The Battle of Lahore and Pakistans Main Attack in

1965

The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965

A Strategic and Operational Analysis

by

Agha.H.Amin

December 2001

This is part of one of the chapters of my book

Pakistan Army till 1965 published on 17 August
1999 and later summarised and published as a
journal article in December 2001
The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor in general has remained the subject of
too much propaganda and too little analysis. On
Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a
superhuman effort while on the Indian side it exposed
many glaring weaknesses in the Indian Army at unit,
brigade, divisional and corps level.

On the other hand the total failure of the main

Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or
forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by
official propagandists who successfully shifted the
entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc.
Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire
tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were
overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the
Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC
1st Armoured Division survived unceremonious
dismissal simply because he was close to the then
army chief.

Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the

Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as one may
call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at
individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the
Indian side, it led to various drastic changes in high
command and re-thinking about unit employment.
After the war, Indian High Command spent a very
large fortune on increasing terrain friction by
construction of spurs, bunds, drains etc to ensure that
something like a tank thrust against their strategic line
of communication to Kashmir and Amritsar may
never again take place. In 1971, thus little activity
took place in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis
shifted to area south of Sutlej.

We will analyse the corps level battle in this article in

the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which involved a total
force of some five infantry divisions and one
armoured division and an independent armoured
brigade.
Orientation withthe battle area
The Ravi-Sutlej Corridor from the point where the
River Ravi finally enters Pakistan near BRB Syphon
north of Lahore till Kasur measures roughly 160,000
yards in frontage. The main Pakistani town Lahore, a
place which had immense strategic, political as well
as psychological significance for Pakistan was
located just 29 kilometres from the border while the
main Indian town Amritsar was about 28 kilometres
from the border. Khem-Karan, a small Indian town
which made many headlines in the first four days of
the war was located about 60 kilometres south west
of Amritsar and 5 kilometres to the border. Ravi, the
river comprising the northern boundary of the corridor
was relatively smaller than Sutlej, the river which
formed the southern boundary of the corridor and
entered Pakistan in the Sejhra Bulge, going into India
again for a few miles into Hussainiwala Headworks
before re-entering Pakistan again a few miles south of
Kasur, a small Pakistani town 5 kilometres from the
border.

Since there was no natural boundary between India

or Pakistan in this corridor, Pakistan had constructed
the BRBL (Bambanwalla Ravi Bedian Link) Canal
which the Indians referred to as Ichhogil Canal. The
BRBL canal ran from north to south from Ravi in the
north till Sutlej in the south, after it entered the
corridor passing through a siphon on the Ravi from
Sialkot District.

The canal was constructed in the 1950s with the

express purpose of serving as a defence
obstacle against a possible Indian attack on Lahore.
Its western banks were higher than its eastern banks
to provide good fields of fire and observation for the
defender and lined with bunkers.

It was approximately five metres deep and 45 metres

wide and was a “complete water obstacle”, formidable
in subcontinental terms where attack across water
obstacles was regarded as a formidable and
extremely difficult operation!1
The BRB running in a nearly ninety degree direction
flows 5 to 14 kilometres from the Indian border. It has
various branches which run from east to west like the
Lahore Branch, Kasur Branch.

All these branches ran from northeast to

southwest and thus no cause of any ground friction
for any attacker advancing from east to west.

The BRB crossed the GT Road at Dograi a village

located on its east bank. The other obstacles in the
corridor were the Hudiara Drain, Rohi Nala and the
Nikasu Nala.

The first two could be crossed with minor engineer

effort or recce while the third required greater
engineer effort. Both Ravi and Sutlej were complete
water obstacles with width varying from 150 to 350
metres and were in near full flow in the season. The
fields of fire in the area were limited from 300 yards to
1200 yards and the area near the canals, their
branches and the nalas were boggy, limiting tank
movement and requiring careful reconnaissance.

The main roads in the area were the GT Road linking

Lahore with Amritsar and onwards to Jullundhur and
Ludhiana. Lahore-Harike Road linking Lahore with
Ferozepur-Ludhiana Road and the Ferozpur Road
linking Lahore with Ferozpur, after passing through
Kasur and crossing the Sutlej over the Hussainiwala
Headworks near Ferozpur.

The major bridges from where the BRB could be

crossed were at Dograi on the GT Road, Bhaini,
Malikpur, Bedian, Barki, Kasur etc. In addition, there
were various aquaducts and viaducts on the BRB.
The area had thick vegetation trees etc and various
crops specially sugar cane severely limited fields of
observation and fire.
Indian Plan

The Indian war plan was finalized on 9th August

1965.2 The plan envisaged a major attack in the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor employing 11 Corps (4 Mountain
Division, 7 Infantry Division and 15 Infantry Division)
along three axis i.e 15 Infantry Division on Amritsar-
Lahore axis, 7 Infantry Division on Khalra-Barki-
Lahore axis and 4 Mountain Division on Khem
Karan-Kasur axis.

Each division had two brigades while their third

brigade was held by the 11 Corps as reserve or for
other tasks. 29 Brigade (ex-7 Division) was directly
under corps headquarter and tasked to defend the
area opposite the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave, Dharm
Enclave and the Jassar Bridge.

The corps boundary of the 11 Corps extended

from Dera Baba Nanak (Included) some 56 Kilometre
North of Amritsar in the north till the north bank of
Sutlej River in the south and onwards till Ganganagar
which was defended by 67 Infantry Brigade (three
battalions) supported by 4 Independent Squadron
(Sherman-75mm). The 2 Independent Armoured
Brigade was the corps reserve of 11 Corps.

It consisted of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) and 8th Light

Cavalry (AMX-13). 15 Infantry Division had 14 Scinde
Horse (Shermans-76 mm), and 1st Skinners Horse
(Shermans) an additional regiment which was on
move on 6th September 1965 from Benares to the
frontline.

This unit joined the 15 Division only on 11th

September. The 7th Division’s integral armour unit
was the 21 Central India Horse (Sherman-75mm)
while the 4th Mountain Division (less 33 Mountain
Brigade deployed on Chinese border) had the 9
Deccan Horse (Sherman-76 mm).

In addition after 6th September the 7th Light Cavalry

(PT-76) equipped with fully amphibious PT-76 tanks
was moved to the corps area with restrictions placed
on the unit for utilization in only highly sensitive
missions because of conversion and armour
vulnerability reasons since the PT-76 was newly
inducted and had very thin armour plates.

This brigade also had 1 Field Regiment (SP) and 1

Dogra (Lorry borne). In addition the corps also had a
reserve infantry brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade (three
infantry units) (ex-15 Division) initially placed at Tarn
Taran.

The reader may note that Joginder Singh claims that

at one point General Harbaksh Singh had agreed to
transfer 7 Division to 1 Indian Corps involved in
Operation Nepal opposite Chawinda but the decision
was changed on Joginder’s remonstrances to the
Indian Army chief. This if done would have left a big
gap in between Indian 15 and 4 Mountain Division.3
Each Indian division had an organic artillery brigade
known as divisional artillery in Pakistan. In addition
there was the 21 Independent Artillery Brigade
consisting of one medium and one heavy regiment.
In addition the 11 Corps was also given three other
formations which were not in its area of operations on
6th September 1965.

These were 41 Mountain Brigade (forced to move to

Akhnur after Grand Slam), 50 Para Brigade which
was on move from Agra to 11 Corps area on 6th
September and the 23 Mountain Division which was
initially Indian Army Reserve and did not arrive in the
battle area and had no influence on the conduct of
operations till end of the war.

