Structure, Agency and the

Internal Conversation

Margaret S. Archer
University of Warwick

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
 Aclmowledgements
I am a lone writer who gets on best without distraction. Therefore, my
first thanks are to the ESRC, for a Research Fellowship that allowed me
to retreat to my study at home for three years of semi-eremitic research.
Shortly after beginning what was to be 'another theory book', I knew it
was going to be necessary to interview real people and, with trepidation,
set out to locate these interlocutors. My gratitude to the generosity of
the twenty men and women who collaborated is boundless, because their
personal disclosur es form the most exciting and original part of the book.
May they all succeed in developing or maintaining a way of life that
enables them to realise their ultimate concerns!
Although a lone writer, I would not thrive as a lonely person. Three
friends, in particular, must be thanked for their constant support. First is
the late and much missed Ninian McNamara, who convinced me that I
should investigate the internal conversation and became as excited as
I did when its different modes began to emerge. Second is my hus-
band, Andrew Jones, to whom an on-going thank you for reading every
word of the original text - on behalf of the society for the defence of the
English language. Residual barbarities are my responsibility alone. Third
is Doug Porpora, whose encouragement has been rock-like and whose
gift of friendship is as rare as the depth with which it is appreciated.
Lastly, my thanks go to my son, Kingsley Jones, for producing the dia-
grams and designing the cover, co Mandy Eaton for patiently transcribing
the interview tapes, and to Frances Jones, whose competence covered up
my computing deficiencies.
x
I
Introduction: how does structure
influence agency?
How does structure influence agents? To ask the question invites social
theorists to advance a process, that is a causal mechanism linking the
two. On the whole, they have reached a negative consensus about what
this process is not. It is not social determinism. Structural and cultural
influences cannot be modelled on hydraulic pressures. If they cannot,
then something else is involved in the process. That something could be
the properties and powers of agents themselves, which is the thesis of this
book.
How structures are variously held to influence agents is dependent
upon what 'structure' and 'agency' are held to be. There is no ontological
consensus whatsoever about what they are within social theory. The sole
and slim agreement is that in some sense 'structure' is objective, whilst in
some sense 'agency' entails subjectivity. Both logically and traditionally,
this minimal accord was compatible with accounts of the process by which
one influenced the other that are diametrically opposed. E ither structure
or agency could be held to be dominant, and the other element to be
correspondingly weak, so weak that it was deprived of causal powers -
such that structure melted into 'constructs' or agents faded -i.nto trag_er.
More recently, it has become popular to suggest that we abandon the
quest for a causal mechanism linking structure and agency, in favour
of ' transcending' the divide between objectivity and subjectivity alto-
gether. Basically, this enterprise rests upon conceptualising 'structures'
and 'agents' as ontologically inseparable because each enters into the
other's constitution. 1 Arguments 'against transcendence'2 protest that the
interplay between the objective and the subjective can only be occluded
by the attempt to transcend the difference between the two. Those who
are 'for transcendence' are denying that objectivity and subjectivity re-
fer to two causal powers that are irreducibly different in kind and make
1
For a critique of such ' central conflation', see Margaret S . Arche:r, Realist Social T heory:
The Morphogenetic A pproach, Cambridge University Press, l 995, ch. 4.
2 Nicos Mouzelis, 'The Subiecrivist-Obiecrivist Divide: Against Transcendence', S ociology,
34: 4, 2000.
 relatively autonomous contributions to social outcomes. Moreover, the
'duality' of structure and agency (or arguments about the homology be-
outcome

.. r
tween the positional and the dispositional), which conceptualise them
as inextricably intertwined, are both hostile to the very differentiation of
subject and object that is indispensable to agential reflexivity towards so-
ciety. Consequently, the potential of such reflexivity for mediating the
influence of structure upon agency is lost in advance.
reproduction
• 2

condition I 1· ~
reproduction /transformation

Realist social theory is obviously 'against transcendence' because it

is 'for emergence'. Ontologically, 'structure' and 'agency' are seen as 3 production 4
distinct strata of reality, as the bearers of quite different properties and ~

powers. Their irreducibility to one another entails examining the interplay

between them. Hence the question has to be re-presented in this context -
how do structures influence agents? In other words, how does objec-
tivity affect subjectivity, and vice versa? Social realists have not given a
fully satisfactory answer. We have advanced a rather vague process of
'conditioning' 3 - one that is far too imprecise to do service as a causal
mechanism.
