Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Office of the Court Administrator
Manila

2nd Endorsement
December 23, 2002
OCA IPI No. 02-1612-RTJ
“Alamo Transport Leasing Services thru its Pres. Carlitos V. Clavano
v. Judge Amalia F. Dy, RTC, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City, et al.”

COMMENT

The undersigned, in compliance with the Indorsement dated

December 14, 2002 of the Honorable Office of the Court

Administrator requiring her to file her comment on the Complaint-

Affidavit in the instant case, copy of which was received on

December 4, 2002, most respectfully submits the following comment:

1. The allegations in paragraph 1 as to the personal

circumstances of the complainant are denied for lack of personal

knowledge on the part of the undersigned, although it appears in

some pleadings filed in Civil Case MC-02-1875 that complainant has

asserted such personal circumstances previously.

2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 (on the filing of a complaint

docketed as Civil Case MC-02-1875), 3 (on the undersigned being

the presiding judge of Branch 213 of the Regional Trial Court of

Mandaluyong City handling the case) and 4 (on the issuance of the

Order dated July 17, 2002 granting the application for the issuance of

a writ of preliminary attachment) are admitted.

 3. The allegations in paragraphs 5 (on the issuance of the Writ

of Attachment) and 6 (on the enforcement of the Writ by the Sheriff)

are admitted on the basis of the records of Civil Case MC-02-1875.

4. The allegations in paragraph 7 are denied for being untrue

and misleading. While the undersigned has no personal knowledge of

the alleged offer made by ALAMO to post a counter-bond, it appears

that no counter-bond had been posted at the time the writ was being

enforced by the Sheriff.

4.1. Under the rules, counter-bonds require prior court approval

and the approval may be granted only after the submission of all the

required clearances to the court. In this case, a mere offer to submit a

counter-bond to the sheriff during the implementation of the writ will

not suffice in itself to warrant the non-implementation of the writ of

attachment. All clearances of the bond have to be examined first by

the court in order to determine, among other purposes, whether the

bonding company involved is blacklisted or not.

5. The allegations in paragraph 8 (on the motor vehicles

attached) are admitted on the basis of the records of Civil Case MC-

02-1875.

6. The allegations in paragraph 9 are denied for being false.

Based on the records of Civil Case MC-02-1875, the Branch Sheriff

filed a Sheriff’s Return stating the description of the ten (10) motor

vehicles attached.

2
 7. The allegations in paragraph 10 with respect to the second

batch of motor vehicles attached are admitted on the basis of the

records of Civil Case MC-02-1875. However, the undersigned has no

personal knowledge as to the veracity of the allegations in paragraph

10 as to the place, manner and other circumstances indicating how

the writ of attachment was implemented by the Branch Sheriff.

8. The allegations in paragraph 11 as to the purported illegality

of the attachment are denied for being baseless.

8.1. The undersigned submits that, contrary to the opinion of

the complainant, garnishment is not applicable. As Justice Regalado

(the same authority cited by the complainant) points out,

“garnishment xxx refers to money, stocks, credits and other

incorporeal property which belong to the party but is in the

possession or under control of a third person” (Regalado, Remedial

Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 7th Rev. Ed., p. 612). Garnishment is

therefore unavailing here for being the inappropriate remedy

because: (1) the property involved is corporeal in nature (motor

vehicles); and (2) although it appears that they were allegedly being

leased by the Complainant’s client, the motor vehicles remained in

the possession, or under the control, of ALAMO.

9. The allegations in paragraph 12 are denied for the same

reason stated in paragraph 6 above, i.e., based on the records of

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Civil Case MC-02-1875, the Branch Sheriff filed a Sheriff’s Return

stating the description of the ten (10) motor vehicles attached.

10. The allegations in paragraph 13 are denied for being

speculative and baseless. The undersigned has no personal

knowledge and (in the absence of any appraisal or valuation by a

competent entity) no basis to determine whether the total value of the

attached vehicles was more than the amount of plaintiff RAM’s

attachment bond in Civil Case MC-02-1875. (In any event, as

complainant subsequently manifested in paragraph 14 of the

Complaint-Affidavit, ALAMO is not questioning the matter of the

alleged excessive attachment.)

