IOS2601/201/2/2019

Tutorial Letter 201/2/2019

Interpretation of Statutes
IOS2601

Semester 2
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

IMPORTANT INFORMATION:
This tutorial letter contains important information
about your module

BARCODE
 CONTENTS
Page
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................…………………………….…. 3
2 FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 01 .................................................................................... 3
3 FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 02 ...................................................................................13
4 FORMAT OF THE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2019 EXAMINATION PAPER .................... 17
5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 17

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1. INTRODUCTION

Dear Student

On registration, you received Tutorial Letter 101/3/2019 and Tutorial Letter 102/3/2019. This is
the last tutorial letter for this module. It contains feedback on Assignments 01 and 02, and important
information on the format of the October/November 2019 examination paper. Study this tutorial
letter very carefully.

2. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 01

2.1 Feedback and suggested answer

QUESTION 1

(1) DISTINGUISH between the promulgation and adoption of legislation. (7)

Adoption of legislation means the passage of legislation through its various stages in the legislature
until it is passed. Promulgation means the publication of the legislation in the Government Gazette.
It is making the legislation known to the public and it is formally put into operation.

(2) Do you think the Preamble to the Act (especially the last paragraph) was drafted with the
application of the classic “mischief rule” in mind? Substantiate your answer with
reference to case law by explaining what the mischief rule entails and why it is regarded
as a precursor of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. (14)

The preamble contains a programme of action or a declaration of intent with regard to the broad
principles contained in the particular statute. The preamble provides the interpreter with a starting
point to the final meaning of the legislative text.

In Jaga v Donges the preamble was considered to be part of the context of the statute. In Qozeleni
v Minister of Law and Order and Khala v The Minister of Safety and Security, the court’s
acknowledged the unqualified application of the Constitution’s preamble. In National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan, the court rejected the argument that a preamble may be
considered only if the text of the legislation is not clear and ambiguous as an outdated approach to
interpretation.

Heydon’s case (mischief rule);

The historical context of the particular legislation is used to place the provision in question in its
proper perspective. The use of surrounding circumstances is also known as the mischief rule. The
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mischief rule was laid down in the 16th century by lord Coke in the famous Heydon’s Case (1584) 3
Co Rep 7a (76 ER 637) and forms the cornerstone of the contextual approach to interpretation. It
poses four questions that must be answered to establish the meaning of legislation:

 What was the legal position before the legislation was adopted?
 What was the mischief (or defect) not provided for by the existing legislation or the
common law?
 What remedy (solution) was provided by the legislature to solve this problem?
 What was the true reason for the remedy?

The object of the rule is to examine the circumstances leading to the measure in question. The
mischief rule has been applied on numerous occasions by the courts. An example is the case of
Santam Insurance Ltd v Taylor, in which the court was obliged, on account of the incomprehensible
language used in the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972, to examine the historical
background of the Act in order to ascertain its purpose.
(See pages 118-119, and 152 of the textbook, Botha 5th ed 2012)

(3) How should the purpose of the Act be determined? Give two internal aids that can be
consulted and give an example of each from the text of the Act (where possible). (4)

Express purpose clause and interpretation guidelines are formulated in a more focussed and
detailed terms. They are considered to be more valuable during the interpretation process.
However the interpreter must still analyse the legislative text as a whole together with all internal
and external aids to determine the purpose of legislation.

(i) The legislative text in another official language

Section 240 of the Constitution provides that the English text will prevail in the event of any
inconsistency between the different texts. The signed version of the legislative text does not carry
more weight simply because it is signed:

• The signed version of the text is conclusive only where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the versions (Handel v R). The signed version is only used as a last resort to
avoid a stalemate.
• If one version of the text is wider than the other (e.g. one prescribes a penalty of
imprisonment and a fine, and the other, only a fine), the ‘common-denominator’ rule is
followed, and only a fine will be imposed. The texts are read together to establish the
common denominator (Jaffer v Parow Village Management Board).
• If there is no conflict, the versions complement one another and must be read together.
An attempt must be made to reconcile the texts with reference to the context and the
purpose of the legislation (Zulu v Van Rensburg).
• Even the unsigned version of the legislative text may be used to determine the intention
of the legislature (Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of
Racing Clubs).

(ii) The preamble

The preamble contains a programme of action or a declaration of intent with regard to the broad
principles contained in the particular statute. The preamble provides the interpreter with a starting
point to the final meaning of the legislative text.

