G.R. No.

179736               June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality as
a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Hing filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with RTC prayer
for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil
Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

They alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 adjacent to the property/lots of of the
respondents Choachuy are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to their property of petitioners;7 

that the Choachuys constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April
2005,

On the other hand, prior to the filing of the complaint by the Sps Hing, Choachuys filed a case for injunction
and damages against Sps. Hing which was already denied by the court with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, they claimed that Sps. Hing were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building,
which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary
injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;

Sps Hing now alleged that Choachuys on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the auto repair shop
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing sps’ property;11 that respondents, through
their employees, that Choachuys’ employees also took pictures of Sps’ on-going construction;12 and that the
acts of respondents which is a violation of Sps Hing right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

 Respondents:

- they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

- the property involved is not used as a residence but for business therefore there is no violation of
right to privacy .40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video
surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional
security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case

Petitioners’ Arguments-

- Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private
lives of others. Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37

- petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide
behind Aldo’s corporate fiction. They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building,
where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.

RTC: ruled in favor of Sps Hing

CA: reversed: explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.

- that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras

- They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the
proper parties.

ISSUE: WoN Sps. Hing’s right to privacy was violated-- YES

RULING:
 NOTES:

 The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

 The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws.

 It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities."

 It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power.
In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the
State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes

.48

 The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public
are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied
or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into
the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be limit to
his residence it may include places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

 The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the
right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
depends on a

two-part test:

(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy;

(2) and this expectation recognized by the society as reasonable."

Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable
expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone.
  Therefore , The installation surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless consented by the person whose right to privacy is affected.

 These cameras should not be used to pry into the privacy of a person’s residence or business
office as it would be similar to eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of
petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents’ property
or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a
good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the
revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property.

 In this Case, Sps. Hing have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether it used
as a business office or as a residence

 that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see
then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not
be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no
indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to
an injunctive writ.

 The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of the Coachuys in
setting up a camera is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should only
focus at back of their properties, however, it also extended to the property of the Sps. Hing and as
per checking the monitor it only shoed the roof of the coachuys. at the back. Respondents’ camera
cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection
of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55

ISSUE: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they
could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that
respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not
cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for
evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for
Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance
cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the
matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the
Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in
mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it
is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family. 63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building,
allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents
even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the
set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of
the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if
the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate
fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated
September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL
CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

Petitioner Valmonte in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent Belmonte, be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans of 2m
each guaranteed by immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or

(c) or at least have access to such documents the public records for the subject
information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

June 4, 1986

Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila

Sir:

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the
present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the
matter.s,

(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE

[Rollo, p. 7.]

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied that it cannot do so, considering that
GSIS had a duty to preserve the confidential relationship between it and its customers who borrow from it
 June 17, 1986

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City

Dear Compañero:

Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of
June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to
secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve
this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.

As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim
and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS
[Rollo, p. 41.]

ISSUE: WoN petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans – Yes, except the list of
the names of the members involved or granted with the loans

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136
SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May
29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of
matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for
by the petitioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of
which provided:

The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is
vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom
the power had been delegated.

The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI,
 Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were
empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted
in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right
to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure  *  and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of
the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information it is limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of
full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."

2 requisites:

1. Information sought is a matter of public concern and

2. not excluded or exempted by law

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of
"public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of
the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern". As observed in Legazpi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there

is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information
was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the
actions and conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]

 Petitioners are members of the media. As such, they have the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information they publicize. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is
not only critical, but is vital to the exercise of their professions, therefore, these rights cannot be
violated by govt concealing or controlling such information . The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information.
For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
 in this case the information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that some Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition secured "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately
before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. guaranteed by
Imelda Marcos.

 The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and govt employees and the administrator
of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, therefore, its funds are of a public
character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums,
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations
which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the
Hence, GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with
law the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the
old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial
 solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.]
Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment,
p. 8.]
 It is therefore of a public concern to ensure that these funds are managed properly with strict
compliance with law with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees.
 Also the borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, who holds public office, who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS, Hence, the information sought is clearly a matter of
public concern and they cannot be denied access from it. and were therefore expected to be the first to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions
were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make
the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

ISSUE: WoN the information sought is among those excluded by law/ Won confidential relationship exist
between GSIS and its borrowers—NO

Invoked by respondent:

1. Confidential relationship exist

2. Right to privacy is excluded from right to info

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a
policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

RE: Confidential relationship exist

 Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law
is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of
the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution
and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of
the right to information.

RE: RIGHT TO PRIVACY excluded from right to info

There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130
Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:

 When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing
interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)],
a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for
relief.
 Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80
N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is affected/ claimed to be violated.

