pleasant experience to continue or for an unpleasant experience to stop “but it will not
have any preferences for the long-term future, and the desires it has do not survive
periods of sleep or temporary unconsciousness.”23 Such a being “has no conception of
its own future existence after a period of sleep.”24 Regan similarly emphasizes the
importance of having a psychophysical identity over time. This would suggest that
neither Fred nor Sara is a person because the preferences of neither will survive
temporary unconsciousness. And this shows how arbitrary such an approach is. A
person must not only have future desires, but those future desires must be able to
survive temporary unconsciousness. And how many episodes of temporary
unconsciousness must be survived? Two? Twenty-two? Thirty-seven?
Singer maintains that “painless killing and administering an anesthetic seem to be
equivalent. Killing does not thwart any more desires than putting the being to sleep. The
being will be able to continue to satisfy its preferences after it awakes, but from the
being’s subjective perspective it is as if a new being, with new preferences, came into
existence.”25 So if a human with early dementia has preferences for the long-term future,
but those preferences fade away after some period of time, is that human a person or
not? If not, when did that human cease to be a person? How many of one’s long-term
preferences must be permanent? Are persons only those whose long-term future
preferences are all permanently there? And, even if we decide that we can live with the
hopeless arbitrariness of this framework and we concede that a connection to a future
self has to go beyond the next second of consciousness, why does that connection
need to survive temporary unconsciousness? If I have those future preferences now
and will have them for the next several hours, and will then have a new set of
preferences for some period of hours, and then another set, and so on, why isn’t that
enough to claim that I am the sort of being who has an interest in continuing to live? The
fact that these are the questions suggested by such an approach to personhood
demonstrates why no one outside of academia would ever take it seriously as a basis
for analyzing or deciding matters of personhood where vulnerable humans are involved.
Considering the length of time of future-oriented thinking required misses the point
that Brophy so elegantly and simply made: a sentient being is the sort of being whose
life is a tacit assertion of “Il faut que je vive,” or “I must live.” It is by virtue of being
subjectively aware—however that manifests itself—that one prefers to get to the next
second of consciousness and is connected to one’s future self in that next second. This
is not to say that cognitive states that go beyond sentience do not give rise to other
interests—they clearly do. We do not have to treat Fred, Mary, and Sara equally in all
respects; indeed, it would be absurd to suggest that equal treatment in all respects is
required. But we do see ourselves obligated to treat them equally in one respect: we do
not think it is morally acceptable to treat any of them exclusively as resources; we see
ourselves as obligated not to kill them even if it would benefit us to do so.
It may be the case that a human is not a person if that human is so severely brain-
damaged as to have no cognitive ability and no hope of ever emerging from a comatose
state. For example, an anencephalic child is born with a forebrain and cerebrum and is
usually deaf, blind, unconscious, and unable to feel pain. Such a being may have no
interests because that being may have no sort of mind that prefers, desires, or wants
anything. Therefore, that child would have no interests to treat as morally significant.
There may be other instances, such as those involving a human who was previously
normally functioning but, for whatever reason, falls into an irreversible coma. For various
reasons, including the sensibilities of loved ones, or because we are not completely
certain whether the coma is irreversible or whether there is conscious experience or
merely nociception without any subjective experience, we may treat the human as if
they were a person. But we would not see the permanently comatose person as
someone to whom we had direct moral obligations but something concerning which we
had obligations. We may err in favor of continuing to treat that human as a person
because there is much at stake if we are wrong, but if we were certain that the human
did, in fact, have no interests, we would not say that such a human was a person unless
our notion of personhood is connected with a religious idea involving the possession of
a soul (and nothing else), as is the central concern in discussions about early-term
abortion.26
We do not think it is wrong to kill an infant who is not anencephalic but who is
disabled (Singer uses the example of an infant born with hemophilia) because we
expect the infant’s life to have more happiness than misery; we think it is wrong as a
primary matter because the infant has a life that matters to the infant. The infant is not
equal (in terms of being the same) as a normally functioning adult in the same way that
a mentally disabled adult is not the same as a normally functioning adult. But they are
equal—they are all the same—in that they are conscious and by virtue of being
conscious they are connected to the next second of their lives. And we cannot decide
that any of them is inferior to any of the others for the purpose of treating any of them
exclusively as a resource without making distinctions that are unprincipled and arbitrary.
Even if we can say that the adult loses more by death than the infant does, the infant
loses something and we cannot judge that loss to be inconsequential without starting
down a necessarily arbitrary and unprincipled path.
To the extent that we ever consider it morally acceptable on any level to kill a human
person (outside of the context of self-defense), we do so only when we think death is in
that person’s interest. But even then, the importance of personhood results in our
imposing limits. Given that we have not yet widely recognized assisted suicide (although
public opinion is increasingly in favor of it), it seems that we are so concerned about
protecting the life of persons that we are not willing to accede to a person’s informed
decision to end their life even when they are in terrible pain. In any situation where a
human chooses to end their life, they are saying that they no longer wish to be a person;
they no longer wish to continue their conscious experience; they no longer see the
necessity of continuing to live that is a concomitant of being conscious; they no longer
wish to be connected to their future selves if only for the next second. Our failure to
respect the decision of a human person to end their life out of a concern for personhood
should cause us some concern as to whether our respect for personhood in this context
comes at the cost of disrespect of the person. In cases where the human who is ill or in
pain is, for whatever reason, unable to communicate their wishes, we are extremely
reluctant to recognize that the inextricable link between sentience and an interest in
continuing to live has been broken and the human no longer has a morally significant
interest in living.
In sum, where humans are concerned, the question we ask to determine whether
there is a morally significant interest in life (and, hence, personhood) is not whether the
human can think about having a life in the way that normally functioning humans do, but
rather whether it is in the interest of a human to live. And we assume that it is, as long
as the human has conscious experience because, like Brophy, we understand that to
say, “X is sentient” is to say, “X has both an interest in not suffering and a separate but
concomitant interest in continuing to live.” We regard all human persons as being equal
in one respect: they all deserve not to be used exclusively as a resource. They all value
their lives, however they do so, even if that is only valuing the next second of their
consciousness.
Singer argues that, although it is difficult, we can compare the value of lives and have
a basis for rejecting the idea that all lives are equal based on the idea that every being
values their life. He offers the following thought experiment. We should imagine that, like
Puck in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, we have the ability to turn
ourselves into animals and that when we are in an animal state, we have all and only
the mental experiences of the animal. When we are in a human state, we have all and
only the experiences of a human. Imagine further that we can enter into a third state in
which we are able to remember exactly what each of the other mental states was like. If
we are offered the choice to live life as the animal or the human under the best possible
circumstances, and we would choose one over the other, then that arguably allows us to
make sense of value that goes beyond the point of view of the particular being:
If it is true that we can make sense of the choice between existence as a horse and existence as a human, then
—whichever way the choice would go—we can make sense of the idea that the life of one kind of animal
possesses greater value than the life of another; and if this is so, then the claim that the life of every being has
equal value is on very weak ground. We cannot defend this claim by saying that every being’s life is all-
important for it, because we have now accepted a comparison that takes a more objective—or at least
intersubjective—stance and thus goes beyond the value of the life of a being considered solely from the point of
view of that being.27
In other words, if I, a human, would choose to be a human and not a horse, then we
have a possible basis for saying that a human life has more value than a nonhuman life.