10.1. Furthermore, it may be observed that pursuant to Section

4 of Rule 57, Rules of Civil Procedure, and for the protection of the

rights and interests of defendant ALAMO, plaintiff RAM was required

to post an attachment bond under the Order dated July 17, 2002 with

the undertaking to pay all costs and damages defendant ALAMO may

sustain by reason of the attachment.

11. The allegations in paragraph 14 with respect to ALAMO’s

filing of its URGENT MOTION FOR DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT

dated July 24, 2002 along with its counter-bond are admitted on the

basis of the records of Civil Case MC-02-1875.

12. The allegations in paragraph 15 regarding ALAMO’s

counsel’s request that the hearing on its URGENT MOTION FOR

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DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT be set on July 26, 2002 at 8:30

a.m. are admitted on the basis of the records of Civil Case MC-02-

1875.

13. The allegations in paragraph 16, 17, 18 and 19 are admitted

subject to the following qualifications:

13.1. The Urgent Motion For Discharge Of Attachment was filed

by ALAMO on July 25, 2002. ALAMO’s request that the Urgent

Motion be included in the calendar the following day, July 26, 2002,

was denied in view of the failure to comply with the 3-day notice rule.

The Motion was instead calendared for hearing on August 12, 2002,

the next available date in the court’s calendar. However, the August

12, 2002 hearing was reset upon motion by counsel for plaintiff RAM

on the ground that she would be attending an election protest at the

MTC Branch 64, Makati City.

14. The undersigned has no personal knowledge as to the

veracity of the allegations in paragraph 20. However, upon receiving

information as to the alleged theft, the undersigned ordered the

Branch Sheriff to request the police authorities to immediately

conduct an investigation on the incident, the results of which were the

subject of the Sheriff’s Report dated August 23, 2002 (mentioned in

paragraph 24 of the Complaint-Affidavit).

15. The allegations in paragraph 21 to the effect that “[T]he act

of the Branch Sheriff in merely placing said attached vehicles at the

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rooftop, unguarded, was, yet again, a violation of the Order of the

Court as contained in the WRIT” are denied for being an erroneous

conclusion or mere opinion. While not an impregnable fortress, the

premises of the Mandaluyong City Hall are in fact guarded.

16. The allegations in paragraph 22 with respect to plaintiff

RAM’s filing of an URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR

SAFEKEEPING OF THE ATTACHED VEHICLES dated August 5,

2002 and an URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO RESOLVE

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SAFEKEEPING OF THE ATTACHED

VEHICLES dated August 23, 2002 are admitted on the basis of the

records of Civil Case MC-02-1875.

17. The allegations in paragraph 23 are denied for being

erroneous and untrue. As earlier mentioned, upon receiving

information as to the alleged theft, the undersigned ordered the

Branch Sheriff to ask the police authorities to immediately conduct an

investigation on the incident, the results of which were the subject of

the Sheriff’s Report dated August 23, 2002. The incident and the

subsequent developments were discussed during the hearing on

September 2, 2002, as follows:

COURT:
Call the next case, please.
INTERPRETER:
Civil Case No. MC-02-1875, RAM Specialist Manpower
Service, Inc. versus ALAMO Transport Leasing Services,
Inc., for Sum of Money with damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary attachment.

6
COURT:
Appearances?
ATTY. TENORIO:
Same appearance for the plaintiff your honor, we are ready.
ATTY. LIM:
For the defendant your honor, ready.
COURT:
The incident for this case today is the motion to lift the
attachment bond?
ATTY. TENORIO:
Your honor, likewise, we have already filed our Reply on the
defendant’s Answer last August 30, 2002, your honor.
COURT:
Well I’m sorry, I have just read that just early morning today
since I was on official leave for five days last week, so its
only today that I have read said pleading. By the way, what
has happened to those four tires that were stolen from one
of the vehicles turned over to the Sheriff of this court?
ATTY. TENORIO:
Your honor, we have already replaced the four stolen tires.
We have bought new ones, your honor.
ATTY. LIM:
Your honor, may I manifest that its not only the four wheels
of one of said vehicle was stolen but some accessories and
two (2) car stereos from the other cars, your honor.
COURT:
Well, the Sheriff merely told me when he call me up at my
residence at 8:30 p.m. during the date of the incident that it
was merely the four tires that were stolen. What has the
Sheriff done to said incident? Call the Sheriff please.
INTERPRETER:
Your honor, the Sheriff is out of the office, he is in Antipolo,
he has an execution.
COURT:
Will you please call Atty. Pascua?
(After a moment, Atty. Pascua went inside the court room
from the staff room.)
COURT:
Atty. Pascua, what have you done regarding the incident that
took place regarding the subject vehicles? Have you
blottered that in the police station? The counsel here is
alleging that its not only the four wheels that was stolen but
including some car accessories and two car stereos.

