Galinato, Noel Francis T.

UP Law | 3-G

D. Local Legislation
Secs. 48-59, LGC
Sec. 9, Art. X, CONST.

Casino v. CA - an ordinance/resolution requiring a higher threshold for its valid and must be
complied with before any valid subsequent thereto can be made
● Resolution No. 49 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City declared the area
where the Coliseum, a licensed cockpit under the Revised Admin. Code, a residential
zone. Due to this declaration, the cockpit’s license was canceled.
● A provision in Reso. No. 49 also provided that i t can only be amended by a ¾ vote of
the Sanggunian. However, sometime in 1985, the Sanggunian passed Reso. No. 378.
● Reso No. 378 in effect amended Reso No. 49 by only a simple majority. Reso No. 378
reclassified the area of the cockpit as a recreational zone. By virtue of this Reso, the
Mayor reinstated the license of the cockpit.
● Petitioner challenges the re-issued licenses of the cockpit, alleging that it is null and void
because Reso No. 378 invalidly amended Reso No. 49.
● ISSUE: Whether Reso No. 378 invalidly amended Reso No. 49. – YES, the amendment
is invalid.
● RULING: Any amendment to Reso No. 49 must comply with the ¾ vote requirement.
○ It is legally permissible, as exceptions to the general provisions on measures
covered by city charters and the Local Government Code, that the vote
requirement in certain ordinances may be specifically provided for, as in the case
of Sec. 6.44 of Reso No. 49, instead of the usual majority vote.
○ The LGC and the City Charter are only laws of general application and embrace
a wider scope or subject matter. Reso No. 49 must be given effect because it is
more specific and enacted by municipal authorities.
○ Municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be
prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a
particular statute and, therefore, to pass the appropriate ordinance and attain the
main object of the law.

Gamboa v. Aguirre - a Vice Governor serving as Acting Governor cannot preside over
sessions of the Sanggunian
● Rafael Coscolluela, along with Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. as petitioner and Marcelo Aguirre,
Jr. and Juan Y. Araneta as respondents, were elected as Governor, Vice-Governor, and
SP members respectively in Negros Occidental. In August 1995, the Governor
designated Gamboa as Acting Governor during his official trip abroad. During a regular
session of the SP, respondents questioned Gamboa's authority to preside as Acting
Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. In another session, seven members of the
SP voted to allow Gamboa to continue presiding while four others voted against with one
abstention. Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition before the
 lower court, which declared Gamboa temporarily incapacitated to preside over SP
sessions during his period as Acting Governor.
● ISSUE: W/N an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, may
continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) – NO.
● RULING: The Local Government Code states that the Vice-Governor is the presiding
officer of the SP, and he assumes the position of the Governor in case of a permanent
vacancy. If the vacancy is temporary, the Vice-Governor will automatically assume the
duties of the Governor but will not become the Governor. He is considered a quasi-
Governor and is not a member of the SP for the time being. The Governor no longer
presides over the SP to provide a system of check and balance. The Vice-Governor's
appointment as Acting Governor creates a temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-
Governor, and the Vice-Governor cannot exercise the duties of both offices
simultaneously. The temporary vacancy calls for the election of a temporary presiding
officer.

1. Local Initiative and Referendum

Secs. 120-127, LGC.
Compare with R.A. 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act)

Garcia v. COMELEC (237 SCRA 297, 1994) - a resolution may be the subject of a local
initiative
● The SB of Morong, Bataan passed a Resolution, Pambayang Kapsyahan Blg. 10 S.
1993, which agreed to the municipality’s inclusion in the Subic Special Economic Zone.
● However, there was opposition to this Resolution. Petitioners filed a petition before the
SB opposing the Resolution. The SB, however, never acted on it.
● As a result, the petitioners resorted to the power of initiative under the Local
Government.
● After having been convinced by the Municipality’s mayor, the COMELEC denied the
petitioner’s petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because what it sought to
amend or reject was a Resolution and not an Ordinance.
● According to the COMELEC, the LGC of 1991 provides that a resolution cannot be the
subject of a local initiative.
● ISSUE: Whether a Resolution may be the subject of a local initiative. – YES.
● RULING: COMELEC’s narrow and literal interpretation subverts the Constitution and
spirit of the LGC. Our Constitutional history shows that the people’s power of initiative
and referendum was a check against excesses of the legislature.
● Sec. 32 Art. VI of the Constitution provides that “any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress, or local legislative body” may be the subject of an initiative or referendum.
● Furthermore, the LGC never limited the scope of local initiative to ordinances alone.
Therefore, a resolution may be the proper subject of an ordinance.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 1996 – an initiative is to propose the

enactment of a law; a referendum is to approve or reject a law that was enacted.
 ● Similar facts above. The Court in this case, however, discusses the differences between
initiative and referendum because COMELEC issued Reso No. 2845 and 2848
scheduling a local REFERENDUM and not a local INITIATIVE. What was intended by
Garcia, however, was a local INITIATIVE that proposes an amendment of a national law
R.A. No. 7227.
● ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC was guilty of GAD in issuing Reso No. 2848.– YES.
● COMELEC should reevaluate its resolution because a referendum is different from an
initiative.
● Statutory and conceptual differences between a referendum and initiative.
○ Under the Initiative and Referendum Act:
■ Initiative - power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election for
the purpose.
● Three systems: (1) proposing to amend the Constitution; (2)
proposing to enact Statutes; (3) proposing to enact local
legislation– Resolution or Ordinance.
■ Indirect initiative - people send a proposal to Congress or the local
legislative body for action
■ Referendum - power to approve or reject a legislation through an election.
● Two classes: (1) Referendum on statutes; (2) Referendum on
local law
○ J. Cruz: Initiative - power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly; Referendum -
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has
been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action
on the part of electors become a law.
○ These are also echoed in the LGC (Sec. 120, and 126)
● With these differences, the process of voting in an initiative is different from the process
of voting in a referendum. Voting for an initiative is not merely a YES or NO because
COMELEC must see to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper
form and language so it may be easily understood and voted by the electorate.
○ No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate
BUT
○ Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

