έ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώ! ௐ 18 ‫ !

ס‬ௐ 3 ഇ ࢱ 83-101 2022 ѐ/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬

Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 83-101 Autumn 2022

東協中心性與避險策略之研究
以加入『區域全面經濟夥伴協定』
與『跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定』經濟倡議為例*

ዒֈٚ
ำ‫ࡊڒ‬ԫ̂ጯିጯ‫מ‬෸͕̚౾̀‫ࡁޢ‬տࣶ

ၡ ࢋ
ҋҽጼͽֽĂ‫઼ֲݑڌ‬छ‫ົם‬ј઼ࣶЯᛵُВய๕˧д‫ֲݑڌ‬ቺ
‫ؼ‬Ă҃ซҖጼர˯۞ဥඕĂჯ᜕ડા‫׶‬πĄҽጼඕՁ‫ޢ‬Ăྍ௡ᖐ౅࿅
Ķкᙝኘҿķͽ̈́ĶડાགྷᑻፋЪķඈ͞ёซҖ෶‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼Ă֭ుՎ
ঐੵડા̰̝ᙯඁĄࣃ଀‫ڦ‬ຍ۞ߏ‫םڌ‬Ȉ࣎ј઼ࣶ۞གྷᑻ൴णăۤົ
̼͛ă߆‫ޘטڼ‬ᄃ‫ܫି؟‬Ј࢛൒ѣளĂ‫ݒ‬ਕૉ౅࿅ĶವՐВᙊķăĶВ
Т‫ם‬થķăĶ̙̒࿰̰߆ķ̈́Ķ࠹̢Βटķࣧ‫݋‬ଯҖĶ‫םڌ‬ሀёķĂࠎ
Ķ‫םڌ‬གྷᑻВТវķಧ‫ؠ‬։рૄᖂĂܳซડા˘វ̼Ą൒҃Ă21 ͵ࡔ
ٙ‫ޙ‬ၹ۞Ķ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķĂ౅࿅னѣ۞̣࣎‫םڌ‬ΐ˘Ăࢍѣ઼̚ă͟
ώăᔹ઼ă৸Ҙᜋă፫߷ᄃО‫۞ޘ‬ҋϤ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ĂО‫ޘ‬Я઼̚၆‫׎‬෶
‫ึٽ‬म࿅̂҃ੜ΍Ăᕖ̂ડા̼ፋЪԛјĺડાБࢬགྷᑻ෶‫ူٽ‬ҡ‫ם‬
‫ؠ‬Ļ൴೭ტड़Ąώ͛͹ૺ‫םڌ‬ᑕ͚޺ RCEP ᄃĺྭ͉π߶ူҡБࢬซ
Վ‫ؠם‬Ļዮ‫׽‬Ķ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķĂπᏊ઼̂ᝋ˧ĂᔖҺ‫׎צ‬஝‫ט‬Ą

ᙯᔣෟĈ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ăᔖᐍăડાБࢬགྷᑻ෶‫ူٽ‬ҡ‫ؠם‬ăྭ͉π߶
ူҡБࢬซՎ‫ؠם‬

*
ώ͛‫ܐ‬ቇ൴ܑҌέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫ ົם‬2022 ѐ 5 ͡ 22 ͟Ᏹந̝Ķྭ͉π߶ူҡБࢬซՎ‫ם‬
‫ؠ‬ķĞCPTPPğጯఙࡁ੅ົĂপҾຏᔁ୶ѯ̂ጯోࡌᇉି଱೩ֻᚗෳຍ֍Ăͽ̈́‫׌‬Ҝઠ
Щᆶߤ؎ࣶჟᜥ۞֍ྋĂֹώ͛ౢՀΐԆචĄ
84 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

壹、前言
‫઼ֲݑڌ‬छ‫ົם‬ĞAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEANğĂᖎ
Ⴭ‫םڌ‬Ăࠎֲ͉ࢦࢋ۞߆‫ڼ‬གྷᑻ௡ᖐĂϤОκă੺ֽҘֲăහ‫ޠ‬ᄼăາΐ
‫̈́؂‬঍઼‫ ٺ‬1967 ѐјϲĂјϲҌ̫ࡗ 55 ѐĄᑭෛ‫۞םڌ‬൴ण።ΫĂૻᝋ
઼छ̝߆‫ڼ‬ᄃགྷᑻᚮ‫ߏۋ‬ՙ‫ڼ߆ֲݑڌؠ‬ඕၹ۞͹ࢋЯ৵Ă๊̼߆‫ع‬ม͹
ཌྷ۞ЪүĂ‫׎‬Ъүᛉ඀Β߁Ĉ֨ͤВய͹ཌྷᕖ೸ăડાщБăགྷᑻኢጪ̈́
Б஧෶‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼ඈĂౌ‫ૻזצ‬ᝋ઼छγొ۞ᇆᜩĄ‫ܕ‬ѐֽĂͽૻᝋ઼छ͹
Ğ Comprehensive
ጱ۞Б஧෶‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼ซ඀Ăтĺྭ͉π߶ူҡБࢬซՎ‫ؠם‬Ļ
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPPğĂౌົ၆ߊ
ѣ۞λ‫ݭ‬ҋϤ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ĞMega-FTAsğயϠλ̂۞ᇆᜩĄ
ώኢ͛ϫ۞д‫ٺ‬аᜪ‫םڌ‬ፋЪ۞።Ϋซ඀Ă֭ᕩৼ΍α࣎ล߱Ĉ
Ğ1ğҽ
Ĉ‫םڌ‬౹ؕົ઼ࣶᅳጱˠ၆Вய͹ཌྷ۞ऻᛵĂ҃ซҖ઼
ጼॡഇĞ1960s-70sğ
छщБ˯۞Ъүć
Ğ2ğડાགྷᑻᖼ‫ݭ‬ഇĞ1980s-90sğ
Ĉ‫઼םڌ‬छଂซ˾ആ΃
̼ጯ̍ຽᖼ‫ݭ‬ј΍˾ጱШ۞གྷᑻវĂ֭ခᐽγ઼ۡତԸྤĞforeign direct
investmentğĄ1997 ѐĂֲ߷‫ܛ‬Ꮙࢲᇷयଡ‫̶ొֲ̂ڌ‬гડĂ‫ֲݑڌ‬གྷᑻ‫צ‬
क़Ąд͟ώ۞͹ጱ˭ซҖ‫םڌ‬ȈΐˬĞASEAN Plus ThreeğĂ‫םڌ‬ᄃ઼̚ă
͟ώăᔹ઼ࡁᛉВТјϲҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬ડĂֲ๊̼͉གྷᑻЪү௡ᖐĞAsia-Pacific
Economic Cooperationğă‫੼ֲڌ‬पົĞEast Asia Summitğăֲ̈́ለົᛉ
ĞAsia-Europe MeetingğćĞ3ğ‫ޙ‬ၹĶ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķĞASEAN Centralityğࣧ
‫݋‬Ğ2000sğĈ‫ؼੵםڌ‬ᜈ͹ጱ‫ֲڌ‬གྷᑻፋЪĂ‫ ٺ‬2003 ѐௐ˝‫ب‬ᅳఞົᛉ఼
࿅ĺ᳜֧ௐ˟‫ࡗם‬ĻĞBali Concord IIğĂ‫ކ‬ο૟д 2020 ѐ‫ޙ‬ϲ‫םڌ‬ВТវ
ĞASEAN CommunityğĂТॡૻ̼ᄃ͟ώ۞ᙯܼćĞ4ğஎ̼Ķ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķ
ጼரຍஉĞ2010sğĈд࡚ă͟ă̚ඈડાૻᝋ۞ᚮ‫˭ۋ‬Ă‫౅םڌ‬࿅ᕖ̂෶
ĞASEAN connectivityğĂܳјĺડાБࢬ
‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼ซ඀ૻ̼Ķ‫ాםڌ‬ඕّķ
ĞRegional Comprehensive Economic Partnerships, RCEPğ
གྷᑻူҡ‫ؠם‬Ļ ĂԷ
ႊֲ͉гડ۞͚ᕇĞfulcrumğ۞֎ҒĞNishimura, et al., 2019ğĄ
ტ៍‫םڌ‬൴णซ඀Ă‫ߏםڌ‬ᛳ‫ٺ‬Яγొ‫ރ‬਎҃ĶజજķĞpassiveğᚯ௡
۞઼छมЪү௡ᖐĂ‫ޙ׎‬ၹĶ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķ۞࣍ᛉߏ༊΃ૻᝋ઼छᚮဳ˭
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 85

۞߆‫ڼ‬ᔖᐍඉரĞpolitical hedgesğ۞ྻϡĂϫ۞ߏдૻ઼۞ᚮЪᙯܼ˭న
‫ڱ‬ჯ޺ϠхӀৈĂТॡ˵ᄃ‫ૻ΁׎‬ᝋϹ‫ـ‬ĂᖣͽπᏊሕд‫ރ‬਎۞઼छĄώ
͛͹ૺࠎ˞ᔖҺགྷᑻ‫צ‬ಏ˘ૻ઼͹ጱ̝ࢲᐍĂ‫םڌ‬ᑕүࠎᄃ‫઼ૻ΁׎‬Ϲ‫ـ‬
۞͕̚Ă͚޺ RCEP ᄃ CPTPPĂֹ‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶਕૉдк̮۞ۤົშྮӀϡ
ૻ઼۞ᅮՐĂᒔ଀Հк۞߆‫ڼ‬Ɲགྷᑻड़ৈĄ