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 ATTY. PASCUA:
Your honor, the Sheriff of this Branch had already made an
incident report regarding that matter at the Office of the
Public Order and Safety and the Sheriff has likewise,
attached the Sheriff’s Return to the case records regarding
turn-over of the subject vehicles to the plaintiff, and on the
night of the incident he have the incident blottered before the
Mandaluyong Police Station.
ATTY. LIM:
That’s why your honor, we behemently object to the turn
over of the subject vehicles to the plaintiff without notice to
the defendant, your honor.
COURT:
Well, let me study that. So, you are submitting for resolution
the motion to lift the attachment bond?
ATTY. TENORIO:
Yes, your honor.
ATTY. LIM:
Yes, your honor.
COURT:
Without further argument. Alright, order (please refer the
case record for the order of this case).
SESSION ADJOURNED.
(TSN dated September 2, 2002, pp. 2-3 [Exhibit “21” of
Complainant’s EXHIBIT “U”].)

17.1. Moreover, the undersigned respectfully submits that

under the rules, whatever damages to the attached vehicles that may

be suffered by defendant ALAMO may be remedied by proceeding

against, and would be covered by, plaintiff RAM’s attachment bond.

18. The allegations in paragraph 24 with respect to the Sheriff’s

Report dated August 23, 2002 are admitted on the basis of the

records of Civil Case MC-02-1875. However, the undersigned has no

personal knowledge as to the veracity of the allegation of paragraph

24 as to the absence or presence of a representative of ALAMO

during the inspection subject of the Sheriff’s Report.

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 19. The allegations in paragraph 25 on the issuance of the

August 23, 2002 Order are admitted. The Order (Complainant’s

EXHIBIT “K”), which granted plaintiff RAM’s URGENT EX-PARTE

MOTION FOR SAFEKEEPING OF THE ATTACHED VEHICLES

dated August 5, 2002 on the condition that the attached vehicles will

be kept in “a guarded garage subject to ocular inspection of the

Complainant upon proper request from the court,” states in full:

Considering the ex-parte motion to resolve plaintiff’s motion

for safekeeping of the attached vehicles dated today and
considering further sheriff’s report dated August 23, 2002, the court
deems it prudent to rule with dispatch this particular issue. It
should be noted that this incident including the defendant’s motion
to discharge writ together with plaintiff’s opposition thereto has
been set for hearing last August 8, 2002 where the counsel for the
defendant appeared while the plaintiff’s counsel moved for
postponement due to previously scheduled hearing.
After careful assessment of their circumstances obtaining,
the court finds cogent reasons to give due course to the plaintiff’s
prayer for safekeeping of the attached vehicles in order not to
expose them to the rain, sun, robbers and elements which will
cause great depreciation. The plaintiff should shoulder any and all
expenses while the attached vehicles are under custodia legis
inside a guarded garage subject to the ocular inspection of the
defendant upon proper request made to the court.
With respect to the issue of whether or not the writ of
preliminary attachment should be discharged, the court deems it
necessary to hear the contention of the conflicting parties before it
can judiciously rule on the matter in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 57 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it
is hereby ordered that all the attached vehicles be placed in a
guarded garage for safekeeping at the expense of the plaintiff
subject to ocular inspection of the defendant upon proper request
made to the court. Let the hearing of the motion for discharge of
the writ of preliminary attachment be set for hearing on September
2, 2002 at 8:30 in the morning as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.

