Industrial Safety

(Course Book for Diploma in Fire and Industrial Safety)

UNIT 1 Fundamentals of industrial safety- safety policy and safety terminology- work permit systems UNIT 2 Job safety analysis (jsa)- hazop study- fault tree analysis UNIT 3 Safety inventory systems- occupational health hazards

UNIT 4 Safety organization and duties of a safety officer- safety committee and accident investigation UNIT 5 Safety management systems

UNIT 1
Fundamentals of industrial safety
Fundamentals
Safety is the state of being "safe" (from French sauf), the condition of being protected against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, psychological, educational or other types or consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents, harm or any other event which could be considered non-desirable. Safety can also be defined to be the control of recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level of risk. This can take the form of being protected from the event or from exposure to something that causes health or economical losses. It can include protection of people or of possessions. Industrial safety is a category of management responsibility in places of employment. To ensure the safety and health of workers, managers establish a focus on safety that can include elements such as, Management leadership and commitment Employee engagement Accountability Safety programs, policies, and plans Safety processes, procedures, and practices Safety goals and objectives Safety inspections for workplace hazards Safety program audits Safety tracking & metrics Hazard identification and control
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Safety committees to promote employee involvement Safety education and training Safety communications to maintain a high level of awareness on safety

DIFFERENT TYPES OF SAFETY SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENTS

Industrial safety systems are crucial in any hazardous plants such as oil and gas plants and nuclear plants. They are used to protect human, plant, and environment in case the process goes beyond the control margins. As the name suggests, these systems are not intended for controlling the process itself but rather protection. Process control is performed by means of process control systems (PCS) and is interlocked by the safety systems so that immediate actions are taken should the process control systems fail. Process control and safety systems are usually merged under one system, called Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS). Industrial safety systems typically use dedicated systems that are SIL 2 certified at minimum; whereas control systems can start with SIL 1. SIL applies to both hardware and software requirements such as cards, processors redundancy and voting functions.

TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY SYSTEMS

There are three main types of industrial safety systems in process industry. Process Safety System or Process Shutdown System, (PSS).

Safety Shutdown System (SSS): This includes Emergency Shutdown-(ESD) and Emergency Depressurization-(EDP) Systems. Fire and Gas System (FGS). These systems may also be redefined in terms of ESD/EDP levels as: ESD level 1: In charge of general plant area shutdown, can activate ESD level 2 if necessary. This level can only be activated from main control room in the process industrial plants. ESD level 2: This level shuts down and isolates individual ESD zones and activates if necessary EDP. ESD level 3: Provides "liquid inventory containment".

SSS
The Safety Shutdown System shall shutdown the facilities to a safe state in case of an emergency situation, thus protecting personnel, the environment and the asset. Safety Shutdown System shall manage all inputs and outputs relative to Emergency Shut Down (ESD) functions (environment & personnel protection). This system might also be fed by signals from the main fire and gas system. Weatherfords CS7X electro-hydraulic safety shutdown system is a low power, highly reliable, microprocessor based, integrated wellhead control system. By providing operation of wellheads and other production functions using standard application modules the system achieves a high level of safety and control. The system is optimized for controlling offshore platforms. Low power requirements are ideal for production applications

where conventional power sources are not available. Integrated hydraulic/pneumatic logic provides quick dedicated safety monitoring. SCADA systems easily link with the system to allow for remote monitoring and control.

FEATURES
Integrated wellhead process control and SCADA Low power remote operation Scalable system design Easily programmable ESD logic Intelligent diagnostics and alarming

FGS
The main objectives of the fire and gas system are to protect personnel, environment, and plant (including equipment and structures). The FGS shall achieve these objectives by: Detecting at an early stage, the presence of flammable gas, Detecting at an early stage, the liquid spill (LPG and LNG), Detecting incipient fire and the presence of fire, Providing automatic and/or facilities for manual activation of the fire protection system as required, Initiating signals, both audible and visible as required, to warn of the detected hazards, Initiating automatic shutdown of equipment and ventilation if 2 out of 2 or 2 out of 3 detectors Initiating the exhausting system.

Process Safety of Industrial

ESD
Emergency Shut Down-(ESD) systems are aimed at isolating (closing) any hazardous valves in a process due to abnormal conditions Traditionally risk analyses has concluded that the Emergency Shut Down system is in need of a high Safety Integrity Level, typically SIL 2 or 3. Basically the system consists of fieldmounted sensors, valves and trip relays, system logic for processing of incoming signals, alarm and HMI units. The system is able to process input signals and activating outputs in accordance with the Cause & Effect charts defined for the installation.

TYPICAL ACTIONS FROM AN EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN SYSTEM

Shut down of part systems and equipment Isolate hydrocarbon inventories
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Isolate electrical equipment *) Prevent escalation of events Stop hydrocarbon flow Depressurize / Blow down Emergency ventilation control *) Close watertight doors and fire doors *) *) May alternatively form part of the fire/gas detection and protection system.

EDP
Due to closing ESD valves in a process, there may be some trapped flammable fluids, and these must be released in order to avoid any undesired consequences (such as pressure increase in vessels and piping). For this, emergency depressurization (EDP) systems are used in conjunction with the ESD systems to release (to a safe location and in a safe manner) such trapped fluids.

PSV
Pressure Safety Valves or PSVs are mechanical devices and are usually used as a final safety solution when all previous systems fail to prevent any further pressure accumulation and protect vessels from rupture due to overpressure.

SIS
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is a form of process control usually implemented in industrial processes, such as those of a factory or an oil refinery. The SIS performs specified functions to achieve or maintain a safe state of the process when unacceptable or dangerous process conditions are detected. Safety instrumented systems are separate and independent from regular control systems but are composed of similar elements, including sensors, logic solvers, actuators and support systems.
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The specified functions, or safety instrumented functions (SIF) are implemented as part of an overall risk reduction strategy which is intended to reduce the likelihood of identified hazardous events involving a catastrophic release. The safe state is a state of the process operation where the hazardous event cannot occur. The safe state should be achieved within one-half of the process safety time. Most SIF are focused on preventing catastrophic incidents. The correct operation of an SIS requires a series of equipment to function properly. It must have sensors capable of detecting abnormal operating conditions, such as high flow, low level, or incorrect valve positioning. A logic solver is required to receive the sensor input signal(s), make appropriate decisions based on the nature of the signal(s), and change its outputs according to user-defined logic. The logic solver may use electrical, electronic or programmable electronic equipment, such as relays, trip amplifiers, or programmable logic controllers. Next, the change of the logic solver output(s) results in the final element(s) taking action on the process (e.g. closing a valve) to bring it to a safe state. Support systems, such as power, instrument air, and communications, are generally required for SIS operation. The support systems should be designed to provide the required integrity and reliability.

THE NEED FOR SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION

Managing and equipping industrial plant with the right components and sub-systems for optimal operational efficiency and safety is a complex task. Safety Systems Engineering (SSE) describes a disciplined, systematic approach, which encompasses hazard identification, safety requirements specification, safety systems design and build, and systems operation and maintenance over the entire lifetime of plant. The foregoing activities form what has become known as the safety Life-cycle model, which is at the core of current and emerging safety related system standards.

ICS
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other smaller control system configurations such as skid-mounted programmable logic controllers (PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. ICSs are typically used in industries such as electrical, water, oil, gas and data. Based on information received from remote stations, automated or operator-driven supervisory commands can be pushed to remote station control devices, which are often referred to as field devices. Field devices control local operations such as opening and closing valves and breakers, collecting data from sensor systems, and monitoring the local environment for alarm conditions.

DCS
A Distributed Control System (DCS) refers to a control system usually of a manufacturing system, process or any kind of dynamic system, in which the controller elements are not central in location (like the brain) but are distributed throughout the system with each component sub-system controlled by one or more controllers. The entire system of controllers is connected by networks for communication and monitoring. DCS is a very broad term used in a variety of industries, to monitor and control distributed equipment. Electrical power grids and electrical generation plants Environmental control systems Traffic signals Radio signals Water management systems Oil refining plants
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Chemical plants Pharmaceutical manufacturing Sensor networks Dry cargo and bulk oil carrier ships

DCSs are used to control industrial processes such as electric power generation, oil and gas refineries, water and wastewater treatment, and chemical, food, and automotive production. DCSs are integrated as a control architecture containing a supervisory level of control, overseeing multiple integrated sub-systems that are responsible for controlling the details of a localized process. Product and process control are usually achieved by deploying feed back or feed forward control loops whereby key product and/or process conditions are automatically maintained around a desired set point. To accomplish the desired product and/or process tolerance around a specified set point, only specific programmable controllers are used. ELEMENTS A DCS typically uses custom designed processors as controllers and uses both proprietary interconnections and communications protocol for communication. Input and output modules form component parts of the DCS. The processor receives information from input modules and sends information to output modules. The input modules receive information from input instruments in the process (a.k.a. field) and transmit instructions to the output instruments in the field. Computer buses or electrical buses connect the processor and modules through multiplexer or de-multiplexers. Buses also connect the distributed controllers with the central controller and finally to the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) or control consoles.

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APPLICATIONS Distributed Control Systems (DCSs) are dedicated systems used to control manufacturing processes that are continuous or batch-oriented, such as oil refining, petrochemicals, central station power generation, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, food & beverage manufacturing, cement production, steelmaking, and papermaking. DCSs are connected to sensors and actuators and use set point control to control the flow of material through the plant. The most common example is a set point control loop consisting of a pressure sensor, controller, and control valve. Pressure or flow measurements are transmitted to the controller, usually through the aid of a signal conditioning Input /Output (I/O) device. When the measured variable reaches a certain point, the controller instructs a valve or actuation device to open or close until the fluidic flow process reaches the desired set point. Large oil refineries have many thousands of I/O points and employ very large DCSs. Processes are not limited to fluidic flow through pipes, however, and can also include things like paper machines and their associated quality controls (see Quality Control System QCS), variable speed drives and motor control centers, cement kilns, mining operations, ore processing facilities, and many others. A typical DCS consists of functionally and/or geographically distributed digital controllers capable of executing from 1 to 256 or more regulatory control loops in one control box. The input/output devices (I/O) can be integral with the controller or located remotely via a field network. Todays controllers have extensive computational capabilities and, in addition to proportional, integral, and derivative (PID) control, can generally perform logic and sequential control. Modern DCSs support also neural networks and fuzzy application. DCSs may employ one or several workstations and can be configured at the workstation or by an off-line personal computer. Local communication is handled by a control network with transmission over twisted pair, coaxial, or fiber optic cable. A

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server and/or applications processor may be included in the system for extra computational, data collection, and reporting capability.

PLC
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) or programmable controller is a digital computer used for automation of electromechanical processes, such as control of machinery on factory assembly lines, amusement rides, or lighting fixtures. PLC is used in many industries and machines. Unlike general purpose computers, the PLC is designed for multiple inputs and output arrangements, extended temperature ranges, immunity to electrical noise, and resistance to vibration and impact. Programs to control machine operation are typically stored in battery-backed or nonvolatile memory. A PLC is an example of a real time system since output results must be produced in response to input conditions within a bounded time, otherwise unintended operation will result.

PLC System Overview

HISTORY
The PLC was invented in response to the needs of the American automotive manufacturing industry. Programmable logic controllers were initially adopted by the automotive industry where

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software revision replaced the re-wiring of hard-wired control panels when production models changed. Before the PLC, control, sequencing, and safety interlock logic for manufacturing automobiles was accomplished using hundreds or thousands of relays, cam timers, and drum sequencers and dedicated closed-loop controllers. The process for updating such facilities for the yearly model change-over was very time consuming and expensive, as electricians needed to individually rewire each and every relay. In 1968 GM Hydromantic (the automatic transmission division of General Motors) issued a request for proposal for an electronic replacement for hard-wired relay systems. The winning proposal came from Bedford Associates of Bedford, Massachusetts. The first PLC, designated the 084 because it was Bedford Associates' eighty-fourth project, was the result. Bedford Associates started a new company dedicated to developing, manufacturing, selling, and servicing this new product: Modicon, which stood for modular digital controller. One of the people who worked on that project was Dick Morley, who is considered to be the "father" of the PLC. The Modicon brand was sold in 1977 to Gould Electronics, and later acquired by German Company AEG and then by French Schneider Electric, the current owner. One of the very first 084 models built is now on display at Modicon's headquarters in North Andover, Massachusetts. It was presented to Modicon by GM, when the unit was retired after nearly twenty years of uninterrupted service. Modicon used the 84 moniker at the end of its product range until the 984 made its appearance. The automotive industry is still one of the largest users of PLCs.

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DEVELOPMENT
Early PLCs were designed to replace relay logic systems. These PLCs were programmed in "ladder logic", which strongly resembles a schematic diagram of relay logic. This program notation was chosen to reduce training demands for the existing technicians. Other early PLCs used a form of instruction list programming, based on a stack-based logic solver. Modern PLCs can be programmed in a variety of ways, from ladder logic to more traditional programming languages such as BASIC and C. Another method is State Logic, a very high-level programming language designed to program PLCs based on state transition diagrams. Many early PLCs did not have accompanying programming terminals that were capable of graphical representation of the logic, and so the logic was instead represented as a series of logic expressions in some version of Boolean format, similar to Boolean algebra. As programming terminals evolved, it became more common for ladder logic to be used, for the aforementioned reasons. Newer formats such as State Logic and Function Block (which is similar to the way logic is depicted when using digital integrated logic circuits) exist, but they are still not as popular as ladder logic. A primary reason for this is that PLCs solve the logic in a predictable and repeating sequence, and ladder logic allows the programmer (the person writing the logic) to see any issues with the timing of the logic sequence more easily than would be possible in other formats.

PROGRAMMING
Early PLCs, up to the mid-1980s, were programmed using proprietary programming panels or special-purpose programming terminals, which often had dedicated function keys representing the various logical elements of PLC programs. Programs were stored on cassette tape cartridges. Facilities for printing and

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documentation were very minimal due to lack of memory capacity. The very oldest PLCs used non-volatile magnetic core memory. More recently, PLCs are programmed using application software on personal computers. The computer is connected to the PLC through Ethernet, RS-232, RS-485 or RS-422 cabling. The programming software allows entry and editing of the ladder-style logic. Generally the software provides functions for debugging and troubleshooting the PLC software, for example, by highlighting portions of the logic to show current status during operation or via simulation. The software will upload and download the PLC program, for backup and restoration purposes. In some models of programmable controller, the program is transferred from a personal computer to the PLC though a programming board which writes the program into a removable chip such as an EEPROM or EPROM.

FUNCTIONALITY
The functionality of the PLC has evolved over the years to include sequential relay control, motion control, process control, distributed control systems and networking. The data handling, storage, processing power and communication capabilities of some modern PLCs are approximately equivalent to desktop computers. PLC-like programming combined with remote I/O hardware, allow a general-purpose desktop computer to overlap some PLCs in certain applications. Regarding the practicality of these desktop computer based logic controllers, it is important to note that they have not been generally accepted in heavy industry because the desktop computers run on less stable operating systems than do PLCs, and because the desktop computer hardware is typically not designed to the same levels of tolerance to temperature, humidity, vibration, and longevity as the processors used in PLCs. In addition to the hardware limitations of desktop based logic, operating systems such as Windows do not lend themselves to deterministic logic execution, with the result that the logic may not always respond to changes in logic state or input status with the

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extreme consistency in timing as is expected from PLCs. Still, such desktop logic applications find use in less critical situations, such as laboratory automation and use in small facilities where the application is less demanding and critical, because they are generally much less expensive than PLCs. In more recent years, small products called PLRs (programmable logic relays), and also by similar names, have become more common and accepted. These are very much like PLCs, and are used in light industry where only a few points of I/O (i.e. a few signals coming in from the real world and a few going out) are involved, and low cost is desired. These small devices are typically made in a common physical size and shape by several manufacturers, and branded by the makers of larger PLCs to fill out their low end product range. Popular names include PICO Controller, NANO PLC, and other names implying very small controllers. Most of these have between 8 and 12 digital inputs, 4 and 8 digital outputs, and up to 2 analog inputs. Size is usually about 4" wide, 3" high, and 3" deep. Most such devices include a tiny postage stamp sized LCD screen for viewing simplified ladder logic (only a very small portion of the program being visible at a given time) and status of I/O points, and typically these screens are accompanied by a 4-way rocker push-button plus four more separate push-buttons, similar to the key buttons on a VCR remote control, and used to navigate and edit the logic. Most have a small plug for connecting via RS-232 or RS-485 to a personal computer so that programmers can use simple Windows applications for programming instead of being forced to use the tiny LCD and push-button set for this purpose. Unlike regular PLCs that are usually modular and greatly expandable, the PLRs are usually not modular or expandable, but their price can be two orders of magnitude less than a PLC and they still offer robust design and deterministic execution of the logic.

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FEATURES
Control panel with PLC (grey elements in the center). The unit consists of separate elements, from left to right; power supply, controller, relay units for in- and output The main difference from other computers is that PLCs are armored for severe conditions (such as dust, moisture, heat, cold) and have the facility for extensive input/output (I/O) arrangements. These connect the PLC to sensors and actuators. PLCs read limit switches, analog process variables (such as temperature and pressure), and the positions of complex positioning systems. Some use machine vision. On the actuator side, PLCs operate electric motors, pneumatic or hydraulic cylinders, magnetic relays, solenoids, or analog outputs. The input/output arrangements may be built into a simple PLC, or the PLC may have external I/O modules attached to a computer network that plugs into the PLC.