And we don’t have to limit this thought experiment to a choice of human vs. nonhuman.
As Singer points out, when Mill compared dissatisfied humans with satisfied pigs, he
also said that it was better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool (understood at that
time to be someone who was cognitively disabled) satisfied. For example, if I could have
all and only the mental experiences of a human who is mentally disabled and a normal
human, and would choose to be a normal human rather than a mentally disabled
human, that provides a possible basis for claiming that being a normal human is more
valuable and we have a basis for rejecting the claim that all lives are equal based on the
point of view of the mentally disabled human. If I can have all and only the mental
experiences of a skilled surgeon and all and only the mental experiences of an
uneducated laborer, then, if I can enter into a third state in which I choose to be the
surgeon rather than the laborer, that allows me to say that the life of the former is, on an
objective or at least intersubjective basis, more valuable.
Singer acknowledges that this thought experiment “requires us to suppose a lot of
things that could never happen and some things that strain our imagination.”28 Putting
aside that even Singer recognizes that this thought experiment is largely useless, it is
fanciful to think that we could ever understand the subjective experience of a horse.
Indeed, it is not certain that we can understand the subjective experience of members of
our own species. But the point is that what we would choose in this thought experiment
says nothing about the value of life because that is something that cannot be assessed
from any perspective other than the point of view of the individual being as that being.
The fact that I would choose to be a normal human rather than a human who is mentally
disabled, or a human rather than a horse, or a rich human rather than a poor human is
relevant only as a statement of what I value when I engage in a bizarre thought
experiment. It does not and cannot provide anything remotely resembling a “neutral
ground” for making determinations about the comparative value of lives.29 I still value my
life as much as you value yours even if I would choose to be you; my choice does not
mean that what I do not choose may be used as a thing.
Singer claims that “[i]n general, it does seem that the more highly developed the
mental life of the being, the greater the degree of self-awareness and rationality and the
broader the range of possible experiences, the more one would prefer that kind of life.”30
That is just another way of saying that Singer, as a cognitively sophisticated human,
values the lives of cognitively sophisticated humans more than he values the lives of
beings (human and nonhuman) who are less cognitively sophisticated. That tells us
something about Singer, but to claim this position as providing an “objective” or
“intersubjective” basis for rejecting the claim that every sentient being is equal in that all
have a life that they value, however they value it, provides an excellent illustration of the
arbitrary mess we necessarily encounter once we depart from using sentience as the
only criterion necessary for personhood.
Although there will be persons who can think about their lives in an abstract way,
there will be some who cannot but who are conscious, who are connected to the future
second by second, and for whom continued existence is in their interest. All have equal
value based only on their sentience. Their other characteristics do not give them more
value as persons in the sense of their not being used exclusively as resources, but may
and probably will justify their different treatment in other respects. Personhood in the
sense of having a morally significant interest in one’s life involves only one characteristic
—conscious experience—that is not and cannot be a matter of degree. One is either a
being who has conscious experience and some sort of mind that prefers, wants, or
desires things, or one is not. If one is sentient, then one is relevantly similar to every
other being of this sort in that for all of these beings, there is something that it is like to
be them. To talk about degrees of sentience makes no sense. Brigid Brophy said it well,
and anticipated the uselessness of Singer’s thought experiment:
Your pleasure may be more pleasurable than my pain is painful. You may have received a special revelation to
that effect, and your special revelation might be correct. But as neither you nor I can enter into the other’s being
or sentiency, we shan’t convince one another; and an impartial, reasonable third person, who can’t enter into
either of us, possesses no reasonable scale for judging between us.31
Anthropocentrism
What accounts for our different treatment of humans and nonhumans with respect to
personhood?
That’s a question that is most easy to answer. Anthropocentrism is the idea that
humans are the most important entities in the universe. And anthropocentrism is the
only reason why we demand more than sentience for nonhuman personhood.
It is clear that both Singer and Regan regard the content of human experience to be
more morally significant than the content of nonhuman experience. Singer’s claim to
treat similarly situated humans and nonhumans the same is belied by his position that
the content of normally functioning human minds has greater moral value than the
content of the minds of nonhumans who are self-aware because the latter will be less
connected to their future selves. Regan asserts that the content of human experience is
more significant than that of nonhumans when he claims that we have an obligation to
favor humans over nonhumans in exceptional situations of conflict because humans
have greater opportunities for satisfaction of their interests.
Linking personhood with cognitive attributes other than sentience is nothing but
anthropocentrism and is no different from the racism, sexism, and other forms of
discrimination that both Singer and Regan claim to abjure. Anthropocentrism is what
accounted for why animals were excluded from the moral community altogether and
treated as things before the nineteenth century, and it is what accounts for why we deny
personhood to animals today despite claiming that we regard them as members of the
moral community and even supposedly according that status legal protection.