20. The allegations in paragraphs 26 and 27 with respect to the

Sheriff’s Turn-Over Receipt dated August 23, 2002 and the Sheriff’s

9
Return dated August 27, 2002 are admitted on the basis of the

records of Civil Case MC-02-1875. However, the undersigned has no

personal knowledge as to the veracity of whether the turn-over was

made by the Sheriff without notifying defendant ALAMO or its

counsel.

20.1. The other allegations in paragraphs 26 and 27 are denied

for being erroneous and untrue, as the turn-over was made in

accordance with the Order dated August 23, 2002 granting plaintiff

RAM’s motion for safekeeping. Contrary to the Complainant’s

submission, defendant ALAMO’s rights and interests in the attached

vehicles were duly protected in view of the issuance of the July 17,

2002 Order and the attachment bond posted by plaintiff RAM in the

amount of P1,424,699.91 pursuant to the said Order, and the

issuance of the August 23, 2002 Order.

21. The undersigned has no personal knowledge as to the

veracity of the allegations in paragraph 28 as to when counsel for

ALAMO was informed of the turn-over. The other allegation in

paragraph 28 to the effect that at the September 2, 2002 hearing

counsel for ALAMO manifested its objection to the turn-over, is

admitted, as evidenced by the TSN of said date, p. 3 thereof (Exhibit

“21” of Complainant’s EXHIBIT “U”).

22. The allegations in paragraph 29 are denied, for the reasons

earlier stated in paragraph 20.1 above, namely: (1) the turn-over was

10
made in accordance with the Order dated August 23, 2002 granting

plaintiff RAM’s motion for safekeeping; and (2) defendant ALAMO’s

rights and interests in the attached vehicles were duly protected in

view of the issuance of the July 17, 2002 Order and the attachment

bond posted by plaintiff RAM in the amount of P1,424,699.91

pursuant to the said Order, and the issuance of the August 23, 2002

Order granting plaintiff RAM’s motion for safekeeping of the attached

vehicles in a guarded garage at its expense and subject to inspection

by defendant ALAMO upon request.

23. The allegations in paragraph 30 state as follows:

30. On September 3, 2002, at around 10:00 in the

morning, our counsel went to Branch 213 to check for any
development on the case. He was informed that there was no
development yet. When he asked to speak with the judge, he was
informed that the judge was in the courtroom. Hence he went to
the courtroom to speak with the judge, AMALIA F. DY. When our
counsel respectfully asked for an approximate date when our
motion for discharge might be resolved, he was rudely and
apathetically answered back by JUDGE AMALIA F. DY that: 1. She
does not know since she just came back from a two (2)-week travel
abroad, and she has not read the records; 2. Her office is still being
cleaned and she cannot be there since she is allergic to dust; and
3. Our counsel should just follow-up with her staff;

The above allegations are basically admitted subject to the following

qualifications:

23.1. The undersigned denies having talked to counsel for

ALAMO “rudely” or “apathetically,” which is untrue. It appears that

despite having been informed that the undersigned was working in

the courtroom, counsel for ALAMO demanded of the court’s

personnel to speak to the undersigned and proceeded to enter the

11
courtroom. Counsel for ALAMO, who appeared agitated, then asked

the undersigned as to when she would be ruling on his motions for

the discharge of attachment and to cite counsel for plaintiff RAM for

direct contempt. The undersigned informed him that as she had just

returned from a five-day official leave (not from travel abroad as

erroneously alleged by the complainant), she still had to review the

records of the case. The undersigned then reminded counsel for

ALAMO that it was improper to discuss the case in the absence of the

other party, and advised him to instead follow up the matter with the

court personnel at a later time. Thereafter, counsel for ALAMO left

the courtroom.

23.2. It must be noted that the above incident took place on

September 3, 2002, or the day after the hearing of the case on

September 2, 2002 during which the parties had agreed to have the

pending motion to lift the attachment submitted for resolution.

24. The allegations in paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 regarding the

filing of various motions by ALAMO’s counsel mentioned therein are

admitted on the basis of the records of Civil Case MC-02-1875.

