A Maritime Strategy Without a Navy – A Review of the Government’s

Strategic Thought and Practice Since 1998

Gary Blackburn, MA student at the University of Hull, January 2007

An examination of military strategy since the end of the Cold War, particularly

following the Strategic Defence Review of 1998, reveals that there has been a

substantial shift in British defence policy from a continental to a maritime

approach. However, whilst strategy and doctrine have been moving increasingly

in the maritime direction, actual force configurations do not, yet, match the

strategic plan. In short, there is a gap between stated intentions and actual

capabilities and as such the Government, despite its own policy position, is a

long way from fully implementing a maritime strategy. In understanding why this

has happened it will first be necessary to briefly define what is meant by a

maritime strategy. This paper will then consider the change in strategic emphasis

that has occurred since the end of the Cold War and assess the extent to which

this has been achieved in terms of policy formulation, force configuration, actual

operations and resource allocation. This paper will also consider the

consequences if the Government fails to implement its own strategy.

Eric Grove has emphasised that it is the joint operations between naval, land and

air power which characterises a maritime strategy as distinct from a naval

strategy, which is more narrowly concerned with the use of purely naval forces.1

His view echoes that of Julian Corbett who stated that the strategic effectiveness

1 Eric J. Grove, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: University of
Hull Press, 1998), p. 26-31

1
of naval forces is largely determined by their ability to influence decisive land

campaigns:

‘Since men live on the land and are not upon the sea, great issues

between nations at war have always been divided. . .either by what your

army can do against the enemy’s territory or else by the fear of what the

fleet makes it possible for your army to do.’2

Thus, maritime strategy is largely concerned with the projection of power across

the seas and it is most effective when naval forces are used to enable and assist

land and air forces, as Grove says, ‘. . .it cannot be stressed too much that

maritime is joint in nature.’3

Peter Hore has rightly highlighted the inherent mobility of naval forces which

allows a country employing a maritime strategy to project power across the

globe. The seas are completely joined up and international law allows for the

transit of all ships in the vast majority of the world’s oceans and seas. As such,

this gives a maritime power huge reach:

‘Mobility is the quality which more than anything characterises a

maritime strategy. Maritime forces can be deployed anywhere across

2 Julian S. Corbett (1911), Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Classics of Sea Power ed.
(Eric.J Grove, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press ) p. 16. Quoted from Peter Hore, Dimensions of
Sea Power, (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1998), p. 14
3 Eric J. Grove, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: University of
Hull Press, 1998), p. 26

2
 the world, through contiguous seas and adjacent to 80% of the world’s

nations. . . Maritime forces can be deployed from Portsmouth to the

coast off Pyongyang without crossing an international border.’4

As well as mobility, Hore also points out the versatility of maritime forces. They

can provide poise (gunboat diplomacy) and leverage over the political and

military forces of an opponent.

However, in order to exploit the benefits of a maritime strategy, a country must

first achieve command of the sea, or what is now known as sea control. The

British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) defines this as:

‘The condition in which one has the freedom of action to use the sea

for one’s own purposes in specified areas for specified periods of time.’5

From the expeditionary perspective, it would therefore be necessary to have sea

control in order to be able to project power ashore, and hence fulfill a maritime

strategy. Since the 1990’s much maritime doctrine has been concerned with

littoral warfare, that is to say close to the enemy‘s shore. During the Cold War,

the NATO navies’ role would have been to attack the Soviet Navy in blue, or

deep, water environments. But with the demise of the Soviet Navy the ‘blue

water’ threat was removed allowing western navies to concentrate on power

4 Peter Hore, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: University of Hull
Press, 1998)p. 18
5 British Maritime Doctrine (1806), Quoted from Eric Grove, Dimensions of Sea Power, (Hull:
University of Hull Press, 1998), p. 27