Central to realist social theory is the statement that 'the causa-J power of
social forms is mediated through social agency'. 4 That is surely correct,
because unless we accept that structural and cultural factors ultimately
emerge from people and are efficacious only through people, then social
forms are reified. However, what explanatory work does this statement
do and what does it fail to accomplish?
Basically, it is little more than a condensed statement about realist
social ontology. It refers to structural and cultural emergent proper-
ties, which are held to have temporal priority, relative autonomy and
causal efficacy vis a vis members of society. Only because social forms
do possess these three characteristics can they be held to exert an irre-
ducible influence upon something different in kind and pertaining to a
different level of stratified reality, namely people. Agents possess prop-
erties and powers distinct from those pertaining to social forms. Among
them feature all those predicates, such as thinking, deliberating, believ-
ing, intending, loving and so forth, which are applicable to people, but
never to social structures or cultural systems. Beyond that, the statement
specifies only that the causal power of social forms 'is mediated through
agency', but it does not te!l us anything about the mediatory process
involved. Obviously, the word 'through' requires unpacking before the
process of mediation has begun to be conceptualised.
3 than otherwise', in such situations.
See Roy Bhaskar's most developed diagram of his 'Transformational Model of Social Ac-
tion', RecJaiming ReaJity, Verso, London, l 989, p. 94. Equally, see my own basic diagram
of the 'Morphogenetic Approach', Realist Social Theory, p. 157. See figures 1.1 and 1.2.
4 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead,
1989, p. 26.
Source. Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, Verso, London, 1989, p. 94
Figure 1. 1 The place of conditioning in Bhaskar's transformational
model of social action.
structural conditioning
T1
socio-cultural interaction
T2 T3
structural elaboration (morphogenesis)
structural reproduction (morphostasis) T4
Source. Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 157
Figure 1.2 The place of social conditioning in Archer's morphogenetic
approach.
However, the unpacking has been far from complete. Generically, it
has consisted in replacing the word 'through' by the process of 'social
conditioning'. Since to condition entails the existence of something that
is conditioned, and because conditioning is not determinism, then this
process necessarily involves the interplay between two different kinds of
causal powers - those pertaining to structures and those belonging to
agents. Therefore, an adequate conceptualisation of conditioning must
deal with the interplay between these two powers. Firstly, this involves a
specification of how structural and cultural powers impinge upon agents,
and secondly of how agents use their own personal powers to act 'so rather
Realist social theorising, like much other social theory, has been almost
exclusively preoccupied with the first problem, which is why it is consid-
ered to be incomplete as yet. It has concentrated upon the question of

I
rg;zg;:ggz ~ .1.IJ"ClVi1;n:.tmQu-~---------------~--------------..'!5a----------------------------------------------
transmission, or how it is that structural properties can impinge upon
agents so as potentially to be able to condition their actions. Frequently,
this has been answered by construing these influences as 'constraints'
and 'enablements'. They are transmitted to us by shaping the situations
(structural or cultural) in which we find ourselves, such that some courses
of action would be impeded and others would be facilitated.
However, it should be noted that these two very useful concepts them-
selves imply the exercise of agential powers. Constraints require something
to constrain, and enablements something to enable. If, per impossibile, no
agent ever entertained any course of action, they could neither be con-
strained nor enabled. Only because people envisage particular courses of
. action can one speak of their constraint or enablement, and only because
they may pursue the same course of action from different social contexts
can one talk of their being differentially constrained and enabled.
In other words, this preliminary unpacking of the word 'through' ac-
knowledges that the two different causal powers of structural objectivity
and agential subjectivity are both entailed by the concepts of 'constraints' it'. Yet, even there, subjectivity has not entirely made its exit.
and 'enablements'. This is also the case for all other ways in which struc-
tures can be held to influence us as agents. Here, it could be objected
that we sometimes talk of structural factors working upon us, without
our awareness - as in the 'unacknowledged conditions of action'. It might
seem that if these are influential, but unacknowledged, then their effects
must be independent of their subjective reception. Equally, references are
also made to the influences of objective structural and cultural factors in
creating vested interests and motivating us to defend them, or in reducing
our aspirations by limiting our social horizons. In such cases, it might be
thought that if objectivity shapes subjectivity in these ways, then the lat-
ter makes no independent contribution to outcomes. However, it would
be erroneous, in all three instances, to believe that subjectivity has been
banished from these processes of conditioning.