Singer and Regan are not alone here. Anthropocentrism is the general philosophical
line. Some theorists, such as John Rawls and Roger Scruton,35 argue that animals are
excluded from the moral community because they cannot share rights, responsibilities,
and duties. Gary Varner argues that self-awareness is not enough; animals must have
an autobiographical sense of themselves to count as persons.36 Jeff McMahan, another
prominent ethicist, and one who is actually more sympathetic to animals than many
philosophers, claims that, in addition to being “largely psychologically unconnected to
themselves in the future,” animals are just lesser beings.37 He claims that “animals are
incapable of the depths of psychological misery to which most human beings are
susceptible” but “their capacity for physical suffering rivals our own.” He adds (echoing
Regan):
Yet their highest peaks of well-being are significantly lower than those accessible to most human beings. While
some animals—dogs, for instance—experience exuberant joy more readily and frequently than many adult
human beings do, animals lack other dimensions of well-being that are arguably more important, such as
achievement, creativity, deep personal relations, knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, and so on.38
According to McMahan, by being killed, an animal loses a life that is “inferior in quality
and quantity.”39 It is not clear as to how McMahan has acquired such keen insight into
the inner lives of animals, but all he is doing here is asserting that animal lives matter
less because animals do not have the thoughts and interests that philosophy professors
have. They do not show much interest in going to art galleries, or in listening to a
Chopin concert, or in reading Plato, or in having the sorts of (often dysfunctional)
relationships that humans have. Putting aside that there are many human persons who
don’t care very much for at least some of those activities, why would we think that not
being able to (or not wanting to) engage in those activities makes a life less morally
valuable for purposes of taking that life? Again, Brigid Brophy said it well:
To argue that we humans are capable of complex, multifarious thought and feeling, whereas the sheep’s
experience is probably limited by lowly sheepish perceptions, is no more to the point than if I were to slaughter
and eat you on the grounds that I am a sophisticated personality able to enjoy Mozart, formal logic and
cannibalism whereas your imaginative world seems confined to True Romances and tinned spaghetti.40
The thinking that animals are simply “inferior” to humans reflects Mill’s view that a
miserable human is better off than a happy pig. What, apart from self-interested
proclamation, makes human characteristics “superior” or allows us to conclude that we
experience a morally more valuable pleasure when we are happy than a pig does when
she is happily rooting in the mud or playing with other pigs? It is this sort of
anthropocentric thinking that leads the animal ethicist Robert Garner to say that, “in
general terms, the package of cognitive abilities possessed by normal adult humans
(including the most and least intelligent and the most and least depressed) is greater
than those possessed by most adult nonhumans.”41 That is nothing more than an
assertion. One of our rescued dogs, Finlay, is a double-merle sheltie who was born
blind and deaf. Approximately 25 percent of every litter of double merles is blind, deaf,
or both but normal puppies are quite expensive so, given the property considerations
involved, it makes economic sense for breeders to kill those who are “defective.” Finlay
somehow made it to a rescue group and we adopted him. To watch him—guided only
by his sense of smell and what must be an extraordinary level of muscle memory—
move around the garden at lightning speed, or run through the house, hardly ever
touching a wall and only occasionally running into one of our other dogs, makes it clear
how self-interested is our proclamation about our superiority. We are not the measure of
things. We are one measure among many.
Again, the problem with this becomes clear if we restrict our analysis to human
beings. Assume we have two humans: a philosophy professor and a factory worker who
has no higher education and has no interest in having any discussions that would be
regarded by the philosopher as intellectually stimulating. If we were to say that it is
better to be a miserable philosophy professor than a happy factory worker, or that
philosophers had more opportunities for satisfaction than did factory workers, such
assertions would, quite rightly, be viewed as arbitrary and elitist. We would say that both
the philosopher and the factory worker are persons and neither has more value for the
purpose of using one exclusively as the resource of another. We would not say that the
philosophy professor has more moral value and that, if we are in a lifeboat, the
philosopher has a greater claim to stay on board than does the worker.
Although there is certainly a tradition in Western thought that assigns a higher value
to intellectual pursuits than to other sorts of activities, that tradition was shaped almost
exclusively by academics and others who valued intellectual pursuits and was not the
result of any democratic or impartial assessment of competing pleasures and
preferences. The notion that nonhuman animals have pains and pleasures that are
different from and lesser than those of humans is no different from asserting that the
pleasures and pains of a less-intelligent or less-educated human are inferior to those of
a more-intelligent or better-educated one.
To the extent that humans and nonhumans have different sorts of minds, those
differences may be relevant for some purposes, just as differences between and among
humans may be relevant for some purposes, as we saw in the case of Mary and Fred.
Any differences between human and nonhuman minds, however, are logically irrelevant
to whether we use animals in painful experiments or kill them for other purposes, or
whether we exploit animals for food, just as Fred’s inability to do math is not relevant to
whether we should take his kidney to save Mary or use him in an experiment to obtain
data that may benefit Mary. We cannot claim that humans are superior based on their
having more interests, or more intense interests, than nonhumans without begging the
question from the outset and engaging in reasoning that, if applied in the human
context, would quite rightly be seen as morally objectionable.
In response to any claim that a human who lives in an eternal present still must have
some conceptual content to their consciousness or else their behavior would be chaotic
in every respect and that is what distinguishes humans from nonhumans, the answer is
that this is the same for any sentient being. Why would a being that was nothing more
than unconnected series of sensations act in anything but a chaotic and random way?
Animals must think in some way. Their thinking is not connected to concepts that are
linked to symbolic communication as ours is, but they must be linked to some sort of
equivalent of the concepts we use or they would be unable to function in their respective
environments. To claim that animals react successfully to the challenges in their
environment as a result of “instinct” is one step away from the Cartesian position that
animals are just machines.
So much of our thinking about animals involves a category mistake by characterizing
the cognitive abilities of humans and nonhumans as being located on the same
spectrum when the reality is that animal minds and human minds are necessarily
different because animals do not communicate in the way that we do. This does not
mean that animals have less-sophisticated minds; it means they have different minds.
The use of a quantitative term here—that humans have greater cognitive sophistication
—misses the point. The issue for purposes of whether killing them harms them is not
whether nonhumans have minds that are faint versions of the minds of normally
functioning humans. The issue is whether they have minds.
What many ethicists have to say about animals is reminiscent of what Thomas
Jefferson had to say: “Their griefs are transient. Those numberless afflictions, which
render it doubtful whether Heaven has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt,
and sooner forgotten with them. In general, their existence appears to participate more
of sensation than reflection.”42 Jefferson was talking about human slaves.
We can look at Jefferson’s statement and dismiss it as reflecting that Jefferson, a
slave owner, had a vested interest in an institution in which sentient beings were
commodified. But when it comes to animals, just about all of us are in a position
analogous to that of slave owners. Most of us directly participate in the exploitation of
animals. That may explain why otherwise intelligent people say things that are as
transparently self-interested—and wrong—about animals when attempting to justify
exploiting them.
In the previous chapter, we saw that there is no reason, other than anthropocentrism, to
condition the personhood of nonhuman animals on any characteristic other than
sentience. In this chapter, we are going to see that saying someone is a person is
another way of saying that they must have a right not to be property. To be property is
to be a thing. We reject human slavery (which can take a number of forms) because it
treats persons as things. If humans are going to be members of the moral community at
all, they at least must have the right not to be property. We do not think that supposedly
“humane” slavery is fine; we maintain that it is necessary to ensure that no suffering is
imposed pursuant to using others exclusively as resources.
If animals are going to matter morally, they must have that same right. I am not
proposing that nonhuman animals be given other rights. Nonhumans are not persons
because they have all the rights that humans have; they are persons because they are
the sorts of beings who have moral value and that means that they must have one right
not to be used exclusively as resources for others.
We have seen that another way of talking about the personhood of animals involves the
right to not be property. We recognize that, if humans are to not be things and are to be
members of the moral community at all, they cannot be the property of others. If we
agree that animals have moral value, we cannot deny them this one right as well. As in
the case of humans, recognizing that animals have moral value and according to them a
right not to be property does not mean that we protect nonhumans from all suffering and
death. It does, however, mean that we protect them from all suffering and death that
result from their being used exclusively as resources for humans.