3
projection from the littoral.6

Maritime strategy, therefore, allows a state to project its power in any part of the

world which is accessible by the sea. It is more flexible than a land-based

strategy. It was argued by strategists such as Basil Liddell-Heart that the natural

strategy for Britain to pursue was a maritime one.7 However, from 1914 until

1989 (with a significant interlude in the 1920s and ’30s) Britain was committed to

defending the balance of power in Europe by committing varying levels of her

land and air power to the continent. British policy makers felt compelled to focus

much of their efforts on securing the home base and continental Europe from the

power of an aggressive totalitarian hegemon. Britain of course had many

interests and commitments outside of Europe during this period, but economic

constraints had compelled the Wilson Government in 1968 to declare an end to

the projection of British power east of Suez8. Prior to 1968 a limited maritime

posture had played second fiddle to the continental strategy; thereafter the

defence policy was even more weighted to the continental policy.

In 1989, however, the Cold War came to an end and with it the rationale which

had underpinned Britain‘s continental strategy. The political, economic and

military collapse of Soviet power was confirmed by the revolutions across eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union itself was dissolved in 1991. At a stroke almost fifty

6 Lieutenant Commander Jeremy Stocker, RNR., ‘Nonintervention: Limited Operations in the

Littoral Environment’, UNNWC Review, Autumn, 1999, p. 1
7 Peter Hore, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: The University of
Hull Press, 1998), p. 13
8 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, London: Penguin Group, 2004), p.
326

4
years of superpower confrontation had ended. Strategically, this changed the

picture dramatically for Britain.

However, the continental approach was deeply ingrained in British policy circles

and steps towards a change in direction were slow to come about. Though two

Defence White Papers were produced during the early 1990’s - Options for

Change9 and Front Line First10, both were primarily concerned with securing the

‘peace dividend’ which the end of the Cold War offered. It was not until the

publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 that the current

Labour Government made a serious attempt to change defence strategy.

There is no doubt that the SDR represented a break with the past and was the

beginning of move back towards a maritime strategy. In his foreword to the

review, the then Defence Secretary, George Robertson, was explicit in his view

that the strategic position had changed and that policy would reflect this:

‘The Review is radical, reflecting a changing world, in which the

confrontation of the Cold War has been replaced by a complex mixture

of uncertainty and instability.’11

The emphasis from now on would be on an expeditionary or maritime capability

9 Peter Hore, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: The University of
Hull Press, 1998), p. 20
10 M. Rifkind, Parliamentary debate discussing Options for Change,Hansard Report, London,
14th July 1994. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199394/cmhansrd/1994-07-
14/Debate-1.html (accessed 20th December 2006).
11Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationery Office, 1998), p. 1

5
which would allow Britain to project power further from the home base: ‘In the

post-Cold War world, we must now be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than the

crisis come to us.’ The centrality of the Royal Navy was key to Robertson’s

plans, he continued by saying ‘. . .so we plan to buy two new larger aircraft

carriers to project more power flexibly around the world. . .new transport aircraft

and ships will move our people and equipment rapidly to trouble-spots.’12

The collapse of the Russian armed forces removed an existential threat to

Britain’s survival for the first time since the 1930’s. Peter Hore correctly noted in

1998 that:

‘With the end of the Cold War and the absence of a threat at the grand

strategic level there is a much reduced need for the forward deployment

of forces [in Germany]. . .future forces will be expeditionary,’13

The SDR represented an essential repositioning of British strategy and must be

seen as the policy highpoint of the period. The clarity of its vision is almost

beyond dispute. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue with the small naval cuts

contained within the document as they appear to have been driven by strategic

logic rather than pressure from the Treasury. Labour also seems to have been

far quicker at appreciating the new imperatives of Foreign Policy which

underpinned the Review than the previous Conservative Government had been.

Robertson’s thinking was clearly influenced by the need for expeditionary forces
12 ibid. p. 2
13 Peter Hore, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: The University
of Hull Press, 1998), p. 20

6
in the first Gulf War of 1991 and those peacekeeping units used in the former

Yugoslavia. It is evident from the Review that Robertson felt that addressing

such crises were in the national interest:

‘Instability in Europe. . . threatens our security. Instability elsewhere. .