For example, where the unacknowledged conditions of action are con-
cerned, a native English speaker may advance her academic career, thanks
to the predominance of the English language, without any acknowledge-
ment on her pare thac the conditions of her action are the heritage of
British colonialism. That is pertecdy correct, but what she is respond-
ing to, in pursuing her academic projects, is the ease and rewarding-
ness of h.er situation. This is aU she needs to know, and she wiH on1y
know that under her own descriptions, for example, 'I won't have to wait
long for that book to be translated', or her presumption that English will
always be an official language ac conferences. Her subjective response,
namely exerting her personal powers to write further arcides and papers,
does nae depend upon her understanding the generative mechanisms that
I
structured the situations she encounters; it is enough that she is aware of
her situation.
Similarly, a vested interest is an interest vested in a position, and for
it to move an agent then it has to be found good by that person, under
her own descriptions. Human subjectivity has not been eliminated, as is
demonstrated when some people use their personal powers to renounce or
repudiate their vested interests. Then again, the differential life-chances
allocated to those differently situated in society are influential because
they assign different opp ortunity costs to the same course of action (such
as buying one's own house). Yet, it is agential deliberations that determine
whether or not the price is deemed worth paying, even if its costs to
them, in terms of saving, overtime and foregoing other things, are higher
than to those who are better placed. Therefore, we can never explain who
becomes a homeowner without consulting agents' subjectivity. Otherwise
we would be confined to making empirical generalisations of the kind,
'the greater the costs of a project, the less likely are people to entertain
Of course, if we did all respond to social forms in identical fashion,
reference to 'personal powers' would not be redundant, but it would lose
much of its interest. Instead, explaining what people do, in all of the above
cases, involves reference to agents' subjective and reflexive formulation of
personal projects - in the light of their objective circumstances. This being
the case, then the influence of constraints and enablements will be taken
as paradigmatic of how structure conditions agents - such conditioning
being a process that involves both objective impingement and subjective
reception.
Structural constraints o r enablements
and human projects
There are no constraints and enablements per se, that is as emmes.
These are the potentiaJ causal powers of structural emergent properties,
such as distributions, roles, organisations, or institutions, and of cultural
emergent propert1es, such as propositions, theor1es or doctrines. Yet, to
constrain and to enable are transitive verbs; they have to impede or to
facilitate something. As with aH potential causal powers, they can remain
unexerdsed because it is a wholly contingent maner whether they are
activated. In other words, constraints and enablements do not possess
an intrinsic capacity for constraining or enabling in abstraction. For any-
thing to exert the power of a consrraint or an enablemem, 1t has to stand
in a relationship such that it obstructs or aids the achievement of some
specjfic agential enterprise. The generk name given to such enterprises
 is 'projects'. Obviously a project is a human device, be it individual or
collective, because only people possess the intentionality to define and
design courses of action in order to achieve their own ends. Animals, of
course, have a limited intentionality when stalking prey, for example. But
only the higher primates, who can use sticks to reach what is beyond their
grasp, can be credited with primitive projects; tigers do not dig traps or
lay snares for gazelles. In other words, a project involves an end that is de-
sired, however tentatively or nebulously, and also some notion, however
imprecise, of the course of action through which to accomplish it.
This is the reason why constraints and enablements are terms in social
science, which refer to causal powers that can be exercised in society,
but are not terms employed in natural science. Where chemical reac-
tions are concerned, a different terminology would be used, for instance
that of 'inhibitors', 'catalysts' and 'retarding agents' . Importantly, this
recognises that simply by virtue of their composition, two substances
will, ceteris paribus, necessarily interact in determinate ways. There is no
entity involved which possesses the reflexivity to deliberate about how
to respond to the causal power(s) which have been activated (apart, of
course, from the experimenter). Consequently, terms are adopted which
straightforwardly tell us how the reaction is necessarily blocked, speeded-
up or slowed-down when other substances or processes (such as heating)
intervene. 5
The language of social constraints and enablements is entirely other
because they work quite differently in relation to human projects. The
first difference is that they can operate through anticipation. Reflexive
agents can sometimes foresee the impediments that certain projects would
encounter and thus be deterred from pursuing them. Equally, they may
anticipate the ease with which other projects could be advanced, and the
benefits that would accrue, and thus be encouraged to adopt them. This
sui generis difference from inert matter does not depend upon human
agents being correct in their forecasts and expectations; indeed they are
not, but inert matter cannot anticipate at all.
The second difference is that when a project is constrained or en-
abled during its execution, agents can act strategically to try to discover
ways around it or to define a second-best outcome (where constraints are
concerned). Equa1ly strategically, they can deliberate about how to get
the most out of propitious circumstances, which may mean adopting a
more ambitious goal, so that a good outcome is turned into a better one
(where enablements are concerned). Thus, by their nature, humans have
5 The cereris paribus etause has to be invoked again, but only co refer co further contingent
intrusions in laboratory experiments, which are rarely perfectly closed.