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In Jaga v Donges the preamble was considered to be part of the context of the statute. In Qozeleni
v Minister of Law and Order and Khala v The Minister of Safety and Security, the court’s
acknowledged the unqualified application of the Constitution’s preamble. In National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan, the court rejected the argument that a preamble may be
considered only if the text of the legislation is not clear and ambiguous as an outdated approach to
interpretation.

(iii) The long title

Provides a short description of the subject matter of the legislation. It forms part of the
statute considered by the legislature during the legislative process. The role played by the long
title in helping to ascertain the purpose of the legislation will in each case depend on the information
it contains. The courts may refer to the long title of a statute to establish the purpose of the
legislation (Bhyat v Commissioner for Immigration 1932 AD).

(iv) The definition clause

The definition clause is an explanatory list of terms in which certain words or phrases used in the
legislation are defined. A definition in the definition section is conclusive, unless the context in which
the word appears in the legislation indicates another meaning. In that case the court will follow the
ordinary meaning of the word (Brown v Cape Divisional Council). In Kanhym Bpk v Oudtshoorn
Municipality it was held that a deviation from the meaning in the definition clause will only be justified
if the defined meaning is not the correct interpretation within the context of the particular provision.

(v) Express legislative purpose and interpretation guidelines

While the purpose clause and the interpretation guidelines provide a more detailed description of
the legislative scheme than the long title, they can never be decisive. The interpreter must analyse
the legislative text as a whole with external aids.

(vi) Headings to chapters and sections

Heading to chapters or sections may be regarded as introductions to those chapters or sections.

Headings should be used to determine the purpose of the legislation. The value attached to
headings will depend on the circumstances of each case (Turffontein Estates v Mining
Commissioner Johannesburg).

(vii) Paragraphing and punctuation

Punctuation can affect the meaning of the text. In R v Njiwa the court held that punctuation must
be taken into consideration during interpretation. In Skipper International v SA Textile and Allied
Workers’ Union the court held that since punctuation was considered by the legislature during the
passing of the legislation, it must be considered during interpretation.

(viii) Schedules

Schedules serve to shorten and simplify the content-matter of sections in legislation. The value of
a schedule during interpretation depends on the nature of the schedule, its relationship to the rest
of the legislation, and the language in which the legislation refers to it.
(See pages 115-126 of the textbook, Botha 5th ed, 2012).

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QUESTION 2

Compare the orthodox text-based approach to statutory interpretation to the text-in-context

approach to statutory interpretation. You must make use of case law in your answer. (25)

ORTHODOX TEXT-BASED APPROACH

It is the primary rule of interpretation that if the meaning of the words is clear, it should be put into
effect, and, indeed, equated with the legislature’s intention (Principal Immigration Officer v
Hawabu). Because ordinary citizens may rely on the everyday meaning of legislation, the courts
may not proceed beyond the plain meaning of the text. Interpretive questions must first, and as far
as possible, be settled by the dictionary.

The golden rule of textual interpretation states that only if the wording of the legislative provision is
ambiguous (there is more than one dictionary meaning of the words in question), or if the ordinary
meaning leads to such obviously absurd results (Venter v R) that no legislature could have intended
that the ordinary meaning should be applied in the circumstances, can the court deviate from the
ordinary meaning of the words in the legislation. What should a court do where it cannot simply
apply the plain meaning of the words?

In these circumstances, the court may turn to a number of secondary aids. These aids are found
both in other parts of the legislative text beyond the wording of the specific section in question (the
so-called internal aids) and outside the legislative text as a whole (so-called external aids). Only
when it is not clear from the wording of the legislative provision itself what the legislature intended,
should the court look at the internal aids contained in the rest of the legislation (the title, long title,
preamble, chapter headings etc.) to determine what the intention of the legislature was.

Only where the legislation as a whole still does not provide an answer can the court consult the
external aids (commission reports, parliamentary debates, memorandums). Only in cases where
the language (the primary indicator of legislative meaning) is unclear or absurd, and the internal and
external aids (the secondary indicators of legislative meaning) cannot resolve the uncertainty or
absurdity, then the court can turn to a set of common law presumptions (the tertiary aids or indicators
of legislative meaning) in order to resolve the uncertainty. In these cases, the court in effect
concedes that it cannot determine what the legislature actually intended, and that it will therefore
make an assumption about what the legislature intended. These assumptions are discussed by
Botha in various instances in the textbook. The assumptions are common law ideals of the good
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legislature that we simply ascribe to our actual legislature in cases of doubt. We assume that a good
legislature would not exclude the jurisdiction of the courts, nor would it attempt to change the existing
law more than is necessary.