.may not always threaten us directly. But it can do indirectly, and we

cannot stand aside when it leads to massive human suffering.’14

This was in marked contrast to the arch-realist view taken under the

Conservatives with its extraordinarily narrow view of what constituted the British

national interest.15 By 1998 it was clear that this extended beyond the defence of

the north German Plain and the north Atlantic.

Events in Iraq (1998), Kosovo and Sierra Leone confirmed the view that

expeditionary forces would be required to operate far from the home base, and

so confirmed the logic of the SDR. Crises such as these were particularly

instructive in confirming that Britain would act unilaterally if necessary (Sierra

Leone) and would sometimes be at odds with its American ally (Kosovo).16 This

is an important point because the ability to take a slightly different position from

the US, or to act independently if necessary, was based upon the flexibility

afforded by the developing expeditionary capability. Unfortunately, by 2003, as

14 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationery Office, 1998), p.
5
15 Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism - The Left-wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy,
(London: The Social Affairs Unit), p. 109
16 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Britain at War From the Falklands to Iraq‘, RUSI Journal, February
2006, Vol. 151, No.1, p. 13

7
we shall see, this capability had been undermined.

In terms of the conflicts Britain has fought since the SDR was written, there has

certainly been a pronounced move to an expeditionary strategy. In 2000 Britain

unilaterally intervened in support of the beleaguered UN mission in Sierra Leone.

The aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious and the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean formed

the key part of the task force which defeated rebels in the country during

Operation Pallister. As well as other naval assets, the task force was supported

by other expeditionary forces such as the Royal Marines, the Parachute

Regiment and Special Forces.17 The Sierra Leone campaign was seen as an

exemplar of the way in which operations would be conducted under the new

strategy:

‘Sierra Leone was considered to be ‘a major validation and

demonstration of MCJO [Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations]’. It

was also considered to be a ‘key pillar achievement’ of the Naval

Strategic Plan. . .’18

Operation Telic, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was also enabled by maritime assets.

The First Sea Lord, Sir Jonathon Band, has estimated that the Royal Navy

accounted for 95% of the operation’s strategic lift as well as leading the assault in

the British zone of activity.19

17 Eric J. Grove, The Royal Navy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 262
18 ibid. p. 262
19 First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, UK Maritime Power in a Global Context,
University of Edinburgh, 23rd February 2006. http://www.royal-

8
Thus, most of Britain’s military activity since SDR has been expeditionary in

nature. This confirms that both in terms of theory and actual practice there has

been a strong drift towards an expeditionary or maritime policy. However, whilst

this has certainly been the correct policy, in some respects it has not gone far

enough and too much general capability has been sacrificed in the name of

specialisation. The cuts are now so deep that Britain’s forces lack balance and

indeed may not be capable of sustaining an independent maritime strategy, and

so by extension, an independent foreign policy. Though the Government remains

committed to key aspects of a maritime strategy, and has delivered some of the

necessary components of that, in other areas it has failed to support it.

In December 2003, following the war in Iraq, the Ministry of Defence produced

another White Paper entitled Delivering Security in a Changing World. This was

followed up in July 2004 with Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future

Capabilities, which expanded upon what the effects of the White Paper would be

on the armed forces. Both documents are contradictory and both represent a

limitation on the extent to which defence policy is moving towards a maritime

strategy. At one point its author Geoff Hoon declares: ‘We will increase our

capacity to undertake expeditionary operations. . .’20 but in another area

confirmed that the SSN fleet will be cut to eight vessels, that the destroyer/frigate

fleet would be reduced from 32 to 25 (a 22% cut), and that the minesweeper fleet

navy.mod.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.5019 (accessed 20th December 2006).