I
degrees of freedom in determining their own courses of action. These
certainly vary with the stringency of constraints and the strength of en-
ablements, but agents enjoy their own powers of reflexive deliberation,
in contrast with inert matter, which merely manifests indeterminacy or
inertia if causal powers are weak (for example, if insufficient amounts of
a substance are present) .
In short, constraints and enablements derive from structural and cul-
tural emergent properties. They have the generative power to impede
or facilitate projects of different kinds from groups of agents who are
differentially placed. H owever, the activation of their causal powers is
contingent upon agents who conceive of and pursue projects upon which
they would impinge. Otherwise, constraints and enablements remain un-
exercised. Because they are relatively enduring, structural and cultural
emergent properties retain their generative potential to exert constraints
and enablements were anyone or a group to adopt a project upon which
they would impinge.
In other words, it is essential to distinguish between the existence of struc-
tural properties and the exercise of their causal powers. Properties pertain
to structures and cultures; for example, science will always now contain
the potential for the construction of nuclear bombs, regardless of a global
prohibition upon their manufacture. Conversely, whether constraints and
enablements are exercised as causal powers is contingent upon agency
embracing the kinds of projects upon which they can impact. Moreover,
the influences of constraints and enablements will only be tendential be-
cause of human reflexive abilities to withstand them and strategically
to circumvent them. The effect of these structural and cultural causal
powers is at the mercy of two open systems; the world and its contin-
gencies and human agency's reflexive acuity, creativity and capacity for
commitment.
In sum, the activation of the causal powers associated with constraints
and enablements depends upon the use made of personal emergent prop-
erties to formulate agential projects. Thus, a top-heavy demographic
structure simply cannot constrain a generous pension policy unless and
until some group, which is in a position to introduce it, does in fact ad-
vocate such a policy. Similarly, the necessary contradiction6 between two
sets of beliefs or theories remains a purely logkal maner, which is without
social consequence, unless there are people whose project it is to uphold
one of these sets of ideas.
As these examples show, it is not the mere co-existence of structural and
cultural properties with any kind of project held by agents that realises the
6
See Margaret S. Archer, Culture and A gency, Cambridge University Press, l 988, p. l 4Sf.
 powers of constraints and enablements. Instead, the projects have to be
of such a nature that they activate particular causal powers. There is no
necessity that this should always be the case. Certain intentional human
activities, like private prayer, can never be the objects of structural or
cultural constraints, though they may be socio-culturally discouraged.
Conversely, private drinking may or may not be constrained according to
variations in taxation, availability or legality.
The answer to the question, 'what is required for structural and cul-
tural factors to exercise their powers of constraint and enablement?' can
be summarised as follows. Firstly, such powers are dependent upon the
existence of human projects; no projects mean no constraints and en-
ablements. Secondly, to operate as either an enabling or a constraining
influence, there has to be a relationship of congruence or incongruence
respectively with particular agential projects. Thirdly, agents have to re-
spond to these influences; which being conditional rather than determin-
istic, are subject to reflexive deliberation over the nature of the response.
In sum, no structural or cultural emergent property is constraining or
enabling tout court. To become constraints or enablements involves a re-
lationship with the use made of personal emergent properties. Whether or
not their causal power is to constrain or to enable is realised, and for whom
they constitute constraints or enablements, depends upon the nature of
the relationship between them and agential projects.
Until we understand this relationship, any account of 'conditioning'
remains unilateral, since it concentrates exclusively upon how the situa-
tions and circumstances that we confront are structurally and culturally
moulded for us. Conversely, specifying how structures and agents com-
bine entails two stages. Firstly, it involves theorising about how struc-
tural and cultural forms can impinge upon people. This, realism is held to
have conceptualised adequately when dealing with social forms as con-
straints and enablements, although it has underplayed the indispensability
of agential projects to the activation of these social powers. Secondly, the
specification of how social forms are influential also entails the reception
of these objective influences, with their potential power to condition what
people may do, by reflexive agents whose subjective powers ultimately
determine what they do in fact do. Here, Hollis and Smith criticise social
realism because 'it does not make sense ofhow we integrate structures and
agents in a single story' .1 In short, we realists have failed to 'specify how
structures and agency are to be combined'. If this criticism means that
we have not theorised how 'transmission' and 'reception' come together
7 Manin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of
lnremarional Studies, 20, I 994, p. 250.