Although utilitarians reject rights, it seems that even they, too, must reject the
property status of animals either as a matter of a right of equal consideration that is
integral even to utilitarianism, or as a presumption that accepts property status only
when utility requires that we ignore equal consideration. Just as Bentham arguably
recognized that the property status of humans means that human slaves would always
count for “less than one” relative to human persons with property rights in those slaves,
so, too, will animals count for less.
In chapter 5, we will consider why, if animals matter morally and cannot justifiably be
used as resources for humans, veganism is a moral imperative and a matter of justice.
{5}
Veganism as a Moral Imperative
If we agree that animals have moral value and we cannot justify treating animals
exclusively as resources, we must accord to them the one right—the right not to be
property—that we accord to all humans as providing the minimum protection necessary
to have moral value. We must stop using nonhuman animals as resources. All animal
use—for food, clothing, entertainment, biomedical research, and so on—assumes that
animals are things. Once we accept that nonhumans are persons, all of these uses
must stop. None of these institutionalized uses can be justified morally.
Our obligation to stop using animals is not only one that concerns animal exploitation
as a social matter; it is an obligation that we all have as individuals. Chattel slavery was
wrong because it treated humans as things; it violated their right not to be used as
things. There was an obligation to end the institution. But there was also an individual
obligation not to participate directly in slavery by owning slaves. Sex trafficking is wrong
because it treats humans as things; it violates their rights not to be used exclusively as
resources. We must end this institution and not campaign to make it supposedly more
“humane,” and we must also not participate in it by purchasing the services of someone
who is a victim of this practice. If animals are nonhuman persons, then we have an
obligation to promote the abolition—not just the regulation (which is pretty useless
anyway)—of nonhuman exploitation as an institutional matter. On a personal level, we
must no longer participate directly in animal exploitation—by eating, wearing, or
otherwise using animals—to the extent practicable. Our using animals as resources is
tantamount to acknowledging that animals are things. If animals are nonhuman persons,
we have an obligation to live as vegans.
Recall the definition of veganism that I provided in the introduction: veganism
involves not eating, wearing, or using animals or animal products to the extent
practicable with the goal of abolishing all animal use because such use cannot be
morally justified. Recall also that I made three points when I introduced this definition:
First, veganism is not just a matter of diet. Vegans also do not wear animal clothing, use
products that contain ingredients that involve animals, or patronize zoos, circuses,
rodeos, or other forms of entertainment that involve animals. Diet is often the focus of
discussion about veganism because our numerically most significant use of animals—
by far—is for food; our main contact with animals is as food. As long as we are eating
animals, we are unlikely to be able to appreciate that other animal uses are similarly
objectionable. Once we stop eating animals for moral reasons, it becomes easy to see
how other uses are also objectionable. In any event, although veganism is not just about
food, most of our discussion will focus on food. Second, being vegan requires that we
not exploit animals to the extent that is practicable. It is impossible to avoid all animal
use in that there are animal by-products in road surfaces, plastics, and so on. What
veganism requires is that we not participate directly in animal exploitation when we have
a meaningful choice. Third, veganism is a moral imperative. It is something that we have
a moral obligation to do if we agree that animals are not things. It is a matter of justice.
In this chapter, we will explore veganism further.
Reform Campaigns
Promoting measures that fall short of veganism is also reflected in campaigns that
support animal welfare reform rather than promoting the abolition of animal use. These
campaigns, which are promoted by most of the corporate animal charities, seek various
reforms that they claim will make animal use supposedly more “humane.” As we saw
earlier, the property status of animals guarantees that welfare standards will always be
low. And, as I have also discussed, welfare reform efforts ignore the fundamental moral
principle that, if animals are persons, then we are acting unjustly by imposing any
suffering on them incidental to using them as things. There is, however, another aspect
of welfare campaigns that I mentioned in chapter 1 and want to discuss further here.
As I wrote in 1996, the modern animal movement maintains that better animal
welfare will lead eventually to greater public sensitivity to the issue of animal exploitation
and then to the end of animal exploitation or, at least, to a significant reduction in animal
use. The problem is that there is absolutely no evidence that supposedly higher animal
welfare leads to abolition or reduction. What has happened, however, is that animal
charities and industry (broadly defined as those who produce or sell animal products)
have, in many respects, become business partners.15 The charities campaign for
minimal changes and often target practices that are economically vulnerable, industry
initially resists but then agrees to an even lesser change often phased in over a long
period and in a way that accommodates its economic interests, and both benefit. The
charities get to declare victory and claim that their campaign has successfully
persuaded industry to take animal welfare more seriously, which helps their fundraising,
and the latter, praised by “animal people” for agreeing to the reform that may even
increase their production efficiency (and certainly never harms them seriously), get to
reassure the public that they share the public’s concern for the “compassionate”
treatment of animals in marketing whatever product they sell. Some of these charities
even have programs where they certify animal products as “humane.” The “happy” eggs
and milk that I discussed earlier in this chapter are often products that are certified or
promoted by animal welfare charities, and some certify or promote “happy” meat as
well. The partnership between animal charities and institutional exploiters is a win-win
situation for animal charities and animal producers, and a win situation for consumers,
who can feel better about continuing to exploit animals. Only the animals lose.
In the past thirty years, billions of dollars have been raised by animal charities as part
of efforts to make the treatment of animals used for various purposes supposedly more
“humane.” Animals are still being tortured; the primary effect of these campaigns has
been to promote the fantasy that we can exploit animals in a benign way. Roger Scruton
describes the life of grazing animals in Britain as involving being “well-fed, comfortable
and protected, cared for when disease afflicts them and, after a quiet life among their
natural companions, despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must
surely envy.”16 This view may reflect what Scruton has seen in paintings by Reynolds or
Constable, but it is not reality. Jeff McMahan claims that “humane rearing, when
practiced scrupulously, does not cause animals to suffer.”17 That is conjecture on his
part as that sort of rearing has never existed, and certainly not on any commercial level,
and, for reasons I have discussed, I do not believe it can exist under any circumstances.
In any event, by making humans who care about animals feel more comfortable
about continuing to exploit animals rather than focus them on the idea that any animal
use reflects an acceptance that animals are just things that have no moral value, animal
charities have, in effect, convinced the public that recognizing animals as having moral
value is consistent with continuing to exploit animals. I believe that the “animal
movement” thereby does a very great disservice to animals.
Single-Issue Campaigns
Single-issue campaigns, which focus on a particular animal product or use, encourage
the belief that some types of animal exploitation are morally more acceptable than
others, and thereby perpetuate animal exploitation. Examples of single-issue campaigns
include the anti-fur campaign, the anti-veal campaign, the anti–foie gras campaign,
campaigns targeting the consumption of dogs in Asian countries, anti-hunting
campaigns, and campaigns targeting kosher or halal slaughter.