25. The allegations in paragraphs 34 and 35 on the issuance of

the September 9, 2002 Omnibus Order are admitted; however, with

respect to the reasons for the issuance, these are set forth in the said

Order (Complainant’s EXHIBIT “Q”), the pertinent portions of which

state as follows:

12
 This resolves the following incidents presented by the
parties, to wit:
(1) Urgent motion for discharge of the attachment
accompanied by the submission of defendant’s
counter-bond to lift attachment dated July 24,
2002 conjointly with comment/opposition thereto
by the Plaintiff dated August 5, 2002;
(2) Defendant’s Urgent ex-parte motion for an early
resolution of defendant’s urgent motion for
discharge of attachment dated July 24, 2002
together with the comment thereto filed by the
plaintiff on September 6, 2002;
xxx
It appearing from the case records that the issues posed in
Nos. 1 and 2 are factually and legally linked, the court deems it
judicious to resolve them jointly. As borne out by the records, the
defendant through counsel is praying for the discharge of
attachment accompanied by the posting of a counter-bond pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 57 Section 12 thereof. The Plaintiff
through counsel on the other hand, opposed the discharge of
attachment contending that the motion should be deemed as a
mere scrap of paper for its failure to comply with the three-day
notice rule and further averred that the plaintiff’s administrative
manager has already requested the Land Transportation Office for
the dropping of their franchise with the LTFRB so they can convert
their vehicles from public utility to private in order to sell said cars.
Moreover, the plaintiff explained that a mere deposit in the amount
of P10,000.00, the defendant will readily reserve a car for any
prospective buyer. Be that as it may, the court however noticed
that it finds no compelling reason to rule upon the issue of whether
or not the attachment should be discharged in accordance with
Rule 57 Section 12 of the Rules of Court it appearing that the
plaintiff had seasonably raised in its comment/opposition dated
August 5, 2002 that the defendant’s instant motion to discharge
attachment is a mere scrap of paper for its failure to comply with
the mandatory three-day notice rule, an issue which this court
cannot simply ignore for it involves respect and adherence to the
rules of court. No less than the Honorable Supreme Court held in
the case of Manila Electric Co. vs. La Campana, 247 SCRA 77,
“that a motion that does not meet the requirements of section
4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper
which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the court
has no authority to act upon”. Thus, suffice it to state that failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements of three-day notice rule
is a FATAL FLAW. The fact that the court had taken cognizance of
the defective motion first, by requiring the parties to set it for
hearing and second when it denied the same for lack of merit in its
omnibus orders did not cure the defect nor alter the nature of the
defective motion. (Filipinas Fabricators vs. Magsino, 157 SCRA
469; cited Pojas vs. Gozo Dodole, G.R. No. 76519, December 21,
1990), 192 SCRA 575. Upon exhaustively traversing the
circumstances obtaining, the court finds no cogent reason to apply
the rules of liberal construction.
xxx

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 PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the court hereby
renders judgment:
(1) DENYING defendant’s urgent motion for discharge of the
attachment accompanied by the submission of
defendant’s counter-bond dated July 24, 2002 for failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court;
xxx

26. The allegations in paragraph 36 with respect to the

issuance of the Orders dated July 26, 2002 and August 8, 2002, are

admitted. The allegations in paragraphs 36 and 37 with respect to the

filing of various pleadings and motions by plaintiff RAM and

defendant ALAMO mentioned therein are admitted on the basis of the

records of Civil Case MC-02-1875. However, the undersigned has no

personal knowledge as to the veracity of the allegations pertaining to

the acts of Atty. Tenorio.

27. The allegations in paragraphs 38, 39 and 40 are admitted

with respect to (1) the fact that at the September 20, 2002 hearing,

only counsel for ALAMO appeared; and (2) the issuance of the Order

of September 20, 2002. The undersigned has no personal knowledge

as to the veracity of the allegations of the said paragraphs recounting

what counsel for ALAMO did in securing copies of the TSN and the

Order.

27.1. The allegations in paragraph 40 with respect to the filing

of the MANIFESTATION and SUPPLEMENTAL MANIFESTATION by

defendant ALAMO’s counsel are admitted on the basis of the records

of Civil Case MC-02-1875.

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 27.2. However, the other allegations of paragraphs 38, 39 and

40 on the version of counsel for ALAMO as to what happened at the

September 20, 2002 hearing are misleading and untrue. The portion

of the September 20, 2002 Order complained of correctly reflects

what took place and the action taken by the undersigned at the

hearing. Moreover, the portion referred to merely stated the non-

prejudicial fact that the undersigned would resolve the incident after

evaluation of the pleadings already submitted by the parties.

