DOLO v.

CULPA

FELONIES

Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem
proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of
a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
(As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - the following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.

2. A person under nine years of age.

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment,
in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of
Art. 80 of this Code.

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with
the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody
of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be
committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.

G.R. No. 177218               October 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family
dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was
further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace.
Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for
the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not
by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his
anger.

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries,
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired.
Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This
declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence.

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so
Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay
captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer
on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"25 which is the essence of voluntary
surrender.

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With
one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was
thus proper.

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the
penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of
exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all
monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

G.R. No. 152133             February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with
two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to
their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the
latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus,
upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan
then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left
side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back.
Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already
holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home.

Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By
nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and
his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a
piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later
vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and
shortly thereafter, he died.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum

The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.

Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13
February 1996. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996.

CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.

He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the
spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the
possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.

(1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The
entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the
upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same
triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the
victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre,
in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the
spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible
external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an
obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen
can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause
of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate
cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."

This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute
suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. We reiterate the rule that
the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression
is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender –

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this
Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as
rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of
the victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a
maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional.

G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978

MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did
not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer,
in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that
she did not do what she had done with criminal intent.

After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes
necessary for conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to
acquittal.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being
dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting exdelicto.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the judgment
of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries
requiring four to six days' healing time inflicted upon the victim.

I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the offense of
slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"(T)he relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government,
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the Heart and mind
of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those
who exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual further categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking,
or pushing pupils about)."

It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis may,
without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate
punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively, in the parents.

The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as
having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provisions of law she may not be
absolved of the proven charge.

The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the degree
of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for
Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws and rules
which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their
pupils but provide for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts,
which as pointed out by Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted by petitioner
on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate" (even assuming that teachers had the
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment).

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General practically argues that a
good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal
liability.

Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which may prompt or induce a
person to perform the act constituting a crime (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result,
as distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result
(People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193).

A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be
convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is
proven. A good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime.

Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the cloak
of the parental privilege, "treat their children with excessive harshness" which is a cause for
deprivation or suspension of their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p.
5368).

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student, are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student (emphasis supplied).
MUÑOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is punishable by law.   Every
1

felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary with all three elements present, to wit: freedom,
intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault (culpa).   Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or
2

threat;   intelligence, by insanity or infancy;   intent, by proof of mistake of fact, performance of duty,
3 4

or the like.

But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by
protestation of good faith and honest belief of petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for
the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that
petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of anger"   because Benedicta
6

Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of
the accused (petitioner now) for several years."  7

In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege Benedicta, motivated
petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.

Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did was to impose a
"moderate penalty" on Wilma.

Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with such vehemence and
force as to produce not one or two but seven linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right
thigh which according to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting
physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline was
necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of bodily punishment which would leave
injuries on the person of the recalcitrant pupil.

Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.

G.R. No. 137268            March 26, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother

Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga,
ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUÑEZ @ Rey Nuñez, accused-
appellants.

CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head
injury and/or traumatic chest injury.

On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of
P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are, however, credited in full during the
whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing that they will abide by all
the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it is
presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did
commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar
had contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the
head of the victim into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all
the consequences even if the result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It
is pointed out that in P. v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting
physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. In murder
qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if
the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. 

First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual
performed over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the
victim's parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded
to subject the boy to a "treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body.
Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had
no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they
ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to
intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or
intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill
taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which,
because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the
latter's death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong
to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith
healing.

Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they
can.

Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of
Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

G.R. Nos. 120744-46               June 25, 2012

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera,
Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations
between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the
religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who
was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With
Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney,
Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were
approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup
were both wounded and bleeding profusely.

Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be employees of
San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this
point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as
he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and,
returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were
being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva
20 

who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St.
Francis Hospital.

Yapyuco’s version:

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him
that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective
strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del
Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members
convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his
suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where
the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came
much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping,
the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police
officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence
38 

they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting
from the direction of Naron’s house directly at the subject jeepney.

Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his
men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From
there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who
fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.

Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in
bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been
ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account
41 

of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein. That night, he said, his group which
42 

responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan
Police Substation,  the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by
43 

Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. He denied that
44 

they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney
would have been killed.  He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney
45 

did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in
the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the
spot on the road where they were assembled.

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares of the
costs of said action.

II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the
information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson,
Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.

III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in
relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance
present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of
₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.

SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the
guise of maintaining peace and order; that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting,
54 

which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent
to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their
defense of lawful performance of official duty; that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
55 

benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or
probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members, and
they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did; that there was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume
56 

that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police
operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario
Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.

