Cas FIAT

81 avenue de la République
75543 PARIS Cedex 11

Tél: 01 49 23 57 24
Fax : 01 49 23 57 41
E-mail : ccmp@ccip.fr
Internet : www.ccmp.fr
Nouvelle Fiat 500 : développement et perspectives G1677
Par Jean-Marc POINTET

Université Paris Est - ESIEE Management -
IRG-PRISM
Intégration CCMP : 2010
Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine
Pour ce produit, l'établissement acquéreur est autorisé à :

• Diffuser le produit à l'ensemble du corps professoral de l'établissement dans le but d’utiliser ce produit pédagogique pour son enseignement.
• Reproduire le produit sans limitation de quantité, ni de durée. S'il s'agit d'un document au format numérique, celui-ci peut être diffusé par tout moyen et
support (intranets et extranets dûment autorisés par l'établissement acquéreur) à l'exclusion de sites web librement accessibles au public extérieur à
l'établissement acquéreur
L’établissement acquéreur du produit s'engage à :
• ne pas communiquer ou céder tout ou partie du produit à un tiers n'enseignant pas dans l'établissement acquéreur
• conserver une version originale intégrale et datée du produit telle qu'elle a été livrée par la CCMP lors de l'achat,
• conserver le logo de la CCMP et le logo de l'établissement créateur ainsi que les logos ou marques des entreprises citées dans le produit,
Nouvelle FIAT 500
Développement et perspectives
© CCMP 2010
Auteur : Jean-Marc POINTET
Etablissement créateur : Université Paris Est, ESIEE Management et IRG-PRISM

SOMMAIRE
I. “Fiat paints picture with rebirth of street icon” ............................................ 4
II. « Le succès de la Fiat 500, l'exemple à suivre »........................................... 5
III. « Le contexte global : la 500, au cœur d’un mouvement rétro dans

l’automobile » .............................................................................................. 6
IV. « La Fiat 500 avance avec succès sur la route néorétro » ............................ 8
V. « La 500 renaît, Fiat aussi », Eric Jozsef, Libération, 6 juillet 2007............ 10
VI. Fiat dévoile la nouvelle 500 sur la Toile, Marie-Laure Cittanova ................. 11
VII. « Chrysler pourrait assembler des Fiat 500 au Mexique »,.................... 13
VIII. Extrait de Gilles Lipovetsky G, ............................................................... 13
IX. « Analyse des réactions des Italiens et des Français suite à la démarche
participative de Fiat concernant la préparation du lancement de la 500 » . 14
X. “Fiat Auto 2008, an Arabian phoenix in the international auto industry”.... 18
XI. Annexes...................................................................................................... 39
1. Références Internet utiles pour des recherches relatives au cas ............................... 39

2. Références bibliographiques générales relatives au cas........................................... 39
© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 2

Université Paris Est - ESIEE Management - IRG-PRISM

Nouvelle FIAT 500
Développement et perspectives
En février 2010, la Direction marketing et communication de FIAT France, vous confie un dossier
de travail. Ce dossier est composé d’articles de presse et d’enquêtes qui ont été réalisés de 2006 à
2010.
A partir des éléments dont vous disposez dans ce dossier (voir sommaire ci-après),
il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes :
1. Pourquoi le rétro représente-t-il un moyen de rompre avec des conventions du

marché tout en limitant davantage les risques qu’avec une stratégie de rupture classique ?
2. Le mouvement rétro dans l’automobile s’impose-t-il actuellement en masse ou reste-
t-il un phénomène marginal ?
3. A votre avis, était-il risqué de concevoir une 500 rétro ?
4. Quels sont les fondements organisationnels et technologiques du marketing
stratégique de Fiat concernant le projet 500 ?
5. Quelles sont les spécificités du marketing opérationnel de Fiat ?
6. Les objectifs du site interactif sont-ils limités à la communication ?
7. A votre avis, le consommateur est-il exploité par l’entreprise ?
8. En procédant à une évaluation de la concurrence, des opportunités et des menaces,
proposez des recommandations stratégiques et opérationnelles favorables à la poursuite du
succès de la 500.