28. The allegations in paragraph 41 regarding the filing of a

VERY URGENT MOTION FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF

DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS MOTION dated September 17, 2002 by

ALAMO’s counsel are admitted on the basis of the records of Civil

Case MC-02-1875.

29. The allegations in paragraph 42 are admitted only with

respect to the filing of a MANIFESTATION dated September 27, 2002

by ALAMO’s counsel on the basis of the records of Civil Case MC-02-

1875. However, the undersigned has no personal knowledge as to

the veracity of the other allegations of the said paragraph.

30. The undersigned is in no position, and respectfully declines,

to comment on the allegations in paragraphs 43, 44 and 45, as the

same pertain to acts of counsel for plaintiff RAM being complained of

by ALAMO.

15
 31. The allegations in paragraph 46 on the issuance of the

September 27, 2002 Order are admitted. For accuracy as to the

matters contained therein, the Order (Complainant’s ANNEX “GG”)

states in full as follows:

Upon second call of this case today, both counsels are

already present and the several motions were in fact reviewed to
avoid confusion. It was noted in open court that there are five (5)
motions filed by Atty. Lim and two (2) corresponding replies on
September 20 and 24, 2002. However, Atty. Lim is requested to
please submit in writing before the close of office hours on
September 30, 2002 his two (2) manifestations that the vehicles
subject of this case were found in the office of the Counsel for the
plaintiff but later on it was not there anymore. Said counsel Atty.
Lim is given until September 30, 2002 before the close of office
hours at 4:30 p.m. to submit the said manifestation in writing and
Atty. Tenorio is given five (5) days from the said date or until
October 7, 2002 to submit her comments and/or objections to all
the seven (7) pleadings including the manifestations above
mentioned.
WHEREFORE, after the expiration of said period that is on
October 8, 2002, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution
by this court.
The setting on October 4, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. is hereby
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court this 27th day of September, 2002 at
Mandaluyong City, Philippines.

31.1. Thus, as may be gleaned from the above Order, there

were at least seven (7) (and possibly eleven (11)

motions/manifestations and other pleadings) which were to be

submitted for resolution of the court upon expiration of the period for

filing of all additional pleadings on October 8, 2002.

32. The allegations in paragraph 47 state as follows:

47. It has been ninety-five (95) days, or more than three

(3) months since we filed our URGENT MOTION FOR
DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT on July 25, 2002; and it has been

16
 twenty (20) days, or almost three (3) weeks since our repleaded
and reiterated URGENT MOTION FOR DISCHARGE OF
ATTACHMENT was deemed submitted for resolution. Yet to this
day, said matter has not yet been resolved;

32.1. The allegations of paragraph 47 are inaccurate and

misleading, for the following reasons:

32.2. Defendant ALAMO’s URGENT MOTION FOR

DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT filed on July 25, 2002 was resolved

by the undersigned in the Omnibus Order dated September 9, 2002.

32.3. As earlier stated, there were several motions and

incidents submitted for resolution as of October 8, 2002. Among

those was defendant ALAMO’s motion for reconsideration of the

Omnibus Order dated September 9, 2002.

32.4. And as will be seen below, the undersigned was still in the

process of studying the various pending motions and incidents when

defendant ALAMO filed on November 6, 2002 a motion for inhibition

addressed to the undersigned.

33. The allegations in paragraph 48 state as follows:

48. Since October 8, 2002, our counsel’s office has been

following-up with Branch 213 for any development, but everyday
they have been given the same answers, which are: “No new order
yet. The judge is still studying the matter”;

33.1. The undersigned has no personal knowledge as to the

veracity of the above allegations in paragraph 48 regarding the

follow-up efforts purportedly made by counsel for defendant ALAMO.

17
The undersigned admits, however, that she had been in the process

of studying the various pending motions and incidents submitted for

resolution as of October 8, 2002.

33.2. It may be noted that the Complaint-Affidavit in this case is

dated October 28, 2002 and notarized on October 29, 2002, or barely

three (3) weeks after the various motions and pleadings filed by the

parties were considered submitted for resolution by the undersigned.