The reader may note that this formation was last

ordered to concentrate in area Dera Baba Nanak by
26th September 19654 while ceasefire took place on
night 22/23rd September 1965.
In the strategic sense the prime Indian aim in 11
Corps area was to launch a thrust at Pakistani vital
centre of Lahore which would compel Pakistan to
“retain large portion of her reserves in that Sector”.5
Another major strategic benefit that the Indians
visualised to derive from 11 Corps attack was
ensuring defence of Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor by utilising the BRB as a water obstacle.

The Indian planners had assessed that with all

territory from the border till BRBL in Indian hands the
Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor was secure
against any Pakistani attack. This was so since no
water obstacle like BRB was available with the
Indians for the defence of their side of the Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor.

The reader may note that before the war if Joginder

Singh the Chief of Staff Western Command is to be
believed some people (Harbaksh Singh) in the Indian
Higher Command regarded the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor
as indefensible and were in favour of taking a
defensive position on the Beas River.6

In classical strategic terms the Indian 11 Corps attack

was a “Thrust” defined by Andre Beaufre
as “Reach a vulnerable point in spite of opposition of
the enemy” and aimed at “Depriving the enemy of his
freedom of action by wearing him down”.7

In pure operational order terminology 11 Corps tasks

were:—8

Advance to the Ichogil Canal (BRBL) along the axes

GT Road, Bhikiwind-Khalra and Bhikiwind-Khem
Karan to capture Pakistani territory from opposite
Ranian inclusive to its junction with Dipalpur Canal
opposite Hussainiwala inclusive and capture intact:—

a. GT Road Bridge over Ichogil Canal.

b. GT/Jallo Link Road Bridge. Barki Bridge over

Ichogil Canal.

c. Destroy any enemy which may enter the Punjab

and Ganga Nagar Sector in Rajhastan.

d. Simultaneously with point “a” above eliminate

Bridgehead in the area Dera Baba Nanak, and if
possible capture the bridge intact.

e. Finally on completion of task “a”, be prepared to

continue the advance to Lahore.
15 Division Plan

Translated into tangible terminology the above

mentioned objectives were to be acomplished by
commencing the advance of 15 Infantry Division in
two phases. In Phase One commencing on night 5/6
September with two brigades and one task force.

54 Infantry Brigade (three battalions) of this divison

supported by a tank squadron (14 Scinde Horse) and
engineer field company was to advance along GT
Road after crossing the international border at 0400
Hours 6th September and capture two bridges on
BRB at Jallo and Dograi. Simultaneously, a battalion
group task force i.e 1 Jat (ex-38 Infantry Brigade)
half tank squadron (14 Scinde Horse), engineer field
company, under direct command of HQ 15 Division
were to capture road bridge in area Bhaini-Dhilwal.
In the second phase not before six hours after 0400
Hours 38 Infantry Brigade was to capture area Bhasin
and Dograic.
7 Division Plan

The 7 Infantry Division was also given a two phase

plan. In Phase one, it was to advance with one
infantry brigade (48 Brigade) supported by tank
squadron less one troop (21 Central India Horse)
advancing along axis Khalra-Barki capturing Barki
and securing the adjacent bridge over the Ichogil
Canal (BRBL) by last light 6th September.

Simultaneously and independent task force directly

under 7 Division Headquarter comprising 17 Rajput
and one tank troop (21 Central India Horse),
supported by a regiment strength of artillery and a
field company of engineers was to cross the border at
axis Wan-Bedian and secure Bedian by last light 6th
September.

In Phase two, 65 Infantry Brigade was to carry out

mopping up operations along BRBL and also destroy
all bridges on BRBL within 7 Division area of
responsibility.
4 Mountain Division Plan

4 Mountain Division comprising two infantry brigades

and one tank regiment (9 Deccan Horse) was the
southern most division of the advancing force. It was
tasked to secure Pakistani territory upto Ichhogil
Canal which in this area was just about 4 kilometres
from the Indian border, destroying bridge over
Ichhogil Canal over road Khem Karan-Kasur and to
occupy a defensive sector to contain possible
Pakistani offensive consisting of an armoured division
and two infantry brigades.

This division was also assigned the support of 2

Indian Independent Armoured Brigade on priority.

The reader may note that initially the Indian planners

had correctly assessed that Pakistani 1st Armoured
Division may be employed in this sector. However,
once Pakistan’s 7th Infantry Division the sister
division of the 1st Armoured Division had moved into
Gujrat area the Indian Intelligence equally
incompetent like their Pakistani counterparts had by
September assessed that the Pakistani 1st Armoured
Division was in Wazirabad area!9

Thus the 11 Corps was in a relaxed mood and had no

clue that the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was
dispersed in Changa Manga Forest area about to
commence an attack which in leading Indian military
analyst Ravi Rikhyes word had the potential to be
India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.
Pakistani Plan 10 Division Plan

The Pakistani plan in this corridor had two different

dimensions. One was the defence of Lahore the
prime Pakistani defensive consideration. The second
was the main Pakistani attack originating from Kasur
aimed at severing the entire Indian 11 Corps line of
communication. There were three Pakistani divisions
in the corridor.

The 10 Division responsible for defence of Lahore

from BRB Syphon till Bedian in the south a frontage
of approximately 60,000 yards.10 The newly raised
11 Division responsible for defence of the area from
Bedian till and including Hussainiwala Headworks, a
total frontage of some 100,000 yards11 in gunner
terminology!

The 10 Division had three infantry brigades, two of

which were deployed in defensive role and one along
with a tank regiment (23 Cavalry), two infantry
battalions, a field artillery regiment in direct
support and an R & S Company was designated as
the Division Strike Force responsible for
counterattacks.

Before the war this brigade had been trained to carry

out counterattacks to destroy any enemy penetration
west of BRBL.

The reader may note that 23 Cavalry had one M-47

Squadron while the remaining two squadrons were
equipped with Shermans.12 The TDU regiments were
also equipped with Shermans.

114 Brigade was responsible for defence of Ravi

Syphon through Bhaini Bridge till and including the
main GT Road at Wagah. It had three infantry
battalions, an R & S Company less one platoon, a
TDU tank squadron (30 TDU) and was directly
supported by a field artillery regiment. The main
defensive positions of the brigade were on the BRBL.

103 Brigade was responsible for defence of area

excluding GT Road till Bedian. It had two infantry
battalions, a TDU tank squadron (30 TDU), an R & S
Company less a platoon, and a field artillery regiment
in direct support.

The 10 Divisional artillery’s strong point and one

which gave it a marked advantage over the Indians,
was in possession of 30 Heavy Regiment consisting
of latest US eight 155 mm guns and four 8 inch
Howitzers. In addition, the division had three medium
regiments supporting three infantry brigades, a
medium regiment and two locating batteries.
11 Division Plan

The 11 Division was raised in 1965 around May

1965.13 It consisted of three infantry brigades i.e 21
Brigade, (two battalions), 52 Brigade (three
battalions) and 106 Brigad(two battalions).

In addition it had two tank regiments (15 Lancers and

32 TDU). The division had two roles i.e defending the
line of BRB and also providing a bridgehead to the
main Pakistani attack force i.e the 1st Armoured
Division. Its artillery consisted of three field regiments,
one mortar troop,one medium regiment, one heavy
regiment (eight 8 inch Howitzers and four 115 mm
guns) and most valuable a corps locating regiment.

The dual operational task of the 11 Division was

defence of Kasur, destroy enemy advance on axis
Ferozpur-Kasur and Khem Karan-Kasur, capture
Pakistani side of Hussainiwala enclave and destroy
all enemy likely water crossings in the divisional area.
Its offensive role was to be prepared to secure a
bridgehead across the Rohi Nala for the 1st
Armoured Division.