Relevant case law:

In Union Government v Mack and Farrar’s Estate v CIR it was held that the intention of the
legislature should be deduced from the words used in the legislation; in other words, the plain
meaning of the text in an intentional disguise. If the legislature had a specific intention, it would be
reflected in the clear and unambiguous words of the text (Ensor v Rensco Motors (Pty) Ltd).

In Jaga v Donges the majority of the court decided to adopt a textual approach (as was common
in 1950 when the case was heard). The court held that the words “sentenced to imprisonment” were
not further defined or qualified by the legislature. The plain meaning should therefore be determined
and applied. “Imprisonment”, in plain language, meant that the sentence imposed on the offender
contained a period of imprisonment (suspended or not) as an element. The warrant was thus legally
issued as Jaga did receive a sentence of imprisonment.

In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries the court decided the case in favour
of the toll road operators. It began its reasoning by applying the rules of the textual approach to the
question. It stated that the primary rule in the construction of statutory provisions is to ascertain the
intention of the legislature. The court proceeded to say that it is now well established that one seeks
to achieve this, in the first instance, by giving the words of the enactment under consideration their
ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would lead to an absurdity so glaring that the
legislature could not have contemplated it. Subject to this proviso, no problem would normally arise
where the words in question were only susceptible to one meaning: effect had then to be given to
such meaning. In other words, the court turned to the dictionary, hoping to find a clear meaning for
the terms “road” and “alternative”. Having consulted the dictionary, the court discovered that the
words “an alternative road” are not linguistically limited to a single ordinary grammatical meaning.
The phrase could mean either “a different roadway” (as the association argued) or “a different route”
(as the toll operators argued). Because both interpretations were linguistically feasible, the court
turned to the so-called secondary aids of textual interpretation. However, it found that none of the
recognised internal or external aids helped to indicate which one of the two meanings of the term
“road” was intended by the legislature. The court then turned to the common law presumptions.

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However, none of the presumptions helped to indicate which of the two possible meanings of the
term “road” we should accept as the legislative intention. The textual approach therefore did not
provide any solution to the problem.

In Bhyat v Commissioner for Immigration the court said:

The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to endeavour to arrive at the intention of the lawgiver
from the language employed in the enactment… in construing a provision of an Act of Parliament
the plain meaning of its language must be adopted unless it leads to some absurdity, inconsistency,
hardship or anomaly which from a consideration of the enactment as a whole a court of law is
satisfied the Legislature could not have intended.

In Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council the court stated:

[T]he rules of statutory [exegesis] are intended as aids in resolving any doubts as to the Legislature’s
true intention. Where this intention is proclaimed in clear terms either expressly or by necessary
implication the assistance of these rules need not be sought.

In Commissioner, SARS v Executor, Frith’s Estate, the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated the
well-known traditional rule of interpretation:

The primary rule in construction of a statutory provision is (as is well established) to ascertain the
intention of the legislator and (as is equally well established) one seeks to achieve this, in the first
instance, by giving the words under consideration their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do
so would lead to an absurdity so glaring that the Legislature could not have contemplated it.

In Engels v Allied Chemical Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd it was held that:

The rules of construction of Acts of parliament… clearly state that they must be construed according
to the intention of the legislature expressed in the Acts themselves. One consequence of this rule
is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly
not been made.

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In Bulawayo Municipality v Bulawayo Waterworks Ltd Kotzé J stated that:

The intention of the legislature can alone be gathered from what it has actually said, and not from
what it may have intended to say, but has not said.

In Volschenk v Volschenk it was held that the most important rule of interpretation was to give
words their ordinary, literal meaning.

In Sigcau v Sigcau the court argued that ‘ordinary meaning’ includes the ordinary grammatical
meaning.

TEXT-IN-CONTEXT APPROACH

The legislative function is a purposive activity. In terms of this approach, the purpose or object of
the legislation (the legislative scheme) is the prevailing factor in interpretation. The context of the
legislation, including social factors and political policy directions, are also taken into account to
establish the purpose of the legislation. The mischief rule is regarded as the forerunner of a
purposive, contextual approach to interpretation. The mischief rule acknowledges the application
of external aids including the common-law prior to the enactment of the legislation, defects in the
law not provided for by the common-law, what new remedies (solutions) did the legislature provide,
and the true reason for the remedies.