 It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were
holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of
the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]

RE: Documents in private nature and not official transactions-- NO

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the people's right of access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its
loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information
which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated.
In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605,
November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign
attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.

Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and
controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of fun public
disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).

Commissioner Suarez is recognized.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?

MR. OPLE. Very gladly.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" — referring
to the transactions of the State — and when we say the "State" which I suppose
would include all of the various agencies, departments, ministries and
instrumentalities of the government....

MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.

MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be

distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation
of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?

MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic

and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and
already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations

leading to the consummation of the transaction.

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the

national interest.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional

Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured
[Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as
to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
RE: LIST OF NAMES- not included

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list
of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not grant the petitioners a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v.
Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans
granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable
regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem
necessary

FALSE LIGHT

G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times  with a heading
"WHERE THE HEART IS, where Saint Louis Realty Corporation published an advertisement misrepresenting that
the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio and his family. This was published without
the consent of Dr. Aramil

with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) St. Louis Realty with the heading
". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below
the photograph was the following write-up:

Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their
family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house
in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family.
They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities.
Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they
bought a lot and built their dream house (house of dr aramil ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are
now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class
subdivision planned for wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist
and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same
date, When Dr. Aramil saw it, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest, that the unauthorized
used of his house for the advertisement caused damaged to his profession as a doctor and mental anguish
- considering that he invited several ppl including his friends, students and colleagues and when they saw
the advertisement they thought that he was just renting his house from the Arcadios,

Dear Sirs:

This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969
issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned address and
implying that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any permission or authority on my
part for the use of my house for such publicity.

This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the apparent
distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private property but also damaging to
my prestige in the medical profession I have had invited in several occasions numerous medical
colleagues, medical students and friends to my house and after reading your December 15
advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional
and personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how
much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to
another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.
 I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their final
advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.

I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless you could
satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped
publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or
apology was published.

On February 20, 1969, Dr Aramil demanded for damages from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary
damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10,

St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published
in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).

It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 and published a new advertisement with the
Arcadio family and their real house but with no apologies. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil
and no explanation of their mistake, it only published in another issue of Manila times a notice of
rectification

On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of
April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:

This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila
Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila
Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969
wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was
mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.

The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as was
intended all along.

Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification
and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity,
Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan
as ponente, and Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.

The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles
21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not
belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and
conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those
factual findings are binding on this Court.

St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the
privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and
"similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief".

ISSUE: WON St LOUIS REALTY IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES-- YES

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by
Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was
renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was
then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows and
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they secretly got married and planned to elope, however they failed to elope. To facilitate the elopement,
Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
because when Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at school the college. Vicenta was brought home, she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño her parents were surprised, because Pastor never asked
for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because it is great scandal for them that the clandestine marriage
would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice.
Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint
of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
Vicenta’s letters to Pastor became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice
because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a divorce decree, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Sps Escaño, Vicenta’s parents filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-
2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, and had children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and that her parents influenced and prevented Vicenta to be
together her husband and her conduct towards her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed for the annulment of their
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

ISSUE: WoN Tenchavez is entitled for damages--- NO

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained
valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in
the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence.

The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture
and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and
"Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274).

In the letters of Tenchavez shows that he expressly apologized to the parents of Vicenta for "misjudging
them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by him "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic].

He was actually allowed to to visit and court Vicenta in their house, and the record shows nothing to prove that
he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded.

And Even after learning their secret marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of
Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict ccomplaince with the canons of
their religion believing that the first marriage was invalid. defective. If no recelebration was done of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of
because Vicenta refused and respecting her decision does not constitute undue influence over Vicenta;s
affections. to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to
the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections.

Neither the fact that they sent money to Vicenta while she was in the United States does not mean they
agreed to the divoce- it is only natural for parents to want a good life for their children. ; for it was natural
that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce
Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

In this case, Vicenta acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her
and ask that her decisions be respected.

 There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, had improper motives, or helped her in filing for
annulment, nor concurred in the divorce. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard
to what will justify interference.

- A parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives.

- He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital
relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where
 his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or
annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are
indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the
case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

THEREFORE, VICENTAS PARENTS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF DAMAGES- considering that

Tenchavez falsely accused them THAT THEY ALIENATED VICENTAS AFFECTIONS TOWARDS HIM.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to
give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation
on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had
originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence
of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000
only.

RE: VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE- yes valid

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before
us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the
marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until
the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is
well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the
marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act
of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
 Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1,
Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
(Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our
polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art.
17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous
union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her
refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws
prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on
the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the
innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court
committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines,
and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

VEXATION

G.R. No. 124617             April 28, 2000

PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C. CORTEZ, respondents.