貳、冷戰時期的東協：團結避免東南亞區域赤化
‫םڌ‬ԛј۞͹ࢋЯ৵ߏҽጼॡഇгቡ߆‫۞ڼ‬҂ณĂ˵ಶߏଯҖБ஧ͅ
В͹ཌྷĂԛј̫͇ிٙ࠰ۢ۞‫םڌ‬Ą઼࡚ᓁ௚ғ഑ᄹĞDwight D. Eisenhowerğ
д 1954 ѐ޽΍Ăࡶߏ̚‫ݑ‬ΗफརˢВயᛨ๕˧ቑಛĂ‫઼ֲݑڌ΁׎‬छಶົ
ు႙̼֔Ă‫זצ‬Ķ੻ൕड़ᑕķĞDomino Theoryğ۞ᇆᜩ҃৾৾ࣆ˭ĄЯѩĂ
઼࡚۞Б஧ͅВ߆ඉߏ౅࿅ᄃ༊г߆ᝋ۞ЪүĂ̂кᇴౌߏ፾෗߆ᝋٕ࢕
ְ߆ᝋĂଠ‫ט‬༊гВய͹ཌྷ۞൴णĞHanssona, et al., 2020: 495ğĄ൒҃Ă
Hanssona ඈˠĞ2020ğ೩ֻ࠹༊ᖳಱ۞Ϋफ़͛ᚥĂᄮࠎ઼࡚Б஧ͅВ߆ඉ
ᄃ‫ֲͅݑڌ‬В߆ඉ૜̙Ξ̶Ă݈۰ߏ፬൴‫ޢ‬۰۞๊̼጗Ą
Mahbubani ᄃ SngĞ2017ğ˵͚޺˯ࢗኢᕇĂᄮࠎ‫઼ࣶົ̣ؕࣧ࣎םڌ‬
ౌഅགྷ።࿅઼̰Вய͹ཌྷᛢใĄ1942 ѐҌ 1954 ѐĂහ‫ޠ‬ᄼ۞܎ҹͅ‫࢕ݔ‬
ĞHukbalahap Rebellionğ˵൴જ၆හ‫ޠ‬ᄼ߆‫ڠع‬྅‫ݔ‬ใĞCho & Park, 2013:
76ğ
Ą1956 ѐĂᚶ੺ֽҘֲ௲ᗓࡻ઼௚‫ޢڼ‬Ă‫ؑڌ‬ą‫ܠ‬οౌٛતĞTunku Abdul
Rahmanğٙᅳጱ۞ᓑ༖д઼ົ‫଀פ‬౼ӀĂ੺ֽҘֲВயᛨౘπࢋՐ߆‫ع‬Т
ຍٚᄮВயᛨࠎЪ‫ڼ߆ڱ‬௡ᖐĂ‫ؑڌ‬ą‫ܠ‬οౌٛત١඗ౘπٙ೩΍ٙѣ۞
ࢋՐĂጱ࡭රࠠ‫׶‬ኘĞBaling Talksğ৔ෘĞHack, 1978: 613-15ğ
Ą1965 ѐĂ
О‫ޘ‬κҘֲВயᛨĞPartai Komunis Indonesia, PBKğ൴જ߆តϏ‫ڍ‬Ăዎ‫צ‬
‫ז‬ᛂ‫ݣ‬ћᓁ௚ĞSuhartoğ൑ଐгᗉᑅĂ̂ณОκරཱྀˠЯࠎᄃ઼̚Вயᛨ
ˠ̀ѣాඕ҃ዎ‫ז‬఍ՙĞRoosa, 2006ğ
Ą˯ְࢗІ֖ͽពϯĂ‫ֲݑڌ‬г͞߆
‫ع‬Яࢬᓜ‫઼ֲݑڌ‬छ̰ొВய͹ཌྷ๕˧̝߄ጼĂЧ઼ᅳጱˠࠎዮ‫߆઼̰׽‬
ᝋĂυืૻ̼ᄃ઼࡚дБ஧ͅВᛉᗟ˯۞ЪүĄ
дᚢႝ඾̼֔۞‫ڤ‬ಛ˭ĂϲಞͅВ۞Оκă঍઼ăາΐ‫؂‬ă੺ֽҘֲ
86 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ᄃහ‫ޠ‬ᄼ‫ ٺ‬1967 ѐ 8 ͡ 7 ͟дત֐ഈฟົᛉĂາΐ‫۞؂‬γ‫ܜ‬ٛຒઙ‫ݑ‬ĞS.

Rajaratnamğົܑ̚ϯĈ
Ķт‫ڍ‬ԧࣇ̙ဥඕĂԧࣇಶົα̶̣ෘķĞMahbubani
& Sng, 2017ğ
Ą௩͟Ă൴Ҷĺ‫֏ކםڌ‬ĻĞASEAN Declarationğ
Ăϒёјϲ‫ڌ‬
‫઼ֲݑ‬छ‫ົם‬Ą‫םڌ‬јϲ‫ܐ‬ഇॡ૱Яࠎј઼ࣶᅳ˿‫ۋ‬ᛉĂ‫ܡ‬ᘣ၁ኳ۞൴णĂ
тĈ1968 ѐහ‫ޠ‬ᄼᄃ੺ֽҘֲдՒ͐˯͹ᝋ̝‫ۋ‬ᛉĄ
Ang Cheng Guan аጸ݈ᓁநՂЍᚹĞLee Kuan Yewğ၆઼࡚ˢ‫ܬ‬෸‫ݑ‬
ٙઇ۞ෞኢĈ
Ķ࡚͞д෸‫ݑ‬Ըˢ۞͕˧ֹ‫઼߷ֲ΁׎‬छౌਕૻ̼၁˧‫ٯ‬ԩВ
ய͹ཌྷ۞ᙹᖬķĞTaylor, 2019: 195-96ğ
Ąᐌ඾෸‫ݑ‬д̚‫ݑ‬Ηफ۞౼ӀĂֹܳ
1976 ѐ 2 ͡‫ٺ‬Оκ᳜ᲔफᓝҖௐ˘‫੼םڌب‬पົᛉĂ֭ᘪࢎĺ‫׶םڌ‬Ꮨ‫ކ‬
֏ĻĞDeclaration of ASEAN Concord, 1976ğᄃĺ̓рᄃЪү୧ࡗĻĞTreaty of
Amity and Cooperation, 1976ğĂቁϲĶЪүķăĶ̓рķăĶ࠹̢಴ࢦķăĶ̢̙
̒ঘķ̈́Ķֹ̙ϡ‫˧ڠ‬ķඈࣧ‫݋‬Ğӓয়ϣĂ1998Ĉ38ğĄ

參、尋求貿易對話夥伴：自由貿易區之推動與區域經
濟轉型
‫םڌ‬ҋଂௐ˟‫੼םڌب‬पົ‫ޢ‬Ăྍ௡ᖐฟؕд෶‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼ซ඀̚ฟؕ
ᄃ‫΁׎‬གྷᑻវ၆ྖĂ֭᎕ໂܳซડા̰གྷᑻᖼ‫ݭ‬Ăૻ̼γ઼ۡତԸྤ
Ğforeign direct investment, FDIğ
Ą1980 Ҍ 1990 ѐ΃ഇมĂ઼ᅫᙯܼ̚۞ડ
ા͹ཌྷጯࠁĞregionalismğࠎ‫۞ֲݑڌ‬ડાፋЪ೩ֻ˞։р۞ྋᛖ˧Ăੵ˞
᎕ໂ٤णฟ‫ా۞ّٸ‬ඕᙯܼĂ֭ᘪᛳડાมٕડા̰۞ҋϤ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ĂԆ
БវរҋϤ͹ཌྷ۞‫ޥ‬ჯĄѩล߱۞‫םڌ‬ડા͹ཌྷ൴णĂ˵ు႙ᔙШྭડા
۞͞ШᔙซĂགྷ෶߿જቑಛஉᄏֲ߷̈́ለ߷Ą
DrysdaleĞ1991ğ޽΍Ăฟ‫ݭٸ‬ડા͹ཌྷĞopen regionalismğߏֲ͉ડ
ાፋЪ۞পّĂົ઼่ࣶ̙ਕૉ‫צ‬ৈξಞฟ‫۞ٸ‬ј‫ڍ‬ĂᔘΞͽՙ‫ؠ‬ξಞฟ
‫۞ٸ‬඀‫ޘ‬ᄃ࿅඀Ă҃‫˵઼ࣶົܧ‬Яѩ‫צ‬೎ĄϺѣొ̶ጯ۰ᄮࠎЧ઼‫ــ‬ᄃ
̙Т۞઼छᘪࢎĶᐹ೎ّ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ķĞpreferential trade agreements, PTAsğĂ
˘઼࣎छΞਕྫྷрೀ઼࣎छᘪࢎĶᐹ೎ّ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ķ
Ă҃ᘪࢎ۞୧ІᄃҋϤ
̼඀‫̙˵ޘ‬ТĂડા෶‫ٽ‬ඕ༖ಶည‫ۇ‬ᔦ྆۞ཌྷ̂ӀᛧĞspaghetti-bowl effectğ
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 87