The search for the purpose of legislation requires a purpose-orientated approach which recognises
the contextual framework of the legislation right from the outset, and not only in cases where a literal
text-based approach has failed. The purpose-orientated approach provides a balance between
grammatical and overall contextual meaning. The interpretation process cannot be complete until
the object and scope of the legislation (ie its contextual environment) are taken into account. In this
way the flexibilities and peculiarities of language, and all the internal and external factors, are
accommodated in the continuing time-frame within which legislation operates.

To resolve the dispute, the court in Public Carriers Association decided to look at the purpose of the
provision. The Court declared that it should adopt the interpretation which best served that purpose.
At the time this was a controversial step to take. The Court therefore made the statement quoted in
the textbook in paragraph 5.2.1 in order to justify its approach. However, the Court then continued

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as follows: “It must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly entrenched in our law
and I do not seek to challenge it. But where its application results in ambiguity and one seeks to
determine which of more than one meaning was intended by the legislature, one may in my view
properly have regard to the purpose of the provision under consideration to achieve such objective”.
The Court proceeded to state that the purpose of s 9(3) was to ensure that road users who wished
to do so could reach their original destination without paying the new toll fees. That being the primary
object of s 9(3), the Court held that “an alternative road” meant “an alternative route” and not “an
alternative roadway”. It was not necessary to provide a wholly separate roadway in order to achieve
the object of the Act. All that was required was a route that bypassed the toll gates. It followed that
the declaration of the relevant portion of the N3 as a toll road was valid.

Relevant case law:

In Jaga v Dönges, Schreiner JA (to whom Botha refers in the textbook), adopted a contextual or
purposive approach. He came to the opposite conclusion. His judgment is extremely important and
has been cited with approval by the Constitutional Court on more than one occasion. Schreiner JA
described the contextual approach in the following terms:

“Certainly no less important than the oft-repeated statement that the words and expressions used
in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must
be interpreted in the light of their context. But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to the
application of this principle. The first is that “the context”, as used here, is not limited to the language
of the rest of the statute and is regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be
interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose,
and, within limits, its background. The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting
may be along either of two lines. Either one may split the inquiry into two parts and concentrate, in
the first instance, on finding out whether the language to be interpreted has or appears to have one
clear ordinary meaning, confining a consideration of the context only to cases where the language
appears to admit to more than one meaning; or one may from the beginning consider the context
and the language to be interpreted together”.

Schreiner JA adopted the last-mentioned version of the contextual approach (i.e. “one may from the
beginning ...”). Schreiner JA insisted that very few words have a natural or ordinary meaning in the
sense that their meaning is entirely independent of the context in which they are used. The question
is thus what words mean, not only in the context in which they are used in the legislative text, but
also in the context of the purpose of the legislation and the mischief that it was designed to remedy.
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The text and the context must be balanced, otherwise the context may be given such an
exaggerated importance that the language used in the legislation becomes strained, or otherwise
the text may be given such an exaggerated importance that verbalism and consequent failure to
further the aims of the legislation might result.

The real impact of Schreiner’s judgment and his contextual approach lies in his willingness to accept
that the phrase “sentenced to imprisonment” did have the clear and ordinary meaning which the
majority claimed it had. Even so, he insisted, the broader context and purpose of the legislation
overrode that clear meaning. The purpose of the provision was to create an objective test for the
identification of undesirable persons who should be removed from society by deportation. However,
the suspension of prison sentences has the opposite aim. A suspended sentence is a means of
keeping an offender within society while aiding his or her rehabilitation. To include suspended
sentences in the meaning of “sentenced to imprisonment” would not serve the purpose of the
legislative provision (to remove an offended from society). The deportation warrant was thus illegally
issued as Jaga had not been sentenced to imprisonment for the purposes of section 22.

