Hegel and Steiner

Terje Sparby

There are many common elements in Hegel’s philosophy and Steiner’s work. Both are
evolutionary thinkers (though not in a Darwinian sense), both assign a central role to the
concept of soul and spirit, and both have a positive attitude about what human knowledge can
achieve. In one instance, Steiner goes so far as to say that there is no difference between his
own and Hegel’s philosophy.1
It has long been well known that there are common elements in Hegel and Steiner. To
what degree their philosophical views actually overlap, and what their actual disagreement
might be, is, however, something that remains unclear. The reason for this is, among other
things, that Steiner from time to time makes statements about Hegel that at least seem to be in
conflict with each other. For example, it is difficult to reconcile Steiner’s claim that there is
no difference between his own and Hegel’s philosophy with what Steiner writes about Hegel
in The Philosophy of Freedom: Steiner claims that the difference between himself and Hegel
consists of that Hegel puts thinking first and not the concept (Steiner puts thinking before the
concept). This is something we will look into in more detail later on.
Furthermore, Steiner often rejects Hegel’s dialectics 2 It is abstract and shadowy, Steiner
says. Still he claims that all spiritual science – including anthroposophy – needs Hegel’s
system of ideas, since this is based on a victory over abstract logic.3 In Hegel’s thinking one
will find a seed for the actual experience of the spiritual world.4
If one is critically minded, it might be thought that Steiner does not really have one
unified view on, and that this is the reason for the conflicting statements. If one rather is
apologetically minded, one will try to unite the conflicting statements based on a notion of
what the essence of Steiner’s view is. A Hegelian perspective would, however, imply
considering the contradiction as essential. From such a perspective, presenting the
contradictory is part of a truthful presentation of the whole. There is reason to believe that

1
Steiner writes this in a letter to Eduard von Hartmann, november 1. 1894. Se GA 39, 1987, p. 227.
2
See Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, p. 198ff.
3
GA 199, 1985, p. 156.
4
GA 81, 1994, p. 64f.

1
Steiner agrees with Hegel about this.5 But one difference that is noticeable when trying to
interpret both of these thinkers, is that in Hegel the contradictory is usually a part of the
presentation of the whole, while in in Steiner one often have to create the unity in the
contradictory oneself. And, again, if one is critically minded, one will put an emphasis on the
contradictory in Steiner, while if one is apologetically minded, one will attempt to explain
and remove the contradiction.
Of course, one should not try to resolve every contradiction one encounters. As I will
show here, I think that Steiner at times simply is mistaken in his judgement of Hegel.
However, in some cases he has been is foresighted in his consideration of Hegel. In total, I
think there is a deep correspondence between Hegel and Steiner.
The structure of the following will be like this: First I will consider one important
contribution to the clarification of the relationship between Hegel and Steiner, namely Jaap
Sijmons Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf
Steiners. Sijmons study is thorough and nuanced, but I think he is wrong about a few but still
essential points.
When this has been done, I will give a presentation of the general features of Hegel and
Steiner’s philosophy. In this part I will also show why I think it is problematic to say that
Hegel is an ”objective dialectician” in the way that Sijmons does.
Then I will go into a treatment of Steiner’s claim about the difference between himself
and Hegel’s view in The Philosophy of Freedom. As I will argue, I believe Steiner (and hence
also Sijmons) about this.
After that, I will look into Steiner’s account of Hegel in The Riddles of Philosophy. It is in
this book in particular that Steiner is foresighted; his view is in accordance with the best
contemporary research on Hegel. Here I will argue against Sijmons with regards to the status
of the individual in Hegel’s philosophy.
Most of the argumentation will focus on the correspondence between Hegel and Steiner.
This will, however, reveal aspects where they truly differ. Hegel is clearly against the idea of
reincarnation, while for Steiner, at least in his anthroposophical period, reincarnation is
central. Still, I will claim that there is nothing in Hegel’s thinking that in principle implies
that he must be against reincarnation. On the contrary, there really is a correspondence
between the principles of Hegel’s philosophy and anthroposophy. Through a deepening of

5
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners, Basel:
Schwabe 2008, pp. 200ff.

2
thinking and perception, which lies at the ground of anthroposophy, one will reach a better
realization of the intention of Hegel’s philosophy. This is a perspective that I will elaborate
on towards the end.

Recent Studies On the Relationship Between Hegel and Steiner

In the recent years some important studies about the relationship between Steiner and Hegel
have been published, among them the already mentioned Phänomenologie und Idealismus:
Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners (2008) but also Metaphysics as
Christology: an odyssey of the self from Kant and Hegel to Steiner (2005) by Jaap Sijmons
and Jonael Schickler respectively. Sijmons treats many of the questions concerning the
relationship between Hegel and Steiner in detail, while Schickler considers Hegel as part of
an overall interpretation of the history and development of philosophy from Kant and Hegel
to Nietzsche and Steiner. Sijmons and Schickler agree that the dialectical aspects of Hegel’s
philosophy should be more emphasised when coming to terms with what is specific to
Steiner’s philosophy and anthroposophy. Sijmons understands Steiner’s method as a unity of
phenomenology and idealism,6 while Schickler characterises Steiner’s work as a unity of
Kant and Hegel, a ”transcendental ontology.” 7
Sijmons study has provided many clarifications about the relationship between Hegel and
Steiner. The most important main point concern the establishment of the view that both Hegel
and Steiner are representatives of a dialectical understanding the fundamental categories of
thinking. Both of them view the conceptual world as a unified whole that exhibits a basic
dialectical pattern. And as I have pointed out already, Sijmons has also show that both Hegel
and Steiner recognize the reality of contradiction.8
Furthermore, one can refer to correspondences in Steiner’s, Goethe’s and Hegel’s
understanding of nature, and this correspondence is probably rooted on Goethe’s work on
natural science. Both Steiner and Hegel had a strong sympathy for Goethe. Steiner wrote a
theory of knowledge for Goethe’s worldview. In Hegel’s logic, which is the foundation of his
philosophy, pure thinking develops from the simplest seed of thought, pure being, into an
organic whole, the idea or the dialectical method. In the way pure thinking develops one can

6
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, pp. 391ff.
7
Schickler, Jonael: Jonael Schicklers Metaphysics as Christology: an odyssey of the self from Kant and Hegel
to Steiner. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005, p. 131.
8
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, pp. 200ff.

3
recognize a Goethean morphology. 9 Sijmons goes so far as to claim that Hegel’s basic ideas
are constitutive for Steiner’s interpretation of Goethe.10 Hegel’s connection of the self-
investigation of thinking with Goethe’s morphology already provides a foundation for a
philosophical understanding of Goethe. Indeed, Steiner claims that Hegel is the philosopher
of Goethe’s worldview.11
Sijmons also shows that there seems to be a correspondence between Steiner’s idea of the
twelve basic philosophical worldviews and the development of the pure determinations of
thinking in Hegel’s logic. 12 Whether this is true is something we will not go further into here,
but if it should be true, it would provide evidence of a close affinity between Hegel and
Steiner.
Sijmons also points to some differences between Hegel and Steiner. According to
Sijomns, Steiner provides a definite step beyond ”the subjective form of thinking”, i.e. its
abstractness or lack of realty, by referring to experience.13 It is not enough to rely on thinking
alone if one wants to achieve real knowledge. Accordingly, Steiner does not develop ”an
objective dialectic of the world” as Hegel does, but exclusively considers the process of
knowledge of the individual subject.
In The Philosophy of Freedom Steiner himself points out how he thinks his own view
differs from Hegel. As I have already indicated, Steiner claims that Hegel, in contrast to
himself, puts the concept rather than thinking first. For Steiner, thinking is not subordinate to
any external principle, it has got no basic pattern that directs it. As Sijmons admits, Steiner is
wrong in this matter at least when it comes to the wording of Hegel’s philosophy.14 It is easy
to show that Hegel does not start with the concept. It does not appear until the third part of
his logic. However, Sijmons tries to prove that Steiner is actually right in saying that Hegel
puts the concept before thinking. Sijmons thinks that the consequence of giving thinking
priority over the concept is that the focus shifts onto the individual acting agent (Steiner) and
away from a superordinate world spirit (Hegel).