'-
as two elements of a single mediatory process, then the point is well taken
and this book is dedicated to producing the necessary account - which I
believe is possible and they do not.
In brief, this book aims to replace the 'inevitability of two stories' (the
'external' and the 'internal') with the 'tale of two powers' - with a single
account of the necessary interplay between objectivity and subjectivity.
Without this, the realist proposition that the 'causal power of social forms
is mediated through social agency' rightly repudiates reification, but it
remains far too indefinite to give due recognition to the p ersonal powers
of human agents. That will be the case while ever we realists fail fully to
theorise the mediatory process denoted by that word 'through'.
Therefore, we need to be a good deal more precise about the agential
process involved. After all, 'constraints and enablements' only indicate
the difficulty or ease with which certain projects could be accomplished,
ceteris paribus, by groups of people standing in given relations to (part
of) society. They tell us absolutely nothing about which projects are
entertained, even though they can inform us about who has an objective
material or ideational interest in adopting a maintenance project rather
than a transformatory one. Much more is involved; agents have to diag-
nose their situations, they have to identify their own interests and they
must design projects they deem appropriate to attaining their ends. At
all three points they are fallible: they can mis-diagnose their situations,
mis-identify their interests, and mis-judge appropriate courses of action.
However, the fundamental question is not whether they do all of this well,
but how they do it at all. The answer to this is held to be 'via the inter-
nal conversation'. This is the modality through which reflexivity towards
self, society and the relationship between them is exercised. In itself it
entails just such things as articulating to ourselves where we are placed,
ascertaining where our interests lie and adumbrating schemes of future
action.
Personal reflexivity~the missing link in mediation
The account of how structures influence agents, which will be developed
throughout this book, is entirely dependent upon the proposition that our
human powers of reflexivity have causal efficacy - towards ourselves, our
society and relations between them. However, reflexivity, which is held
to be one of the most important of personal emergent properties, is often
denied to exert causal powers - in which case it becomes considerably
less interesting or of no img_ortance at all in accounting for any outcome.
To revindicate the influential nature of reflexivity is thus essential to the
present enterprise.
,.............l"!!!"l'".......~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--,~~~~~~~~~~~-___..."'T'""~~~~~~~~Tl-"~~
The opposition to be overcome can be summarised by considering
Graham's statement below and what he says about himself in relation to
his actions, compared with how others would interpret his words.
I'm very cautious in what we spend- I like to be right if I'm going to do something
out there. And the caution is don't jump straight in. Just stand back ... and make
plans. Stand back, don't stand forward. (Graham, 62-year-old construction site
foreman)
The lay person's reaction would probably be that he is thinking about
himself, his finances and his spending, and it is the fact that he dwells
upon these relationships which makes Graham a cautious spender. If lay
people are invited to be imaginative, they might also picture what he does
when shopping. He 'stands back', meticulously aware of his income and
expenditure; he knows what is within his means and what is beyond them;
he is not an impulse buyer, but is alert to good value; he will be attentive
to quality and so will shop around; and what he eventually purchases
will be the closest approximation to what he set out to buy, at the best
price available. In short, what Graham does in the marketplace cannot be
explained without reference to Graham himself. Specifically, his doings
are a product of how he thinks about himself and how he monitors his
activities, 'out there' in the market.
A formal description of his statement would be that Graham is exer-
cising his personal capacity for reflexivity to deliberate about himself in
relation to his circumstances in order to plan his future actions. However,
there would not be consensus upon that description, which is very close to
the lay understanding. Instead, theorists would disagree amongst them-
selves about what part Graham's deliberations play in accounting for his
actions. Their disagreement is firmly rooted in how Graham, the agent,
is conceptualised. The disputants can be placed on a continuum, which
ranges from those who maintain that 'Graham' is the proper name given
to a particular neural network, to those who hold that he is a ' cultural
artefact'. 8 At the one extreme, his thinking explains nothing about his
doing, because his thoughts have no independent power to affect his ac-
tions; at the opposite extreme, his thoughts may account for his deeds, but
these are not his thoughts, since they have been internalised from soci-
ety. In between these two poles are various concepts of the agent, which
accord his thoughts different amounts of responsibility for his actions.
Lee us briefly characterise three theoretical positions whose protagonists
would dispute what Graham says of himself.
(A) At one pole, neurological reductionists would not deny that
Graham felt as if he were planning his budget careful.ly, but this feeling
S Rom H arre, Personal Being, Basil Blaclnvell, Oxford, l 983, p. 20.