ਠ۬ᜇ̙୻Ăֹఢ‫݋‬ᙱͽેҖĂ‫ܬ‬ᄞ‫ז‬кᙝ෶‫ٽ‬វր۞ड़‫ڍ‬ᄃΑਕ
ĞBhagwati, et al., 1998: 1128-30ğĄ൒҃Ăߊѣᘪࢎ۞Ķᐹ೎ّ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ķ
ߏӎᄃкᙝ෶‫ٽ‬ኘҿ۞ĺᙯඁၱ෶‫ٽ‬ᓁ‫ؠם‬ĻĞGeneral Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, GATTğ̚۞Ķ‫ڡܧ‬ෛّࣧ‫݋‬ķ࠹̢࠙ᛈࣃ଀Ք‫ޥ‬Ă఺˵ߏϫ݈
‫םڌ‬дௐ˟‫گ‬ડા͹ཌྷٙࢬᓜ۞߄ጼĞBhagwati, et al., 1998: 1146ğĄ
д 1980 ѐഇมĂੵ˞զ඿‫ ٺ‬1984 ѐΐˢ‫̝םڌ‬γĂ‫ ٺ˵םڌ‬1987 ѐ
12 ͡ᓝҖௐˬ‫੼םڌب‬पົᛉĂᘪࢎĺ੺κٛ‫֏ކ‬ĻĞManila Declarationğ
ᄃĶ‫םڌ‬Җજࢍ൪ķĞASEAN Plan of Actionğᄃĺ‫ֲ̓ݑڌ‬рᄃЪү୧ࡗ
࣒ϒᛉ‫ؠ‬३ĻĞProtocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of
Southeast Asiağቁܲј઼ࣶ̰۞઼छΞͽᄃ‫ͽםڌ‬γ۞઼छ‫׶‬πྋՙ۬৾
Ğӓয়ϣĂ1998Ĉ39ğ
ĄΩγĂ1987 ѐ‫םڌ‬ᄃ͟ώјϲĶ‫םڌ‬ů͟ώฟ൴ૄ
‫ܛ‬ķĞASEAN-Japan Development FundğĂјϲĶ̍ຽ̢ྃ፟‫ט‬ķĞBrand to
Brand Complementation ğ ᄃ Ķ ‫ ̍ ם ڌ‬ຽ Ъ ү ࢍ ൪ ķĞ ASEAN Industrial
Cooperationğခᐽγྤซዸᄃགྷᑻᖼ‫ݭ‬ĂχౄͽᄦౄϠயࠎ͹វ۞Ϡயֻ
ᑕᙥĞNishimura, et al., 2019ğĄ
д 1990 ഇมĂ෸‫ݑ‬ăᆴ઼ᄃ቞ո৾৾ΐˢјࠎ‫઼ࣶົםڌ‬Ă‫ ٺ‬1992
ѐ ᓝ Җ ௐ α ‫ ੼ ם ڌ ب‬प ົ ᛉ Ą ົ ᛉ ̚ Ă ੵ ˞ ᕖ ̂ ‫ ם ڌ‬৪ ३ ఍ Ğ ASEAN
Secretariatğ۞ΑਕγĂ࿰ࢍ‫ ٺ‬2008 ѐјϲĶ‫םڌ‬෶‫ٽ‬ҋ෶‫ٽ‬ડķĞASEAN
ĂᘪࢎĺВТѣड़ᐹ೎ᙯඁࢍ൪‫ؠם‬ĻĞAgreement on the
Trade Area, AFTAğ
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme, CEPTğ
Ă૟ડા̰෶‫̍۞ٽ‬ຽᄦ
ј‫۞ݡ‬ᙯඁഴ‫ ז‬5%ͽ˭Ąੵѩ̝γĂ‫۞םڌ‬၆ྖူҡ˵̙Ԋࢨ‫߷ֲٺ‬Ă1996
ѐ 3 ͡Ρฟௐ˘ѨĶለֲົᛉķĞAsia-Europe Meeting, ASEMğĂົ̚Тຍ
ಶ‫̂׌‬ડાม۞෶‫ٽ‬ăԸྤᄃࢫҲᙯඁᛉᗟϹೱຍ֍ĂјϲĶለֲૄ‫ົܛ‬ķ
ĞAsia-Europe FoundationğĄጯ۰ӓয়ϣ̶‫ژ‬Ă‫઼םڌ‬छᙸຍనϲҋ෶ડĂ
͹ࢋֽҋγొડાགྷᑻ۞ᚮ‫ۋ‬ĂΒ߁Ğ˘ğ઼̚ćĞ˟ğ݈ᛂᓑгડćĞˬğ
1992 ѐለ߷ፋЪΞਕౄјԸྤ̶೸ड़ᑕć
ĞαğΔ࡚ҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬ડĞNAFTAğ
јϲ૟઼ֹᅫྤ‫̶ܛ‬೸‫ז‬ግҘ࣯Ğӓয়ϣĂ1998Ĉ40-42ğĄ
1997 ѐ 7 ͡ 2 ͟ᘕ൴ֲ߷གྷᑻࢲᇷĞAsian Financial Crisisğ
Ă঍ᅜ၆࡚
‫ܛ‬෵ࣃĂ঍ᅜ๗த฀ 20%Ăࢦ౹Оκă঍઼ඈֲ߷‫઼΁׎‬छĄԇᗉ໰Ğ1997ğ
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๗த‫ޢ‬Ă͔ٙ൴۞‫ܛ‬ᏉયᗟĂтĈγๅᓁᗝᘆ੼ă઼̰‫ۏ‬ᆊࢳႚĞາΐ‫؂‬ᄃ
੺ֽҘֲੵγğ
ăགྷ૱૳֔фᕖ̂ă߆ᑕតନ߉̙֖ᄃ઼ᅫќ͚ਗ਼म̂ඈඈĄ
ֲ߷གྷᑻࢲᇷឰ‫઼םڌ‬छᄮۢ‫ࢦ࣎˘ז‬ᕇĂӈགྷᑻ̰གྷᑻፋЪ۞ࢦࢋ
ّĂವՐ‫ޙ‬ϲ˘࣎ͽĶ‫ࠎםڌ‬͹វķ۞ВၷડાĂՙ‫ؠ‬ᕖ̂ϫ݈னѣ۞Ķ‫ڌ‬
‫ם‬෶‫ٽ‬ҋ෶ડķĂ‫ޙ‬ϲᄃᔹ઼ă͟ώă઼̚۞Ķ‫םڌ‬ΐˬķĞASEAN Plus
ThreeğူҡЪү፟‫ט‬ĞNishimura, et al., 2019ğ
ĄӓࠠӖĞ2007Ĉ121ğ޽΍Ă
‫םڌ‬ഇ‫౅ޞ‬࿅ѩགྷ෶Ъү۞͞ёĂ൴णјᙷҬለ༖ĞEuropean Unionğ۞Ķ‫ڌ‬
ֲВТវķĂᔙШ˯ࢗᙸഀ۞͞९ܼ౅࿅Ķ‫םڌ‬ΐˬķЪү॰ߛĂు႙൴ण
јĶ‫੼ֲڌ‬पົķ
Ą‫۞םڌޢـ‬үࠎȈ࣎ј઼ࣶ۞πέĂणனՀΐк̮۞Ъ
үറ྽Ą
‫םڌ‬ଂҽጼॡ࣏ઐШડાщБ۞௡ᖐ‫ז‬ҽጼඕՁ‫ޢ‬Ăౙᜈѣາ۞јࣶ
઼ΐˢ‫םڌ‬௡ᖐĂͷ‫׍‬ѣкΑਕ֭൴யྭાူҡ၆ྖĂጯࠧᄮࠎ‫םڌ‬Αਕ
۞ᖼតԆБ௑ЪĶາડા͹ཌྷķĞnew regionalismğĄ‫ࡶڒ‬ౡĞ2016Ĉ18-24ğ
ᄮࠎĂҽጼ۞ඕՁ‫׶‬Б஧̼۞ԣిតዏĂ‫̏םڌ‬јࠎĶளኳщБኑЪវķĂ
ᔵ൒‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶ̝มхд඾኏ࡎᄃღૺĂ‫׎‬щБᛉᗟՀΐк̮ĂΒ߁Ĉۤ
ົă߆‫ڼ‬ăགྷᑻᄃᒖဩĂᄃ‫΁׎‬௡ᖐᛉᗟాඕՀΐஎˢͷБࢬĄ౵ព඾ត
̼ం࿅‫ٺ‬Ķ‫םڌ‬෶‫ٽ‬ҋ෶‫ٽ‬ડķ‫׶‬Ķ‫םڌ‬Ըྤડķ۞јϲĂԛј‫םڌ‬ξಞ
֭ᕖ̂၆γ෶‫ٽ‬Ăӛ͔Հкγ઼ԸྤĂ൴೭ᔌ๕ፋវᚮ‫˧ۋ‬ĂтО੺າј
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肆、建構東協中心性：延續東亞高峰會與東協加三合
作框架
ңᏜ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ĉጯࠧ၆‫ّ͕֭̚םڌٺ‬՟ѣჟ໤۞‫ؠ‬ཌྷĂ‫׎‬дડા
̝Αਕّ˵ߏጯࠧٙ੅ኢ۞൏ᕇ̝˘Ąಶ‫םڌ‬።Ϋਔඛֽ࠻Ă‫઼ֲݑڌ‬छ
͛‫ځ‬к̮ͷमளّ̂Ă̙‫ٽ‬൴ण΍ᙷҬለ༖ĶϤ˭҃˯ķĞbottom-upğ۞ડ
ા ፋ Ъ ሀ ё Ă ˵ ಶ ߏ ౅ ࿅ ለ ߷ ໮ ᐀ В Т វ Ğ European Coal and Steel
Community, ECSCğ྿јྭ઼ొ‫ܝ‬ม۞ፋЪሀёĂుՎᔙШՀᇃ‫۞ھ‬ᛉᗟЪ
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 89