9
Förster, Eckart: ”Die Bedeutung von §§76-77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der
nachkantischen Philosophie, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 56, 2002, pp. 333-342.
10
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, p. 172.
11
GA 6, 1990, p. 206.
12
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, pp. 363ff.
13
Ibid., p. 205ff.
14
Ibid., p. 43.

4
 I agree with the points where Sijmons shows that there is a similarity between Hegel and
Steiner. There is accordingly no reason to go further into this. To some extent I disagree on
the points where Sijmons claims there is a difference. Hegel and Steiner are not in principle
disagreeing about the role of experience and observation should play in relation to conceptual
knowledge. Furthermore I think that one cannot say that Hegel puts the concept before
thinking. Sijmons does not argue this point convincingly. And, as I consequence, do not
believe it can be maintained that Hegel, in contrast to Steiner, sides with the world spirit and
not the individual in his thinking. I will return to this again later.
However, Hegel overlooked the possibility of a deeper, experientially based knowledge
of the essence (Wesen) of something as one finds it in Goethe. Here Sijmons touches on a
real difference between Hegel and Steiner, but if one includes Steiner’s anthroposophical
perspective in the consideration and understands Hegel more on the basis of his logic and less
on the basis of his system, then it can be shown that there is a deep correspondence between
Hegel and Steiner (despite superficial differences when it comes to the question of
reincarnation). The biggest weakness of Sijmons study is that it to a large extent fails to take
Steiner’s anthroposophical perspective into account. At most one tells half of the story if one
considers the relationship between Hegel and Steiner without bringing anthroposophical into
the picture.
In the following I will not enter into Schickler’s interpretation. I agree with its main point
– that Hegel’s dualism is overcome through Steiner’s anthroposophy – but I will present an
independent argument for this view. My main thesis is that anthroposophy realises Hegel’s
basic principles better than he did himself.
Hjalmar Hegge claimed that one should go with Hegel beyond Hegel.15 My approach is
the following: If one goes with Hegel beyond Hegel, then one not only ends up with a version
of Hegel that is more in accordance with himself, i.e. with a ”truer” Hegel, but also a version
of Hegel that would be in harmony with anthroposophy. There is an unresolved contradiction
in Hegel’s philosophy. Anthroposophy gives a solution to the contradiction. This is
something I will return to towards the end.

15
Hegge, Hjalmar, Frihet Individualitet og Samfunn, Oslo: Antropos 2003, p. 39.

5
Hegel’s and Steiner’s Philosophy
Hegel is known in particular for his work The Phenomenology of Spirit published in 1807.
This work has, despite its inaccessible style, had a major influence of the philosophy after
Hegel. In the preface to it, Hegel presents a metaphor that is defining for his whole
philosophy. Human knowledge is similar to the growth of a flower. The flower proceeds
through different stages, from a seed to full blossoming. Hegel points out that one does not
say that a stage disproves another. A later stage is a development of an earlier stage. In this
way one can also consider philosophy. Usually philosophy is understood as an activity
consisting of finding arguments for and against different positions. Hence philosophy is
struggle over who has got the right view. Hegel, however, understands the conflicting views
as connected. They stand in a developmental relationship and together actually make out a
whole.
Based in this perspective, Hegel starts to investigate what he calls the shapes of spirit.
These shapes are different ways that the human being has understood itself and its
relationship to objects, and the shapes are presented in a kind of idealised, historical
sequence. Some shapes are theoretical, others practical, and others again are shapes of reason.
For the theoretical shapes the main thing is that the inside of the human being (its thoughts)
should be subordinated and made to correspond to external objects. For the practical shapes
the relationship is reversed: Externality should be made to correspond to the inside of the
human being. Human action changes the external world in accordance with human ideals.
The shapes of reason can also be called shapes of unity. Within them the theoretical and
practical forms a unity: The human being relates to the world both creatively and as a
knower. The investigation of the shapes of reason ends with ”absolute knowledge”. Here it is
important to observe that absolute knowledge for Hegel not at all means to know everything.
One has simply come to know what knowledge is.
This absolute knowledge the The Phenomenolgy of Spirit ends with is developed into
a system of concepts in Hegel’s logic, his Science of Logic, a work that has to be called even
more challenging and obscure than even The Phenomenology of Spirit. In Science of Logic
Hegel presents the most fundamental determinations of thinking, which can be divided into
three main areas, being, essence and the concept. The determinations are developed in the
same organic manner as the shapes in The Phenomenology of Spirit. Being and nothing at
first appear to be in opposition to each other, but are fundamentally rather the same, namely
as becoming. Abstract opposites become concrete unities.

6
 The development of the fundamental determinations of thinking is also a development
that reveals what truth is. Here one may continue the metaphor of the organism. For Hegel,
truth equals the seed that has blossomed. Something is true when it has developed into what it
had in itself to become. In Hegel’s logic, truth is the movement of thinking exhibited as a
basic structure. This movement is that which often is called the dialectical method. For
Hegel, however, the method is really identical to the self-movement of thinking. This
movement can be divided into three moments: It is a development from an indeterminate,
abstract beginning (i), through opposition (ii), to a whole consisting of opposites (iii). Science
of Logic ends exactly with the presentation of the dialectical method, thinking’s own way of
development, its true aim and determination.
Hegel also creates a philosophical system, which is presented in a compressed form in
his The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1817). The system consists of three parts:
The logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. The logic we have just described.
When thinking reaches full self-knowledge, its pinnacle, it ”dies”. As all its determinations
appear in their inner connection, the dissolve into a dimension where everything stands in an
external relationship to each other: Time and space. This is the beginning of the philosophy
of nature. From nature the organism arises, which then develops into self-knowing spirit.
This is where the system ends.
Hegel also holds a series of lectures on everything from the history of religion and the
history of art to philosophy of right. Another of Hegel’s well known works, Elements of the
Philosophy of Right, was intended to be a book that would be elaborated on through lectures
on the same subject.
It is unclear what the relationship is between Hegel’s The Encyclopedia of
Philosophical Sciences and his lectures. For example, The Encyclopedia of Philosophical
Sciences also includes a treatment of the state, of religion and art. But one cannot simply
understand the lectures as an expansion of The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. In
the lectures Hegel brings in material from empirical consciousness. Empirical consciousness
is characterised by that the human being has external objects outside of itself, objects that it
has not created. Hegel left empirical consciousness behind in the process exhibited in The
Phenomenology of Spirit, and it does not play any role anymore in Science of Logic, where
thinking only has itself as an object. What can be said is that the lectures are independent
philosophical investigations that are informed by the dialectical understanding of truth. When

7
spirit knows itself, this happens through it turning back into itself. At the same time Hegel
does not think that empirical consciousness can make out a satisfactory foundation for truth
and happiness. Only pure thinking and human self-knowledge as spirit can give this to the
human being.
Hence Hegel is a kind of dualist. Truth is known in the pure sphere of thinking and
not within empirical consciousness. On the way to truth, the external has to be left behind in
favour of the internal. And the internal can only to a certain degree in the external. This is of
course a simplification, but it gives expression to something unresolved in Hegel’s
philosophy. In it the main thing is that the opposition between the inner and the outer should
be resolved. This is where anthroposophy comes in, something I will return to.
Steiner’s main philosophical works develop a theory of knowledge and an ethics.
Both have a focus on the process of knowledge and deliberation of the individual. The
starting point is Goethe’s consideration of nature, which Steiner seeks to give a philosophical
justification. Steiner then develops his own standpoint further in dialogue with his Neo-
Kantian contemporaries.
Steiner puts emphasis on the empirical consideration of human consciousness (its
process of knowledge and life of action), but his epistemological works are, in a sense,
unfinished. On the one hand one has a lower form knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the
sensory world, and in relation to this world Steiner’s epistemology only presents an ideal of
knowledge. The ideal is the unity of concept and observation, but when it comes to the
knowledge of the sensory world, such knowledge is always only temporary, provisional. One
has to continuously test and revise the insights one thinks one has attained. On the other
hand, one has the knowledge of thinking. Here something else comes to the fore: Observation
and concept appear as standing in an immediate relationship to each other. But this higher
form of knowledge that thinking represents does not give us any insight into a concrete
reality. One needs both the closeness to reality that the senses give and the unity of thinking,
in one and the same act, to achieve real knowledge. That which is unfinished in Steiner’s
theory of knowledge is, accordingly, the idea of a form of knowledge that is higher still than
pure thinking, a form of knowledge where observation and thinking enter into a unity and at
the same time reveal the true, deeper essence of reality. This is only developed in
anthroposophy.
Steiner’s ethics is a so-called ethical individualism. It tries to connect the possibility
of true, ethical insights with an individual realisation of the good. Steiner is not concerned
with what the individual should do as an individual, but to show what a process of free action

