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Team Code: CN-23-A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PERUCIA

In the matter of Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

(Under article 133 of Constitution of Perucia)

Civil Appeal No. ____/20__

In the matter of

Abram……………………………………………… Appellant
versus

Shashwat …………………………………….…... Respondent

Memorial on the behalf of Appellant

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Table of Contents
Abbreviations............................................................................................................................3
Table of Authorities.................................................................................................................4
Statement of Jurisdiction.........................................................................................................5
Statement of facts.....................................................................................................................6
Statements of Issues.................................................................................................................8
Summary of Arguments..........................................................................................................9
Advanced Arguments.............................................................................................................10
Issue 1..................................................................................................................................10
Issue 2..................................................................................................................................13
Issue 3..................................................................................................................................16
Issue 4..................................................................................................................................18
Prayer......................................................................................................................................20
Annexure I:.............................................................................................................................21
Annexure II.............................................................................................................................22

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Abbreviations

& And

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

ART Act Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 2021

Hon’ble Honourable
ICA, 1872 Indian Contract Act, 1872

JJ Act Juvenile Justice Act

Ltd. Limited

Ors. Others

PC Privy Council

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec. Section

Supp Supplementary

Surrogacy Act Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021

v. Versus

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Table of Authorities

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 133---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5, 10
Article 134-A----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9

STATUTES

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000------------------------------------------------------------------------------16

Surrogacy Act, 2021--------------------------------------------------------------------------------13, 17
The Indian Contract Act, 1872------------------------------------------------------------------------14

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Adoption Regulation, 2022-------------------------------------------------------------------------9, 17

United Nation' s Convention of the Rights of the Child--------------------------------------------18

ANNEXURE

Annexure I-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
Annexure II------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7

CASES

Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India--------------------------------------------------------------15

Inda Devi v. Board Of Revenue----------------------------------------------------------------------11
Johnson v. Calvert--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15
Krishnaswami v. General Governor in Council---------------------------------------------------10
Muhammad Allahdad Khan v. Muhammad Ismail-----------------------------------------------16
Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria--------------------------------------------------------------------------11
Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India------------------------------------------------------------16, 18
State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money----------------------------------------------------------11
Union of India v. Hafiz Mohd------------------------------------------------------------------------11

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Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant has approached this Court under Article 133 of Constitution of Perucia after
obtaining the certificate through an oral application made under article 134-A 1 from the High
Court of Cati.
133. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to
civil matters

2
[(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a
civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India 3[if the High Court certifies under
article 134A—]

(a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and

(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the
Supreme Court.]

(2) Notwithstanding anything in article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court under
clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law
otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one
Judge of a High Court.

1
134A. Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree, final order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of
article 132 or clause (1) of article 133, or clause (1) of article 134,
(a) may, if it deems fit so to do, on its own motion; and
(b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after the
passing or making of such judgment, decree, final order or sentence,
determine, as soon as may be after such passing or making, the question whether a certificate of the nature
referred to in clause (1) of article 132, or clause (1) of article 133 or, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) of clause
(1) of article 134, may be given in respect of that case.
2
Subs. by the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972, s. 2, for cl. (1) (w.e.f. 27-2-1973).
3
Subs. by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, s. 18, for “if the High Court certifies” (w.e.f.
1- 8-1979).
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Statement of Facts

For the sake of brevity and convenience of this honourable court the fact of present case is
summarised as follows:

1. Mr. and Mrs. Chopra, a married couple (aged 38 &37) belongs to a reputed industrial
family. The couple found themselves that they were not capable of conception, owing
it to infertility. After few days they came to know about the procedure of surrogacy
practiced in EBC clinic in the city of Cati.
2. The couple approached to ART Clinic of EBC Hospital whereby, executing a non-
Disclosure and Confidentially Agreement, an appointment was booked with the
leading doctor in this field, Dr. Goswami. After getting to know about surrogacy they
were ready to extend their family through it, for this they approached their relatives
for a surrogate mother.
3. Later on, EBC Hospital found a potential candidate in Ms. Khan, who agreed to carry
Mr. & Mrs. Chopra surrogate child. Ms. Khan, a widow aged about 32 years, was
already a mother of 3 years old daughter Alia.
4. Afterwards, they make a contract of surrogacy with the terms and conditions. (Refer
to Annexure I). Same was signed by both parties and was registered duly with stamp.
5. The embryo was handled in the clinic and thereafter, the same was implanted in Ms.
Khan’s body. Soon after, Ms. Khan conceived, and intending parents were informed
about the good news.
6. Ms. Khan frequently visited the hospital for regular check-ups and met Dr. Goswami
for his recommendations. All seemed well, until the latter half of the seventh month of
pregnancy when Ms. Khan started felling emotionally attached to the child.
7. Later, one fine day, during the seventh month of Ms. Khan's pregnancy, Mr. & Mrs.
Chopra hailed their fate after they naturally conceived a child. When this information
reached Ms. Khan, her feelings for the child within her grew even more.
8. In the latter half of eight months of pregnancy Ms. Khan decided that she wouldn't be
able to give up on child. But due to obligation arising out of contract she felt bound
and imprisoned, thus she decided to abscond and never be found in City of Cati again.