20 Ministry of Defence (2004), Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future Capabilities,
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/147C7A19-8554-4DAE-9F88-
6FBAD2D973F9/0/cm6269_future_capabilities.pdf p. 1 (accessed 19th December 2006).

9
would be cut to 16. Additionally the army’s infantry battalions would be reduced

from 40 to 36.21

As stated earlier, naval forces are inherently mobile and flexible and hence

ideally suited to expeditionary warfare. The cuts represent a real diminution of

the Navy’s ability to deliver a maritime strategy. The documents state that this is

not the case and puts a strong emphasis on Networked Enabled Capability22,

which is meant to enhance communications between individual units, the three

services and with allies to deliver greater strategic effects from existing forces.

However, there is clearly a point where numbers cannot be degraded at the

expense of superior communication. After all, there is not much point having the

best communication tools if there are no forces left to communicate with each

other. Of course, an expeditionary strategy based upon achieving strategic

effects in the littoral environment would always require making choices in a world

of finite resources. However, the composition of a Navy is such that without the

right balance of forces the whole strategy is jeopardised. The function of

minesweepers, destroyers, frigates and submarines is to help achieve sea

control so that expeditionary assets can be brought to bear.23 Geoffrey Till

argues that whilst future naval operations will focus on the littoral securing sea

control will still be vital:

‘The capacity to participate in expeditionary operations is at the

21 ibid. p. 7-8
22 ibid. p. 5-6
23 Eric J. Grove, Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: University of
Hull Press, 1998), p. 29-30

10
 moment key to being a security provider, it should not be assumed that

this will forever necessarily be the main focus. . .nor should it be

assumed that this focus in any sense reduces the need for sea control,

or the abiding qualities that are required to gain and maintain it.’24

Lieutenant Commander Jeremy Stocker also emphasised the need to gain

control of the littoral before power can be projected:

‘Establishment of local sea control entails the neutralisation of enemy sea

denial assets, such as submarines, mines, and missile-armed attack

craft.’25

The White Paper and its supporting document contained within them one

particularly risky policy development. An admission that at the high end of war

fighting capability the UK would not field the full spectrum of military capability

and would therefore be dependent upon the United States of America:

‘The full spectrum of capabilities is not required for large scale

operations, as for the most demanding operations could only be

conceivably undertaken alongside the United States.’26

24 Geoffrey Till, Sea power - A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, 2004), p.
375-6
25 Lieutenant Commander Jeremy Stocker, ‘Nonintervention: Limited Operations in the Maritime
Environment‘, UNNWC Review, Autumn 1999, p. 8
26 The Ministry of Defence (2004), Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future Capabilities,
MOD website, p. 1

11
Herein lies the limit to which Britain’s policy has been changed from a continental

to a maritime policy. More worryingly, such thinking represents a closing down of

Britain’s foreign policy options and ignores the lessons of both recent and more

distant history. The Falklands War of 1982 was fought unilaterally without the

USA as an active participant. Indeed, Britain fought the war in spite of American

attempts to broker a disadvantageous peace.27 In 1999 during Operation Allied

Force, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton had a profound disagreement over the use of

ground troops28. In both cases a full spectrum of capability, however limited,

gave Britain foreign policy options which allowed action to be taken or

considered, which was not necessarily in line with the USA‘s thinking. The

Falklands War could not have been won without the Sea Harrier’s air defence

capability and yet in 2006 the Sea Harriers were withdrawn removing the main air

defence capability of the fleet - a significant reduction of full spectrum capability.

Of course, until the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, the USA had

been isolationist, and an isolationist strain is till detectable in US politics. So-

called paleoconservatives, such as Pat Buchanan, are highly critical of American

overseas intervention.29 The early Bush administration was highly unilateralist; it

scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and refused to sign the Kyoto

Agreement. Bearing in mind these facts, it seems a perilous course not to equip

the armed forces with the equipment they need to be able to carry out a maritime

27Lawrence Freedman, ‘Britain at War From the Falklands to Iraq‘, RUSI Journal, February 2006,
Vol. 151, No.1, p. 12
28 John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, (London: Free Press, 2003), p. 56-57
29 David Aaronovitch ( 2006) ’Forget Red, Blue and Yellow Now the Choice is Progressive v
Reactionaries’ Times Online May 22nd.
http://timesonline.typepad.com/david_aaronovitch/2006/05/forget_red_blue.html. (accessed 21st
December 2006).