8
consists of. A perspective that is barely expressed in Steiner’s philosophical works, but which
really stands out in his anthroposophy, and also in his Credo, is that the individual should
remove that which makes it into a single being and rather enter into a life within a greater
whole, the whole of the universe. Steiner’s philosophical works hardly enter into the conflict
between the individual and the universal, how freedom is concretely realised within a society
and within a greater world and stream of development. In anthroposophy it is, for example,
important that a clairvoyant consciousness is developed. This is presented as a universal
human goal and is realised through, among other things, that the individual subordinates itself
to moral ideals, develops that capacity for reverence and devotion. How this is a realisation of
the individual is not explained by Steiner’s philosophical works, and from the perspective of
ethical individualism one can say that such a proposal of universal human goals connected
with absolute moral claims is something that the individual has to reject as something that is
foreign to it.
In addition to Steiner’s theory of knowledge and ethics, one has the historical
perspective from The Riddles of Philosophy, which ends with a treatment of the transition
from philosophy to anthroposophy. Anthroposophy enters where philosophy meets its limits.
Insights from Steiner’s anthroposophy start to form a background for a critique of
philosophical consciousness, but also starts to add deeper, supersensible insights to
philosophy. However, Steiner’s anthroposophical perspective also challenges his own
philosophy, and this is something he himself does not really consider. Rather, Steiner
understands his philosophy as a foundation for his anthroposophy. But the anthroposophical
perspective shakes the philosophical one, and therefore it shakes its own foundation as well.
Where Steiner sees a continuity between philosophy and anthroposophy, one may equally
well see a breach.
Goethe was very important to both Hegel and Steiner. Goethe’s morphology forms
the foundation of Hegel’s dialectics. Consequently Goethe permeates the whole of Hegel’s
work. Steiner’s philosophy begins exactly with Goethe, and Goethe is not only relevant to
Steiner as a philosophy. Goethe also points the way to supersensible knowledge.
Philosophically speaking, one has to say that Hegel goes deeper than Steiner. Steiner
presents a particular theory of knowledge and ethics, starting with the empirical
consciousness of the individual as it is given. Hegel takes such particular theories of
knowledge and ethics as starting point and considers them from a higher perspective. The
main for Hegel is, as mentioned, is not to argue for or against certain theories, but to show
how the relate to each other and develop into the revelation of truth as the self-movement and

9
dialectic of pure thinking. The strength of this approach lies in the hidden connection it
reveals. The weakness, many will say, lies in that one leaves empirical consciousness as it is.
One does not intervene and give a guideline for the human search for knowledge and its life
of action. In contrast to Goethe, Hegel does not try to change or deepen the natural scientific
approach to nature (even of Hegel admittedly is ambivalent with regards to this – he sides
with Goethe against Newton as often as he can, and he has clear views about which natural
scientific theories that are preferable according to the perspective of reason).
Both Steiner and Hegel agree that pure thinking has a special significance. Both
understand it as an area of higher experience, as intellectual intuition. In difference to Steiner,
Hegel develops the principles of the morphology of pure thinking. Steiner probably follows
Hegel here and has not seen any reason to change or expand upon what one finds in Hegel’s
logic. A characteristic of the determinations of pure thinking is that they do not stand still.
They show forth an inner movement. Everything is determined though its relation to
something else, first as its opposition, but then as a change and transition into this opposite,
which it turns out that it is one with. Pure being is other-being, nothing, since it in pure being
is nothing determinate that can be thought. But nothing is as well, since it makes a difference
whether being or nothing is thought. Both are transitory determination, they go under as they
are thought, turn into their opposites, which also disappear. They are their development into
each other, they arise and pass away, and as this movement they are identical.
It is within such movements of thinking that truth is revealed for Hegel. There is
nothing higher than this and truth is reached in its purity only on that thinking which has
itself as its object. Still, one can do a form of philosophy that is based on such movements of
thinking. Such a philosophy tries to order an empirical material according to the form of
thinking, and this is what Hegel is doing in his lectures. He develops a history of philosophy,
a philosophy of art and religion, based on both empirical data and dialectical logic. There can
also be an independent theoretical and practical philosophy, a theory of knowledge and
ethics, based empirical data and dialectical logic.16 If Hegel had developed a practical and
theoretical philosophy independently of his system, it would probably be very similar to
Steiner’s philosophy. At the least it would have been compatible it.
Hegel thinks, however, that one cannot find truth and higher satisfaction within
(lower) empirical consciousness. One needs something beyond this, and this one finds in pure

16
This is a point of view that stems from Hans Friedrich Fulda. See Fuldas article “Hegels Philosophie – mit
Metaphysik und ohne sie.”, in: Kervégan, J.-F., Mabille, B. (ed.), Hegel avec ou sans métaphysique?
(forthcoming).

10
thinking. But Steiner agrees with this, particularly the anthroposophical Steiner, who wants to
proceed via thinking to a higher, supersensible knowledge.
When Sijmons claims that there is a difference between Steiner and Hegel that
consists of that Steiner tries to go beyond the subjectivity of the concept through bringing
experience into the picture,17 this is misleading, at least if one considers the anthroposophical
Steiner also. Hegel is, as Steiner, concerned with the subjective process of knowledge. One
finds this throughout The Phenomenology of Spirit. It becomes especially clear in the chapter
on ”Beobachtende Vernunft” (”Observing Reason”). Here Hegel rejects that we find natural
laws through analogies or induction. Through analogies we end up with as much falsehood as
truth. Holberg’s ”Erasmus Montanus” shows this in all clarity: Mother Nille has in common
with a rock that she cannot fly. Accordingly Mother Nille is a rock. Analogies may lead to
something true, but also to something false. If we had used analogies consistently we would
probably end up with more untruth than truth. Hence analogies are no reliable source of truth.
Induction also cannot give us truth. If I see that a rock fall to the ground time after time when
it is dropped from a height, we can still only presume that it will drop the next time. This is
what Hume as shown in all clarity. We can calculate a probability that something will
happen, but that something is probable is next to nothing when compared to what is true. The
reason why we say that rock will fall to the ground is because we sense that it is heavy. The
conceptual forms a unity with experience. With this as a starting point we can reflect on the
relationship between the rock and earth, the speed of the fall and the lawfulness of gravity in
general.
Here I do not see any essential difference between Hegel’s and Steiner’s approach.
Hegel is, however, concerned with clarifying what such processes of knowledge have within
a larger perspective. It becomes clear that observing reason not really can reach any true
understanding of nature. Nature is, in the end, itself untrue. We can try to make nature fit into
schemes of species and different kinds of lawfulness, but nature itself is too chaotic for us to
reach any final understanding of nature. Hegel concerns himself with that this is in itself is an
experience of consciousness. And The Phenomenology of Spirit is exactly an investigation of
”the experience of consciousness”. The troublesome relationship that consciousness has to
nature does something to consciousness. When one investigates this one already has a kind of
higher experience and philosophy can continue its search for truth in this higher experience.

17
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, p.198.

