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Notes: Preface
Notes: Preface
Preface
1 Zinich (1994), part 1,3.
2 Illarionov (1995).
Introduction
1 Kornai (1992), 13.
2 Hanson (1988), 153,162.
3 Khanin (1991), 114.
4 Khanin (1993), 92. This may seem a hard judgement of a school whose
leader, Bergson, is said to have sold his trousers in a Moscow street for the
sake of scholarship (to buy a handbook of official commodity prices),
according to personal correspondence from Janet Chapman (15 May 1994).
5 Gregory (1994), 9-11.
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Notes to pages 13-30 307
2 An inside view
1 Sukharevskii (1945a), (1945b).
2 Voznesenskii (1947).
3 These figures are introduced below in tables 2.8 and 2.12.
4 GARF, f. 3922/4372, op. 4, d. 115,11.35-9.
5 For explanation of material product system aggregates and their compo-
nents, see the Guide to national account (p. xxvi).
6 CfBergson (1961), 23-4.
7 These are the words of Wiles (1987), 60. Wiles also details the history of the
deceptions which followed Stalin's death. Davies (1993), 580, provides new
evidence of budgetary deception in the early 1930s.
8 UNSO (1971), 59-60. For a brief overview, see above the 'Guide to national
accounts'.
9 UNSO (1971), 20. For further discussion see Wiles (1987), 62.
10 Davies (1958), 250.
11 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1892,1. 63.
12 GARF, f. 3922/4372, op. 4, d. 115,11. 50-3.
13 See table A.I (rows 1, 7).
14 See table 5.11.
15 Voznesensky (1948), 56. 'Servicemen' was the official translation of the
gender-neutral term voennoslnzhashchie; women served as well as men.
16 For 'the means of waging war', see Kravchenko (1970), 125, 228; for 'arma-
ment', IVMV, vol. 6 (1976), 340.
17 Rather similar figures were published in 1971 by the veteran economic
planner Gennadii Sorokin (1971), 105-6. They too showed Soviet national
income produced, and the main utilisation categories, in 1940 and 1944, in
constant prices of 1940. In keeping with the spirit of the times, however,
there was no mention of defence; however, as Eugene Zaleski (1980), 352,
was first to point out, Sorokin's figures could be used to derive a plausible
defence-related expenditure series. Total consumption in each year, less
material consumption of civilian households, could be attributed to the
armed forces. Less obviously, total allocations to reserves, less the figure
given for reserves 'used for accumulation', could perhaps be interpreted as
allocations to military stockbuilding. Zaleski's accurate guesswork is vindi-
cated by the greater detail and more explicit row titles of table 2.9. In one
respect, however, the figures cited by Sorokin were highly misleading. His
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308 Notes to pages 32-40
figure for NMP produced in 1944 was only 239.3 billion rubles in 1940 prices
- no more than 62 per cent of 1940, despite the fact that by the end of 1944
Soviet prewar frontiers had been roughly restored. Sorokin's figure under-
stated NMP produced in 1944 at prewar prices, in comparison to the figures
in table 2.9 (row 3), by roughly 30 billion rubles (more than one tenth).
Sorokin's figure of 239.3 billion rubles also suggested an unbelievable gap
between NMP produced, less losses, and NMP utilised, of 72 billion rubles
(nearly one quarter of NMP utilised), all supposedly attributable to net
imports. The equivalent figure from table 2.9 (row 5) is 45.6 billion rubles (15
per cent of NMP utilised at prewar prices), a far more credible sum, though
still possibly overstated.
18 The level of national income suggested for 1944 (70 per cent of 1940 for NMP
produced, and 80 per cent for NMP utilised) is also implausibly low. For a
comparison with other estimates, see table 5.3.
19 See table K.3.
20 Compare GARF, f. 3922/4372, op. 4, d. 115,11.19-22 and 503.
21 Both quotations are from Cairncross (1991), 12. The first is cited by
Cairncross from Ely Devons.
22 Bacon (1993).
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Notes to pages 41-50 309
figure responded that they were under great pressure to come up with something
definite (personal communication, May 1994).
7 See further the 'Guide to national accounts'.
8 E.g. Wheatcroft and Davies (1985).
9 UNSO(1971).
10 Bergson (1961), 26.
11 Higgs (1992), 46-8.
12 EC-IMF-OECD-UN-WB (1993), 14.
13 Cited by Higgs (1992), 47.
14 On this point Higgs (1992), 48-9, was on firmer ground.
15 Bergson (1953), 42-54. For more recent accounts of the adjusted factor cost
standard, see Rosefielde (1981), 7-8; Pitzer (1990), 2-5.
16 Bergson (1953), 55-8.
17 Bergson (1953), 80.
18 Bergson (1944); Bergson (1953), 66.
19 Some wartime illustrations of these principles at work in price formation are
given in appendix A.