үĞ੥ૈ‫ۿ‬ăᘲҌ࡚Ă2007Ĉ381ă395ğĄጯࠧ၆ለ༖ᄃ‫םڌ‬൴ण̝ளТѝ
ѣ‫֍ؠ‬Ă੥ૈ‫ۿ‬ᄃᘲҌ࡚Ğ2007Ĉ382ğྋᛖለ༖ม۞̢જՀ෭‫ܕ‬Ķ௚ЪķĂ
҃‫ܧ‬ĶፋЪķćĶ‫םڌ‬ΐ˘ķᄃĶ‫םڌ‬ΐˬķЪү॰ߛᛳĶۤཏķّኳĂᔘ
Ϗ྿ĶВТវķ̝ఢሀĄඊ۰ᄮࠎĂ‫םڌ‬дĶ‫םڌ‬ΐˬķ۞Ъү॰ߛౌૻ
አ‫׎‬Ҝ‫͕̚ا‬ᅳጱ۞гҜĂ‫ޙ‬ၹ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ጼரຍဦȈ̶‫ځ‬ពĄ
ՂᘜఆĞ2015Ĉ76-78ğ၆‫۞ّ͕̚םڌٺ‬ຍஉ೩΍Հஎˢ۞࠻‫ڱ‬Ă‫ڌ‬
‫˘ߏّ͕̚ם‬჌‫םڌ‬γϹሀёĂ‫׍‬ѣ጖ჸВᙊă‫ܧ‬ϒё‫ם‬થăᑣཉ‫ۋ‬ᛉͽ
̙̈́ͽ‫˧ڠ‬ྋՙ‫ۋ‬ᛉඈপኳĄдѩࣧ‫˭݋‬Ă‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶ၆‫ٺ‬௡ᖐٙ྿ј۞
ВᙊĂϏ‫׍‬ѣᆹҖཌྷચ̝యЇĂј઼ࣶ̙‫צ‬௡ᖐ‫ࡗט‬Ă֭޺ᜈֳѣ੼‫۞ޘ‬
ҋ͹ّĄ‫םڌ‬࿅Ν౅࿅ᒉౄ၆ྖူҡĞdialogue partnerğᙯֽܼܳซ߆གྷЪ
үĂΒ߁ֲ͉གྷᑻЪүົᛉĞAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APECğă
‫םڌ‬ડાኢጪĞASEAN Regional Forum, ARFğ
ă‫םڌ‬ΐˬᄃ‫੼ֲڌ‬पົĞEast
Asia Summitğ
ĂγϹ˯Ӕனͽ‫۞͕̚ࠎםڌ‬ᏬคĞspoke-and-hubğඕၹĞՂ
ᘜఆĂ2015Ĉ78-79ğĄ
ࡶಶ‫ֲݑڌ‬ડાֽଣտ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬Ăᔵ൒‫םڌ‬Ҝ‫ا‬ค͕Ăҭ̢જ۞࿅
඀֭̚Ϗਕ͹ጱՙඉ࿅඀Ăͷॡ૱ତ‫צ‬၆ྖူҡ̝‫ם‬ӄĄࡁտ۰ࡶߏࢋଣ
տֲ͉ડા˭۞‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬Ăᑕྯ௲࿅Ν‫۞םڌ‬ᏬคඕၹĂдՀ‫׍‬ᇃ‫۞ޘ‬
ਔඛ˭ଣտ̖ਕၓព‫׎‬ຍஉĄೱήྖᄲĂࡶߏࢋ˞ྋ‫םڌ‬дડા‫̚טޙ‬ٙ
Էႊ۞֎ҒĂυืࢋ‫ֲ͉ٺૄޙ‬ડાЪү۞ਔඛĂ౅࿅ϫ݈னѣ۞ֲ͉ડ
ાЪү፟‫˞ֽט‬ྋ‫ົّ͕̚םڌ‬ՀБࢬĄ
д఺˘͞ࢬĂCaballero-AnthonyĞ2008: 563ğ೩΍ۤົშྮ̶‫ژ‬Ğsocial
network analysis, SNAğ౉शĂϡֽྚᛖ‫םڌ‬дડાፋЪ࿅඀ٙ̚Էႊᅳጱ
۞֎ҒĂ޽΍‫םڌ‬ᔵ൒՟ѣည͟ώᄃ઼̚Ξͽ၁ኳᇆᜩ‫઼΁׎‬छ۞ᝋ˧Ă
ҭ‫׎‬Ķ੼‫̬ޘ‬ᇴّ͕̚ķĞhigh betweennessğਕૉֹ‫םڌ‬дࢬ၆кᆸѨЪү
॰ߛ˭۞߄ጼ˭Ă‫ם‬አ̰ొВᙊ֭጖ჸ͕̚гҜĄ
ጯࠧ̏ѣధк͛ᚥଣտ‫םڌ‬дૻᝋ઼छᚮဳ˭ĂԷႊ඾͕̚ᜭજ۰۞
֎ҒĄNarineĞ2002ğᄮࠎĂд‫ޙ‬ϲາડાЪүॡĂ̙ኢߏ͟ώ઼ٕ̚ౌ̙
ᙸຍତ‫צ‬၆͞дડાҫѣ͚੨۞гҜĂҭ‫ݒ‬Ξତ‫םڌצ‬үࠎૻᝋ̢જ̝ม
۞͚ᕇĄDalpinoĞ2009: 5-7ğܑϯĂٙᏜĶ‫םڌ‬ሀёķಶߏдֲ͉ă‫ݑڌ‬
90 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ֲԷႊ͚ᕇ۞֎ҒĂૻአĶವՐВᙊķăĶ̙̒࿰̰߆ķ̈́Ķ࠹̢Βटķࣧ
‫݋‬Ă౅࿅‫੼ֲڌ‬पົ͞ёะវ‫ם‬થ፟‫ט‬ĂซҖડા‫ם‬થЪүĄ‫੼ֲڌ‬पົ
่ࢨĺ‫ֲ̓ݑڌ‬рЪү୧ࡗĻĞASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,
TACğᘪཌ઼̖ਕ΍यĂΒ߁Ĉ઼̚ă͟ώă઼ܻă‫઼ڱ‬ă፫̂ӀֲăО
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StubbsĞ2014: 536-37ğᑭរ‫םڌ‬д‫۞ֲڌ‬ᅳጱгҜĞleadershipğᄃᜦ
ᝋĞhegemonyğ۞̙ТĈ݈۰ߏ˘࣎кᙝ̢જ۞࿅඀Ăј઼ࣶΞֶ໰‫טޙ‬
߹඀ะវ࣍ᛉ֭ВТྋՙયᗟć҃‫ޢ‬۰ߏ౅࿅‫ٕ˧ڠ‬ᄲ‫ֽڇ‬྿јϫ۞Ą‫ڒ‬
ࡶౡĞ2016Ĉ28ğᄮࠎĂ‫࣎˘ߏםڌ‬кᙝ፟‫ૄט‬ᖂٙԛј۞ડાЪү௡ᖐĂ
дγϹ˯۞‫׍‬វ၁ኹ˯ߏ˘჌Ķऴّ޽ጱّࣧ‫݋‬ķĂ֭‫׍‬ѣ˭ЕΑਕĈĞ1ğ
͹જఢထტፋડાፋЪ̝ϫᇾన‫ؠ‬ćĞ2ğజજгдјࣶ۞ᅮՐ˭አፋડા
ፋЪ̝͞ШćĞ3ğᕚᒜ‫׌ࢗ˯ٺ‬۰มĄૄ‫֏ࢗ˯ٺ‬ኢĂඊ۰ᄮࠎ‫םڌ‬дჯ
᜕‫ֲֲ͉̈́ڌ‬ડાְચ˯Ă‫םڌ‬дԷႊ͚ᕇ۞֎ҒΑ̙Ξ՟Ă‫׎‬পঅّٕ
ధߏ೩ֻ‫ܧ‬јࣶ˘࣎γϹറ྽âТྋՙયᗟĄ൒҃Ă‫׎‬ĶವՐВᙊķ
ăĶВ
Т‫ם‬થķăĶ̙̒࿰̰߆ķ̈́Ķ࠹̢Βटķ̙ҭ၆ј઼ࣶ՟ѣࡗՁ˧Ă˵ࡎ
ព΍дࢬ၆ֲ߷‫ܛ‬ᏉࢲᇷॡĂП፟఍ந˯۞ӧဩĄ‫ᙷͻ৿םڌ‬Ҭለ༖ĶϤ
˭҃˯ķ‫۞ࢬޘט‬൴णĂ၆‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ౄј߄ጼĂߏӎਕઇࠎ˘࣎ϖᜈ۞
γϹሀёĂጯࠧ۞᜜‫̪ۋ‬дซҖ̚Ą
д 2000 ѐ΃Ăֲ͉ડાགྷᑻЪүΒ߁‫םڌ‬ΐˬă̈́ĺྭ͉π߶ጼரགྷ
ᑻူҡᙯܼ‫ؠם‬ĻĞTrans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement,
TPSEPğ
Ă‫̂׌‬๕˧ߏֲ͉གྷᑻፋЪ̝‫ܐ‬Ă‫̂׌‬གྷ෶௡ᖐĄಶ‫֏҃םڌ‬Ă2003
ѐ ༊ ॡ О κ ዇ ࣃ ‫ ם ڌ‬͹ य ઼ ॡ Ă ܳ ј ᘪ ࢎ ĺ ‫ ם ڌ‬᳜ ֧ ௐ ˟ ‫ ࡗ ם‬ĻĞ Bali
Concord IIğĂण୕Ķ‫םڌ‬ВТវķ̝ᙸഀĄ2007 ѐĂĺ‫םڌ‬ጳౢĻĞASEAN
Charterğ఼࿅Ăௐ˘୧ௐ 15 ༼Ă೶ܳј઼ࣶჯ޺‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬Ăֹ‫םڌ‬д൴
ण၆γᙯܼ˯јࠎଯજડા‫۞טޙ‬Ķ͹ࢋᜭજ˧ķ
ĄಶĶྭ͉π߶ጼரགྷᑻ
ူҡᙯܼ‫ؠם‬ķ҃֏ĂϤզ඿ăംӀă৸Ҙᜋ̈́າΐ‫ ٺ؂‬2005 ѐᘪཌĂ࡚
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ܼ‫ؠם‬ĻĞTrans-Pacific Partnership, TPPğĄ
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 91