Schreiner JA held that even the textual approach, if it was correctly applied, should have led to the
same conclusion. It is worthwhile to consider this criticism of the majority approach as it sheds
valuable light on the inner working and limits of the textual approach. According to Schreiner JA,
the ordinary meaning of the expression “sentenced to imprisonment” is ambiguous, since the
expression could mean both “being physically removed to prison” or “being sentenced where the
sentence includes imprisonment”. Because of this ambiguity, the secondary aids had to be applied.
Since there were no secondary aids available in the case which could resolve the choice between
the two meanings, the tertiary aids had to be applied. One common law presumption is that
legislative provisions must be interpreted in favour of individual freedom. It must therefore be
presumed that the legislature intended the deportation of persons only where these persons were
unconditionally sentenced to imprisonment. To hold otherwise, as the majority did, would subject
an unnecessarily large range of offenders to the very drastic measure of deportation. It would thus
fail to protect the value of individual freedom.

Students could also mention the following:

Schreiner J also identified the following guidelines for interpretation of statutes:

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● Right from the outset, the interpreter may take the wider context of provision (e.g. its ambit
and purpose) into consideration with the legislative text in question.
● Irrespective of how clear or unambiguous the grammatical meaning of the legislative text
may seem to be, the relevant contextual factors (e.g. the practical effects of different
interpretations, as well as the background of the provision) must be taken into account.
● Sometimes this wider context may even be more important than the legislative text.
● Once the meaning of the text and context (language-in-context) is determined, it must be
applied, irrespective of whether the interpreter is of the opinion that the legislature intended
something else.

In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries the court decided to look at the
purpose of the provision in order to resolve the dispute. The Court declared that it should adopt the
interpretation which best served that purpose. At the time this was a controversial step to take. The
Court stated that: “It must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly entrenched in
our law and I do not seek to challenge it. But where its application results in ambiguity and one
seeks to determine which of more than one meaning was intended by the legislature, one may in
my view properly have regard to the purpose of the provision under consideration to achieve such
objective”. The Court proceeded to state that the purpose of s 9(3) was to ensure that road users
who wished to do so could reach their original destination without paying the new toll fees. That
being the primary object of s 9(3), the Court held that “an alternative road” meant “an alternative
route” and not “an alternative roadway”. It was not necessary to provide a wholly separate roadway
in order to achieve the object of the Act. All that was required was a route that bypassed the toll
gates. It followed that the declaration of the relevant portion of the N3 as a toll road was valid.

The decision of Jansen JA in Mjuqu v Johannesburg City Council can almost be regarded as a
model of the contextual approach, since he utilised virtually the entire spectrum of available aids
and surrounding circumstances to determine the purpose and scope of the legislation in question.

In University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council, Rabie CJ held that the court had to examine all
the contextual factors in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, irrespective of whether or not
the words of the legislation were clear and unambiguous.

In Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda the court held:

It sometimes happens that the goal of social and economic changes is reached more quickly through
legal development by the judiciary than by the legislature. This is because judges have a certain
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amount of freedom or latitude in the process of interpretation and application of the law. It is now
acknowledged that judges do not merely discover the law, but they also make the law.
They take part in the process of creation. Law-making is an inherent and inevitable part of the
judicial process

In Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd, the court stated that:

…it is the duty of the Court to read the section of the Act which requires interpretation
sensibly, i.e. with due regard, on the one hand, to the meaning or meanings which permitted
grammatical usage assigns to the words used in the section in question and, on the other
hand, to the contextual scene, which involves consideration of the language of the rest of the
statute as well as the ‘matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits,
its background’. In the ultimate result the Court strikes a proper balance between these
various considerations and thereby ascertains the will of the Legislature and states its legal
effect with reference to the facts of the particular case which is before it.

In Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners’ Association v Administrator, Transvaal, the court

recognised the importance of legislative context. It held that it is permissible to interpret the
provisions of legislation against the background of the dismantling of apartheid.

3. FEEDBACK ON ASSIGNMENT 02

Question 1.1
In Nourse v van Heerden 1999 (2) SACR 198 (W) the court found that … (1)

(1) legislation can be abrogated by disuse.

(2) legislation must be repealed by a competent legislature.

(3) the case had to be decided in terms of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of
1996.

(4) the Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 was unconstitutional.

The correct answer is (2). See page 74 of your prescribed textbook.

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Question 1.2
The judicial act of cutting out the offending part of a provision in a piece of legislation in
order to rescue it from the fate of unconstitutionality is known as: (1)

(1) severance.

(2) reading in.

(3) substitution.

(4) reading down.

The correct answer is (1). See page 197 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.3
Promulgation refers to ... (1)

(1) the different stages, readings and processes through which legislation has to pass before
it is accepted and issued by the relevant legislative body.