I. “Fiat paints picture with rebirth of street icon”
John Reed, Financial Times, 3 juillet 2007.
Fiat Auto will be showcasing the rebirth of an iconic car and its own financial revival when it
relaunches the Cinquecento city car at festivities around Italy on Wednesday.
The carmaker has invited more than 7,000 dealers, importers, financial analysts and others to
Turin to mark the new 500’s launch, 50 years to the day after its debut. Thirty other Italian cities
will display the car on their piazzas.
In reviving the Cinquecento in multiple versions, with improved technology and a high price for its
size, Fiat is following the lead of BMW, which has produced more than 1m Minis since relaunching
an upscale version of the car in 2001.
Fiat will offer customers a choice of accessories for their 500s including chrome elements, special
wheel rims and upholstery, and Italian-flag graphics, making – it says – more than 500,000
permutations possible. The carmaker is also aiming for a five-star crash-test rating, ambitious for a
car barely 3½-metres long.
The Turin-based producer is also billing the Cinquecento as “the manifesto of a ‘new Fiat’.” Under
chief executive Sergio Marchionne, the company has swung back into profit and increased its share
in a tough European market. Last month Fitch Ratings gave Fiat’s debt its first investment-grade
credit rating in four years.
The new Cinquecento’s price, starting at about €10,000 ($13,600), will put it towards the top end
of Europe’s growing city-car segment, where it will sit alongside models such as the Citroen C1 and
Renault Twingo. Company officials try to discourage comparisons with BMW’s luxury Minis, which
start at €15,850 and go up to €21,600 for the Mini Cooper S.
With petrol prices high and emissions controls tightening, small cars are selling well. City and
subcompact cars both expanded their shares of the European market last year.
Fiat is trying to position itself as a leader in low-emission cars as European lawmakers push
manufacturers to cut their vehicles’ carbon dioxide emissions by a quarter by 2012. Fiat says the
500 will be compliant with Euro 5 emissions limits from its launch, two years before the standards
come into force.
The new Cinquecento will combine “emotional appeal with rational buying reasons”. such as lower
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions, says Kevin Gaskell of EurotaxGlass, an automotive
consultancy which has done some work for Fiat.
Fiat will make the new Cinquecento in the same plant in Tychy, Poland, where it makes its Panda
city car and will begin producing a new version of Ford Motor’s Ka next year. Analysts say Fiat
should easily meet its initial target of 120,000 sales a year, which it says it can increase to 140,000
if demand is high enough.
“Retro models have proved to be very popular, as proved by the Mini,” says Jonathon Poskitt,
manager of the European sales forecast with consultancy JD Power. “They will try to position it as a
basic-segment car, but at a little bit of a premium to the Panda.”
Prices for the new 500 are expected to go from about €10,000 to more than €14,000 for a version
with a 1.3 litre diesel engine. Ford’s new Ka, with a similar engine and substructure to the 500, is
expected to be cheaper.
Fiat is said to be considering offering a sports version of the 500 in the US. The company does not
sell cars in the world’s largest vehicle market, but plans to relaunch its Alfa Romeo premium brand
there in 2009.