PLC COMPARED WITH OTHER CONTROL SYSTEMS

PLCs are well-adapted to a range of automation tasks. These are typically industrial processes in manufacturing where the cost of developing and maintaining the automation system is high relative to the total cost of the automation, and where changes to the system would be expected during its operational life. PLCs contain input and output devices compatible with industrial pilot devices and controls; little electrical design is required, and the design problem centers on expressing the desired sequence of operations. PLC applications are typically highly customized systems so the cost of a packaged PLC is low compared to the cost of a specific custom-built controller design. On the other hand, in the case of mass-produced goods, customized control systems are economic due to the lower cost of the components, which can be optimally chosen instead of a "generic" solution, and where the non-recurring engineering charges are spread over thousands or millions of units.

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For high volume or very simple fixed automation tasks, different techniques are used. For example, a consumer dishwasher would be controlled by an electromechanical cam timer costing only a few dollars in production quantities. A microcontroller-based design would be appropriate where hundreds or thousands of units will be produced and so the development cost (design of power supplies, input/output hardware and necessary testing and certification) can be spread over many sales, and where the end-user would not need to alter the control. Automotive applications are an example; millions of units are built each year, and very few end-users alter the programming of these controllers. However, some specialty vehicles such as transit busses economically use PLCs instead of custom-designed controls, because the volumes are low and the development cost would be uneconomic. Very complex process control, such as used in the chemical industry, may require algorithms and performance beyond the capability of even high-performance PLCs. Very high-speed or precision controls may also require customized solutions; for example, aircraft flight controls. Programmable controllers are widely used in motion control, positioning control and torque control. Some manufacturers produce motion control units to be integrated with PLC so that G-code (involving a CNC machine) can be used to instruct machine movements. PLCs may include logic for single-variable feedback analog control loop, a "proportional, integral, derivative" or "PID controller". A PID loop could be used to control the temperature of a manufacturing process, for example. Historically PLCs were usually configured with only a few analog control loops; where processes required hundreds or thousands of loops, a distributed control system (DCS) would instead be used. As PLCs have

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become more powerful, the boundary between DCS and PLC applications has become less distinct. PLCs have similar functionality as Remote Terminal Units. An RTU, however, usually does not support control algorithms or control loops. As hardware rapidly becomes more powerful and cheaper, RTUs, PLCs and DCSs are increasingly beginning to overlap in responsibilities, and many vendors sell RTUs with PLClike features and vice versa. The industry has standardized on the IEC 61131-3 functional block language for creating programs to run on RTUs and PLCs, although nearly all vendors also offer proprietary alternatives and associated development environments. A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct or regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. There are two common classes of control systems, with many variations and combinations: logic or sequential controls, and feedback or linear controls. There is also fuzzy logic, which attempts to combine some of the design simplicity of logic with the utility of linear control. Some devices or systems are inherently not controllable

LOGIC CONTROL
Logic control systems for industrial and commercial machinery were historically implemented at mains voltage using interconnected relays, designed using ladder logic. Today, most such systems are constructed with programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or microcontrollers. The notation of ladder logic is still in use as a programming idiom for PLCs. Logic controllers may respond to switches, light sensors, pressure switches, etc., and can cause the machinery to start and stop various operations. Logic systems are used to sequence mechanical operations in many applications. Examples include

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elevators, washing machines and other systems with interrelated stop-go operations. Logic systems are quite easy to design, and can handle very complex operations. Some aspects of logic system design make use of Boolean logic.

ONOFF CONTROL
For example, a thermostat is a simple negative-feedback control: when the temperature (the "process variable" or PV) goes below a set point (SP), the heater is switched on. Another example could be a pressure switch on an air compressor: when the pressure (PV) drops below the threshold (SP), the pump is powered. Refrigerators and vacuum pumps contain similar mechanisms operating in reverse, but still providing negative feedback to correct errors. Simple onoff feedback control systems like these are cheap and effective. In some cases, like the simple compressor example, they may represent a good design choice. In most applications of onoff feedback control, some consideration needs to be given to other costs, such as wear and tear of control valves and maybe other start-up costs when power is reapplied each time the PV drops. Therefore, practical onoff control systems are designed to include hysteresis, usually in the form of a deadband, a region around the setpoint value in which no control action occurs. The width of deadband may be adjustable or programmable.

LINEAR CONTROL
Linear control systems use linear negative feedback to produce a control signal mathematically based on other variables, with a view to maintaining the controlled process within an acceptable operating range.

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The output from a linear control system into the controlled process may be in the form of a directly variable signal, such as a valve that may be 0 or 100% open or anywhere in between. Sometimes this is not feasible and so, after calculating the current required corrective signal, a linear control system may repeatedly switch an actuator, such as a pump, motor or heater, fully on and then fully off again, regulating the duty cycle using pulse-width modulation.

PROPORTIONAL CONTROL
When controlling the temperature of an industrial furnace, it is usually better to control the opening of the fuel valve in proportion to the current needs of the furnace. This helps avoid thermal shocks and applies heat more effectively. Proportional negative-feedback systems are based on the difference between the required set point (SP) and process value (PV). This difference is called the error. Power is applied in direct proportion to the current measured error, in the correct sense so as to tend to reduce the error (and so avoid positive feedback). The amount of corrective action that is applied for a given error is set by the gain or sensitivity of the control system. At low gains, only a small corrective action is applied when errors are detected: the system may be safe and stable, but may be sluggish in response to changing conditions; errors will remain uncorrected for relatively long periods of time: it is over-damped. If the proportional gain is increased, such systems become more responsive and errors are dealt with more quickly. There is an optimal value for the gain setting when the overall system is said to be critically damped. Increases in loop gain beyond this point will lead to oscillations in the PV; such a system is under-damped.

PID CONTROL
Apart from sluggish performance to avoid oscillations, another problem with proportional-only control is that power application is always in direct proportion to the error. In the
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example above we assumed that the set temperature could be maintained with 50% power. What happens if the furnace is required in a different application where a higher set temperature will require 80% power to maintain it? If the gain was finally set to a 50 PB, then 80% power will not be applied unless the furnace is 15 below setpoint, so for this other application the operators will have to remember always to set the setpoint temperature 15 higher than actually needed. This 15 figure is not completely constant either: it will depend on the surrounding ambient temperature, as well as other factors that affect heat loss from or absorption within the furnace. To resolve these two problems, many feedback control schemes include mathematical extensions to improve performance. The most common extensions lead to proportional-integralderivative control, or PID control (pronounced pee-eye-dee).

COMMUNICATIONS
PLCs have built in communications ports, usually 9-pin RS-232, but optionally EIA-485 or Ethernet. Modbus, BACnet or DF1 is usually included as one of the communications protocols. Other options include various fieldbuses such as DeviceNet or Profibus. Other communications protocols that may be used are listed in the List of automation protocols. Most modern PLCs can communicate over a network to some other system, such as a computer running a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) system or web browser. PLCs used in larger I/O systems may have peer-to-peer (P2P) communication between processors. This allows separate parts of a complex process to have individual control while allowing the subsystems to co-ordinate over the communication link. These communication links are also often used for HMI devices such as keypads or PC-type workstations

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SAFETY POLICY AND SAFETY TERMINOLOGY

A safety policy is an outline of the company's commitment to health and safety and indicates the company's objectives, the organization of responsibilities and arrangements in place for achieving the objectives. The amount of detail will be dependent on the size of the company and the associated risks. Consequently a small office with one site and eight employees may only require a simple statement whereas a small retailer with six outlets may need to provide more detail taking account of additional staff being employed at different locations. The aim however is that it remains a working document rather than a paper exercise. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 places responsibility on both employers and employees for the health and safety of persons at work and others who may be affected by such work. The law requires a written statement of policy on health and safety to be prepared by all organizations employing five or more persons (not necessarily at the same site). The policy must be brought to the attention of all employees and reviewed periodically.

OBJECTIVES OF SAFETY POLICY

To give highest priority to safety, in selection of plants & equipment's, erection and commissioning activities To develop operating manuals for each process, with safety provisions duly highlighted To provide safety training to employees and contract workers and to ensure use of PPE and safe work practices

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To inculcate safety culture in the organization where safety is manifested in each employees mind, thought and expression To strictly adhere to the safety related laws, rules, procedures framed by the Govt. and to take appropriate action in case of violation To identify and eliminate risk related process by carrying out safety audits To ensure, prepare and update Disaster Management Strategies and organize mock drills to keep the concerned personnel in preparedness To give priority to occupational health of its employees To continuously strive for improvement in safety performances

INDIA SAFETY POLICY

Employing ICAO standards and recommended practices, as minimum international standards and recommended practices, Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) will ensure the highest level of safety in the Indian aviation system. Mindful of Indias State Safety Programme (SSP), DGCA will maintain an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at enhancing aviation safety. DGCA will implement proactive and as far as possible predictive strategies encouraging all stakeholders/ service providers to understand the benefits of a safety culture, which should be based on an inclusive reporting culture. DGCA will foster and assist stakeholders in developing comprehensive Safety Management Systems (SMS) and will develop preventive safety strategies for the aviation system in an environment of a just culture.

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DGCA COMMITS TO:

Develop and embed a safety culture across all aviation industries that recognizes the importance and value of effective aviation safety management and acknowledges at all times that safety is paramount; Support the management of safety in India through an effective safety reporting and communication system; Develop general rulemaking and specific operational policies that build upon safety management principles; Ensure that the DGCA financial and human resources are sufficient for implementation, establishment and maintenance of SSP and that personnel have the proper skills and are trained for discharging their responsibilities, both safety related and otherwise. That these personnel are specialists in their functional areas and competent in safety regulation of operators and service providers; Clearly define for all regulatory staff, their responsibilities and accountabilities for the implementation, establishment and maintenance of SSP and its performance; Conduct both performance-based and complianceoriented activities, supported by analyses and prioritized resource allocation based on safety risks levels (proactively targeting regulatory attention on known areas of high risk); Ensure that acceptable levels of safety for aviation operations within the State are being set, measured and
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achieved, and expressed in terms of safety performance indicators and safety performance targets; Continually improve the SSP and safety performance; Interact effectively with service providers in the resolution of safety concerns; Ensure that operators and service providers establish and maintain the Safety Management

SYSTEM (SMS) IN THEIR OPERATION;

Establish provisions for the protection of safety data, collection and processing systems, so that people are encouraged to provide essential safety-related information on hazards, and there is a continuous flow and exchange of safety management data between DGCA and service providers; and Promulgate an enforcement policy that ensures that no information derived from any safety data, collection and processing systems, established under the SMS will be used as the basis for enforcement action, except in the case of gross negligence or wilful deviation; and Achieve the highest levels of safety standards and performance in aviation operations. This policy must be understood, implemented and observed by all staff involved in activities related to the State Safety Program. 1. General Statement of Policy This should be signed by a Director of the company or the senior partner.

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2. Responsibilities Ultimate responsibility for health and safety rests at Director level, with delegation of duties to managerial employees. Those named must be fully aware of their duties, details of which should be included in their job description. Employees must also be reminded that they have responsibilities under the law to take care of the health and safety of themselves and others and to co-operate with you in doing that. 3. Training All employers have an obligation to provide induction training to all staff. This should cover general safety including such matters as accident reporting, first aid, means of escape in case of a fire as well as restrictions etc. There may also be a need to provide specialist training covering specific types of equipment or changes to the method of working that may only be applicable to certain members of staff. 4. Accidents First aid treatment must be available to all employees whilst they are at work, whether they are at their normal base or working away. The standard of first aid treatment will vary depending upon the size of the organization and the activities carried out at the premises. Employees must be made aware of the first aid treatment available and records must be kept of treatment administered. Certain incidents may also be reportable under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR). 5. Fire Safety The fire fighting equipment and the means of escape are covered by the Fire Precautions Act and the local Fire Officer should be contacted for advice and guidance. Fire safety should however form part of your overall management of health and safety and details should be included in your safety policy. 6. Electrical Equipment Electrical systems must be maintained to prevent danger and consequently there will be a need to carry out regular visual examination of electrical equipment by competent staff as well as interim examination and where

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applicable, testing of electrical systems by other competent persons.

Electrical Equipment of motorcycle

7. Housekeeping Housekeeping is an important area and there are general obligations regarding such matters as cleanliness, safe storage and safe access. 8. Machinery/Equipment Machinery/equipment must be designed for the purpose, suitably maintained and operators must be suitably trained. Some machinery equipment may need to be fitted with guards and safety devices to dangerous parts and certain machinery e.g. lifts and pressure vessels must be examined and certified fit for use by a competent person at prescribed intervals.

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9. Dangerous and Hazardous Substances Hazards may be biological, chemical or physical and will include fire and explosion. Risks must therefore be identified and all possible steps taken to eliminate or reduce those risks. 10. Fluids/Gases under Pressure Under certain conditions some fluids/gases under pressure can ignite or explode. It is therefore important to identify such equipment and ensure that clear rules relating to use and maintenance are applied. 11. Personal Protective Equipment Where personal protective equipment is provided it must be of the correct type, suitably maintained and where applicable, the employee must be suitably trained in its use. It should however be noted that an employer has a duty to eliminate or control risk so far as is reasonably practicable before resorting to personal protective equipment (i.e. PPE must be a last resort). 12. Noise Excessive noise impairs hearing and in certain circumstances there will be a need to reduce the noise level or provide personal protective equipment. 13. Contractors and Visitors You have obligations to ensure the health and safety of both contractors and visitors and in turn contractors will have obligations to ensure the safety of your staff as well as visitors. It is therefore important that clear rules are set out covering such people. You will need to know what the contractor will be doing on your premises and similarly you will need to inform them of any activities taking place on your premises that may affect their employees. 14. Advice and Consultancy Advice is freely available, but you may also have other people that you have access to for certain purposes.

WORK PERMIT SYSTEMS

A work permit system consists primarily of a standard procedure designed to ensure that potentially hazardous routine
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and non routine work on industrial installations can be carried out safely. The procedure should define the need for the following essential steps: Details of the necessary preparatory work Clear definition of responsibilities Appropriate training of the work force Provision of adequate safety equipment A formal work permit with or without attached specific checklists. This work permit, 1. Specifies the work to be accomplished and authorizes it to be started under the strict observance of consigned work and safety procedures. 2. After information and agreement of all other concerned parties (process, safety, customers, suppliers).

Work Permit

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: WHEN?

1. For all non-routine works, 2. For hazardous routine works not covered by procedures,
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3. When work is performed: by your employees and/or third parties

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: FOR WHAT KIND OF WORK?

A work permit is required in case of: Potential oxygen deficiency or enrichment Potential flammable/explosive atmosphere Potential high temperature/pressure Potential hazardous chemicals, e.g.: toxic substances Confined space entry, e.g.: tanks, cold box, pit, normally closed vessels Bypassing or removing/altering safety devices or equipment Elevated works Introduction of ignited sources where not permanently allowed (fire permit), e.g.: open flame, welding, grinding, Electrical troubleshooting or repair on live circuits Or also in case of:
Work Permit area

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Manual or powered excavations Use of mobile cranes Insulation or catalysts handling Use of adapters Product conversion of stationary or mobile or portable vessels and containers Temporary or permanent changes, alterations, modification of equipment or processes, Exposure to traffic, Exposure to moving/rotating machinery In proximity of vents, liquid of gas On process lines with gas release

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: WHY?

1. Because: In charge of the work, you don't know everything about the site and the process around about the work. Safety measures have to be prepared. You cannot start the work without the OK of the production personnel or the customer or the supplier. The production needs your OK in order to re-start the plant after your work is achieved. 2. To obtain a safe as well as a quick and cost effective work

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: WITH WHOM?

In order to define the scope of work for concerned/involved by and during the work, the Work Permit must be prepared with: everyone

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The person responsible for the work The person(s) in charge of the production, the customer or supplier, who will release the process before the work starts The other work bodies The person in charge of HSE measures

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: HOW?

1. Before issuing the Work Permit, you must: Describe the work to be done List all the specifications and drawings which are required Issue detailed planning with all involved entities Determine the logging and tagging procedures 2. Fill-in together the work permit and signs, 3. The start of the work must be authorized by production and/or user, 4. The re-start of the process must take place after the work is finished. The Work Permit System: Review of flow sheets, drawings and specifications Purpose of the review is to ensure all key persons involved in job planning have a thorough understanding of the job. It should include: Process fluids and materials involved, Degree of isolation, Effect of other processes, Power supply isolation, Specialist advice,
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Location of underground services and pipes, Location of elevated power cables, Location of elevated pipelines and walkways, Purging and lock-out requirements, Pressure, Temperature, Valve Identification, Equipment Specification, Operating and maintenance instructions, Materials of construction and compatibilities

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: WORK SITE INSPECTION

Anyone involved and signing the Safe Work Permit must visit the work place in order: To inspect the work area Neighboring activities, site rules, overhead, underground, access, natural hazards (flood, rain, snow), etc, To identify potential hazards Flammable, oxygen, toxic substances, confined spaces, electricity, pressure, temperature, moving objects, traffic, falls/trips/slips, etc.