20 Bergson (1953), 65n.
21 This argument was put to me by Philip Hanson (personal communication,
21 March 1994).
22 Voznesenskii (1947).
23 SNK-TsK (1941).
24 Bergson (1953), 7-9n. As Bergson recognised, the line between methodolog-
ical deficiency and fabrication was sometimes finely drawn, especially when
the deficient methodology was adopted deliberately for purposes of distor-
tion. The high-level exaggeration of harvest yields in the 1930s, which
involved an unacknowledged shift from barn yield to 'biological' yield in
harvest measurement, is a case in point (see Wheatcroft and Davies (1994a),
30,116). The important point, however, is that even here the distortion could
be corrected once the methodology was understood. The same applies to the
postwar concealment of the true defence budget; the published one was not
freely invented, but was processed through a distorting methodology. In this
connection, Igor Birman wrote:
in thefirstplace we need not a number, but the methodology; knowing the method-
ology, ... we can calculate the number without needing to resort to lie detectors and
other detective accessories (Birman (1991), 11).
For a rare example of free invention, the published defence budget in
1931-3, recently uncovered and in this connection deeply disturbing, see
Davies (1993), 580.
25 Khanin (1991), 14-28.
26 Wiles (1962), 224.
27 Nove (1972), 381.
28 Khanin (1991), 107-8.
29 Hodgman (1954), 9-11.
30 Jasny (1951b), 110-16.
31 Hodgman (1954), 11.
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310 Notes to pages 51-74
4 Industry
1 See table A.I, row 1.
2 Hodgman (1954), Kaplan, Moorsteen (1960), Nutter (1962), Moorsteen,
Powell (1966).
3 Powell (1968), 6.
4 Powell (1968), 32.
5 See further the Note on index number relativity (p. xxxiii).
6 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 93, d. 718,1. 52; d. 720,1. 72; d. 1044,1. 72; d. 1095,11. 3-4;
d. 1110,1. 67; d. 1173,1.10; also, Terpilovskii (1967), 84, 87. For more detail
and discussion see chapter 5.
7 This work was originally carried out by Edwin Bacon, and the results are
reproduced here with only two minor amendments - revision of the price of
oil, and inclusion of a price for sawn timber. See Bacon and Harrison (1993).
8 Jasny (1951b); Jasny (1952); Moorsteen (1962); Chapman (1963); Zaleski
(1980).
9 Nutter (1962), appendix B.
10 Khanin (1991), 118; Ericson (1988), 25.
11 Wiles (1962), 225-6.
12 Tupper (1981), 9-10.
13 GARF, f. 3922/4372, op. 4, d. 313,11.165-9.
14 IVOVSS, vol. 6 (1965), 45. This figure probably also formed the basis for
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Notes to pages 76-96 311
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312 Notes to pages 97-130
6 The Alliance
1 Dawson (1959), Jones (1969), Herring (1973), Martel (1979), Beaumont
(1980), Titley (1991).
2 Thus Allen (1956), 518-556, made incidental reference to aid to the USSR in
a broader study of transatlantic transfers. For brief evaluations of the impor-
tance of Lend-Lease within studies of other topics in Soviet economic
analysis, see Bergson (1961), 99-100n, Nutter (1962), 214, Linz (1980), 25-33,
Millar (1980), 116, Harrison (1985), 149-50, Linz (1985), 25-27, Moskoff (1990),
119-22, Barber and Harrison (1991), 33-34, 189-90. For special attention
devoted to this neglected field see only Munting (1984a), Munting (1984b),
van Tuyll (1989).
3 Munting (1984a), 495; Barber and Harrison (1991), 190.
4 This hypothesis is supported by the suggestion that the wide range of goods
requested by the Soviet authorities for import under Lend-Lease arrange-
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Notes to pages 130-1 313
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314 Notes to pages 132-47
13 Calculated from Minvneshtorg (1967), 60, applying the official exchange rate
of 5.30 rubles per $1. For estimated peacetime trade ratios in time series see
Gregory, Stuart (1990), 325.
14 Jones (1969), 52.
15 Figures are taken or calculated from Allen (1956), 529, 535, using current
prices, and applying the official exchange rate of $4.03 per £1.
16 United States President (1944), 58, (1945b), 49.
17 ISE, vol. 5 (1978), 586, IVMV, vol. 12 (1982), 186.
18 See table 6.1 and, for war expenditures of the United States (in dollars) and
United Kingdom (in sterling), Allen (1956), 542 (I assume that US war
spending in the first half of 1942 amounted to 40 per cent of the annual total;
calculations are again based on current prices and exchange rates).
19 Voznesensky (1948), 61.
20 Tamarchenko (1967), 54: The relative weight of [Allied] deliveries compared
with domestic output in the period of the war amounted to only 4 per cent'.
ISE, vol. 5 (1978), 546:
Overall Anglo-American deliveries in comparison with the volume of domestic
output amounted in the war-economy period to a total of only 4 per cent
More circumspectly, IVMV, vol. 12 (1982), 187:
. . . Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were highly insignificant - about 4 per cent of the
output of industrial products in the USSR' (emphasis added).
21 Gerschenkron (1948), 656.
22 Harrison (1988), 189.
23 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 27, d. 714,1.11.