2. Acts of Sanggunian

2.1. Ordinance and Resolution

Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy, 2009

● Due to the petitioners’ failure to submit conversion papers showing that the land where
their radio station was located had been converted from agricultural to commercial, the
City Zoning Administrator-Designate refused to issue a zoning clearance to petitioner.
 ● This led to the denial of the petitioner's renewal of mayor’s permit by the City
Administrator of Cauayan.
● The deadline for renewal had lapsed and their radio station was closed.
● ISSUE: W/N the property of CBS Development Corporation (CDC) had been duly
converted or classified for commercial use despite the lack of approved conversion
papers from DAR showing that the property was converted to commercial land. - YES.
● RULING: The LGC authorizes local legislative bodies to enact ordinances authorizing
the issuance of permits or licenses upon such conditions and for such purposes
intended to promote the general welfare of the LGU inhabitants.
● Essentially, a municipal license is a governmental restriction on private rights and is only
valid if based on the police power or taxing power of the municipality.
● Furthermore, the exercise of these powers must be consistent with thh Constitution and
the law. The Court found that there is nothing in the law that exempts media entities from
being required to obtain permit or licenses from LGUs. While there may be concerns, the
Court noted that these permit requirements are valid as long as they have been duly
ordained through local legislation and content-neutral in character– applicable to all
those similarly situated businesses.
● Still, there are safeguards within the LGC against any arbitrary exercise of the authority
to issue licenses and permits. The power of the mayor to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same must be exercised pursuant to law or ordinance.
● There is no reason to doubt that when the HLURB acknowledged in 1996 that the
property in question was commercial, it had consulted the development plans and
zoning ordinances of Cauayan. Assuming that the property was belatedly revealed as
non-commercial, it could only mean that even the HLURB, and not just the local
government of Cauayan, erred when it classified the property as commercial in 1996.

3. Formalities

a. Vote

Ortiz v. Posadas - a majority vote of the quorum is required to pass ordinances

● The municipal council of Tabaco Albay has 16 members. While voting for Ordinance No.
25, concerning cockpits, 7 voted in favor of it while 6 voted against it.
● 3 members of the council were, however, absent.
● W/N the ordinance is valid. NO.
● An ordinance passed by less than majority is invalid.
○ Sec. 2224 of the Admi Code requires the affirmative vote of a majority vote of all
the members of the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, whether
or not an ordinance creating indebtedness.

b. Essential requisites

City of Manila v. Laguio, supra

c. Judicial Intervention
Sec. 4, Rule 64, ROC

V. Perez v. De la Cruz, 1969

● Petitioner Perez, the vice mayor of Naga, expressed her intention to vote twice in a
private conference held with seven city councilors to create a tie and thereafter exercise
her power as the presiding officer to break the tie for the selection of the secretary of the
municipal board of the city and the chairmen of the various standing committees of the
said board.
● Four councilors filed a petition for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent Perez from casting her vote except in a case of tie vote.
● The respondents argued that the Vice Mayor of Naga is only a presiding officer and not
a member of the board, and therefore cannot vote except when there is a tie, and that
the Vice Mayor had threatened to participate in the election other than to break the tie.
● RTC ordered Perez to show cause for the writ but denied her time to file a motion to
dismiss. The judge granted the injunction restraining Perez from casting her vote except
in a tie, and from voting and participating in any legislative proposal of the Municipal
Board except in cases where members are equally divided. When Perez moved to
dismiss the injunction, the RTC denied the motion.
● The CA issued a restraining order to stop the enforcement of the writ of prohibitory
injunction by the RTC. Perez and the Liberal councilors passed an amendment to their
Rules of Procedure granting the chairman the right to vote as a member and vote again
in case of a tie. The CA later denied Perez's petition for certiorari and dissolved the
restraining order because it lacked jurisdiction over the issues in the case. Hence, the
petition.
● The petitioner argues that as a legislative official performing legislative functions, she is
not subject to any prohibitory process by the courts.
● ISSUE: W/N THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
YES.
● The courts have the authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings, and the
objective of the proceeding for prohibition is to prevent the petitioner from participating in
certain legislative matters. The petitioner acted without jurisdiction when she insisted on
voting twice, and a writ of prohibition can validly prevent and restrain her. The claim that
the acts intended to be restrained are mere "probable actuations" is not valid, as
prohibition is a preventive remedy and not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. The record shows that the petitioner voted twice for the approval of the
alleged amendment to the rules of procedure.

Homeowners Ass’n of the Phils. Inc. v. Mun. Board of the City of Manila
● The Mayor and Municipal Board of the City of Manila declared a state of emergency to
provide affordable housing for the poor through Municipal Ordinance No. 4841.
However, the Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President,
Vicente A. Rufino brought an action against the ordinance. The lower court nullified the
ordinance, ruling that the power to declare a state of emergency belongs to Congress,
 the ordinance encroaches on property rights, and the City of Manila lacks the authority to
prohibit what is forbidden in the ordinance.
● ISSUE: W/N Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional. – NO
● RULING: Municipal corporations have the authority to regulate through police power,
which may affect individual rights and property but must be reasonable and limited to the
demands of public interest or welfare. In times of emergency, regulations affecting
individual rights must be co-extensive with the crisis and for a definite and reasonable
period. Municipal corporations' powers are subject to the same limitations as the
National Government. The ordinance is unconstitutional as it is unlimited, indefinite,
negative, and uncertain.