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9. During the last week of her eight months of pregnancy, she executed her plan. Just
before absconding she wrote a letter informing the hospital and intending parents
about her disappearance. And in the letter, she apologizes for this decision and said
“please let me adopt this child”. She sent the letter by post to Mr. And Mrs. Chopra
and to Dr. Goswami. (Annexure II)
10. After receiving the letter, Mr. and Mrs. Chopra personally searched for whereabouts
of Ms. Khan's for few weeks but they didn't approach authorities as they do not want
to reveal their incompetency to media. They couldn't trace Ms. Khan and they
accepted their fate and lived with their natural born child.
11. Thereafter, Mrs. Chopra gave birth to boy child named him Shashwat. And Ms. Khan
also gave birth to a boy child named him Abram.
12. Abram was very hardworking and studious. He obtained first rank in prestigious
engineering entrance exam of Perucia. While packing for his shift to Perucia he found
a copy of contract signed between Mr. And Mrs. Chopra and Ms. Khan. Thus, Abram
realised that Ms. Khan was not his biological mother.
13. Abram came to Cati, in order to meet his parents, where Chopras family resided, after
reaching there he got a news that his biological parents died in a flight crash a year of
ago. Now, all property and business belong to Shashwat, being the only successor.
After knowing all this Abram claim in Mr. Chopra's property as a successor based on
surrogacy contract before Shashwat.
14. Abram filled a suit for claiming right on the property of Mr. Chopra's in District court
of Cati, where civil court ruled in favour of Abram. Now against the civil court order,
Shashwat appealed in High court of Cati, which overturned the Civil court order.
Later the counsel of Abram through an oral application made before High court
obtained a certificate to appeal before supreme court

Supreme court accepted the appeal and decided to hear the case.

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Statements of Issues

1. Whether the appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Perucia?

2. Whether the Surrogacy Contract was valid between Mr. and Mrs. Chopra and Ms. Khan
under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021?
3. Whether Abram stood adopted by Ms. Khan?
4. Whether Abram has any right in the property of the Chopras?

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Summary of Arguments

1. Whether the appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Perucia?

My humble submission is Yes.
The appeal filed before the hon’ble Court is maintainable as the appeal includes as
substantial question of law and is certified by the hon’ble High Court of Cati under
the Article 134-A4 of the Constitution of Perucia. The impugned order of the High
Court should be set aside.
2. Whether the Surrogacy Contract was valid between Mr. and Mrs. Chopra and
Ms. Khan under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021?
My humble submission is Yes.
The contract so formed is valid as per the provisions of Surrogacy (Regulation) Act,
2021 and is complied with all the provisions of the said Act.
3. Whether Abram stood adopted by Ms. Khan?
My humble submission is No.
The appellant Abram do not adopt by Ms. Khan as adoption was not done according
to the regulations of Adoption Regulation, 2022 by CARA and other Acts enforced in
the Country of Perucia for the time being.
4. Whether Abram has any right in the property of the Chopras?
My humble submission is Yes.
The Abram i.e., appellant has equal right in the property of Chopras as per the section
85 of Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 and section 316 of ART Act, 2021.