In this task the division was to secure general line

Patti-Harike inclusive of bridge over Harike and
Bhikkiwind on axis Lahore-Harike. In the Phase two,
the division was to get the 5 Armoured Brigade to
capture Jandiala Guru Bridge over the Beas River.14
Conversely, if the GHQ decided to launch the whole
of 1st Armoured Division in conjunction with 11
Division, 11 Division was then to provide a firm base
to facilitate operations of 1st Armoured Division.

In this eventuality the 5 Armoured Brigade was to

revert to under command 1st Armoured Division.15
Lately, Major General Naseerullah Babar in an
interview conducted by this scribe for the Defence
Journal claimed that the originator of this offensive
plan was Major General Altaf Qadir.16
1st Armored Division Plan

As per the initial war plans of the Pakistani

GHQ Headquarter, 1 Corps was supposed to control
the operations of 8 Division, 15 Division, 10 Division,
11 Division and 1st Armoured Division. Humanly
speaking, this was an impossible task and a tribute to
Ayub and Musa’s grasp of strategic and
organisational depth or lack of it! Even the officially
sponsored historian Shaukat Riza admitted “nothing
could be farther away from intention or capability of
HQ 1 Corps” .17
The reader may, note that the 1st Armoured Divisions
prime task was to function as a reserve for the Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor along with 7 Infantry Division.

However, later on the 7 Division was diverted to

Operation Grand Slam North of Chenab River.18
The first armoured division as it stood in 1965 was
one of the finest armoured formations that the sub
continent had seen till 1965.

To be precise in the words of Gul Hassan the last C-

in-C of the Pakistan Army and the then Director
Military Operations in 1965, the 1st Armoured
Division was the “best equipped division that we
fielded and far superior to any armour formation the
Indians had”19
In September 1965, the 1st Armoured Division
consisted of three armoured brigades (3rd, 4th and
5th) each with two tank regiments and one APC
borne (Armoured Personnel Carrier) mechanised
infantry battalions.

In addition the division had a recce regiment and the

normal divisional artillery component of three self
propelled (tracked) artillery regiments, one medium
regiment, one self-propelled (tracked) Light Anti
Aircraft Regiment. In addition there was the usual
component of engineer signal and other supporting
arm and service battalions.

On 1st September 1965, Headquarter 1 Corps still in

command of 1st Armoured Division and still retaining
some mental equilibrium which it was soon to lose
from 6th September 1965 issued its grand operational
instruction to the 1st Armoured Division:—

“1st Armoured Division on orders from GHQ was

required to debouch from a bridgehead provided by
11 Division and to cut Grand Trunk Road in area
Jullundhur”!20

In other words, 1 Corps Headquarter was assigning

the 1st Armoured Division an objective some 100
miles inside India and one which required crossing of
one major river !

As per this instruction the 5 Armoured Brigade was

initially placed under command 11 Division for
establishment of bridgehead.21
The initial 1st Armoured Division plan is illustrated on
the adjoining map. It envisaged an advance by 3rd
Armoured Brigade along Sobraon Branch to secure
the Beas Bridge, a distance of 60 miles, an advance
by the 4 Armoured Brigade along Kasur Branch to
Jandiala Guru on Grand Trunk Road east of Amritsar,
a distance of some 50 miles. 5 Armoured Brigade
was to revert to command of 1st Armoured Division in
the breakout phase and act as reserve.22

If 1st Armoured Division succeeded in accomplishing

the above mentioned tasks this would have meant
that complete Indian 11 Corps was encircled and
forced to either surrender or withdraw northwards
towards Pathankot.

In the process the Indians would have forced to sue

for ceasefire and would have lost all territory including
crucial cities like Amritsar till the Beas River. This is
why Ravi Rikhye called it a possible fourth battle of
Panipat for India.
Conduct of Battle

On 4th September at precisely 2230 Hours the

Pakistani GHQ sent a signal to all formations which
asked them to take “necessary defensive measures”
against India. War had not yet broken out but
Pakistan had already launched an infantry
division/armoured brigade size attack in Indian Held
Kashmir from 1st September. The signal whose
language was described by Shaukat Riza as “not
peremptory”23 read as following:--

Pak
Army DTE Sept 042230 E
Latest Intelligence reports indicate Indian
concentration on both East and West Pakistan and
such flash announcements on All India Radio as
QUOTE Pakistanis attacking Jammu etc. UNQUOTE
indicate their aggressive intention, formations will take
necessary defensive measures (.) All Informed
Gul Hassan states that there was no ambiguity in this
signal and that all formations took immediate action
on it barring 10 Division in Lahore. This in view of Gul
Hassan was a clear case of complacency.24
10 Division area

All that 10 Division did on receipt of the above

mentioned signal was to warn forward troops to
exercise greater vigilance and ordered troops to move
into defensive positions on night 5th and 6th
September.25 Gul’s assertion is confirmed by
Shaukat Riza who states that GOC 10 Division on 4th
September brushed aside Commander 114 Brigades
suggestion to move into defences but later relented
and ordered move to defensive positions during night
5/6 September 1965 on the morning of 5th
September.26
THE BRB CANAL WAS MOST DECISIVE IN STOPPING THE INDIAN ATTACK ON LAHORE.IT WAS
WHAT THE ENGLISH CHANNEL WAS TO THE GERMANS IN 1940

Shaukat did not give any reason in his book in which

he repeatedly praised Ayub and Musa as to why the
Pakistan Army had so non-military in the language of
it signals while stating that the 10 Division was not in
full deployment because of the GHQ!27 Even the
Indian armour historian noted that “for some
unaccountable reason the 114 Brigade was not in its
defences when the Indian attack came on the
morning of 6th September “.28

The two forward brigades of the 10 Division were

occupying their positions when the Indian attack
commenced at 0400 Hours 6th September 1965. 3
Jat the leading battalion of the 54 Indian Brigade
reached the BRB bridge near Dograi which had been
destroyed by the Pakistani defenders.
The Indians claim that two companies of this battalion
crossed the BRB walking over the partially destroyed
debris of the bridge and occupied Batapur for
sometime but were forced to withdraw since the
Indian 54 Brigade/15 Division did not reinforce it.29
The reader may note that in this case the weakest link
in the whole affair was not the Indian soldier or 3 Jat
but the Indian 54 Brigade Commander and GOC 15
Division who did not respond to CO 3 Jat’s repeated
requests for reinforcements!

The claim of 3 Jat having crossed the BRBL,

however, is denied by Major General Tajammul
Hussain Malik who was then defending that area as
Commanding Officer 3rd Baluch.30
Lieutenant Colonel Tajammul Hussain Malik commanding 3rd Baluch played the most decisive role in repelling
main Indian attack on Lahore

In the final analysis 54 Brigade accomplished little

except 3 Jat’s singular accomplishment of contacting
the BRBL opposite Batapur.

1 Jat Group similarly performed miserably. It failed to

reach the BRBL and was repulsed by the combined
effect of artillery fire and left forward battalion of the
114 Brigade. It panicked and dispersed back to the
Indian side of the border by mid-day.31 It was
replaced by 6 Kumaon along with two tank troops
which deployed at Ranian.32

The 38 Infantry Brigade of the 15 Division also

advanced very slowly at H + 6 and according to
Harbaksh’s narrative had just advanced within 2000
yards of the BRBL by 2200 Hours 6th September.33

By 1300 Hours 6th September GOC 15 Indian

Division Niranjan Parshad reported that the situation
in his sector was serious on account of high
casualties and no further offensive action was
possible! On hearing this report, Harbaksh Singh
accompanied by Commander 11 Corps personally
visited 15 Division battle area and found that

“the situation had been grossly exaggerated and the

fighting potential of the formation were in no way
impaired — only the GOC had failed to measure upto
certain local reverses, inevitable in any battle”.
Harbaksh found the GOC 15 Division “drained of all
will and vision ...his attitude was passively negative
and there was the unmistakable air of the defeatist
about him. He stated his inability to undertake any
further offensive action on the plea that his formation
had lost all capacity for operations”.34

On 7th September afternoon GOC 15 Division while

on the way to visit 38 Brigade towards Bhasin was
ambushed35 by 18 Baluch.