12
strategy and to ensure Britain’s independence in extremis.

All of this is not to argue that tough choices about what to spend the defence

budget on do not have to be made, but rather the Government can only achieve

its stated objectives by retaining a balanced fleet, with full spectrum capability, if

it wishes to have a full and effective maritime strategy. There are several

compelling strategic and budgetary reasons why the Government should

reconsider the posture outlined in late 2003. First, Britain’s likely enemies have

caught onto the importance of the littoral and have been arming accordingly;

secondly, there remain some Cold War commitments which could be cut in order

to make way for extra investment in naval forces and finally, we need to consider

whether as a nation we are providing the necessary resources for defence.

It seems reasonable to suppose that future threats to Britain will come from

states such as North Korea, Iran and possibly China. The key question here is to

what extent these countries could threaten an expeditionary force which Britain

might mount unilaterally, or more likely, as part of a coalition. If we take diesel

powered submarines (SSK’s) as an example of sea denial assets, the evidence

is sobering. The Military Balance 2006 shows that North Korea has 65+

submarines capable of operating in the littoral and China has 53 (excluding

SSN’s).30 Iran has only three SSKs but over 250 fast patrol craft. Iran has also

recently developed an underwater weapon capable of traveling over 200 miles

30 The International Institute for Strategic Studies ed. Colonel Christopher Langton, The Military
Balance 2006, (Abingdon: Taylor Routledge, 2006), p. 266 and p. 278-9

13
per hour.31

So, in the littoral environment where Britain’s forces are likely to be deployed the

sea denial threat is growing. It makes no strategic sense therefore to reduce

anti-submarine assets and minesweepers. Additionally, the afore mentioned

countries have numerically large air forces, which again suggests that recent cuts

to the Navy’s air defence capability is short-sighted. In a recent magazine article

Commander Sharkey Ward expressed his concern as follows:

‘Without [organic air superiority] no Offensive Expeditionary Force can

be taken seriously and, indeed, without organic air superiority such a

force should not even set sail towards an action zone.’32

The potential military threat to an emasculated Navy is of course exacerbated by

bureaucratic, political and resource constraints. One such issue is the cost of

systems and bases which are legacies of the continental strategy. The biggest

example of which is British Forces Germany. In 2004 the BBC reported that

25,000 British troops remained in Germany, contributing 1.5 billion euros to the

German economy.33 One of the arguments put forward for the retention of the

BFG is that there are no suitable bases for British armoured training in the UK. It

is strange that such an expensive luxury should be maintained at a time when

31 BBC News (2006), ‘Iran Tests Super-Fast Torpedo’, 3rd April.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4871078.stm (accessed 21st December 2006).
32 Commander Sharkey Ward, ‘The Post Sea Harrier Gamble’. Warships International Fleet
Review, July 2006. P. 47
33 Chris Summers (2004), ‘From Occupiers and Protectors to Guests’, Germany, 20th July.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3842031.stm (accessed 21st December 2006).

14
the Navy is being required to cut its escort fleet by 22%. If Britain is serious

about its maritime strategy it must consider axing this legacy of the Cold War.

Another legacy is the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. The Government has

committed itself to 232 of these at a unit cost of £65 million although the last 88

have yet to be ordered.34 Undoubtedly the money would be better spent by

‘marinising’ these so that they could be operated from the proposed new

Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. By operating from the decks of the new carriers

they are more likely to provide value for money to the taxpayer than being used

to defend against a non-existent threat to British airspace. However, the BBC

has also recently reported that the purchase of 138 F-35 Lightning 2s is likely to

proceed, and so a ’marinised’ Typhoon option is unlikely to be exercised.35

These examples illustrate that the transition to a maritime strategy has not been

without problems and that strategic logic has often had to play second fiddle to

political and military inertia. The result is that the Royal Navy, the key enabler of

a maritime strategy, lacks the equipment and personnel it needs.

