1h Weimar Republic

6/1/23, 10:55 PM Weimar Republic - Wikipedia
Weimar Republic
Coordinates: 52°31′12″N 13°22′30″E
The Weimar Republic,[b] officially named the German Reich, was a

historical period of Germany from 9 November 1918 to 23 March German Reich
1933, during which it was a constitutional federal republic for the first Deutsches Reich
time in history; hence it is also referred to, and unofficially proclaimed
itself, as the German Republic.[c] The period's informal name is 1918–1933[1][2][3]
derived from the city of Weimar, which hosted the constituent
assembly that established its government. In English, the republic was
usually simply called "Germany", with "Weimar Republic" (a term
introduced by Adolf Hitler in 1929) not commonly used until the
1930s.
Following the devastation of the First World War (1914–1918), Flag

(1919–1933) Coat of arms
Germany was exhausted and sued for peace in desperate (1919–1928)
circumstances. Awareness of imminent defeat sparked a revolution, the
abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, formal surrender to the Allies, and the Motto: Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit
("Unity and Justice and Freedom")
proclamation of the Weimar Republic on 9 November 1918.[7]
Anthem: Das Lied der Deutschen
In its initial years, grave problems beset the Republic, such as "The Song of the Germans"
hyperinflation and political extremism, including political murders and (from 1922)
two attempted seizures of power by contending paramilitaries; 3:37
internationally, it suffered isolation, reduced diplomatic standing and
contentious relationships with the great powers. By 1924, a great deal
of monetary and political stability was restored, and the republic
enjoyed relative prosperity for the next five years; this period,
sometimes known as the Golden Twenties, was characterised by
significant cultural flourishing, social progress, and gradual
improvement in foreign relations. Under the Locarno Treaties of 1925,
Germany moved toward normalising relations with its neighbours,
recognising most territorial changes under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
and committing to never go to war. The following year, it joined the
League of Nations, which marked its reintegration into the
international community.[8][9] Nevertheless, especially on the political
right, there remained strong and widespread resentment against the
treaty and those who had signed and supported it.
The Great Depression of October 1929 severely impacted Germany's Weimar Republic in 1930
tenuous progress; high unemployment and subsequent social and
political unrest led to the collapse of Chancellor Hermann Müller's
grand coalition and the beginning of the presidential cabinets. From
March 1930 onwards, President Paul von Hindenburg used emergency
powers to back Chancellors Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and
General Kurt von Schleicher. The Great Depression, exacerbated by
Brüning's policy of deflation, led to a surge in unemployment.[10] On
30 January 1933, Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as Chancellor to
head a coalition government; Hitler's far-right Nazi Party held two out
of ten cabinet seats. Von Papen, as Vice-Chancellor and Hindenburg's
confidant, was to serve as the éminence grise who would keep Hitler
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimar_Republic 1/33
under control; these intentions badly underestimated Hitler's political

abilities. By the end of March 1933, the Reichstag Fire Decree and the
Enabling Act of 1933 were used in the perceived state of emergency to
effectively grant the new Chancellor broad power to act outside
parliamentary control. Hitler promptly used these powers to thwart
constitutional governance and suspend civil liberties, which brought
about the swift collapse of democracy at the federal and state level, and
the creation of a one-party dictatorship under his leadership.
Until the end of World War II in Europe in 1945, the Nazis governed
Germany under the pretense that all the extraordinary measures and
laws they implemented were constitutional; notably, there was never an
attempt to replace or substantially amend the Weimar constitution. German States in 1925 (with Prussia and its
Nevertheless, Hitler's seizure of power (Machtergreifung) had provinces shown in blue)
effectively ended the republic, replacing its constitutional framework
Capital Berlin
with Führerprinzip, the principle that "the Führer's word is above all
and largest city 52°31′N 13°23′E
written law".
Official languages German
Name and symbols Common languages Unofficial: [show]

Low German, Polish,
The Weimar Republic is so called because the assembly that adopted Limburgish, Frisian,
its constitution met in Weimar from 6 February to 11 August 1919,[11] Yiddish, Danish, Sorbian,
but this name only became mainstream after 1933. Sinte Romani, Lithuanian
Religion 1925 census:[4]

64.1% Protestant
Terminology (Lutheran, Reformed,
United)
Between 1919 and 1933, no single name for the new state gained 32.4% Roman Catholic
widespread acceptance, thus the old name Deutsches Reich was
0.9% Jewish
officially retained, although hardly anyone used it during the Weimar
2.6% Other
period.[12] To the right of the spectrum, the politically engaged rejected
the new democratic model and were appalled to see the honour of the Demonym(s) German
traditional word Reich associated with it.[13] Zentrum, the Catholic
Government Federal representative
Centre Party, favoured the term Deutscher Volksstaat (German People's
semi-presidential republic
State),[d] while on the moderate left Chancellor Friedrich Ebert's Social (1919–1930)
Democratic Party of Germany preferred Deutsche Republik (German Federal authoritarian
Republic).[13] By the mid-1920s, most Germans referred to their presidential republic under
government informally as the Deutsche Republik, but for many, a Parliamentary system
especially on the right, the word "Republik" was a painful reminder of (1930–1933)
a government structure that they believed had been imposed by foreign President
statesmen and of the expulsion of Kaiser Wilhelm in the wake of a • 1919–1925 Friedrich Ebert
massive national humiliation.[13] • 1925–1933 Paul von Hindenburg
Chancellor
The first recorded mention of the term Republik von Weimar (Republic • 1919 (first) Philipp Scheidemann
of Weimar) came during a speech delivered by Adolf Hitler at a Nazi
• 1933 (last) Adolf Hitler
Party rally in Munich on 24 February 1929. A few weeks later, the term
Weimarer Republik was first used again by Hitler in a newspaper Legislature Bicameral
article.[12] Only during the 1930s did the term become mainstream, • Upper house Reichsrat (de facto)
both within and outside Germany. • Lower house Reichstag
Historical era Interwar period

According to historian Richard J. Evans:[14]
• Established 9 November 1918
• Constitution 11 August 1919
The continued use of the term 'German Empire', Deutsches • Admitted to the 8 September 1926
Reich, by the Weimar Republic ... conjured up an image League of Nations
among educated Germans that resonated far beyond the • Rule by decree 29 March 1930[5]
institutional structures Bismarck created: the successor to begins
the Roman Empire; the vision of God's Empire here on • Hitler inaugurated 30 January 1933
earth; the universality of its claim to suzerainty; and a Chancellor
more prosaic but no less powerful sense, the concept of a • Reichstag fire 27 February 1933
German state that would include all German speakers in • Enabling Act 23 March 1933[1][2][3]
central Europe—'one People, one Reich, one Leader', as Area
the Nazi slogan was to put it.
1925[6] 468,787 km2
(181,000 sq mi)
Population
Flag and coat of arms
• 1925[6] 62,411,000
The black-red-gold tricolor of the 1848 German revolutions was

• Density 133.129/km2 (344.8/sq mi)
named as the national flag in the Weimar Constitution.[15] It was Currency 1919–23 "Papiermark" (ℳ)
abolished in 1935 after the Nazi Party had come to power. The coat of 1923–24 Rentenmark (RM)
arms was initially based on the Reichsadler ("imperial eagle") 1924–33 Reichsmark (ℛℳ)
introduced by the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, and announced in
November 1911. In 1928, a new design by Karl-Tobias Schwab was
Preceded by Succeeded by
adopted as national coat of arms, which was used until being replaced
by the Nazi's Reichsadler in 1935, and readopted by the Federal German Empire Nazi Germany
Republic of Germany in 1950.
Today part of Germany
Poland
Armed forces
Russia[a]
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, several million soldiers of Lithuania
the Imperial German Army either simply dispersed on their own or
were formally demobilized. The provisional civilian government and the Supreme
Army Command (OHL) planned to transfer the remaining units to a peacetime army.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the new army, the Reichswehr, was limited
to 100,000 men and the Reichsmarine (navy), to 15,000. The treaty prohibited an air
force, submarines, large warships and armoured vehicles.[16]
The official formation of the Reichswehr took place on 1 January 1921, after the
limitations had been met. The soldiers of the Reichswehr took their oath to the Weimar Reichskriegsflagge during the
Constitution. The commander-in-chief was the Reich president, while the Reich Weimar period
minister of the armed forces exercised command authority. Military right of command
(Kommandogewalt) was in the hands of the OHL. The resulting dualism between
civilian power and military command was to become a heavy burden on the Republic. Whereas Reichswehr Minister Otto
Gessler was content with limited political and administrative duties during his tenure (1920–1928), Hans von Seeckt, Chief of
Army Command from 1920 to 1926, succeeded in largely removing the Reichswehr from the control of the Reichstag. Under
Seeckt the Reichswehr developed into a "state within the state".[17][18]
During the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Seeckt refused to deploy the Reichswehr against the Freikorps involved in the putsch[19] but
immediately afterwards had the Ruhr Red Army brutally suppressed during the Ruhr uprising. The Reichswehr also organized
the so-called "Black Reichswehr", a secret reserve of personnel networked with paramilitary formations, which the Reichswehr
saw itself as leading.[20] It developed far-reaching cooperation with the Soviet Red Army, leading to the secret training of
German military pilots in clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles.[21]
With Seeckt's fall in 1926, the Reichswehr made a change in course for which Colonel Kurt von Schleicher was primarily
responsible. The goal was to arouse broad social support for rearmament and to militarize society itself for the purpose of
future warfare.[22] Under Paul von Hindenburg's Reich presidency, Reichswehr leadership gained increasing political influence
and eventually helped determine the composition of the Reich governments. As a result, the Reichswehr contributed
significantly to the development of an authoritarian presidential system during the final phase of the Weimar Republic.[23]
In 1935, two years after Adolf Hitler's rise to power, the Reichswehr was renamed Wehrmacht. It was the unified armed forces
of the Nazi regime.
History
Background
Germany and the Central Powers fought the Allies of WWI between 28 July 1914 and 11 November 1918. The war ended with
20 million military and civilian deaths,[24] including 2,037,000 German soldiers[25] and from 424,000[26] to 763,000[27][28]
civilians, many of them from disease and starvation as a result of the Allied blockade of Germany.
After four years of war on multiple fronts in Europe and around the world, the final Allied offensive began in August 1918,
and the position of Germany and the Central Powers deteriorated,[29][30] leading them to sue for peace. After initial offers were
rejected by the Allied Powers, the hunger and privation of the war years came together with the awareness of an impending
military defeat[31] to help spark the German Revolution. On 9 November 1918, a republic was proclaimed,[32]: 90 and the
abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II was announced,[33][32]: 85–86 marking the end of Imperial Germany and the beginning of the
Weimar Republic. The armistice that ended the fighting was signed on 11 November.
Germany lost the war because its allies were facing defeat and its economic resources were running out, while by late summer
1918 fresh American troops were arriving in France at the rate of 10,000 per day. Support among the population had begun to
crumble in 1916, and by mid-1918 many Germans wanted an end to the war. Increasing numbers of them began to associate
with the political left, such as the Social Democratic Party and the more radical Independent Social Democratic Party, which
demanded an end to the war. When it became obvious to the generals that defeat was at hand, General Erich Ludendorff
convinced the Kaiser that Germany needed to pursue an armistice and that the majority parties in the Reichstag, not the OHL,
had to take responsibility for it.[34] Although in retreat, the German armies were still on French and Belgian territory when the
war ended on 11 November. Ludendorf and Paul von Hindenburg then began proclaiming that it was the defeatism of the
civilian population – especially the socialists – that had made defeat inevitable. The stab-in-the-back myth was spread by the
Right throughout the 1920s and ensured that many monarchists and conservatives would refuse to support the government of
what they called the "November criminals".[35] The destabilising effect of the stab-in-the-back myth on the Weimar democracy
was an important factor in the rise of National Socialism.[36]
November Revolution (1918–1919)
On 29 October 1918, a rebellion broke out among sailors at Wilhelmshaven; similar