SUMMARY: Rosalinda Cortez, a company nurse of petitioner company PAAUC, she was given several
memoranda requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for
throwing a stapler at Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him, for losing the money
entrusted to her ,for making her co-employee punch in her time card for her and for failing to process
the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees

This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-
08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a
company nurse1 of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was a issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner
corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring FOR her to explain within forty-eight
(48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William
Chua, her superior, and saying invectives against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00
entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and,
(c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the
morning of 6 September 1944 when in fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private
respondent although it was read to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the
required explanation, so that while her case pending investigation the company placed her under preventive
suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by
petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking
Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to receive the second memorandum although it
was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private
respondent at her last known address by registered mail.

Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 and the
punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.
On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her
termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious
misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.2

On 6 December 1994 private respondent Cortez filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and
claim for damages, non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against
PAAUC and its president Francis Chua.3

respondent Cortez claims that on her first year of working with the company , William Chua,manager, already
showed interest on her and it continued for 4 years manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was
receiving special treatment from him and invite her "for a date," which she would as often refuse. On many
occasions, he would make sexual advances — touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders,
running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful but she never flirt back. He started
harassing her The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but
she never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. And
threatened her that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from
service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that when her
table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings was
transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument
ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect. 

ISSUE: WoN Cortez is entitled to damages-- YES

Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for transmittal was
not lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal as evidenced by a
receipt duly signed by the latter. 12

With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her time
card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan, and that
was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing that she was
anyway only accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit of the company with the
acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was apparently tolerated as the employees were not
getting any reprimand for doing so. 13

As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees, private
respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was employed as a
company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees.

On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and legal, at the
same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.4

On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The NLRC ordered petitioner
PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal
up to her actual reinstatement.5

On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was denied;6 hence, this
petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.

The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled to damages in the
event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained.

The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of
an employee 7 which grounds should be strictly construed since a person's employment constitutes "property" under
the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that there exists a valid ground for termination of the
employment rests upon the employer.8 Likewise, in light of the employee's right to security of tenure, where a
penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to
be visited with a consequence so severe.9

A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment for "serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust." Specifically —

1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr. William Chua,
the Plant Manager.

2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent to CLMC for
Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was not recovered.

3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were at
work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per time card you were in at 8:02
A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.
 4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an ATM card of nine
(9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees complained by the name of Tirso Aquino
about the status of his ATM Card and upon query from the bank it was found out that no application and no
deposit for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not open the ATM Card and
deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit was made after a month
later. 10

RULING:

The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled
that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must
relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer. 14 

The act of private respondent in throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant
manager may be considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider
it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the
performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts
complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse.
Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no other. 15 Also, the
memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending investigation of her case was
addressed to her as a nurse. 16

As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in
her time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise does not constitute serious
misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she was asked by an officer to perform a task
outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company, with the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was
her first time to commit such infraction during her five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not
lose anything by reason thereof as the offense was immediately known and corrected.

On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to private
respondent dated 20 October 1994 17 and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, the money entrusted to
her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees concerned, although belatedly. We agree with
the submission of the Solicitor General that —

The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support a
conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show that
opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show that
Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for petitioner's
employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain requirements before
an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms, identification cards, minimum
deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was caused by Rosalinda's neglect or
willful act (emphasis supplied). 18

Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 19 The
negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the ground
"willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" must be founded on facts established by
the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which
loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. 20 All these requirements prescribed by law and
jurisprudence are wanting in the case at bar.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled to recover
such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by malice or bad faith or that it
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her services. In disbelieving the explanation
proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table was the response of a spurned lothario, public
respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter —

Complainant's assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she
threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to her
which started from her early days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable. For
indeed, if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during that period? Why
did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for the Plant Manager to react.
This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all. 21

Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to
expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more prepared to support
her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to
his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst
because she would have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights.

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry
"foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is
expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs,
circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.

 In this case, Cortez admitted that she allowed four (4) years to pass to make a complaint about her
superior’s sexual advancements on her. finally coming out with her employer's sexual impositions. Not
many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a
public, even corporate, scandal.
 If petitioner corporation had not issued if the third memorandum was not issued terminating the
services of Cortez she would have kept silent that terminated the services of private respondent, we
could only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence.
 Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of
quality employment has become a daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected
to give up one's employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps,
to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could outwit her employer's ploys she would
continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational hazards.
 This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one
could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that
time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so
must she have no place in his office.
 As to William Chu, considering he was rejected, So, he provoked her, harassed her until she gave in
and confronted him and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, so he
"found" the perfect reason to terminate her.