伍、東協中心性的避險策略
дଣտ‫઼ֲڌ‬ᅫᙯܼ྆Ăາன၁͹ཌྷྻϡវրֽᛚ઼ࢗछҖࠎ۰дវ
րඕၹ̢̚જଐԛĂWaltĞ1987ğᄮࠎ઼छົֶ໰γд‫ރ‬਎Ɲ‫ܬ‬ர۞ຍဦĂ
҃ଳ‫פ‬Ķᝋ˧‫ט‬ᏊķĞbalancingğăĶଞଂķĞbandwagoningğăٕ‫ޙ‬ϲĶຍᙊ
ԛၗᓑ༖ķ
ĄಶĶᝋ˧‫ט‬Ꮚķඉர҃֏Ăт‫ڍ‬ሕд۞ᜦᝋ઼छు႙ᕖૺᝋ˧Ă
҃‫΁׎‬ಏ˘Ɲк઼࣎छ൑‫ڱ‬஝‫׎ט‬ҖࠎĂ౵рಶߏᄃ‫΁׎‬൑‫͚ڱ‬੨΁ࣇ۞
઼छซҖඕ༖ĂࢫҲϠх۞П፟ຏĄಶĶଞଂķඉர҃֏Ă͹ࢋߏᛚࢗ˘
઼࣎छົᄃ౵‫ރ׍‬਎۞઼छซҖᓑ༖Ăд఺჌ඉர˭Ăລ‫֘ܮ‬Ğfree riderğ
઼छٕଯ‫ע‬యЇĞbuck passingğ۞઼छົు႙ᆧΐĄಶĶຍᙊԛၗᓑ༖ķ
҃֏Ăຍᙊԛၗ࠹Т۞઼छट‫ٽ‬ԛјᓑ༖ᙯܼĂҭߏ።Ϋ˯ຍᙊԛၗ̶‫ڡ‬
۞ᓑ༖˵ߏ૱ၗĂтңՐхТளĞunifying ideologiesğ֭੠Րຍᙊԛၗဥ
ඕĞideological solidarityğ
ĄWalt ྋᛖԾᙯ઼छ۞ϠхӀৈᐹА‫ٺ‬ຍᙊԛၗĂ
Ѝያຍᙊ‫ݭ‬ၗ‫ޙ‬ၹ۞ᓑ༖Ă̙҃ࢦෛ၁ኳϠхӀৈĂट‫ٽ‬ϞྋĄ
‫ֽͽ˳ܜ‬Ă˯ࢗᓑ༖۞៍ᕇࠎ઼ᅫ߆‫ࡁڼ‬տ̶‫ژ‬೩ֻ։р۞౉शĂϡ
ͽྋᛖវրඕၹ˭ૻᝋ઼छ۞ᚮဳᄃડા઼छม۞̢જҖࠎĄ˯ࢗ͛ᚥ͹
ࢋ౅࿅ᓑ༖நኢ၆‫םڌ‬ડા௡ᖐ೩΍ྋᛖĂ઱၆઼छҖࠎ۰Ξкࢦгણᄃ
ֲ͉ડાЪү۞ᛉ඀Ă՟ѣ೩΍ྵ‫׍‬ᄲ‫۞˧ڇ‬ྋᛖĄೱήྖᄲĂ‫םڌغז‬
ሀё̚۞кࢦّߏᛳ‫ٺ‬Ķᝋ˧‫ט‬ᏊķăĶଞଂķٕĶຍᙊԛၗᓑ༖ķ֭՟ѣ
Հΐ௟ቜ۞᜜ᙋĄ൒҃Ă
Ķᔖᐍķඉர၆็௚ᓑ༖நኢ۞ጼர៍೩΍Հಱྋ
ᛖ˧۞ኢᕇĂপҾߏдБ஧̼ᔌ๕˭൴ण૜̷۞གྷ෶‫ॾࠧ͵۞ֽـ‬Ԋ྆Ă
೩ֻՀ‫׍‬វ۞ҖࠎሀёĄᔖᐍඉரд઼ᅫᙯܼᅳા˘ਠజෛࠎߏĶጼரࡁ
տķٕĶ઼छщБᅳાķ̝ቑᘞĂጯࠧ၆ᔖᐍ۞‫ؠ‬ཌྷѣ‫ࠁ׌‬͹ૺĞӓૣஉĂ
2018Ĉ516-17ğĄ
ௐ ˘ ჌ ‫ ؠ‬ཌྷ Ă ᄮ ࠎ ᔖ ᐍ ඉ ர ߏ ᓑ ༖ ந ኢ ˭ ۞ ˘ ᒖ Ą Lim ᄃ Cooper
Ğ2015Ĉ703ğܑϯĈĶᔖᐍߏᄃ઼̂ඕ༖ॡĂଳ‫פ‬ሀቘ۞ҖࠎሀёĂᖣͽ
ೱ‫פ‬ඕ༖ඕၹ˭Հ̂۞ҋ͹ᝋķ
Ąѩ˘ᔖᐍኢࢗࡎព΍Ķ‫ڦ˭ࢬ׌‬ķ۞Ը፟
‫ޥ‬ჯĂֶ̙ᏥЇңૻᝋ઼छĂܲ঻੼‫ޘ‬ҋ͹ᝋĞች‫ޜځ‬ăૺ౶ᅛĂ2015Ĉ4ğĄ
92 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ЯѩĂдᓑ༖ඕၹ˭Ăጼரϲಞ෸ሀቘĂᔖᐍ۞ड़‫˵ڍ‬ಶ෸‫ځ‬ពĄඊ۰ᄮ
ࠎĂLim ᄃ Cooper ඾ࢦ‫઼ٺ‬छщБࢬШĂ͹ૺᔖᐍඉரߏ˘჌ሀቘ۞ϲಞĂ
‫ݒ‬၆઼छҖࠎ՟ѣՀஎ˘ᆸ۞ೡࢗĄ
ௐ˟჌‫ؠ‬ཌྷĂᄮࠎᔖᐍඉரᏉЪ߆‫ڼ‬ᄃགྷᑻ۞ቑᘞĂߏ˘჌̬‫ٺ‬Ķᝋ
˧‫ט‬ᏊķᄃĶଞଂķ۞ጼரᏴีĄॲፂ WeitsmanĞ2004ğ۞ĶᔖᐍТ༖ķ
Ğhedging allianceğ៍ᕇĂ̈‫઼ݭ‬छдࢬ၆γдщБ‫ރ‬਎ॡĂ֭‫ົܧ‬Ᏼᙝ৭
ଳ‫פ‬প‫ؠ‬ጼரĂ҃ͅົྻϡ஄ЪёጼரĄKuikĞ2008: 167-71ğᄮࠎ‫׍‬វ۞ᔖ
ᐍඉரΞડ̶ࠎĈĞağࢲᐍᑕតᏴีĞrisk contingency optionğĂтมତ‫ט‬Ꮚ
Ğindirect balancingğă‫͚ࡗט‬੨઼ّछĞdominance-denialğćĞbğ౵̂ᒔৈ
ᏴีĞreturn maximizing optionğ
Ăтགྷᑻ၁ϡ͹ཌྷĞeconomic-pragmatismğă
ࡗՁّϹ‫ـ‬Ğbinding engagementğᄃѣࢨ‫۞ޘ‬ଞଂĞlimited bandwagoningğ
Ğ֍ܑ 1ğĄ