Fur is no worse than leather. Fur is the skin of an animal that has the fur or hair still
attached. Leather has the fur or hair removed. Fur is no worse than wool. Sheep are
subjected to all sorts of violent treatment, including shearing. Sheep are prey animals
who are easily frightened. They resist being shorn and are clearly terrified during this
process and even the most careful shearer will nick or cut the sheep in the process of
shearing. And sheep used for wool do not die of old age; they are eventually
slaughtered and consumed as meat. Neither veal nor foie gras is worse than steak.
Eating dogs is no different from eating any other animals. Animals who are hunted and
animals sold at the supermarket all died violent deaths. Kosher and halal slaughter,
which involve the exsanguination of an unstunned animal, are brutal—just as is non-
kosher/non-halal slaughter, particularly in light of the fact that animals who are
supposedly stunned before they are shackled, hoisted, and cut are often not fully
unconscious. Bullfights and rodeos are both brutal and no worse morally than eating
animals.
Single-issue campaigns, like animal welfare campaigns, encourage animal
exploitation by explicitly or implicitly promoting the idea that some forms of animal use
are worse than other forms and, by implication, the non-targeted uses are morally more
acceptable. For example, in a campaign targeting kosher/halal slaughter, a large UK
animal charity recommended that those concerned boycott businesses that sold meat
from animals who were not stunned. This explicitly suggested that stunned meat is
morally better. The veal boycott implicitly promotes the idea that meat from cows is
morally better than meat from calves.
Moreover, these campaigns often reflect, involve, and perpetuate discrimination
against humans. The campaign against eating dogs encourages the idea that Asians
are morally more reprehensible because some of them eat dogs; the anti-fur campaign
has always had sexist and misogynist aspects. The campaign against kosher slaughter
has always had anti-Semitic aspects just as the anti-halal campaign has Islamophobic
aspects. It is clear why animal advocacy organizations promote such campaigns. It
allows them to build large coalitions of people who themselves participate in animal
exploitation but are then able to point a finger at other, often disfavored, humans who
are the “real” abusers. In any event, we are unlikely to appreciate that species is an
irrelevant criterion for excluding nonhumans from membership in the moral community
as long as we do not see that using race, sex, sexual orientation, and so forth to
exclude humans from the moral community or to treat them in unfair ways is similarly
problematic.18
I have long maintained that I could view some single-issue campaigns in a more
favorable light if they were explicitly and consistently presented as an incremental step
leading toward the abolition of all animal exploitation (and if they did not involve some
form of human discrimination). I have yet to see any single-issue campaign that does
this. That is because they cannot do so as a financial matter. In order to be the
fundraising devices they are intended to be, they need to keep the pool of possible
donors as large as possible. These campaigns cannot take the position that all animal
use is morally unacceptable because many members of the coalition (and donors to
these charities) will not be vegans and will be engaged in various forms of animal
exploitation. The point of these campaigns is to promote targeting others who are the
culpable parties.
As I mentioned earlier, we do not need to eat animal products to lead healthy lives.
Vegans must make sure to get vitamin B-12, which humans do not manufacture, or at
least not in reliable quantities. But all humans have to get B-12 from some exogenous
source. Carnivores get it from meat; vegans get it from nutritional yeast, other fortified
food, or supplements, and there have been claims that water lentils contain a bioactive
form of B12. Humans also need fatty acids that they don’t manufacture. Most people get
their essential fatty acids from eating fish. The fish get it from consuming algae. Vegans
get these fatty acids directly from an algae supplement, or from flaxseeds and walnuts,
which provide these nutrients.
In sum, if animals are persons and have a morally significant interest in their lives, then
our institutionalized exploitation of animals, which assumes that animals are things and
are not persons, cannot be defended. We have an obligation to support the abolition of
animal use and to stop participating directly in animal exploitation in our own lives. If
animals matter morally, veganism is a moral imperative.
And that brings us to the point that I made in the introduction. It is not veganism that
is extreme; what is extreme is embracing the idea that animals matter morally and not
being vegan.
A general conclusion follows.
Conclusion
This book was not meant to convince those who do not care at all about animals—who
think that they are just things to which we can have no moral obligations—that they are
wrong and that animals have moral value. It was meant to convince the very many
people who do care about animals, and who do think that they have moral value and are
not things, that the moral value of nonhumans is inconsistent with our imposing any
suffering or death on them incidental to using them exclusively as resources. If we
agree that animals matter morally, we are committed to stopping our direct participation
in institutionalized animal exploitation. Veganism is a moral imperative.
Our conventional thinking—the default position on animals that most of us embrace—
is that animals are not things. They have morally significant interests in not suffering.
We recognize that we have a moral obligation, which is supported by law, to treat
animals “humanely” and to not impose “unnecessary” suffering on them. But our
conventional wisdom also says that nonhuman animals are not persons. They are
sentient. They are subjectively aware. But they do not have a morally significant interest
in their lives. They cannot think of themselves in the future so they cannot have any
preferences about their future existence. They don’t care that we use and kill them; they
care only about how we treat them. They are our property; we can use and kill them as
long as we take seriously their interests in not suffering. So animals aren’t persons but
they are not things either. They are quasi-persons. We saw, however, that there were
two significant problems with this arrangement.
First, because animals are chattel property, the standard of animal welfare is very
low. We protect animal interests more or less only to the extent that it makes economic
sense for us to do so. For the most part, we look to the norms and customary practices
of those involved in an animal use and defer to their judgments about what makes
economic sense. Yes, in theory, we could accord a greater level of protection to animal
interests, but, as a practical matter, whatever level of protection we accord will always
be low. And the status of animals as property makes according equal consideration to
their interests—that is, assessing their interests without discounting on account of
species—extremely difficult, if not impossible. Animal interests will always be accorded
less weight because animals are property.
Second, our denial of personhood status to animals based on their supposedly not
having an interest in continuing to live is a breathtaking example of how, if our self-
interest is at stake, we can believe something that, if we think about it for a minute, is
literally absurd. Where humans are involved, we recognize that being subjectively aware
itself provides the link to a future self—the self in the next second of consciousness. We
don’t require that they have a particular conceptual framework that involves their being
able to contemplate the future in abstract terms in order to have an interest in continuing
to live. This is why we see no morally relevant difference between a human with late-
stage dementia who has no ability to remember the past or plan for the future beyond
the next second of consciousness and one who can remember the past and plan for the
future but whose ability to do so is very limited. It would be completely arbitrary to say
that one is a person and one is not. We treat both as persons because both have an
interest in and value their lives, however they think about and value their lives. We do
not treat them as if they were persons; we treat them as persons. We do not say that it
is acceptable to use them exclusively as resources and to kill them as long as we treat
them “humanely”; we say that it is wrong to use them exclusively as resources at all. We
do not require that, in order to be persons, humans have to be faint versions of normally
functioning humans.