11
Finally one ends up with pure thinking, which could also be called pure experience, since it is
the form of all experience and itself an experience.
Again there is no real difference between Steiner and Hegel here. Both understand the
knowledge that empirical consciousness provides as problematic. Both understand thinking
as a higher real of experience. A difference is of course that Steiner thinks that there is an
even further area of higher experience and that one does not come to this through only
deepening thinking, one also has to deepen observation. As I will show further on, I believe
that this is something that one still can understand as a development of Hegel, a better
realisation of Hegel’s philosophy.
Hegel’s philosophical works consequently do not stand in an opposition to Steiner’s
philosophy. While Steiner focuses on the process of knowledge and deliberation of the
individual, Hegel incorporates this into a more comprehensive philosophical perspective that
does not stop with the individual alone, but sees it in relation to society, culture and natural
science. Hegel is in part pessimistic when it comes to what the individual can achieve as a
knowing being within ordinary consciousness. Truth is exclusively revealed in pure thinking,
but this also makes it possible to consider ordinary knowledge from a higher standpoint.
Epistemology turns into, as in The Phenomenology of Spirit, a study of different
epistemological shapes. As a philosopher, Steiner appears more optimistic than Hegel when it
comes to ordinary consciousness. Without good reason, one could say – empirical
consciousness can at most give us more or less well-justified hypotheses or theories – and the
anthroposophist Steiner also appears to be a pessimist on behalf of what ordinary
consciousness can achieve. At the same time he thinks that the human being can reach an
even higher knowledge than pure thinking. Hence Hegel goes beyond Steiner in the field of
philosophical epistemology, but the anthroposophist Steiner goes beyond Hegel again.
Something similar is true with regards to ethics. The philosopher Steiner is focused on
the individual, while Hegel brings the consideration of it in relation with something greater.
However, without reducing it: It is a clear motive in Hegel that the human being realises itself
as a single being through going beyond itself and becoming one with something foreign to it,
which it still itself is in a deeper sense. In anthroposophy this perspective is extended to
include the possibility of becoming a participator in the source of being and a great cosmic
drama. Again, Steiner’s philosophy is more limited than Hegel’s, but with anthroposophy
Steiner goes further than Hegel.
The relationship between Steiner and Hegel’s ethical perspective is something I will
go more into after I have investigated further whether it is possible to show that there is a

12
considerable difference in Hegel and Steiner’s view of knowledge (which Sijmons thinks
there is).

Steiner on Hegel in The Philosophy of Freedom

Up until now I have tried to show how one can find correspondences between Steiner and
Hegel, in particular if one takes Steiner’s anthroposophy into account. At the same time I
have already indicated that Steiner himself, in The Philosophy of Freedom, points to what he
thinks is an essential difference between his own and Hegel’s philosophy. Steiner writes:

Ich muß einen besonderen Wert darauf legen, daß hier an dieser Stelle beachtet werde, daß
ich als meinen Ausgangspunkt das Denken bezeichnet habe und nicht Begriffe und Ideen, die
erst durch das Denken gewonnen werden. Diese setzen das Denken bereits voraus. Es kann
daher, was ich in bezug auf die in sich selbst ruhende, durch nichts bestimmte Natur des
Denkens gesagt habe, nicht einfach auf die Begriffe übertragen werden. (Ich bemerke das hier
ausdrücklich, weil hier meine Differenz mit Hegel liegt. Dieser setzt den Begriff als Erstes
und Ursprüngliches.)18

The question is whether Steiner is right in claiming that there is such a difference between
himself and Hegel. Hegel indeed treats the concept last and not first in is logic. In Jahrbuch
für anthroposophische Kritik (2002) Werner Firgau claims that the difference Steiner points
to is non-existent. Firgau refers in particular to the following from Science of Logic in order
to justify that Hegel too puts thinking first: ”Logisch ist der Anfang, indem er im Element des
frei für sich seienden Denkens, im reinen Wissen gemacht werden soll.”19
This is elaborated on in the following passage from Science of Logic:

Soll aber keine Vorausetzung gemacht, der Anfang selbst unmittelbar genommen werden, so
bestimmt er sich nur dadurch, daß es der Anfang der Logik, des Denkens für sich, sein soll.
Nur der Entschluß, den man auch für eine Willkür ansehen kann, nämlich daß man das
Denken als solches betrachten wolle, ist vorhanden. So muß der Anfang absolut oder, was
hier gleichbedeutend ist, abstrakter Anfang sein; er darf so nichts voraussetzen, muß durch
nichts vermittelt sein noch einen Grund haben; er soll vielmehr selbst Grund der ganzen
Wissenschaft sein. Er muß daher schlechthin ein Unmittelbares sein oder vielmehr nur das
Unmittelbare selbst. Wie er nicht gegen Anderes eine Bestimmung haben kann, so kann er
auch keine in sich, keinen Inhalt enthalten […]. Der Anfang ist also das reine Sein.20

Now one might ask: Is the beginning in thinking or pure being? Being is indeed a concept, it
is the simplest thing that can be said of anything at all. The answer to the question can be

18
GA 4, 1995, p. 58.
19
TWA 5: 67.
20
Ibid., p. 68f.

13
found if one looks at the sequence of the claims. Pure thinking is that which comes first, that
without presupposition. One starts with thinking and it this shows itself to determine itself as
pure being. Hence it is thinking and not the concept that is the beginning of Hegel’s logic.
There are also other statements in Hegel that further supports that he puts thinking first
and not the concept. The following comes from § 17 of The Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences:

Für den Anfang, den die Philosophie zu machen hat, scheint sie im allgemeinen ebenso mit
einer subjektiven Voraussetzung wie die anderen Wissenschaften zu beginnen, nämlich einen
besonderen Gegenstand, wie anderswärts Raum, Zahl usf., so hier das Denken zum
Gegenstande des Denkens machen zu müssen. Allein es ist dies der freie Akt des Denkens,
sich auf den Standpunkt zu stellen, wo es für sich selber ist und sich hiermit seinen
Gegenstand selbst erzeugt und gibt.

According to this there should be no doubt that Steiner is mistaken when he claims that Hegel
puts the concept first and not thinking. In order to decide once and for all what comes first
when it comes to such fundamental questions is not a simple matter. Hegel explains that that
which at first appears to be immediate though the act of thinking must be made into a result,
i.e. something mediated, and furthermore into the result of a process in which that which was
there in the beginning returns to itself. This is similar to how when one draws a circle in a
continual, unidirectional movement. One has to start here or there, but even if the point where
one starts is arbitrary, the point where one ends is not; when one has reached the end, one is
necessarily at the beginning again. This is also how philosophy should be according to Hegel.
Hence the beginning is something that only has meaning for the philosophizing subject that
decides to start, and has to start somewhere, since one cannot create the whole in advance.
But is not the lawfulness of the circle, i.e. its concept, presupposed when one wants to draw a
circle? Could it be that even if thinking comes first for us, it is nonetheless the case that it is
the conceptual that comes first, that which thinking submits itself to in a process of
knowledge?
Sijmons presents an interpretation that is in line with this. He claims that Steiner is
indeed right in saying that Hegel puts the concept and not thinking first. Sijmons points to
that the most likely reason for why Steiner explicitly takes a stance against Hegel is that their
philosophies in general stand so close to each other. 21 But the way Sijmons defends Steiner

21
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, p. 357.

