1.

1    Background of Study     The word idealism is a metaphysical and

epistemological doctrine, which show that ideas or thought make up
fundamental reality. Therefore the only thing actually knowable is
consciousness, where as we can never be sure that matter or anything in
the outside world really exists.1 But the only real things are mental
entities, not physical things which exist only in the sense that they are
perceived.     The two basic forms of idealism are metaphysical idealism,
which holds that in knowledge process the mind can grasp through
knowledge. And metaphysical idealism is directly opposed to
materialism, which show the view that the basic substance of the world is
matter and that it is known primarily through material forms. It is known
primarily through material forms. In its epistemology it is opposed to
realism, which holds that in human knowledge objects are grasped and
seen as they really are, in their existence outside and independently of the
mind.

George Berkeley’s idealism can be found in his numerous works, but

his view concerning sources of knowledge, ideas perception and
minds, the new principle are to be found in his book “the principle of
Human knowledge”, which is regarded as Berkeley’s master piece
which he tries to explain ht e “Origin of ideas was published in 1710”
and the “Three Dialogue between Hylas nad Philonou in 1713”.     In
the following dialogue, Berkeley defends his idealism, which opines
that the notion that only minds and ideas exist, “To be is to
perceived”. .

4. Idealism and Immaterialism

Berkeley’s famous principle is esse is percipi, to be is to be
perceived. Berkeley was an idealist. He held that ordinary
objects are only collections of ideas, which are mind-
dependent. Berkeley was an immaterialist. He held that
there are no material substances. There are only finite
mental substances and an infinite mental substance,
namely, God. On these points there is general agreement.
There is less agreement on Berkeley’s argumentative
approach to idealism and immaterialism and on the role of
some of his specific arguments. His central arguments are
often deemed weak.

The account developed here is based primarily on the

opening thirty-three sections of the Principles of Human
Knowledge. It assumes, contrary to some commentators,
that Berkeley’s metaphysics rests on epistemological
foundations. This approach is prima facie plausible
insofar as it explains the appeal to knowledge in the title of
the Principles , it is consistent with Berkeley’s epistemic
concerns in other writings, and it provides an explanatory
role for abstract ideas. There will be occasional digressions
concerning the problems perceived by those who claim
that Berkeley’s approach was more straightforwardly
metaphysical.

Berkeley begins his discussion as follows:

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the

objects of human knowledge, that they are
either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or
else such as are perceived by attending to the
passions and operations of the mind, or lastly
ideas formed by help of memory and
imagination, either compounding, dividing, or
barely representing those originally perceived in
the aforesaid ways. (PHK §1).

This seems to say that ideas are the immediate objects of

knowledge in a fundamental sense (acquaintance).
Following Locke, there are ideas of sense, reflection, and
imagination. So, ordinary objects, as known, are
collections of ideas marked by a single name. Berkeley’s
example is an apple.
If ideas are construed as objects of knowledge, then there
must also be something that “knows or perceives them,
and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining,
remembering about them” (PHK §2; cf. §6). This Berkeley
calls this ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’. Minds (as knowers) are distinct
from ideas (as things known). For an idea, to be is to be
perceived (known). Since this holds for ideas in general, it
holds for “sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense” in
particular (§3).

Berkeley contends that the “opinion strangely prevailing

amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a
world all sensible objects have an existence natural or real,
distinct from being perceived” is inconsistent, “a manifest
contradiction” (PHK §4). If one construes ‘sensible objects’
as ideas of sense, and ideas are objects of knowledge, then
having a real existence distinct from being perceived
would require that an object be known (as an idea) and
unknown (as a thing distinct from being perceived), which
is inconsistent. He explains the source of the error on the
basis of the doctrine of abstract ideas (PHK §5), a
discussion which parallels the discussion in Introduction
§10.

Ordinary objects, as known, are nothing but collections of

ideas. If, like Descartes, Berkeley holds that claims of
existence are justified if and only if the existent can be
known, then ordinary objects must be at least collections
of ideas. As Berkeley put it, “all the choir of heaven and
furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which
compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any
subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be
perceived or known” (PHK §6). The only substance that
can be known is a spirit or thinking substance (PHK §7).
But notice what has not yet been shown. It has not been
shown that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas,
nor has it be shown that thinking substances are
immaterial. Berkeley’s next move is to ask whether there
are grounds for claiming ordinary objects are something
more than ideas.