II. « Le succès de la Fiat 500, l'exemple à suivre »
Quentin Sannié, président de Mandragore (conseil en stratégies), Latribune.fr, 15 octobre 2008.
Visible dans nos rues, le succès remarquable et inattendu de la Fiat 500, avec ses partis pris
prononcés (jugés comme autant de défauts par la presse spécialisée), nous apparaît comme le
signe d'une évolution du marché dans lequel des produits considérés jusqu'alors comme des niches
entrent dans le top des ventes du marché.
Les ventes de la Fiat 500 ont atteint 116.000 exemplaires en Europe depuis le début de l'année,
devançant ainsi ses camarades du segment «petites voitures» (Twingo, C1). Les ventes de Mini,
classées dans un autre segment «petites voitures de luxe», restent également importantes, avec
plus de 100.000 exemplaires sur la même période. Ces modèles «segmentés», atteignent des
performances comparables aux modèles «cœur de gamme» des constructeurs généralistes !
En soi, ce n'est pas nouveau. Il y a dix ans, la Twingo et la Laguna se vendaient. Aujourd'hui, la
nouvelle Laguna, partout saluée comme une voiture excellente, comme le compromis idéal, connaît
des ventes à peine à la moitié des prévisions. Que se passe-t-il ?
N'est-ce pas là le signe d'une mutation en profondeur du marché ? Le «désir de voitures» est remis
en cause par un ensemble de facteurs extérieurs : le prix du pétrole, le développement de la
conscience environnementale, les nouveaux symboles d'autonomie comme les produits nomades
ou les vols "low cost". Au-delà d'une préférence raisonnable pour les petites voitures, n'est-on pas
face à des acheteurs qui arbitrent au sein de l'ensemble de leur consommation ? Désormais, le
constructeur doit créer une préférence non plus vis-à-vis de ses concurrents automobiles, mais
bien vis-à-vis d'autres produits appréciés des consommateurs.
Schématiquement, on peut distinguer les clients visés par l'industrie automobile traditionnelle, pour
qui l'achat d'une voiture est programmé et qui s'inscrivent dans une logique d'investissement
(«Quel modèle acheter ?»), et les autres, de plus en plus nombreux, c'est notre hypothèse, pour
lesquels la question même de l'achat d'une voiture se pose («Dois-je acheter une voiture ?»).
Les premiers possèdent souvent déjà une voiture et ont une approche rationnelle. Ils s'intéressent
à l'automobile, sont au fait des sorties, anticipent leur achat, partagent les codes et la structure
«hiérarchisée» proposés par l'industrie et la presse spécialisée. Dans cette perspective, la Fiat 500
est pour eux une petite voiture d'entrée de gamme avec un rapport qualité-prix très moyen. Les
seconds arbitrent ce choix au sein de leur panier de consommation (voiture ou voyage au
Mexique ? dernier écran plat ? refaire la cuisine ?). Ils attendent qu'une consommation automobile
éventuelle leur apporte des éléments de valeur distinctifs et signifiants sur un champ large. Ils vont
chercher le produit qui donne du sens, qui dise quelque chose d'eux. La motivation d'achat est
différente, les critères d'achats pris en compte également.
Dans cette seconde perspective, la Fiat 500 réinvente des codes statutaires qui transcendent la
catégorie. Le client peut renoncer à d'autres achats pour l'acquérir. Il peut aussi renoncer à
dépenser plus (la Laguna par exemple) pour préférer s'afficher au volant de la Fiat 500 et, avec la
différence de prix, s'offrir ce voyage au Mexique. Quand Sergio Marchionne , président du groupe
Fiat, déclare vouloir devenir l'Apple des voitures, et que la «500 soit notre iPod», il atteste, selon
nous, d'une vision nouvelle de la consommation automobile.
Faire des choix radicaux au service du design devient la condition de création d'objets à la fois
accessibles et désirables, forme démocratisée du luxe qui emporte une large adhésion. Cette
démarche va à l'encontre de la logique de nombreux constructeurs généralistes, en particulier
français, qui s'efforcent de gommer les aspérités de leurs modèles pour s'assurer de plaire au plus
grand nombre, mais s'en trouvent n'être préférés par personne, même si leur assise de vente reste
large. Le design n'est pas le seul domaine dans lequel les constructeurs devront faire preuve
d'audace. L'éco-conception et la valeur d'usage sont encore des terrains sur lesquels il manque des
produits référents. Désormais, les partis pris forts ne sont pas contradictoires avec des succès de
vente, bien au contraire, dans l'automobile comme ailleurs.


III. « Le contexte global : la 500, au cœur d’un mouvement rétro
dans l’automobile »
Jean-Marc Pointet, IRG-PRISM et ESIEE Management, document de travail, janvier 2010.
1
De 1957 à 1975, la Fiat 500 a été produite à 3,6 millions d’unités . Dans les années 1960, elle
devient la voiture la plus vendue en Italie. Au-delà du grand volume de production obtenu, son
succès est surtout d’avoir créé un attachement indéfectible puis une nostalgie grandissante2. La
nouvelle 500 est présentée le 4 juillet 2007. Dès son lancement en septembre 2007, la production
de 120 000 unités par an initialement prévue s’avère insuffisante face à la demande. Pour
certaines versions, le délai de livraison est estimé à un an. Début 2008, l’usine poursuit sa montée
en production pour atteindre l’objectif de 190 000 unités par an3.
Plus grande (3,40 m de long contre 2,97 m à l’origine), la nouvelle 500 conserve les proportions, le
caractère et les codes esthétiques qui ont fait d’elle une icône (Cancellieri et Ramaciotti, 2007).
Plus pure et raffinée, cette reproduction de caractéristiques s’associe à un travail actif de
réactualisation. En créant un lien indéfectible entre hier et aujourd’hui, Fiat assume l’héritage d’un
dessin devenu culte et réinvente avec finesse sa 500. Fiat poursuit ainsi une démarche de
marketing d’authenticité. Il s’agit de réinterpréter, avec distance et créativité, une automobile qui
existait. Ce marketing revitalise une somme de détails visuels qui font qu’une 500 est une 5004.
Légendaire et familière, la 500 apparaît régulièrement aux yeux du public (merchandising,