unrest then spread to become the Kiel mutiny on 3 November. Sailors, soldiers and
workers began electing workers' and soldiers' councils (Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte)
modelled after the Soviets of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The revolution spread
throughout Germany, and participants seized military and civil power in individual
cities.[37] The power takeovers were achieved everywhere without loss of life.
At the time, the socialist movement, which represented mostly labourers, was split Sailors during the mutiny in Kiel,
among two major left-wing parties: the Independent Social Democratic Party of November 1918
Germany (USPD), which called for immediate peace negotiations and favoured a
soviet-style command economy, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD),
also known as the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany (MSPD), which had supported the war and favoured a
parliamentary system. The rebellion caused great fear among supporters of the monarchy and in the middle classes because of
the soviet-style aspirations of the councils. To centrist and conservative citizens, the country looked to be on the verge of a
communist revolution.[38]
By 7 November the revolution had reached Munich, resulting in the flight of King Ludwig III of Bavaria.[39] The MSPD
decided to make use of their support at the grassroots level and put themselves at the front of the movement. They joined the
calls for Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicate, and when he refused, Chancellor Maximilian of Baden made a public announcement that
the Kaiser and Crown Prince Wilhelm had already done so.[40] Gustav Noske (MSPD) was sent to Kiel to prevent any further
unrest and took on the task of controlling the mutinous sailors and their supporters in the Kiel barracks. The sailors and
soldiers welcomed him, and he was able to defuse the situation.[41]
On 9 November 1918, the German Republic was proclaimed by MSPD member Philipp
Scheidemann at the Reichstag building in Berlin, angering Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the
MSPD, who thought that the question of monarchy or republic should be answered by a
national assembly.[42] Two hours later, a Free Socialist Republic was proclaimed at the Berlin
Palace. The proclamation was issued by Karl Liebknecht, co-leader with Rosa Luxemburg of
the communist Spartakusbund (Spartacus League), a group of a few hundred supporters of the
Russian Revolution that had allied itself with the USPD in 1917.[43] On the same day, in a
move that was contrary to the constitution because only the Kaiser could appoint a chancellor,
Prince Max of Baden, at Ebert's request, transferred his powers as chancellor to him.[44] In
view of the mass support for more radical reforms among the workers' councils, a coalition
government called the Council of the People's Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) was
established, consisting of three MSPD and three USPD members. Led by Ebert for the MSPD
and Hugo Haase for the USPD, it governed Germany from November 1918 to January
1919.[45] Although the new government was confirmed by the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers'
Council, it was opposed by the Spartacus League.
Philipp Scheidemann
On 11 November 1918, an armistice was signed at Compiègne
proclaiming the German
by German representatives. It effectively ended military Republic from the Reichstag
operations between the Allies and Germany. It amounted to a building
German capitulation, without any concessions by the Allies; the
naval blockade was to continue until complete peace terms
were agreed on.[46]
The Executive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Greater Berlin called for a
National Congress of Councils (Reichsrätekongress) which took place from 16 to 21 December
1918. Against the opposition of the more radical members who demanded a socialist republic,
Ebert, backed by the large MSPD majority at the Congress, was able to schedule elections for a
provisional National Assembly that would act as an interim parliament and be given the task of
writing a democratic constitution for a parliamentary government.[47]
Philipp Scheidemann
addresses a crowd from a
To ensure that the fledgling government maintained control over the country, Ebert and General
window of the Reich Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor as leader of the Supreme Army Command (OHL),
Chancellery, 9 November concluded the secret Ebert–Groener pact on 10 November. Over the telephone, Ebert promised
1918 that he would allow sole command of the troops to remain with the officer corps, while Groener
pledged that the military would be loyal to the government and that it would help it in its fight
against left-wing revolutionaries.[48] The agreement marked the acceptance of the new
government by the military, but the new Reichswehr armed forces, limited by the Treaty of Versailles to 100,000 army soldiers
and 15,000 sailors, remained fully under the control of the German officer class.[49]
A rift developed between the MSPD and USPD after Ebert called upon the OHL for troops to put down a mutiny by a leftist
military unit on 23/24 December 1918 in which members of the Volksmarinedivision (People's Navy Division) captured the
city's garrison commander Otto Wels of the USPD and occupied the Reich Chancellery where the Council of the People's
Deputies had its offices. The ensuing street fighting left 11 Volksmarinedivision members and 56 members of the regular army
dead.[50] The USPD leaders were angered by what they believed was treachery by the MSPD, which in their view had joined
with the anti-communist military to suppress the revolution. As a result, the USPD left the Council of the People's Deputies
after only seven weeks. On 30 December, the split deepened when the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was formed out of
a number of radical left-wing groups, including the Spartacus League and the left wing of the USPD.[43]
In January, the Spartacus League, in what was known as the Spartacist uprising, took advantage of a large strike in Berlin and
attempted to establish a communist government. The uprising was put down by paramilitary Freikorps units consisting of
volunteer soldiers. Following bloody street fights, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were summarily killed after their
arrests on 15 January.[51] With the affirmation of Ebert, those responsible were not tried before a court-martial, leading to
lenient sentences, which made Ebert unpopular among radical leftists.
The National Assembly elections, in which women were allowed to vote for the first time, took place on 19 January 1919.[52]
The MSPD won the largest share of the votes at 37.9%, with the USPD fifth at 7.6%.[53] To avoid the ongoing fights in Berlin,
the National Assembly convened in the city of Weimar, giving the future Republic its unofficial name. The Weimar
Constitution created a parliamentary republic

with the Reichstag elected by proportional
representation.[54]
During the debates in Weimar, fighting