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Work site inspection

THE WORK PERMIT SYSTEM: DEVELOPMENT OF WORK PROCEDURES

Preparation of a detailed work procedure is essential to ensure that the work will proceed safely in a planned and logical manner: Following requirements to be considered: Reference drawings, Timing of various operations, Details of any special equipment, Needs to inform local authorities, safety precautions and equipment, Emergency procedures, etc,. The procedure should include: Logging and tagging procedures: Electricity, process fluids Instrumentation, utilities (water, air, oil,) Depressurizing, Draining, Venting, Purging, Flushing, Isolating, Atmosphere checking, Disassembly of equipment, Method of repair, Reassembly and installation, Quality control, Pressure and leak testing, Reinstatement of equipment, Hand-back procedure, etc.

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Review questions Five Marks 1. What industrial safety? 2. Mention the different types of safety system in industries. 3. Write a short note on ESD. 4. Write a short note on ICS. 5. Write a short note on SIS. 6. Write a short note on SSS 7. Draw the block diagram for PLC system. 8. Define safety policy. 9. Why the work permit system is needed? 10. For what kind of work permit system is required in industries? Fifteen Marks 1. Explain the different types of industrial safety system? 2. Explain PLC? 3. .Explain the concepts of ICS and DCS? 4. Write a short note on the following: i) FGS ii) EDP iii) PSV 5. Explain safety policy and safety terminology in detail. 6. Explain the concept of work permit system. 7. When the work permit system is needed? Explain its concepts.

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8. Explain the terms to be considered before issuing work permit. 9. Why work permit system is needed? Explain its concepts. 10. Explain the development of work procedures in the work permit system.

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UNIT II
Job safety analysis
A Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is a method that can be used to identify, analyze and record 1) the steps involved in performing a specific job, 2) the existing or potential safety and health hazards associated with each step, and 3) the recommended action(s)/procedure(s) that will eliminate or reduce these hazards and the risk of a workplace injury or illness. Job Safety Analysis is one of the safety management tools that can be used to define and control the hazards associated with a certain process, job or procedure. Job Safety Analysis is a term used interchangeably with Job Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment. The purpose of a JSA is to ensure that the risk of each step of a task is reduced to ALARP.

Job hazard analyses

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The analysis starts with a summary of the whole job process. This is broken down into smaller steps and listed in table form. The hazards involved in each single step are identified, and then the control measures to eliminate, reduce or mitigate each hazard are identified and described. By this means every aspect of the whole process is analyzed and safe methods of work determined. Job Safety Analysis (JSA), also known as Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), Activity Hazard Analysis (AHA) or Risk Assessment (RA), is a safety management tool in which the risks or hazards of a specific job in the workplace are identified, and then measures to eliminate or control those hazards are determined and implemented. More specifically, a job safety analysis is a process of systematically evaluating certain jobs, tasks, processes or procedures and eliminating or reducing the risks or hazards to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) in order to protect workers from injury or illness. The JSA process is documented and the JSA document is used in the workplace or at the job site to guide workers in safe job performance. The JSA document is also a living document that is adjusted as conditions warrant. The JSA process begins with identification of the potential hazards or risks associated with a particular job. Once the hazards are understood, the consequences of those hazards are then identified, followed by control measures to eliminate or mitigate the hazards. A more detailed JSA can be performed by breaking the job into steps and identifying specific hazards and control measures for each job step, providing the worker with a documented set of safe job procedures. Some JSA processes also include a risk assessment that lists the probability of each hazard occurring and the severity of the consequences, as well as the effectiveness of the control measures. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers uses a risk assessment code (RAC) to analyze the level of risk associated with each job step. For more information on RAC, see USACE AHA FORMAT.

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The end result of a JSA is an easy to understand document that can be shared with workers as part of pre-job and safety meetings, and/or included as part of worker job descriptions. The JSA process can be used to help refine safe work procedures described in safety manuals or standard operating procedures, and the JSA document can serve as a useful tool in training new employees. It is important to remember that a JSA is not simply a piece of paper; it is a process. Workers and management need to understand that a piece of paper will not make the job safe. Rather, workers and management must understand the risks and hazards associated with the job and know how to utilize the chosen controls in such a way as to eliminate or mitigate those risks. The JSA documents the decisions of this process.

WHY IS JSA IMPORTANT?

Many workers are injured and killed at the workplace every day in countries all around the world, both in industrialized and non-industrialized countries. Protecting safety and health is critical to employee lives, jobs and business. Systematically looking at workplace operations, establishing proper job procedures and ensuring all employees are properly trained can help mitigate and prevent workplace injuries and illnesses. This is also likely to result in not only fewer worker injuries and illnesses, but also safer and more effective work methods, reduced workers legal claims, increased productivity and fewer injury and lost time costs.

JSA AS A LEADING INDICATOR

There is a growing trend among companies today to go beyond measurement of past safety performance and incident reports in developing their safety programs, and move into more proactive measurements of safety. Measurement of past incidents, successes and failures happens after the fact and is considered a lagging indicator. Measurement of future performance, or commitment to tangible goals, is considered a leading indicator.

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Performing a job safety analysis (JSA) can help workers and management identify potential hazards before they occur, and implement corrections so that they do not occur. Setting tangible goals to perform safety analyses of all jobs, or to correct all hazards so that they reach a specific minimal level of risk are other examples of using leading indicators to drive a safety program, as opposed to lagging indicators, which measure past performance.

JSA USE IN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

In the event of an incident, documentation of the job safety analysis is critical to the team investigating the incident. By reviewing the process and understanding the hazards, controls, job steps and safe practices defined and implemented, incident investigators can gain valuable insight, leading to a better incident investigation, and in turn, better process, safer controls and safer work practices. The JSA document may also be helpful in event of legal remedies sought by aggrieved parties, as it provides a record of how the job is supposed to be performed safely, and the workers who signed off on it.

WHO SHOULD CONDUCT/CREATE THE JSA?

Often, employers, foremen, supervisors and health and safety professionals conduct job safety analyses, which are then reviewed with and/or by workers performing the job. At other times, workers may discover a task on the job site which does not have a written JSA, and may conduct their own JSA on the job site before beginning the task.

HOW DO I CONDUCT/CREATE A JSA?

1. Involve your employees. It is very important to involve your employees in the hazard analysis process. They have a unique understanding of the job, and this knowledge is invaluable for finding hazards. Involving employees will help minimize oversights, ensure a quality analysis, and get workers to "buy in" to the solutions because they will share ownership in their safety and health program.
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2. Review your accident history. Review with your employees your worksites history of accidents and occupational illnesses that needed treatment, losses that required repair or replacement, and any "near misses" -- events in which an accident or loss did not occur, but could have. These events are indicators that the existing hazard controls (if any) may not be adequate and deserve more scrutiny. 3. Conduct a preliminary job review. Discuss with your employees the hazards they know exist in their current work and surroundings. Brainstorm with them for ideas to eliminate or control those hazards. If any hazards exist that pose an immediate danger to a workers life or health, take immediate action to protect the worker. Any problems that can be corrected easily should be corrected as soon as possible. Do not wait to complete your job safety analysis. This will demonstrate your commitment to safety and health and enable you to focus on the hazards and jobs that need more study because of their complexity. For those hazards determined to present unacceptable risks, evaluate types of hazard controls. 4. List, rank, and set priorities for hazardous jobs. List jobs with hazards that present unacceptable risks, and rank them based on those most likely to occur and those with the most severe consequences. These jobs should be your first priority for analysis. 5. Outline the steps or tasks. Nearly every job can be broken down into job tasks or steps. When beginning a job safety analysis, watch the employee perform the job and list each step as the employee takes it. Be sure to record enough information to describe each job action without getting overly detailed. Avoid making the breakdown of steps so detailed that it becomes unnecessarily long or so broad that it does not include basic steps. You may find it valuable to get input from other workers who have performed the same
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job. Later, review the job steps with the employee to make sure you have not omitted something. Point out that you are evaluating the job itself, not the employees job performance. Include the employee in all phases of the analysis -- from reviewing the job steps and procedures to discussing uncontrolled hazards and recommended solutions. Be sure to document your findings in order to create a written record of your JSA. Sometimes, in conducting a job safety analysis, it may be helpful to photograph or videotape the worker performing the job. These visual records can be handy references when doing a more detailed analysis of the work. Management and workers may also find it useful to assign a probability and severity ranking to each hazard in the job, denoting how likely or probable the hazard is to occur, and the severity of the consequences should it occur. It is important to remember that the JSA should be performed prior to the start of work, updated as conditions change and reviewed periodically to ensure its accuracy. Many organizations perform and document their JSAs a day or so in advance, and then review them with workers that morning, prior to start of work. This helps ensure that they have taken the time to thoroughly analyze for hazards or risks, and have the appropriate controls in place to eliminate or minimize those hazards before arriving at the job site. When conditions such as changes in job requirements, site conditions (e.g., weather), manpower or equipment operations (e.g., malfunctions, new equipment) present themselves, it is important to stop and re-analyze the job for potential new hazards created by these changes. New controlling measures should then be put in place to eliminate or minimize the new hazard. If new controls cannot be implemented on the job to reduce the hazard to an acceptable risk level or ALARP, new engineering and

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administrative controls may need to be devised by job management or supervisors before returning to work.

WHEN IS A JSA REQUIRED?

Some type of risk analysis should be performed before every job. Some tasks are routine and the hazards and controls well understood. For routine tasks consider using a Standard Operating Procedure, a set of standing orders that control the known hazards. For tasks that are complex, unusual, difficult, require the interaction of many people or systems or involve new tools or methods, a JSA should be performed.

HOW IS JSA CREATED?

The JSA or JHA should be created by the work group performing the task. Sometimes it is expedient to review a JSA that has been prepared when the same task has been performed before but the work group must take special care to review all of the steps thoroughly to ensure that they are controlling all of the hazards for this job this time. The JSA is usually completed on a form. The most common form is a table with three columns (although each company has a variation with many having five or six columns). The headings of the three columns are (1) Job Step (2) Hazard (3) Controls. A Hazard is any factor that can cause damage to personnel, property or the environment (some companies include loss of production or downtime in the definition as well). A Control is any process for controlling a hazard. The work group firstly breaks down the entire job into its component steps. Then, for each step, hazards are identified. Finally, for each hazard identified, controls are recorded in

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WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF DOING A JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS?

One of the methods used in this example is to observe a worker actually perform the job. The major advantages of this method include that it does not rely on individual memory and that the process prompts recognition of hazards. For infrequently performed or new jobs, observation may not be practical. One approach is to have a group of experienced workers and supervisors complete the analysis through discussion. An advantage of this method is that more people are involved in a wider base of experience and promoting a more ready acceptance of the resulting work procedure. Members of the joint occupational safety and health committee must participate in this process. Initial benefits from developing a JSA will become clear in the preparation stage. The analysis process may identify previously undetected hazards and increase the job knowledge of those participating. Safety and health awareness is raised, communication between workers and supervisors is improved, and acceptance of safe work procedures is promoted.

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A JSA, or better still, a written work procedure based on it, can form the basis for regular contact between supervisors and workers. It can serve as a teaching aid for initial job training and as a briefing guide for infrequent jobs. It may be used as a standard for health and safety inspections or observations. In particular, a JSA will assist in completing comprehensive accident investigations.

AFTER THE JSA WORKSHEET IS COMPLETED

After the JSA worksheet is completed, the work group that is about to perform the task should have a toolbox talk, and discusses the hazards and controls, delegate responsibilities, ensure that all equipment and PPE described in the JSA are available, that contingencies such as fire fighting are understood, communication channels and hand signals are agreed etcetera. Then, if everybody in the work group feels that it is safe to proceed with task, work should commence. If at any time during the task circumstances change, then work should be stopped (sometimes called a "timeout for safety"), and the hazards and controls described in the JSA should be reassessed and additional controls used or alternative methods devised. Again, work should only recommence when every member of the work group feels it is safe to do so. When the task is complete it is often of benefit to have a close-out or "tailgate" meeting, to discuss any lessons learned so that they may be incorporated into the JSA the next time the task is undertaken. Tips and Tricks It is vitally important that workers understand that it is not the JSA form that will keep them safe on the job, but rather the process it represents. It is of little value to identify hazards and devise controls if the controls are not put in place. Workers should never be tempted to "sign on" the bottom of a JSA without first reading and understanding it. JSAs are quasilegal documents, and are often used in incident investigations, contractual disputes, and court cases.

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Everybody in the workforce should be involved in creating the JSA. The more minds, the more year of experience applied to analyzing the hazards in a job, the more successful the work group will be in controlling them.

HAZOP STUDY
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.

Hazard and Operability The HAZOP technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process systems, but has later been extended to other types of systems and also to complex operations and to software systems. A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guidewords and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.

WHEN TO PERFORM A HAZOP?

The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out as early in the design phase as possible - to have influence on the design. On the other hand; to carry out a HAZOP we need a rather complete design. As a compromise, the HAZOP is usually carried
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out as a final check when the detailed design has been completed. A HAZOP study may also be conducted on an existing facility to identify modifications that should be implemented to reduce risk and operability problems. HAZOP studies may also be used more extensively, including: At the initial concept stage when design drawings are available When the final piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) are available During construction and installation to ensure that recommendations are implemented During commissioning During operation to ensure that plant emergency and operating procedures are regularly reviewed and updated as required

TYPES OF HAZOP
Process HAZOP The HAZOP technique was originally developed to assess plants and process systems Human HAZOP A family of specialized HAZOPs. More focused on human errors than technical failures Procedure HAZOP Review of procedures or operational sequences sometimes denoted SAFOP - Safe Operation Study

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Software HAZOP Identification of possible errors in the development of software

Responsibilities of HAZOP team leader:

Define the scope for the analysis Select HAZOP team members Plan and prepare the study Chair the HAZOP meetings

Responsibilities of HAZOP secretary:

Prepare HAZOP worksheets Record the discussion in the HAZOP meetings Prepare draft report(s)

HAZOP meeting
Proposed agenda: 1. Introduction and presentation of participants 2. Overall presentation of the system/operation to be analyzed 3. Description of the HAZOP approach 4. Presentation of the first node or logical part of the operation 5. Analyze the first node/part using the guide-words and parameters 6. Continue presentation and analysis (steps 4 and 5) 7. Course summary of findings Focus should be on potential hazards as well as potential operational problems

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Each session of the HAZOP meeting should not exceed two hours.

HAZOP PROCEDURE
1. Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage) 2. Choose a study node (i.e., line, vessel, pump, operating instruction) 3. Describe the design intent 4. Select a process parameter 5. Apply a guide-word 6. Determine cause(s) 7. Evaluate consequences/problems 8. Recommend action: What? When? Who? 9. Record information 10. Repeat procedure (from step 2)

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MODES OF OPERATION
The following modes of plant operation should be considered for each node: Normal operation Reduced throughput operation Routine start-up Routine shutdown Emergency shutdown Commissioning Special operating modes

PROCESS PARAMETERS
Process parameters may generally be classified into the following groups: Physical parameters related to input medium properties Physical parameters related to input medium conditions Physical parameters related to system dynamics Non-physical tangible parameters related to batch type processes Parameters related to system operations These parameters are not necessarily used in conjunction with guide-words: Instrumentation Relief Start-up / shutdown

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Maintenance Safety / contingency Sampling

REPORT CONTENTS
Summary 1. Introduction 2. System definition and delimitation 3. Documents (on which the analysis is based) 4. Methodology 5. Team members 6. HAZOP results Reporting principles Classification of recordings Main results Appendix 1: HAZOP work-sheets Appendix 2: P&IDs (marked)

ADVANTAGES
Systematic examination Multidisciplinary study Utilizes operational experience Covers safety as well as operational aspects Solutions to the problems identified may be indicated Considers operational procedures
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Covers human errors Study led by independent person Results are recorded

WORKSHEET ENTRIES NODE

A node is a specific location in the process in which (the deviations of) the design/process intent are evaluated. Examples might be: separators, heat exchangers, scrubbers, pumps, compressors, and interconnecting pipes with equipment.

DESIGN INTENT
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the node; this is qualitatively described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or quantitatively in the process parameters, like temperature, flow rate, pressure, composition, etc.

DEVIATION
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from their design/process intent.

PARAMETER
The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process (e.g. pressure, temperature, composition).

GUIDEWORD
A short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the design/process intent. The most commonly used set of guide-words is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, and reverse. In addition, guidewords like too early, too late, instead of, are used; the latter mainly for batch-like processes. The guidewords are applied, in turn, to all the parameters, in order to identify

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unexpected and yet credible deviations from the design/process intent.

CAUSE
The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several causes may be identified for one deviation. It is often recommended to start with the causes that may result in the worst possible consequence.

CONSEQUENCE
The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. Consequences may both comprise process hazards and operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced quality of the product. Several consequences may follow from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have several causes

SAFEGUARD
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the deviation or to mitigate its consequences. There are, in principle, five types of safeguards that: Identify the deviation (e.g., detectors and alarms, and human operator detection) in case of overfilling it. These are usually an integrated part of the process control) Prevent the deviation from occurring (e.g., an inert gas blanket in storages of flammable substances) Prevent further escalation of the deviation (e.g., by (total) trip of the activity. These facilities are often interlocked with several units in the process, often controlled by computers) Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation (e.g., pressure safety valves (PSV) and vent systems)
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Compensate for the deviation (e.g., an automatic control system that reduces the feed to a vessel

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. This analysis method is mainly used in the field of safety engineering to quantitatively determine the probability of a safety hazard.

