Issue No.

06 – May 2007
May 2007 Issue No. 06

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical

items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC),
brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance
best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization
and efficiency in daily operation.

E-JETS NEWS addresses Operator’s concerns with maintenance support and

dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be
shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance.
Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter within EMBRAER
Customers.

Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at CIS / Aerochain at

http://www.aerochain.com

- Login (enter username and password);

- Select “Technical Services” and then “EMBRAER Customer Services”;

- Select “Maintenance Support”;

- Select “E-JETS NEWS;

- Click on desired E-JETS NEWS.

If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS
NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service
Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS
publication can be address to:

E-JETS NEWS

Tel: +55 12 3927 5762

Fax: +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A
property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third
party without EMBRAER’s written consent. Also, no article published should be considered
authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

Page 1
May 2007
CF34-10E Bleed Bias Sensor
(BBS) Leakage – Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
In the previous E-Jets NEWS (issue No.
th
05), it was informed that on March 20 ,
2007, after take-off, the “Eng 1 Fire”
message was displayed on the EICAS,
with the red handle light on in the
EMBRAER 190 aircraft. The flight crew
followed the instructions given in the
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and
shut the engine down without blowing the
extinguishing fire bottles.
Analysis of the event has showed that the
nuts and bolts of the ninth-stage duct
assembly and BBS fitting PN 341-5122-
503 were improperly connected.
As informed, an immediate interim action
was defined by EMBRAER and GE. Also,
SB190-36-0010 PNEUMATIC - LH/RH
ENGINES - Inspection of Bleed Bias
Sensor Fitting Installation was issued on
rd
March 23 , 2007, requiring an inspection
of the ninth-stage duct assembly and
BBS fitting for proper torque installation.
The whole EMBRAER 190/195 fleet in
the field has been inspected and no fault
was found.
EMBRAER and GE carried out an
investigation and concluded that an
assembly or maintenance error has
occurred.
A warning has been included in
EMBRAER 190 Aircraft Maintenance
Manual (AMM) to emphasize the correct
torque that must be applied and that the
criss-cross pattern must be used on this
BBS assembly.
The revised procedure is in EMBRAER
190 AMM 36-11-04, Task 36-11-04-400-
801-A, subtask 420-074-A, (4) (b) 4, and
will be available in the next scheduled
revision.
Issue No. 06
SPDA FAIL Cause by
TRANSFER ERROR
ACKNOWLEDGE Machine
Check Interruptions – Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As already informed in E-Jets NEWS
issue N°5, a failure mode has been
identified on the SPDA MICRO/COMM,
which can cause an SPDA FAIL
message correlated to a maintenance
message (SPDA1/2 LRM8/12 FAULT).
Initial investigation has pointed to a CPU
manufacturer component specification
change, which affects the interaction
between the CPU and L2 cache
processing. The investigation has also
showed that initial occurrences of this
issue appeared on SPDA MICRO/COMM
PN 1707789 series, serial numbers 605
to 808, which had CPU PN 5912880-1
replaced with PN 5912880-3.
Further investigation has determined that
Transfer Error Acknowledge machine
checks occur more frequently with power
dissipation at higher levels due to
manufacturing process variation. This
can affect both microprocessors PN
5912880-1 and 5912880-3. Hamilton
Sundstrand has implemented a new
screening procedure to identify faulty
CPU components. This will allow both
CPU PN 5912880-1 and PN 5912880-3
components to be used on SPDA
microprocessor boards. Microprocessor
modules S/N 905 and subsequent have
been subjected to the new screening
procedure.
All Micro Modules that undergoes the
screening test will be marked with Mod 5.
EMBRAER SNL 170-24-0021 and SNL
190-24-0015 have been issued to
indicate the applicable maintenance
action to be performed.
The new SPDA Block software is being
developed to eliminate all interactions
between the CPU and the L2 cache.
This new SPDA Block software will also
eliminate SPDA FAILs caused by
Transfer Error Acknowledge machine
check interruptions.
Page 2
May 2007 Issue No. 06

SF-ACE – Electrical Connector Broken Fuel Feed Tube Flange

and Mounting Tray Adjustment Causing FUEL FEED FAULT
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Effectivity: EMBRAER 170

EMBRAER has received field reports
concerning difficulties during the
installation of the SF-ACE in the
MOUNTING TRAY. This issue was
raised due to the SF-ACE not fitting the
electrical connectors of the mounting tray
during its installation. Refer to (Figure 1).
EMBRAER has recently received a report
about the finding of a broken engine
ejector pump feed tube flange (PN 170-
05988-401 – item 10, detail B below) on
an aircraft.