The GOC escaped but his jeep was captured and is

still retained by 18 Baluch (now 3 Sind) as a war
trophy.
Harbaksh Singh sacked GOC 15 Division on 7th
September and Major General Mohinder Singh
succeeded Niranjan Parshad as the new GOC 15
Division on night 7/8 September 1965.36

On night 7/8 September 38 Brigade based in Pul

Kanjri area attempted to capture Bhasin but failed. 54
Brigade on Jallo and Dograi villages with a battalion
each also failed on night 7/8 September.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani GOC 10 Division ordered a

counterattack to put 15 Division on the defensive. The
Divisional Strike Force 22 Brigade was given orders
to attack Indians east of BRB, something which they
had not practiced in pre-war training manoeuvres.

The 22 Brigade crossed the BRB at Maqboolpur

Syphon with 23 Cavalry leading, Brigadier Qayyum
Sher37, captured area Bhaini by 0830 Hours 8th
September and had cut the GT Road at Milestone 13
in Dograi area by 1330 Hours.
This audacious counterattack threw the Indian 15
Division into utter confusion. Harbaksh Singh states
that two Indian units 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra in
Dograi area broke the line and abandoned their
defences.38
 The battalions were later goaded, rallied and brought
back to the defences. This forced 11 Indian Corps to
reinforce the area with their reserve brigade i.e 96
Infantry Brigade which was now deployed
immediately behind 54 Brigade in depth in the
Hudiara Drain area.
The 22 Brigade Force was too weak to stay in Dograi
area. Therefore, it withdrew back to the west bank of
the BRB after executing their counter-attack.
On 10th September 1965, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon again
abandoned Ranian area39 in face of alleged heavy
artillery, tank and infantry small arms fire. This
produced another crisis in the 11 Corps. The right
flank of the Indian 11 Corps was exposed and
Amritsar could be threatened from this direction. This
produced an operational crisis of magnanimous
proportions in the 11 Indian Corps Headquarter. To
plug this gap, 96 Infantry Brigade was rushed forward
to Ranian area and its position at the Hudiara Drain
as the reserve brigade was taken over by the 50 Para
Brigade.
Meanwhile, the 7 Indian Division performed better.

It crossed the international border at 0530 Hours 6th

September with 48 Brigade in lead and secured the
Hudiara Drain defended by a company size advanced
position by an outflanking manoeuvre from the left. 65
Brigade commenced the advance from Hudiara Drain
onwards towards Barki and contaced the BRB
opposite Barki which was held in strength by
elements of a unit of 103 Brigade.

Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and a

company of 12 Punjab was captured by the 7 Division
employing one battalion (4 Sikh) supported by Central
India Horse less two squadrons on night 10th/11th
September.

Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the Nishan-

I-Haidar was the 17 Punjab Company Commander at
Barki and survived this action.

He was killed by enemy shelling on 11th September

on the west bank of the BRBL the next day.40

The Indian Commanding Officer of Central India

Horse Lt Col Joshi who was leading from the front
was mortally wounded once his jeep was blown up by
an anti-tank mine and died on 12th September.41
17 Rajput advanced successfully till the BRBL on 6th
September 1965 but failed to capture the Bedian
bridge since the Pakistani battalion defending the
area inundated the area. Nothing significant took
place in this sector till ceasefire.

The last significant event which took place in the 10

Division area was the recapture of Dograi by the
Indians. Dograi on the east bank of the BRBL was
defended by the 16 Punjab.
It was attacked by two infantry battalions supported
by a squadron plus of tanks and captured by a multi-
directional night attack on night 21/22 September
1965. The village had little strategic significance
specially when compared with the casualties suffered
by both the attackers and defenders who were
involved in the Dograi battle.
11 Division area

4 Mountain Division attacked the 11 Division area on

6th September 1965. The attack was on too wide a
front and too diluted to make any impact.

The Indians were overconfident in this sector since

they thought that Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division
was in Wazeirabad as earlier discussed. Ballanwalla
a small village and securing all area upto the east
bank of the BRBL from area opposite Rajoke till
opposite Kasur was the main Indian objective in the
area.

The Indians had planned a two brigade attack (they

only had two brigades in this division) with 7
Mountain Brigade (two battalions supported by a tank
squadron) going in the north and 62 Mountain
Brigade (three battalions and a company supported
by a tank squadron), in the South while 1/9 Gurkha
along with Deccan Horse less two squadrons was the
Divisional Reserve.
At mid-day Pakistan’s 52 Brigade mainly 7 Punjab
supported by tanks and well directed artillery
fire launched a determined counterattack on the 62
Brigade.

Harbaksh Singh notes that “the 13 Dogra gave away

and broke the line”.42 13 Dogra was the left forward
attacking battalion of the 62 Brigade and its bolting
away disoriented the whole Indian attack.
Similarly, the 7 Mountain Brigade opposite
Ballanwalla was thrown back by artillery fire and the
small arms fire of the 106 Brigade units.

The Indian Armour historian claims that “Pattons

unexpectedly appeared east of the canal through
a viaduct located 500 metres south of the road
bridge”43 (Khem Karan-Kasur on the BRBL).
However, Shaukat Riza has made no mention about
this either because of anti-armour bias or because he
wanted to unduly project the 52 Brigade.
K.C Praval notes that 9 Jammu and Kashmir right
forward attacking battalion of the 62 Mountain
Brigade became so demoralized by the combined
effect of 52 Brigade attack and artillery/tank fire that it
retreated as far back as Valtoha !

Another significant affair in the 11 Division battle area

was the moverment of the 21 Brigade its reserve
brigade. Initially, on 5th September the brigade was
ordered to be ready to move north and moved north
towards Bhimbhar at 0430 Hours 6th September.

Later the move was countermanded and the brigade

reverted to command 11 Division whose area it
reached on around 0200 Hours 7th September!44
1st Armoured Division/11 Division Attack

Since this article is devoted to the overall battle in

Ravi-Sutlej Corridor the 1st Armoured Division attack
will be covered in brief.

At 1430 Hours 6th September, 2 FF (reserve battalion

of 52 Brigade) was ordered by 11 Division
Headquarter to capture a bridgehead across the Rohi
Nala by first light 7th September.
Similarly the 5 Armoured Brigade which was
placed under command 11 Division on 5th
September was ordered on 5th September to secure
“line Bhikkiwind-Patti as soon as possible”.45
 Major Dost Mohammad Utras tank fell in the BRB during the crossing and he drowned in the BRB

The 2 FF launched its attack astride road Khem

Karan-Kasur across the Rohi Nala at 1930 Hours 6th
September 1965 and by 2130 Hours secured
a bridgehead across the Rohi Nala.46 6 Lancers the
leading regiment of 5 Armoured Brigade was to cross
the Rohi Nala.

The bridge over Rohi Nala was completed by 1130

Hours but since its exit ramp was too steep the first
tank of 6 Lancers crossed it at 1300 Hours 7th
September.47

After one squadron of 6 Lancers had crossed the

Rohi Nala at 1600 hours one tank got stuck and
blocked the Rohi Nala bridge. At this time there were
ten tanks across the Rohi Nala and about a company
strength of 1 FF.

Colonel Sahibzad Gul, CO 6 Lancers made some

forward movement putting some Indians in front on
the run shooting three Indian tanks and capturing
about 25 prisoners.
1st ArmouredDivision Attack

The 1st Armoured Division was involved in the main

battle from 6th September when 5 Armoured Brigade
was placed under command 11 Division.