HISTORY OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is another technique for reliability and safety analysis. Bell Telephone Laboratories developed the concept in 1962 for the US Air Force for use with the Minuteman system. It was later adopted and extensively applied by the Boeing Company. Fault tree analysis is one of many symbolic "analytical logic techniques" found in operations research and in system reliability. Other techniques include Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs).

METHODOLOGY
FTA methodology is described in several industry and government standards, including NRC NUREG0492 for the nuclear power industry, an aerospace-oriented revision to

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NUREG0492 for use by NASA,[11] SAE ARP4761 for civil aerospace, MILHDBK338 for military systems[12] for military systems. IEC standard IEC 61025[13] is intended for cross-industry use and has been adopted as European Norm EN 61025. Since no system is perfect, dealing with a subsystem fault is a necessity, and any working system eventually will have a fault in some place. However, the probability for a complete or partial success is greater than the probability of a complete failure or partial failure. Assembling a FTA is thus not as tedious as assembling a success tree which can turn out to be very time consuming. Because assembling a FTA can be a costly and cumbersome experience, the perfect method is to consider subsystems. In this way dealing with smaller systems can assure less error work probability, less system analysis. Afterward, the subsystems integrate to form the well analyzed big system. An undesired effect is taken as the root ('top event') of a tree of logic. There should be only one Top Event and all concerns must tree down from it. Then, each situation that could cause that effect is added to the tree as a series of logic expressions. When fault trees are labeled with actual numbers about failure probabilities (which are often in practice unavailable because of the expense of testing), computer programs can calculate failure probabilities from fault trees.

ANALYSIS
Many different approaches can be used to model a FTA, but the most common and popular way can be summarized in a few steps. Remember that a fault tree is used to analyze a single fault event and that one and only one event can be analyzed during a single fault tree. Even though the fault may vary dramatically, a FTA follows the same procedure for an event, be it a delay of 0.25 m sec for the generation of electrical power, or the random, unintended launch of an ICBM.
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Fault tree analysis diagram FTA analysis involves five steps:

DEFINE THE UNDESIRED EVENT TO STUDY

Definition of the undesired event can be very hard to catch, although some of the events are very easy and obvious to observe. An engineer with a wide knowledge of the design of the system or a system analyst with an engineering background is the best person who can help define and number the undesired events. Undesired events are used then to make the FTA, one event for one FTA; no two events will be used to make one FTA.

OBTAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM

Once the undesired event is selected, all causes with probabilities of affecting the undesired event of 0 or more are studied and analyzed. Getting exact numbers for the probabilities leading to the event is usually impossible for the reason that it may be very costly and time consuming to do so. Computer software is used to study probabilities; this may lead to less costly system analysis.

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System analysts can help with understanding the overall system. System designers have full knowledge of the system and this knowledge is very important for not missing any cause affecting the undesired event. For the selected event all causes are then numbered and sequenced in the order of occurrence and then are used for the next step which is drawing or constructing the fault tree.

CONSTRUCT THE FAULT TREE

After selecting the undesired event and having analyzed the system so that we know all the causing effects (and if possible their probabilities) we can now construct the fault tree. Fault tree is based on AND and OR gates which define the major characteristics of the fault tree.

EVALUATE THE FAULT TREE

After the fault tree has been assembled for a specific undesired event, it is evaluated and analyzed for any possible improvement or in other words study the risk management and find ways for system improvement. This step is as an introduction for the final step which will be to control the hazards identified. In short, in this step we identify all possible hazards affecting in a direct or indirect way the system.

CONTROL THE HAZARDS IDENTIFIED

This step is very specific and differs largely from one system to another, but the main point will always be that after identifying the hazards all possible methods are pursued to decrease the probability of occurrence.

WHAT IS A FAULT TREE DIAGRAM (FTD)?

Fault tree diagrams (or negative analytical trees) are logic block diagrams that display the state of a system (top event) in terms of the states of its components (basic events). Like reliability block diagrams (RBDs), fault tree diagrams are also a graphical

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design technique, and as such provide an alternative to methodology to RBDs. An FTD is built top-down and in term of events rather than blocks. It uses a graphic "model" of the pathways within a system that can lead to a foreseeable, undesirable loss event (or a failure). The pathways interconnect contributory events and conditions, using standard logic symbols (AND, OR etc). The basic constructs in a fault tree diagram are gates and events, where the events have an identical meaning as a block in an RBD and the gates are the conditions.

EMERGENCY PLANNING
Major incidents and disruptive challenges requiring urgent action can strike suddenly, unexpectedly and anywhere. Many agencies have a part to play in dealing with these emergencies and their aftermath. Emergency Planning is the process whereby the Council prepares to deal with major emergencies and incidents and assist in the welfare and recovery of the community. The aim of Emergency Planning is to maintain appropriate arrangements and procedures that enable the council to respond to and manage major incidents.

HOW DOES THE COUNCIL PROVIDE EMERGENCY PLANNING?

The Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 is the primary legislation that underpins the responses of the Emergency Services and other primary responders, including local authorities like Leicester City Council. The Emergency Planning service coordinates the planning, training, exercising, activation and the management of the Council's response to emergencies. The service works in collaboration with the emergency services, adjoining local authorities, voluntary agencies and the many other varied responders who have a role to play, to ensure there is a cocoordinated and effective response. Emergency Planning falls into four broad categories:
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Planning - The Council is continually assessing the risks posed within Leicester and developing and maintaining plans to ensure that procedures are in place to control and mitigate their impact. Training and Exercising - The service conducts a program of training and exercises for our staff and partner agencies to make them aware of the need to plan. Training and exercising helps provide an effective response. Liaison - the service works closely with partner agencies and stakeholders to share information and ensure dovetailing of plans and procedures thereby providing a co-coordinated and integrated response to emergency incidents. Operational - The Council provides a 24-hour, 365 day response to major incidents.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

Hazardous Materials Response Plans Oil Spill Response Planning All Hazard Plans Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Support EOC Layout and Design Emergency Preplans Crisis Management Planning Response Training

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Review Questions Five Marks 1. Define JSA. 2. When JSA is required? 3. How to create JSA? 4. Write a short note on HAZOP. 5. Write the types of HAZOP. 6. What are the responsibilities of HAZOP team member? 7. Draw the flow chart for HAZOP modes of operation. 8. What are work sheet entries? 9. Write a short note on fault tree analysis. 10. Draw the diagram for fault tree analysis. Fifteen Marks 1. Explain briefly about JSA. 2. Explain the duties of safety manager after the JSA work sheet is completed. 3. Explain the concept of HAZOP Study 4. Explain the types of HAZOP in detail. 5. Explain briefly about HAZOP Modes of operation. 6. What are worksheet entries? Explain its concepts. 7. Explain the concepts of fault tree analysis. 8. How does the council provide energy planning? 9. What are the steps involved in fault tree analysis 10. Explain the different types of emergency planning.

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UNIT III
SAFETY INVENTORY SYSTEM
SAFETY STOCK
Safety stock (also called buffer stock) is a term used by logisticians to describe a level of extra stock that is maintained to mitigate risk of stock outs (shortfall in raw material or packaging) due to uncertainties in supply and demand. Adequate safety stock levels permit business operations to proceed according to their plans. Safety stock is held when there is uncertainty in the demand level or lead time for the product; it serves as an insurance against stock outs

Safety stock

With a new product, safety stock can be utilized as a strategic tool until the company can judge how accurate their forecast is after the first few years, especially when used with a material requirements planning worksheet. The less accurate the forecast, the more safety stock is required. With material requirements planning (MRP) worksheet a company can judge how much they will need to produce to meet their forecasted sales demand without relying on safety stock. However, a common strategy is to try and reduce the

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level of safety stock to help keep inventory costs low once the product demand becomes more predictable. This can be extremely important for companies with a smaller financial cushion or those trying to run on lean manufacturing, which is aimed towards eliminating waste throughout the production process. The amount of safety stock an organization chooses to keep on hand can dramatically affect their business. Too much safety stock can result in high holding costs of inventory. In addition, products which are stored for too long a time can spoil, expire, or break during the warehousing process. Too little safety stock can result in lost sales and, thus, a higher rate of customer turnover. As a result, finding the right balance between too much and too little safety stock is essential.

REASONS FOR SAFETY STOCK

Safety stocks enable organizations to satisfy customer demand in the event of these possibilities: Supplier may deliver their product late or not at all The warehouse may be on strike A number of items at the warehouse may be of poor quality and replacements are still on order A competitor may be sold out on a product, which is increasing the demand for your products Random demand (in reality, random events occur) Machinery breakdown Unexpected increase in demand

REDUCING SAFETY STOCK

Safety stock is used as a buffer to protect organizations from stock outs caused by inaccurate planning or poor schedule adherence by suppliers. As such, its cost (in both material and
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management) is often seen as a drain on financial resources which results in reduction initiatives. In addition, time sensitive goods such as food, drink, and other perishable items could spoil and go to waste if held as safety stock for too long. Various methods exist to reduce safety stock; these include better use of technology, increased collaboration with suppliers, and more accurate forecasting [3][4] In a lean supply environment, lead times are reduced which can help minimize safety stock levels thus reducing the likelihood and impact of stock outs. Due to the cost of safety stock, many organizations opt for a service level led safety stock calculation; for example, a 95% service level could result in stock outs, but is at a level which is satisfactory to the company. The lower the service level, the lower the requirement for safety stock. An Enterprise Resource Planning system (ERP system) can also help an organization reduce its level of safety stock. Most ERP systems provide a type of Production Planning module. An ERP module such as this can help a company develop highly accurate and dynamic sales forecasts and sales and operations plans. By creating more accurate and dynamic forecasts, a company reduces their chance of producing insufficient inventory for a given period and, thus, should be able to reduce the amount of safety stock which they require. In addition, ERP systems use established formulas to help calculate appropriate levels of safety stock based on the previously developed production plans. While an ERP system aids an organization in estimating a reasonable amount of safety stock, the ERP module must be set up to plan requirements effectively.

INVENTORY POLICY
The size of the safety stock depends on the type of inventory policy that is in effect. An inventory node is supplied from a "source" which fulfills orders for the considered product after a certain replenishment lead time. In a "periodic review" inventory policy the inventory level is checked periodically (such
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as once a month) and an order is placed at that time if necessary; in this case the risk period is equal to the time until the next review plus the replenishment lead time. On the other hand, if the inventory policy is a "continuous review" policy (such as an Order point-Order Quantity policy or an Order Point-Order Up To policy) the inventory level is being check continuously and orders can be placed immediately, so the risk period is just the replenishment lead time. Therefore "continuous review" inventory policies can make do with a smaller safety stock.

SAFETY SURVEY
Safety Survey - a systematic review, to recommend improvements where needed, to provide assurance of the safety of current activities, and to confirm conformance with applicable parts of the safety management system. (ESARR3)

Safety Survey

OBJECTIVE OF SAFETY SURVEY

To provide a flexible and cost-effective method to identify areas for safety improvement within the aviation service provider organization.

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REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Although there is no explicit ICAO recommendation to the aviation service provider organizations to schedule and conduct safety surveys, these are considered best practice. ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual states that organizations pursuing a proactive strategy for safety management should actively seek systemic unsafe conditions using safety surveys to elicit feedback from front-line personnel about areas of dissatisfaction and unsatisfactory conditions that may have accident potential. The provisions in Commission Regulation 2096 establishing common requirements for the provision of air navigation services and in ESARR 3 mandate air traffic service providers to carry out safety surveys within the scope of their safety assurance activities. Safety surveys shall be carried out as a matter of routine.

DESCRIPTION OF SAFETY SURVEY

Surveys are complementary to incident investigation, since they examine systems under normal conditions to identify weaknesses that have not yet been seen to contribute directly or indirectly to a safety occurrence. Also, the role of a safety survey is quite similar to the one performed by quality audits in quality management systems. Both activities are conducted to check compliance with standards (or targets) and procedures, detect problems and facilitate the identification of solutions and improvements. Safety surveys generally are cost-effective, easy to administer and flexible method for identifying hazards by sampling the workforce opinion within an organization. Surveys are used as a safety monitoring tool to assess whether an existing situation or organizational aspect is satisfactory. Surveys may also be used to review particular areas of safety concerns where hazards are suspected; therefore they can be important part of the hazard identification process within the SMS. In all cases, the principles and procedures when conducting a safety survey are the same.

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CONDUCTING A SAFETY SURVEY

The safety surveys are usually independent of routine inspections and safety audits by government or organization's management. Aviation service providers may choose to conduct safety surveys at regularly planned intervals or ad-hoc. Safety surveys should be carried out internally conducted by independent and adequately trained personnel. Since 'independent' would normally mean independent of the area being surveyed, different ways might be suggested to achieve independence. The most common options would be using specific personnel, cross-auditing and external support. The safety manager of the organization should head up safety surveys and be responsible for the recruitment, training and review of the personnel conducting this activity. The surveys can review operational units, particular operational and engineering activities or facilities. Surveys should also be performed to review SMS processes established to meet regulatory requirements. The objectives are to assess factors affecting safety of operations, significant activities and SMS safety processes, and to facilitate the identification of corrective actions wherever necessary. According to ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual, the common principles and procedures that need to be followed when conducting a safety survey are: Objectives the goal of the survey should be clearly declared for all intended respondents. Sample size - should be sufficient to permit valid conclusions to be drawn from the information collected. Neutral and unbiased the survey is best to be conducted through the use of checklists, questionnaires and interviews as necessary, in a way that will encourage openness of the participants.

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Reducing risk of bias the random selection of the participants will help reducing the risk of receiving biased information. Formulating and sequencing survey questions - openended questions requiring narrative responses should be avoided in surveys. Rather, questions should elicit specific responses (which can be scored). These might include evaluating an opinion along some predetermined scale, e.g. from strongly disagree, through neither agree nor disagree, to completely agree. Prior coordination should be made with the authorities governing the target respondents, unions and professional associations. Assurance of confidentiality - regarding the information collected through the survey. Some other factors that ICAO suggest for consideration when conducting a survey are to obtain the cooperation of the people involved, avoid perception of witchhunt and to respect the operational experience of target respondents. Surveys have a particular application when an organization is undergoing significant change. A careful consideration of the ongoing major changes and the nature of the operations, of the systems and procedures used must be given when selecting the time frame for surveys, such as Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) and Normal Operations Safety Survey (NOSS). Surveys and programs, such as LOSA, NOSS and FDA are used to sample normal operations activities and provide useful normative data for analysis of the daily operations, providing to the organization proactive tools for hazard identification and safety improvement.

RESULTS TO BE EXPECTED
Generally the line personnel are aware where the areas of risk are. Line managers and operational staff typically have best perceptions of where to look for risks and areas for improvement

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in their fields of responsibility. Surveys completed by operational personnel can provide important diagnostic information about daily operations and valuable insight into the: Perceptions and opinions of operational personnel; Level of teamwork and cooperation among various employee groups; Problem areas or bottlenecks in daily operations; Corporate safety culture; Current areas of dissent or confusion. It is important for the organization to fully realize that safety surveys can be obstructed by subjectivism. That is why close attention is needed when producing the safety survey report and interpreting the results from it. The bias can be found not only in the participant's opinion but also during the creation and interpretation processes.

MANAGING THE SURVEY RESULTS

According to ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual, data gathering and analysis, development of the recommendations and preparation of the final survey report takes considerable amount of time. That is why, it is desirable to conduct a briefing with those responsible as soon as the survey has been completed and if any conclusions are immediately available, they should be discussed informally. The recommendations, stemming from the survey, should be sensible and not over-reactive in nature, they should be within the scope and ability of the organization. The validity of all survey information obtained may need to be verified before corrective action is taken. According to ICAO, the sensitive issues should not be avoided, but care should be taken to ensure that they are presented in a fair, constructive and diplomatic manner.

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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH HAZARDS

Occupational health and safety is a cross-disciplinary area concerned with protecting the safety, health and welfare of people engaged in work or employment. The goal of all occupational health and safety programs is to foster a safe work environment.[1] As a secondary effect, it may also protect coworkers, family members, employers, customers, suppliers, nearby communities, and other members of the public who are impacted by the workplace environment. It may involve interactions among many subject areas, including occupational medicine, occupational (or industrial) hygiene, public health, safety engineering, chemistry, health physics.

RELATIONSHIP TO OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY

Occupational health psychology (OHP), a related discipline, is a relatively new field that combines elements of occupational health and safety, industrial/organizational psychology, and health psychology.[2] The field is concerned with identifying work-related psychosocial factors that adversely affect the health of people who work. OHP is also concerned with developing ways to effect change in workplaces for the purpose of improving the health of people who work. For more detail on OHP, see the section on occupational health psychology....

REASONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY

The event of an incident at work (such as legal fees, fines, compensatory damages, investigation time, lost production, lost goodwill from the workforce, from customers and from the wider community). Legal - Occupational requirements may be reinforced in civil law and/or criminal law; it is accepted that without the
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extra "encouragement" of potential regulatory action or litigation, many organizations would not act upon their implied moral obligations. Occupational health and safety officers promote health and safety procedures in an organisation. They recognize hazards and measure health and safety risks, set suitable safety controls in place, and give recommendations on avoiding accidents to management and employees in an organisation. This paper looks at the main tasks undertaken by OHS practitioners in Europe, Australia and the USA, and the main knowledge and skills that are required of them. Like it or not, organisations have a duty to provide health and safety training. But it could involve much more than you think. (Damon, Nadia. 2008. Reducing The Risks, Training and Coaching Today, United Kingdom, pg.14) An effective training program can reduce the number of injuries and deaths, property damage, legal liability, illnesses, workers' compensation claims, and missed time from work. A safety training program can also help a trainer keep the required OSHA-mandated safety training courses organized and up-to-date. Safety training classes help establish a safety culture in which employees themselves help promote proper safety procedures while on the job. It is important that new employees be properly trained and embraces the importance of workplace safety as it is easy for seasoned workers to negatively influence the new hires. That negative influence however, can be purged with the establishment of new, hands-on, innovative effective safety training which will ultimately lead to an effective safety culture. A 1998 NIOSH study concluded that the role of training in developing and maintaining effective hazard control activities is a proven and successful method of intervention.