14
claim fails to be fully convincing. And he does not treat any of the textual support for that
Hegel puts thinking first.
To justify his position, Sijmons points to another place where Steiner indicates that
there is a difference between himself and Hegel.22 In his doctoral thesis, Steiner claims that
his own objective idealism differs from Hegel’s absolute idealism. The reason is that Hegel
thinks that the source of both the separation of being and concept as well the mediation
between the two is an ”objective world dialectic”, while the objective idealist thinks that all
of this takes place within the subject and the subjective process of knowledge. The difference
is accordingly that for Hegel the process of knowledge rests on something outside of it, a
process controlled by an ”objective concept” that comes before thinking.
Sijmons tries to make it plausible that Hegel believes there is an objective world
dialectic, controlled by the process of the concept. He does this through referring to different
places where Hegel describes the relationship between the parts of the system, i.e. between
the logic, nature and spirit. However, nowhere does it become apparent that Hegel puts the
concept before thinking. Hegel also does not have any doctrine of how the world and the
human being came to be. He does not view it as the task of philosophy to develop such a
doctrine. What Hegel does have, is a doctrine of the development of the human being as a
self-knowing being. This knowledge indeed has got an objective structure, a concept, i.e.
dialectic. Could it be that Steiner means that even if this structure becomes clear as such
towards the end in Hegel, Hegel considers this structure, i.e. the concept in itself, as
something that ”directs” the process from outside, and hence really is that that is primary?
The way I understand Sijmons is that it this that Steiner has in mind when he speaks
of the difference between himself and Hegel. Hegel, Sijmons claims, puts the absolute idea of
knowledge first (the absolute idea is a further development of Hegel’s doctrine of the concept
in the logic; in its pure form it is identical to the dialectical method). 23 Opposite of Hegel,
Steiner supposedly puts the experience of thinking and knowledge, which is both individual
and universal, first. Since both think that knowledge is individual and universal we can set
this aside (for Hegel the universal and individual is ultimately inseparable). The difference is
consequently that Steiner puts the experience of thinking and knowledge first, while Hegel
puts the concept, in the form of the structure of dialects, first. Thinking is hence, for Hegel,

22
Ibid., p. 358.
23
Ibid., p. 359.

15
directed by a structure external to it. Now it starts to seem believable that Steiner and Hegel
understand thinking in a fundamentally different way.
Describing Hegel’s dialectic as a finished structure is, however, one-sided. The
structure arises during thinking’s self-investigation. The dialectic also dissolves all
oppositions and structures into a pure movement or activity. In itself thinking does not have a
structure, but is all the same the source of all structure. When thinking expresses itself in
determinate forms, concepts, to which we can refer, then this implies fixating moments of the
activity of pure thinking. It is this that comes both first and last in Hegel’s logic. The logic is
primary when it comes to understanding reality philosophically, but external reality only
follows the self-movement of thinking to a greater or lesser extent.
This may seem to concern only inessential details. But Sijmons draws some important
conclusions from, as he believes, the fact that Hegel puts the concept first and not thinking.
By doing this, Hegel, according to Sijmons, puts a universal development of the world before
the individual. For Sijmons, this is the basis for a further differentiation between Steiner and
Hegel. This will considered further in the following.

Steiner on Hegel in The Riddles of Philosophy

There are many myths about Hegel’s philosophy. One is that Hegel thinks the individual
should submit itself to society and an objective, universal spirit. In recent research on Hegel’s
social philosophy is, however, the common view is that Hegel tries to find a way to unite
modern consciousness, where the individual stands in the centre, with the consciousness of
ancient Greek community comes first. It is remarkable that Steiner’s presentation of Hegel in
The Riddles of Philosophy is in accordance with the contemporary Hegel scholarship on this
point.
Steiner starts by referring to the claim that the individual disappears in Hegel’s
philosophy, or, more precisely, disappears within the sate, but by drawing attention to another
tendency in Hegel, Steiner ends up with a more balanced view. Steiner thinks that Hegel puts
the individual, or personality, in the centre. Steiner supports this with the following quote by
Hegel:

Das Reichste ist daher das Konkreteste und Subjekivste, und das sich in die einfachste Tiefe
Zurücknehmende das Mächtigste und Übergreifendste. Die höchste, zugeschärfste Spitze ist
die reine Persönlichkeit, die allein durch die absolute Dialektik, die ihre Natur ist, ebensosehr

16
 alles in sich befaßt und hält, weil sie sich zum Freisten macht, – zur Einfachheit, welche die
erste Unmittelbarkeit und Allgemeinheit ist.24

On this point, Steiner was ahead of his time, as he also was in his interpretation of
Nietzsche.25 One of the main concerns of Hegel’s philosophy is exactly to try to conceive of
what an individual actually is. He seeks to understand an individual as something more than
something singular or particular that is opposed to something universal. For Hegel, the
individual includes both something particular and something universal. The individual is
bodily speaking something separate, a being of nature, but it is also something that realises
itself through culture and society. Even if it is important for the individual to establish an
independent existence in relation to external forces and authorities, the individual is also a
being that is capable of entering into a positive relation with something that at first appears
foreign to it. The process of individual formation is also a process of ”Stirb und Werde”,
where it realises that it does not go under but rather realises itself in a deeper sense in the
meeting with otherness. The individual gains a new identity in the encounter with that which
at first seems to limit its freedom.26
Steiner’s further interpretation of Hegel in The Riddles of Philosophy can, however,
seem to be at odds with much of contemporary research on Hegel. It has become common to
understand Hegel in a way that implies that he has no ontology. Rather, he is concerned
exclusively with the self-knowledge of the human being. According to such interpretations
dialectics is only a regulative ideal for the understanding of reality. There are no objective,
material dialectical processes. It is only the way human conceptual knowledge proceeds that
can be called dialectical. Such interpretations are often referred to as anti-metaphysical or
deflationist. Accordingly, ”spirit” is understood to be identical with ”society”.
This is an interpretation that lies far away from Steiner’s presentation of Hegel. For
Steiner, Hegel indeed thinks that there is a kind of primordial being that has created the
world. This primordial being knows itself as the human knows its own process of becoming.
The primordial being realises itself in the human being, prepared through the preceding
stages of existence:

24
TWA 6: 570. GA 18, 1985, p. 247.
25
As Trond Berg Eriksen has pointed out in the preface to his translation of Steiner’s Nietzsche-bok, Steiner
anticipates the future development the interpretation of Nietzsche in that he ”[...] he interprets the main
expression of the will to power as the ability to conquer oneself and to go beyond” and ”[...] really takes an
interest in the content of Nietzsche’s writings, rather than simply adore him as an apocalyptical sign of that
time.” See Steiner, Rudolf, Nietzsche – I kamp mot sin tid, Oslo: Viderforlaget 1992, p. 8.
26
See also Sparby, Terje: ”Individets frihet.” In: Minerva, 4, 2008.

17
 Goethe und Hegel stimmen in dieser Vorstellung vollständig miteinander überein. Was der
erstere aus seinem Anschauen der Natur und des Geistes heraus gewonnen hat, das spricht der
letztere auf Grund des hellen, reinen, im Selbstbewußtsein lebendigen Denkens aus. […]
Hegel will alle Welterscheinungen in der Stufenfolge ihres Werdens begreifen, vom
einfachsten, dumpfen Wirken der trägen Materie bis hinauf zu dem selbstbewußten Geiste.
Und in dem selbstbewußten Geiste sieht er die Offenbarung des Urwesens der Welt.27

But does not such a perspective on human existence conflict with Steiner’s ethical
individualism? Sijmons claims that it does, that Hegel thinks that individuals are completely
subordinated to the development of world spirit.28 The world spirit realises itself by secretly
having the aims of individuals serve itself. This is what is called ”the cunning of reason”.
Sijmons points out that Steiner in The Philosophy of Freedom rejects such a standpoint.
Steiner’s monist philosophy denies that a superordinate being realises its own aims through
humans. In Hegel, Sijmons claims, the perspective of the individual is lacking. Hegel’s
philosophy does not contain any ”moral phantasy”, no considerations of the value of life, and
the individual is only known as subordinate to the development of history and consciousness.
29
All of this stems from Hegel understanding of thinking as something that is subordinate to
the concept. When thinking is directed by something external to it, the human being cannot
be free as an individual.
In order to form an adequate conception of how Hegel understands the development
of the world one has to have a concept of internal teleology. External teleology is a
relationship where something is used as a means for an aim that lies outside of it. That which
is used as means is replaceable. In order to get from A to B, one can use one’s feet or any
other means of transportation. The means of transportation is externally related to the aim.
Internal teleology is, however, a relationship where aims and means cannot be separated.
When an animal hunts a pray then it does this in order to eat, but it eats in order to continue
its organical existence, which comes down to hunting and eating. That which in one moment
is the aim is the means in the next and vice versa.
It is from such a perspective one has to understand concepts such as ”the cunning of
reason” in Hegel. ”The world spirit” does not direct the human being from outside, but is
completely interwoven with human existence. As long as the human being does not know

27
GA 18, 1985, p. 255.
28
Sijmons, Jaap: Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners,
Basel: Schwabe 2008, p. 360.
29
Ibid., s. 360.