The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the position of the Tamaraw
jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right
side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit
Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots were
fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and
the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be
positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged. 61

The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing

to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the
gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and
injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger
side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and inside
the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the
lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners.

As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the
aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup
began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate
and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident
premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from
Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to
be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.

Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for 60 days
which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; that he was earning ₱8,350.00
68 

monthly; and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney. Also, Teodoro
69  70 

Licup had stated that his family had spent ₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during
the wake, ₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the prosecution of
these cases. He also submitted a certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of
71 

his deceased son. On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to
72 

indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and ₱120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased
Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.

Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of
conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled
themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be
coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon
demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged. It believes that
83 

criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road that would
give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the
Tamaraw jeepney. This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores
84 

and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence. It refutes the
85 

invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the
belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown
that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that
the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David,
it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw
jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals instead.

It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not
by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that
the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not there was
intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had discharged the
bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and
106 

negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed
with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts
107 

to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense charged
for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary
consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it
must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or
duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case.

The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for
which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw
or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should
be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires
nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains
to other government officers or agencies.

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed.

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah
Chong, but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical
127 

circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his
instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his
bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but
at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that
he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding
that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." x x x

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the
rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be,
the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the
extreme measure.

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the
commission of the act. In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must
137 

prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal
act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide;
and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with
intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors
before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

Petitioners’ affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was
Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their
(petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the
suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a
relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel
Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He
also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against
members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA
members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate
that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in
court emerged.

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice. People v. Guillen and
147  148 

People v. Nanquil  declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
149 

with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo, we held that that there can be no
150 

frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of
intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.

Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,
likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.

They did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side
of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells
which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the
injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s
conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service
firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively responsible for the
consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.

Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas
an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases
are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan
has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one
(1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the
indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as
well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

ACCIDENTS

ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are exempt
from criminal liability:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

[G.R. NO. 150647 : September 29, 2004]

ROWENO POMOY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without
any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting
upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of
said victim thereafter.

"Erna Basa:
"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at
about past 2 o'clock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and
exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened
the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of
the gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while
grappling were two to three meters away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the
gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was
not certain who pulled the gun.

"Eden Legaspi:

"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the
investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o'clock that same
afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on the
bench; when the commotion started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion
that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she saw two
persons grappling for the possession of a gun and immediately two successive shots rang out;
she did not leave the place where she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of
the two men fall down

CA Ruling

In the instant case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the
victim when the former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that
the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial
court's finding that the said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his
public position to commit the crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and
no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. 

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:

"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intent of causing it.

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due
to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been
foreseen or controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident,
courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence.

The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the
scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely
tried to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the
weapon was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun,
both hands of petitioner were fully engaged - - his right hand was trying to maintain possession
of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how,
under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety
lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.

More significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is
very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-
automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when
possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.

The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act
with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the
accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all
these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member - -
specifically, one of the investigators - - of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the
Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the
latter's cell for a routine interrogation.

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner
- - an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code - - a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner

is ACQUITTED.

No costs.

U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil 489

1. When was the alleged crime committed? – Is this an important fact in the story of
Ah Chong?
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter
the room, I will kill you."

2. What are the essential facts for the case of Ah Chong?

Ah Chong, was employed as a cook. The deceased, Pascual, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of
the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. 
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had retired for the
night, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up
in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark,
and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called
out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who,
it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook;
and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his
pillow for his personal protection.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day. He was charged with the
crime of assassination. During the trial, the defendant invokes self-defense as he was merely
trying to defend himself from someone whom he believes to be a robber
The trial court convicted the accused for the crime of homicide.

3. How did the Trial Court resolve the case of Ah Chong? Cite the page where it is
written.
(Pages 491 and 492)

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
 (1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

4. What is the difference between “Article 8” and “Article 1” as discussed on page 492
and 495? What is “mistake of fact” as discussed on page 493? What is Article 568 as
discussed in page 497?

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,

even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption
of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power,
7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element
of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a
less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which
case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider
proper.

5. What was the Supreme Court ruling upon? Cite the page to justify your answer.

(Page 506)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was
in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge;
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant
at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated,
with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

6. What is the gist of the discussion regarding the man “masked and disguised as a
footpad” on page 501 to 502?

Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the
same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."

7. What is the gist of the discussion of “Question III” from page 503 to 504?

"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have
executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed
was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc."