In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor.1âwphi1 In moral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of. 22 Exemplary damages, on the other
hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for the public
good" 23 if the employer ''acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." 24

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager showed an
obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he would terminate her
services if she would not give in to his sexual advances.

 Thereforere the Sexual harassment made to Cortez is an imposition of misplaced "superiority"

which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affected her
sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent therefore she should be
adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered,
petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to
lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions committed
considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that she inflicted
serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently inimical to her
employer's interest. 25 Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was pending investigation
appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the dismissal of
private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners Philippine Aeolus
Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed from the time of her
dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the strained relations between
the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent, petitioners should pay private
respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality of this
judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against petitioners.

Concepcion vs. CA (GR No. 120706, 31 January 2000) - MANGALINDAN

PETITIONER: RODRIGO CONCEPCION

RESPONDENTS: SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS

FACTS:

 in 1985 the spouses Nicolas resided in an apartment leased to them by Florence "Bing"
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound.

 Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit
basis. 

 Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital.

  However, Rodrigo Concepcion, brother in law of Florence, angrily accused Nestor at his
apartment of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka
ni Bing! . . . Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio.
Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."

 To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter's dare, to see some relatives of the
Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were
able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. 

 The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo again accused Nestor when they confronted Florence
at the terrace of her residence wherein Florence denied having an illicit relationship with Nestor.
the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. 

 Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and
threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the
affair, he would kill Florence.

 As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent
that he could no longer face his neighbors.

  Florence stopped her joint venture with Nestor’s business. Hence, his business declined.
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses
declined.

  To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas Also the wife of Nestor started to doubt Nestor's fidelity to
the point that she wanted to leave Nestor. resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during
which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband.

 Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanded a public apology and payment of damages from
Rodrigo. However, he was ignored by Rodrigo.

 spouses Nicolas filed a civil suit against him for damages.

RTC: Rodrigo is liable for damages. 

CA: affirmed RTC decision

Rodrigo’s DEFENSE:

 he only wanted to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he
sought an appointment with Nestor to ventilate his feelings about the matter.

 Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner,
and then only casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.

 The award of damages was without legal basis. The alleged act does not fall under Arts. 26 and
2219 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of
defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of another's residence or meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another. 

ISSUE: WoN Rodrigo (Petitioner) is liable for damages— YES

RULING:

Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive,
scandalous and insulting language

Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence and she denied the rumor herself over the
telephone about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. he
could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. Yet he still confronted
Nestor, which caused him public humiliation, a clear violation of his right as a person, his privacy and
even utter defamatory remarks at him, a married man, which was witnessed by many people his wife
and children, neighbors and friends, Rodrigo accusing him of having an adulterous relationship with
Florence.
It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion
on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. 

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and why
he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor
face to face, invade the latter's privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife
and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him — a married man — of having an adulterous
relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment

That as a result , he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught and
debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why
a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and payment
of damages, which petitioner ignored.

RE: WoN the acts imputed constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219 – Yes

 In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but
are merely examples and do not preclude other similar acts may be included. Damages therefore are
allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or
abusive language.

RE: Ratio of Art. 26 of Civil Code

- Every Person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
othe rperson

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if
human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.

RE: Petitioner’s defense of lack of knowledge

Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had
never seen him before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent
declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for
in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the collection
problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral
Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name of
Nestor's wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence which
Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives
who were the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to
denied the rumor.

RE: Petitioner’s defense that confrontation did not actually happen.

If indeed the confrontation did not actually happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at
all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response
from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek
redress bespeaks of the validity of their claim . On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while
explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced
any reason why the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the
past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by
private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas
spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be
messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to decide and
that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case

G.R. No. 119107             March 18, 2005

JOSE V. LAGON, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.

On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased, through an intestate court,1 two parcels of land from the estate
of Bai Tonina Sepi located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro
Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against Lagon petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sultan Kudarat.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late
Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the "property") in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to that he will build commercial
buildings which would, in turn, be and leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would
answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the
lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial building which will be leased to new
tenants as per agreement had was not yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.

When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent he remitted his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
estate. But when the administrator advised him Lapuz stopped collecting rentals from the tenants as per advised of
the administrator of the buildings he constructed, however he discovered that Lagon represented himself as
the new owner of the property, and collected rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the
latter,

Lapuz then accused Lagon of inducing the heirs of the deceased to sell the property to him despite the
existence of his contract of lease, thereby he violated his leasehold rights over it.

Lagon claimed: (wala daw sya knowledge sa contract)

- denied that he induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in
dire needed money to pay off the obligations of the deceased.