The above account is not the only interpretation of the first

seven sections of the Principles. Many commentators take
a more directly metaphysical approach. They assume that
ideas are mental images or objects of thought (Winker,
p.6), or modes of a mental substance , or immediate
objects of perception , or any of Berkeley’s other
occasional characterizations of ideas, and proceed to show
that, on the chosen account of ideas, Berkeley’s arguments
fail. A. A. Luce tells us that Berkeley’s characterization of
an apple in terms of ideas is concerned with the apple
itself, rather than a known apple , which suggests that
Berkeley begs the question of the analysis of body. Many
commentators tell us that what seems to be an allusion to
ideas of reflection in the first sentence of §1 cannot be
such, since Berkeley claims one has no ideas of minds or
mental states They ignore his allusions to ideas of
reflectionand the presumption that if there are such ideas,
they are the effects of an active mind . Many
commentators suggest that the argument
for esse is percipi is in §3 – ignoring the concluding words
in §2 – and find the “manifest contradiction” in §4
puzzling at best. Most commentators assume that the case
for idealism – the position that there are only minds and
mind-dependent entities – is complete by §7 and lament
that Berkeley has not established the ‘only’. The epistemic
interpretation we have been developing seems to avoid
these problems.

Berkeley holds that ordinary objects are at

least collections of ideas. Are they something more? In
§§8-24 Berkeley examines the prime contenders for this
“something more,” namely, theories of material substance.
He prefaces his discussion with his likeness principle, the
principle that nothing but an idea can resemble an idea. “If
we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it
impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only
between our ideas” (PHK §8). Why is this? A claim that
two objects resemble each other can be justified only by a
comparison of the objects (cf. PC §377, ##16-18). So, if
only ideas are immediately perceived, only ideas can be
compared. So, there can be no justification for a claim that
an idea resembles anything but an idea. If claims of
existence rest on epistemically justified principles, the
likeness principle blocks both grounds for claiming that
there are mediately perceived material objects and Locke’s
claim that the primary qualities of objects resemble one’s
ideas of them (Locke, 1.8.15, p. 137).

One of the marks of the modern period is the doctrine of

primary and secondary qualities. Although it was
anticipated by Descartes, Malebranche, and others, the
terms themselves were introduced in Robert Boyle’s “Of
the Origins of Forms and Qualities” (1666) and
Locke’s Essay. Primary qualities are the properties of
objects as such. The primary qualities are solidity,
extension, figure, number, and mobility (Locke 2.8.9, p.
135; cf. 2.8.10, p. 135). Secondary qualities are either the
those arrangements of corpuscles containing only primary
qualities that cause one to have ideas of color, sound,
taste, heat, cold, and smell (Locke 2.8.8, p. 135; 2.8.10, p.
135) or, on some accounts, the ideas themselves. If the
distinction can be maintained, there would be grounds for
claiming that ordinary objects are something more than
ideas. It is this theory of matter Berkeley considers first.

After giving a sketch of Locke’s account of the

primary/secondary quality distinction (PHK §9), his initial
salvo focuses on his previous conclusions and the likeness
principle. “By matter therefore we are to understand an
inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and
motion, do actually subsist” (PHK §9). Such a view is
inconsistent with his earlier conclusions that extension,
figure, and motion are ideas. The likeness principle blocks
any attempt to go beyond ideas on the basis of
resemblance. Combining the previous conclusions with the
standard account of primary qualities requires that
primary qualities both exist apart from the mind and only
in the mind. So, Berkeley concludes that “what is
called matter or corporeal substance, involves a
contradiction in it” (PHK §9). He then turns to the
individual qualities.

If there is a distinction between primary and secondary

qualities, there must be a ground for the distinction.
Indeed, given the common contention that an efficient
cause must be numerically distinct from its effect (see
Arnauld and Nicole, p. 186; Arnauld in Descartes, 2:147;
Locke 2.26.1-2, pp. 324-325), if one cannot show that
primary and secondary qualities are distinct, there are
grounds for questioning the causal hypothesis. Berkeley
argues that there is no ground for the distinction.
Appealing to what one knows – ideas as they are conceived
– Berkeley argues that one cannot conceive of a primary
quality such as extension without some secondary quality
as well: one cannot “frame an idea of a body extended and
moved, but I must withal give it some colour or other
sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the
mind” (PHK §10). If such sensible qualities as color exist
only in the mind, and extension and motion cannot be
known without some sensible quality, there is no ground
for claiming extension exists apart from the mind. The
primary/secondary quality distinction collapses. The
source of the philosophical error is cited as the doctrine of
abstract ideas. His arguments in Principles §§11-15 show
that no evidence can be found that any of the other so-
called primary qualities can exist apart from the mind.
After disposing of the primary/secondary quality
distinction, Berkeley turns to an older theory of material
substance, a substratum theory. At least since Aristotle,
philosophers had held that qualities of material objects
depend on and exist in a substance which has those
qualities. This supposed substance allegedly remains the
same through change. But if one claims there are material
substances, one must have reasons to support that claim.
In Principles §§16-24 Berkeley develops a series of
arguments to the effect that (1) one cannot form an idea of
a substratum, (2) the theory of material substance plays no
explanatory role, and (3) it is impossible to produce
evidence for the mere possibility of such an entity.