If the money for a fully functioning maritime strategy cannot be found from a

more prudent expenditure of the defence budget, then perhaps greater resources

should be found for military expenditure. In October 2006 The Guardian reported

that in terms of GDP share the budget was the lowest it had been since the

1930’s at 2.1%.36 The most up to date data from SIPRI reveals that, when based

34 Richard Norton-Taylor (2006), ‘MoD projects overspent by £3billion and a total of 36 years
late.’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,1955881,00.html (accessed 21st December 2006).
35 BBC News (2006), ‘Joint Strike Fighter deal agreed’, 12th December
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6173143.stm (accessed 21st December)
36 Mark Oliver (2006), ‘British Military Bites the Bullet’, October 11th.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1899128,00.html (accessed 21st December 2006).

15
on 2003 prices, British military spending is hardly different today than it was at

the end of the Cold War. In 1989 Britain spent $52.6 billion on defence and $51

billion in 2004 (in 2003 prices).37 However, the proportion of GDP spent had

dropped from 4% to 2.8% in those years, a reduction of 30%.

It does not seem unreasonable that the Government should allocate more of its

budget to defence as it seems to be prepared to use its forces on a regular basis.

The former Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Guthrie, said in a recent interview

that the armed forces need more resources if they are to meet the Government’s

policy objectives:

‘A lot has changed and we actually do need more soldiers to actually

do the tasks - and new equipment.’38

In some respects there has been a shift to a maritime strategy. The SDR

remains the centerpiece of the Government’s strategy; they have invested in a

significant increase in amphibious capability; they are building new classes of

destroyers and attack submarines and there is a commitment to build two new

aircraft carriers. In terms of strategic lift and amphibious shipping the picture

looks very rosy. But other components of the Navy have been cut which must

call into question the extent to which the Government has moved towards a

maritime strategy.

37 The SIRI Military Expenditure Database (2006)

http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html
38 Ned Temko and Mark Townsend (2006),’Afghanistan War is ’Cuckoo’ Says Blair’s Favourite
General’, October 29th. http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1934413,00.html
(accessed 21st December 2006).

16
Additionally, it needs to be borne in mind that whilst the primary role of the Navy

is to support an expeditionary strategy, the Navy is still expected to contribute to

a wide variety of missions and these require numbers. In December 2006 the

Royal Navy’s website reported that ships are deployed in the Atlantic, the

Caribbean, the South Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Such

commitments are essentially on-going, standard commitments, completely

separate from the forces required to support any future crisis.39 The Navy is also

expected to play its role in protecting fisheries, protecting the world’s sea lanes of

communication (SLOC’s), protecting the UK’s North Sea energy installations and

sending ships to undertake defence diplomacy. In short, the Navy needs

numbers to achieve its many tasks. When pressed on this in an interview the

former First Sea Lord, Sir Alan West, warned against reducing numbers further:

‘. . .we do have to be careful to make sure that we do not reduce the Navy

to a level that makes recovery very difficult. Whenever the UK has got to

the stage where it is spending too little on defence the nation has suffered

due to some unforeseen event not long afterwards.’40

In summary the stated strategy of the Government has moved strongly towards a

maritime strategy. This policy however has not been matched by the necessary

deeds to make the strategy a reality. The reduction of units such as

39 Royal Navy website ‘Global Operations.’ (2006)

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.5838 (accessed 21st December 2006).
40 The First Sea Lord, Sir Alan West (an interview) ‘A Life on the Cutting Edge’. Warships
International Fleet Review, February 2006. P. 21

17
minesweepers and frigates is at odds with the ability to project power

independently. Alarming media reports in December 200641 and January 2007

have suggested that the two new carriers may not be built and that half of the

Navy’s main units may be mothballed. If either of these were to happen then the

move towards a maritime strategy would be dead and buried. A maritime

strategy requires a Navy and a Navy requires ships. Without an independent

maritime strategy Britain’s foreign policy options will also be severely curtailed,

leaving the country largely dependent upon the goodwill of the USA, or perhaps

even France.