4
134A. Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court.—Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree,
final order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of article 132 or clause (1) of article 133, or clause (1) of article
134,— (a) may, if it deems fit so to do, on its own motion; and (b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on
behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after the passing or making of such judgment, decree, final order or
sentence, determine, as soon as may be after such passing or making, the question whether a certificate of the
nature referred to in clause (1) of article 132, or clause (1) of article 133 or, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) of
clause (1) of article 134, may be given in respect of that case.
5
Section 8 of Surrogacy (Regulation)Act, 2021:
A child born out of surrogacy procedure, shall be deemed to be a biological child of the intending couple or
intending woman and the said child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges available to a natural child
under any law for time being in force
6
Section 31 of ART Act, 2021:
(1) The child born through assisted reproductive technology shall be deemed to be a biological child of the
commissioning couple and the said child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges available to a natural
child only from the commissioning couple under any law for the time being in force.
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Advanced Arguments

ISSUE 1
Whether the appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Perucia?
My Humble Submission is Yes. The appeal filed before this Hon’ble Court is maintainable
as the appeal filed under the Article 133 of The Constitution of Perucia which states:
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil
matters-
[(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a
civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India 7 [if the High Court certifies
under article 134A—]
a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and
b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme
Court.]

(2) Notwithstanding anything in article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court
under clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law
otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of
one Judge of a High Court.
In the given case, it involves a substantial question of law as the certificate for appeal has
been given to the appellant through an oral application made by the aggrieved party under the
article 134-A.
The provisions of article 133 (1)(a) is satisfied as follows i.e., substantial question of law in
the present case. The rights of surrogate child in the present circumstances are in question
and of general importance and it is a matter of concern.
This can be supported by the following references:
a) In the case of Krishnaswami v. General Governor in Council7 it was held
(2) A donor shall relinquish all parental rights over the child or children which may be born from his or her
gamete.
7
AIR 1947 FC 37
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“If there is a difference of opinion on any decision of law among the High
Courts, and If there is no direct decision of the Supreme Court on that point
it would be a substantial question of law.”
In the above-mentioned case, it was said by the Apex Court that if there is no direct decision
of Supreme Court then it would be a substantial question of law, & in the given case, there is
no precedent of the hon’ble Court and no direct provision in any statute exists on the issue of
rights of a child/children born out of surrogacy when there is change in mind of contracting
parties occurs and in consequences of which surrogate child has to suffer. And undoubtedly,
there is an imperative necessity arising from the facts and circumstance of current case.
Also, referring to judgement of the case Union of India v. Hafiz Mohd8. i.e.,
“It is apparent that there must be some imperative necessity arising from
the facts & circumstances of the case before the Court can certify it to be fit
one to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.”
In the case of Inda Devi v. Board Of Revenue9.
“When the case is one of great public or private importance”
In the case of State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money10,
“No certificate will lie unless besides a substantial question of law of
general importance being involved, the High Court must be satisfied that
the said question needs to be authoritatively decided by Supreme Court.”

In the case of Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, it was said that,

“The proper test for determining whether a question of law is raised in the
case is substantial would be whether it is general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if
so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by Supreme Court or by Privy Council or by Federal Court or is not
free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the
question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be
applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere
question of applying those principles or that plea raised is palpably absurd,
8
AIR 1975 Delhi 77
9
AIR 1957 All. 116
10
AIR 1976 SC 1111: (1976) 1 SCC 822
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the question would not be a substantial question of law. Thus, a question of
law would be a substantial question of law if it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties and if it was not covered by a decision of the
Supreme Court or of the Privy Council or of the Federal Court.11”
Referring to above mentioned cases and arguments advanced it is strongly contended that the
concerned matter involves substantial question of law and that too of general importance
which is in imperative necessity to be heard and dealt by the Apex Court. In the light of the
above arguments, the impugned order by the High Court should be set aside.

11
Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria (2005) 7 SCC 60, 65-66 (para 5): (2005) 7 JT 630 following Chunilal V. Mehta
and Sons Ltd., v. Century Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd., 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314 and relying on
Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Dy. Commr. Of Partbgarh, (1927) 54 IA 126: AIR 1927 PC 110
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ISSUE 2
Whether the Surrogacy Contract was valid between Mr. and Mrs. Chopra and Ms.
Khan under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021?

My humble submission in Yes.

The Surrogacy contract formed between Mr. & Ms. Chopra & Ms. Khan is valid as per the
provisions of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.