ܑ 1Ĉᔖᐍඉரณ
ᔖᐍඉர!
ඉர! ᝋ˧‫ט‬Ꮚ! ࢲᐍᑕតᏴี! ౵̂ᒔৈᏴี! ଞଂ!
ᑕϡ! )Бࢬّ*! ‫͚ࡗט‬੨ གྷᑻ၁ϡ ࡗՁّ ѣࢨ‫) !ޘ‬Бࢬّ*!
มତ‫ט‬Ꮚ
઼ّछ ͹ཌྷ! Ϲ‫!ـ‬ ଞଂ!

! ! ! ! ! ! !
ณ‫!ޘ‬
١඗ૻᝋ඀‫!ޘ‬ ̚‫!ޘ‬ ତৼૻᝋ඀‫!ޘ‬

ྤफ़ֽ໚ĈKuikĞ2008: 166ğĄ

Kuik ၆ĶࢲᐍᑕតᏴีķᄃĶ౵̂ᒔৈᏴีķ˭۞ඉரઇ΍௟ቜ۞ೡ
ࢗĄĞ˘ğăมତ‫ט‬ᏊĈ઼छົ೩̿࢕ְ˧ณ֭ԛј઼֨Ъү፟‫ט‬Ăᑕ၆Ϗ
ֽ۞̙ቁ‫ّؠ‬Ąมࠧ‫ט‬ᏊᄃߘّπᏊ̙ТĂ‫ޢ‬۰౅࿅‫ܧ‬ϒё࢕ְඕ༖၁ኹ
πᏊ̝ϫ۞ĄĞ˟ğă‫͚ࡗט‬੨઼ّछĈࠎ͚֨ͤ੨઼ّछ஝‫઼̈ט‬छĂ̈
઼఼૱ົᄃ‫΁׎‬ડા઼छٚፉડાְّચĂдγϹ˯൴೭ะវщБ̝ᇆᜩ
˧Ăჯ᜕ώ઼ӀৈĂ҃‫߄ܧ‬ጼனѣᝋ˧ඕၹĄд 1960 ѐ΃‫ޢ‬ഇĂপҾߏд
Ҙ͞͵઼ࠧछഴ͌၆‫םڌ‬ٚᏚॡĂ‫͚ࡗט‬੨઼ّछܼ‫םڌ‬γϹ౵੼޽ጱࣧ
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 93

‫݋‬ĄĞˬğăགྷᑻ၁ϡ͹ཌྷĈӈ઼ֹछ̝มхд඾߆‫ڡ۞˯ڼ‬ளĂ઼छົ̪
ົᕖ̂ᄃ઼̂۞ۡତ෶‫ٽ‬ᄃԸྤშྮĂ·̶ᕖ̂གྷᑻӀৈĄĞαğăࡗՁّ
Ϲ‫ـ‬Ĉ‫઼޽ھ‬छົБࢬّᄃૻᝋ઼छϹ‫ـ‬ĂΒ߁߆‫ڼ‬ăགྷᑻᄃ̼͛ᆸࢬĂ
ϫ۞ߏĶ‫̼ޘט‬ķĞinstitutionalizedğγϹ߿જ̝ఢቑĂೈೈචᄵ઼̂Ᏺೈ
̏‫ޙ‬ϲĞregularizedğ̝γϹ৩ԔĄּт 1990 ѐ΃ѝഇĂ‫઼םڌ‬छᄃ઼̚
۞Ϲঘಶ૲ѣࡗՁّ۞ј̶ĂтĈͽ‫ࠎםڌ‬͹វ۞‫םڌ‬ડાኢጪă‫םڌ‬ᄃ
઼̚၆ྖ፟‫ט‬ĄĞ̣ğăѣࢨ‫ޘ‬ଞଂĈ઼छົᏴፄّг੨Ъૻᝋ઼छĂֶ໰
̙ТᛉᗟᏖ‫פ‬Ӏৈâ઼࣎छΞଳ‫פ‬ѩ჌ඉரᄃ૦੓̚۞ૻᝋϹ‫ـ‬ĂТॡ
ᄃᜦᝋ઼छϹঘĂᔖҺ࿬‫׶‬ᔈԊ൴ϠĄ
ְ၁˯Ăᔖᐍඉரߏঙજ۞ໄ‫ه‬Ă‫઼ֲ̈ݑڌ‬ᄃ૦੓̚۞ૻᝋٕᜦᝋ
઼छϹ‫ـ‬ॡĂᑕ൴೭Ķ࠹̢̚‫׶‬үϡķĞmutually counteracting effectsğĂࢫ
Ҳ߆‫ࢲڼ‬ᐍّĞKuik, 2008: 163ğ
ĄGohĞ2005ğ˵޽΍Ă઼छࢬᓜሕд‫ރ‬਎
ॡĂߊ̙ଳ‫פ‬ଞଂٕ‫ט‬Ꮚ۞ඉரĂϺ̙ଳ̚ϲ۞ϲಞĂѩ჌Ķ஄Ъёጼர
ሀёķϒߏᔖᐍඉர۞ჟᐌĄώ༼૟ྻϡᔖᐍඉரྋᛖ‫םڌ‬дֲ͉གྷᑻፋ
Ъซण̚Ă઄‫םڌؠ‬ଳࡗՁّϹ‫͞۞ـ‬ёᕖ̂னѣ۞෶‫ؠםٽ‬Ă౅࿅ΐˢ
RCEP ‫̼ޘט‬ҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬ડ̝ఢቑૻ̼‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ćТॡĂ‫˵םڌ‬ᅮࢋ֨ͤ‫׎‬
΁ડાૻᝋ߄ጼ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬Ăଳ‫͚ࡗט‬੨઼ّछ߆ඉĂΐˢ CPTPP ޺ᜈ൴
೭Ķ࠹̢̚‫׶‬үϡķ጖ჸ‫םڌ‬дડાّ۞ᅳጱгҜĄ
ඊ۰ᄮࠎĂ̙ኢߏᄃડાૻᝋٕᜦᝋ઼छ۞Ϲ‫ـ‬࿅඀̚Ăᔖᐍඉரү
ࠎͽĶ‫ࠎםڌ‬͹វķ۞߆ඉᏴีĂѣӄ‫ٺ‬጖ჸ̰ొᄮТĂૻ̼‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬
̝ຍᙊ‫ݭ‬ၗĂѣड़ᅟତλ‫ݭ‬ҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬ડགྷᑻ࣍ᛉĄӓࠠӖĞ2007Ĉ123-29ğ
޽΍Ă2004 ѐҌ 2010 ѐมĂ‫םڌ‬࿅Νഅᄃ઼̚ăᔹ઼̈́͟ώᘪཌĶ‫םڌ‬Ů
1ķᘪཌҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬ડĞFTAğ‫ؠם‬ćᐌ‫˫ޢ‬ᄃᔹ઼ă͟ώᄃ઼̚ԆјĶ‫םڌ‬
10Ů3ķҋϤ෶‫ؠםٽ‬ć ፫߷ă৸Ҙᜋ‫׶‬О‫ޘ‬ΐˢ‫݋ޢ‬ჍүĶ‫ םڌ‬10+6ķĂ
‫ֽޢ‬൴णјĶ‫ֲڌ‬ტЪགྷᑻူҡķĞComprehensive Economic Partnership in
East Asia, CEPEAğĄ
RCEP ‫ߏ݋‬૟‫ םڌ‬10+6 ۞ડાБొፋЪࠎ˘ҋϤ෶‫ؠםٽ‬Ăϫᇾߏ࣎
ј઼ࣶ̝ม 10 ѐ̰ࢫҌ࿬ᙯඁ۞ٚᏚࠎ͹ĄО‫ ٺޘ‬2019 ѐ‫ٸ‬ୢΐˢ఺࣎
ᖬᄏˠ˾ 35 ᆆͽ̈́‫ ܕ‬30%۞Б஧෶‫ٽ‬ᓁᗝĂಝჍБ஧౵̂ఢሀ۞ҋϤ෶‫ٽ‬
94 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