In November 2006 the Government published The Future of the United

Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, in which Tony Blair persuasively argues for a

replacement system on the grounds that the threats are unpredictable and

because it takes time to develop technology.42

Such wisdom must be extended to Britain’s nascent maritime strategy, otherwise

Britain’s role as a great power will probably be at an end, with or without the

nuclear deterrent.

41 The Daily Telegraph (2006), ‘From Royal Navy to coastal defence force’
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=U34W5VBWKJDQLQFIQMFCFGGAVC
BQYIV0?xml=/opinion/2007/01/05/dl0501.xml&posted=true&_requestid=77689, (accessed 5th
January 2007)
42 Ministry of Defence (2006), ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Strategic Deterrent.’
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (accessed 21st December 2006).

18
Bibliography:

David Aaronovitch ( 2006) ’Forget Red, Blue and Yellow Now the Choice is Progressive
v Reactionaries’ Times Online May 22nd.
http://timesonline.typepad.com/david_aaronovitch/2006/05/forget_red_blue.html.

First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, UK Maritime Power in a Global Context,
University of Edinburgh, 23rd February 2006. http://www.royal-
navy.mod.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.5019

BBC News (2006), ‘Joint Strike Fighter deal agreed’, 12th December
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6173143.stm (accessed 21st December)

Lawrence Freedman, ‘Britain at War From the Falklands to Iraq‘, RUSI Journal, February
2006, Vol. 151, No.1

Eric J. Grove, The Royal Navy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),

Eric J. Grove, ’Principles of Maritime Strategy’ in Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric
Grove and Peter Hore), (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1998), p. 26-31

Peter Hore, ‘The Strategy of Choice’ in Dimensions of Sea Power (ed. Eric Grove and
Peter Hore), (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1998)

Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism - The Left-wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign

Policy, (London: The Social Affairs Unit),

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Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, London: Penguin Group,
2004)

Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationery Office,
1998),

19
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6FBAD2D973F9/0/cm6269_future_capabilities.pdf

Ministry of Defence (2006), ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Strategic Deterrent.’
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf

Richard Norton-Taylor (2006), ‘MoD projects overspent by £3billion and a total of 36

years late.’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,1955881,00.html

Mark Oliver (2006), ‘British Military Bites the Bullet’, October 11th.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1899128,00.html

M. Rifkind, Parliamentary debate discussing Options for Change,Hansard Report,

London, 14th July 1994

Royal Navy website ‘Global Operations.’ (2006)

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.5838

The SIRI Military Expenditure Database (2006)

http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html (accessed 21st December
2006).

Lieutenant Commander Jeremy Stocker, RNR., ‘Nonintervention: Limited Operations in

the Littoral Environment’, UNNWC Review, Autumn, 1999

Chris Summers (2004), ‘From Occupiers and Protectors to Guests’, Germany, 20th July.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3842031.stm

Ned Temko and Mark Townsend (2006), ’Afghanistan War is ’Cuckoo’ Says Blair’s
Favourite General’, October 29th.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1934413,00.html

The Daily Telegraph (2006), ‘From Royal Navy to coastal defence force’
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=U34W5VBWKJDQLQFIQMFC
FGGAVCBQYIV0?xml=/opinion/2007/01/05/dl0501.xml&posted=true&_requestid=77689
,

Geoffrey Till, Sea power - A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, (London: Frank Cass,
2004)

The First Sea Lord, Sir Alan West (an interview) ‘A Life on the Cutting Edge’. Warships
International Fleet Review, February 2006. P. 21

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