publicités d’enseignes diverses, mode, cinéma). Elle est dessinée (BD), miniaturisée à différentes
échelles et numérisée (pléthore de sites Internet). En 2006, Disney Pixar l’emploie dans le film
« Cars »5 puis Mac Donald’s, associé à la promotion du film, participe à la diffusion des miniatures.
Ces exemples prouvent le capital sympathie et l’attractivité dont elle bénéficie. Véritable
« monument national » en Italie, elle continue de circuler dans Rome malgré l’interdiction en
centre-ville des véhicules polluants6. La Fiat 500 des années 1960 à 1970 symbolise la jeunesse et
l’insouciance, tout autant que la réussite de Fiat, du design italien, et de l’Italie. Ses conducteurs se
souviennent du bruit de crécelle de son moteur, de l’exiguïté de son habitacle et l’image de bonne
humeur qu’elle inspirait. L’attrait de cette voiture n’a jamais été démenti. Ainsi, le magazine « Top
Gear » de juillet 2006 l’a désignée, à la suite d’un sondage, « voiture la plus sexy du monde ».
Mondialement célèbre, elle est « presque un phénomène transgénérationnel »7.
1
A titre de comparaison, la Mini originelle s’est vendue à 5,3 millions d’unités (1959-2000), la première Renault
Twingo à 2,4 millions d’exemplaires (1993-2007) et la VW Coccinelle à 21,5 millions (1938-2003).
2
En Italie, quelques 600 000 Fiat 500 seraient encore en circulation (Herald Tribune, 20 novembre 2004).
3
90 917 unités ont été commercialisées en Italie en 2008 (contre 18 468 Mini et 11 254 Renault Twingo). 21 250
unités ont été commercialisées en France en 2008 (contre 18 999 Mini et 65 333 Renault Twingo). Les chiffres
pour l’Allemagne sont de 17 638 Fiat 500, 30 843 Mini et 22 157 Twingo.
4
Exemple de la grille d’aération arrière de la 500 by Diesel alors qu’elle n’est d’aucune utilité, la voiture étant
désormais une traction.
5
http://adisney.go.com/disneypictures/cars/main.html?sec=1&car=12
6
Une 500 d’époque pollue autant que 200 petites cylindrées d’aujourd’hui. Pourtant, la Commission des
Transports du Sénat a approuvé le décret de loi autorisant la circulation des Fiat 500 âgées d’au moins 25 ans
dans les zones réservées aux voitures équipées de pots catalytiques. Source : Stampa, 2 fevrier 2006.
7
Laurent Aliphat, responsable communication médias Fiat V.P. chez Fiat France, « Faire de Fiat 500 un objet de
désir », Le Journal des Grandes Ecoles, spécial 10 ans, décembre 2006.


La période 1950-60 était audacieuse. La Mini a symbolisé parfaitement cette époque où des
voitures sont conçues avec passion par des artistes inconnus. Sous l’impulsion des carrossiers
principalement italiens8, les voitures étaient différenciées et les styles nationaux particulièrement
affirmés. C’était une période où les constructeurs faisaient assaut d’imagination afin de séduire une
clientèle débordée par ses propres tentations. De la Citroën DS de 1955 à la Renault 16 de 1965,
tous ces véhicules conceptuellement innovants bénéficiaient de formes nouvelles, utilisaient des
matériaux nouveaux, des teintes inédites9. C’est la « décennie durant laquelle on a probablement
vu davantage de bonnes idées arriver à maturité » (Milonevich, 1993). Uniques, ces voitures
deviendront « mythiques » (Barthes, 1957).
Le phénomène de retour aux produits chargés d’histoire, de légende et de sens, a été initié dans
l’automobile par VW avec le Concept 1 de 1994 préfigurant la New Beetle commercialisée en 1998.
Dans la foulée, des concept-cars procédant de cette logique sont présentés sur les salons. Ainsi, le
Renault Fifties (1996), le Lancia Fulvia (2003), le Fiat Trepiùno (2004) ou plus récemment le
concept Révolte de Citroën (2009) sont de redoutables supports de communication et n’ont d’autre
vocation que d’actualiser l’image de marque en aimantant le spectateur. Celui-ci est alors aiguillé
vers les modèles du catalogue disponibles à la vente. C’est confronté au succès de ces voitures que
le développement est envisagé, parfois dans l’embarras, souvent dans la controverse.
C’est donc à partir des années 1990 que des designers ont puisé leur inspiration dans l’histoire
automobile au premier degré, s’autorisant à citer des grands carrossiers du passé, à emprunter des
idées de capots ou de calandres que leurs aînés auraient jugées insupportablement dépassées et
impossibles pour une nouveauté des années 1980. C’est ainsi que l’on est revenu au style
émotionnel avec la Mazda Miata directement inspirée de la Lotus Elan, puis les Fiat Coupé et
Barchetta, Mazda 121, Chrysler PT Cruiser mais surtout l’Alfa Roméo 156 commercialisée en 1997
et la nouvelle Mini ressuscitée avec brio par BMW en 2001. Ces véhicules synthétisent les lignes
marquantes des années 1950-60, ou même plus récemment des années 70 (Ford Mustang,
Chevrolet Camaro, Dodge Challenger, Citroën C6). La conception de l’Alfa Roméo 156 résulte de
cette démarche de différenciation du présent par réinvestissement du passé. Son grand succès
peut s’expliquer par le fait qu’elle « retraduit dans le monde actuel les signes du passé glorieux
d’Alfa, et notamment la calandre de la célèbre Giulietta, dans un tout original et unique » (Cova et
Cova, 2001). La marque au trèfle poursuit cette démarche sur l’ensemble de sa gamme et en vient
à concurrencer Mini en 2009 avec MiTo, un véhicule traduisant au présent de nombreux codes
stylistiques issus du passé légendaire de la marque.
8
En particulier Pinin-Farina, Bertone. Soulignons l'ingéniosité de Flaminio Bertoni, styliste chez Citroën, qui a
activement participé aux conceptions originales des Citroën Traction Avant, 2CV, DS 19, Ami 6.
9
Exemple du vert cru de la Citroën DS 19, couleur des trois DS exposées au salon de l'Auto de Paris 1955.