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IDENTIFYING SAFETY AND HEALTH HAZARDS

Hazards, risks, outcomes
The terminology used in OSH varies between states, but generally speaking: A hazard is something that can cause harm if not controlled. The outcome is the harm that results from an uncontrolled hazard. A risk is a combination of the probability that a particular outcome will occur and the severity of the harm involved. Hazard, risk, and outcome are used in other fields to describe e.g. environmental damage, or damage to equipment. However, in the context of OSH, harm generally describes the direct or indirect degradation, temporary or permanent, of the physical, mental, or social well-being of workers. For example, repetitively carrying out manual handling of heavy objects is a hazard. The outcome could be a musculoskeletal disorder (MSD) or an acute back or joint injury. The risk can be expressed numerically (e.g. a 0.5 or 50/50 chance of the outcome occurring during a year), in relative terms (e.g. "high/medium/low"), or with a multi-dimensional classification scheme (e.g. situation-specific risks). HAZARD ASSESSMENT Hazard analysis or hazard assessment is a process in which individual hazards of the workplace are identified, assessed and controlled/eliminated as close to source (location of the hazard) as reasonable and possible. As technology, resources, social expectation or regulatory requirements change, hazard analysis focuses controls more closely toward the source of the hazard. Thus hazard control is a dynamic program of prevention. Hazardbased programs also have the advantage of not assigning or

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implying there are "acceptable risks" in the workplace. A hazardbased program may not be able to eliminate all risks, but neither does it accept "satisfactory" -- but still riskyoutcomes. And as those who calculate and manage the risk are usually managers while those exposed to the risks are a different group, workers, a hazard-based approach can by-pass conflict inherent in a riskbased approach RISK ASSESSMENT Modern occupational safety and health legislation usually demands that a risk assessment be carried out prior to making an intervention. It should be kept in mind that risk management requires risk to be managed to a level which is as low as is reasonably practical.

THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD:

Identify the hazards Identify all affected by the hazard and how Evaluate the risk Identify and prioritize appropriate control measures The calculation of risk is based on the likelihood or probability of the harm being realized and the severity of the consequences. This can be expressed mathematically as a quantitative assessment (by assigning low, medium and high likelihood and severity with integers and multiplying them to obtain a risk factor), or qualitatively as a description of the circumstances by which the harm could arise. The assessment should be recorded and reviewed periodically and whenever there is a significant change to work practices. The assessment should include practical recommendations to control the risk. Once recommended controls are implemented, the risk should be re-calculated to determine of it has been lowered to an acceptable level. Generally speaking, newly introduced controls
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should lower risk by one level, i.e., from high to medium or from medium to low.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH: THE WORKPLACE

Other than the home environment, the workplace is the setting in which many people spend the largest proportion of their time. Indeed, for many people, particularly in developing countries, the boundary between their home and workplace environments is blurred, since they often undertake agricultural or cottage industry activities within the home. Growth of the latter has often been spurred by population growth and rapid urbanization, in combination with economic development, and in parallel with larger, more conspicuous industrial development. In favorable circumstances, work contributes to good health and economic achievements. However, the work environment exposes many workers to health hazards that contribute to injuries, respiratory diseases, cancer, musculoskeletal disorders, reproductive disorders, cardiovascular diseases, mental and neurological illnesses, eye damage and hearing loss, as well as to communicable diseases. The current global labor force stands at about 2600 million and is growing continuously. Approximately 75% of these working people are in developing countries. The officially registered working population constitutes 6070% of the world's adult male and 3060% of the world's adult female population. Each year, another 40 million people join the labor force, most of them in developing countries. Workplace environmental hazards are therefore a threat to a large proportion of the world population.

THE WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In some of the least developed countries up to 80% of the workforce is employed in agriculture, mining and other types of primary production. Heavy physical work, often combined with heat stress, occupational accidents, pesticide poisonings, organic
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dusts and biological hazards are thus the main causes of occupational morbidity and mortality in these countries. Additionally, numerous non-occupational factors such as parasitic and infectious diseases, poor hygiene and sanitation, poor nutrition, general poverty and illiteracy aggravate these occupational health effects. The informal sector and small-scale industries (SSIs), in particular, are subject to numerous workplace hazards. Many migrants find work in the informal sector and SSIs since these offer easy entry for newcomers, and often do not require formal trade skills, or large amounts of capital or machinery. Estimates suggest over 1000 million people worldwide are employed by small-scale industries. In some countries, such as Thailand, SSIs may account for the majority of registered industries. However, SSIs are not subject to occupational health-and-safety provisions. Even in the advanced economy of the USA, 90% of all work sites, covering 40% of the countries total workforce of 110 million, are not inspected regularly and/or do not have access to occupational health services. Many of those working in SSIs therefore suffer adverse health impacts due to exposure to dusts, heat stress, toxic substances, noise, vibration and poor hygiene. In rapidly-industrializing countries occupational health problems often arise due to use of technologies that are less advanced and more hazardous than those favored by developed countries. Moreover, managing all aspects of production for example, health and safety at work and the health of the work environment, as well as the external environment can be difficult when technical and financial resources are limited, as is often the case. In such circumstances, occupational accidents, traditional physical and ergonomic hazards, and occupational injuries diseases become major problems. Their true extent is unknown, however, since many occupational injuries and diseases are neither notified nor registered.

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Evidently, the panorama of workplace hazards varies in accordance with the stage of economic development that has been reached and approaches to health protection should take this into account. The basic principles of occupational health remain the same, however, and are laid out in the Declaration on occupational health for all.

WORKPLACE EXPOSURES
Workplace health hazards generally differ from those found in the general environment. Furthermore, because workers are often exposed in confined spaces, exposure levels to workplace hazards are often much higher than exposures to hazards in the general environment. In developing countries, workers may be exposed simultaneously to workplace hazards, to an unsafe housing environment, and a polluted general environment. The following summary of major workplace hazards has been extracted from the Global strategy on occupational health for all, which was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1996. Mechanical hazards, unshielded machinery, unsafe structures in the workplace and dangerous tools are some of the most prevalent workplace hazards in developed and developing countries. In Europe, about 10 million occupational accidents happen every year (some of them commuting accidents). Adoption of safer working practices, improvement of safety systems and changes in behavioural and management practices could reduce accident rates, even in high-risk industries, by 50% or more within a relatively short time. Approximately 30% of the workforce in developed countries and between 50% and 70% in developing countries may be exposed to a heavy physical workload or ergonomically poor working conditions, involving much lifting and moving of heavy items, or repetitive manual tasks. Workers most heavily exposed to heavy physical workloads include miners, farmers, lumberjacks, fishermen, construction workers, storage workers and healthcare personnel. Repetitive tasks and static muscular load are also
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common among many industrial and service occupations and can lead to injuries and musculoskeletal disorders. In many developed countries such disorders are the main cause of both short-term and permanent work disability and lead to economic losses amounting to as much as 5% of GNP. Exposure to some 200 biological agents, viruses, bacteria, parasites, fungi, moulds and organic dusts occurs in selected occupational environments. The hepatitis B and hepatitis C viruses and tuberculosis infections (particularly among healthcare workers), asthma (among persons exposed to organic dust) and chronic parasitic diseases (particularly among agricultural and forestry workers) are the most common occupational diseases resulting from such exposures. Blood-borne diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B are now major occupational hazards for healthcare workers. Physical factors in the workplace such as noise, vibration, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation and microclimatic conditions can all affect health adversely. Between 10 and 30% of the workforce in developed countries, and up to 80% of the workforce in developing and newly-industrializing countries, are exposed to such physical factors. In some high-risk sectors such as mining, manufacturing and construction, all workers may be affected. Noise-induced hearing loss is one of the most prevalent occupational health effects in both developing and developed countries. About 100 000 different chemical products are in use in modern work environments and the number is growing. High exposures to chemical hazards are most prevalent in industries that process chemicals and metals, in the manufacture of certain consumer goods, in the production of textiles and artificial fibres, and in the construction industry. Chemicals are also increasingly used in virtually all types of work, including non-industrial activities such as hospital and office work, cleaning, and provision of cosmetic and beauty services. Exposure varies widely. Health
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effects include metal poisoning, damage to the central nervous system and liver (caused by exposure to solvents), pesticide poisoning, dermal and respiratory allergies, dermatoses, cancers and reproductive disorders. In some developing countries, more than half of the workers exposed to dust-containing silica in certain high-risk industries (such as mining and metallurgy) are reported to show clinical signs of silicosis or other types of pneumoconiosis. Reproductive hazards in the workplace include around 200300 chemicals known to be mutagenic or carcinogenic. The reported adverse effects include infertility in both sexes, spontaneous abortion, fetal death, teratogenesis, fetal cancer, fetotoxicity and retarded development of the fetus or newborn. Numerous organic solvents and toxic metals, many biological agents, such as certain bacteria, viruses and zoonoses, as well as heavy physical work, are also associated with an increased risk of reproductive disorders. The reproductive hazards of ionizing radiation are now well-established, while hazards from nonionizing radiation are under intensive study. Both male and female workers may be affected by these hazards, but protection of women of fertile age and pregnant women is of particular concern. About 300350 substances have been identified as occupational carcinogens. They include chemical substances such as benzene, chromium, nitrosamines and asbestos, physical hazards such as ultraviolet radiation (UVR) and ionizing radiation, and biological hazards such as viruses. In the European Union alone, approximately 16 million people are exposed to carcinogenic agents at work. The most common cancers resulting from these exposures are cancers of the lung, bladder, skin, mesothelium, liver, haematopoietic tissue, bone and soft connective tissue. Among certain occupational groups, such as asbestos sprayers, occupational cancer may be the leading factor in ill-health and mortality. Due to the random character of effect, the only effective control strategy is primary prevention that eliminates exposure

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completely, or that effectively isolates the worker from carcinogenic exposure. Exposure to the estimated 3000 allergenic agents in the environment is mainly occupational. In the work environment, such hazardous agents enter the body via the respiratory tract or the skin. Allergic skin diseases are some of the most prevalent occupational diseases. Occupational respiratory diseases should therefore be the focus of any occupational health programme. Occupational asthma, for instance, is caused by exposure to various organic dusts, microorganisms, bacteria, fungi and moulds, and several chemicals. The increased number of people who develop an allergic response, coupled with high numbers of occupational allergenic exposures and improved diagnostic methods, has led to a steady growth in the registered numbers of occupational asthma cases in several industrialized countries. Psychological stress caused by time and work pressures has become more prevalent during the past decade. Monotonous work, work that requires constant concentration, irregular working hours, shift-work, work carried out at risk of violence (for example, police or prison work), isolated work or excessive responsibility for human or economic concerns, can also have adverse psychological effects. Psychological stress and overload have been associated with sleep disturbances, burn-out syndromes and depression. Epidemiological evidence exists of an elevated risk of cardiovascular disorders, particularly coronary heart disease and hypertension in association with work stress. Severe psychological conditions (psychotraumas) have been observed among workers involved in serious catastrophes or major accidents during which human lives have been threatened or lost. Social conditions of work such as gender distribution and segregation of jobs and equality (or lack of) in the workplace, and relationships between managers and employees, raise concerns about stress in the workplace. Many service and public employees experience social pressure from customers, clients or the public,
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which can increase the psychological workload. Measures for improving the social aspects of work mainly involve promotion of open and positive contacts in the workplace, support of the individual's role and identity at work, and encouragement of teamwork.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH IMPACTS

The great variety of occupational health hazards makes quantification of their associated health risks and impacts at the global level very difficult. Some estimates have been based on the occupational injuries and diseases reported in official statistics. But a large number of injuries and diseases caused by workplace hazards are not reported. Adjustment is therefore necessary. Making such adjustment, ILO and WHO estimate that there may be as many as 250 million occupational injuries each year, resulting in 330 000 fatalities. Due to the changes in occupational distribution with development, many countries have experienced a shift from the hazards that characterize work in agriculture, mining and other primary industries, to those of manufacturing industries or service industries. Following such a shift, occupational injuries and diseases could be expected to fall in number and the severity of those that do occur to be less. But, in fact, new occupational disease problems have emerged, leading to an increased incidence of reported occupational disease in certain developed countries. In addition to the specific workplace hazards discussed above, work and health are associated in other ways, creating possibly even greater impacts on health. Working conditions, type of work, vocational and professional status, and geographical location of the workplace and employment also have a profound impact on the social status and social well-being of workers. Historically, occupational health programs have developed with attempts to improve the social conditions of underserved and unprivileged occupations. In many countries, social policy and social protection are closely linked with employment and
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unemployment. As the mobility of workers increases, leading to high numbers of migrant workers in some countries, their health, well-being and social support will require special attention. These are key issues for sustainable development.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

The United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is an agency of the United States Department of Labor. It was created by Congress of the United States under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, signed by President Richard M. Nixon, on December 30, 1970. Its mission is to prevent work-related injuries, illnesses, and occupational fatality by issuing and enforcing standards for workplace safety and health. The agency is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor. The OSH Act which created OSHA also created the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as a research agency focusing on occupational health and safety. NIOSH is not a part of the U.S. Department of Labor. OSHA federal regulations cover most private sector workplaces. The OSH Act permits states to develop approved plans as long as they cover public sector employees and they provide protection equivalent to that provided under Federal OSHA regulations. In return, a portion of the cost of the approved state program is paid by the federal government. Twenty-two states and territories operate plans covering both the public and private sectors and five Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and the US Virgin Islands operate public employee only plans. In those five states, private sector employment remains under Federal OSHA jurisdiction. Occupational Health -The promotion and maintenance of the highest degree of physical, mental and social well-being of workers in all occupations total health of all at work.
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Occupational Hazards -``Source or situation with a potential for harm in terms of injury or ill health, damage to property, damage to the workplace environment, or a combination of these.

TYPES OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH HAZARDS

Physical Chemical Biological Mechanical Psychosocial Physical hazards Temperature - Heat / Cold Illumination Noise Vibration Radiation

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DISEASES DUE TO PHYSICAL AGENTS

Heat - Heat hyperpyrexia, Heat Exhaustion, Heat Syncope, Heat Cramps, burns, Prickly heat Cold - Frost bite, Light Occupational Cataract, Atmospheric-pressure- Caisson disease, air embolism, explosion. Noise - Occupational deafness, Radiation -Cancer, Leukemia, aplastic anemia, Pancytopenia Electricity - Burns, Shocks

CHEMICAL HAZARDS
A chemical hazard arises from contamination of an area with harmful or potentially harmful chemicals. Possible sources of

chemical hazards include the burning of fossils, materials and chemicals used in construction and industry, pollution of the environment and water supply, chemical spillages, industrial accidents, and the deliberate release of toxic materials. The use of chemicals has increased dramatically due to the economic development in various sectors including industry, agriculture and transport. As a consequence, children are exposed to a large number of chemicals of both natural and man-made origin. Exposure occurs through the air they breathe, the water they drink or bathe in, the food they eat, and the soil they touch (or

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ingest as toddlers). They are exposed virtually wherever they are: at home, in the school, on the playground, and during transport. Chemicals may have immediate, acute effects, as well as chronic effects, often resulting from long-term exposures. About 47 000 persons die every year as a result of such poisoning. Many of these poisonings occur in children and adolescents, are unintentional (accidental), and can be prevented if chemicals were appropriately stored and handled. Chronic, low-level exposure to various chemicals may result in a number of adverse outcomes, including damage to the nervous and immune systems, impairment of reproductive function and development, cancer, and organ-specific damage. Sound management of chemicals, particularly heavy metals, pesticides and persistent organic pollutants (POPs), is a prerequisite for the protection of childrens health. Due to the magnitude of their health impact on children, the initial focus for action should be placed on the so-called intellectual robbers : lead, mercury and polychlorinated biphenyl, as well as on pesticides, but this by no means implies that other chemicals should be ignored. Routes of entry - Inhalation, Ingestion, skin absorption. (inhalation is the main route of entry) Chemical agents can be classified intoMetals - Lead, TEL, As, Hg, Cd, Ni , Co etc. Aromatic Hydrocarbons - Benzene, Toluene, phenol etc. Aliphatic Hydrocarbons - Methyl alcohol Gases - Simple asphyxiants : N2, CH4, Co2 Chemical asphyxiants : CO, H2S, HCN

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Irritant gases : Ammonia, SO2, Cl2, Systemic poison : Cs2 Dusts (Pneumoconiosis)

INORGANIC DUST
Coal Dust - Anthracosis Silica -Silicosis Asbestos -Asbestosis Organic Dusts Cane Fiber - Bagassosis (Bronchi gets affected) Cotton dust - Byssinosis (In Textile industries) Tobacco - Tobaccosis,Lung Cancer Grain Dust - Farmer's Lungs

HAZARD SYMBOL
Hazard symbols are recognizable symbols designed to warn about hazardous materials or locations. The use of hazard symbols is often regulated by law and directed by standards organizations. Hazard symbols may appear with different colors, backgrounds, borders and supplemental information in order to signify the type of hazard.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Dangerous goods, also called hazardous materials or HazMat, are solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, other living organisms, property, or the environment. They are often subject to chemical regulations. "HazMat teams" are personnel specially trained to handle dangerous goods. Dangerous goods include materials that are radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizing, asphyxiating, biohazardous, toxic, pathogenic, or allergenic. Also included are physical conditions such as compressed gases and liquids or hot materials, including
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all goods containing such materials or chemicals, or may have other characteristics that render them hazardous in specific circumstances. Dangerous goods are often indicated by diamond-shaped signage. The colors of each diamond in a way has reference to its hazard i.e.: Flammable = red because fire and heat are generally of red color, Explosive = orange, because mixing red (flammable) with yellow (oxidizing agent) creates orange. Non Flammable Non Toxic Gas = green, due to all compressed air vessels being this color in France after World War II. France is where the diamond system of HazMat identification originated. Mitigating the risks associated with hazardous materials may require the application of safety precautions during their transport, use, storage and disposal. Most countries regulate hazardous materials by law, and they are subject to several international treaties as well. Even so, different countries may use different class diamonds for the same product. For example, in Australia, Anhydrous Ammonia UN 1005 is classified as 2.3 (Toxic Gas) with sub risk 8 (Corrosive), where as in the U.S. it is only classified as 2.2 (Non Flammable Gas). People who handle dangerous goods will often wear protective equipment, and metropolitan fire departments often have a response team specifically trained to deal with accidents and spills. Persons who may come into contact with dangerous goods as part of their work are also often subject to monitoring or health surveillance to ensure that their exposure does not exceed occupational exposure limits. Laws and regulations on the use and handling of hazardous materials may differ depending on the activity and status of the material. For example, one set of requirements may apply to their use in the workplace while a different set of requirements may apply to spill response, sale for consumer use, or transportation. Most countries regulate some aspect of hazardous materials.