continued sporadically across Germany. On 7
April 1919 the Bavarian Soviet Republic was
declared in Munich but quickly put down by
Freikorps and remnants of the regular army. The
Official postcard of the National Chart of the Weimar Constitution of
fall of the Munich Soviet Republic to these
Assembly 11 August 1919. It replaced the law
units, many of which were on the extreme right,
resulted in the growth of far-right, antisemitic concerning the provisional Reich
movements and organisations in Bavaria, including Organisation Consul, the Nazi power of 10 February 1919.
Party, and societies of exiled Russian monarchists.[55] Revolutionary sentiment also
arose in the eastern states where interethnic discontent between Germans and minority
Poles led to the Silesian Uprisings and the Greater Poland uprising in the German Province of Posen, which became part of the
Second Polish Republic under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.[56]
Years of crisis (1919–1923)
Burden from the First World War
In the four years following the First World War, the situation of most German civilians remained dire. The post-war economic
crisis was a result of lost pre-war industrial exports, the loss of imported raw materials and foodstuffs due to the continental
blockade, the loss of Germany's overseas colonies and the worsening debt balances that had been exacerbated by Germany's
heavy reliance on bonds to pay for the war. The economic losses can be attributed in part to the extension of the Allied
blockade of Germany until the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. It is estimated that between 100,000[57] and
250,000[58] German civilians died of disease or starvation between the end of the war and the signing of the treaty. Many
German civilians expected life to return to pre-war normality after it was lifted, but the severe food shortages continued. In
1922, for example, meat consumption had not increased since the war years. At 22 kilograms per person per year, it was less
than half of the 52 kilograms consumed in 1913. German citizens felt the food shortages more deeply than during the war
because the reality contrasted so starkly with their expectations.[59]
Immediate post-war industrial production fell to the levels of the 1880s, or 57 percent of its value in 1913. The 1919 per capita
GDP was only 73 percent of the comparable 1913 figure.[60] Controlled demobilisation kept unemployment initially at around
one million. By January 1922 the unemployment rate had sunk to just 0.9%,[61] but inflation caused most workers' real wages
to be significantly lower than they were in 1913.[62] The hyperinflation that peaked in late 1923 had its worst effects on
government workers, whose wages did not keep pace with private sector workers, and on middle class Germans who had
invested in war bonds[63] or who relied on savings, investments or pensions for their living. What had once been substantial
savings became essentially worthless due to the enormous fall in the Papiermark's value.[64]
After four years of war and famine, many German workers were disenchanted with the capitalist system and hoped for a new
era under socialism or communism. Socialists dominated the new revolutionary government in Berlin, and numerous short-
lived council republics were set up in cities across Germany.[65] Even after they were suppressed, ideological conflicts
between the Left and supporters of the former empire led to political violence and extremism. The young republic found itself
in a nearly constant economic and political crisis until 1924.
Treaty of Versailles
The Treaty of Versailles ended the state of war between Germany and most of the Allied powers and set the conditions for
peace. It was signed 28 June 1919 and can be divided into four main categories: territorial issues, disarmament, reparations and
assignment of guilt.
Territorially, Germany had to renounce sovereignty over its colonies[66] and in Europe
lost 65,000 sq km (25,000 sq mi) or about 13% of its former territory – including 48%
of its iron and 10% of its coal resources – along with 7 million people, or 12% of its
population.[67] The Saarland was put under the control of the League of Nations for 15
years, and the output of the area's coal mines went to France.[68] Alsace–Lorraine,
which Prussia had annexed following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, once again
became French.[69] The northern part of Schleswig-Holstein went to Denmark
following a plebiscite.[70] In the east, a significant amount of territory was lost to a
restored Poland.[71] The Memel Territory was ceded to the Allied powers,[72] and
Danzig went to the League of Nations as the Free City of Danzig.[73] The Polish
Corridor left East Prussia physically separated from the rest of Germany. German territorial losses from the
Treaty of Versailles
Under the terms of both the Armistice of 1918
and of the Treaty of Versailles, French, British, Administered by the League of
Belgian and American troops occupied the Nations
Rhineland, the area of Germany on the west Annexed or transferred to
bank of the Rhine river, together with neighbouring countries by the treaty,
bridgeheads on the east bank near Cologne, or later via plebiscite and League of
Mainz and Koblenz. In addition, the Rhineland Nation action
and an area stretching 50 kilometers east of the Weimar Germany
Rhine was to be demilitarized.[74] France had
demanded the occupation both to protect itself
from a renewed German attack and as collateral for German reparations. The
occupation was to last 15 years, until 1934, but ended in 1930.[75]
The treaty's disarmament provisions were intended to make the future German army
Map showing the areas under the
incapable of offensive action. It was limited to no more than 100,000 men with only
Rhineland occupation
4,000 officers and no general staff; the navy could have at most 15,000 men and 1,500
officers. The Rhineland was to be demilitarized and occupied and all fortifications in
the Rhineland and 50 kilometres (31 miles) east of the river demolished. Germany was
prohibited from having an air force, tanks, poison gas, heavy artillery, submarines or dreadnoughts. A large number of its ships
and all of its air-related armaments were to be surrendered.[70][76]
Germany had to compensate the Allied Powers for the losses and damages of the war, with the exact amount left to be
determined at a later date (Article 233).[77] In the short term it was required to pay the equivalent of 20 billion gold marks in
installments through April 1921 (Article 235).[77]
The most contentious article of the treaty, the so-called War Guilt Clause, did not use the word "guilt". It stated that Germany
accepted full responsibility for all the loss and damage from a war that was imposed on the Allies by the aggression of
Germany and her allies (Article 231).[77]
The implications of Article 231 and the territorial losses especially angered the Germans. The treaty was reviled as a dictated
rather than a negotiated peace. Philipp Scheidemann, then minister president of Germany, said to the Weimar National
Assembly on 12 May 1919, "What hand should not wither that puts this fetter on itself and on us?"[78] He resigned rather than
accept the terms, but after the Allies threatened to resume hostilities, the National Assembly voted to approve the treaty on 23
June.[79] It was signed in Paris five days later.
Explaining the rise of extreme nationalist movements in Germany shortly after the war, British historian Ian Kershaw pointed
to the "national disgrace" that was "felt throughout Germany at the humiliating terms imposed by the victorious Allies and
reflected in the Versailles Treaty...with its confiscation of territory on the eastern border and even more so its 'guilt clause'."[80]
Adolf Hitler repeatedly blamed the Republic and its democracy for accepting the oppressive terms of the treaty.[81]
War guilt
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty was widely perceived not only as a legal legitimisation of reparations but also as a moral
condemnation of Germany, and it triggered a storm of indignation among the German public.[82] The hostility towards it came
from across the political spectrum, from the far right to the moderate governing parties to the KPD.
After the treaty came into force, the Foreign Office continued the state's control of the debate over war guilt. The War Guilt
Department financed and directed the Centre for the Study of the Causes of the War, which was to provide "scientific" support
for the "campaign of innocence" abroad. For war-innocence propaganda at home, a "Working Committee of German
Associations" was founded with representatives of many groups considered "fit for good society".[83] In 1919 the Weimar
National Assembly established a parliamentary committee to inquire into the events that had led to the "outbreak, prolongation
and loss of the First World War". Even though it met until 1932, its results were of questionable value due to the lack of
cooperation from the civil service and military, together with increasing interference from the government, which wanted to
prevent a German admission of guilt before the world public.[84]
During the course of World War I, war reporting was the responsibility of the German General Staff and after 1918 of the
Potsdam Reich Archives founded by General Hans von Seeckt.[85] It was thus the leadership of the Reichswehr with its largely
anti-democratic civil service personnel that, along with the Foreign Office, determined the portrayal of the war in the Weimar
Republic. The Potsdam Archive also dedicated itself to the task of "disproving" German war guilt and war crimes.
All in all, there was little objective and critical questioning of the causes of the war or of Germany's responsibility for it in
academia, politics or the media during the Weimar period. The official view of history continued to follow the argument issued
by the OHL in 1914 that Germany was threatened by invasion and encirclement. Revising the conditions of the Versailles
Treaty became the main goal of German foreign policy.[86]
The consensus opposing the "war guilt clause" did much to promote agitation against foreign countries and the Weimar
Constitution. Both the DNVP and, in particular, the NSDAP questioned the entire post-war order and propagated a "war guilt
lie". In line with national conservative and bourgeois right-wing parties, they accused the governing parties of having
contributed to Germany's humiliation by signing the treaty and of denying it the right to self-determination.[87]
Political turmoil: Kapp Putsch and Ruhr uprising
The young republic was exposed from the beginning to attacks from both the extreme right and extreme left. The Left accused
the Social Democrats of betraying the ideals of the labour movement because of their alliance with the old elites; the Right
held the supporters of the Republic responsible for Germany's defeat in the First World War, denigrating them as "November
criminals" and insinuating that the German army, which was still fighting on enemy soil when the war ended, had been stabbed
in the back by them and the revolution (the stab-in-the-back myth).[88]
In the March 1920 Kapp Putsch, Freikorps units under General von Lüttwitz
occupied the government quarter in Berlin and appointed the former Prussian
civil servant Wolfgang Kapp as Reich chancellor in an attempt to reverse the
revolution and install an autocratic government. The legal government fled
Berlin and called for a general strike. The putsch quickly failed due in large
part to the refusal of the ministerial bureaucracy to obey Kapp's orders. The
Reichswehr, however, proved itself to be unreliable. It adopted a wait-and-see
attitude under General von Seeckt, the head of the Troop Office, who said that
"Reichswehr do not fire on Reichswehr".[89]
Some among the working class did not limit themselves to passive resistance to Crowds in Berlin watching the Marinebrigade
the Kapp Putsch. Especially in the Ruhr, where dissatisfaction with the lack of Ehrhardt march in under the imperial war
nationalisation of key industries was particularly high, councils were formed ensign during the Kapp Putsch
that sought to seize local power. In the Ruhr uprising, civil war-like fighting
broke when the Ruhr Red Army, made up of some 50,000 armed workers,
mostly adherents of the KPD and USPD, used the disruption caused by the general strike to take control of the industrial
district. After bloody battles in which an estimated 1,000 insurgents and 200 soldiers died, Reichswehr and Freikorps units
suppressed the revolt in early April.[90]
In Bavaria the Kapp Putsch led to an anti-republican government reshuffle that made the Free State a so-called "cell of order"
(Ordnungszelle) within the Weimar state and a rallying point for right-wing conservative and reactionary forces.[91] The
unstable political conditions in the early phase of the Weimar Republic were also evident in the Reichstag elections of 1920, in
which the centre-left Weimar Coalition, which until then had had a three-quarters majority, lost 125 seats to parties on both the
left and right.[92]
Political assassinations
The sharp political polarisation that had occurred was

visible in particular in the assassinations of important
representatives of the Republic by members of the right-
wing extremist Organisation Consul. Finance Minister
Matthias Erzberger was assassinated in August 1921 and
Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau in June 1922. Both men
had been defamed as compliant to Germany's former
enemies in the matter of reparations payments. In addition,
Erzberger was attacked for signing the armistice agreement
in 1918, and Rathenau had sought to break Germany's
external isolation after the First World War through the
Treaty of Rapallo, which opened diplomatic relations with
Matthias Erzberger, one of Soviet Russia. Rathenau also attracted right-wing extremist Walther Rathenau, German
the signers of the 1918 hatred because he was a Jew. The passing of a "Republic Foreign Minister, was
armistice, was assassinated in 1922.
Protection Act", which established a special court for the
assassinated in 1920. protection of the Republic and prohibited organizations,
printed material and rallies that opposed the constitutional
republican form of government, was intended to put a stop to the Republic's right-wing enemies.
The conservative judiciary from the imperial era that still remained in place and passed lenient sentences against right-wing
state criminals contributed to the fact that their activities could not be permanently deterred.[93]
Reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr
After a series of international conferences to determine the reparations for which Germany was liable, an amount of 132 billion
Reichsmarks was presented in May 1921, to be paid either in gold or commodities such as iron, steel and coal.[94] Chancellor
Joseph Wirth had no choice other than to accept, but in an attempt to have the amount lowered, he began the German policy of
"fulfilment" (Erfüllungspolitik). By attempting to meet the payments, it intended to show the Allies that the demands were
beyond Germany's economic means.[95] In May 1922, when the Reichsmark was rapidly losing value, Germany was granted a
payment moratorium over strong French objections.[94]
In January 1923 France declared Germany in default. The French minister president Raymond Poincaré saw Germany's failure
to pay reparations as a lever that he could use to achieve the separation of the Rhineland from the German Reich, a French
demand that had been refused by the British at Versailles.[96] After the Reparation Commission determined that German coal
deliveries were short, French and Belgian troops on 11 January 1923 marched into the Rhineland,[95] Germany's most
productive industrial region, and took control of most of its mining and manufacturing companies. The German government
under Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno responded with a policy of non-violent passive resistance to the occupation. It underwrote the
costs of idled factories and mines and paid the workers who were on strike. Unable to meet the enormous costs by any other
means, it resorted to printing money. Along with the debts the state had incurred during the war, it was one of the major causes
of the hyperinflation that followed.[97]
Realizing that continuing the course was untenable, the new Reich Chancellor Gustav Stresemann called off the passive
resistance in September 1923.[98] The occupation ended in August 1925, following an agreement (the Dawes Plan) to
restructure Germany's payments. The total reparations payout from 1920 to 1931 (when payments were suspended
indefinitely) was 20 billion marks. 12.5 billion was cash that came mostly from loans provided by New York bankers. The rest
was goods such as coal and chemicals, or from assets like railway equipment.
Hyperinflation
The hyperinflation fueled by the government response to the occupation of the