Surrogacy is defined in Surrogacy Act, 2021, under section 2 (zd) as

“‘surrogacy’ means a practice whereby one woman bears and gives birth to a
child for an intending couple with the intention of handing over such child to the
intending couple after the birth”

Section 4 of the Surrogacy Act, 2021 deals with the provisions which gives the basis for the
formation of contract of surrogacy, basic essentials are as follows:

As per section 4, sub-section (ii), i.e., no surrogacy or surrogacy procedure shall be

conducted, undertaken, performed or availed of, except, for the following purposes, namely:

“4 (ii) (a) when an intending couple has a medical indication necessitating

gestational surrogacy”

As per para 5 of given facts, it is clearly stated that intending couples was duly granted a
certificate of recommendation by the competent authority.

“4 (ii) (b) when it is only for altruistic surrogacy12 purposes”

As per the contract (in Annexure I), the intending couple agreed on all the necessary expenses
to the Ms. Khan, surrogate mother, as defined in the section 2 (ii) of Surrogacy Act. Expenses
such as medical expenses and insurance coverage of 36 months post-delivery.

Other contentions are as follows:

12
“altruistic surrogacy” means the surrogacy in which no charges, expenses, fees, remuneration or monetary
incentive of whatever nature, except the medical expenses and such other prescribed expenses incurred on
surrogate mother and the insurance coverage for the surrogate mother, are given to the surrogate mother or her
dependents or her representative.
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a) a certificate of a medical indication in favour of either or both members of the
intending couple or intending woman necessitating gestational surrogacy from a
District Medical Board.13
b) Age of surrogate mother14 i.e., between 25-35
c) The intending couple not had any surviving child biologically or through adoption or
through surrogacy when contract was formed.15

For a valid contract the basic essentials of can be referred to section 10 of The Indian
Contract Act, 1872 which states –

Section 10: What agreements are contracts- All agreements are contracts if they
are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to
be void.

On comparing these two sections we can say that the essentials for a valid contract are
fulfilled by the parties as:
1. Free Consent: the parties to contract gave their consent for surrogacy without any
undue influence, coercion fraud and misrepresentation.
2. Competent parties: under clause (iii) of section 4 states the competencies of parties
such as the intending couple must a have a certificate showing a medical necessity of
having a child through surrogacy. The age of the parties as well other essentials was
fulfilled by the parties.
3. Lawful Consideration: In terms of the money the surrogacy done was an altruistic in
nature and which is also permitted by the sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) section 4. The
altruistic surrogacy16 is defined under clause (ii) of section 2.
4. Lawful object: The contract between the parties was entered for the purpose of
gestational surrogacy which is a lawful object as per section 4 (iii) (a) (I) of the
Surrogacy Act.
Gestational surrogacy17 is defined as
13
Section 4 (iii) (a) (I)
14
Section 4 (iii) (b) (I)
15
Section 4 (iii) (c) (II)
16
Supra 11
17
Explanation clause of (a) (ii) of section 4 Surrogacy Act, 2021
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“gestational surrogacy” means a practice whereby a surrogate mother
carries a child for the intending couple through implantation of embryo
in her womb and the child is not genetically related to the surrogate
mother
5. Hereby not expressly declared to be void: The contract so formed was not void and
was not in contrary to any law for the time being in force.
The following cases supports the above-mentioned arguments,
1. Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India18
In this case, the Apex court India for the first time recognized the surrogacy in India
and also defined it in its judgement. Also in this case, the custody of surrogate child
was given to the mother of intending couple.
2. In the case of Johnson v. Calvert19, the Supreme Court of California stated that a
surrogacy contract was enforceable and commissioning parents had all parental rights
over the child and not the surrogate. Any conflict regarding parentage was to be
resolved on the basis of the intention of the parties at the time of agreement. Payments
made in surrogacy agreements are for services rendered and not compensation or
consideration for transfer of parental rights.

18
(2008) 13 SCC 518
19
5 Cal. 4th 84, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 851 P.2d 776 (1993)
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ISSUE 3
Whether Abram stood adopted by Ms. Khan?

My humble submission is No.

Abram does not stand adopted by Ms. Khan as Republic of Perucia which is pari-materia to
the Republic of India, which means all the regulations of Republic of India are applicable in
the Republic of Perucia. To support the statement the concept of adoption in Muslim law
does not exist. In Muslim law there is no such concept of adoption, a regulatory authority by
which an Indian can adopt is by following the guidelines laid down by CARA (Central
Adoption Resource Authority). The other statute for adoption is Guardianship and wards act,
1890 by which the adoption can be done. The adoption should be done as per the provisions
of the aforesaid act.