I
would only be a phenomenological accompaniment to the workings of his
hard-wiring. Since the latter alone is causally responsible for his spend-
ing, then his feelings do not account for his doings. When he talks of
'standing back and making plans', he rightly characterises how it feels to
him when about to make a purchase, but he wrongly concludes that his
sensation of deliberating about his purchases is causally responsible for
what goes into his shopping basket. His sense of planning is only phe-
nomenological 'froth' - an epiphenomenon. Thus his notion that he can
monitor himself to act cautiously rather than rashly is also pure delusion.
Graham lacks the personal powers to make a difference, for ' Graham',
the neural network, will do just what his brain-events make him do in the
shopping mall. Graham's characterisation of himself as a ' cautious man'
is not necessarily uninteresting, but only as a further candidate for reduc-
ing to 'Graham's' 9 neural-firings. Thus Graham is the embodiment of the
shopper, who performs all the actions entailed in shopping, but what is
going through his head as he does so is a subjective irrelevance; his de-
liberations have n o causal efficacy, and he is wrong in believing that they
do. How does structure influence agency? It does so in exactly the same
way that the natural environment influences non-human organism s -
that is without any mediation by subjectivity.
(B) In the middle of the continuum are those who would countenance
what Graham says of himself, but would also draw attention to what he
is not saying and what he may lack the 'discursive penetration ' to say.
Both of the latter are needed in order to provide a complete account
of his actions. Attention might be drawn to his careful budgeting as a
disposition, acquired semi-consciously and quasi-automatically from his
working-class position, 10 because money has been tight throughout his
life. Here, his subjectivity is not disregarded. He might indeed mentally
debate between buying a barbecue or re-laying the patio, and he may plan
in which order to obtain the two, but he will be largely unaware that his
horizons have been socially reduced, such that he does not even consider
acquiring an outdoor jacuzzi.
In similar vein, it might be pointed out that Graham's sub}ective con-
ception of his spending plans necessarily means that he tacitly draws
upon many objective factors, 11 precisely in order to be able to plan. H is
deliberations presuppose various things about his social context, yet he
9
Daniel C. Dennen, Consciousness Explained, Penguin, London , 1993. Theorises can agree
'about just what a subject's heterophenomenological world is, while offering entirely
different accounts of how heterophenomenological worlds map onro evenrs in the brain',
p. 81.
to Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of er-Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, l 977 and
The Logic of Pracrice, Polity Press, Oxford, 1990.
11 Anthony Giddens, Ceniral Problems in Social Theory, Macmillan, London, 1979 and The
Consr:icucion of S ociety, Polity Press, Oxford, 1990.
_ -------- =- 1z. m·a.vu:a\;;a·oi.~-.---------------------------------"""'!(! ! !~----------------------------------------------
may not be fully aware of making these presumptions. For example, he is
drawing on the fact that the construction industry furnishes him with a
steady income, that those on steady incomes can readily buy a barbecue
on credit, and that someone with his contacts can re-do the patio at less
than the commercial cost. The outcome could be that Graham ends up
with a new barbecue standing on a new patio this summer. Ifhe does, he
probably also remains unaware that objectively he has helped to keep the
garden suppliers in business and that subjectively his neighbour is now
considering his own garden improvements.
This sounds quite plausible, but it has one drawback, namely it is now
not clear where Graham starts and finishes in relation to his context. If, in
making his plans, he has to draw upon these social factors, then how much
of what he says is about himself and how much is about his circumstances?
To appreciate the difficulty that this creates, suppose one tries to allow that
Graham is indeed a 'cautious man', as he says of himself. If 'caution' is
characteristic of him as a person, he will not even entertain a plan until he
has 'stood back', examined the ins and outs, and finally reassured himself
that it is a modestly non-risky enterprise. The problem is encountered
immediately. For Graham to deem a course of action to be a low-risk
one entails him drawing upon further presuppositions about his social
context - that his suppliers are reputable, that he will not be made re-
dundant, that home improvements increase re-sale value etc. Thus, there
never comes a point at which it is possible to disentangle Graham's per-
sonal caution (a subjective property of a person) from the characteristics
of his context (objective properties of society). In any case, as was seen
above, his very disposition towards careful budgeting is not entirely his
own, but a refraction of his social origins. 'Graham' has now become
so inextricably intertwined with his social background and foreground
that it is no longer clear who is 'standing back'. All that is certain is that
he does not have the last word about himself, his intentions or actions.
Therefore, it becomes impossible that Graham can deliberate upon his
circumstances as subject to object, because these are now inseparable for
'Graham'.