Ruhr caused the cost of a loaf of bread to rise from 3 Reichsmarks in 1922 to 80
billion Reichsmarks in November 1923. Prices were rising so rapidly that people
rushed to spend their pay at lunch breaks before it lost any more of its value.
Foreign trade became all but impossible, as did German ability to pay
reparations.[99] While personal savings became virtually worthless, so did fixed
debts. Middle class owners of land or houses often came out ahead because their
debts lost value along with the currency. Large industrial concerns profited in the
same manner, and wealth concentrated in fewer hands.[63] The classic example was
Million mark notes being used as a
Hugo Stinnes, who earned the title of Inflation King by taking advantage of its
scratch pad
effect on debt to amass controlling interests in 1,535 businesses with 2,890
different plants by 1924.[100] Stinnes' empire collapsed after the government-
sponsored inflation was stopped by the introduction of the Rentenmark on 15 November 1923. One U.S. dollar was equivalent
to 4.20 Rentenmarks; the exchange rate was 1 Rentenmark to one trillion paper marks. The new money was backed by the
Reich's gold reserves along with a 3.2 billion Rentenmark mortgage on the land holdings of agriculture, industry and trade.
The introduction of the Rentenmark was successful at stabilizing German currency and the economy.[101]
Additional political violence and the Hitler putsch
With the proclamation on 21 October 1923 of the Rhenish Republic came a short-lived secessionist movement in the wake of
which sections of the labour force became increasingly radicalized. In Saxony and Thuringia, Communists won enough seats
to participate in governments under Social Democratic minister presidents. In both states the Communists were expelled by
Reich executions (Reichsexekutionen) using Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. In the Reichstag, the Social Democrats
withdrew their support from Cuno's government and entered a grand coalition under DVP Chancellor Gustav Stresemann.[102]
The nationalist right, especially in Bavaria, branded the breaking off of the Ruhr resistance as treason. In a breach of the
Weimar constitution, Bavaria declared a state of emergency, and executive power was transferred to Gustav Ritter von Kahr as
State Commissioner General. The Reichswehr under the Chief of Army Command, General Hans von Seeckt, who had his
own governmental ambitions directed against left-wing parties and Weimar parliamentarism,[103] behaved loyally towards the
Stresemann government only with respect to his own interests. In spite of the moves against the governments in Saxony and
Thuringia, no action was taken against Bavaria, where Kahr was preparing a military coup aimed at overthrowing the Reich
government in cooperation with the Bavarian military under district commander Otto von Lossow.[104]
In 1920 the German Workers' Party had become the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), or Nazi Party, which
would eventually become a driving force in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Adolf Hitler named himself chairman of the
party in July 1921. On 8 November 1923, in a pact with Erich Ludendorff, a league of nationalist fighting societies called the
Kampfbund, took over a meeting that Kahr and Lossow were holding at a beer hall in Munich. Ludendorff and Hitler declared
that the Weimar government was deposed and that they were planning to take control of Munich the following day. Kahr and
Lossow organized the resistance to Hitler, with the result that the coup attempt was easily stopped.[105] Hitler was arrested and
sentenced to five years in prison for high treason, the minimum sentence for the charge. He served less than eight months in a
comfortable cell, receiving a daily stream of visitors until his release on 20 December 1924. While in jail Hitler dictated Mein
Kampf, which laid out his ideas and future policies. Hitler decided to focus on legal methods of gaining power.[106]
Golden Era (1924–1929)
Gustav Stresemann was Reichskanzler for 100 days in 1923, and served as foreign minister
from 1923 to 1929, a period of relative stability for the Weimar Republic, known in
Germany as Goldene Zwanziger ("Golden Twenties"). Prominent features of this period were
a growing economy and a consequent decrease in civil unrest.
Once civil stability had been restored, Stresemann began stabilising the German currency,
which promoted confidence in the German economy and helped the recovery that was so
greatly needed for the German nation to keep up with their reparation repayments, while at
the same time feeding and supplying the nation.
Once the economic situation had stabilised, Stresemann could begin putting a permanent
currency in place, called the Rentenmark (October 1923), which again contributed to the
growing level of international confidence in the Weimar Republic's economy.
To help Germany meet reparation obligations, the Dawes Plan was created in 1924. This was Poster promoting Hitler's Mein
an agreement between American banks and the German government in which the American Kampf in 2 paperback volumes
banks lent money to German banks with German assets as collateral to help it pay for 2.85 Rentenmarks each
reparations. The German railways, the National Bank and many industries were therefore
mortgaged as securities for the stable currency and the loans.[107]
Germany was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the new Soviet Union.
Under the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany accorded it formal (de jure) recognition, and the
two mutually cancelled all pre-war debts and renounced war claims. In October 1925
the Treaty of Locarno was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Britain, and Italy; it
recognised Germany's borders with France and Belgium. Moreover, Britain, Italy and
Belgium undertook to assist France in the case that German troops marched into the
demilitarised Rhineland. Locarno paved the way for Germany's admission to the
League of Nations in 1926.[108] Germany signed arbitration conventions with France Wilhelm Marx's Christmas
and Belgium and arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, undertaking to broadcast, December 1923
refer any future disputes to an arbitration tribunal or to the Permanent Court of
International Justice. Other foreign achievements were the evacuation of foreign troops
from the Ruhr in 1925. In 1926, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations as a permanent member, improving her
international standing and giving the right to vote on League matters.
Overall trade increased and unemployment fell. Stresemann's reforms did not relieve the underlying weaknesses of Weimar but
gave the appearance of a stable democracy. Even Stresemann's German People's Party failed to gain nationwide recognition,
and instead featured in the 'flip-flop' coalitions. The Grand Coalition headed by Muller inspired some faith in the government,
but that did not last. Governments frequently lasted only a year, comparable to the political situation in France during the
1930s. The major weakness in constitutional terms was the inherent instability of the coalitions, which often fell prior to
elections. The growing dependence on American finance was to prove fleeting, and Germany was one of the worst hit nations
in the Great Depression.
Culture
The 1920s saw a remarkable cultural renaissance in Germany. During the worst phase of hyperinflation in 1923, the clubs and
bars were full of speculators who spent their daily profits so they would not lose the value the following day. Berlin
intellectuals responded by condemning the excesses of what they considered capitalism and demanding revolutionary changes
on the cultural scenery.
Influenced by the brief cultural explosion in the Soviet Union, German literature, cinema, theatre and musical works entered a
phase of great creativity. Innovative street theatre brought plays to the public, and the cabaret scene and jazz bands became
very popular. According to the cliché, modern young women were Americanized, wearing makeup, short hair, smoking and
breaking with traditional mores. The euphoria surrounding Josephine Baker in the metropolis of Berlin for instance, where she
was declared an "erotic goddess" and in many ways admired and respected, kindled further "ultramodern" sensations in the
minds of the German public.[109] Art and a new type of architecture taught at "Bauhaus" schools reflected the new ideas of the
time, with artists such as George Grosz being fined for defaming the military and for blasphemy.
Artists in Berlin were influenced by other

contemporary progressive cultural
movements, such as the Impressionist and
Expressionist painters in Paris, as well as
the Cubists. Likewise, American
progressive architects were admired. Many
of the new buildings built during this era
followed a straight-lined, geometrical style.
Examples of the new architecture include
the Bauhaus Building by Gropius, Grosses
The "Golden Twenties" in Berlin: a jazz
Schauspielhaus, and the Einstein
band plays for a tea dance at the hotel
Tower.[110]
Esplanade, 1926
Not everyone, however, was happy with the

changes taking place in Weimar culture. The Elephant Celebes by Max Ernst
Conservatives and reactionaries feared that Germany was betraying its traditional (1921)
values by adopting popular styles from abroad, particularly those Hollywood was
popularising in American films, while New York became the global capital of fashion.
Germany was more susceptible to Americanization, because of the close economic links brought about by the Dawes plan.
In 1929, three years after receiving the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize, Stresemann died of a heart attack at age 51. When the New
York Stock Exchange crashed in October 1929, American loans dried up and the sharp decline of the German economy
brought the "Golden Twenties" to an abrupt end.
Social policy under Weimar
A wide range of progressive social reforms were carried out during and after the revolutionary period. The Executive Council
of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, a coalition that included Majority Social Democrats, Independent Social Democrats,
workers and soldiers, introduced the eight-hour work day, reinstated demobilised workers, released political prisoners,
abolished press censorship, increased workers' old-age, sick and unemployment benefits and gave labour the unrestricted right
to organise into unions.[111] It was made harder for estates to sack workers and prevent them from leaving when they wanted
to. Under the Provisional Act for Agricultural Labour of 23 November 1918, the normal period of notice for management and
most resident labourers was set at six weeks. In addition, a supplementary directive of December 1918 specified that female
and child workers were entitled to a fifteen-minute break if they worked between four and six hours, thirty minutes for
workdays lasting six to eight hours, and one hour for longer days.[112] A decree on 23 December 1918 established committees
(composed of workers' representatives "in their relation to the employer") to safeguard the rights of workers. The right to
bargain collectively was also established, while it was made obligatory "to elect workers' committees on estates and establish
conciliation committees". A decree on 3 February 1919 removed the right of employers to acquire exemption for domestic
servants and agricultural workers.[113] In 1919, legislation provided for a maximum working 48-hour workweek, restrictions
on night work, a half-holiday on Saturday, and a break of thirty-six hours of continuous rest during the week.[114]
With the decree of 3 February 1919, the Ebert government reintroduced the original structure of the health insurance boards
according to an 1883 law, with one-third employers and two-thirds workers.[115] As of 28 June 1919, health insurance
committees were elected by the workers themselves.[116] That same year, health insurance was extended to wives and
daughters without their own income, people only partially capable of gainful employment, people employed in private
cooperatives, and people employed in public cooperatives.[117]
The Provisional Order of January 1919 concerning agricultural labour conditions fixed 2,900 hours as a maximum per year,
distributed as eight, ten, and eleven hours per day in four month periods.[118] A code of January 1919 bestowed on land
labourers the same legal rights that industrial workers enjoyed, while a bill ratified the same year obligated the states to set up
agricultural settlement associations which "were endowed with the priority right of purchase of farms beyond a specified
size".[119]
A series of progressive tax reforms were introduced under the auspices of Matthias Erzberger, including increases in taxes on
capital[120] and an increase in the highest income tax rate from 4% to 60%.[121] Under a governmental decree of 3 February
1919, the German government met the demand of the veterans' associations that all aid for the disabled and their dependents be
taken over by the central government[122] (thus assuming responsibility for this assistance) and extended into peacetime the
nationwide network of state and district welfare bureaus that had been set up during the war to coordinate social services for
war widows and orphans.[123]
The Youth Welfare Act of 1922 obliged all municipalities and states to set up youth offices in charge of child protection, and
also codified a right to education for all children,[124] while laws were passed to regulate rents and increase protection for
tenants in 1922 and 1923.[125] Health insurance coverage was extended to other categories of the population during the
existence of the Weimar Republic, including seamen, people employed in the educational and social welfare sectors, and all
primary dependents.[117] Various improvements were also made in unemployment benefits, although in June 1920 the
maximum amount of unemployment benefit that a family of four could receive in Berlin, 90 marks, was well below the
minimum cost of subsistence of 304 marks.[126]
In 1923, unemployment relief was consolidated into a regular programme of assistance following economic problems that
year. In 1924, a modern public assistance programme was introduced, and in 1925 the accident insurance programme was
reformed, allowing diseases that were linked to certain kinds of work to become insurable risks. In addition, a national
unemployment insurance programme was introduced in 1927.[127] Housing construction was also greatly accelerated during
the Weimar period, with over 2 million new homes constructed between 1924 and 1931 and a further 195,000 modernised.[128]
Renewed crisis and decline (1930–1933)
Onset of the Great Depression
In 1929, the onset of the depression in the United States of America produced a severe
economic shock in Germany and was further made worse by the European banking
crisis of 1931. Germany's fragile economy had been sustained by the granting of loans
through the Dawes Plan (1924) and the Young Plan (1929). When American banks
withdrew their line of credit to German companies, the onset of severe unemployment
could not be abated by conventional economic measures. Unemployment thereafter
grew dramatically, at 4 million in 1930,[130] and in September 1930 a political
earthquake shook the republic to its foundations. The National Socialist German
Workers' Party (NSDAP), until then a minor far-right party, increased its votes to 19%, Troops of the German Army feeding
becoming Germany's second largest party, while the Communist Party of Germany the poor in Berlin, 1931
(KPD) also increased its votes; this made the unstable coalition system by which every
chancellor had governed increasingly unworkable. The last years of the Weimar
Republic were marred by even more systemic political instability than previous years,
as political violence increased. Four Chancellors (Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen,
Kurt von Schleicher) and, from 30 January to 23 March 1933, Hitler governed through
presidential decree rather than through parliamentary consultation. This effectively
rendered parliament as a means of enforcing constitutional checks and balances
powerless.
Gross national product (inflation