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The most widely applied regulatory scheme is that for the transportation of dangerous goods. The United Nations Economic and Social Council issues the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which form the basis for most regional and national regulatory schemes. For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organization has developed regulations for air transport of hazardous materials that are based upon the UN Model but modified to accommodate unique aspects of air transport. Individual airline and governmental requirements are incorporated with this by the International Air Transport Association to produce the widely used IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR). Similarly, the International Maritime Organization has developed the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code ("IMDG Code", part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) for transportation on the high seas, and the Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail has developed the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail ("RID", part of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail). Many individual nations have also structured their dangerous goods transportation regulations to harmonize with the UN Model in organization as well as in specific requirements. The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS) is an internationally agreed upon system set to replace the various different classification and labeling standards used in different countries. GHS will use consistent criteria for classification and labeling on a global level. Dangerous goods are divided into classes on the basis of the specific chemical characteristics producing the risk. Note: The graphics and text in this article representing the dangerous goods safety marks are derived from the United Nations-based system of identifying dangerous goods. Not all countries use precisely the same graphics (label, placard and/or text information) in their national regulations. Some use graphic
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symbols, but without English wording or with similar wording in their national language. Refer to the Dangerous Goods Transportation Regulations of the country of interest.

BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
Biological hazards, also known as biohazards, refer to biological substances that pose a threat to the health of living organisms, primarily that of humans. This can include medical waste or samples of a microorganism, virus or toxin (from a biological source) that can impact human health. It can also include substances harmful to animals. The term and its associated symbol is generally used as a warning, so that those potentially exposed to the substances will know to take precautions. Sources of biological hazards include bacteria, viruses, insects, plants, birds, animals, and humans. These sources can cause a variety of health effects ranging from skin irritation and allergies to infections (e.g., tuberculosis, AIDS), cancer and so on. If you started searching in the directory for the cause of a disease or injury, you would probably end up in the "Biological Hazards" section first. On the other hand, if you searched for the disease itself, the search engine would take you to the "Diseases, Disorders and Injuries" section. This section will include information on animal bites, since they can cause certain infections or diseases. However, this section does not include information on the harm or injuries caused by the physical action of animals. For example, kicks from horses would be discussed in the "safety" section [not there yet]. Biological hazards are organisms or are parts that come from organisms that are harmful to the health of people. There are four different levels of biological hazards. The reaction the body has to each level is different and can range from stomach aches to death and everything in between.

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Level One biological hazards are usually bacteria or other types of microorganisms that are relatively harmless to a human. They best way to protect your self from this level of hazards os to wear protective gloves and a face mask at all time while working near them. The best way to dispose of them is in a normal trash reciprocal. You can help prevent the spread of these germs buy washing your hands frequently during the day. The most common level one biological hazards are hepatitis, chicken pox and E.coli. Level Two biological hazards are usually bacteria or viruses that cause mild symptoms in most people that become infected. A little more care is put into making sure you do not become infected with one of these viruses. Frequent had washing is suggested along with the proper protective gear such as a face mask that cover both the eyes and the mouth. Level Two biological hazards are well known and include salmonella, measles, Lyme disease, influenza(the common cold) and HIV. Level Three biological hazards can have severe or even fatal symptoms in humans but can usually be treated by vaccines or other treatments that know exist. The precautions taken to avoid contracting a level Three virus are much more serious than the precautions used for the first two. There is usually special equipment and protective gear that is used to prevent the spread of any hazards germs. A few level three hazards are anthrax, malaria, tuberculosis, and typhus. If they are not contained properly an outbreak could occur and potentially harm thousands of people before they can all be vaccinated against the virus. Level Four is by far the worst types of biological hazards. They can cause severe illness or death in humans and have no known vaccinations or treatments. Most of the time people working around these types of viruses are required to wear full hazardous material body suits to protect them from the virus they are trying to fight. It is also necessary to wear oxygen mask to avoid breathing in the harmful hazards. The most deadly of these biological hazards are Ebola, bird flu, Bolivian, and Dengue fever
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It is extremely important to the health of everyone that all people who are working with or around anything that can be considered a biological hazard always practices safety. There is no room for mistakes when you could be putting the health of thousands of people at risk.

CONTROL MEASURES SUBSTITUTION

Substitute reusable equipment with single-use, disposable equipment, e.g. needles, spatulas, emery boards, make-up brushes, razors, hand towels.

REDESIGN
Provide dull-tip scissors for cutting hair to prevent scissorinduced trauma. Install surfaces, furniture and fittings that are made of nonabsorbent materials and can be readily cleaned. Design the work area so that clean and contaminated instruments are kept separate from each other.

ISOLATION
Make sure all used sharps are placed in a clearly labelled, rigid-walled, puncture resistant container that meets Australian Standards immediately after use. Make sure all waste that is contaminated with blood or body substances is placed in a leak proof bag or container and sealed.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
Develop and implement procedures for:

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cleaning, disinfecting, sterilising and storing reusable equipment, in accordance with Queensland Health requirements managing blood and body substance spills managing accidental blood and body substance exposures and skin penetrating injuries safe disposal of contaminated waste, including sharps (this should comply with state or local council requirements) cleaning and storing laundry Provide workers with supervision, information and training on infectious diseases and infection control practices and procedures. Provide Hepatitis B immunisation for workers at risk of exposure to blood and body substances, particularly for workers performing skin penetrating procedures. Make sure workers do not reuse equipment marked by the manufacturer as 'single use'. Make sure workers do not reuse equipment that has been contaminated with blood or body substances unless it has been cleaned and disinfected or sterilised according to Queensland Health requirements. Make sure workers dispose of dispensed creams, ointments and lotions and do not return them to the original container. Make sure workers do not reuse wax unless it has been decontaminated according to Queensland Health requirements. Make sure workers treat all blood and body substances as potentially infectious and take standard precautions to
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prevent exposure, e.g. wear disposable gloves, good hygiene practices, safe handling of sharps. Provide adequate hand washing facilities at the workplace. Instruct workers to wash their hands using soap and water before and after client contact, and after contact with blood and body substances and contaminated equipment. Provide a number of sets of equipment to allow some equipment to be cleaned and disinfected or sterilised while others are in use. Instruct workers to follow the recommended dilutions and storage requirements for disinfectants and observe use-by dates.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Make sure workers wear disposable gloves for all contact with blood and body substances, and when performing skin penetration procedures, such as electrolysis, skin extractions, tattooing and ear and body piercing. Make sure workers wear contaminated equipment. gloves when cleaning

Make sure all abrasions, cuts or lesions are covered by waterproof dressings. Make sure workers wear eye and/or face protection when performing a procedure, such as cleaning contaminated equipment, which may cause a splashing hazard. Provide devices, such as gloves and finger cots, to protect nail technicians from abrasive injuries from files. CLASSIFICATION Category A, UN 2814- Infectious substances affecting humans and animals: An infectious substance in a form
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capable of causing permanent disability or life-threatening or fatal disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals when exposure to it occurs. Category B, UN 2900- Infectious substances affecting animals only: An infectious substance that is not in a form generally capable of causing permanent disability of lifethreatening or fatal disease in otherwise healthy humans and animals when exposure to themselves occurs. Category B, UN 3373- Biological substance transported for diagnostic or investigative purposes. Regulated Medical Waste, UN 3291- Waste or reusable material derived from medical treatment of an animal or human, or from biomedical research, which includes the production and testing of biological products. Bacteria-Tetanus, (Milkmen) Tuberculosis, Anthrax, Brucellosis

Virus - Hepatitis, AIDS Protozoal&Parasitic-Malaria,Hydatid(Dog handlers),Hookworms, tapeworms (Agriworkers), etc. Fungi-(Agri-workers)-Tinea-infections,Coccidiomycosis, Psittacoses, Ornithosis, etc.

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MECHANICAL HAZARDS
There are many hazards in agriculture associated with mechanical equipment. Knowing every hazard of every machine is very difficult. For this reason, agricultural safety and health professionals group them in ways that help the operator recognize the different types of hazards regardless of the machine. Your ability to recognize these hazardous components is the first step in being safe. This task sheet identifies groups of hazards, what the danger is, where the hazards may be found, and gives instruction for avoiding them.

PINCH, WRAP AND SHEAR POINTS

A pinch point hazard is formed when two machine parts move together and at least one of the parts moves in a circle These types of hazards are often found in power transmission systems such as belt drives, chain drives and gear drives. Avoid pinch points by keeping machine guards in place. Any type of rotating machine component can be considered a wrap point. The rotating components are often shafts such as the PTO. Individuals can be caught in a wrap point by their in a wrap point by their loose clothing or long hair. Guards can protect the operator from wrap points. Attention to dress and care of long hair is important as well.

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A shear point occurs when the edges of two machine parts move across or close enough to each other to cut a relatively soft material. One of the two objects can be stationary or moving while second is moving. Hedge trimmers are a good example of a shear point. Shielding the worker from the shear point is difficult on many agricultural machines. The best precaution to take for preventing injury is to shut off the machine before making repairs or adjustments.

Injuries-Falls, cuts, abrasions, concussions, contusions, etc. ErgonomicDisorders-Musculo-skeletal disorders(MSDs),Cumulative-trauma-Disorders etc. Ergonomics: ``Adjustment of Man & Machine``/ Application of human biological sciences with engineering science to achieve optimum mutual adjustment of man & his work, the benefit being measured in terms of human efficiency and well being.

(CTDs)

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Tool / machine design to fit to work. Ergo tools/ ergo friendly tools : Tools which reduce the stresses or problems resulting in CTD's / MSD's.).

PSYCHOSOCIAL HAZARDS
Lack of job satisfaction, insecurity, poor interpersonal relations, work pressure, ambiguity, etc. Psychological & behavioral changes hostility, aggressiveness, anxiety, depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, sickness absenteeism. Psychosomatic disorders- Hypertension, headache, bodyache, peptic ulcers, asthma, diabetes, heart disorders, etc.

TYPE OF CONTROL MEASURES

Medical (required to monitor effectiveness of Engineering Controls) Engineering (Best Engineering Control is to reduce exposure) Administrative / Legal. (Emphasis given to reduce the exposure)

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Review Questions Five Marks 1. What is mean by safety stock? 2. Write a reason for safety stock. 3. Write a short note on inventory policy. 4. How to conduct safety survey? 5. Mention the types of occupational health hazards. 6. What is occupational health? 7. What is an occupational hazard? 8. Define confidentiality. 9. What is the main objective of conducting safety survey? 10. Write a short note on Mechanical Hazards. Fifteen Marks 1. Explain briefly about safety inventory system. 2. How to reduce safety stock? Explain its concepts. 3. Explain briefly about inventory policy in detail. 4. How to conduct a safety survey? Explain its concepts. 5. What are the reason for safety stock 6. Explain the concepts of occupational health hazards. 7. Explain the concept Mechanical Hazards. of Biological hazards and

8. Explain the concept of chemical hazards in detail.

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9. Explain the following: i. ii. Occupational Hazards Occupational Health

10. Explain the types of occupational health hazards.

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UNIT IV
SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND DUTIES OF A SAFETY OFFICER
International bodies that keep an eye on workplace health and safety Safety Organizations

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA)

This federal agency establishes partnerships and encourages constant improvement in the areas of workplace health and safety with outreach programs and continuing education and training. An OSHA endeavor is called Making the Business Case for Safety and Health.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH)

NIOSH is a federal agency established to help assure healthy and safe working conditions for men and women in the workforce by providing training, education, research, and information related to the field of occupational safety and health.
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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL (NSC)

A nonprofit, nongovernmental resource for information related to the prevention of accidental injury or death, the National Safety Council focuses on research and statistics, fact sheets, consulting services, training and industry related events, as well as producing Safety and Health Magazine and a bilingual safety video library (English and Spanish).

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS (ASSE)

Founded in 1911 and guided by a board of directors, the ASSE is the oldest and largest professional safety organization, with 30,000 members who manage, supervise, research and consult on occupational safety, health, transportation and environmental issues in all industries, government, labor and education.

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CANADIAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERING (CSSE)

Self-governed by a voluntary board of directors, the CSSE is the leading Canadian organization for professionals focused on health and safety. Through working relationships with governmental agencies, industry and safety organizations, the CSSE promote greater awareness of the issues surrounding health and safety in the workplace.

INTERNATIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION (ISEA)

The ISEA is the U.S.-based trade association for companies that manufacture safety equipment. Its members include world leaders in the design and manufacture of clothing and safety equipment. ISEA member companies aim to promote the standardization of safety equipment and the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (ICOH)

ICOH is an international, nongovernmental professional society whose aims are to foster the knowledge and development of occupational health and safety in all its aspects. Founded in 1906 in Milan and operating in the official languages of English and French, ICOH is the world's leading international scientific society in the field of occupational health.

INTERNATIONAL ERGONOMICS ASSOCIATION (IEA)

The IEA is a federation of 42 societies from around the globe that focus on ergonomics and human factors. Governed by a council and run by an executive committee, the IEA promotes the international exchange of scientific information through conferences and meetings worldwide.

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CANADIAN CENTRE FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY (CCOHS)

CCOHS is a Canadian federal government agency focused on the elimination of all Canadian work-related illnesses and injuries. CCOHS has a mandated, impartial approach to the dissemination of information about workplace health and safety.

CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE

This national nonprofit organization is dedicated to reducing the costs and consequences of partner violence at work and to eliminating it altogether. This site covers everything from policies and programs to legal issues and legislation.

Center for Research on Occupational and Environmental Toxicology (CROET)

CROETweb.com is an occupational safety and health resource directory sponsored by the Center for Research on Occupational and Environmental Toxicology (CROET) at Oregon Health & Science University in Portland, Oregon. CROETweb.com contains links to hundreds of occupational safety and health resources focusing on day-to-day workplace issues.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS (IASP)

This trade association of safety professionals is dedicated to creating a properly managed safety culture - with a focus on producing employees who take an active role in training and identify potential hazards in the workplace, thus establishing the foundation for an effective culture of safety.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

AFL-CIO consists of 54 national and international volunteer member unions whose members have been a significant
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force in America for enabling working people to build better lives and futures for their families.

U.S. / EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH

This group is a joint effort between the governments of the United States and the European Union. Their website is a portal for all current news and regulatory documents related to workplace safety and health as it pertains to both continents.

TRI-NATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH

This working group is composed of government occupational safety and health experts from the U.S., Mexico and Canada, working together to improve living standards and working conditions. Its members make technical recommendations to their respective ministers of labor on workplace safety issues.

DUTIES OF DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY OFFICERS

The head of each department is responsible, as far as is reasonably practicable, for the safety of all members of staff, students and visitors within areas under his/her control. The head is also responsible for safe working conditions for staff and students undergoing field courses and the like, which are held under the aegis of the department, but are away from normal departmental premises. Heads must also satisfy themselves that there are safe working conditions and procedures at other institutions where staff and students are working. The head of department must appoint a departmental safety officer to advise him/her on how to implement the University's health and safety policies and the departmental health and safety rules. The role of the departmental safety officer is advisory and does not carry executive responsibility for health and safety within the department.