In the case of Muhammad Allahdad Khan v. Muhammad Ismail 20, Mahmood, J.

remarked that,

“There is nothing in the Mohammedan Law similar to adoption as recognised in

Roman and Hindu System. The Mohammedan Law does not recognise adoption
as a mode of filiation”

In the case of Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India 21, The Supreme Court of India observed
that

“The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 as amended in 2006 is an enabling legislation

that gives a prospective parent the option of adopting an eligible child by
following the procedure prescribed by the Act, Rules and the Central Adoption
Resource Agency guidelines, as notified under the Act.”

Also,

It was contended by the Board, in the same case, “Islamic Law professes what is
known as the “Kafala” system under which the child is placed under a ‘Kafil’
who provides for the well-being of the child including financial support and thus
is legally allowed to take care of the child though the child remains the true
20
ILR (1888) All. 289
21
(2014) 4 SCC 1
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descendant of his biological parents and not that of the “adoptive” parents. The
Board contends that the “Kafala” system which is recognized by the United
Nation’s Convention of the Rights of the Child under Article 20(3) is one of the
alternate systems of child care contemplated by the JJ Act, 2000 and therefore a
direction should be issued to all the Child Welfare Committees to keep in mind
and follow the principles of Islamic Law before declaring a Muslim child
available for adoption under Section 41(5) of the JJ Act, 2000.”

CARA framed Adoption Regulation, 2022 under which section 4 specifies the child eligible
for adoption which is as follow:

Section 4: Child eligible for adoption-

The following shall be eligible for adoption, namely:

(a) any orphan or abandoned or surrendered child, declared legally free for adoption by
the Child Welfare Committee;
(b) a child of a relative defined under clause (52) of section 2;
(c) child or children of spouse from earlier marriage, surrendered by the biological
parents for adoption by the step-parent.
According to this provision, the child should be abandoned or surrendered, but here, Abram
was not of neither description as mentioned and was not declared legally free for adoption
therefore adoption was not valid.

According to section-722 of Surrogacy Act which says that in any case the child born through
surrogacy can’t be abandon by intending parents for any reason whatsoever, which implies
and interpreted as that Abram’s adoption is not valid.

22
The intending couple or intending woman shall not abandon the child, born out of a surrogacy procedure,
whether within India or outside, for any reason whatsoever, including but not restricted to, any genetic defect,
birth defect, any other medical condition, the defects developing subsequently, sex of the child or conception of
more than one baby and the like.
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ISSUE 4
Whether Abram has any right in the property of the Chopras?

My humble submission is Yes.

Since the contract between Mr. and Mrs. Chopra and Ms. Khan is valid and according to
contract between them, clause VI of same (Annexure I) stands valid and therefore Abram
should be a successor in the property of Mr. & Mrs. Chopra.

The appellant Abram has an equal share in the property as being the surrogate child Abram
has all rights that a natural child possesses in the property. Since the contract between the
Chopras and Ms. Khan is legal and the adoption of Abram was not legal therefore, Abram has
full rights in the property of the Chopra. It is contended that in The JJ Act, 2000, as amended,
is an enabling legislation that gives a prospective parent the option of adopting an eligible
child by following the procedure prescribed by the Act, Rules and the CARA guidelines, as
notified under the Act and here in the present case no adoption is made by the procedures
established by the Act and guidelines of CARA. Ms. Khan followed no such legal procedures
of adoption.

In the case of Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India23, it was clearly stated by

“The All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

Board’) that Islamic Law does not recognize an adopted child to be at par with a
biological child. According to the Board, Islamic Law professes what is known as
the "Kafala” system under which the child is placed under a ‘Kafil’ who provides
for the well-being of the child including financial support and thus is legally
allowed to take care of the child though the child remains the true descendant of
his biological parents and not that of the " adoptive" parents. The Board
contends that the " Kafala" system which is recognized by the United Nation' s
Convention of the Rights of the Child under Article 20(3) is one of the alternate
systems of child care contemplated by the JJ Act, 2000 and therefore a direction
should be issued to all the Child Welfare Committees to keep in mind and follow

23
(2014) 4 SCC 1
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the principles of Islamic Law before declaring a Muslim child available for
adoption under Section 41(5) of the JJ Act, 2000.”