Brüning's policy of deflation (1930–1932)
adjusted) and price index in
Germany, 1926–1936 while the
On 29 March 1930, after months of lobbying by General Kurt von Schleicher on behalf
period between 1930 and 1932 is
of the military, the finance expert Heinrich Brüning was appointed as Müller's
marked by a severe deflation and
successor by Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg. The new government was expected
recession
to lead a political shift towards conservatism.
As Brüning had no majority support in the Reichstag, he became, through the use of the
emergency powers granted to the Reichspräsident (Article 48) by the constitution, the first Weimar chancellor to operate
independently of parliament. This made him dependent on the Reichspräsident, Hindenburg.[5] After a bill to reform the
Reich's finances was opposed by the Reichstag, it was made an emergency decree by Hindenburg. On 18 July, as a result of
opposition from the SPD, KPD, DNVP and the small contingent of NSDAP members, the Reichstag again rejected the bill by
a slim margin. Immediately afterward, Brüning submitted the president's decree that the Reichstag be dissolved. The
consequent general election on 14 September resulted in an enormous political shift within the Reichstag: 18.3% of the vote
went to the NSDAP, five times the percentage won in 1928. As a result, it was no longer
possible to form a pro-republican majority, not even with a grand coalition that
excluded the KPD, DNVP and NSDAP. This encouraged an escalation in the number of
public demonstrations and instances of paramilitary violence organised by the NSDAP.
Between 1930 and 1932, Brüning tried to reform the Weimar Republic without a
parliamentary majority, governing, when necessary, through the President's emergency Unemployment rate in Germany
decrees. In line with the contemporary economic theory (subsequently termed "leave-it- between 1928 and 1935 as during
alone liquidationism"), he enacted a draconian policy of deflation and drastically Brüning's policy of deflation (marked
cutting state expenditure.[5] Among other measures, he completely halted all public in purple), the unemployment rate
grants to the obligatory unemployment insurance introduced in 1927, resulting in soared from 15.7% in 1930 to
workers making higher contributions and fewer benefits for the unemployed. Benefits 30.8% in 1932.
for the sick, invalid and pensioners were also reduced sharply.[131] Additional
difficulties were caused by the different deflationary policies pursued by Brüning and
the Reichsbank, Germany's central bank.[132] In mid-1931, the United Kingdom
abandoned the gold standard and about 30 countries (the sterling bloc) devalued their
currencies,[133] making their goods around 20% cheaper than those produced by
Germany. As the Young Plan did not allow a devaluation of the Reichsmark, Brüning
triggered a deflationary internal devaluation by forcing the economy to reduce prices,
rents, salaries and wages by 20%.[10] Debate continues as to whether this policy was
without alternative: some argue that the Allies would not in any circumstances have
allowed a devaluation of the Reichsmark, while others point to the Hoover Moratorium Communist Party (KPD) leader
as a sign that the Allies understood that the situation had changed fundamentally and Ernst Thälmann (person in
further German reparation payments were impossible. Brüning expected that the policy foreground with raised clenched fist)
of deflation would temporarily worsen the economic situation before it began to and members of the Roter
Frontkämpferbund (RFB) marching
improve, quickly increasing the German economy's competitiveness and then restoring
through Berlin-Wedding, 1927
its creditworthiness. His long-term view was that deflation would, in any case, be the
best way to help the economy. His primary goal was to remove Germany's reparation
payments by convincing the Allies that they could no longer be paid.[134] Anton
Erkelenz, chairman of the German Democratic Party and a contemporary critic of
Brüning, famously said that the policy of deflation is:
A rightful attempt to release Germany from the grip of reparation

payments, but in reality it meant nothing else than committing suicide Federal election results 1919–1933:
because of fearing death. The deflation policy causes much more damage the Communist Party (KPD) (red)
than the reparation payments of 20 years ... Fighting against Hitler is and the Nazi Party (NSDAP)
fighting against deflation, the enormous destruction of production (brown) were radical enemies of the
Weimar Republic and the surge in
factors.[135]
unemployment during the Great
Depression led to a radicalisation of
In 1933, the American economist Irving Fisher developed the theory of debt deflation. many voters as the Nazi Party rose
He explained that a deflation causes a decline of profits, asset prices and a still greater from 3% of the total votes in 1928 to
decline in the net worth of businesses. Even healthy companies, therefore, may appear 44% in 1933 while the DNVP
over-indebted and facing bankruptcy.[136] The consensus today is that Brüning's (orange) lost its conservative wing
policies exacerbated the German economic crisis and the population's growing and subsequently joined the radical
frustration with democracy, contributing enormously to the increase in support for opposition in 1929.[129]
Hitler's NSDAP.[5]
Most German capitalists and landowners originally supported the conservative experiment more from the belief that
conservatives would best serve their interests rather than any particular liking for Brüning. As more of the working and middle
classes turned against Brüning, however, more of the capitalists and landowners declared themselves in favour of his
opponents Hitler and Hugenberg. By late 1931, the conservative movement was dead and Hindenburg and the Reichswehr had
begun to contemplate dropping Brüning in favour of accommodating Hugenberg and Hitler. Although Hindenburg disliked
Hugenberg and despised Hitler, he was no less a supporter of the sort of anti-democratic counter-revolution that the DNVP and
NSDAP represented.[137]In April 1932, Brüning had actively supported Hindenburg's

successful campaign against Hitler for re-election as Reichspräsident;[138] five weeks
later, on 30 May 1932, he had lost Hindenburg's support and resigned as Reichskanzler.
While it is a popular theory that economic performance and democratic government are
positively correlated (more resources and workers as a result of industrialization,
stimulating economic growth), it is not the sole factor that popularized support for the
NSDAP.[139] Instead, in her paper, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar
Republic", Sheri Berman states that Hitler was able to infiltrate civic groups and grow Nazi Party (NSDAP) leader Adolf
his base that way, citing the fragmenting characteristics of civil society as a main cause Hitler saluting members of the
of the NSDAP's rise to power.[140] In these civic societies, groups instilled anti- Sturmabteilung in Brunswick, Lower
democratic values in their participants.[141] From there, Hitler was able to infiltrate Saxony, 1932
these groups and use their leaders, working from the inside out and growing his
base.[140]
Since the government could not respond to all of these anti-democratic criticisms from
these civil society groups, they (the civil society groups) aligned themselves with
populist groups who would support them, eventually leading to the alignment with the
Nazi party.[142] As David Rieff states, civil society being a uniting force is true to the
extent that people will be inherently good in their ideals.[143] By using the heads of
these committees, Hitler was able to spread his message in these groups and further his
agenda without actually campaigning. Due to a "lack of any basic consensus about the
past, present and future of the German state and society",[144] civic associations groups The SA had nearly two million
were sheep waiting to be led by a herder. Therefore, focusing on the contradictions and members at the end of 1932.
ambivalences of civil society will provide the real reason of the rise of the NSDAP.[145]
Papen deal
Hindenburg then appointed Franz von Papen as new Reichskanzler. Papen lifted the ban on the NSDAP's SA paramilitary,
imposed after the street riots, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the backing of Hitler.
Papen was closely associated with the industrialist and land-owning classes and pursued an extremely conservative policy
along Hindenburg's lines. He appointed as Reichswehr Minister Kurt von Schleicher, and all the members of the new cabinet
were of the same political opinion as Hindenburg. The government was expected to assure itself of the co-operation of Hitler.
Since the republicans were not yet ready to take action, the Communists did not want to support the republic and the
conservatives had shot their political bolt, Hitler and Hugenberg were certain to achieve power.
Elections of July 1932
Because most parties opposed the new government, Papen had the Reichstag dissolved and called for new elections. The
general elections on 31 July 1932 yielded major gains for the Communists, and for the Nazis, who won 37.3% of the vote—
their high-water mark in a free election. The Nazi party then supplanted the Social Democrats as the largest party in the
Reichstag, although it did not gain a majority.
The immediate question was what part the now large Nazi Party would play in the Government of the country. The party owed
its huge increase to growing support from middle-class people, whose traditional parties were swallowed up by the Nazi Party.
The millions of radical adherents at first forced the Party towards the Left. They wanted a renewed Germany and a new
organisation of German society. The left of the Nazi party strove desperately against any drift into the train of such capitalist
and feudal reactionaries. Therefore, Hitler refused ministry under Papen, and demanded the chancellorship for himself, but was
rejected by Hindenburg on 13 August 1932. There was still no majority in the Reichstag for any government; as a result, the
Reichstag was dissolved, and elections took place once more in the hope that a stable majority would result.
Schleicher cabinet
The 6 November 1932 elections yielded 33% for the Nazis,[146] two million voters fewer than in the previous election. Franz
von Papen stepped down and was succeeded as Chancellor (Reichskanzler) by General Kurt von Schleicher on 3 December.
Schleicher, a retired army officer, had developed in an atmosphere of semi-obscurity and intrigue that encompassed the
Republican military policy. He had for years been in the camp of those supporting the Conservative counter-revolution.
Schleicher's bold and unsuccessful plan was to build a majority in the Reichstag by uniting the trade unionist left wings of the
various parties, including that of the Nazis led by Gregor Strasser. This policy did not prove successful either.
In this brief Presidential Dictatorship intermission, Schleicher assumed the role of