The 5 Armoured Brigade attack was to commence at

0500 Hours on 7th September, however, it was
delayed to 1130 Hours because of delay in bridge
construction on Rohi Nala which was within Pakistani
territory.

Gul Hassan the then DMO later claimed in his

memoirs that a bridge was not required since the
Rohi Nala was fordable but did not explain what he
had done as DMO to bring this point in any pre-war
planning discussion ! By evening 1600 Hours only
about a tank squadron strength of the 6 Lancers
leading unit of 5 Armoured Brigade had crossed the
Rohi Nala since one of its tanks had got stuck on the
Rohi Nala Bridge.
Thus 7th September was lost with just ten tanks
across the Rohi Nala. All this was happening at a time
when the situation in 4 Mountain Division as per
Harbaksh Singh was so serious that ‘out of six
battalions two and half had left the line and the
remaining three and half were under severe enemy
pressure”.

Harbaksh states that it was under these

circumstances that GOC 4 Mountain Division sought
permission from GOC 11 Corps to withdraw and take
a position at Assal Uttar in the rear.48

Harbaksh states that early in the morning of 8th

September he received a handwritten letter from
GOC 11 Corps recommending that four infantry units
i.e 18 Rajputana, 7 Grenadier, 9 J & K, AND
13 Dogra be disbanded and that another infantry
division should replace 4 Mountain Division.49
At this stage Harbaksh had no reserves and exhorted
GOC 4 Mountain Division and GOC 11 Corps to be
more resolute.

While all this was happening Brig Bashir commander

5 Armoured Brigade was throwing to winds Pakistan’s
Armour superiority by dividing his brigade into two
directions with 24 Cavalry to advance along axis
Khem Karan-Bhikiwind and 6 Lancers towards
Valtoha Railway Station.
 Naik Abdul Hameed , played a crucial role in repelling Pakistani tank attack on 2
Mountain Division and was awarded Indias highest military award Param Vir Chakra

24 Cavalry contacted defences of 4 Mountain Division

and tried to develop the situation from the west but
failed because of lack of infantry support and timely
arrival of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) which reached the
4 Mountain Division area after mid-day.
6 Lancers reached Valtoha Railway Station but was
recalled after last light back to Khem Karan by
Brigadier Bashir to leaguer in line with the old British
practice which in this scenario was not required.50
By 9th September when the Pakistani armour once
again commenced advance the Indian armour was
well poistioned with 3rd Cavalry Centurions plugging
flanks which could have enabled 5 Armoured Brigade
to get into rear of 4 Mountain Divisioon 8th
September.
The critical time span was over. The ancient Greeks
used to say that the Goddess of Victory favours those
who are bold. Boldness was sadly missing in 5
Armoured Brigade less Sahibzad Gul the only tank
commander who wanted to lead and fight from the
front.
oured Brigade recommenced advance from its
leaguers near Khem Karan, 6 Lancers was greeted
by Centurion fire of 3rd Cavalry while 24 Cavalry also
made nominal progress.
 Indian Centurions of 3rd Cavalry in defensive
position

To compound things further Sahibzad Gul the only

man in the whole senior lot was killed on 9th
September near Valtoha.
This indomitable man was only given an SJ since he
was not from the more pampered regiments of the
then Pakistan Army!
By 10th September the Indians were well poised to
meet any outflanking attack.
They had taken a horse shoe position with about
three tank regiments, one in 4 Mountain Division
defences, another less one squadron in Valtoha area
and the third and the most formidable in technical
terms i.e the 3rd Cavalry covering the western deep
flank of the 4 Mountain Division.
Naseer now launched 4 Cavalry into this valley of
death. The result was catastrophic. 4 Cavalry got
bogged down and was forced to surrender. The
Indians claimed that they captured all tanks of the
unit, the Commanding Officer and 12 officers
including six majors and several other ranks.51
Shaukat Riza states that “some tank crew of 4
Cavalry trickled into HQ 4 Armoured Brigade.They
reported that the regiment had been taken
prisoner...at the end of the day 4 Cavalry reported 4
Officers and 25 Other Ranks missing and a total of
ten killed. Almost all the tanks had been lost”.52 The
layman reader should not get shocked.In tank warfare
such things happen. In WW two an illustrious British
tank unit 8th Hussars along with 4 Armoured Brigade
was captured by the Germans.53
 Captured tanks of Pakistans 4 Cavalry

The fault in 4 Cavalry fiasco was not of the unit but its
CO and GOC 1st Armoured Division.
Indian armour historian admits that 4 Cavalry fought
well but ran out of fuel because of poor planning and
was caught in a well laid ambush.

Thus ended an offensive which had the potential to

knock the Indian Army out of the war. The 3rd
Armoured Brigade was never employed and from
11th September the 1st Armoured Division less 5
Armoured Brigade and 4 Cavalry which was totally
written off was despatched to Chawinda.

The Indians launched some very fool hardy frontal

attacks on 11 Division from 11th September till 22nd
September. All were repulsed since surprise had
been lost and defence keeping in view terrain and
relative strength was the superior form of war.
Analysis

Level of strategic success

On the strategic level the Indians failed in their prime

aim i.e in compelling Pakistan to “retain large portion
of her reserves in that Sector” i.e Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor.

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division successfully

disengaged from Khem Karan and was redeployed
opposite Chawinda. The Pakistanis thus defended
Lahore successfully with existing formations except 5
Armoured Brigade whose one tank regiment (4
Cavalry) was completely lost, having been captured
by Indians while two (6 Lancers and 24 Cavalry)
suffered serious losses.

Thus at ceasefire in strategic terms the Pakistani

position opposite Chawinda was far superior. It is
another thing that Ayub and Musa lacked strategic
resolution to launch Operation Wind Up which had the
potential of bagging two Indian Infantry divisions in
Chawinda area.
Element of Surprise

Both the sides started with the element of surprise,

the Indians having achieved surprise opposite Lahore
and Pakistan having achieved complete strategic
surprise opposite Khem Karan.

Ironically the Intelligence agencies of both sides were

a complete negation of the “Two Nation Theory” in
terms of comparative levels of ‘grey matter’, keeping
in view the fact that both miserably failed to detect the
location of each other’s armoured division till the last
minute!

Employment of Armour

The conduct of 5 Armoured Brigade on 7th, 8th and

9th September was the most crucial aspect of the
battle. Commander 5 Armoured Brigade totally failed
in his job.

His initial orders divided his brigade into three

directions, with 6 Lancers going towards the right and
24 Cavalry going in the centre and left.

Had he kept his two tank regiments concentrated in

any one direction with a squadron on the main Khem
Karan-Bhikiwind axis the Pakistanis would have
outflanked the 4th Mountain Division on the 8th
September.

This would have enabled GOC 1st Armoured Division

to pump in the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the
success of the 5th Armoured Brigade with the 4th
Armoured Brigade while still retaining 3rd Armoured
Brigade for the final push to the Beas River Bridge.

By 9th September the Indians were well poised to

defeat any outflanking move and the “critical time
span” i.e had run out for the Pakistanis.
In every battle, campaign and a war there are/is one
or more period/s when one side is greatly exposed to
the risk of being decisively defeated, due to material
factors or psychological factors like perception of the
opposing commander that his cause is doomed, with
the other side being possibly aware of it or not.54
Superior decision making means the ability or
talent to identify the critical time span and seize it
relentlessly! Brigadier Basheer failed in it on 7th,
8th and 9th September!

Alas, the truth in Schillers saying “what is lost in a

moment is lost for eternity”.