- that he did not violate Lapuz leasehold rights as he had no knowledge of the renewal lease contract
between the deceased and Lapuz, when he purchased the property

- that when he made an inquiry, there were no encumbrances on the property, and that the copies of
the renewal were unsigned and no records that they were notarized covering the property it; that his
personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.,

- therefore, Lagon filed a counterclaim for damages (actual and moral)

On the other hand

Lapuz: argued that it was impossible for Lagon not to know about the contract since He was aware that
Lapuz was collecting rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate court disbelieved the
contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for petitioner to become liable for damages, he must have
known of the lease contract and must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
parcels of land.

Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who
allegedly notarized the lease contract between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the
parties indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed
him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract,
petitioner presented in court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of any
lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only learned
of the alleged lease contract when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the
tenants of the building.

RTC: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Lapuz.

1. Declaring the "Contract of Lease" executed by Bai Tonina Sepi Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff
on November 6, 1974 (Exh. "A" and "A-1") over Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No. 6399.
3ls-73, and Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124), all situated along Ledesma St.,
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which document was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S. Fajardo, Sr. and entered into
his notarial register as Doc. No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series of 1974, to be authentic and
genuine and as such valid and binding for a period of ten (10) years specified thereon from November 1,
1974 up to October 31, 1984;

2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the commercial buildings found on the aforesaid lots and
he is entitled to their possession and the collection (of rentals) of the said commercial buildings within the
period covered by this "Contract of Lease" in his favor;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following:

a) Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots covered by the "Contract of Lease" in favor of

4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all the rentals he had collected from the thirteen (13)
tenants or occupants of the commercial buildings in question, the plaintiff is hereby restored to the
possession of his commercial buildings for a period of seventy-three (73) months which is the
equivalent of the total period for which he was prevented from collecting the rentals from the tenants
or occupants of his commercial buildings from October 1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, and for this
purpose a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby issued, but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay to the
defendant the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00) every end of the month for the entire
period of seventy three (73) months. This portion of the judgment should be considered as a mere
 alternative should the defendant fail to pay the amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos
(P506,805.56) hereinabove specified;

5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant for lack of merit;

6. With costs against the defendant.2

Court of Appeals modified the assailed judgment of the trial court as follows:

ISSUE: WoN petitioner lagon is liable for interference of contractual relation – NO, not all the elements of
interference with contractual relations are present.

RULING:

Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
interference with contractual relations.7 The interference is penalized because it violates the property rights
of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom.8

The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed existence of
private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages.

the elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations:

(a) existence of a valid contract;

(b) knowledge of the existence of the contract on the part of the third person and

(c) interference without legal justification or excuse of the third person.

In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing
from private respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented from
using the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.

 first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, Lapuz
presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal which proved that the
Lapuz and the deceased actually renewed their lease contract, therefore it is a valid
contract. While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only
proved its due execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after
undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioner's counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and
subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable
proof that private respondent and the l ate Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract.
Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and
delivery.11

 However, the second element is lacking, , requires that there be knowledge on the part of the
interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential
element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.12 A defendant in such a case cannot
be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.13 While it is not necessary to prove
actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a
reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights
of the parties in the contract.14 In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the
lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of the deceased, the sellers ) likewise allegedly did not
inform Lagon of any existing lease contract.

When He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious
circumstance that would have made him a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any
conflicting claim over the property there was no indication in property's title and no record with
the registry as to the contract of lease between the deceased and lapuz. Even the registry of
property had no record of the same.15

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, Even if Lagon had knowledge of the contract
such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the

 third element . Interference without legal justification or excuse for his action or he acted with malice
is also lacking or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice17 or must have been driven by purely impious
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.18
  In this case, No evidence that Lagon induced the heirs of the deceased to sell the property to him.

The word "induce" refers to situations where when a person causes another to choose one course of
conduct by persuasion or intimidation.19 The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was of their own volition and that Lagon did not do anything to
influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his
claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract
with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.

In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at all if the interferer acts for the
sole purpose of furthering a personal financial interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court
explained it:

RE: JUSTIFICATION

x x x, as a general rule, interfering with the business relations of another Is justified when the actor's motive
is to benefit himself and for as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

 . Such justification does not exist where the actor's motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some
authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party whose rights
are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de
minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover,
justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct
lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.20

The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view, When Lagon bought the property it
was for an advancement of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,21 the Court declared that a person is not a malicious
interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will
not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith
involved.

In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are
present,.