"Socialist General" and entered into relations with the Christian Trade Unions, the
relatively left of the Nazi party, and even with the Social Democrats. Schleicher planned
for a sort of labour government under his Generalship. But the Reichswehr officers were
not prepared for this, the working class had a natural distrust of their future allies, and the
great capitalists and landowners also did not like the plans.
Hitler learned from Papen that the general had not received from Hindenburg the authority
to abolish the Reichstag parliament, whereas any majority of seats did. The cabinet (under
a previous interpretation of Article 48) ruled without a sitting Reichstag, which could vote
only for its own dissolution. Hitler also learned that all past crippling Nazi debts were to be
relieved by German big business.
On 22 January, Hitler's efforts to persuade Oskar von Hindenburg, the President's son and
confidant, included threats to bring criminal charges over estate taxation irregularities at
the President's Neudeck estate; although 5,000 acres (20 km2) extra were soon allotted to
Poster for the nationalist "Black–
Hindenburg's property. Outmaneuvered by Papen and Hitler on plans for the new cabinet,
White–Red" coalition of Alfred
and having lost Hindenburg's confidence, Schleicher asked for new elections. On 28
Hugenberg (DNVP leader),
January, Papen described Hitler to Paul von Hindenburg as only a minority part of an
Franz von Papen, and Franz
alternative, Papen-arranged government. The four great political movements, the SPD,
Seldte
Communists, Centre, and the Nazis were in opposition.
On 29 January, Hitler and Papen thwarted a last-minute threat of an officially sanctioned

Reichswehr takeover, and on 30 January 1933 Hindenburg accepted the new Papen-Nationalist-Hitler coalition, with the Nazis
holding only three of eleven Cabinet seats: Hitler as Chancellor, Wilhelm Frick as Minister of the Interior and Hermann
Göring as Minister Without Portfolio. Later that day, the first cabinet meeting was attended by only two political parties,
representing a minority in the Reichstag: The Nazis and the German National People's Party (DNVP), led by Alfred
Hugenberg, with 196 and 52 seats respectively. Eyeing the Catholic Centre Party's 70 (plus 20 BVP) seats, Hitler refused their
leader's demands for constitutional "concessions" (amounting to protection) and planned for dissolution of the Reichstag.
Hindenburg, despite his misgivings about the Nazis' goals and about Hitler as a personality, reluctantly agreed to Papen's
theory that, with Nazi popular support on the wane, Hitler could now be controlled as Chancellor. This date, dubbed by the
Nazis as the Machtergreifung (seizure of power), is commonly seen as the beginning of Nazi Germany.
End of the Weimar Republic
Hitler's chancellorship (1933)
Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor on the morning of 30 January 1933 in what some observers later described as a brief and
indifferent ceremony. By early February, a mere week after Hitler's assumption of the chancellorship, the government had
begun to clamp down on the opposition. Meetings of the left-wing parties were banned and even some of the moderate parties
found their members threatened and assaulted. Measures with an appearance of legality suppressed the Communist Party in
mid-February and included the plainly illegal arrests of Reichstag deputies.
On 27 February 1933 the Reichtstag burned to the ground, which was blamed on an act of arson by Dutch council communist
Marinus van der Lubbe. However, in 2019, an affidavit that had been concealed by a prominent Nazi era German historian was
uncovered. In the affidavit from the 1950s, a former member of the Nazis' paramilitary SA unit swore that on the night of the
Reichstag fire, he was part of an SA group that drove Van der Lubbe from an infirmary to the Reichstag, where they noticed "a
strange smell of burning and there were clouds of smoke billowing through the rooms". The fire already being set when der
Lubbe was forcefully brought there by the SA, as well as the Nazi government's immediate use of the event to seize power, has
led many contemporary historians to validate that the SA played a role in the arson, as a false flag attack.[147] Hitler blamed
the fire on the KPD (though Van der Lubbe was not a member of the party) and convinced Hindenburg to issue the Reichstag
Fire Decree the following day. The decree invoked Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and "indefinitely suspended" a
number of constitutional protections of civil liberties, allowing the Nazi government to take swift action against political
meetings, arresting and killing the Communists.
Hitler and the Nazis exploited the German state's broadcasting and aviation facilities in a massive attempt to sway the
electorate, but this election yielded a scant majority of 16 seats for the NSDAP-DNVP coalition. At the Reichstag elections,
which took place on 5 March 1933, the NSDAP obtained 17 million votes. The Communist, Social Democrat and Catholic
Centre votes stood firm. This was the last multi-party election of the Weimar Republic and the last multi-party all-German
election for 57 years.
Hitler addressed disparate interest groups, stressing the necessity for a definitive solution to the perpetual instability of the
Weimar Republic. He now blamed Germany's problems on the Communists, even threatening their lives on 3 March. Former
Chancellor Heinrich Brüning proclaimed that his Centre Party would resist any constitutional change and appealed to the
President for an investigation of the Reichstag fire. Hitler's successful plan was to induce what remained of the now
Communist-depleted Reichstag to grant him, and the Government, the authority to issue decrees with the force of law. The
hitherto Presidential Dictatorship hereby was to give itself a new legal form.
On 15 March, the first cabinet meeting was attended by the two coalition parties, representing a minority in the Reichstag: The
Nazis and the DNVP led by Alfred Hugenberg (288 + 52 seats). According to the Nuremberg Trials, this cabinet meeting's first
order of business was how at last to achieve the complete counter-revolution by means of the constitutionally allowed
Enabling Act, requiring a 66% parliamentary majority. This Act would, and did, lead Hitler and the NSDAP toward his goal of
unfettered dictatorial powers.[148]
Hitler cabinet meeting in mid-March
At the cabinet meeting on 15 March, Hitler introduced the Enabling Act, which would have authorised the cabinet to enact
legislation without the approval of the Reichstag. Meanwhile, the only remaining question for the Nazis was whether the
Catholic Centre Party would support the Enabling Act in the Reichstag, thereby providing the 2⁄3 majority required to ratify a
law that amended the constitution. Hitler expressed his confidence to win over the centre's votes. Hitler is recorded at the
Nuremberg Trials as being sure of eventual Centre Party Germany capitulation and thus rejecting of the DNVP's suggestions to
"balance" the majority through further arrests, this time of Social Democrats. Hitler, however, assured his coalition partners
that arrests would resume after the elections and, in fact, some 26 SPD Social Democrats were physically removed. After
meeting with Centre leader Monsignor Ludwig Kaas and other Centre Trade Union leaders daily and denying them a
substantial participation in the government, negotiation succeeded in respect of guarantees towards Catholic civil-servants and
education issues.
At the last internal Centre meeting prior to the debate on the Enabling Act, Kaas expressed no preference or suggestion on the
vote, but as a way of mollifying opposition by Centre members to the granting of further powers to Hitler, Kaas somehow
arranged for a letter of constitutional guarantee from Hitler himself prior to his voting with the centre en bloc in favour of the
Enabling Act. This guarantee was not ultimately given. Kaas, the party's chairman since 1928, had strong connections to the
Vatican Secretary of State, later Pope Pius XII. In return for pledging his support for the act, Kaas would use his connections
with the Vatican to set in train and draft the Holy See's long desired Reichskonkordat with Germany (only possible with the co-
operation of the Nazis).
Ludwig Kaas is considered along with Papen as being one of the two most important political figures in the creation of the
Nazi regime.[149]
Enabling Act negotiations
On 20 March, negotiation began between Hitler and Frick on one side and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) leaders—Kaas,
Stegerwald, and Hackelsburger on the other. The aim was to settle on conditions under which Centre would vote in favour of
the Enabling Act. Because of the Nazis' narrow majority in the Reichstag, Centre's support was necessary to receive the
required two-thirds majority vote. On 22 March, the negotiations concluded; Hitler promised to continue the existence of the
German states, agreed not to use the new grant of power to change the constitution, and promised to retain Zentrum members
in the civil service. Hitler also pledged to protect the Catholic confessional schools and to respect the concordats signed
between the Holy See and Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1931). Hitler also agreed to mention these promises in
his speech to the Reichstag before the vote on the Enabling Act.
The ceremonial opening of the Reichstag on 21 March was held at the Garrison Church in Potsdam, a shrine of Prussianism, in
the presence of many Junker landowners and representatives of the imperial military caste. This impressive and often
emotional spectacle—orchestrated by Joseph Goebbels—aimed to link Hitler's government with Germany's imperial past and
portray Nazism as a guarantor of the nation's future. The ceremony helped convince the "old guard" Prussian military elite of
Hitler's homage to their long tradition and, in turn, produced the relatively convincing view that Hitler's government had the
support of Germany's traditional protector—the Army. Such support would publicly signal a return to conservatism to curb the
problems affecting the Weimar Republic, and that stability might be at hand. In a cynical and politically adroit move, Hitler
bowed in apparently respectful humility before President and Field Marshal Hindenburg.
Passage of the Enabling Act
The Reichstag convened on 23 March 1933 at the Kroll Opera House, and in the midday opening, Hitler made a historic
speech, appearing outwardly calm and conciliatory. Hitler presented an appealing prospect of respect towards Christianity by
paying tribute to the Christian faiths as "essential elements for safeguarding the soul of the German people". He promised to
respect their rights and declared that his government's "ambition is a peaceful accord between Church and State" and that he
hoped "to improve [their] friendly relations with the Holy See". This speech aimed especially at the future recognition by the
named Holy See and therefore to the votes of the Centre Party addressing many concerns Kaas had voiced during the previous
talks. Kaas is considered to have had a hand therefore in the drafting of the speech.[149] Kaas is also reported as voicing the
Holy See's desire for Hitler as bulwark against atheistic Russian nihilism previously as early as May 1932.[150]
Hitler promised that the Act did not threaten the existence of either the Reichstag or the Reichsrat, that the authority of the
President remained untouched and that the Länder would not be abolished. During an adjournment, the other parties (notably
the centre) met to discuss their intentions.[151]
In the debate prior to the vote on the Enabling Act, Hitler orchestrated the full political menace of his paramilitary forces like
the storm division in the streets to intimidate reluctant Reichstag deputies into approving the Enabling Act. The Communists'
81 seats had been empty since the Reichstag Fire Decree and other lesser known procedural measures, thus excluding their
anticipated "No" votes from the balloting. Otto Wels, the leader of the Social Democrats, whose seats were similarly depleted
from 120 to below 100, was the only speaker to defend democracy and in a futile but brave effort to deny Hitler the 2⁄3
majority, he made a speech critical of the abandonment of democracy to dictatorship. At this, Hitler could no longer restrain
his wrath.[152]
In his retort to Wels, Hitler abandoned earlier pretence at calm statesmanship and delivered a characteristic screaming diatribe,
promising to exterminate all Communists in Germany and threatening Wels' Social Democrats as well. He did not even want
their support for the bill. "Germany will become free, but not through you," he shouted.[153] Meanwhile, Hitler's promised
written guarantee to Monsignor Kaas was being typed up, it was asserted to Kaas, and thereby Kaas was persuaded to silently
deliver the Centre bloc's votes for the Enabling Act anyway. The Act—formally titled the "Act for the Removal of Distress
from People and Reich"—was passed by a vote of 444 to 94. Only the SPD had voted against the Act. Every other member of
the Reichstag, whether from the largest or the smallest party, voted in favour of the Act. It went into effect the following day,
24 March.
Consequences
The passage of the Enabling Act of 1933 is widely considered to mark the end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of
the Nazi era. It empowered the cabinet to legislate without the approval of the Reichstag or the President, and to enact laws
that were contrary to the constitution. Before the March 1933 elections, Hitler had persuaded Hindenburg to promulgate the
Reichstag Fire Decree using Article 48, which empowered the government to restrict "the rights of habeas corpus [...] freedom
of the press, the freedom to organise and assemble, the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications" and
legalised search warrants and confiscation "beyond legal limits otherwise prescribed". This was intended to forestall any action
against the government by the Communists. Hitler used the provisions of the Enabling Act to pre-empt possible opposition to
his dictatorship from other sources, in which he was mostly successful: in the months following the passage of the Enabling
Act, all German parties aside the NSDAP were banned or force to disband themselves, all trade unions were dissolved and all
media were brought under the control of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (with the partial
exception of the Frankfurter Zeitung). The Reichstag was then dissolved by Hindenburg and a snap one-party election was
called in November 1933, giving the NSDAP full control of the chamber.
The constitution of 1919 was never formally repealed, but the Enabling Act meant that it was a dead letter. The Reichstag was
effectively eliminated as an active player in German politics. It only met sporadically until the end of World War II, held no
debates and enacted only a few laws; for all purposes, it was reduced to a mere stage for Hitler's speeches. The other chamber
of the German parliament (the Reichsrat) was officially abolished on 14 February 1934 by the "Law on the Abolition of the
Reichsrat"; this decision was in clear violation of the Enabling Act, which stipulated that any laws passed under its authority
could not affect the institutions of either chamber. By this time, however, the Nazis had become law unto themselves, and these
actions were never challenged in court.
On 2 August 1934, Hindenburg died from lung cancer, thus eliminating any remaining obstacle to Nazi full dominance; the
day before his death, the Hitler Cabinet passed the "Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich" that transferred
the President's powers upon his death, including as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to the new post of "Führer and
Reich Chancellor", giving Hitler complete power over all the Reich without any possibility of checks and balances. This action
was later ratified by a highly non-democratic referendum. This, along with the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 shed
the last remains of the Weimar Republic.
Reasons for failure