IV. « La Fiat 500 avance avec succès sur la route néorétro »
Le Figaro, Charles Gautier, 11 février 2008.
Gagner de l'argent avec une voiture d'entrée de gamme est une gageure. Pour réussir ce
tour de force, Fiat a utilisé tous les moyens : production polonaise commune avec Ford,
mode du néorétro, moteur peu polluant.
Elle ne fume pas, elle ne boit pas, elle ne parle pas, mais elle drague…
La nouvelle Fiat 500, assez aguicheuse, cultive sa ressemblance avec
son ancêtre lancée voilà cinquante ans, même si elle est sensiblement
plus grande qu'elle… C'était l'époque où l'Italie de La Dolce Vita roulait
en scooter. Quelque 3,8 millions d'exemplaires plus tard, la nouvelle
Cinquecento, comme son aînée, fait tourner les têtes.
Elle joue les stars au cœur d'une industrie prise sous les tirs croisés de la concurrence asiatique et
européenne, des contraintes techniques et des envies de la clientèle. Dessinée en interne par le
groupe Fiat, elle symbolise à elle seule le renouveau du groupe italien. Les récompenses ne se sont
pas fait attendre : la belle a été élue «voiture de l'année 2008» par un jury de journalistes. La
Cinquecento a su profiter de la mode du «néorétro», du retour des lignes anciennes.
Les chiffres de vente illustrent le succès esthétique : 105 000 commandes ont été enregistrées en
France et en Italie entre le 4 juillet dernier et la mi-novembre. Et, en Allemagne, 6 500 Fiat 500
ont été vendues alors qu'aucun modèle n'était encore disponible. Elle est d'ores et déjà deuxième
en Europe sur le segment des voitures citadines derrière… la Fiat Panda.
La rentabilité est attendue assez rapidement pour la petite voiture. « Le groupe est très discret sur
l'investissement », explique Gaétan Toulemonde, analyste automobile à la Deutschebank . «On a
coutume de dire que son coût de production est supérieur de quelques centaines d'euros à celui
d'une Panda, mais qu'en revanche elle se vend entre 1 000 et 1 500 euros de plus que l'entrée de
gamme de Fiat.» En effet, elle est commercialisée entre 10 500 et 14 500 euros. On sait que la
Panda, avec laquelle la 500 partage des éléments de structure, a nécessité un investissement de
600 millions d'euros, la Grande Punto de 820 millions d'euros.
« Actuellement, le prix de vente d'une Fiat 500 se situe plus vers le haut de la fourchette
pratiquement 14 000 euros que vers le bas, poursuit Gaétan Toulemonde. Mais combien de temps
cela va-t-il durer?» La clientèle visée est en effet a priori très sensible au prix. Autre avantage, la
Fiat 500 se tire très bien des tests antipollution et trois modèles peuvent bénéficier des bonus liés à
l'écotaxe récemment décidée par le gouvernement.
L'iPod de l'auto
Esthétiquement, les designers ont tenté et réussi le coup du néorétro, dont la référence reste la
Mini du groupe BMW. «Les styles de la Mini et de la 500 plaisent et, de surcroît, elles renvoient à
des voitures qui rappellent une période heureuse des années de croissance dans les pays
concernés», assure un expert en marketing.
Sergio Marchionne, administrateur délégué de Fiat, autrement dit le patron du groupe italien, a
défini à sa manière cette petite voiture : ce doit être « l'iPod de l'auto». Branchée, ludique… bref,
bien ancrée dans l'époque. Évidemment, l'Internet a été utilisé pour le teasing de lancement, sans
oublier tout ce qui lui donne une touche « fabbricato les versions, les accessoires et in Italia ».
Enfin, c'est une façon de parler, car désormais il s'agit pour le groupe d'adapter sa production au
site de Tichy (Pologne). Le groupe, qui n'avait programmé initialement que 120 000 voitures par
an, a décidé de porter sa production dès 2009 à 190 000 voitures annuellement.