18
itself, the world spirit also does not know itself. Viewed in this way the world spirit is
subordinate to the human being and not the other way around. Only to the degree that human
beings do exactly what they themselves want will something higher be realised. After a
sequence of actions have played themselves out one can see certain deeper connections be
revealed, and that which one tried to realised from one’s limited perspective led to something
else, which one did not consciously want, but which in any case is a truer realisation of what
one is as a human being.
It is the deeper connections such as these that Hegel wants to uncover through his
philosophy, and one naturally cannot uncover them without taking into consideration
different ways that the individual views itself and how it tries to realise the good in a concrete
world (”moral phantasy”). It can, for example, be referred to the chapters ”The Realisation of
Rational Self-Consciousness Through Itself” and ”The Individuality, Which To Itself Is Real
In and For Itself” in The Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel offers such considerations.
But Hegel does not argue, as previously indicated, in favour of that one way of living is better
than another. He wants to show connections within apparently conflicting positions. For
Hegel everything depends on showing forth the development of the whole and not trying to
find the best argument for the one or the other standpoint. Again, such philosophical
perspectives that Steiner presents are the starting point of the philosophical metareflection
that Hegel undertakes.
An objection that also could be raised against Sijmons is that it is not thinkers such as
Hegel that should be the target for the philosopher Steiner, bur rather the later,
anthroposophical Steiner. In anthroposophy it is indeed claimed that there is a universal
pattern of development. History is controlled by spiritual beings and the human being
develops as a part of the spiritual hierarchy.30 Human action is controlled by karmic laws.
Without having access to a supersensible consciousness, the human being cannot have any
real insight into what stands behind everything.
To achieve such an insight, the human must learn to relate to and enter into something
greater than itself. Towards the end of The Riddles of Philosophy, Steiner describes what is
necessary in order to achieve access to higher knowledge: Attention and loving devotion. 31
The individual has to direct itself towards something beyond it and fully enter into a unity
with it. With Hegel we can understand this as a further realisation of freedom and the

30
GA 110, 1991, p. 172ff.
31
GA 18, 1985, p. 605.

19
dialectical principles that lie at the ground of his philosophy. In other words, it is possible to
find deep correspondences between Hegel and Steiner if one searches thoroughly enough.
Before we go into this I want to consider a point where there is a clear disagreement between
Hegel and Steiner, at least on the surface.

Hegel and Steiner on Reincarnation

The idea of reincarnation is, as is well known, central to Steiner’s anthroposophy even if it
does not appear as a part of his philosophy. Hegel rejects the idea of reincarnation. One could
possibly say that spirit in a certain way ”reincarnates” in each human being through its
education, through and becoming part of society and internalising culture (”Bildung”), but
Hegel has a negative attitude towards the notion that there is some core identity in each
human being that reincarnates in different bodies throughout history.
On one occasion Hegel treats Herodotus’ account of Pythagoras’ earlier incarnates as,
among other things the Ethalides, son of Hermes, and, during the war against Troy,
Euphorbus, son of Panthus. Hegel rejects this as foolishness. 32 The idea of reincarnation is
”ungreek”, Hegel thinks. It conflicts with the dawning understanding of a higher, free
personality that was growing at the time.
The problem that Hegel sees in the idea of reincarnation is that the human being not
only can become an animal in its next incarnation, but also something material, for instance
water. Furthermore he draws on Aristotle’s rejection of the idea of reincarnation. Aristotle’s
objection consists of that the Pythagoreans neither explain why the soul takes up residence in
the body, nor how the body actually relates to the soul. According to the Pythagorean myth,
an arbitrary soul takes up residence in a body. Aristotle claims that when something stands in
an arbitrary relationship to something else, it is not possible that the one can move the other.
The soul moves the body and hence cannot stand in an arbitrary relationship to it. Aristotle
proposes a final argument in the form of an analogy: As every art has to have its tool, so the
soul has to have a body. The soul cannot exist without a body and therefore reincarnation is
not possible.
The question is whether this is a blow against Steiner’s understanding of
reincarnation. Firstly, Steiner’s doctrine does not imply that a human being can reincarnate as
a frog or water. The human being cannot arbitrarily pass over from one developmental line to

32
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy – Greek Philosophy to Plato, Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska Press 1995, p. 234.

20
another. The anthroposophical understanding of the development of the human being and the
cosmos is an gigantic story of embodiment and the becoming of the free personality. Steiner
indeed tries to give an explanation for why the soul ”takes up residence in the body”, and
what soul finds which body is also subjected to specific laws.
Secondly, anthroposophy contains a doctrine of different bodies. Even if the human
body is not always physically incarnated, it is a question whether it ever leaves all forms of
embodiment behind. I think it is consistent with anthroposophy to say that spirit is dependent
on some form of embodiment. In that case Aristotle’s objection that the soul needs a body
will no longer apply (but would have to include an argument for why the soul needs a
physical body).
In 1910 Steiner holds a lecture in Norway entitled ”Über Hegel”. The content has not
been preserved, but in all likelihood it was followed up on by Helga Geelmuyden in one of
her articles on Hegel that was published the same year in the journal Kringsjå. There we,
among other things, find a reference to § 259 of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, where Hegel
points out that ”development” does not concern one material shape’s development from
another. It is the idea that develops, and since the idea only exists as the inner side of nature
and partially as a living individuality, real metamorphosis only belongs to the idea.
Geelmuyden, possibly inspired by Steiner, thinks that Hegel here presents the idea of
reincarnation in a philosophical form.
Accordingly one can say that Steiner’s and Hegel’s view are possible to unite with
regards to the idea of reincarnation. Steiner believes that one has to be convinced that
reincarnation is the case in the same way that the natural scientist reaches conviction that life
on earth has a common origin and sequence of development. As human biological life
descends from other biological life, the human soul descends from other soul-life. Steiner is,
however, not concerned with giving a philosophical argument in favour of reincarnation.
What is important for him is that it is possible, through higher forms of knowledge, to reach a
deeper connection between the body and the soul, between individuality and embodiment.
The doctrine of reincarnation is a consequence of this. As I have indicated here, there is
nothing in Hegel’s philosophy that is principally in conflict with the idea of reincarnation. It
is also possible to claim that he is in fact in possession of such an idea, even if he admittedly
does not understand the development of the human as an ensouled being in accordance with
it. It is difficult to say how Hegel would have reacted to Steiner’s doctrine of higher forms of
knowledge. I believe, however, that Hegel, if he is to remain true to his own basic ideas,

21
would have to listen attentively to what Steiner has to say about higher knowledge. This is
something we will now go further into.

Limits and Possibilities in Hegel’s Philosophy

Steiner considers Hegel as someone who has thought so deeply as it possible for a human
being to think.33 However, what the human being can experience and know in thinking is not
the deepest that the human being can reach as a thinking being. In his autobiography Steiner
writes that even if he admired how Hegel developed his thoughts, he found little in Hegel of
what he himself experienced as lying behind thinking.34 In accordance with Hegel’s view one
can say that there is an infinite richness inherent in everything one experiences as a sensing
being, but only as far as a material is presented in the form of thinking will it be fully
satisfactory for knowledge.35
Steiner’s experience of a world behind thinking is probably the source of his critical
perspective on philosophy. In one of the lectures Steiner holds in Oslo, philosophy is
described in the following manner:

Alle Philosophie der Welt ist nichts anderes als eine Summe von Gedankenbildungen, von
Ideen, welche wie Bilder hereingeworfen werden in unser physisches Leben und die
eigentlich ihren Ursprung haben in dem überphysischen Leben, in dem, was der Hellseher in
der geschilderten Weise wahrnehmen kann. Der Philosoph nimmt nicht dasjenige wahr, was
hinter seinen Bilder liegt und was er in diesen Bildern hineinwirft in das physische
Bewusstsein. Von all en wichtigen, großen Gedanken der Philosophen, die jemals in der Welt
eine Rolle gespielt haben, kann der Okkultist immer den Ursprung angeben. Dier Philosoph
sieht nur das Gedankenschattenbild, der Okkultist das reale, lebendige Lichtelement, das
dahintersteht.36

How does Hegel view the hidden sides of consciousness, the sides that the occultist Steiner
speaks of when he says that there is an element of light that stands behind thinking?
It is in particular in The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences that Hegel approaches the
aspects of consciousness that we do not usually experience. He seems surprisingly interested
in occult phenomena like clairvoyance, mesmerism and hypnosis. It’s worth quoting a whole
passage here that draws a very clear picture of Hegel’s attitude towards altered states of
consciousness:

33
GA 161, 1999, p. 42.
34
GA 28, 2000, p. 390.
35
Compare Hegel, G.W.F., Enzyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Werke in 20
Bänden, Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, § 465.
36
GA 137, 1993, 54f.