The reasons for the Weimar Republic's collapse are the subject of continuing debate. It may have been doomed from the
beginning since even moderates disliked it and extremists on both the left and right loathed it, a situation often referred to as a
"democracy without democrats".[154] Germany had limited democratic traditions, and Weimar democracy was widely seen as
chaotic. Since Weimar politicians had been blamed for the Dolchstoß ("stab-in-the-back"), a widely believed theory that
Germany's surrender in the First World War had been the unnecessary act of traitors, the popular legitimacy of the government
was on shaky ground. As normal parliamentary lawmaking broke down and was replaced around 1930 by a series of
emergency decrees, the decreasing popular legitimacy of the government further drove voters to extremist parties.
No single reason can explain the failure of the Weimar Republic. The most commonly asserted causes can be grouped into
three categories: economic problems, institutional problems, and the roles of specific individuals.
Economic problems
The Weimar Republic had some of the most serious economic problems ever experienced by any Western democracy in
history. Rampant hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and a large drop in living standards were primary factors. From 1923
to 1929, there was a short period of economic recovery, but the Great Depression of the 1930s led to a worldwide recession.
Germany was particularly affected because it depended heavily on American loans. In 1926, about 2 million Germans were
unemployed, which rose to around 6 million in 1932. Many blamed the Weimar Republic. That was made apparent when
political parties on both right and left wanting to disband the Republic altogether made any democratic majority in Parliament
impossible.
The Weimar Republic was severely affected by the Great Depression. The economic stagnation led to increased demands on
Germany to repay the debts owed to the United States. As the Weimar Republic was very fragile in all its existence, the
depression was devastating, and played a major role in the Nazi takeover.
Most Germans thought the Treaty of Versailles was a punishing and degrading document because it forced them to surrender
resource-rich areas and pay massive amounts of compensation. The punitive reparations caused consternation and resentment,
but the actual economic damage resulting from the Treaty of Versailles is difficult to determine. While the official reparations
were considerable, Germany ended up paying only a fraction of them. However, the reparations damaged Germany's economy
by discouraging market loans, which forced the Weimar government to finance its deficit by printing more currency, causing
rampant hyperinflation. At the beginning of 1920, 50 marks was equivalent to one US dollar. By the end of 1923, one US
dollar was equal to 4,200,000,000,000 marks.[155] In addition, the rapid disintegration of Germany in 1919 by the return of a
disillusioned army, the rapid change from possible victory in 1918 to defeat in 1919, and the political chaos may have led to
extreme nationalism.
Princeton historian Harold James argues that there was a clear link between economic decline and people turning to extremist
politics.[156]
Institutional problems
It is widely believed that the 1919 constitution had several weaknesses, making the eventual establishment of a dictatorship
likely, but it is unknown whether a different constitution could have prevented the rise of the Nazi party. However, the 1949
West German constitution (the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany) is generally viewed as a strong response to
these flaws.
The institution of the Reichspräsident was frequently considered as an Ersatzkaiser ("substitute emperor"), an
attempt to replace the emperors with a similarly strong institution meant to diminish party politics. Article 48 of
the Constitution gave the President power to "take all necessary steps" if "public order and security are
seriously disturbed or endangered". Although it was intended as an emergency clause, it was often used before
1933 to issue decrees without the support of Parliament (see above) and also made Gleichschaltung easier.
During the Weimar Republic, it was accepted that a law did not have to conform to the constitution as long as it
had the support of two-thirds of parliament, the same majority needed to change the constitution
(verfassungsdurchbrechende Gesetze). That was a precedent for the Enabling Act of 1933. The Basic Law of
1949 requires an explicit change of the wording, and it prohibits abolishing the basic rights or the federal
structure of the republic.
The use of a proportional representation without large thresholds meant a party with a small amount of support
could gain entry into the Reichstag. That led to many small parties, some extremist, building political bases
within the system, and made it difficult to form and maintain a stable coalition government, further contributing
to instability. To counter the problem, the modern German Bundestag introduced a 5% threshold limit for a party
to gain parliamentary representation. However, the Reichstag of the monarchy was fractioned to a similar
degree even if it was elected by majority vote (under a two-round system).
The Reichstag could remove the Reichskanzler from office even if it was unable to agree on a successor. The
use of such a motion of no confidence meant that since 1932, a government could not be held in office when
the parliament came together. As a result, the 1949 Grundgesetz ("Basic Law") stipulates that a chancellor may
not be removed by Parliament unless a successor is elected at the same time, known as a "constructive vote of
no confidence".
The fundamental rights of habeas corpus, sanctity of the home, inviolability of the mail, freedom of speech and
the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association (including religious associations) and the inviolability of
property – Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Weimar Constitution – could be suspended
under Article 48.[157] The Basic Law lists them as basic rights that cannot legally be nullified and in Article 20 (4)
includes the right to resist attempts to abolish the constitutional order.[158]
Role of individuals
Brüning's economic policy from 1930 to 1932 has been the subject of much debate. It caused many Germans to identify the
Republic with cuts in social spending and extremely liberal economics. Whether there were alternatives to this policy during
the Great Depression is an open question.
Paul von Hindenburg became Reichspräsident in 1925. As he was an old style monarchist conservative, he had little love lost
for the Republic, but for the most part, he formally acted within the bounds of the constitution; however, he ultimately—on the
advice of his son and others close to him—appointed Hitler chancellor, thereby effectively ending the Republic. Additionally,
Hindenburg's death in 1934 ended the last obstacle for Hitler to assume full power in the Weimar Republic.
The German National People's Party (DNVP) has also been blamed as responsible for the downfall of the Weimar Republic
because of its ultranationalist positions and its unwillingness of accepting the Republic because of its monarchist ideology. In
his book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, journalist and historian William L. Shirer wrote that the DNVP's status as a far-
right party rather than a mainstream conservative party was one of the main reasons for the Weimar Republic's downfall. In
Shirer's view, the DNVP's refusal to "take a responsible position either in the government or in the opposition" during most of
Weimar's existence denied Weimar "that stability provided in many other countries by a truly conservative party."[159]
Similarly, conservative British historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennett blamed the DNVP for failing to reconcile with the
Republic, stating that "Under the cloak of loyalty to the Monarchy, they either held aloof or sabotaged the efforts of successive
Chancellors to give a stable government to the Republic. The truth is that after 1918 many German Nationalists were more
influenced by feelings of disloyalty to the Republic than of loyalty to the Kaiser, and it was this motive which led them to
make their fatal contribution to bringing Hitler to power".[160]
Legacy
Nazi propaganda tended to describe the Weimar Republic as a period of treason, degeneration, and corruption. The whole
period from 1918 to 1933 was described in propaganda as "The time of the System" (Systemzeit), while the Republic itself was
known as "The System" (Das System), a term that was adopted into everyday use after 1933.[161] Another Nazi phrase used for
the republic and its politicians was "the November criminals" or "the regime of the November criminals" (German: November-
Verbrecher), referring to the month the republic was founded in (November 1918).[162]
The Weimar Republic brought democratic voting rights to all adults (including women), the eight-hour work day, innovations
in media and technology, and more freedom for homosexual people. New strides for transgender rights were being made,
which involved their own publications, parades, and balls.[163] The first modern transgender affirming clinic that offered male-
to-female surgeries began in the Weimar Republic.[164] However, this was undone by extreme homophobic policies of Nazi
Germany.[165]
According to Foreign Policy, the Weimar Republic is seen as "the best-known historical example of a 'failed' democracy that
ceded to fascism".[166]
Constituent states
Prior to the First World War, the constituent states of the German Empire were 22 smaller monarchies, three republican city-
states, and the Imperial Territory of Alsace–Lorraine. After the territorial losses of the Treaty of Versailles and the German
Revolution of 1918–1919, the remaining states continued as republics. The former Ernestine duchies continued briefly as
republics before merging to form the state of Thuringia in 1920, except for Saxe-Coburg, which became part of Bavaria.
State Capital
Free States (Freistaaten)
Anhalt Dessau
Baden Karlsruhe
Bavaria
Munich
(Bayern)
Brunswick
Braunschweig
(Braunschweig)
Coburg – to
Coburg
Bavaria in 1920
Hesse (Hessen) Darmstadt
Lippe Detmold
Mecklenburg-
Schwerin
Schwerin
Mecklenburg-
Neustrelitz
Strelitz
Oldenburg Oldenburg
Prussia
Berlin
(Preußen)
Saxony
Dresden
(Sachsen)
Schaumburg-
Bückeburg
Lippe
Thuringia
(Thüringen) – Weimar
from 1920
Waldeck-
Pyrmont – to
Prussia
(Pyrmont joined Arolsen
Prussia in 1921,
Waldeck followed in
1929)
Württemberg Stuttgart
Free and Hanseatic Cities (Freie
und Hansestädte)
Bremen
Hamburg
Lübeck
States merged to form Thuringia in
1920
Gotha Gotha
Reuss Gera
Saxe-Altenburg
(Sachsen- Altenburg
Altenburg)
Saxe-
Meiningen
Meiningen
(Sachsen-
Meiningen)
Saxe-Weimar-
Eisenach
(Sachsen- Weimar
Weimar-
Eisenach)
Schwarzburg-
Rudolstadt
Rudolstadt
Schwarzburg-
Sondershausen
Sondershausen
These states were gradually abolished under the Nazi regime via the Gleichschaltung process, whereby they were effectively
replaced by Gaue. There were two notable de jure changes, however. At the end of 1933, Mecklenburg-Strelitz was merged
with Mecklenburg-Schwerin to form a united Mecklenburg. Second, in April 1937, the city-state of Lübeck was formally
incorporated into Prussia by the Greater Hamburg Act, apparently motivated by Hitler's personal dislike for the city. Most of
the remaining states were formally dissolved by the Allies at the end of the Second World War and ultimately reorganised into
the modern states of Germany.
See also
Germany portal
1920s portal
Timeline of the Weimar Republic
Württemberg Landtag elections in the Weimar Republic
References
Explanatory notes
a. Kaliningrad Oblast
b. German: Weimarer Republik, [ˈvaɪmaʁɐ ʁepuˈbliːk] ( listen)
c. German: Deutsche Republik
d. During the time of the Weimar Republic, terms such as People's Republic and/or People's State were used by
republican movements across the political spectrum. It was only during and after World War II that such
terminology became more specifically associated with socialist and Communist regimes.
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General and cited sources