There is no reason—other than our anthropocentrism and the overpowering sense of
entitlement that it facilitates—to deny personhood to nonhumans who are subjectively
aware. Their lives consist of their continued consciousness, which connects them to
their future selves. The only fair way to deal with the matter of nonhuman personhood is
to recognize that the issue is resolved not by whether a being has a mind that is similar
to the mind of a normally functioning human, but by whether the being has a mind. A
mind that is subjectively aware is necessary to have interests; if a being has no
interests, we cannot harm that being. But a mind that is subjectively aware is also
sufficient to have an interest in continuing to live. Of all conscious beings—human and
nonhuman—we can say that, despite any differences in the nature of their
consciousness, there is something it is like to be a conscious being and that necessarily
involves being connected to the next second of consciousness, and the next second
after that, and so forth. We would find it heinous if anyone proposed that we used
merely conscious humans exclusively as resources but we accept without question that
it is acceptable to so use merely consciousness nonhumans. That differential treatment
cannot be justified.
We may not know where the precise line is between those nonhumans who are
conscious and those who are not, but we know without question that all of the mammals
and birds we exploit are sentient. And we know that fish and amphibians—all
vertebrates—are sentient. We may not and may never be able to understand what their
consciousness is like, but we know that they are conscious. There is controversy as to
whether other animals, such as noncephalopod mollusks or crustaceans, are sentient.
In cases where we are not sure, we should, as we do in the case of humans, err in favor
of treating those beings as sentient, as there is much at stake if we are wrong in thinking
that these animals lack phenomenal consciousness.
If animals have moral value, they must have one right—the right not to be property. If
they do not have this one right, their interests in not suffering will be devalued or
ignored. Their interest in their lives will be ignored. Recognizing the right of animals not
to be property does not protect nonhuman animals from all suffering and death any
more than the right of humans not to be property protects them from all suffering and
death. But in both cases, the right protects the rightholders from all suffering incidental
to use exclusively as a resource.
If we agree that animals matter morally, then we can no longer justify using them
however supposedly “humanely” we treat and kill them. Focusing on whether treatment
is “humane” misses the point. It’s not a matter of whether animal products are produced
on factory farms or family farms. If we agree that animals matter morally, we can no
longer justify the institutionalized exploitation of animals as a societal matter and we
have an obligation as individuals not to participate in the use of animals, however they
are treated. We are committed to veganism—not eating, wearing, or otherwise using
animals—as a matter of fundamental fairness. Although this appears to be a radical
conclusion, our conventional wisdom is that we should not inflict “unnecessary” suffering
on animals. A coherent interpretation of this principle—one that did not assume the
legitimacy of the status of animals as property—would militate against most, if not
substantially all, animal use even in the absence of personhood or rights considerations.
The fact that we subject animals to any suffering incidental to uses that cannot plausibly
be characterized as necessary is compelling proof that, despite what we think about
animals being quasi-persons, they are nothing but things.
Our moral “conflicts” with animals are mostly of our own doing. We bring billions of
sentient animals into the world in order to kill them for reasons that are often trivial. We
then seek to understand the nature of our moral obligations to these animals. But by
bringing these animals into existence for reasons that we would never consider
appropriate for humans, we have already decided that animals are outside the scope of
our moral community altogether. Accepting that animals have this one right not to be
property does not entail letting cows, chickens, pigs, and dogs run free in the streets.
We have brought these animals into existence and they depend on us for their survival.
We should care for those presently living, but we should stop causing more to come into
being to serve as our resources.
There are those who claim that the world that I envisage is a bleak one because we
will no longer have the joy that we experience when we interact with nonhumans. You
will probably not be surprised to learn that I very much disagree with that
characterization. It is certainly the case that, in the Abolitionist world I would like to see,
we will not have any more domesticated animals that we use for food, clothing, or other
purposes. We won’t have the joy we may presently get from seeing the sheep graze on
the hillside because we won’t be exploiting those animals any longer for their meat or
wool. We won’t see the cow in the pasture nuzzling and caring for her calf. And,
eventually, we won’t have any more “pets” because there will be no more animals who
need to be adopted.
Although the thought of that may make us sad consider the following:
We might not see the sheep grazing on the hillside, but we will no longer be
responsible—as we are now—for the terror those animals feel when they are shorn, or
when, after their wool is taken for the last time, they are sent to die in the
slaughterhouse. We might not see the cow and her calf, but we will no longer be
responsible—as we are now—for the profound grief that she feels when her baby is
taken from her and sent off to be turned into veal chops and the despair of her life that
consists of repeated impregnation followed by taking her baby until she has gone
through this five or six times and is then taken to the slaughterhouse. We might not
have pets at some point in the distant future—there will be plenty to adopt for a long
while yet—but we won’t be responsible—as we are now—for bringing into existence
beings who are bred for servility and docility and most of whom have horrible lives.
We will no longer be responsible—as we are now—for the unspeakable violence that
characterizes our present relationship with other animals and that we have, remarkably,
come to see as “normal.” We will no longer be part of the slaughter of the many, many
billions of animals that we kill every year for food, clothing, entertainment, sport, and
research and testing.
The primary vehicle for our discriminating against other humans has involved our
characterizing these other humans as “animals.” Once some group of humans has been
reduced to the moral status of animals, we can disregard their personhood or
discriminate against them as persons. Anything goes. If we end our exploitation of
animals, how could we continue to discriminate against other humans? We will be
unable to do so, or at least not nearly as easily as we have done for thousands of years.
I think that it is probably likely that we will expand our moral concern to animals only
after we do a better job of rejecting violence against other humans. But it is important to
understand that the issues about human rights and animal rights are inextricably
intertwined.
There will still be animals in the wilderness and there will be nondomesticated
animals—birds, squirrels, mice, and so on—who inhabit our cities and towns. We will
interact with them from time to time but our interaction will, admittedly, be very different.
We will no longer see them as things or as quasi-persons; we will see them as
nonhuman persons. Although our obligation not to treat them as property will, strictly
speaking, be limited to not treating them exclusively as our resources, their status as
persons will militate in favor of our not deliberately killing them, at least in any situation
in which we cannot justify that killing as self-defense. When we have interactions with
them that we do not particularly want, we will think about resolving any conflicts in ways
that reflect our recognition that their lives matter. For example, we will become more
careful about things we do that result in mice coming into our homes instead of being
careless and then solving the problem that we created by killing them. I welcome the
raised consciousness that we would have.
An Abolitionist world, which would be far less alienating than the world in which we
presently live, would be anything but bleak. And although I have not discussed other
reasons that militate in favor of veganism, a vegan world, or a largely vegan world, may
be the only way that we will avoid a climate catastrophe. And a vegan world would make
possible the eradication of human hunger, as well as the elimination of the specter of
more pandemics and other zoonotic diseases.
I assume that you reject the idea that animals are just things with respect to whom
we have and can have no moral obligations. I anticipate that you started reading this
book thinking that animals matter morally but that they were not persons and that
“humane” treatment was all that they deserved. I hope that I have persuaded you
otherwise and that you now see that veganism is not extreme. What is extreme is
thinking that animals matter morally and not being vegan.