‫ؠם‬ĂࣧЯߏ RCEP ֭Ϗฟ‫ٸ‬౻̍ொજĂጱ࡭෶‫ٽ‬ਗ਼म൑‫ڱ‬πᏊĄӈ‫ ܮ‬RCEP

ߏϤ‫םڌ‬೩΍Ăҭ‫צ‬ৈ౵̂۞ᑕྍߏ઼̚Ąॲፂ RCEP ௐ˘‫޽؞‬΍Ă઼̚
၆ RCEP 14 ࣎ј઼ࣶ΍˾ᓁࣃј‫ ܜ‬6.9%Ąొ̶ጯ۰ᄮࠎĂRCEP ઇࠎ͚ᇣ
‫۞ّ͕̚םڌ‬ኢ̪ࢗ‫ޞ‬҂រĞՂᘜఆĂ2015Ĉ83-95ğĄ
ጯࠧ၆‫۞ّ͕̚םڌ‬ଣ੅ჸ൏‫ّ͕̚םڌٺ‬ᅳጱгҜĂপҾߏ‫םڌ‬В
Тវߏӎѣ‫׍‬វ၁ኹᅳጱ۞ᝋ˧Ă‫̙޺ٱ‬Т۞࠻‫ڱ‬ĄMuellerĞ2019: 177-78,
194-95ğ޽΍ RCEP ֹགྷ෶შྮӔனкໂ‫ې‬ၗĂԛјღ૜۞གྷ෶შྮĄ‫ڌ‬
‫ّ͕̚ם‬णன‫םڌ‬၆γ൴ण˘࡭۞གྷ෶ϲಞĂҭ‫םڌ‬࿅‫ٺ‬ЈᏥγొྤ໚Ă
̰ొ৿ͻፋЪγొགྷᑻྤ໚̝፟‫ט‬Ă߄ጼ‫۞ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᅳጱгҜĄ̙ኢ‫ڌ‬
‫ם‬Էႊᅳጱ۰ăᜭજ۰ă࣍ᛉ۰ٕ͚ᕇ۞֎ҒĂᏬคّ۞൴णĶ෪ᇈຍཌྷķ
Ą‫׌‬ѐ‫ޢ‬ĂMuellerĞ2021: 747ğᄮࠎ‫۞ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᔖᐍඉ
̂‫ٺ‬Ķ၁ኳຍཌྷķ
ரдડા‫ڼ‬ந˯ѣ‫े׎‬ኢĄଂડા‫ڼ‬நᆸࢬֽ࠻ĂĶ‫םڌ‬ΐ˘ķ۞॰ߛĂЧ
઼‫ם‬ᛉ̙ТĂ৿ͻડા‫ޙ۞ޘט‬ϲጱ࡭‫ם‬ᛉ઼೩΍࠹̢ᚮ‫۞ۋ‬ᛉ඀Ă‫ܬ‬ᄞ
‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬Ąଂ઼छᆸࢬֽ࠻â͞ࢬ೩࣍‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ĂΩγ˘͞ࢬ‫̯ݒ‬
ధј઼ࣶଳ‫פ‬ଞଂ۞ϲಞĂ߆ඉ൑‫ڱ‬ჯ޺˘࡭ّĄ
ඊ۰ᄮࠎ Mueller ۞ኢ͔ࢗ൴͞‫ڱ‬ኢăώវኢᄃۢᙊኢ۞᜜ኢĂТॡஎ
̼‫ֲݑڌ‬ડાፋЪࡁտ۞к̮ࢬШĄଂ።Ϋ۞֎‫ֽ࠻ޘ‬Ă‫םڌ‬௡ᖐјϲ౵
͹ࢋ۞ࣧЯߏЯࠎડાщБᛉᗟĂႬ‫ޢ‬Ꮙˢགྷᑻ൴णᛉᗟĂ֭‫ޙ‬ၹડાᄮ
ТĄЯѩĂĶк̮ᛉᗟ൴णķăĶ৿ͻ‫ޙޘט‬ϲķ˘ۡߏ‫םڌ‬൴ण۞পҒĂॡ
Ҍ̫̰͟ొј઼ֶࣶᖞ৾‫̙ۋ‬ᕝĄ‫םڌ‬јϲ̝‫ܐ‬ಶ̏གྷߏ‫ܧ‬૱ᗫ೸۞௡
ᖐĂд̙జ࠻р۞൴ण።඀˯Ăԛ๬ј઼ࣶ̰۞ВТຍᙊĂᕖ̂གྷᑻડા
۞൴णĄMueller ۞ෞ‫نژ‬ர˞‫םڌ‬።Ϋ൴ण۞ਔඛĂ‫۞םڌ‬௡јώኳ˯ಶ
ߏĶ੅ኢّኳķ۞πέĂ౅࿅ѩπέ๊̼ડાγ۞ซ඀ĂপҾߏдགྷ෶˯
۞ಫЪĄ
Ωγ˘͞ࢬĂֲ͉གྷᑻፋЪ۞Ω˘۵ૻ̂๕˧ TPPĂᔵ൒੺ֽҘֲă
ΐो̂ăግҘ࣯ă͟ώă৪ጆă෸‫ݑ‬ăግҘ࣯ඈ 8 ઼࠹ᚶΐˢĂҭ઼࡚ᓁ
௚̌೼‫ ٺ‬2017 ѐ‫ކ‬οੜ΍ྍ‫ؠם‬ĂϤ͟ώࢦາ͹ጱ֭൴णࠎ CPTPPĄϤ‫ٺ‬
઼࡚۞ੜ΍Ăј઼ࣶ۞ GDP ּͧ˵ଂࣧА۞ 38% ࢫҌ 13%Ăགྷᑻड़ৈᅈ̙
т༊‫ ۞ܐ‬TPPĄѩγĂCPTPP ܲ঻ TPP ෹࿅ 95% ۞ีϫĂࣜඕ۞୧͛ะ̚
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 95

дംᇊੑயᝋᄃ᜕ܲԸྤ۞‫ۋ‬ბྋՙ፟‫ט‬ĄCPTPP дኜк͞ࢬ࠰ჯ޺ TPP

ॡഇ۞੼ᇾ໤ĞՂԠૻĂ2018Ĉ21-22ğĈ
1. ͽ TPP ‫ם‬ᛉࠎૄᖂĂৼˢ౻̍ăᒖဩă౅‫̼ځ‬ᄃͅలჺă߆‫ع‬ଠ‫ט‬
ְຽă࿪̄થચඈາᎸᅳાć
2. ய‫̍̈́ݡ‬ຽ‫ݡ‬ፋវฟ‫ٸ‬඀‫੼ࠤޘ‬Ăੵ͌ᇴྺய‫̪ݡ‬ѣᙯඁγĂ̍ຽ
‫ݡ‬ೀͼԆБ‫פ‬ঐᙯඁĄԆјࢫඁ‫ޢ‬Ă૟ঐੵј઼ࣶม෹࿅ 98% ۞ᙯ
ඁć
3. ੵ˞প‫ؠ‬ҖຽҾѣυࢋ۞Ⴞგନ߉γĂ‫ڇ‬ચຽ̂ౌ̟ͽҋϤ̼ć
4. ј઼ࣶ࠹̢Тຍᕖ̂ฟ‫ع߆ٸ‬ଳᔉξಞĄ

ϫ݈ CPTPP གྷᑻЪү෶‫ؠםٽ‬Ϥ͟ώೠ௷ĂТॡ˵Ξਕ૲જ̙Тડા
ಏ˘઼छΐˢ֭ᕖ̂‫׎‬ఢሀĄॲፂ‫଀ك‬഑઼ᅫགྷᑻࡁտٙĞPeterson Institute
for International Economicsğ޽΍Ăт‫ڍ‬Оκă‫ݑ‬ᔹăහ‫ޠ‬ᄼăέ៉ͽ̈́঍
઼ౌΐˢ CPTPPĂБ஧ќˢᒔৈ૟ົ೩੼ˬࢺĂ࿰ࢍଂϫ݈۞ѐᒔৈᗝ
1,470 ࡚̮೩̿Ҍ 4,490 ࡚̮Ąᕖ̂ CPTPP ј઼ࣶ૟χౄྭા۞གྷᑻЪүᄃ
ֻᑕᙥĞUS-ASEAN Business Council, INC, 2021ğĄ
CPTPP ᄃ RCEP ѣ˭Е‫̙̂׌‬Т̝఍Ąௐ˘ăCPTPP ٙஉᄏ۞ቑಛ̙
่݀ࢨ‫ֲ͉ٺ‬гડĂᔘΒ߁࡚߷઼छĞግҘ࣯ăΐो̂ᄃംӀğĂᛳ‫ྭٺ‬ા
෶‫ٽ‬ҋϤ̼‫ؠם‬ĞDymond, et al.: 2022ğĄГ۰ĂCPTPP дྋՙԸྤ۰‫ۋ‬ბ
˯ĂଳĶԸྤˠęг͹઼ม‫ۋ‬ბྋՙķ፟‫ט‬Ğinvestor-state dispute settlement,
ISDSğ
ĂԸྤˠΞ૟઼ᅫ‫ۋ‬ბϹ;઼ᅫ‫ڱ‬लЅ෗Ă҃ RCEP ଳĶ઼छม‫ۋ‬ბ
ྋՙķ፟‫ט‬Ğinter-state dispute settlement mechanismğĂ˵ಶߏ༊Ըྤˠд
г͹઼ዎ࿃થຽ‫ۋ‬ბॡĂԸྤˠื౅࿅ϓ઼ซҖ‫ޢ‬ᜈ۞ሿથăኪᐺăአྋ
፟‫ט‬ĞDymond, et al., 2022ğĄ
‫םڌ‬௡ᖐдડાགྷᑻፋЪ۞࿅඀̚ĂԷႊ඾ᓝ֖ᅅࢦ۞֎ҒĂ౅࿅ఢ
ቑّ፟‫ט‬ĞтĈ‫੼םڌ‬पົğĂ྿јะវ‫ם‬થ̝ϫ۞ĂซҖડાЪүĄѣధ
к‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶд࿅Νᜩᑕ઼̚Ķ˘૲˘ྮķĞBelt and Road Initiativeğ۞ૄ
ᖂ‫ޙ‬నགྷᑻ࣍ᛉĂRCEP ۞ᘪࢎ൑Ⴗߏૻ̼‫םڌ‬ᄃ઼̚۞གྷ෶ᙯܼĂ‫˵םڌ‬
ు႙ֶᏥ၆઼̚۞΍˾෶‫ٽ‬Ąࢬ၆઼̚ᄃ࣌͟ᆧ۞ᇆᜩ˧Ă‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶ۞
96 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