To avoid such scenario, the correct

installation is given in AMM Task 27-53-
02-400-801-A (Slat/Flap Actuator Control
Electronic Unit – Installation). Refer to
(Figure 2).

Figure 1 – SF-ACE Installation

FIGURE 2 (SF-ACE Electrical Connector and

Mounting Tray - Adjustments)

Page 3
May 2007
Such issue was cause for an
investigation in the past. It was revealed
that the fuel feed line from the engine
feed ejector pump to the manifold might
be damaged due to vibration and/ or
misaligned installation.
As a solution, EMBRAER issued SB 170-
28-0007 – FUEL – REPLACEMENT OF
AN ALUMINUM TUBE WITH A
FLEXIBLE HOSE IN THE ENGINE FUEL
FEED LINE - providing instructions to
replace the aluminum tube connected to
the engine feed ejector pump and to the
manifold with a flexible hose, thus
modifying its fittings, in order to increase
system robustness by eliminating
vibration and misalignment effects on the
fuel feed line.
Currently, only 15% of the affected fleet
has this service bulletin incorporated, and
once an open fuel feed line is the main
cause of the Fuel Feed Fault, the
incorporation of this service bulletin is
also recommended as a proactive
attitude to avoid reports with Fuel Feed
Fault message.
Regarding the Fuel Feed Fault issue,
EMBRAER is also recommending
observance of operational reference
EMBRAER 170 AOM 3-17, with
instructions to keep the AC Pumps 1 & 2
selectors ON before engine start, as well
as EMBRAER 170 AOM 3-29, this last
one with instructions to maintain a
minimum of 65% N2 after selecting the
fuel AC pumps 1 & 2 to AUTO, in order to
avoid the Fuel Feed Fault EICAS
message before takeoff.
P-ACE HARDWARE
MODIFICATION
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
SB170-27-0029REV01 / SB190-27-0012,
which provide instruction for new P-ACE
(-802 for EMBRAER 170 and -822 for
EMBRAER 190) installation, will be
reviewed to make the P-ACE
replacement procedure clear.
The new revision will recommend the
replacement of one P-ACE at a time,
according to AMM Task 27-03-03-04.
Issue No. 06
Pack Air Cycle Machine (ACM)
Contamination
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
In spite of the recommendations given in
SNL 170-25-0004 (190-25-0007),
EMBRAER 170 and 190 aircraft are still
subject to Pack 2 component
contamination by beverages thrown in
the forward galley sink, mainly coffee.
EMBRAER would like to remind that, so
far, this contamination is not considered a
cause of ACM failures. Also, the CMC
should be used to keep track of Pack Fail
messages and their correlated
maintenance messages. For more
information about this, refer to SNL 170-
21-0021 (190-21-0014).
SPDA Block 10.1 RAT
Deployment Logic Modification
Affecting AMM Auto
Deployment Procedure
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 POS MOD SB
170-24-0038 AND EMBRAER 190 POS
MOD SB 190-24-0009
As it is stated on Hamilton SB
40EPS04MPM02/03-24-4 Software
Accomplishment Summary, the RAT auto
deployment logic was changed to avoid
an inadvertent deployment on the ground
caused by the loss of GCU 1 and SPDA
2 at the same time. This change has
impacted the AMM TASK 24-23-00-710-
802-A Ram-Air-Turbine (RAT) Auto-
Deployment - Operational Test, because
with SPDA Block 10.1 it is necessary not
only to simulate in-flight condition and air
speed greater than 50 kts, but also to
remove power from the AC ESS BUS by
switching the GPU to the unlatched
position (OFF).
The AMM has already been revised to
comply with this logic modification and it
will be available in the next schedule
revision.
Page 4
May 2007
Non-Latched Engine Short
Dispatch Messages during
Engine Start
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
During the GE Customer Support
th
Operators Telecon held on April 17 ,
EMBRAER highlighted about Engine
Short Dispatch nuisance and non-latched
messages due to LPT CMD - POSITION
DISAGREE (Fail Code 73215321) during
Engine Start.
Some Operators requested EMBRAER to
prepare a SNL explaining this issue and
reinforcing that no maintenance actions
are necessary. Based on GE
documentation, EMBRAER is working on
a SNL issuance.
In the meantime, EMBRAER would like to
highlight that any Engine Short Dispatch
message latched after flight and caused
due to LPT CMD - POSITION
DISAGREE fault will require an LPTACC
Valve replacement.
EMBRAER 190 Main Brake
Control Valves (BCV) 1 and 4
Maintenance Messages
Correction
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
EMBRAER 190 is equipped with four
separate and independent main brake
control valves. Each main brake control
valve controls brake pressure in one
brake assembly.
EMBRAER has noticed that the
maintenance messages showing the
brake control valve as a possible faulty
LRU are inverted in the CMC.