Une version cabriolet
Et, pour réduire les coûts, elle sera assemblée sur la même ligne que la nouvelle Ford Ka avec
laquelle elle partagera les investissements. Ford et Fiat réalisent ainsi une opération quasi
identique à celle que PSA avait réalisée avec Toyota. En fait, Fiat est en train de réussir avec Ford
ce que le groupe avait manqué avec General Motors (GM). On se souvient que GM et le groupe
italien avaient décidé de nouer une vaste alliance transatlantique après cinq ans de vie commune,
récemment dénouée avec un bonus de 1,55 milliard d'euros, faute de quoi GM aurait été contraint
de racheter le groupe alors en pleine déconfiture. Un vrai pactole certes, mais remarquablement
mis à profit par Sergio Marchionne, à qui l'on doit aussi la relance spectaculaire d'Alfa Romeo.
L'administrateur délégué n'a pas l'intention de laisser retomber le soufflet de la Fiat 500. Déjà on
parle d'une version Abarth, l'emblème sportif de la marque Fiat pour cette nouvelle 500, puis d'un
cabriolet que l'on devine assez séduisant et que l'on imagine prêt à se laisser admirer sur la Via
Veneto.
Le succès de la Fiat 500 a déjà fait un heureux : Luca De Meo. Le volubile patron de la marque Fiat
vient d'être nommé directeur de marketing du groupe. Le succès de la Fiat 500 fait enfler la
rumeur : les Fiat 500 couteraient plus chers d'occasion que neuve. Un phénomène qui touchait
autrefois un autre constructeur italien très célèbre, Ferrari. Mais le groupe Fiat ne s'arrêtera pas en
si bon chemin. Sergio Marchionne, qui veut marquer son avantage, imagine déjà une voiture
encore moins chère en Europe. Et peut-être sera-t-elle aussi sympathique que la Fiat 500…


V. « La 500 renaît, Fiat aussi », Eric Jozsef, Libération, 6 juillet
2007.
Le groupe italien relance la production de la Cinquecento, «pot de yaourt» mythique de
l'après-guerre.
Rome de notre correspondant

Fiat a retrouvé de l'appétit. Au point de ressortir son pot de yaourt. Au bord du gouffre il y a trois
ans, la firme italienne en pleine renaissance a présenté mercredi sa petite dernière, âgée de
50 ans, mais qui affiche une insolente nouvelle jeunesse. Au cours d'un gigantesque spectacle
pyrotechnique et populaire sur les rives du Pô, au coeur de Turin, le constructeur a dévoilé la
quatrième génération de sa Fiat 500, la voiture mythique du boom italien de l'après-guerre, dont la
production avait été interrompue en 1975. «Cette voiture est un symbole de renouveau», a
souligné le président du Conseil, Romano Prodi, évoquant «ce que l'on disait il y a quelques années
de Fiat» (déclin, liquidation.). Avec son allure arrondie, la nouvelle Cinquecento diffuse un fort
parfum de nostalgie, mais regorge de technologies, dispose d'une nouvelle carrosserie et a été
légèrement allongée. Une sorte de métaphore du sursaut de Fiat, qui espère en vendre 120 000
(au prix de 10 500 euros) par an à partir de 2008. «Je veux que Fiat devienne l'Apple de
l'automobile, et que la 500 soit notre iPod», a expliqué Sergio Marchionne, l'artisan de la
résurrection.
«Baleine». Appelé aux commandes en 2004 après la mort de l'«Avvocato» Agnelli par le patron
de Ferrari et nouveau président du groupe, Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, cet Italo-Canadien de
55 ans a fait sortir le constructeur italien du fossé. «Nous avons sué comme des bêtes pour
reconstruire et nettoyer l'ADN du groupe Fiat. Trois ans de catharsis pour recommencer à voir la
lumière», a expliqué Marchionne, qui, dans un entretien au quotidien La Stampa, a révélé ce qu'il
avait ressenti à son arrivée à Turin : «Quand je suis entré dans le ventre de la baleine, je sentais
une odeur de mort industrielle.»
En quelques mois, l'administrateur délégué a réorganisé la production, accéléré la sortie de