The current of history now started moving in the

reverse direction and Pakistan Army paid a very
heavy price for the failure at Khem Karan six years
later in 1971!
Chances ofStrategic Success

At the strategic level the plan was excellent. It was in

planning and at operational level that it failed.

Even Indian military writers like K.C Praval admitted

that the plan was “well conceived”...”that the advance
throughout would be along the grain of the country
and no water obstacles would have to be
crossed”...and that “Pakistani armour had the
capability for the thrust but the plan failed due to inept
execution”.55

Harbaksh Singh admitted that “it was a simple but

foolproof plan” and that “only the 4 Mountain Division
stood in its way”.
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu the tank corps historian
also admitted that
“The loss of any bridge over the Beas was expected to pose such a
serious threat to Delhi that the rest of the Indian Army would be forced
to contain it rather than make an attempt to rescue the stranded XI
Corps”.56

In Clausewitzian terms the strategic plan decides

“when, where and with what forces” the battle is
to be delivered.57 Again in the light of
Clausewitz’s teachings, one of the principal
objects of strategy is “always to be strong, first
generally and then at the decisive point”.58

In this regard, strategy placed at Naseer’s

disposal an initial superiority at the decisive point
of about 7 to 1 but he failed to translate it into
success because he and his 5 Armoured Brigade
Commander were incompetent and the men who
handpicked them based on personal likes were
worse!

After all Naseer was Musa’s handpicked choice. The

fault was not that he was a non-armour officer as Gul
Hassan fallaciously alleges but simply that Naseer
was incompetent! After all, Ibrar who did far better
was also an infantry man. Rommel was an infantry
man. Macarthur, Lee and Meade were from Corps of
Engineers!

The greatness of the German General Staff as this

scribe stated in an article written in 1994 was not that
it produced a Manstein but that it discovered a
Manstein and allowed a Manstein to reach the highest
ranks!59 It was here that the Indo-Pak Armies failed.
They are simply a conspiracy against originality and
boldness!

If successful the 1st Armoured Division attack had

great chances of success.Indian GOC Western
Command Harbaksh Singh frankly admitted that
“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the GT Road or the Beas
Bridge would have found us in a helpless position of a commander
paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the
enemy was inexorably pushing deep into his vitals.It is a nightmarish
feeling even when considered into retrospect at this stage.” 60

The BRB Canal as the key to the battle

It may sound unheroic and unromantic but the BRBL

proved the English Channel that saved Pakistan’s
strategic position in the crucial Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.

This man made obstacle severely restricted the

Indian freedom of manoeuvre and nullified their
relative superiority in infantry. The canal acted as the
anvil vis-a-vis Pakistani artillery fire, tank fire and
infantry small arms fire which played the role of
hammer which crushed the Indians inflicting heavy
casualties on them.

Without BRB there is no doubt that nothing could

have stopped the indians from entering Lahore on 6th
September. Similarly, without BRB the 1st Armoured
Division could not have as easily disengaged from the
Khem Karan battle as it did.

Conversely, the BRB also slowed down the induction

of the 1st Armoured Division into the bridgehead but
this was less because of the BRB and more due to
incompetence in Pakistani planners at GHQ (DMO),
corps and divisional level.
Musa admitted BRBL’s role, once he stated that
Pakistani plan was based on making use of the BRB
canal which to a great extent compensated for
disparity in resources and enabled Pakistani
formations in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor to deploy on
“very extended frontages”. 61
Indecision,Vaccillation and Procrastination in the
Pakistani GHQ

The Pakistani GHQ particularly the Military

Operations Directorate acted as catalysts towards
increased confusion. Their contradictory orders to a
certain extent retarded the pace of advance of the 1st
Armoured Division.

Twice the GHQ gave orders which created great

doubt and confusion in the 1st Armoured Division.
See the case of 3rd Armoured Brigade. On 6th
September it was told to concentrate east of Zafarke
by first light 7th September.

The brigade carried out the move successfully by

0600 Hours 7th September. The same day at 1400
Hours it was told to move to Lahore and at 1500
hours on the same day these orders were
cancelled!62 Imagine the state of mind of the brigade
commander and his commanding officers.

On the second occasion, the 4 Armoured Brigade

was ordered by the DMO to move to Daska in Ravi-
Chenab Corridor at 1300 Hours 7th September.

While the brigade was preparing for the move it was

cancelled the same day at 1600 Hours. Naturally,
GOC 1st Armoured Division Naseer could not have
ordered these moves on his own.
There were men higher up in the chain of command
who were not clear about many things connected with
operational strategy and generalship! 63
Lack of initiative atbattalion, brigade and
divisional level

There was a marked lack of initiative at the battalion,

brigade and divisional level.

Lieutenant Colonel Ihsan ul Haq Malik who later rose

to the rank of major general and participated in the
Khem Karan operations as the CO of the indomitable
15 SP (it was a privilege for this scribe to have served
in the “Romeo Battery” of this fine unit after a
disciplinary problem in 11 Cavalry from 9th August
1984 till 10th October 1984) states that “senior
officers were conspicuously absent from the frontline
in war. I saw a command post of one of them in the
rear areas. The bunker was a massive job.Only a
direct hit by a 5 KT would disturb it!”64
Barring exceptions like Qayyum Sher who as
earlier discussed led from the front. GOC 1st
Armoured Division and Commander 5 Armoured
Brigade preferred staying many miles away from
the line of action!

Brigadier Shami the Artillery Commander was killed

simply because in confusion of battle he was
disoriented and travelled too forward under the
assumption that he was in territory held by own
troops.
 Star plate of Brigadier Shamis jeep

On the decisive 8th of September when the 1st

Armoured Division could have achieved a
breakthrough no officer of colonel level except
Sahibzad Gul was anywhere within 1000 yards of
action! In a personal conversation with this scribe
Brigadier (then captain Asmat Beg Humayun) then
GSO-3 of the 5 Armoured Brigade stated that
Brigadier Bashir had pitched his headquarter in a rest
house many miles behind the actual scene of action.
Triumph of defenceover offence

All battles were triumph of defence over offence. The

attacker was stopped whether it was the Indian
opposite BRB or the Pakistani opposite Assal Uttar or
Valtoha.

If one Pakistani tank unit stopped the Indian

Armoured Division opposite Gadgor, one Indian tank
unit and later one brigade stopped the Pakistani
Armoured Division at Assal Uttar. If there was a
Harbaksh Singh at Assal Uttar prodding 4 Mountain
Division to hold on there was an Abrar at Chawinda
reviving the spirits of the 6 Armoured Division.

There were historic reasons for triumph of

defence.The pre-1947 Indian Army was primarily
used by the Britisher as a shield rather than a spear.
While Indian Infantry dug in, the main manoeuvres in
North Africa were performed by the purely British
armoured divisions.

Burma was a different case altogether since in

Burma the Indian tank brigades overwhelmed the
Japanese with a ratio of 100 to 10 in qualitative and
quantitative terms. Offensive action required
initiative,independent judgement, swiftness in
decision making, all of which were sadly missing in
both the armies beyond tank troop level.

Men like Sahibzad Gul or Tarapur were solitary

exceptions and that is why once they were killed in
action there was no one who could replace them.
Excellence in decision-making had not been
institutionalised in both the armies and I dare say this
is the state till to date. A convincing proof being the
latest Kargil affair!
Role of Artillery

Artillery played a decisive role in breaking many

Indian attacks opposite Lahore and Kasur, however, it
lost its effectiveness when Pakistani armour was
distributed in too wide an area on the 8th
of September. In the case of 1st Armoured Division
offensive its role was severely mauled due to
overemphasis on secrecy.