22
 Indem aber die Erfüllung des Bewußtseins, die Außenwelt desselben und sein Verhältnis zu
ihr, eingehüllt und die Seele somit in Schlaf (im magnetischen Schlafe, Katalepsie, anderen
Krankheiten, z. B. der weiblichen Entwicklung, Nähe des Todes usf.) versenkt wird, so bleibt
jene immanente Wirklichkeit des Individuums dieselbe substantielle Totalität als ein
Gefühlsleben, das in sich sehend, wissend ist. Weil es das entwickelte, erwachsene, gebildete
Bewußtsein ist, das in jenen Zustand des Fühlens herabgesetzt ist, behält es mit seinem
Inhalte zwar das Formelle seines Fürsichseins, ein formelles Anschauen und Wissen, das aber
nicht bis zum Urteil des Bewußtseins fortgeht, wodurch sein Inhalt als äußere Objektivität für
dasselbe ist, wenn es gesund und wach ist. So ist das Individuum die seine Wirklichkeit in
sich wissende Monade, das Selbstanschauen des Genius. In diesem Wissen ist daher das
Charakteristische, daß derselbe Inhalt, der als verständige Wirklichkeit objektiv für das
gesunde Bewußtsein ist [und] um den zu wissen es als besonnenes der verständigen
Vermittlung in ihrer ganzen realen Ausbreitung bedarf, in dieser Immanenz unmittelbar von
ihm gewußt, geschaut werden kann. Dies Anschauen ist insofern ein Hellsehen, als es Wissen
in der ungetrennten Substantialität des Genius ist und sich im Wesen des Zusammenhangs
befindet, daher nicht an die Reihen der vermittelnden, einander äußerlichen Bedingungen
gebunden ist, welche das besonnene Bewußtsein zu durchlaufen hat und in Ansehung deren
es nach seiner eigenen äußerlichen Einzelheit beschränkt ist. Dies Hellsehen ist aber, weil in
seiner Trübheit der Inhalt nicht als verständiger Zusammenhang ausgelegt ist, aller eigenen
Zufälligkeit des Fühlens, Einbildens usf. preisgegeben, außerdem daß in sein Schauen fremde
Vorstellungen (s. nachher) eintreten. Es ist darum nicht auszumachen, ob dessen, was die
Hellsehenden richtig schauen, mehr ist, oder dessen, in dem sie sich täuschen. –
Abgeschmackt aber ist es, das Schauen dieses Zustandes für eine Erhebung des Geistes und
für einen wahrhafteren, in sich allgemeiner Erkenntnisse fähigen Zustand zu halten.37

In other words, Hegel thinks that the individual, in abnormal conditions, is able to enter into a
more immediate relationship with its environment. To the degree that it is able to retain its
ability of intuition (perception) in such states it will also be able to reveal deeper connections
between things that appear disconnected for normal waking consciousness. The human being
can become prophetic, clairvoyant. It can achieve in insight into the hidden connection that
everything has to each other. But that which the clairvoyant reports does not really follow the
standard of the understanding, it is not accompanied by waking consciousness and clear
thinking, and it is not really possible to distinguish between hallucinations and reality in such
states. Therefore they have no real value as a source of knowledge.
In connection with his treatment of altered states of consciousness Hegel also presents
his theory of madness. Jon Mills, an American psychologist and philosopher, thinks that
Hegel anticipates psychoanalysis insofar as he thinks that consciousness is something that
necessarily stands in a relationship to the abyss of the subconscious, and that this abyss to a
large extent determines the content of consciousness as we usually experience it. 38 But for

37
Hegel, G.W.F., Enzyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Werke in 20 Bänden,
Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, § 406.
38
Mills, Jon: The unconscious abyss: Hegel's anticipation of psychoanalysis, Albany: SUNY 2002.

23
Hegel that which characterises the human being is that it is a being that liberates itself from
natural conditions and follows its own standard of knowledge. One could ask whether Hegel
might have had a fear for the subconscious. Why did he not see the potential inherent in
clairvoyant knowledge? Is it necessarily the case that when humans enter into a more
immediate relation to their environment, then it cannot retain its standard of knowledge? Is it
not so that the human spirit is also characterised by the ability to enter into otherness, even by
the ability to realise itself through otherness, i.e. that which is foreign to it?
Hegel himself had experience with madness. One of Hegel’s closest friends,
Hölderlin, and Hegel’s sister, Christiane, both suffered from mental illness. We can even find
evidence that Hegel had his own encounter with the abyss.
Around 1809 Hegel is contacted by a catholic layman theologist and doctor by the
name Karl Joseph Windischmann in connection with a review that Windischmann write of
The Phenomenology of Spirit. A correspondence ensues where Windischmann tells Hegel of
his investigation of magic. Magic is usually something that is thought to belong to
romanticism. Windischmann, however, worked in accordance with an ideal of rational
enlightenment. He viewed himself as a participant in the emancipatory project of human
knowledge. Hegel fully supported this work. In 1810 Windischmann writes a letter to Hegel
in part because he is about to give up on his work. He had entered into a terrible state of mind
and approached complete bodily paralysis. Hegel replies by identifying personally with
Windischmann’s condition. He writes:

Auf Ihr Werk, das sie über die Magie unter Händen habe, bin ich recht sehr begierig; ich
gestehe, daß ich es nicht wagen würde, mich an diese trübe Seite und Weise der geistigen
Natur oder des natürlichen Geistes zu machen, und um so erfreuter, daß Sie uns dieselbe teils
aufhellen, teils so manches Vernachlässigte und Verachtete wieder aufnehmen und seinen
Ehren brignen werden. – Aber zu keiner Arbeit mehr als zu dieser gehört Gesundheit und eine
heitere und zwar feeste heitere Stimmung. Halten Sie sich für überzeigt, daß an Ihrem
Gemütszustände, den Sie mir schildern, jene Arbeit teil hat, dieses Hinabsteigen in dunkle
Rgionen, wo sich nichts fest, bestimmt uns sicher zeigt, allenthalben Lichtglänze blitzen, aber
neben Abgründen, durch ihre Helle viel mehr, getrübt, verführt durch die Umgebung, falsche
Reflexe werden als erleuchten – wo jeder Beginn eines Pfades wieder abbricht und ins
Unbestimmbare ausläuft, sich verliert und uns selbst aus unserer Bestimmung und Richtung
reißt. – Ich kenne aus eigner Erfahrung diese Stimmung des Gemüts …39

We can notice that Hegel does not resort to religion or some other external means to calm an
encourage Windischmann. Rather he gives the following advice in the end of his letter:

39
Hegel, G.W.F.: Briefe von und an Hegel: 1785 bis 1812, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952, p. 314.