33.3. However, before the undersigned could complete her

study of the various pending incidents mentioned above, defendant

ALAMO filed (1) on November 5, 2002, an “Ex-Parte Manifestation”

(a copy of which is attached as ANNEX “1”) to which was attached a

copy of the instant Complaint-Affidavit; and (2) on November 6, 2002,

a “Motion for Inhibition” (a copy of which is attached as ANNEX “2”)

praying that the undersigned inhibit herself from further hearing the

case.

33.4. On November 15, 2002, the undersigned issued an Order

(a copy of which is attached as ANNEX “3”) stating as follows:

Upon second call of this case today, both counsels who

were both notified are not in court, however, case records show
that Atty. Lloyd Chadwick Lim for defendant has filed an ex-parte
motion to have the case for inhibition submitted without further
arguments.
WHEREFORE, the motion for inhibition of this
representation from further hearing this case filed by Atty. Lim
although found to be without basis in fact and in law but solely to
give peace of mind to Atty. Lim, the same is hereby GRANTED.
The Branch Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to transmit
the case records to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial

18
 Court, Mandaluyong City, for the same to be re-raffled to another
court, soonest.
SO ORDERED.
City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, November 15, 2002.

33.5. Thus, in view of the above developments, and as a result

of defendant ALAMO’s motion for inhibition, the undersigned is no

longer handling Civil Case MC-02-1875.

34. Considering the above, the undersigned denies the charges

of serious misconduct and gross inefficiency as well as the alleged

violations of canons and rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct made

in the Complaint-Affidavit.

35. While a judge may be disciplined for a serious misconduct

or inefficiency, the word “misconduct” implies wrongful intention and

not mere error of judgment. For judicial misconduct to exist, there

must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts are corrupt or

inspired by an intention to violate the law or are in persistent

disregard of well-known legal rules. Such evidence is absolutely

absent in the instant case.

35.1. Thus, granting that complainant was dissatisfied with the

Orders issued by the undersigned in Civil Case MC-02-1875 in

connection with the writ of preliminary attachment, it is respectfully

submitted that the issuance thereof does not amount to serious

misconduct or gross inefficiency that would render the undersigned

administratively liable. The Orders were issued in good faith and, in

19
the honest opinion of the undersigned, on the basis of the applicable

rules, laws and jurisprudence. There is no proof or showing in the

Complaint-Affidavit that the alleged errors were attributable to a

conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.

36. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Orders

and acts of the undersigned complained of are indeed erroneous, the

Honorable Supreme Court has duly pointed out that:

Complainant's remedy is really judicial, not administrative,

and since he has already filed a petition in court for the annulment
of the order which he questions in this case, the Court concurs in
the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss this administrative
case. Indeed, we find no basis for finding respondent guilty of the
administrative charges levelled against him. For although
respondent judge's resolution suspending judgment on the motion
for demolition may be erroneous, the error can at most amount only
to an error of jurisdiction what in Rule 65, §1 of the Rules of Court
is termed "grave abuse of discretion." To warrant a finding of
ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, the error must be "so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad
faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision." (144
SCRA 462, 474-475 (1976); see also De la Cruz v. Concepcion,
235 SCRA 597 (1994); Roa v. Imbing, 231 SCRA 59 (1994)) The
error must be "so grave and on so fundamental a point as to
warrant condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or
negligent." (Negado v. Autojay, 222 SCRA 295, 297 (1993))
Otherwise, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that the judge
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and that would be
intolerable.
(Bengzon v. Adaoag, 250 SCRA 344 [1995].)

37. Moreover, as noted commentator Ruben E. Agpalo states:

Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of

his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Sixth Ed., pp. 462-463, citing various
cases.)

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 -oOo-
A judge may not, however, be held liable for erroneous ruling
or decision issued in good faith, which is presumed in the absence
of proof to the contrary. Hence, the fact that a judge abused his
discretion in issuing the order complained of does not necessarily
follow that he acted in bad faith nor does it necessarily mean a
willful disregard of a litigant’s right. Where the judge’s conclusions
in his decision are not without logic, it cannot be said that he is
incompetent. Nor can it be said that a judge, who made findings
unsupported by evidence without, however, proof that it was due to
an intention to violate well-known rules or law or who reconsidered
the judgment objected to as having been rendered in ignorance of
law, committed a serious misconduct as to make him
administratively liable therefor.
In other words, a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment, unless there is proof that the error was attributable to a
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. For as a
matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. This
does not mean, however, that he should not evince due care in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. Good faith and absence
of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the
law and promulgation of unjust decision from being held
accountable for errors of judgment on the premise that no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration
of justice can be infallible.
(Agpalo, supra, at pp. 465-466, citing various cases.)