According to the Section 824 of Surrogacy Act, the rights of a surrogate child should be as of
a natural child, which implies that Abram has equal rights in the property of the Mr. & Mrs.
Chopra. The respondent being the natural child of Mr. & Mrs. Chopra has to share all
property with Abram.

The same has been said in ART Act, 2021 under section 3125 clause (1) that child born
through the process of surrogacy should have equal rights as that of a natural child.

As per Article 8 of The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child i.e.,

1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without
unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity,
States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.

Here, in the present case Ms. Khan didn't follow any lawful procedure of adoption and thus
illegally deprived his identity. The Appellant is biological child of Mr. & Mrs. Chopra and
legal successor of their properties. Thus ,in the absence of direct provisions in such a
situation due to which child had to suffer . It is strongly contended that state shall provide
protection to re-establish his identity i.e., Abram's rights in the properties of Chopras.

24
Section 8. A child born out of surrogacy procedure, shall be deemed to be a biological child of the intending
couple or intending woman and the said child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges available to a
natural child under any law for time being in force
25
Section 31. (1) The child born through assisted reproductive technology shall be deemed to be a biological
child of the commissioning couple and the said child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges available to
a natural child only from the commissioning couple under any law for the time being in force.
(2) A donor shall relinquish all parental rights over the child or children which may be born from his or her
gamete.
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Prayer

In light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, that the
counsel on behalf of Appellant, humbly prays before this hon’ble Supreme Court that it may
be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. The appeal filed is maintainable in the hon'ble Supreme Court.

2. The contract between Ms. Khan & Mr. & Mrs. Chopra is valid since the surrogacy is
altruistic in nature.
3. The adoption done by Ms. Khan is not valid.
4. The appellant is also a successor in the property of Mr. & Mrs. Chopra.

or pass any other order that the court may deems fit in the light of Justice, Equity & Good
Conscience, and for this, the act of kindness of your Lordship(s) the Appellant faction shall
be duly bound ever pray.

Counsel on the behalf of Appellant

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Memorial on the behalf of Appellant
 Team code: CN-23-A.

Annexure I

Contract between Ms. Khan and Mr. Chopra and Mrs. Khan.
1. Market rate for the cost of surrogacy at INR xyz.
2. Market rate for the cost of all unsuccessful attempts of surrogacy at INR xyz.
3. Market rate of medical costs for the surrogate mother at INR xyz.
4. Market rate for each hospital visit for the surrogate mother.
5. Market rate for the cost of medical tests for surrogate mother at INR xyz.
6. Market rate for the cost of a hospital room and other services during childbirth at INR
xyz.
7. Cost of the surrogate mother being unable to work during pregnancy at INR xyz.
8. Insurance coverage for surrogate mother covering postpartum delivery complications
up to thirty-six months after delivery at INR xyz.
9. Expenses for meeting the educational cost of the first child of the surrogate mother,
Alia, up to her graduation.
10. Miscellaneous expenses to the extent of INR xyz.

Other relevant terms and conditions casting an obligation over the contracting parties
involved:
1. The surrogate mother to be of a fit and healthy condition, both mentally and
physically, and to remain to be fit and healthy and not work during the term of
pregnancy.
2. The surrogate mother is to bear the child in good-will and after the birth, to surrender
the child and relinquish all the rights to the intending parents.
3. The intending parents, under no circumstances, to decline acceptance of the child after
birth, irrespective of its physical or mental condition.
4. The surrogate mother is to be less than 35 years of age.
5. The surrogate mother is to be free from the consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, or any
other form of intoxication.
6. The Surrogate (unborn) Child to be the successor to all the properties belonging to the
Chopras.
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Annexure II

The relevant abstract from the letter can be found hereinunder as:

“My sincere apologies to Mr. and Mrs. Chopra, who for all these months have only treated
me as their own. I could not imagine the level of pain I bring to you and would never be able
to completely release myself from this guilt. However, at this point, I have become helpless
and the love I possess for the child growing within me has taken over any other feeling that I
might embark upon. I apologize to the EBC hospital, as well as Dr. Goswami, who has taken
great care of me. I understand I will never become worthy of your pardon, but just believe
that I have become helpless. I think even almighty wanted me to have this child, as he blessed
your womb with another child despite doctors declaring you unfit for the same. I have
decided to raise the baby within me as my own child. Please let me adopt this child. This is
the demand of the Almighty.”

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Memorial on the behalf of Appellant