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The role of the departmental safety officer (with the assistance of the area safety officer, where appointed) is on behalf of the head of department and where reasonably practicable: 1. To ensure that the departmental statement of safety organization is reviewed annually, revised where appropriate and a copy provided for the University Safety Office; 2. To oversee that appropriate risk assessments have been prepared by supervisors and others; where a need for health surveillance and / or immunizations has been identified, to ensure that the University Occupational Health Service has been notified; 3. To carry out annual health and safety inspections of the department and to report findings to the head of department and the University Safety Office; where relevant, the Safety Office will report these findings to the University Occupational Health Service; 4. To monitor the working environment within the department and report unsatisfactory conditions to the head of department; 5. To give advice to members of staff and students on safe working procedures and practices and to arrange health and safety training to an adequate level; 6. To monitor compliance with departmental health and safety rules and University policy relating to health and safety and to advise the head of department where his/her advice is not accepted; 7. To receive notification via the head of department of potentially unsafe and unhealthy conditions and working practices, or other suggestions for improvement, from trade union appointed safety representatives; and to advise the head of department on the necessary steps for resolution of such matters;
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8. To receive and act upon representations with regard to health and safety made by any member of the department; 9. To ensure that necessary accident and incident reports are made to the University Safety Office, and to ensure that cases of suspected occupationally related ill health are reported to the University Occupational Health Service; 10. To act as a focal point for those in the department giving specialist safety advice, eg electrical safety supervisors, fire officers; 11. To maintain liaison with the University Safety Office and the University Occupational Health Service. Departmental safety officers are recommended to seek the advice and assistance of the University Safety Office and the University Occupational Health Service in the exercise of their functions. Heads of departments may wish to give the departmental safety officer authority to take action in exceptional circumstances where he/she discovers what in his/her view is a dangerous practice requiring immediate attention, reporting the situation to the head of department as soon as possible. Academic staff undertaking an appointment as departmental safety officer should be allowed some remission from other departmental duties.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES SAFETY OFFICER:

1. To develop, implement and monitor Board Occupational Health and Safety Policy, Programs, and Procedures; 2. To assist the Board in complying with current health and safety legislation and/or regulations with the objective of ensuring that all reasonable and proper measures are taken to protect the safety and health of learners, staff and visitors;

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3. To establish budget proposals for the operation of the Occupational Health and Safety office and specific training programs; 4. To increase health and safety awareness at all levels within the organization; 5. To investigate and report on all serious/critical personal injury accidents occurring to students, staff and/or visitors to the appropriate senior official, and to assist in the investigation of all accidents/incidents that result in substantial damage to Board vehicles and property; 6. To investigate and report on complaints of hazardous working conditions to the Associate Director and/or other appropriate senior staff; 7. To respond to employees safety concerns; 8. To conduct, as necessary, the safety inspection of any Board facility; 9. To assist the Boards Joint Occupational Health & Safety Committees; 10. To respond to fires and other emergencies on or about the Board property; 11. To coordinate registration and removal of hazardous waste; 12. To receive reports from and respond to orders issued by Department of Labor inspectors; 13. To arrange for Occupational Health and Safety testing and/or evaluations of the workplace by external agencies/consultants as may be necessary; 14. To act as liaison with all related governmental bodies and regulating agencies;

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15. To coordinate the training of personnel in areas of safety, including first aid, CPR, accident prevention and investigation, work place inspections and other matters related to implementing safety procedures in Board facilities; 16. To coordinate the Boards emergency procedures and act as the Boards emergency on-site coordinator; 17. To assist executive staff, senior administrators, principals and supervisors in emergency preparedness; 18. To develop, review, and update appropriate sections of the Boards Emergency Procedures Manual; 19. To liaise with municipal and State Emergency planners, update plans, organize exercises and evaluate procedures; 20. To liaise with the fire department regarding emergency procedures, communications and fire safety education programs; 21. To coordinate the selection and distribution of emergency communications equipment to schools and administrative/support departments; 22. To assume other duties as may be assigned.

SAFETY COMMITTEE AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Industrial accidents refer to any accident that occurs on an industrial site. Causes can range from workers'' negligence or fatigue to faulty machinery, improper supervision of the work site, inadequate safety precautions and unknown safety hazards. When industrial accidents are the result of workers'' negligence or fatigue, the injured party can seek workers'' compensation - a portion of pay to compensate for disability and medical expenses due to the accident. When a third party - such as a site supervisor or equipment manufacturer - is responsible for
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inadequate safety training, enforcement of safety regulations or design and production of faulty products, the injured party may be entitled to additional damages gained through an industrial accident lawsuit. In most cases, industrial accident prevention revolves around the safety of the industrial site. On construction sites, for example, contractors are required to inspect the site with safety engineers and to warn employees of possible danger zones. Workers, in turn, must comply with the safety requirements set forth by their supervisors in order to maximize industrial accident prevention. If contractors or subcontractors fail to enforce safety rules or take safety precautions on their industrial site, they can be held liable in a third party suit. If workers'' negligence is to blame, the injured party is only entitled to workers'' compensation. Industrial accident prevention also lies on the shoulders of the manufacturing companies of equipment. Frequently used on industrial sites. Such equipment consists of, but is not limited to: scaffolding (many industrial accidents are caused by falls from heights or faulty scaffolds), motorized vehicles (tractors, forklifts), gas pressure machinery, electricity conductors and heavy machinery. Industrial accident prevention obligates equipment and machinery manufacturers to design, produce and maintain properly functioning products. When industrial accident prevention fails and an incident occurs, it is imperative to determine the negligent party in order to reach a fair settlement. A personal injury lawyer can help ascertain responsibility in an industrial accident case.

IMPORTANT:
This rule requires you to have a method of communicating and evaluating safety and health issues brought up by you or your employees in your workplace. Larger employers must establish a safety committee. Smaller employers have the choice of either

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establishing a safety committee or holding safety meetings with a management representative present. There is a difference between a safety committee and a safety meeting. Safety committee is an organizational structure where members represent a group. This gives everyone a voice but keeps the meeting size to an effective number of participants. A safety meeting includes all employees and a management person is there to ensure that issues are addressed. Typically, the safety committee is an effective safety management tool for a larger employer and safety meetings are more effective for a smaller employer.

The Committee of Public Safety created in April 1793 by the National Convention and then restructured in July 1793, formed the de facto executive government in France during the Reign of Terror (17931794), a stage of the French Revolution. The Committee of Public Safety succeeded the previous Committee of General Defense (established in January 1793) and assumed its role of protecting the newly established republic against foreign attacks and internal rebellion. As a wartime measure, the Committee composed at first of nine, and later of twelve members was given broad supervisory powers over military, judicial, and legislative efforts. Its power peaked under the leadership of Maximilien Robespierre, between August 1793 and July 1794; following the downfall of Robespierre, the Committee's influence diminished, and it was disestablished in 1795.

SAFETY COMMITTEE GOALS

One representative from each Department in the Harvard Institutes of Medicine (HIM) facility and the New Research Building (NRB) is required to attend each meeting, unless the

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training is specified as optional. The function of this committee will be to serve as a primary communication link between the research community and the HIM/NRB facility management group, including the Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) office. The safety committee meets on a quarterly basis. The meetings are used to provide updates on health and safety policies/procedures at HIM/NRB and any facility related changes/concerns. Committee members serve as a primary contact for EH&S issues and assists in the completion of corrective actions required as a result of inspections by HIM/NRB EH&S and outside regulatory agents. Departments are also expected to create their own safety committee that will meet at least six (6) times per year. Safety committees are a critical component in creating a healthy and safe work environment at HIM/NRB. There are numerous local, state, and federal regulatory issues that must be addressed. The committee structure will allow us to obtain compliance with the regulatory requirements with minimal interruption of the ongoing research. It is the HIM/NRB EH&S offices goal to maintain compliance with minimal disruption to research activities. A Safety Committee, or as it is sometimes referred to a "Joint Health and Safety Committee", is a group of employer and employee representatives who work together to identify and recommend solutions to health and safety problems in the workplace. The Occupational Health and Safety Act require a minimum of two members, one of whom must represent the workers. There is no mandatory maximum. The number will vary from workplace to workplace. Whether or not your company comes under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, having a Safety Committee in place is an important part of your safety program.
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Having a safety committee will also reinforce to your employees your company's commitment to health and safety.

OBJECTIVES
The study of injury and disease statistics and trends so that reports can be made to management on unsafe and unhealthy conditions and practices, together with recommended corrective action. Examination of safety and health audits on a similar basis as indicated in first objective. Consideration of reports provided by government and insurance inspectors. Consideration of reports by safety representatives. Assist management in the development of job site safety rules. Review the effectiveness of health and safety training of employees. Review and assist in communication and promotion of health and safety matters in the workplace. Carry out periodic safety and health audits to determine the effectiveness of programming.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Accidents occur when hazards escape detection during preventive measures, such as a job or process safety analysis, when hazards are not obvious, or as the result of combinations of circumstances that were difficult to foresee. A thorough accident investigation may identify previously overlooked physical, environmental, adminstrative, or process hazards, the need for new or more extensive safety training, or unsafe work practices. The primary focus of any accident investigation should be the

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determination of the facts surrounding the incident and the lessons that can be learned to prevent future similar occurrences. Whenever an accident occurs is to deal with the emergency and ensure that any injuries or illnesses receive prompt medical attention. The accident investigation should begin immediately thereafter. This ensures that details of what occurred will be fresh in peoples minds and that witnesses dont influence one another by talking about the accident. It also minimizes the likelihood that important evidence is not moved, lost, taken, destroyed, or thrown away before the scene has been thoroughly inspected.

TYPES OF ACCIDENTS
Accidents fall into two categories, serious and non-serious. Non-serious accidents do not cause lost workdays even though the worst that could happen did happen. Examples of these include paper cuts, minor scratches or abrasions, or system failures that have minor consequences, such as a low-pressure hose that ruptures and sprays cool water. Serious accidents include both those which did involve lost workdays and those which might have. This second type of serious accident is called a "near miss." Examples of near misses with serious injury potential include: A worker twists an ankle in a fall from a low scaffold (this could easily have been a broken leg or worse); A worker tips back in a chair and topples backward (backward falls are always serious because head injury might result); A worker turns on a machine and gets a slight shock (shock from voltage potential greater than 75 volts DC or 40 volts AC is considered serious). After an accident or near miss occurs, supervisors should contact EHS. All serious accidents, those involving lost workdays or near misses, should be investigated with the same thoroughness.

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WHO SHOULD INVESTIGATE

Supervisors should note initial details of the incident and contact EHS to schedule an interview with the injured employee. Regardless of the type of investigation, the supervisor should be involved for the following reasons: Supervisors have a responsibility to provide their workers with a safe and healthful workplace; Supervisors know the workers and their work better than anyone else and are in the best position to gather the facts and find a practical solution to the problem; The supervisors involvement can help promote better relations with workers by demonstrating concern for their safety and attention to accident prevention.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATE APPROACH

As with most other tasks, skill in conducting effective accident investigations improves with experience. A good basic approach is to find out what caused the accident and what can be done to prevent or minimize the chances of a similar accident occurring. Some suggestions that may help supervisors get the facts and reach a conclusion include: Maintain objectivity throughout the investigation. Its purpose is to find the cause of the accident, not to assign blame for its occurrence. Check the accident site and circumstances thoroughly before anything is changed. Discuss the accident with the injured person, but only after first aid or medical treatment has been given (see Section A1, Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses). Also talk with anyone
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who witnessed the accident and those familiar with conditions immediately before and after it occurred. Be thorough. Small details may point to the real cause. Reconstruct the events that resulted in the accident, considering all possible causes. Determine unsafe conditions or actions that separately or in combination were contributing factors.

WHAT TO DO WITH THE RESULTS

Supervisors should take action to control or eliminate the conditions that caused the accident once these have been conclusively identified. EHS can provide assistance in determining the level of action that may be necessary, such as the following: When equipment changes or safeguards are necessary, supervisors should discuss specific recommendations with Department management; When an operation can be changed to eliminate the hazard, supervisors should make the change if it is within their authority, or seek the necessary approval from Department management; If unsafe acts by workers are involved, ensure that the worker is properly trained and that training is followed. All others involved in similar operations should be trained as well.

WHY LOOK FOR THE "ROOT CAUSE"?

An investigator who believes that accidents are caused by unsafe conditions will likely try to uncover conditions as causes. On the other hand, one who believes they are caused by unsafe acts will attempt to find the human errors that are causes. Therefore, it

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is necessary to examine some underlying factors in a chain of events that ends in an accident. The important point is that even in the most seemingly straightforward accidents, seldom, if ever, is there only a single cause. For example, an "investigation" which concludes that an accident was due to worker carelessness, and goes no further, fails to seek answers to several important questions such as: Was the worker distracted? If yes, why was the worker distracted? Was a safe work procedure being followed? If not, why not? Were safety devices in order? If not, why not? Was the worker trained? If not, why not? An inquiry that answers these and related questions will probably reveal conditions that are more open to correction than attempts to prevent "carelessness".

WHAT ARE THE STEPS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING AN ACCIDENT?

The accident investigation process involves the following steps: Report the accident occurrence to a designated person within the organization Provide first aid and medical care to injured person(s) and prevent further injuries or damage Investigate the accident Identify the causes Report the findings Develop a plan for corrective action

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Implement the plan Evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective action Make changes for continuous improvement As little time as possible should be lost between the moment of an accident or near miss and the beginning of the investigation. In this way, one is most likely to be able to observe the conditions as they were at the time, prevent disturbance of evidence, and identify witnesses. The tools that members of the investigating team may need (pencil, paper, camera, film, camera flash, tape measure, etc.) should be immediately available so that no time is wasted.

WHAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AS THE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT? ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODELS

Many models of accident causation have been proposed, ranging from Heinrich's domino theory to the sophisticated Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). The simple model shown in Figure 1 attempts to illustrate that the causes of any accident can be grouped into five categories - task, material, environment, personnel, and management. When this model is used, possible causes in each category should be investigated. Each category is examined more closely below. Remember that these are sample questions only: no attempt has been made to develop a comprehensive checklist.

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Figure 1: Accident Causation

TASK
Here the actual work procedure being used at the time of the accident is explored. Members of the accident investigation team will look for answers to questions such as: Was a safe work procedure used? Had conditions changed to make the normal procedure unsafe? Were the appropriate tools and materials available? Were they used? Were safety devices working properly? Was lockout used when necessary? For most of these questions, an important follow-up question is "If not, why not?"

MATERIAL
To seek out possible causes resulting from the equipment and materials used, investigators might ask:

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Was there an equipment failure? What caused it to fail? Was the machinery poorly designed? Were hazardous substances involved? Were they clearly identified? Was a less hazardous alternative substance possible and available? Was the raw material substandard in some way? Should personal protective equipment (PPE) have been used? Was the PPE used? Were users of PPE properly trained? Again, each time the answer reveals an unsafe condition, the investigator must ask why this situation was allowed to exist.

ENVIRONMENT
The physical environment, and especially sudden changes to that environment, are factors that need to be identified. The situation at the time of the accident is what is important, not what the "usual" conditions were. For example, accident investigators may want to know: What were the weather conditions? Was poor housekeeping a problem? Was it too hot or too cold? Was noise a problem? Was there adequate light?

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Were toxic or hazardous gases, dusts, or fumes present?

PERSONNEL
The physical and mental condition of those individuals directly involved in the event must be explored. The purpose for investigating the accident is not to establish blame against someone but the inquiry will not be complete unless personal characteristics are considered. Some factors will remain essentially constant while others may vary from day to day: Were workers experienced in the work being done? Had they been adequately trained? Can they physically do the work? What was the status of their health? Were they tired? Were they under stress (work or personal)?

MANAGEMENT
Management holds the legal responsibility for the safety of the workplace and therefore the role of supervisors and higher management and the role or presence of management systems must always be considered in an accident investigation. Failures of management systems are often found to be direct or indirect factors in accidents. Ask questions such as: Were safety rules communicated to and understood by all employees? Were written procedures and orientation available? Were they being enforced? Was there adequate supervision? Were workers trained to do the work?
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Had hazards been previously identified? Had procedures been developed to overcome them? Were unsafe conditions corrected? Was regular maintenance of equipment carried out? Were regular safety inspections carried out? This model of accident investigations provides a guide for uncovering all possible causes and reduces the likelihood of looking at facts in isolation. Some investigators may prefer to place some of the sample questions in different categories; however, the categories are not important, as long as each pertinent question is asked. Obviously there is considerable overlap between categories; this reflects the situation in real life. Again it should be emphasized that the above sample questions do not make up a complete checklist, but are examples only.

HOW ARE THE FACTS COLLECTED?

The steps in accident investigation are simple: the accident investigators gather information, analyze it, draw conclusions, and make recommendations. Although the procedures are straightforward, each step can have its pitfalls. As mentioned above, an open mind is necessary in accident investigation: preconceived notions may result in some wrong paths being followed while leaving some significant facts uncovered. All possible causes should be considered. Making notes of ideas as they occur is a good practice but conclusions should not be drawn until all the information is gathered.