nouveaux modèles, investi dans la recherche et recentré le groupe sur l'automobile en cédant les
activités non stratégiques. «La clé du succès, c'est d'avoir fait un choix industriel et non financier»,
a expliqué di Montezemolo. De fait, au tournant des années 2000, Fiat semblait destiné à être
avalé et mal digéré par General Motors, qui, au final, s'est détourné de son partenaire italien. Les
nouveaux dirigeants ont alors négocié un divorce à l'amiable, empochant comme prime de
séparation un chèque de 1,55 milliard d'euros. L'idée d'une grande alliance stratégique a été
abandonnée au profit de partenariats sur des projets précis, avec l'Indien Tata ou Peugeot. Avec
succès.
Dans un marché automobile essoufflé, Fiat, qui a vendu près de 350 000 Grande Punto et qui
contrôle aussi Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Ferrari et Maserati, regagne des parts de marché. Près d'un tiers
des voitures (31,8 %) achetées l'an dernier en Italie sortent de ses chaînes. «Fiat ne crèvera plus»,
assure Marchionne. Les filiales Iveco (véhicules industriels), Case et New Holland (machines
agricoles) ont aussi de bons résultats.
Bénéfices. Au total, en 2006, Fiat a affiché un chiffre d'affaires en hausse de 11 %, à

51,8 milliards d'euros. Au cours de l'assemblée générale annuelle, en avril, ses dirigeants ont
annoncé que le secteur auto avait pour la première fois depuis six ans dégagé des bénéfices, et
qu'ils s'apprêtaient à redistribuer des dividendes aux actionnaires. «Si les banques étaient restées
dans le capital, elles disposeraient d'un capital de 7 milliards d'euros contre les 3 investis»,
souligne Marchionne, qui s'inspire d'Apple pour être le meilleur sur certains marchés et mise sur le
développement de voitures écologiques. L'objectif est désormais de vendre avec ses partenaires
3,5 millions de véhicules à partir de 2010 et de s'imposer comme l'un des trois ou quatre grands
constructeurs mondiaux. La récente polémique autour de l'héritage de Gianni Agnelli ne semble pas
troubler la sérénité de la firme. Margherita, la fille de l'Avvocato et la mère de John Elkann, vice-
président du groupe, estime que la somme (159 millions d'euros) qui lui a été versée en 2003
après la mort du patriarche, en échange de sa sortie de la holding familiale, est insuffisante. Et
accuse les proches de l'Avvocato de lui avoir caché certains actifs. A Turin, on juge plutôt que, à
l'heure de la résurrection, tout le monde veut sa part du gâteau.
Pour relancer sa voiture mythique sans passer par la case nostalgie, Fiat a choisi d'en faire, avant
sa sortie, la promotion sur Internet. Interactivité garantie.