EMBRAER is working to correct this
issue. For more details, see SNL 190-32-
0018.
Issue No. 06
HONEYWELL SOFTWARE
TOOLS CD
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Honeywell has issued Rev. 7 of TNL
A23-6710-002 to inform operators about
the software tools CD. This CD contains
RT17.6 and DLS 4.0.4 required for Load
19.3 installation.
It is important to emphasize that RT17.6
and DLS 4.0.4 are not compatible with
previous Loads. Refer to Honeywell TNL
A23-6710-002 to select the correct
RT/DLS version for the Load installed in
the aircraft. EMBRAER will revise the
Illustrated Tool and Equipment Manual
(ITEM) accordingly.
Different RT/DLS versions can be
installed in the same computer but in
separated folders (RT/DLS installation file
automatically selects a dedicated folder,
which is properly identified).
Customers need to contact Honeywell to
order the tools CD as per instructions of
TNL A23-6710-002.
Bleed/ Wing Leak Messages
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER would like to remind that, in
case of BLEED 1(2) LEAK and/or A-I
WING 1(2) LEAK CAS messages being
displayed during any flight phases, it is
very important to check the CMC's ODS
Parameters Page (AMS channel in-
control), for evidence of a real leak, at the
first opportunity. Continued resets of
these messages may lead to damage to
the equipment. Furthermore, the
information on this CMC page is only
reset after performing an IBIT of the
system. Refer to the applicable FIM for
instructions.
Page 5
May 2007
APU inlet silencer
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER/ Hamilton Sundstrand APU
has recorded some APU inlet silencer
(PN 4952354) damages.
Also, common damages in the APU inlet
silencer splitter vanes (refer to figure 2)
and its joints with the main assembly
(refer to figure 3) have been observed.
The root cause for the damage is still
under investigation. There is a repair
procedure available since April 2007,
which covers most of the reported
damages.
Special repair procedure is available
upon request via EMBRAER Letter (IC).
This repair will be included in the
Component Maintenance Manual (CMM
Part Number 4952354) in the next
revision, expected to be issued on July
2007.
Figure 1 – APU Inlet PN 4952354
Figure 2 – APU Inlet
Issue No. 06
Figure 3 – Detailed APU Inlet silencer
OVERSPEED TEST FAULT
CMC message Troubleshooting
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
It has been observed in aircraft with
FADEC pre version 5.30 that some OBV
faults could trigger OVERSPEED TEST
FAULT CMC message. Also, the OBV
has been confirmed as the root cause in
many of these cases.
In order to improve the CMC message
system, FADEC version 5.30 has some
improvements in the message logic and
this scenario does not happen anymore
In case of OBV faults, only OBV
messages will be triggered.
Therefore, in aircraft with FADEC 5.30
installed, the OVERSPEED TEST FAULT
CMC message must be checked
according to EMBRAER FIM TASK 73-
21-00-810-916-A.
The OBV low reliability has been treated
and a CF34-8E-AL SB 75-0009
introducing the new OBV PN was issued
on January 2007.
This new OBV PN has the improvements
related to all those issues.
Page 6
May 2007
BRAKE FAULT correlated with
PRESSURE MORE THAN BCM
CMD – SUMMARY
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
EMBRAER has received reports about
the occurrences of BRK LH FAULT and
BRK RH FAULT messages showing
simultaneously on the EICAS with the
correlated CMC messages “INBD (or
OUTBD) L (or R) PR MORE THAN BCM
CMD”.
When there is a report of BRK LH FAULT
and BRK RH FAULT simultaneously on
the EICAS, the CMC should be verified in
order to identify what the correlated
maintenance message is.
EMBRAER has issued SNL 190-32-0017
to clarify the BRK LH (RH) FAULT and to
inform the operators about all actions
taken to solve this issue. The SNL has
the following content: Issue Description,
Symptom of Event, Maintenance/
Operational procedure to clear the
message, Root Cause investigation,
Interim measures and Solution.
Regarding the Interim Solution, it is
important to clarify that EMBRAER has
received some MLG / Brake Assemblies
with a higher class contamination than
required. EMBRAER issued Service
Bulletin 190-32-0017 to present flushing
procedures for the hydraulic lines of the
inboard and outboard main brake and
emergency brake systems. This
procedure is recommended to be
accomplished at the earliest opportunity,
when manpower and facilities are
available. For more details of the flushing
procedure and hardware replacement,
see SNL 190-32-0017 and SB 190-32-
0017.
SNL 190-32-0017 describes the
maintenance and operational procedures
to be followed to clean the BRK LH (RH)