RE: DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

 petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondent's losses This case is one of damnun
absque injuria or damage without injury. "Injury" is the legal invasion of a legal right while "damage"
is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.22 In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,,23 the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been
cancelled by petitioner corporation after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can be
damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that instance,
the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong.24 Indeed, lack of
malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages. 25

With respect to the attorney's fees awarded by the appellate court to private respondent, we rule that it cannot be
recovered under the circumstances. According to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be awarded
only when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances provided therein.26 Likewise, being in the concept of
actual damages, the award for attorney's fees must have clear, factual and legal bases27 which, in this case, do not
exist.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for actual and moral damages, the appellate court affirmed
the assailed order of the trial court because it found no basis to grant the amount of damages prayed for by
petitioner. We find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Actual damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.28 Petitioner was unable to prove
that he suffered loss or injury, hence, his claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioner's prayer for moral
damages was not warranted as moral damages should result from the wrongful act of a person. The worries and
anxieties suffered by a party hailed to court litigation are not compensable.29

With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve into the issue of laches.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 164703               May 4, 2010

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into
the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers
from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is
the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).

Between June and August 1997, Cordero was appointed by Tony robinson as the exclusive distributor of
Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA catamaran) and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines, that he will
receive a commission from the sale of each vessel. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero negotiated with GO,
owner of ACG express, and his lawyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.4

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go, petitioner who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the
sale of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997.5 Accordingly,
the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price
of US$1,465,512.00.6 Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.7

Cordero made two (2) trips to the went to AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia twice, and on one (1) occasion
even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the 2nd vessel. He
shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these
trips. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho.

However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis
Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company
which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the
requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying.
Cordero was not able to contact Robinson, Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be
found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with
Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating with robinson for the
sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go,
Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG
Express Liner.

In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero argued that the act of Go dealing directly with Robinson
violated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they respect the same, without prejudice to legal action
against him and Robinson should they fail to heed the same.8 Cordero’s lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of
ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations
committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach of Cordero’s exclusive
distributorship appointment.9

Having been apprised of Cordero’s demand letter, Thyne & Macartney, the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a
letter to ACCRA law firm argued that the appointment of Cordero as AFFA’s distributor was for the purpose of
one (1) transaction only, which is the sale of the high-speed catamaran vessel by ACG Express Liner in August
1997. The letter further stated that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the terms of which were
contained in a draft agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable time,
and which offer is already being revoked by AFFA.10

As to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his demand letter, Cordero testified before the trial court that on
the same day, Landicho, acting on behalf of Go, talked to him over the telephone and offered to amicably
settle their dispute. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive distributorship with
AFFA and to purchase all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years. In an effort
to amicably settle the matter, Landicho, acting in behalf of Go, set up a meeting with Cordero on June 29, 1998
between 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at the Mactan Island Resort Hotel lobby. On said date, however, only Landicho and
Tecson came and no reason was given for Go’s absence. Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will
convince Go to pay him US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. And so it was
agreed between him, Landicho and Tecson that the latter would give him a weekly status report and that the matter
will be settled in three (3) to four (4) weeks and neither party will file an action against each other until a final report
on the proposed settlement. No such report was made by either Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had
no intention to do so and were just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia.

Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from
Australia based on misdeclaration and undervaluation. Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting BOC
Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact arrived on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and
Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.00.

On August 21, 1998, Cordero filed a civil case to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable for
damages jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in
bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid
commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the
sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including ₱800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills
and entertainment, on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero
also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of
action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was
denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court.13

As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the
trial court on February 26, 1999.14 Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with
the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines.

On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the
purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and
airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to
Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines.

As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFA’s other on-going vessel
construction, this was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that
Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with
Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle
their dispute, this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will
expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer
had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of
agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26,
1998.15

Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to reach a settlement. However, on motion filed by Cordero
through counsel, the trial court reconsidered the resetting of the pre-trial to another date for the third time as
requested by Go, Tecson and Landicho, in view of the latter’s failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on
January 7, 2000 despite due notice. The trial court further confirmed that said defendants misled the trial court in
moving for continuance during the pre-trial conference held on December 10, 1999, purportedly to go abroad for the
holiday season when in truth a Hold-Departure Order had been issued against them.16 Accordingly, plaintiff Cordero
was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

Cordero’s testimony regarding his transaction with defendants Go, Landicho and Tecson, and the latter’s offer of
settlement, was corroborated by his counsel who also took the witness stand. Further, documentary evidence
including photographs taken of the June 29, 1998 meeting with Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-la’s
Mactan Island Resort, photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his family, Robinson and Landicho,
and also various documents, communications, vouchers and bank transmittals were presented to prove that: (1)
Cordero was properly authorized and actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive distributor in the
Philippines; (2) Cordero spent considerable sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG
Express Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero his commissions from each scheduled
payment made by Go for the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA pursuant to Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825.17