8. What was the dissent of Torres, J. all about?

The crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal
Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while
the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real
negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the
defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted
him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife
the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused
should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer
the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE V. RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

1. RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. — Reckless imprudence consists in doing or not doing voluntarily but
without malice an act from which material injury results on account of lack of foresight, for which the
person executing or omitting it can have no excuse.

2. HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE; DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED. — The

degree of precaution and diligence required of an individual in any given case so as to avoid being
charged with recklessness varies with the degree of the danger. If the degree to do harm to a person
or to another’s property, on account of a certain line of conduct is great, the individual who chooses
to follow that particular course of conduct is compelled to be very careful in order to prevent causing
a harm that could be avoided. On the other hand, if the danger is small, very little care is required. It
thus results that there are infinite degrees of precaution or diligence, from the most slight and
instantaneous thought or the transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort and care; and as to
the duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care in such cases will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case.

3. SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE AND RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE DISTINGUISHED. — The weight of

authority supports the proposition that where mediate personal harm, preventable in the exercise of
reasonable care, is threatened upon a human being by reason of the course of conduct pursued by
another, and the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the author, the failure to use
reasonable care to prevent the impending injury constitutes reckless imprudence. On the other hand,
simple imprudence is a mere lack of precaution in those cases where either the threatened harm is
not imminent or the danger is not openly visible.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NARCISO VISTAN Y DE LA

CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

That on or about the 10th day of April, 1920, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, while street car
No. 203 of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. was receiving passengers at the intersection of
M. H. del Pilar and Isaac Peral Streets of this city, said accused, who was then and there the
conductor in charge of said street car, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with
reckless imprudence signal the motorman to go ahead without minding and without taking into
account that one Hugo Borromeo, whom he could then see was at that very moment about to board
the car with one foot on the running board, thereby causing the said Hugo Borromeo to be thrown
down by the jerk of the moving car and his foot overrun by the rear wheels of said car No. 203 upon
falling on the ground, with the result that his left foot was crushed and injured to such an extent as to
require medical attendance and prevent the said offended party from engaging in his habitual work
for a period of more than ninety days; that due to said accident Hugo Borromeo lost his left foot
which had to be amputated. Contrary to law.

"The distinction between simple imprudence, which is a constitutive element of a misdemeanor

under article 590 of the Penal Code, and rash imprudence, which is a constitutive element of the
offense punishable under article 568 of the same Code, is not clearly indicated in the books; but we
think the weight of authority will be found to support the proposition that where immediate personal
harm, preventable in the exercise of reasonable care, is threatened to a human being by reason of a
course of conduct which is being pursued by another, and the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor, the failure to use reasonable care to prevent the threatened injury
constitutes reckless negligence.

"Simple imprudence, on the other hand, is a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the
threatened harm is not immediate or the danger is not openly visible The following is cited in Viada
as a case of simple imprudence: A man goes hunting and raises his gun to shoot at a bird. Upon
lowering the gun without firing, he negligently fails to lower the hammer; and while the gun is being
thus carried cocked, it is accidentally discharged with the result that a person casually in range of the
gun is wounded. As will be seen in this case, although there is imprudence on the part of the hunter,
there is not a conscious advertance to the danger to which the other person is being subjected.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the act
of the accused in giving the order to start the car, when the offended party had his hands already on
the holding devices of the car and his foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or
negligence, but does not show grave fault amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused
having acted with simple imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty provided by article 590,
case No. 4, of the Penal Code.
The judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused and appellant is sentenced to pay a fine
of 60 pesetas and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
censure, with the costs of this instance de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 171636               April 7, 2009

NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a
two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog
in Misamis Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity.5 At the time several students were
coming out of the school premises.6 Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata
(Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of
the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down
petitioner’s jeepney7 which was traveling on the right lane of the road.8 However, neither did
petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to
ride at that point.9

The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which,
he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney.10 Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub),
who was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard "a
strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle
an obstacle."11 Dayata was then seen lying on the ground12 and caught in between the rear
tires.13 Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the
right side.14

Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the
victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim.15 Mellalos loaded the
victim on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan
Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice
of its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.16

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death.17 She
testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification in that it found petitioner
guilty only of simple negligence resulting in homicide.

The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative
events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first
stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and
ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the
moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a
halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.

In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two
eyewitnesses. Petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on
the left side.

However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for
failing to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate
court was referring to the second stage of the incident.

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim’s death
was petitioner’s alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

If at all again, petitioner’s failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of
one’s victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not
covered by the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision would be
tantamount to a denial of due process.

Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The award of damages must
also be deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple
Negligence Resulting in Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals and of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of the MCTC of Laguindingan,
Misamis Oriental.

1avvphi1 .zw