(C) Ac the opposite extreme, Graham's utterance can stand, but only as
part of the ongomg 'conversation of society'. Interpersonally, his commu-
nity will have developed a set of meanings about the appropriate spatial
uses ofh.ouse and garden. Thar these are negotiated consrructs, which are
therefore subject to re-negotiation, is witnessed by the face char Graham's
parents would nor have invited friends and family to eat spare ribs on
their (non-existent) patio. Here, however, we are in still bigger trouble
with Graham's statement about his 'plans' and his belief that his subjec-
tive deliberations are his own. This is because the direct implication of
I
holding that we are 'cultural artefacts' is to void our 'inner lives' in or-
der to vaunt our discursive production. Indeed, the very 'I' that Graham
employs to speak about his 'own' deliberations is not self-referential. Its
use merely demonstrates his mastery of the first-person pronoun, which
indexes the spatial location of his body. 'Graham' has appropriated the
very notion of being Graham, a self, as a theory which he has learned
from society, just as all his internal dialogue is secondary and derivative
from 'society's conversation'. Since there can be 'nothing in the mind
that was not first in the conversation', 12 then 'Graham' cannot privately
deliberate upon his personal plans.
Therefore, in characterising himself as 'cautious', 'Graham' is stressing
his accountability to society's moral order and demonstrating that he has
internalised its prudential discourse. For instance, he appropriates the
term 'cautious' because he does not gamble (dubious practice), although
he takes his 'credit worthiness' for granted (standard practice) . The prob-
lem now is that his society has also been re-conceptualised. Objectively,
our economy is one that encourages people to extend their use of credit to
the limit. Since 'Graham' will be as susceptible to this encouragement as
others in his community, then he may talk as ifhe is planning cautiously,
whilst objectively he is living quite dangerously. How matters are can
never be substituted for how any community (of discourse) takes matters
to be. People who found themselves in negative equity or having their
homes re-possessed confronted real structural powers and not a social
meaning. Once again, it is impossible for 'Graham' to deliberate on his
circumstances as subject to object; his 'subjectivity' has dissolved into
'society's conversation' and his objective context has melted away into
social constructs.
In none of these theories is Graham taken at his word, that is as a
person who subjectively reflects upon himself in relation to his objec-
tive circumstances. This is because both the subjective and the objective
have been re-defined. On the one hand, Graham is not whom he consid-
ers himself to be. Instead, he becomes one of three different versions of
'Graham'. No ' Graham' has the subjective reflexivity that Graham him-
self claims co possess. In place of chis personal property, which allowed
him to 'stand back' and privately make sure that he was 'right' about
what he intended to do, each 'Graham' has a quite different property.
For 'Graham' A, his subjectivity has become an epiphenomenon of his
braln-events, for 'Graham' B lt has become mseparable from hjs soda}
context, and for 'Graham' C ic is a derivative from the collective discourse
of his community. On the other hand, Graham was deliberating in order
l.
12 Rom Harre, Personal B eing, p. l l6.
 to 'be right' when doing things 'out there' in the real social world. In-
stead, 'Graham' A, cannot be a knowing subject in relation to objective
reality, for ' Graham' B, 'out there' has become blurred with ' in here',
and for 'Graham' C, the objective reality of society has been transformed
into how his community takes it to be, not how it is. All three theories
have completely re-defined 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity', such that they
cannot stand in the relationships supposed by Graham when making his
original statement.
In other words, none of these approaches allows that Graham is doing
what he thinks he is doing, that is reflecting upon himself in relation to his
circumstances - as two distinct parts of reality with different properties
and powers. In saying what he does, he endorses a belief in his own
subjectivity and that his reflexive deliberations affect his actions within
the objective social situations that he finds himself.
In this book, I want to maintain that Graham is correct. Firstly, he
is right about his subjectivity, that it is his own internal property, that
it is real and that it is influential. In other words, it is a personal interior
property, with a first-person subjective ontology, and with powers that can be
causally efficacious in relation to himself and to his society. Secondly, he is
also right that he lives in a social world that has different properties and
powers from his own - ones which constrain (and enable) his actions.
These are temporally prior to his conceiving of a course of action, relatively
autonomous from how he takes them to be, but can causally influence the
achievement of his plans by frustrating them or advancing them. Thirdly,
he is again correct that since he is capable of reflexively monitoring himself
in relation to his circumstances, whilst they are incapable of doing the
same towards him, then he is able to adopt a 'stance' towards his social
context, in his case that of a ' cautious man' . In other words, Graham
believes that he had best be aware (and beware) of his society, as best
he can, and then carefully 'plan' before acting. In defending these three
elements of his outlook, this does not imply, and does not need to imply,
that either his 'self-knowledge' or his 'societal-knowledge' are correct,
or that the 'stance' he adopts in order to accomplish what he seeks is
appropriate, lee alone optimal, to his ends.