(2) the process by which the judiciary may modify or adapt the ordinary meaning of a
legislative provision in such a way that it conforms to the purpose or aim of the legislation.

(3) the process by which legislation commences and is formally put into operation.

(4) the process whereby legislation, which is alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution, is
reviewed or tested by the court.

The correct answer is (3). See page 46 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.4

Although they are published in the Government Gazette, the following documents do not
constitute legislation: (1)

(1) Legal notices, reports, draft Bills, discussion papers and proclamations.

(2) Legal notices, reports, draft Bills, discussion papers and advertisements.

(3) Legal notices, reports, draft Bills, discussion papers and the Constitution.

(4) Legal notices, reports, draft Bills, discussion papers and regulations.

The correct answer is (2). See page 33 of your prescribed textbook.

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Question 1.5
In Keagile v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1984 (2) SA 816 (T) … (1)

(1) the accused was charged with contravening the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989.

(2) the accused’s application for a review of the denial of bail was granted.

(3) the court held that the power of the Attorney-General to issue a statement with regards
to the refusal of bail was no longer effective.

(4) the court decided the matter in terms of section 12(2)(d) of the Interpretation Act 33 of
1957.

The correct answer is (4). See page 73 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.6
When interpreting a piece of legislation, internal aids are used.

Which of the aids mentioned below is not an internal aid of interpretation? (1)

(1) The long title.

(2) The definitions clause.

(3) Dictionaries.

(4) The preamble.

The correct answer is (3). See pages 119-122 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.7
According to the textualist viewpoint, courts will only use the secondary and tertiary aids to
interpretation when the words in the legislation seem … and … (1)

(1) clear, unambiguous

(2) unclear, ambiguous
(3) peremptory, positive
(4) directory, negative

The correct answer is (2). See pages 91-97 of your prescribed textbook.

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Question 1.8
The following are semantic guidelines determining that a provision is directory. Identify the
incorrect guideline. (1)
(1) Permissive words such as “may” indicate discretion and will be interpreted as being
directory, unless the purpose of the provision indicates otherwise.
(2) Positive language suggests that the word is merely directory.
(3) A word or words with an imperative character indicate a directory provision.
(4) If the provision is formulated in flexible and vague terms, it is an indication that it is
directory.

The correct answer is (3). See pages 177-178 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.9
In S v A Juvenile 1990(4) SA 151 (ZSC) the court remarked that the Constitution …. (1)
(1) must be interpreted in the context and setting existing at the time when the case is heard,
and not when it was passed, otherwise the growth of society will not be taken into
account.
(2) is now the frame of reference against which everything must function, and against which
all actions must be tested.
(3) embodies the values of society, as well as the aspirations, dreams and fears of the nation,
and should, in fact, be the most important national symbol.
(4) as supreme law of the land, has bestowed on the court the sacred trust of protecting
human rights.

The correct answer is (4). See page 191 of your prescribed textbook.

Question 1.10
The following court case is an example in which restrictive interpretation was applied: (1)
(1) Skinner v Palmer 1919 WLD 39.
(2) Minister van Polisie v De Beer 1970 (2) SA 712 T.
(3) Jaga v Donges 1950 (4) SA 653 (A).
(4) Tefu v Minister of Justice 1953 (2) SA 61 (T).

The correct answer is (1). See page 167 of your prescribed textbook.

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4. FORMAT OF THE OCT/NOV 2019 EXAMINATION PAPER

The Examination Section will inform you in due course of the date, time and venue of the
examination. The examination paper counts 100 marks and you will have 2 hours in which to
complete the paper. You must answer all the questions. Below you will find a guideline on the
format of the paper for the October/November 2019 examination. We hope that you will find it
useful in preparing for the examination.

Question 1

Question 1 consists of 10 multiple-choice questions and carries a total of 10 marks (1 mark for
each question).

Question 2

Question 2 consists of 7 questions and carries a total of 20 marks. (The questions are true or false,
and you have to provide reasons for your answer.)

Question 4

Question 3 consists of 4 questions and carries a total of 40 marks.

Question 4

Question 4 consists of 2 questions and carries a total of 30 marks.

5. CONCLUSION

Please contact us if you experience any problems with the module. A little bit of study every day is
worth far more than cramming a week before the exam!

Good luck with your studies.

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