̰͕ߏ‫ܧ‬૱Ϭ࠼۞Ąགྷᑻ˯ᚢႝ඾Ķଞଂķ۞ᔌ๕Ăҭ˫ُ࿅‫ֶٺ‬Ꮵ઼̚Ă
а‫ז‬࿅Ν઼ٙ̚‫ޙ‬ၹ۞Ķഈ੒វրķ
ć൒҃Ăጐგ઼̙̚ᕝૻአ‫༙׎‬ዐજ፟Ă
χౄĶ઼̚ę‫ڌ‬༖‫ྻ׻‬ВТវķĂҭ‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶ‫ݒ‬Ꮈ࡭৿৿ĞShambaugh,
2021ğĄ
ඊ۰ᄮࠎĂϒߏЯࠎ઼࡚ă઼̚ඈડાૻᝋ၆‫઼םڌ‬छ߆ඉ۞̙˘࡭
ّĂጱ࡭‫઼םڌ‬छϬ࠼۞͕ၗĂឰᔖᐍඉரѣ‫۞̂ޝ‬൴೭۩มĄ‫םڌ‬ኜ઼
Ξͽдડા‫ڼ‬ந˯Ăጾ‫ٱ‬Ķ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ķซҖྭડાƝкࢦણᄃّ̝གྷᑻ
ፋЪĂ‫םڌ‬௡ᖐ͚ᕇ۞֎Ғ̪ࡎព‫ڼ߆׎‬͹វّĂᔖҺ߆‫ૻצ˯ڼ‬ᝋ஝‫ט‬Ą
Ωγ˘͞ࢬĂࡶ‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶు႙ΐˢ CPTPPĂѣΞਕП̈́ᘪࡗ઼̝གྷᑻ͹
ᝋĂႬ‫ޢ‬γྤЋຽࡶ༥˯෶‫ۋٽ‬ბĂֶೈĶԸྤˠę г͹઼ม‫ۋ‬ბྋՙķ
፟‫ט‬Ăг͹઼઼̝̰གྷᑻ‫ڱ‬୧૟൑ϡ‫̝ڠ‬гĄ

陸、結論
ϫ݈ CPTPP ̚Ăາΐ‫؂‬ă෸‫ݑ‬ăզ඿ᄃ੺ֽҘֲᛳ‫઼ࣶົٺ‬Ăϫ݈̏
ѣ‫םڌ΁׎‬ј઼ࣶĂ঍઼ăහ‫ޠ‬ᄼăОκܑ྿ણᄃᎸ኷Ą‫ܕ‬ഇĂౙᜈѣ‫׎‬
΁ડા۞઼छĂΒ߁Ĉࡻ઼ă઼̚ᄃ͟ώ࠰ܑ྿ણᄃຍᙸĄ൒҃ CPTPP ߏ
࣎੼ᇾ໤۞གྷᑻវĂͷᅮࢋјࣶ‫ם‬થ‫̖ޢ‬ਕΐˢĂ၆‫ٺ‬Ҳ‫ޘ‬ฟ൴̝གྷᑻវĂ
ൺഇ̰ࢋΐˢ၁ᛳ̙‫ٽ‬ĄCPTPP ۞࡚ăֲ͉ડાፋЪ፟‫ט‬Ă‫ࣧ̚׎‬யгఢ
‫݋‬ՀѣΞਕ૟‫ֲݑڌ‬χౄјֻᑕᙥᄦౄડĂ઱ CPTPP ࠎ͟ώٙ͹ጱĂϏֽ
‫םڌ‬ᑕྍͽ RCEP ᄃ CPTPP ઇࠎૻ̼‫͞۞ّ͕̚םڌ‬ёĂ޺ᜈԷႊଯજડ
ા‫̰טޙ‬Ķᜭજ۰ķ۞֎ҒĂ൴೭‫׎‬གྷᑻፋЪ࿅඀̚кࢦّ۞পҒĄ
ҋଂ઼࡚ੜ΍ TPP ̝‫ޢ‬Ă࡚̚۞ᚮဳᔌ‫ٺ‬Ϩሤ̼Ă઼࡚ᄮࠎ‫׎‬дᄃ̚
઼۞෶‫̳̙ߏֽـٽ‬π۞Ą2022 ѐ 3 ͡ 28 ͟Ă઼࡚ᑢ‫םڌٺؠ‬পҾपົ˯Ă
ଯҖĶО͉གྷᑻ॰ߛķĞIndo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEFğ
Ăྏဦ‫΃פ‬
CPTPPă֭ԩᏊ઼̚ᅳᅟ۞ RCEPĄ൒҃Ă‫םڌ‬ኜ઼‫ݒ‬ҽீͽ၆Ăͽ̙ҹ΍
यଯᏵົᛉĂឰ઼࡚Ы˞హ੪̄Ąְ၁˯ĂӍˠΞͽ൴னĂͧ੓ĶО͉གྷ
ᑻ॰ߛķĂ‫םڌ‬ј઼ࣶ၆৷གྷᑻ෶‫۞ؠםٽ‬ତ‫ޘצ‬Հ੼Ą
‫ߏّ͕̚םڌ‬дડાፋЪ̚‫םڌ‬ВТវ۞णனĂ෪ᇈ‫םڌ‬ဥඕ۞ϲ
 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 97

ಞĄ൒҃Ăдડા‫ڼ‬ந˯Ă‫םڌ‬јࣶЧ઼ᑕᆶຕෞҤֶፂЧ઼ᅮՐᕖ̂‫׎‬
གྷᑻξಞĂ͚޺ CPTPP ࣍ᛉĂᔖҺགྷᑻ‫઼̚צ‬஝‫ט‬Ą‫ܕ‬ഇ‫םڌ‬ٙ‫ޙ‬ၹ۞Ķ2025
‫ాםڌ‬ඕّ̂ࢍ൪ķĞMaster Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025ğಶߏĶ‫ڌ‬
‫ّ͕̚ם‬ķ۞‫ؼ‬ҩĂૻ̼̰ొ‫۞ޘט‬౹າăડાགྷᑻፋЪ۞ాඕ̈́ˠ̖۞
߹જČඈĂ೬㋃‫םڌ‬Ϗֽ൴ण͞ШĄ
98 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

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 ‫ّ͕̚םڌ‬ᄃᔖᐍඉர̝ࡁտ 101

ASEAN Centrality and Hedging Strategy:

Cases of RCEP and CPTPP

Yu-Cheng Teng
Postdoctoral Researcher, Teaching Excellent Center, National Yunlin
University of Science and Technology, Yunlin, TAIWAN

Abstract
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have been
strategically uniting to maintain regional peace out of fear of the spread of
communism in Southeast Asia ever since the Cold War. Followed by the
Cold War, the organization underwent trade liberalization through
multilateral negotiations and regional economic integration, and gradually
eliminated tariffs in the region. It is worth noting that the despite the ten
members of ASEAN having different economic development, societal
cultures, political systems, and religious beliefs, they could construct
ASEAN Way through consensus, consultation, non-interference, and mutual
respect. These paved the way for the ASEAN Economic Community,
facilitating regional integration. However, ASEAN Centrality was
st
catalyzed in the 21 century through the framework of ‘ASEAN Plus One’,
including Free Trade Agreements with China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Australia, and India, with the latter being in a status of trade surplus to
withdraw. The respective FTAs that emerged gradually led to the formation
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This
article proposes that ASEAN should engage in the RCEP and Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to
consolidate ASEAN Centrality. By doing so, a hedging strategy can
counter balance the influence of great powers and avoid interdependence.

Keywords: ASEAN Centrality, hedging, Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership
102 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 18 ‫ס‬ăௐ 3 ഇĞ2022/ࡌ‫ཱི؞‬ğ