TRIAL COURT: rendered its decision, in favor of Cordero

1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum total of SIXTEEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO AND FORTY THREE CENTAVOS (P16,291,352.43) as
actual damages with legal interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid;

CA: Cordero is entitled to damages for the breach of his exclusive distributorship agreement with AFFA.
(solidarily)However, it held that Cordero is entitled only to commission for the sale of the first catamaran obtained
through his efforts with the remaining unpaid sum of US$31,522.09 or ₱1,355,449.90 (on the basis of
US$1.00=₱43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is
fully paid. As to the ₱800,000.00 representing expenses incurred by Cordero for transportation, phone bills,
entertainment, food and lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for such award, the same being the logical and
necessary consequences of the exclusive distributorship agreement which are normal in the field of sales and
distribution, and the expenditures having redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero).

ISSUE: WoN Go and his lawyers are liable for damagesfor interference of contractual relations
—YES, all elements of interference of contractual relations are present

The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No.
164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747) in which petitioners raised the following arguments:

whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of
his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.

RE: Breach of Exclusive Distributorship

In Yu v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court ruled that the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and
right to the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. Thus,
injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such
contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In that case, the former
dealer of the same goods purchased the merchandise from the manufacturer in England through a trading firm in
 West Germany and sold these in the Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the
exclusive distributorship agreement may not be diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing
or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the
expense of the sole authorized distributor.47

In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the balance of his commission by
respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent
Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA
in the Philippines, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other
words, Cordero was clearly cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was
sold through his efforts.

When Cordero complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to his rights and
demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, On the other hand, Go made his lawyers led by
Landicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay Cordero a certain amount
and to purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and
worse, AFFA through its lawyer in Australia and his exclusive dealership was revoked insisting that his
services were engaged for only one (1) transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.

Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals48 there is no conclusive proof adduced by petitioner
Cordero that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation
of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Further, he contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
holding them solidarily liable to Cordero, relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of the Civil Code despite absence of
evidence, documentary or testimonial, showing that they conspired to defeat the very purpose of the exclusive
distributorship agreement.49

We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents
actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents
from liability for invading Cordero’s rights under the exclusive distributorship.

Therefore, Go and his lawyers clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero when they made full
payment to AFFA without telling him and sending copies bank transmittals as they previously did, and
when they directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in
Manila and negotiations for sale of the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which
Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents’ actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he
was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive
distributorship revoked by AFFA.

Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding them solidarily liable for Cordero’s
unpaid commission, which is the sole obligation of the principal AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in
the letter dated August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay commission payments to Pamana on a
staggered progress payment plan in the form of percentage of the commission per payment. AFFA explicitly
committed that it will, "upon receipt of progress payments, pay to Pamana their full commission by telegraphic
transfer to an account nominated by Pamana within one to two days of [AFFA] receiving such
payments."50 Petitioner Go further maintains that he had not in any way violated or caused the termination of the
exclusive distributorship agreement between Cordero and AFFA; he had also paid in full the first and only vessel
he purchased from AFFA.

RE: INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to
commit such breach.

Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.

The elements of tort interference are:

(1) existence of a valid contract;

(2) knowledge of the existence of a contract on the part of the third person; and

(3) interference is without legal justification of the third person (with malice).52

 As to 1st and 2nd elements: respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and
AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that Go and his lawyers initially dealt
with and recognized Cordero as exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner and as such, Go even entered into the
 Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero as to the first sale of
seacat 25 in behalf of AFFA.

 As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals53 is instructive, to wit:

A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto
may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private
property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking
under a contract. In the case before us, petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s property right. Clearly, and as
correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the
instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of
furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering
with the business relations of another exists where the actor’s motive is to benefit himself. Such
justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other or when there is malice.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer’s interest outweigh that of the party
whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de
minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover,
justification for protecting one’s financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic
interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives.

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the
impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a
malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him.

xxx

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the
expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an
obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner
of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court
correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused
by petitioner’s interference.54 [emphasis supplied.]

Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.55 In the case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals,56 we held that to
sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven
by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
We further explained that the word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one
course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. As to the allegation of private respondent in said case that
petitioner induced the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of
the original lease contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled as follows:

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make
him liable for tortuous interference. x x x

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes another
to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs
of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In
short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the
property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.57

 The acts of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract
directly with their company ACG Express Liner to get a discount for the second vessel resulted in
AFFA’s breach of contractual obligation to pay fully the commission due to Cordero and it also
resulted to the revocation Cordero’s exclusive distributorship.