FAULT EICAS message and release the
aircraft.
Issue No. 06
As described in the SNL, the first attempt
to clear the message consists in de-
energizing and energizing the aircraft.
This procedure will clear the fault
memory of the BCM. After the aircraft
power-down/power-up procedures, the
No. 1 and No. 2 hydraulic systems should
be turned ON and the brake pedals
should be applied to make sure that the
messages do not appear on the EICAS.
If the messages persist after the reset
mentioned above, depending on the
correlated fault code recorded in the
CMC, FIM tasks 32-41-00-810-848-A, 32-
41-00-810-844-A, 32-41-00-810-846-A or
32-41-00-810-850-A should be carried
out. The first step of the troubleshooting
presented in these tasks is an attempt to
unclog the BCV. A “water hammer” effect
is produced in the inlet port of the BCV so
that an eventual residual pressure in the
line downstream of the BCV is forced to
be released.
It was verified that the “water hammer”
effect could accelerate the process of
damage in the outlet port filter of the
Shutoff Valve.
In order to minimize the impact of this
procedure to the filter aforementioned,
the BCV unclogging procedure was
revised. Temporary Revision of the FIM
tasks was issued.
Regarding the Final Solution, EMBRAER
will introduce the following modifications
in the EMBRAER 190 main brake
system:
- Service Bulletin 190-32-0019 - SOV
REPLACEMENT. The SOV PN will
change from 38-957500 to 38-957500-1.
- Service Bulletin 190-32-0020 - BCV
REPLACEMENT. The BCV PN will
change from 39-891-1 to 39-891-2.
Note that Service Bulletin 190-32-0008
must be accomplished before SB190-32-
0017 and SB190-32-0020.
For further information, see the SB
mentioned above and SNL 190-32-0017.
Page 7
May 2007
CF34-8E Combustor Liner
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
EMBRAER was informed about an
engine removal due to cracks in the
combustor liner. Inspection was
performed after the engine experienced
high ITT. After inspection with a
borescope, damage exceeding limits
described on EMM (Subtask 72-00-00-
220-065 (Page 843) – For the inspection
limits, refer to Table 803) was found.
GE was asked about similar occurrences.
This kind of report is very unusual.
EMBRAER provides this information in
advance and communicates that this
issue is being followed up by GE. The
findings and possible root causes will
soon be properly communicated.
Figure 1 – Combustor liner Assembly
Figure 2 – Combustor liner
Issue No. 06
DU and NIM installation
characteristic
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As a troubleshooting tip, remember that
after operational software (Load)
uploaded, DUs (Display Unit) and NIMs
(Network Interface Module) can be
swapped in their different positions
without the necessity of software reload
(Hardware interchangeability must be in
accordance to the AIPC). This
characteristic was always valid for the
NIMs and extended to the DUs since
Load 15.1 (E170) and Load 4.2 (E190),
and it is useful for saving time during the
troubleshooting procedure.
Acronyms
ACM = Air Cycle Machine
AD = Airworthiness Directive
AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog
AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual
ANAC = Agência Nacional de Aviação
Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority)
AOM = Airplane Operations Manual
APU = Auxiliary Power Unit
BBS = Bleed Bias Sensor
BCM = Brake Control Module
BCV = Brake Control Valve
CAS = Crew Alerting System
CMC = Central Maintenance Computer
CMM = Component Maintenance Manual
DLS = Data Load System
DMU = Data-Loader Management Unit
DU = Display Unit
EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual
FADEC = Full-Authority Digital Engine-
Control
FIM = Fault Isolation Manual
Page 8
May 2007 Issue No. 06

GCU = Generator Control Unit

GPU = Ground Power Unit

IBIT = Initiated Built in Test

ITEM = Illustrated Tool and Equipment

Manual

ITT = Interstage Turbine Temperature

LRU = Line Replaceable Unit

MLG = Main Landing Gear

MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List

NIM = Network Interface Module

OB = Operational Bulletins

OBV = Operability Bleed Valve

ODS = Overheat Detection System

P-ACE = Primary Actuator Controls

Electronics

PIL = Parts Information Letters

PN = Part Number

QAR = Quick Access Recorder

QRH = Quick Reference Handbook

RAT = Ram Air Turbine

RT = Remote Terminal

SB = Service Bulletin

SF-ACE = Slat/Flap Actuator Control

Electronic

SN = Serial Number

SNL = Service Newsletter

SPDA = Secondary Power Distribution

Assembly

Note: All abbreviations used in

EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be
found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

Page 9