Ehsan then an artillery CO thus noted “In peace we

had not even seen the maps of this area.Nobody had
ever thought that we could be committed in this area
for an ofensive task”.65

Ehsan further noted that such was the confusion that

“another artillery unit in our formation moved by rail.
Understandably, it never got to the required place in
time”.

Artillery was even ignored in award of gallantry

awards.Thus while infantry officers particularly
belonging to Ayub’s Punjab Regiment Group got the
Lion’s share of gallantry awards artillery and armour
were the underdogs in receipt of gallantry awards.

Thus Shaukat Riza caustically albeit realistically

noted “Three of our observers were killed while
bringing fire on the enemy.

One captain stood up in his post to engage enemy

tanks with better effect.He was killed with a bullet in
his right eye. After ceasefire we recommended them
for gallantry awards. None of them got anything.” 66
Organisational failures

One of the most serious failures which laid the

foundation of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division’s failure
was failure to have a higher command organisation to
control and coordinate the operations of the Pakistani
infantry and armoured divisions.

On the Indian side on the other hand the situation

was to a great extent since all Indian divisions in the
corridor were controlled by a corps headquarter. The
responsibility for this failure can be laid squarely on
the shoulders of Ayub and Musa and to some extent
on the then CGS and DMO.

Staff and Planning Failures

Ironically while all the blame for failure was heaped

on the shoulders of GOC 1st Armoured Division and
Commander 5 Armoured Brigade, the underlying and
some more serious failures were ignored.

Starting from the top, the prime culprit in the planning

was the Military Operations Directorate. Planning for
attacks which decides the fate of a war at the
strategic level cannot be relegated to divisional
headquarters.

The Khem Karan Offensive plan was prepared many

years before the war started. Obstacles like Rohi Nala
and the Nikasu Nala were pre-partition obstacles, the
Nikasu Nala being so prominent that it was even
prominently marked on the maps of the Radclife
Award Boundary Commission maps.

The fault lay not in the fact that the 1st Armoured
Division was launched in bad terrain but in the fact
that adequate preparations in planning were not
made to ensure that ground friction was reduced.

Compare this with another similar operation i.e the

Inchon landing. The terrain and amphibious factors at
Inchon were formidable. Macarthur’s own Chief of
Staff Major General Almond described Inchon as the
worst possible place to land!67

The reader may note that the water channel from

where the amphibious force of Macarthur had to
approach could be conveniently mined or simply
blocked by a sunken or disabled vehicle.

Thus, at Inchon terrain did not favour a landing but

the advantage of strategic surprise were far greater
than terrain odds.The important fact which
differentiated Inchon and Khem Karan was that the
planners at Inchon took terrain as well as movement
factors into account, thereby reducing terrain friction
and the time and space required to concentrate while
at Khem Karan the Pakistani planners starting from
the Military Operations Directorate,1 Corps
Headquarter, 1st Armoured Division Headquarter
down till brigade headquarters of the 1st Armoured
Division did not plan meticulously for the move into
bridgehead and for getting out of the gap between
Rohi Nala and Nikasu Nala as soon as they could.

The governing element in this whole situation was

getting out of the Nikasu-Rohi bottleneck so as to
gain complete freedom of manoeuvre where Pakistani
superiority of nine to three in tank regiments could be
fully exploited.

If BRB saved the Pakistani position in this corridor

then the Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala to a great
extent saved the Indian position. Nothing in the
instructions passed to 1st Armoured Division
indicated that the Pakistani GHQ was even aware of
closeness of two obstacles within Pakistani territory
i.e the Rohi Nala and the BRB which could and did
produce traffic jams which severely delayed the
induction of the 1st Armoured Division into the
bridgehead and enabled the Indians to bring their
independent armoured brigade into the battle area
before the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division had
crossed the crucial Rohi-Nikasu Corridor which was a
serious operational bottleneck.

It was not Nasir or Bashir who failed but the whole

staff system inherited from the British. Nasir
and Bashir were just tips of the iceberg!

The British staff college at Cambrai in words of

Montgommery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton was an
institution preoccupied with “hunting and socialising”!
68 A British officer who rose to considerable height in
the British Army in WW Two “ frankly ascribed his
selection for staff duty to having played golf regularly
with a senior commander”!69

It was a failure of command as well as staff system

where even the staff officers on both sides were too
slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and
furlongs rather than miles.

Their orientation was position oriented rather than

mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a
typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African
experience where the Japanese and Germans
frequently appeared in their rear had made them
extra sensitive about their flanks.
These were men who thought in terms of security
rather than speed. Conformity rather than
unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the
slavish colonial orders oriented. British Indian
Army was the cardinal script of their life.

It was this British system in which every senior

commander was more interested in doing the job of
those one step junior to him that led to the lack of
dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level.

They were trained that way and their behaviour as far

as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be
taken in this context.
Analysis of Casualties

Contrary to popular imagination created by the

propaganda that Chawinda was the greatest battle
since WW II it was in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor that the
Indians suffered the maximum casualties.
Thus, while the 1 Indian Corps which fought the Battle
of Chawinda suffered a total of 575 killed casualties,
the Indian 15 Division opposite Lahore alone suffered
some 486 killed casualties.70 Thus if the casualties of
all three Indian divisions and the independent brigade
in 11 Corps area are combined, these far exceed
those suffered by the 1 Corps which fought the Battle
of Chawinda.
Influence of Higher Headquarters on lower
headquarters

In the case of Indian 4 Mountain Division the GOC 4

Mountain Division lost the will to carry on as proved
by Harbaksh’s narrative.

In this case the situation was restored by Harbaksh’s

personal visit and exhortations to carry on. In the final
analysis 4 Mountain Division gradually regained its
spirit and functioned effectively in the defensive role.
Comparative Differences in the two armies

Many ridiculous myths were propagated in Pakistan

about differences in the two armies. Racially by and
large both the armies were of the same stock.

The Pakistan Army bulk of which some 65% to 75%

being Punjabis who were converted to Islam in the
period 1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars who were
of Hindu Rajput origin.

On the other hand the bulk of the Indian Army

was Punjabi or North Indian again with Sikhs who
were converted to Sikhism in the period from 1500-
1800.
The remaining larger portion of the Indian Army was
Dogra (Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu Jat, and
some Madrasis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. Racially by
and large the armies were alike.

Where a unit did not do well had a deeper connection

with poor leadership at battalion, brigade or divisional
level. Units panicked on both sides, artillery fire had
the same effect on both sides and if one side had
better guns it definitely gave it an advantage.

Thus, there was no major differences in both the

armies at soldier to soldier level.

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965

but the majority were victims of the psychosis of
Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed
the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-
1971!

Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan

Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-
provoking incident soon after the war.

Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just

discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry
brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore.

Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic

expectations and myths that were being created as a
result of the official propaganda.

Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused, ‘may

indeed have happened, but they happen only once.
Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot
of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all
those foolish stories. I wonder what they are really
trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can
fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies.
That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all
respects. I admit God’s help is of the utmost
importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own
performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that
the Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his
Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar
military systems and institutions and fights like hell
when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani
soldier put up a comparatively better performance in
this war was that he fought largely on his own home
ground as a defender”.

Siddiqi further noted that “The Pakistani image

makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk.
They had their own mental picture of the war and
regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who
dared to speak of the war more realistically simply
betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’ ...The
merest suggestion of the criticism of the military
performance became a taboo”.71

Sher was not alone in entertaining these views. Major

General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably
commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the
BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority
opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later
portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda.

Tajammul thus stated,

“We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had
mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively
much inferior. Similarly our artillery guns out
ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an
overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1
to 2 but most of their divisions were
comparatively ill-equipped and untrained and they
had to guard a much bigger frontier”. 72

Conclusion

The battles fought in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are fit to

be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of errors. On
a more serious note Pakistan Army lost its last
chance to force a military solution on the Indians.