 These acts are not considered malicious per se if it is for purpose of proper business interest and
not with wrongful motives. however, respondents went beyond the permissible financial interest for
them to benefit at the expense of Cordero.
  It was Cordero who worked so hard as to the sale of the first vessel, despite that, they cut him off
from the transaction, without giving him explanation, and they dealt directly with AFFA as to the
second vessel

 Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal for them to
purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel sold,
attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go, Landicho and Go’s
family members.

 But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and Tecson secretly negotiated with
Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and
receive from Cordero their "commission" or "cut" from Cordero’s earned commission from the sale
of the first SEACAT 25.

Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased
communicating with him, without giving him any explanation.

 While there was nothing wrong with negotiating for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT
25, which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go and his lawyers and Robinson,
Tecson and Landicho clearly connived in ensuring that Cordero would be cut off in the contract for
sale of the second vessel SEACAT 25, and in ensuring that Cordero would not be paid the balance of
his commission from the sale of the first vessel SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that the
commission was already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly
ruled that the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho

 Therefore their acts were without legal justification and intended to injure Cordero.

The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court.63 We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings
of the RTC and the CA that

RE: respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive
distributorship agreement.

The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better
terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed
exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

As we have expounded in another case:

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.

These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.

Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law x x x. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.64

Petitioner Go’s argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable solidarily with Robinson for
actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees awarded to Cordero since no law or
contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit. Conformably with Article
2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is
solidary.65 In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,66 we held:

[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal
principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action
is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort
in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.1avvphi1 The persons injured
may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together
are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x

A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might
exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement
generally operates to discharge all. x x x

Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not
liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And
this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.67 [emphasis supplied.]

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more
than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable.68 Respondents Go,
Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s
commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent,
which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.

Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.69 On the other hand, the requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by
way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them has been
established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount
of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith
or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.70 The award of exemplary damages is thus in
order. However, we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced
by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances.

Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly
caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich
the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are
given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it "should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive." Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.71

We believe that the amounts of ₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively,
would be sufficient and reasonable. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorney’s fees may also be
awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1).72 We affirm the appellate court’s award of attorney’s fees in the
amount of ₱50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution dated
July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to ₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00,
respectively.

With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.

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In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid balance of the commission due to
Cordero and the eventual termination of his exclusive distributorship by AFFA. They gave a different version of
the events that transpired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825. According to them, several
builder-competitors still entered the picture after the said contract for the purchase of one (1) SEACAT 25 was sent
to Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication, adding that the contract was to be effective on August 7, 1997, the time
when their funds was to become available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can compete with
the prices of other builders, and upon mutual agreement, AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price
under the following terms and conditions: (1) that the contract price be lowered; (2) that Go will obtain
another vessel; (3) that to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must make an advance payment for
the building of the second vessel; and (4) that the payment scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in
the first contract shall still be the basis and used as the guiding factor in remitting money for the building of
the first vessel. This led to the signing of another contract superseding the first one (1), still to be dated 07
August 1997. Attached to the answer were photocopies of the second contract stating a lower purchase price
(US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile transmission of AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.58

As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go averred it was Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at
the time the shipbuilding progress did not turn good as promised, and it was always Landicho and Tecson who, after
several attempts, were able to locate him only to obtain unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still
call up Robinson regarding any progress status report, lacking documents for MARINA, etc., and go to Australia for
ocular inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the scheduled launching of the ship in Australia, Go engaged the
services of Landicho who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for the shipment of the
vessel to the Philippines would be in order. It was also during this time that Robinson’s request for inquiry
on the Philippine price of a Wartsila engine for AFFA’s then on-going vessel construction, was
misinterpreted by Cordero as indicating that Go was buying a second vessel.59

We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these were the very same averments
contained in the Position Paper for the Importer dated October 9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf of
ACG Express Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals
Committee relative to the shipment valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA.60 It appears that the
purported second contract superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 and stating a lower price of
US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only presented before the BOC to show that the vessel imported
into the Philippines was not undervalued by almost US$500,000.00. Cordero vehemently denied there was such
modification of the contract and accused respondents of resorting to falsified documents, including the
facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly confirming the said sale for only US$1,150,000.00. Incidentally,
another document filed in said BOC case, the Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated November 16,
1998,61 states in paragraph 8 under the Antecedent facts thereof, that --

8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by herein Importer to AFFA does not alone represent the
purchase price for Seacat 25. It includes advance payment for the acquisition of another vessel as part of the deal
due to the discounted price.62

which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents negotiated for the sale of the second vessel
and that the nonpayment of the remaining two (2) instalments of his commission for the sale of the first SEACAT 25
was a result of Go and Landicho’s directly dealing with Robinson, obviously to obtain a lower price for the second
vessel at the expense of Cordero.