INJURED WORKERS(S)
The most important immediate tasks--rescue operations, medical treatment of the injured, and prevention of further injuries-have priority and others must not interfere with these activities. When these matters are under control, the investigators can start their work.
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PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
Before attempting to gather information, examine the site for a quick overview, take steps to preserve evidence, and identify all witnesses. In some jurisdictions, an accident site must not be disturbed without prior approval from appropriate government officials such as the coroner, inspector, or police. Physical evidence is probably the most non-controversial information available. It is also subject to rapid change or obliteration; therefore, it should be the first to be recorded. Based on your knowledge of the work process, you may want to check items such as: positions of injured workers equipment being used materials or chemicals being used safety devices in use position of appropriate guards position of controls of machinery damage to equipment housekeeping of area weather conditions lighting levels noise levels time of day You may want to take photographs before anything is moved, both of the general area and specific items. Later careful study of these may reveal conditions or observations missed previously. Sketches of the accident scene based on measurements

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taken may also help in subsequent analysis and will clarify any written reports. Broken equipment, debris, and samples of materials involved may be removed for further analysis by appropriate experts. Even if photographs are taken, written notes about the location of these items at the accident scene should be prepared.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
Although there may be occasions when you are unable to do so, every effort should be made to interview witnesses. In some situations witnesses may be your primary source of information because you may be called upon to investigate an accident without being able to examine the scene immediately after the event. Because witnesses may be under severe emotional stress or afraid to be completely open for fear of recrimination, interviewing witnesses is probably the hardest task facing an investigator. Witnesses should be kept apart and interviewed as soon as possible after the accident. If witnesses have an opportunity to discuss the event among themselves, individual perceptions may be lost in the normal process of accepting a consensus view where doubt exists about the facts. Witnesses should be interviewed alone, rather than in a group. You may decide to interview a witness at the scene of the accident where it is easier to establish the positions of each person involved and to obtain a description of the events. On the other hand, it may be preferable to carry out interviews in a quiet office where there will be fewer distractions. The decision may depend in part on the nature of the accident and the mental state of the witnesses.

INTERVIEWING
Interviewing is an art that cannot be given justice in a brief document such as this, but a few do's and don'ts can be mentioned. The purpose of the interview is to establish an understanding with

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the witness and to obtain his or her own words describing the event:

DO...
put the witness, who is probably upset, at ease emphasize the real reason for the investigation, to determine what happened and why let the witness talk, listen confirm that you have the statement correct try to sense any underlying feelings of the witness make short notes or ask someone else on the team to take them during the interview ask if it is okay to record the interview, if you are doing so close on a positive note

DO NOT...
intimidate the witness interrupt prompt ask leading questions show your own emotions jump to conclusions Ask open-ended questions that cannot be answered by simply "yes" or "no". The actual questions you ask the witness will naturally vary with each accident, but there are some general questions that should be asked each time: Where were you at the time of the accident?
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What were you doing at the time? What did you see, hear? What were the environmental conditions (weather, light, noise, etc.) at the time? What was (were) the injured worker(s) doing at the time? In your opinion, what caused the accident? How might similar accidents be prevented in the future? If you were not at the scene at the time, asking questions is a straightforward approach to establishing what happened. Obviously, care must be taken to assess the credibility of any statements made in the interviews. Answers to a first few questions will generally show how well the witness could actually observe what happened. Another technique sometimes used to determine the sequence of events is to re-enact or replay them as they happened. Obviously, great care must be taken so that further injury or damage does not occur. A witness (usually the injured worker) is asked to reenact in slow motion the actions that preceded the accident.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A third, and often an overlooked source of information, can be found in documents such as technical data sheets, health and safety committee minutes, inspection reports, company policies, maintenance reports, past accident reports, formalized safe-work procedures, and training reports. Any pertinent information should be studied to see what might have happened, and what changes might be recommended to prevent recurrence of similar accidents.

WHAT SHOULD I KNOW WHEN MAKING THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS?

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At this stage of the investigation most of the facts about what happened and how it happened should be known. This has taken considerable effort to accomplish but it represents only the first half of the objective. Now comes the key question--why did it happen? To prevent recurrences of similar accidents, the investigators must find all possible answers to this question. You have kept an open mind to all possibilities and looked for all pertinent facts. There may still be gaps in your understanding of the sequence of events that resulted in the accident. You may need to reinterview some witnesses to fill these gaps in your knowledge. When your analysis is complete, write down a step-by-step account of what happened (your conclusions) working back from the moment of the accident, listing all possible causes at each step. This is not extra work: it is a draft for part of the final report. Each conclusion should be checked to see if: it is supported by evidence the evidence is direct (physical or documentary) or based on eyewitness accounts, or the evidence is based on assumption. This list serves as a final check on discrepancies that should be explained or eliminated.

WHY SHOULD RECOMMENDATIONS BE MADE?

The most important final step is to come up with a set of well-considered recommendations designed to prevent recurrences of similar accidents. Once you are knowledgeable about the work processes involved and the overall situation in your organization, it should not be too difficult to come up with realistic recommendations. Recommendations should:

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be specific be constructive get at root causes identify contributing factors Resist the temptation to make recommendations to save time and effort. only general

For example, you have determined that a blind corner contributed to an accident. Rather than just recommending "eliminate blind corners" it would be better to suggest: install mirrors at the northwest corner of building X (specific to this accident) install mirrors at blind corners where required throughout the worksite (general) Never make recommendations about disciplining a person or persons who may have been at fault. This would not only be counter to the real purpose of the investigation, but it would jeopardize the chances for a free flow of information in future accident investigations. In the unlikely event that you have not been able to determine the causes of an accident with any certainty, you probably still have uncovered safety weaknesses in the operation. It is appropriate that recommendations be made to correct these deficiencies.

THE WRITTEN REPORT

If your organization has a standard form that must be used, you will have little choice in the form that your written report is to be presented. Nevertheless, you should be aware of, and try to overcome, shortcomings such as:

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If a limited space is provided for an answer, the tendency will be to answer in that space despite recommendations to "use back of form if necessary." If a checklist of causes is included, possible causes not listed may be overlooked. Headings such as "unsafe condition" will usually elicit a single response even when more than one unsafe condition exists. Differentiating between "primary cause" and "contributing factors" can be misleading. All accident causes are important and warrant consideration for possible corrective action. Your previously prepared draft of the sequence of events can now be used to describe what happened. Remember that readers of your report do not have the intimate knowledge of the accident that you have so include all pertinent detail. Photographs and diagrams may save many words of description. Identify clearly where evidence is based on certain facts, eyewitness accounts, or your assumptions. If doubt exists about any particular part, say so. The reasons for your conclusions should be stated and followed by your recommendations. Weed out extra material that is not required for a full understanding of the accident and its causes such as photographs that are not relevant and parts of the investigation that led you nowhere. The measure of a good accident report is quality, not quantity. Always communicate your findings with workers, supervisors and management. Present your information 'in context' so everyone understands how the accident occurred and the actions in place to prevent it from happening again.

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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THE INVESTIGATION REVEALS "HUMAN ERROR"?

A difficulty that has bothered many investigators is the idea that one does not want to lay blame. However, when a thorough worksite accident investigation reveals that some person or persons among management, supervisor, and the workers were apparently at fault, then this fact should be pointed out. The intention here is to remedy the situation, not to discipline an individual. Failing to point out human failings that contributed to an accident will not only downgrade the quality of the investigation. Furthermore, it will also allow future accidents to happen from similar causes because they have not been addressed. However never make recommendations about disciplining anyone who may be at fault. Any disciplinary steps should be done within the normal personnel procedures.

HOW SHOULD FOLLOW-UP BE HANDLED?

Management is responsible for acting on the recommendations in the accident investigation report. The health and safety committee, if you have one, can monitor the progress of these actions. Follow-up actions include: Respond to the recommendations in the report by explaining what can and cannot be done (and why or why not). Develop a timetable for corrective actions. Monitor that the scheduled actions have been completed. Check the condition of injured worker(s). Inform and train other workers at risk. Re-orient worker(s) on their return to work.
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PURPOSE
The principal purpose of accident investigation is to obtain information that will be of help in preventing future accidents. Nearly every investigation offers the possibility of preventing future accidents. For this reason it is advantageous to examine each accident, to establish the cause and to correct the situation as soon as possible. Accident investigations are not intended to assign blame or fix fault, but to prevent the reoccurrence of injuries and property damage. Most accidents, unsafe acts, and conditions that lead to accidents are only symptoms of underlying causes.

Accident investigation Identifying the basic cause (the unsafe act and/or unsafe condition) is only the starting point in learning why the accident/incident occurred. Identifying the primary causes of an accident will assist in determining the underlying cause, which enables effective changes and corrections. Proper action reduces the possibility of recurrence.

Review Questions Five Marks 1. What is mean by safety organization?

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2. What is mean by NIOSH? 3. Write a short note on National Safety Council. 4. What is the functionality of IASP? 5. What is mean by Safety Committee? 6. What is the purpose of accident investigation? 7. What accident should be investigated? 8. When should the accident investigation to be made? 9. How to conduct accident investigation? 10. What are the benefits of accident investigation? Fifteen Marks: 1. Mention any five safety organizations, and explain its functions. 2. What are the duties of departmental safety officer? 3. Explain the following: i) IEA ii) CCOHS iii) CROET 4. What are the functions of safety committee? 5. Explain briefly about the purpose of accident investigation. 6. Explain the objectives of safety committee. 7. How to conduct accident investigation? 8. Explain briefly about the investigation procedure. 9. Explain the objectives of accident investigation. 10. Explain the functions of ISEA and ASSE.

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UNIT V
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Safety Management Systems (SMS) is the term used to refer to certain regulatory and enforcement frameworks. These frameworks generally apply to transportation, but have also been explored in other industries. An SMS is the specific application of quality management to safety.

SMS IMPLICATIONS
A SMS is intended to act as a framework to allow an organization, as a minimum, to meet its legal obligations under occupational health and safety law. The structure of a SMS is generally speaking, not of itself a legal requirement but it is an extremely effective tool to organize the myriad aspects of occupational safety and health (OSH) that can exist within an organization, often to meet standards which exceed the minimum legal requirement.

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A SMS is only as good as its implementation - effective safety management means that organizations need to ensure they are looking at all the risks within the organization as a single system, rather than having multiple, competing, Safety Management Silos.[3] If safety is not seen holistically, it can interfere with the prioritization of improvements or even result in safety issues being missed. For example, after an explosion in March 2005 at BP's Texas City Refinery (BP) the investigation concluded that the company had put too much emphasis on personal safety thus ignoring the safety of their processes.[4] The antidote to such silo thinking is the proper evaluation of all risks, a key aspect of an effective SMS.[5] SMS is intended to support a move away from prescriptive regulations (which specify criteria that must be adhered to) toward performance-based regulations which describe objectives and allow each regulated entity to develop its own system for achieving the objectives. In other words, industry must develop its own policies and systems to reduce risk, which should include implementing systems for reporting and correcting shortcomings. The regulator then changes its emphasis from verifying adherence to the criteria to examining the organizational systems and their effectiveness. While SMS is an important advance in safety management, it is only as good as its implementation. SMS means that organizations need to ensure they are looking at all the risks within the organization as a single system, rather than having multiple, competing, 'Safety Management Silos. If safety is not seen holistically, it can interfere with the prioritization of improvements or even result in safety issues being missed. For example, after an explosion in March 2005 at BP's the investigation concluded that the company had put too much emphasis on personal safety thus ignoring the safety of their processes. The antidote to such silo thinking is the proper evaluation of all risks, a key aspect of an effective SMS.

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DEFINITION OF AN SMS
SMS can be defined as a coordinated, comprehensive set of processes designed to direct and control resources to optimally manage safety. SMS takes unrelated processes and builds them into one coherent structure to achieve a higher level of safety performance, making safety management an integral part of overall risk management. SMS is based on leadership and accountability. It requires proactive hazard identification, risk management, information control, auditing and training. It also includes incident and accident investigation and analysis.

DEVELOPING A SMS TOOL

The JHSIT reviewed several SMS models, regulations and guidance material from around the world in order to develop a SMS model specifically designed for the helicopter industry. The toolkit is a compilation of the best practices and solutions. Contributions came from small, medium and large helicopter operators as well as airlines, industry groups and governments. The intent of this document is to assist organizations in achieving their desired safety performance objectives while allowing them to choose the best way to reach that outcome. This is commonly known as a performance based approach, and encourages organizations to choose the solution that best suits their needs and ensures they meet their performance objectives. The toolkit helps the organization determine their level of compliance and develop an action plan to include the necessary components.

WHY IS SMS NEEDED?

SMS is needed to help facilitate the proactive identification of hazards and maximize the development of a better safety culture, as well as modify attitudes and actions of personnel in order to make a safer work place. SMS helps organizations avoid wasting financial and human resources and managements time being focused on minor or irrelevant issues. SMS lets managers

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identify hazards, assess risk and build a business case to justify controls that will reduce risk to acceptable levels. SMS is a proven process for managing risk that ties all elements of the organization together laterally and vertically and ensures appropriate allocation of resources to safety issues.

ATTRIBUTES OF A SMS
Although the details and level of documentation of a SMS may vary, there are 11 fundamental attributes that will assist in ensuring the SMS is effective for any organization. The core attributes of the IHSTs SMS are: 1. SMS Management Plan 2. Safety Promotion 3. Document and Data Information Management 4. Hazard Identification and Risk Management 5. Occurrence and Hazard Reporting 6. Occurrence Investigation and Analysis 7. Safety Assurance Oversight Programs 8. Safety Management Training Requirements 9. Management of Changes 10. Emergency Preparedness and Response 11. Performance Measurement and Continuous Improvement

SMS MANAGEMENT PLAN

A SMS Management Plan should clearly define safety objectives, how the organization intends to execute and measure the effectiveness of the SMS, and how the SMS will support the organizations business plan and/or objectives. The plan should:

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Express managements commitment to safety and clearly state the policies, objectives and requirements of the SMS Define the structure of the SMS as well as the responsibilities and authority of key individuals for managing the SMS Define each element of the SMS Convey the expectations and objectives of the SMS to all employees Explain how to identify and maintain compliance with current safety regulatory requirements

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LAWS RELATED TO SAFETY (FACTORIES ACT 1948 EXPLOSIVE ACT, ELECTRICITY ACT ETC)
Some Safety and incidental Acts and Rules of India are listed below: 1. Factories Act, 1948. 2. Gujarat Factories Rules, 1963 (Similarly there are other State Factories Rules). 3. Boilers Act, 1923. 4. Gujarat Boiler Rules, 1966. 5. Gujarat Boiler Attendants' Rules, 1966. 6. Gujarat Smoke Nuisance Act, 1963. 7. Gujarat Smoke Nuisance Rules, 1966. 8. Indian Boilers Regulation, 1950 (IBR). 9. Electricity Act, 1910. 10. Electricity Rules, 1956. 11. Electricity Supply Act, 1948. 12. Explosives Act, 1884. 13. Explosives Rules, 1983. 14. Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired) Rules, 1981. 15. Gas Cylinders Rules, 1981. 16. Explosive Substances Act, 1908. 17. Petroleum Act, 1934. 18. Petroleum Rules, 1937 & 1976. 19. Calcium Carbide Rules, 1987.
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20. Cinematography Film Rules, 1948 . 21. Inflammable Substance Act, 1952. 22. Atomic Energy Act, 1962. 23. Radiation Protection Rules, 1971. 24. Insecticides Act, 1968. 25. Insecticide Rules, 1971. 26. Poisons Act, 1919. 27. Poisons Rules. 28. Mines Act, 1952. 29. Mines & Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. 30. Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930. 31. Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940. 32. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 33. Plantation of Labour Act, 1951. 34. Employers' Liability Act, 1938. 35. Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. 36. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 37. Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. 38. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955 & Rules 1955. 39. Bombay Weights & Measures Act, 1958 & Rules 1958. 40. Excise and Prohibition Act . 41. Bombay Lifts Act 1939 and rules, 1958.

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42. Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951. 43. Dock Workers (Safety, Health & Welfare) Act 1986, Rules & Regulations. 44. Port Act, 1908. 45. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. 46. Dock Workers (R & E) Act, 1948. 47. Fisheries Act, 1897. 48. Forest Act, 1927 and Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. 49. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rules 1989 including Transport of Hazardous Goods Rules. 50. Railway Red Tariff Rules, 1960. 51. Arms and Ammunition Act. 52. Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Rules, 1975. 53. Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Rules 1982. 54. Environment (Protection) Act 1986, and Rules 1986. 55. Hazardous Wastes Rules, 1989. 56. MSIHC Rules, 1989. 57. Environment Tribunal Act, 1995. 58. Chemical Accidents Rules, 1996. 59. Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997. 60. Bio-medical Wastes Rules, 1998. 61. Child Labour Act 1986 & Rules 1988.
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62. Public Liability Insurance Act & Rules, 1991. 63. The Building and other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Condition of) Service Act, 1996, and Rules.

Review Questions Five Marks 1. What is mean by safety management system? 2. Write any five safety and accidental acts and rules of India listed. 3. Draw the diagram for safety management system. 4. What is the regulatory perspective for safety management system? 5. What is the use of safety management system? 6. What is the purpose of safety management system? 7. When does the hazardous wastes rule implemented? Describe safety management system. 8. When does the implemented? Dock Workers(R&E) Act was

9. When does the Port Act was implemented? Fifteen Marks 1. Explain the implementation management system. procedure for safety

2. Explain briefly about safety management system.

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3. What is the purpose of safety management system? Explain with neat sketch. 4. Explain briefly about safety and incidental acts. 5. Explain the regulatory perspective of safety management system. 6. Why safety management system is needed? 7. What is the necessity of safety management system in industrial safety? 8. explain the needs of industrial safety in detail. 9. Draw the diagram for safety management system. 10. What is the role of safety managers in safety management system?

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