If you are wondering whether my position is realistic, let me suggest that what is not
realistic is to continue as we have: focusing on making animal exploitation more
supposedly “humane” and attacking particular animal uses and products without having
a clear and explicit commitment to abolishing all exploitation. That will never work. The
only way that we will every change the world for animals is if those who care about them
as a moral matter stop participating in their exploitation. If all of us who regard animals
as having moral value followed through and put our morals where our mouths are, and
stopped eating, wearing, and using animals, there would be a huge number of vegans.
Demand for animal products would decrease dramatically and social discourse about
animal ethics would shift from a focus on whether treatment is “humane” to whether use
can be morally justified. Moreover, there would be a very realistic possibility of securing
legislation that dismantled the institutionalized exploitation of nonhuman persons rather
that legislation that does little more than continue the fantasy that humans can engage
in “compassionate” exploitation.
There are so many who do care but who are not yet vegan. I dedicated this book to
those people. They are the hope for change. They have the ability to bring about the
revolution of the heart is so desperately needed.
Notes
Introduction
Where cited materials were found on a website, citations include URLs. Website content and URL addresses are,
however, constantly changing. In order to ensure that the cited materials remain available to the reader, the URL
citations have, where possible, been captured and are available in a file of notes on my website, at www
.HowDoIGoVegan.com. Where the original URL citation is accurate as of the time that the book was completed, the
original citation is provided, and the captured citation is provided following in parentheses. If the original URL should
subsequently no longer contain the cited material, the reader can access that material through the captured site.
Where the original website content or URL citation was already changed as of the time of writing, only the captured
citation is provided. Several of the citations are to another one of my sites, www.AbolitionistApproach.com.
1. I recognize that some philosophers maintain that nonsentient objects can have inherent value and that we can
have moral obligations that we owe to those objects. They may say, for example, that my destroying the Mona
Lisa is morally wrong even if I am the only human left on the planet and I cannot stand the Mona Lisa. I do not
share that view. I recognize that some objects may reflect a higher degree of some virtue, such as technical
competence—a cathedral displays a higher degree of technical ability to build than does a shack and the Mona
Lisa reflects a higher degree of technical competence than does a drawing by a child of a stick figure. But I do
not agree that these objects have any greater value other than what we accord them. And I would regard it as
morally unjustifiable to kill one mouse in order to save the Mona Lisa based on any notion of the supposedly
greater inherent value of the Mona Lisa.
I also recognize that some think that ecosystems (considered apart from any sentient life that lives in or
depends on the ecosystem) have inherent value. I reject this as well. Ecosystems have moral value to the extent
that sentient beings value them. Since healthy ecosystems are essential for all human and nonhuman life, they
have value (and many, including myself, argue that we should attach greater value to ecosystems than we do
because our present valuation is not consistent with the planet being able to sustain sentient life). If, however,
there were no sentient life on Earth, God would violate no moral obligation owed to the ecosystem if God
decided to destroy it.
2. Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1972): 37–65, 37.
3. Joseph Fletcher, “Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man,” Hastings Center Report 2, no. 5
(November 1972): 1–4.
4. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) (London: T. Tegg and Son, 1836), 225.
5. In law, some entities that are not human are considered as “persons.” For example, corporations are considered
as persons. But that just means that corporations can sue and be sued, and can own property. Corporations are
merely legal forms that human persons use for business or other purposes.
6. Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Persons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 63.
7. See the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (July 7, 2012): http://fcmconference.org/img
/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf (www.howdoigovegan.com/resources/April2020
/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf).
8. See Lord Medway (Chairman), Report of the Panel of Enquiry Into Shooting and Angling, 1976–1979 (Bradford,
UK: Hart and Clough, 1980). The panel, which was chaired by Lord Medway, a respected zoologist and
environmental biologist, concluded that all vertebrate animals, including fish and amphibians, are sentient.
9. See Victoria Braithwaite, Do Fish Feel Pain? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
10. See, e.g., Philip Goff, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness (New York: Pantheon,
2019).
11. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why,” Social Research, 62, no. 3 (Fall
1995): 691–710.
12. For those who want a more detailed discussion of the issues that I discuss here, including more about what I
have developed as the Abolitionist Approach to Animal Rights (which is based explicitly on the idea that
sentience is the only characteristic needed for nonhuman personhood), please see, e.g., Gary L. Francione and
Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010); Gary L. Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008); Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000); Gary L. Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the
Animal Rights Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property,
and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). See also Gary L. Francione, “Animals—Property or
Persons?” in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C.
Nussbaum (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 108–42. I have also coauthored with Anna Charlton three
monographs that are intended as practical educational resources: Advocate for Animals!: An Abolitionist Vegan
Handbook (Newark, NJ: Exempla Press, 2018); Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach (Newark, NJ: Exempla
Press, 2015); and Eat Like You Care: An Examination of the Ethics of Eating Animals (Newark, NJ: Exempla
Press, 2013).
13. It is more difficult to convince someone that animals are not things. See Gary L. Francione, “Morality and Logic in
Vegan Advocacy,” Medium.com (July 13, 2019): https://medium.com/@gary.francione/morality-and-logic-in-
vegan-advocacy-e4b8a0377af9 (www.howdoigovegan.com/resources/April2020
/moralityandlogicinveganadvocacy.pdf). I am a moral realist and maintain that the moral obligation to accord
personhood to all sentient beings is incumbent on everyone to observe, whatever they believe. But the argument
in this book is directed to those who already agree that animals matter morally.
This book is an essay built around three central ideas: veganism as a moral imperative if animals matter morally; the
rejection of the status of animals as property and the right of animals to not be used as property; and a theory of
nonhuman personhood based only on sentience.
I thought that, instead of a conventional index, it might be more useful to provide a reference/study guide that
outlined the book so that the reader could identify these ideas in the contexts in which they occur. Please keep in
mind that this guide merely outlines the essay; it should be used in conjunction with the discussions that are
presented in the book.
Introduction
Many people who think that animals matter morally are not vegan and think that veganism is extreme: 1.
The thesis of this book is that, if you think that animals matter morally, then you are committed to be a vegan and
to not eat, wear, or otherwise use animals; it is extreme (in the sense of being extremely inconsistent) to believe that
animals matter morally and not be a vegan: 1–2.
The moral universe is populated by two entities: persons and things. Persons are entities that have moral value;
they can be said to have inherent value—that is, value that derives from the sort of beings they are. Things have
extrinsic value—that is, they have only the value that we accord to them: 2.
“Person” and “human” are not synonymous: 2–3.
Persons are entitled to certain protections: we must justify imposing suffering on them and we take seriously their
interest in their continued existence; we think of persons as having a morally important interest in continuing to live: 3.