Can one form an idea a substratum? No. At least one

cannot form a positive idea of a material substratum itself
– something like an image of the thing itself – a point that
was granted by its most fervent supporters (see Descartes
1:210; Locke 2.23.3, p. 295). The most one can do is form
“An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general”
(Locke 2.23.3, p. 296), “though you know not what it is,
yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to
accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them”
(PHK §16). Berkeley argues that one cannot make good on
the notion of ‘support’ – “It is evident support cannot here
be taken in its usual or literal sense, as when we say that
pillars support a building: in what sense therefore must it
be taken?” (PHK §16) – so one does not even have a
relative idea of material substratum. Without a clear
notion of the alleged relation, one cannot single out a
material substance on the basis of a relation to something
perceived (PHK §17).

If an idea of a material substratum cannot be derived from

sense experience, claims of its existence might be justified
if it is necessary to provide an explanation of a
phenomenon. But no such explanation is forthcoming. As
Berkeley notes: “But what reason can induce us to believe
the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we
perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do
not pretend, there is any necessary connexion betwixt
them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and
what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it
beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected
with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed
without, resembling them” (PHK 18). Since material
substance is not necessary to provide an explanation of
mental phenomena, reason cannot provide grounds for
claiming the existence of a material substance.

Berkeley’s final move against material substance is

sometimes called the “Master Argument.” It takes the
form of a challenge, one on which Berkeley is willing to
rest his entire case. “It is but looking into your own
thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it
possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to
exist without the mind, or unperceived. This easy trial may
make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright
contradiction” (PHK §22). Berkeley seems to argue that in
any case one might consider – books in the back of a
closet, plants deep in a wood with no one about, footprints
on the far side of the moon – the objects are related to the
mind conceiving of them. So, it is contradictory to claim
that those objects have no relation to a mind (PHK, §§22-
23; cf. DHP1 199-201). This is generally not considered
Berkeley at his best, since many commentators argue that
it is possible to distinguish between the object conceived
and the conceiving of it. George Pappas has provided a
more sympathetic interpretation of the passage. He
contends that Berkeley is calling for an “impossible
performance” (Pappas, pp. 141-144). Conceivability is the
ground for claiming that an object is possible. If one
conceives of an object, then that object is related to some
mind, namely, the mind that conceives it. So, the problem
is that it is not possible to fulfill the conditions necessary
to show that it would be possible for an object to exist
apart from a relation to a mind.

Thus, Berkeley concludes, there are no grounds for

claiming that an ordinary object is more than a collection
of ideas. The arguments in §§1-7 showed that ordinary
objects are at least collections of ideas of sense. The
arguments in §§8-24 provide grounds for claiming that
ordinary objects are nothing more than ideas. So, Berkeley
is justified in claiming that they are only ideas of sense.
Berkeley’s argument for immaterialism is complete,
although he has not yet provided criteria for
distinguishing ideas of sense from ideas of memory and
imagination. This is his task in §§29-33. Before turning to
this, Berkeley introduces several remarks on mind.

Berkeley claims that an inspection of our ideas shows that

they are causally inert (PHK §25). Since there is a
continual succession of ideas in our minds, there must be
some cause of it. Since this cause can be neither an idea
nor a material substance, it must be a spiritual substance
(PHK §26). This sets the stage for Berkeley’s argument for
the existence of God and the distinction between real
things and imaginary things.

One knows that one causes some of one’s own ideas (PHK
§28). Since the mind is passive in perception, there are
ideas which one’s own mind does not cause. Only a mind
or spirit can be a cause. “There is therefore some other will
or spirit that produces them” (PHK §29). As such, this
is not an argument for the existence of God (see PHK
§§146-149), although Berkeley’s further discussion
assumes that at least one mind is the divine mind.

He is now in a position to distinguish ideas of sense from

ideas of the imagination: “The ideas of sense are more
strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination;
they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and
are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of
human wills often are” (PHK §30). This provides the basis
for both the distinction between ideas of sense and ideas of
imagination and for the distinction between real things
and imaginary things (PHK §33). Real things are
composed solely of ideas of sense. Ideas of sense occur
with predictable regularity; they form coherent wholes
that themselves can be expected to “behave” in predictable
ways. Ideas of sense follow (divinely established) laws of
nature (PHK §§30. 34, 36, 62, 104).

So, Berkeley has given an account of ordinary objects

without matter. Ordinary objects are nothing but lawfully
arranged collections of ideas of sense.

This section 4 is a condensed version of (Flage 2004).