It failed not because failure was inevitable but

because seeds of failure were sown once soldiering
was mixed with politics, merit was sidelined and men
of limited grey matter were elevated to the highest
ranks. After 1965 the current of history started flowing
against Pakistan and its full results came into light
only in December 1971.

There was logic in Bhutto and his hawk’s position that

Pakistan had the potential to knock India out in a swift
war like the Israelis did in 1956 and 1967.

Unfortunately, Pakistan failed not because of material

reasons but because of qualitative reasons. The
finest steel goes through the hottest fire. This
unfortunately was not the case with the Pakistan
Army of 1965 in terms of higher
leadership.
____________________________
Endnotes and bibliography
1. Gul Hassan the then Pakistani Director Military Operations (DMO)
from 1961 to 1965 stated in his memoirs that all Pakistani planning was
based on the fact that “both sides would refrain from undertaking a
crossing over a major water obstacle at the outset of operations”. See
Page-173-Memoirs of General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University
Press-Karachi-1993. The Indians similarly were equally timid and
Harbaksh Singh the GOC Western Command noted that the Indian
GHQ was also hesitant in attempting to cross a major water obstacle
even within Indian territory which was close to the border. See Page-16
& 17-War Despatches-Lieut Gen Harbaksh Singh-Lancer International-
New Delhi-1991. The reason for this was hesitation in taking any risk
and in being unconventional, the cardinal common trait in both Indian
and Pakistan Army’s higher leadership since the Indians commissioned
in the pre-1947 British Indian Army in any case were not trained to go
beyond company or platoon commander level. The WW II changed
everything and speeded up the process of transfer of power!

2. Page-18-War Despatches-Op Cit.

3. Page-132 & 133- Behind the Scene-An Analysis of India’s Military
Operations-1947-71- Major General Joginder Singh-Lancer
International-New Delhi-1993.
4. Pages-122 & 127-Ibid.
5. Page-15-War Despatches-Op Cit. Harbaksh Singh had visualised
that a major attack in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor with 11 Corps would force
Pakistan to retain a large proportion of her reserves in Lahore Sector
and resultantly minimise the opposition againt the Main Indian Attack in
Ravi-Chenab Corridor opposite Chawinda.
6. Page-134-Joginder Singh-Op Cit- The reader is advised to read
Joginder’s book with a pinch of salt. It was published after publication of
Harbaksh’s War Despatches and was more of a rejoinder than a
detached analysis of the war. Joginder was Harbaksh’s Chief of Staff in
the war and it appears that Harbaksh was tough with Joginder.
Joginder retired in the same rank soon after the war while Harbaksh the
most deserving candidate for Indian Army Chief was not promoted since
he was a Punjabi Sikh. It is hard to believe Joginder’s unsubstantiated
assertion that Harbaksh a staunch Sikh would advocate taking position
behind the Beas abandoning holy places like the Sikh Vatican City i.e
Amritsar.
7. Page-38-An Introduction to Strategy-General Andre Beaufre-Faber
and Faber-London-1965.
8. Page-18-War Despatches-Op Cit.
9. Page-365-The Indian Armoured Corps-History of the Indian
Armoured Corps-1940-71-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-
Vision Books-New Delhi-1991.
10. Page-189-The Pakistan Army-War-1965-Major General Shaukat
Riza-Army Education Press-1984.
11. Page-215-Ibid.
12. Page-189-Ibid.
13. Page-211-Ibid.
14. Pages-213 and 214 -Ibid.
15. Page-215-Ibid.
16. Page-10-” Remembering our Warriors” series-Interview of Major
General Naseerullah Khan Babar (Retired), SJ and Bar conducted by
A.H Amin - Defence Journal-April 2001 Issue-Pathfinder Fountain -
Clifton Karachi-2001. The reader may note that General Babar avoids
self- publicity and propaganda.He agreed to an interview on the
personal request of Mr Ikram Sehgal who had served with him in the
Corps of Aviation in the period 1968-71.
17. Page-215-Ibid.
18. Page-76-Gul Hassan Khan -Op Cit.
19. Page-200-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
20. Page-235-Shaukat Raza-Op Cit.
21. Ibid.
22. Pages 235 & 236-Ibid.
23. Page-135 & 135-Ibid.
24. Page-189-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Pages-192 & 193-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
27. Pages-191 & 192-Ibid.
28. Page-355-History of The Indian Armoured Corps -Op Cit.
29. Page-90-War Despatches-Op Cit and Page-268-The Indian Army
Since Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-
1993.
30. Pages-52, 53 & 54-Story of My Struggle-Major General Tajammul
Hussain Malik-`Jang Publishers-Lahore-1991.
31. Page-356-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
32 . Ibid.
33. Page-92-War Despatches-Op Cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Page-356-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
36. Page-92 -War Despatches-Op Cit.
37. Page-203-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
38. Page-94-War Despatches-Op Cit.
39. Ibid.
40. Page-202-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.Harbaksh claims that Bhatti was
killed on the east bank of BRB (page-96-War Despatches-Op Cit) but
Shaukat states that Bhatti was killed by enemy tanks shooting from
across the BRB Canal (Page-202-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit).
41. Page-362-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
42. Page-99-War Despatches-Op Cit.
43. Page-366-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
44. Pages-218 and 219-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
45. Page-224-Ibid.
46. Pages-221 & 222-Ibid.
47. Page-227-Ibid.
48. Page-100-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
49. Pages-100 & 101-Ibid.
50. We shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised
the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British,
mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because
they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a
peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North
Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab, but mobility oriented since
any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its
equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior
type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured
territory was important, the operational situation was totally different
from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held
since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and
large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This
was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the
School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought
that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the
British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing
numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H
Liddell Hart.
51. Page-109-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
52. Page-245-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
53. Page-220- The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941- J.A.I Agar Hamilton and
L.F.C Turner-0xford University Press-Cape Town-1957
54. Page-33- Plain as well as Subtle aspects of Military Decision-
Making- A.H Amin-Citadel Magazine-Issue-1/94-Command and Staff
College Quetta-1994-Term coined and defined by this scribe.
55. Page-278 & 279-Maj K.C Praval-Op Cit.
56. Page-371-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
57. Page-174-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited by Anatol Rapoport-
Pelican Books-London-1974.
58. Page-276-Ibid.
59. Page-35-Plain as well as Subtle Aspects of Military Decision
Making-Op Cit.
60. Page-161-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
61. Page-23-My Version-Indo Pakistan War 1965-General Musa-Wajid
Alis-Lahore-1983.
62. Page-237-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
63. Ibid.
64. Page-24-Observations of an Artillery Commander-Major General
Ihsan ul Haq Malik (Retired)-Defence Journal-Volume One-Number -8-
1975-Karachi.
65. Page-22-Ibid.
66. Page-20-Article-Back to Square One-Major General Shaukat Riza-
Defence Journal-Volume One-Number -8-1975-Karachi.
67. Page-24-Hell or High Water-MacArthurs landing at Inchon-Walt
Sheldon-Macmillan and Company-Newyork-1968 and Pages 19 to 23
and Pages-186 & 187-Victory at High Tide-The Inchon Seoul
Campaign-Robert.D.Heinl Junior-J.B Lippincott Co-Philadelphia-1968.
68. Page-151-Monty-The Making of a General-1887-1942-London-
Hamilton Books-1981.
69. Footnote-25-Page-87-Op Cit-Sidi Rezeg Battles-Op Cit.
70. Page-404,405 & 409-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit .
71. Pages-108 & 109-The Military in Pakistan-Myth and Reality-Brig
A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.
72. Footnote on page-78-General Tajammul-Op Cit.