38. Prescinding from the above, complainant has failed to

substantiate the charges in the instant case. The rule is that for

charges of judicial misconduct to prosper there must be a showing of

serious misconduct or inefficiency, and as proceedings of this

character are in their nature highly penal in character, the charges

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

Impeachment proceedings against judges are penal in

nature and are governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.
The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It has been held, however, that the quantum of proof required to
establish charges of misconduct against a judge is more than
substantial for the reason that administrative charges against him
are in their nature highly penal in character. For serious
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that

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 the judicial acts are corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law or are in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
xxx
Absent the quantum of evidence required, the charges
against a judge should be dismissed.
(Agpalo, supra, at pp. 469-470, citing various cases.)

39. Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that the filing of the

instant complaint violates the rule that the existence and availability of

judicial remedies preclude a party’s resort to criminal, civil or

administrative proceedings against a judge. As the Honorable

Supreme Court explained at length in one case:

3. Even assuming arguendo that there was reasonable

ground for belief on Flores' part that Judge Abesamis was refraining
from acting on his motions, out of bias or hostility or other improper
motive, there were obvious judicial remedies readily available to
him to obtain relief–the existence and availability of which
precluded his resort to criminal, civil or administrative proceedings
against the Judge.

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial

remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies
against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of
a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The
extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a
motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case
may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.

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 Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of
criminal action) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific
modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or
orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had caused him
"undue injury." This is impermissible, as this Court had already
more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that "administrative or
criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial
review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof" (See In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417-418
[1987]; In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995].)
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject
to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule,
which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are
not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their
jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of
a judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a
competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and * * * also
evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or
order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of
the Civil Code (SEE In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, at pp. 464-465).

Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted

in 1989 and 1990 to the administrative procedure for disciplining
Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal prosecution,
notwithstanding that determination of the correctness of the orders
of Judges Abesamis and Regino–upon which the viability of his
recourse depended–had not yet been made by the Court of
Appeals or this Court before which said orders were then pending
review. For obviously, until and unless there was an authoritative
pronouncement that those orders were indeed tainted by anomaly,
as was his contention, there was no ground whatever to prosecute
Judge Abesamis or Regino, either administratively or criminally, for
rendering them. In fine, Flores filed his administrative and criminal
complaints prematurely, before ascertainment of the existence of
foundation therefor; and it would appear that improper motives
underlay the filing of his complaints: either to vent his wrath against
someone, anyone, because of his frustrations in his attempts to
regain possession of the cockpit, or to so intimidate the respondent
Judges as to make them more malleable in their subsequent
actuations with respect to his future motions.

(Flores v. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302 [1997].)

40. The above rules apply to the instant case. There were

obvious judicial remedies readily available to complainant to obtain

relief from the Orders and acts of the undersigned complained of,

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such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for inhibition. Complainant

had in fact availed himself of the latter, but only after the filing of the

instant administrative complaint. Therefore, the resort to the instant

administrative proceeding is clearly in violation of the prohibition laid

down by the Honorable Supreme Court in Flores v. Abesamis,

supra, and the cases cited therein.

41. In view of the foregoing, it is therefore respectfully

submitted that the complaint-affidavit is baseless and devoid of merit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

December 23, 2002. Mandaluyong City.

AMALIA F. DY
Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213

EXPLANATION
This Comment is being served upon the complainant by registered mail for
reasons of convenience and expediency, personal service being impracticable
due to time, personnel and distance constraints.

AMALIA F. DY

Copy Furnished:

ALAMO TRANSPORT LEASING SERVICES

C/o Mr. Carlitos V. Clavano
Alamo Bldg. 0211 Quirino Avenue
Tambo, Paranaque City

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