Conclusion
To defend these three elements is to endorse the notions that 'structure'
and 'agency' constitute two distinctive and irreducible properties and
powers, and that human reflexive deliberations play a crucial role in me-
diating between them. Many will object to both propositions. On the one
hand, only if the ontological difference between 'structure' and 'agency' is
accepted (acceptance precluding their conflation) does the question arise
as to how the influence of the one is mediated to the other. More exactly, it
is only if the subjectivity of 'agents' and the objectivity of 'structures' are
credited not only with being different kinds of properties, but also with
the capacity for exerting different kinds of causal powers that the process
of mediation becomes problematic. Only then do we have to ask ques-
tions about how 'structure' impinges upon 'agency' and how the powers
of ' agents' affect its reception. Simply to recognise that there is a differ-
ence between subjectivity and objectivity does not entail the problem of
mediation. This has been seen for the neurological reductionists, who do
not deny that we are subjective beings but view our phenomenology as
epiphenomena!, and thus deprived of causal powers. On that premise the
question of mediation is redundant.
On the other hand, among those wh o do endorse the distinctively dif-
ferent and irreducible properties and powers of 'structures' and 'agents',
there should logically be an acceptance of the need for identifying a me-
diatory process that links them. Nevertheless, there may well be resis-
tance to the particular mediatory mechanism that I am advancing in this
book, namely the reflexive deliberations of social agents. Since these ob-
viously entail epistemology, then to hold them responsible for mediation
might also appear to involve committing the 'epistemic fallacy'; 13 that is,
wrongly substituting how agents take things to be for how they really are .
In fact it does not. Certainly, agents can only know themselves and their
circumstances under their own descriptions, which are ever fallible, as is
all our knowledge. If they get either of these seriously wrong, then they
will pay the objective price, which may give them occasion to correct
their views. 14 N ot to acknowledge this would spell a collapse into ide-
alism, whose irrealism withholds objective properties and powers from
'structure' . However, to insist that we pay an objective price for getting
reality wrong is irrelevant to the proposition being advanced. This merely
asserts that unless agents did subjectively conceive of courses of action
in society, then n othing would activate the causal powers of structural
and cultural properties to constrain or to enable them. Therefore, how
people reflexively deliberate upon what to do in the light of their per-
sonal concerns has to form a part of a mediatory account. My aim will
be to convince fellow realists, as well as other social theorists, that human
.reflexivity is central to the process of mediation.
13 See Andrew Collier, Critical Realism, Verso, London, 1994, pp. 76-85 on the 'epistemic
fallacy' . \
14 How maccers are plays a regulatory role towards how we take maners to be; one which
scops very far short ofdeterminism and is beccer seen as associating 'bonuses' with getting
reality right and 'penalties' wirh gerring it wrong.
..
 16 IDtrOdii.ctlon

Yet, to advance the 'internal conversation' as the process of mediation

'through' which agents respond to social forms - fallibly and corrigibly,
but, above all, intentionally and differently - is to attribute three prop- Part 1
erties to their reflexive deliberations. The 'internal conversation is held
to be (a) genuinely interior, (b) ontologically subjective, and (c) causally Solitude and society
efficacious. However, as has been seen in relation to Graham, there are
strenuous forces at work that are concerned to withhold these three predi-
cates from human reflexivity. The next chapter is an anempt to rebut such
arguments, at their Jons et origo ~ within the philosophy of mind.
Only if the 'internal conversation' can be upheld as an irreducible per-
sonal property, which is real and causally influential, can the exercise of
its powers be considered as the missing mediatory mechanism that is
needed to complete an adequate account of social conditioning. In fact,
the defence of the 'internal conversation' and the task of conceptualis-
ing it defensibly will occupy the next three chapters. Only if it can be
established that two sets of emergent, and thus irreducible, properties
and powers are involved can we return to the central problem about the
interplay between objectivity and subjectivity. Then it would indeed be
necessary to resist the 'transcendence' of subjectivism and objectivism,
on the grounds that this would be to conflate two different ontological
levels and their distinctive properties and powers. Only at that point can
we properly examine how all agents anempt subjectively, because reflex-
ively, to establish their own personal modus vivendi in objective social
circumstances which were not of their making or choosing.