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”Fahren Sie getrost fort; die Wissenschaft, die Sie in dieses Labyrinth des Gemüts geführt, ist
allein fähig, Sie herauszuleiten und zu heilen.”40
Hegel hence recognizes that science itself can lead the researcher into the abyss, an
important part of Steiner’s path of meditation. Even if Hegel initially considers altered states
of consciousness to be too unclear to be of scientific interest, he should in principle have
listened with the greatest interest to the possibility of investigate what lies within and beyond
the abyss. Maybe his constant reminder that one has to stick to reason has to with that he, as
he himself says, has not dared to go into the dark side of nature and spirit.
It is interesting in this context to look into what Steiner has to say about Plotinus’
reports about the ecstatic states he experienced. Hegel quotes to following from Plotinus in
his lectures on the history of philosophy: ”Often, when I awake outside of my body I am
beyond the other [”the external” Hegel explains] and have entered into my deepest being,
have wonderful visions and live a god-like life.” 41 Hegel holds this to be a form of ecstasy
that arises through pure thinking and which happens without ”the blood bubbling and
phantasy overflowing”, something which one is likely to associate with ecstatic states. The
soul leaves the body and in complete rest thinking is just as much activity as object. It is at
home within itself. Consequently, this is a state that indeed seems adequate when it comes to
knowledge. At the same time Hegel does not accept Plotinus account of being outside the
body as anything else as a picturesque form of expression. Hegel, however, tries to defend
Plotinus from an accusation of Schwärmerei. Plotinus, he claims, is not a representative of
the same form of ecstasy that ”mad Indians, Brahmins, monks and nuns” are subjected to
when they withdraw into themselves.42 What they experience stands halfway between reality
and concept and hence is neither. Their experiences are, in Hegel’s view, created by
phantasy, and if such conditions are to be seen as giving expression to something that reaches
up to the same heights of knowledge as philosophy does, then that has to happen through
concentrating on their pure thought content. But philosophy is already such a concentration
and therefor the altered states really become superfluous.
Still, Hegel had a good overview of the literature that relate to the esoteric, not only in
the shape of a religious approach. Hegel’s library contained texts of Agrippa, Jacob Böhme
and Paracelsus. He publically associated with a well-known occultist and Böhme-interpreter

40
Ibid., p. 314f.
41
Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures on the History of Philosophy – Plato and the Platonists, Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1995 p. 412.
42
Ibid., p. 408.

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Franz von Bader. The four elements are also part of Hegel’s philosophy nature, and he also
treats a fifth element, the ether. He often makes use of astrological, chemical and alchemical
symbols as abbreviations in his manuscripts. It is, however, without doubt the philosophical
perspective of reason that matters to Hegel. Even if the content of his philosophy, in
particular the speculative part concerned with pure thinking, is intended to be the same as the
mystical content of religion,43 and even if he has developed his philosophy such that it is able
to understand the content of the mystery schools of antiquity, he also thinks that if one wants
to renew the old, then it is Plato and Aristotle we should look to, not the mysteries.44
Despite Hegel’s interest in and understanding of the esoteric, he speaks on behalf of
philosophy. And again, maybe one can point to a lack of courage and other psychological
factors to explain why Hegel did not want to go further into esotericism – including ecstatic
and meditative states of consciousness – even if he believed that this was in the interest of
science.
If one starts with the most fundamental in Hegel’s philosophy, i.e. his dialectic and
logic, and connects this with the possibility for a higher consciousness accompanied by clear
thinking, then one stands at the gates of anthroposophy. It could even be claimed that
according to what is most fundamental in Hegel’ philosophy one has to seek out such a
higher form of knowledge. Without it, Hegel’s philosophy will remain unfulfilled. It is of
minor concern whether Hegel had an interest in the esoteric or if he thinks that one in the
name of science should investigate the dark side of reality. Starting with Hegel’s philosophy
in general it is possible to justify that one has to seek a meditative expansion of human
consciousness in order to reach truth.
This can only be sketched out here, but we will make an attempt: Hegel’s logic
consists of always understanding something in relation to its opposites, its otherness, and its
otherness is something that it develops into and becomes one with. The goal of the process
contains the way to the goal. The process relates to the goal in a full essential, internal way.
Hegel’ system exhibits spirit finding itself in otherness. This otherness is, however, not a
radical otherness, but forms of being that do not accord to the concept, i.e. thinking’s self-
movement, in its purity. The forms that are inadequate for representing truth in a pure form
are left behind as spirit proceeds towards self-knowledge in pure thinking.

43
G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Werke in 20 Bänden,
Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, § 82f.
44
Ibid., p. 31.

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 Within the framework of Hegel’s logic otherness forms the foundation of the new
determinations that arise; otherness completely merges with the new determinations. Hegel’s
logic integrates the inadequate forms, while in the system the shapes are left behind as spirit
reaches the full truth (which consists of a sphere where the inadequate forms are integrated
and not left behind). Hegel’s system in other words does not realise something that is in
accordance with the measure of truth set up by the logic. That which is outside of thinking,
that which the human being does not know itself as one with, as participating creatively in, is
also impossible for it to understand with its whole being. Since the human being is fully co-
creating the object of thinking, it is able to reach a full understanding of it. But the human
being does not know itself as creatively participating in nature, and hence it cannot really
understand the relation it has to nature, its foundation.
If Hegel had taken the possibility of a higher form of consciousness accompanied by
clear thinking, he would also have had the possibility of realising the principles of his logic in
a deeper way. Nature would not be something that principally lies in the dark for the human
being.
As we have seen, Hegel considers altered states of consciousness in The Encylopedia
of the Philosophical Sciences with regards to their potential as a source of knowledge. He
claims that there is a hidden connection between nature and the human being, but the human
being cannot sink into nature in order to reveal what is hidden without violating the demands
of the understanding. Hegel is only acquainted with what Steiner regards as states where clear
consciousness and thinking activity have been dampened. Steiner is in agreement with Hegel
when it comes to the doubtful character of these states. They have little value when it comes
to knowledge and all kinds of subjective aspects can influence them.
Steiner’s, anthroposophy, however, begins with states where clear thinking and self-
consciousness is retained to the highest degree. Within them the human being experiences
itself as creatively participatory in the primordial ground of existence. Sich states would
consequently be a foundation for a deeper realisation of the principles and understanding of
truth that Hegel developed in his logic. Anthroposophy can therefore be understood as a
natural development of Hegel’s philosophy.

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Conclusion
Here I have considered some points where Hegel’s and Steiner’s work overlap. As I have
tried to show there is more that unites these thinkers than separate them. Where Sijmons
claims that there are differences, I maintain that there are none. Steiner is wrong about Hegel
in The Philosophy of Freedom. Hegel does not put the concept before thinking. Still,
Steiner’s anthroposophy provides an opportunity to specify what this really means. Thinking
is in itself an undifferentiated potential, but can develop into a series of ideal forms that
together make out the ideal form of knowledge (the dialectical process).
This, furthermore, implies that I view Sijmons thesis, which says that Hegel, in
opposition to Steiner, has a focus on that which lies beyond individuality, as wrongful. The
focus in the individual is incorporated into Hegel’s philosophy, but Hegel is also very much
interested in the relation the individual has to its environment. He tries to understand how the
individual realises itself through participation in the world, socially, culturally and
philosophically. For Hegel, thinking constructs a world of its own, which it fully participates
in. Here the human being exists freely for itself and can undertake reconstruction of the
natural, historical, and cultural development. In this way the individual can also to a certain
extent find itself in the external world as well. Hegel is open to the possibility of a deeper
participation also in the external world, where the human being becomes one with the
universal being of the world, but he understands the conditions that the human being has to
enter in order to do that as lacking with regards to the kind of knowledge they can produce.
Such perspectives are important in Steiner’s anthroposophy. Steiner understands the
individual as participating in a great cosmic scheme of development. In order to reach real
knowledge the human being has to wake up to a higher, spiritual reality that is fully
accessible to thinking. Through meditative development the human being can gain direct
access to the being of the external world, which is also the real source of its own being. This
is a form of knowledge that passes through pure thinking, but also goes beyond it. Hence
Steiner goes beyond Hegel when it comes to the potential of knowledge inherent in pure
thinking. Pure thinking can be expanded in such a way that the human being takes part in the
inside of the outside world. As I have tried to show, this is not a break with Hegel’s
philosophy, but can rather be understood as a realisation of it.

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