Henig, Ruth (2002). The Weimar Republic 1919–1933 (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781134786848)
(eBook ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203046234 (https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9780203046234). ISBN 978-
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Lane. ISBN 0-393-04671-0.
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Further reading
Allen, William Sheridan (1984). The Nazi seizure of Power: the experience of a single German town, 1922–
1945 (https://archive.org/details/naziseizureofpow0000alle_m2p7). New York, Toronto: F. Watts. ISBN 0-531-
09935-0.
Bennett, Edward W. Germany and the diplomacy of the financial crisis, 1931 (1962) Online free to borrow (http
s://archive.org/details/germanydiplomacy0000benn).
Berghahn, V. R. (1982). Modern Germany (https://archive.org/details/moderngermanysoc0000berg_m4i5).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-34748-3.
Bingham, John (2014). Weimar Cities: The Challenge of Urban Modernity in Germany, 1919–1933. London.
Bookbinder, Paul (1996). Weimar Germany: the Republic of the Reasonable. Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4286-0.
Broszat, Martin (1987). Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany. Leamington Spa, New York: Berg and St.
Martin's Press. ISBN 0-85496-509-2.
Childers, Thomas (1983). The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933 (https://
archive.org/details/nazivotersocialf0000chil). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-
1570-5.
Craig, Gordon A. (1980). Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford History of Modern Europe). Oxford: Oxford University
Press. ISBN 0-19-502724-8.
Dorpalen, Andreas (1964). Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (https://archive.org/details/hindenburgweimar
0000dorp). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. online free to borrow (https://archive.org/details/
hindenburgweimar0000dorp)
Eschenburg, Theodor (1972). Hajo Holborn (ed.). The Role of the Personality in the Crisis of the Weimar
Republic: Hindenburg, Brüning, Groener, Schleicher. New York: Pantheon Books. pp. 3–50, Republic to Reich
The Making of the Nazi Revolution.
Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich (2003), a standard scholarly survey; part of three volume
history 1919–1945.
Eyck, Erich. A history of the Weimar Republic: v. 1. From the collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's election.
(1962)online free to borrow (https://archive.org/details/historyofweimarr00eyck)
Feuchtwanger, Edgar (1993). From Weimar to Hitler: Germany, 1918–1933. London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-
27466-0.
Gay, Peter (1968). Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (https://archive.org/details/weimarcultureout0000ga
yp). New York: Harper & Row.
Gordon, Mel (2000). Voluptuous Panic: The Erotic World of Weimar Berlin. New York: Feral House.
Halperin, S. William. Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (1946)
online (https://archive.org/details/germanytrieddemo00halp).
Hamilton, Richard F. (1982). Who Voted for Hitler?. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-
691-09395-4.
Harman, Chris (1982). The Lost Revolution: Germany 1918–1923 (https://archive.org/details/lostrevolutionge00
00harm). Bookmarks. ISBN 0-906224-08-X.
Hett, Benjamin Carter (2018). The Death of Democracy: Hitler's Rise to Power and the Downfall of the Weimar
Republic. Henry Holt & Company.
James, Harold (1986). The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936 (https://archive.org/details/ger
manslumppolit0000jame). Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-821972-5.
Kaes, Anton; Jay, Martin; Dimendberg, Edward, eds. (1994). The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. Berkeley:
University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06774-6.
Kolb, Eberhard (1988). The Weimar Republic. P.S. Falla (translator). London: Unwin Hyman.
Lee, Stephen J. (1998). The Weimar Republic. Routledge. p. 144.
McElligott, Anthony, ed. (2009). Weimar Germany. Oxford University Press.
Mommsen, Hans (1991). From Weimar to Auschwitz. Philip O'Connor (translator). Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-03198-3.
Nicholls, Anthony James (2000). Weimar and the Rise of Hitler. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-
23350-7.
Peukert, Detlev (1992). The Weimar Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity (https://archive.org/details/weim
arrepublic00detl). New York: Hill and Wang. ISBN 0-8090-9674-9.
Rosenberg, Arthur. A History of the German Republic (1936) 370pp online (https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dl
i.2015.12078)
Smith, Helmut Walser, ed. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. ISBN 978-0-19-872891-7.
ch 18–25.
Turner, Henry Ashby (1996). Hitler's Thirty Days To Power: January 1933 (https://archive.org/details/hitlersthirty
day00turn). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-40714-0.
Turner, Henry Ashby (1985). German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (https://archive.org/details/germanbig
busines00turn). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-503492-9.
Weitz, Eric D. (2007). Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (https://archive.org/details/weimargermanypro00
weit_0). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01695-5.
Wheeler-Bennett, John (2005). The Nemesis of Power: German Army in Politics, 1918–1945. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan Publishing Company. ISBN 1-4039-1812-0.
Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John (1967) [1936]. Hindenburg: the Wooden Titan (https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.
2015.173972). London: Macmillan.
Widdig, Bernd (2001). Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
ISBN 978-0-520-22290-8.
Willett, John (1978). The New Sobriety 1917-1933: Art and Politics in the Weimar Period. London: Thames &
Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-27172-8.
Primary sources
Boyd, Julia (2018). Travelers in the Third Reich: The Rise of Fascism: 1919–1945. ISBN 978-1-68177-782-5.
Kaes, Anton, Martin Jay and Edward Dimendberg, eds. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook,(U of California
Press, 1994).
Price, Morgan Philips. Dispatches from the Weimar Republic: Versailles and German Fascism (1999), reporting
by an English journalist
Historiography
Bryden, Eric Jefferson. "In search of founding fathers: Republican historical narratives in Weimar Germany,
1918–1933" (PhD thesis. University of California, Davis, 2008).
Fritzsche, Peter (1996). "Did Weimar Fail?" (http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0abd/ef3219ecf3066245ef2e48b3f0
bf667e2503.pdf) (PDF). The Journal of Modern History. 68 (3): 629–656. doi:10.1086/245345 (https://doi.org/1
0.1086%2F245345). JSTOR 2946770 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946770). S2CID 39454890 (https://api.sem
anticscholar.org/CorpusID:39454890).
Gerwarth, Robert. "The past in Weimar History" Contemporary European History 15#1 (2006), pp. 1–22 online
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/20081292)
Graf, Rüdiger. "Either-or: The narrative of 'crisis' in Weimar Germany and in historiography." Central European
History 43.4 (2010): 592–615. online (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2986/d888880acb97f73cfe486d530a5f9
e0a1f57.pdf)
Haffert, Lukas, Nils Redeker, and Tobias Rommel. "Misremembering Weimar: Hyperinflation, the Great
Depression, and German collective economic memory." Economics & Politics 33.3 (2021): 664–686. online
Von der Goltz, Anna. Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis (Oxford University Press, 2009)
External links
Documentarchiv.de: Historical documents (http://www.documentarchiv.de/) (in German)
National Library of Israel.org: Weimar Republic collection (http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/English/collections/perso
nalsites/Israel-Germany/Weimar-Republic/Pages/default.aspx)
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6/1/23, 10:55 PM Weimar Republic - Wikipedia

The Weimar Republic,[b] officially named the German Reich, was a

Following the devastation of the First World War (1914–1918), Flag

under control; these intentions badly underestimated Hitler's political

Name and symbols Common languages Unofficial: [show]

Religion 1925 census:[4]

Historical era Interwar period

The black-red-gold tricolor of the 1848 German revolutions was

November Revolution (1918–1919)

On 29 October 1918, a rebellion broke out among sailors at Wilhelmshaven; similar

Constitution created a parliamentary republic

During the debates in Weimar, fighting

Years of crisis (1919–1923)

Burden from the First World War

Political turmoil: Kapp Putsch and Ruhr uprising

The sharp political polarisation that had occurred was

Reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr

The hyperinflation fueled by the government response to the occupation of the

Additional political violence and the Hitler putsch

Golden Era (1924–1929)

Artists in Berlin were influenced by other

Not everyone, however, was happy with the

Social policy under Weimar

Renewed crisis and decline (1930–1933)

Onset of the Great Depression

Gross national product (inflation

A rightful attempt to release Germany from the grip of reparation

NSDAP represented.[137]In April 1932, Brüning had actively supported Hindenburg's

Elections of July 1932

In this brief Presidential Dictatorship intermission, Schleicher assumed the role of

On 29 January, Hitler and Papen thwarted a last-minute threat of an officially sanctioned

End of the Weimar Republic

Hitler's chancellorship (1933)

Hitler cabinet meeting in mid-March

Enabling Act negotiations

Passage of the Enabling Act

Reasons for failure

Timeline of the Weimar Republic

Württemberg Landtag elections in the Weimar Republic

15. "Constitution of the Weimar Republic" (http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/wrv.html). documentArchiv.de (in

56. Scriba, Arnulf (2 September 2014). "Die Teilung Oberschlesiens" (https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/weimarer-re

79. "Vor 100 Jahren: Nationalversammlung konstituiert sich in Weimar" (https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/text

General and cited sources

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Weimar_Republic&oldid=1158073316"

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