We generally identify personhood with characteristics that are required for at least minimal participation in social
institutions and interaction with others: 3–4.
We do not regard animals as either persons or things. We think of them as what we might call quasi-persons; they
are not just things because we recognize that they have direct moral significance—we have a moral obligation to not
inflict “unnecessary” suffering on them and to treat them “humanely”—but we do not regard them as persons because
we think that it is morally acceptable to use and kill them for our purposes: 4–5.
Animals are property—they are things we buy, sell, own, and use exclusively as our resources—and this means
that, irrespective of what we say, animals are just things that have no moral value. To the extent that we protect
animal interests, we do so for the most part to facilitate the economically efficient use of animals: 5.
We may accord a high value to certain animals, such as our pets, but this is just an illustration of our freedom as
property owners to value our property: 5–6.
Because animals are property, we generally do not ask whether particular uses of animals are necessary; instead,
we ask whether it is necessary to impose pain and suffering on animals pursuant to our uses of them, even if those
uses are not necessary: 6.
The concept of “humane” treatment is nothing more than a fantasy, the primary purpose of which is to make us feel
more comfortable about exploiting animals; animal welfare is more about economics than morality: 6.
If we really believe that animals matter morally, we need to recognize that animals are nonhuman persons who
have a morally significant interest in continuing to live and that it is morally wrong to use them exclusively as our
resources irrespective of however “humanely” we treat them; there is no good reason to deny personhood status to
animals: 6.
Where humans are concerned, although we usually think of personhood as involving the characteristics that are
necessary for minimal participation in social institutions and interaction with others, we recognize that there are two
sorts of persons: moral agents, or those who possess all of the cognitive characteristics of normally functioning
humans and who can participate fully in our social, political, and legal institutions; and moral patients, or humans who
do not have all of the cognitive characteristics of normally functioning humans or have them to a lesser degree: 6–7.
It is uncontroversial to say that we regard any moral patient who is at least sentient—any human who is
conscious/subjectively aware—as being a person with a morally significant interest in continuing to live: 7–8.
Sentience provides all we need to justify personhood for nonhumans as it does for humans: 8.
Most of the animals we routinely exploit are clearly subjectively aware, and the only explanation we have for
denying them personhood status and treating them as things, irrespective of our claiming to regard them as having
moral value, is our anthropocentrism, or our belief that humans have greater moral value because we say they do: 8–
9.
If animals are nonhuman persons, they must have a right not to be treated as property. A right is simply a way of
protecting an interest, and the personhood of nonhumans should be protected even if it would benefit humans to
exploit them: 10.
The right not to be treated as property is presented as a moral right, not a legal one, and our recognition of the one
right not to be property would require that we reject the institutionalized exploitation of animals: 10–11.
If animals are persons and have a right not to be used as property, then we should end our institutionalized
exploitation of them and embrace veganism, which is defined as not eating, wearing, or using animals or animal
products to the extent practicable, with the goal of abolishing all animal use because such use cannot be morally
justified: 11–12.
There are also compelling health and ecological reasons, as well as reasons related to human rights and the
alleviation of world hunger, to eat a plant-based diet, but this book will concentrate on the moral reasons why,
because animals matter morally, we should not use animals exclusively as our resources for any purpose: 12–13.
A vegan is one who, whenever faced with a meaningful choice, chooses not to participate directly in animal
exploitation: 13.
Veganism is a matter of what justice requires if animals are nonhuman persons; although less suffering is better
than more suffering, if animals matter morally, we cannot justify imposing any suffering pursuant to using animals as
resources irrespective of however supposedly “humane” our treatment is; veganism is a moral imperative: 13–15.
An outline of the book is presented: 15–16.
This book is not intended as an exhaustive examination of all the issues and debates involved in animal ethics; it is
a relatively brief essay that seeks to provide a starting point for a broad social discussion about the moral status of
nonhuman animals: 16.
The goal is not to convince those who think animals are things that they are wrong and that animals have moral
value; the goal is to demonstrate to those who view animals as having moral value—a very large group—that
veganism is a logical consequence of what they already believe: 16–17.
Conclusion
This book was not meant to convince those who believe animals are merely things that they are wrong; it was meant
to convince those who do regard animals as having moral value that veganism is a moral imperative: 166.
Our conventional thinking about animals is that they matter morally because they are sentient; we are obligated not
to impose “unnecessary” suffering on them and to treat them “humanely,” but they are chattel property that we can
use and kill: 166–67.
Because animals are property, the standard of animal welfare is very low: 167.
Our denial of personhood to animals based on their supposedly not having an interest in continuing to live is
absurd and cannot be defended; nonhuman personhood, like human personhood, depends only on sentience: 167–
68.
We may not know where the precise line is between nonhumans who are sentient and those who are not, but
virtually all the animals we routinely exploit are unquestionably sentient; where we are not sure, we should err in favor
of treating beings as sentient given what is at stake: 168–69.
If animals are going to matter morally, then they must have the one right not to be property; if they are property,
they remain as things: 169.
If we agree that animals matter morally, we can no longer justify killing animals pursuant to our institutionalized
exploitation of them, irrespective of however supposedly “humane,” and we are obligated to be vegan: 169.
This view may appear to be radical, but we would see it as consistent with our widely shared view that it is wrong
to impose “unnecessary” suffering on animals if we did not assume the legitimacy of the property status of animals:
169–70.
Our moral “conflicts” with animals are, for the most part, of our own making: 170.
We have an obligation to care for domesticated animals now in existence, but we should stop causing more to
come into existence: 170.
There are those who claim that the Abolitionist position for which I argue would result in a bleak world because we
would no longer have the joy of interacting with animals, but this position neglects that our joy comes at a great
expense to animals and that our world would be enriched immeasurably by our no longer taking part in the
unspeakable violence and injustice of animal exploitation: 170–71.
If we stopped treating animals like things, we would no longer have the template that allows us to discriminate
against, commodify, and otherwise harm disfavored groups of humans whom we analogize to animals: 171.
There will still be conflicts between humans and nondomesticated animals, but we will view these conflicts in a
different way once we recognize that animal lives matter: 172.
An Abolitionist world would be anything but bleak and may also represent our best chance for avoiding climate
catastrophe and more pandemics and other zoonotic diseases as well as alleviating human hunger: 172.
It is extreme (in the sense of being extremely inconsistent) to maintain that animals have moral value and not be
vegan: 172.
It is not realistic to suggest that going on as we have will change the world for animals; the only realistic solution is
for the very large number of humans who believe that nonhumans matter morally to stop participating in their
exploitation. This would result in a dramatic decrease in demand for animal products and a shift in social discourse
from a focus on whether treatment is “humane” to whether use can be justified; it would also make possible more
meaningful political efforts: 173.
Those humans who value nonhumans morally but who are not yet vegan are the key to change and to the
revolution of the heart that is desperately needed: 173.