24 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 27, d. 714, 1. 10. The forecast additionally listed com-
modities imported against foreign currency reserves, put at 1.7 billion
rubles, making a total expected revenue for Narkomvneshtorg of 14.95
billion rubles.
25 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 27, d. 196,11.1-3.
26 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 27, d. 723,11.41-42.
27 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1847,11.1-2.
28 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1847,1. 53.
29 RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1847,1.53. What were the 'special revenues', which
began to be collected only in 1944? They were bracketed with Lend-Lease
and reparations as though they too were derived from foreign transactions
- perhaps the seizure of assets in German territories under Soviet occupa-
tion prior to the creation of channels for the formal payment of reparations.
30 ISE, vol. 5 (1978), 540.
31 Harrison (1985), 192-97.
32 See table 5.11, row 4.2.
33 See table 5.11, row 5.1.
34 Calculated from Moorsteen and Powell (1966), 622-23.
35 For an attempt to compare the two concepts, see table 5.8, rows 9.1,9.2.
36 On the increase in speed of movement with motorisation of the Red Army
when advancing, see Jones (1969), 233-34; on the railway burden of sup-
plying the food and fodder requirements of horse troops, see van Creveld
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Notes to pages 148-59 315
(1977), 111-13.
37 A classic treatment of this problem is the 'two-gap' model devised by
Chenery, Strout (1966).
38 See table 5.7, rows 1,2.1. This argument is couched in terms of real output at
prewar prices, however. If the great wartime increase in food and consumer
prices relative to prices of weapons (table A.I, rows 1,7) reflected changes in
social opportunity costs, then the argument might fall.
39 Khanin (1991), 265.
40 Milward (1977), 351; see also Howlett (1994).
41 The relative expenditure of human life was only partly endogenous to
national decision making, as this assumes. Moreover, the rule did not apply
on the side of the Axis. Italy and Japan were both poorer than Germany, but
Germany (4.5 million soldiers killed and died) suffered more heavily in pro-
portion to prewar population than either Japan (2 million) or Italy (400,000).
For military losses, see Urlanis (1971), 294; for prewar populations, see table
1.1, col. 1.
42 Cited in IVMV, vol. 12 (1982), 186.
7 War losses
1 Exceptions to this rule include Millar and Linz (1978), and Linz (1980).
Millar and Linz sought to evaluate Soviet non-human war losses in terms of
the number of years of wage incomes and household consumption which
they represented. Approaching the subject from various angles, they found
a range of 3.2 to 7 years' lost earnings. Subsequently, Linz supported various
estimates of years' lost earnings in a higher range.
2 Broadberry, Howlett (1994).
3 Bogart (1920); for a similar comparison between Bogart and the British offi-
cial figures, see Broadberry and Howlett (1994).
4 See for examples Voznesenskii (1948), 126-7; Tamarchenko (1967), 128-9.
5 Both Millar and Linz (1978), and Linz (1980) used a figure of 1,840 billion
rubles (184 billion rubles at the post-1961 rate) for Soviet material losses.
This figure was obtained from table 7.1, column 1, as 'direct budgetary and
other costs' (1,890 billion rubles), less servicemen's pensions, etc (50 or so
billion rubles). It was therefore much greater than - but at the same time
excluded - the only category of losses which concerns us here, the direct loss
of fixed assets (679 billion rubles).
6 So far as I can tell, the first to make this calculation was Tamarchenko (1967),
134; it was afterwards echoed in authoritative works such as ISE, vol. 5
(1978), 559 ('almost 30 per cent of national wealth'), and IVMV, vol. 12
(1982), 148 ('about 30 per cent of national wealth').
7 ChGK (1945).
8 Sheviakov (1991), Sheviakov (1992). These and other figures reported below
are reviewed by Ellman and Maksudov (1994).
9 Moorsteen and Powell (1966), 72-7.
10 The two thirds and the 45 per cent are from Voznesenskii (1948), 126,129.
11 Voznesenskii (1948), 55. The decline was said to persist through 1942, with
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316 Notes to pages 159-64
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Notes to pages 164-8 317
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318 Notes to pages 171-84
8 Conclusion
1 Stalin (1945), 100, speaking on the anniversary of the revolution, 6
November 1943.
2 Cited by Mowat (1956), 649-50.
3 Brute force is the title of the revealing study by Ellis (1990).
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Notes to pages 184-222 319
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320 Notes to pages 222-38
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Notes to pages 240-304 321
8 At current prices and exchange rates, Soviet imports and exports in 1940
amounted to 2,455 million rubles and 2,297 million rubles respectively, com-
pared with GNP at prevailing prices of 435 billion rubles. See Minvneshtorg
(1966), 9, and, for GNP, Bergson (1961), 46.
9 TsSU (1961), 103-51.
10 See table 2.13.
11 Kaser (1970), table 1.
12 See table K.4.
13 See tables 5.1, row 7.2, and B.9, row 1.2.
14 For a comparison of employment with value added after adjustment, see
table 4.7.
15 Moorsteen and Powell (1966), 622-3.
16 See table G.I.
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