VI. Fiat dévoile la nouvelle 500 sur la Toile, Marie-Laure Cittanova
Les Echos, n° 19816, 15 Décembre 2006.
Ressusciter un symbole, un mythe même : celui de l'Italie des années 1960, de la jeunesse, de la
liberté, et d'un constructeur italien, Fiat, dont la réussite était à l'époque liée à ce chef-d'oeuvre du
design italien, la jolie Fiat 500. Autant de défis à relever pour sa descendante, qui arrivera sur le
marché dans neuf mois tout juste et sera officiellement présentée à Francfort le 15 septembre
2007. L'attrait de cette sympathique petite voiture n'a jamais vraiment été démenti. Le magazine
britannique « Top Gear » de juillet dernier l'a même désignée, à la suite d'un sondage, « voiture la
plus sexy du monde ». L'enjeu est donc majeur pour Fiat, au bord de la faillite en 2001. Même si,
depuis, il est en net redressement, le constructeur est attendu au tournant sur ce segment : face
au succès, inattendu, de la nouvelle Mini de BMW, l'italien peut difficilement se permettre un flop
avec sa nouvelle 500.
Premier casse-tête pour le service marketing : dépoussiérer le mythe. Pour ce faire, quoi de mieux
qu'Internet ? Pour projeter son modèle dans le futur, créer et entretenir le « buzz » autour de la «
Nuova 500 » (prononcez « tchinquetchento »), Fiat a créé un site spécial, entièrement consacré au
modèle, www.fiat500.com, ouvert 500 jours avant le lancement du modèle.
Le 3 mai 2006, les fans ont donc pu avoir leur premier rendez-vous, tout virtuel, avec le futur
modèle. Dans son design et sa conception, le site s'adresse aux jeunes. La musique pulse,
l'interactivité est élevée. Tout est conçu pour s'amuser : on peut customiser sa voiture tout à son
aise, en y ajoutant vitres teintées, graphismes, phares et jantes sport... tout est permis. On peut
aussi se livrer à un concours de grimaces pour « ressembler » à une 500... mais aussi lire les
dernières nouvelles sur la star, choisir un jingle, changer la page d'accueil, apprendre à prononcer
correctement « cinquecento », dessiner et voter pour désigner la mascotte _ elle a été choisie et
s'appelle Dante _, bref, baigner dans un univers entièrement fait pour les passionnés du Topolino,
le surnom donné à la Fiat 500 dans les années 1960 en référence à sa forme. « L'objectif est de
répondre aux demandes des gens, de leur donner un espace, rénover et reconstruire le modèle »,
souligne Stefano Stravato, responsable d'Internet à la Fiat.
Un concours incroyable
Le lancement du site s'est accompagné d'une unique page de publicité dans un quotidien et de la
distribution d'autocollants et autres techniques de « guérilla marketing » orientées vers les jeunes.
Une guérilla certes, mais soigneusement orchestrée : le plan de communication existe et le compte
à rebours des jours qui séparent du lancement donne lieu, à intervalles réguliers, à de nouvelles
initiatives. Chaque fois, le site s'enrichit de nouvelles rubriques, comme par exemple l'apparition
récente de la jingle box.
Parmi les quatre premières rubriques figurait un concours réservé aux designers, leaders d'opinion.
Pour mieux les impliquer, Fiat s'est adressé à un spécialiste des relations presse numérique. Il a
recensé les sites où se tenaient des forums sur le design et leur a passé le mot : « Il y a un
concours sur le site 500. » Résultat : 5.000 inscrits, du monde entier, et 1.000 projets. Encore au
stade de la « short list », ils seront examinés par un jury dont font partie le styliste Giorgio Armani
et le président de Fiat, Luca de Montezemolo.
La réponse du grand public a, elle aussi, dépassé les attentes du constructeur, au point de créer un
événement qui n'était pas prévu au programme : 50 jours après le lancement, l'affluence avait
battu des records avec plus de 500.000 visites ! Fiat en a vite profité pour passer la vitesse
supérieure en le faisant savoir par des pleines pages de pub dans les quotidiens italiens. Le site
attire aujourd'hui des jeunes _ 55 % de 20-30 ans et 11 % de moins de 20 ans _ et des
passionnés du monde entier, y compris des Etats-Unis, où la marque n'est pas présente. Quant à
Fiat.it, le site du constructeur, moins ludique, il profite du phénomène avec 24 % de visiteurs entre
20 et 30 ans, 25 % entre 30 et 40 ans et les deux derniers quarts dans les tranches d'âge
supérieures. Seule ombre au tableau : le site de la petite 500 n'attire que 17 % de femmes contre
83 % d'hommes. « La proportion de femmes augmente. Alors qu'elles n'étaient que 13 % en
juillet, elles ont été 21 % en novembre », se défend Stefano Stravato. Et elles ne sont que 12 % à
se rendre sur l'adresse institutionnelle.


La nouvelle Topolino, celle que l'on a surnommée en France le « pot de yaourt », est pourtant une
voiture de femme. Il faudra donc trouver à Fiat une façon de les attirer davantage.
Pour l'heure, le constructeur a accès aux désirs des éventuels clients : couleur des carrosseries,
des tissus intérieurs, accessoires, motorisations..., grâce au « concept lab », où l'on peut concevoir
le modèle de ses rêves, il sait tout de ce que souhaitent les acheteurs. « Cela change la façon de
travailler des équipes du marketing, explique Stefano Stravato, mes collègues m'appellent pour me
demander ce que les internautes ont choisi sur le site. »
Mais les goûts de ces derniers n'impactent pas seulement les équipes travaillant sur le modèle. Les
autres offres de Fiat sont, elles aussi, sous influence. « Nous n'avons pas le même genre de site
pour les autres voitures, mais nous avons des forums et pour chaque produit nous développons
une initiative spécifique comme la chasse au trésor avec Google Earth pour le lancement de la Fiat
Seidici. Les forums sont des lieux importants et donnent à Fiat l'occasion de dialoguer : les gens y
discutent de leur voiture, qu'elle soit ou non de notre marque », explique Stefano Stravato. Des
lieux instructifs où recueillir remarques, suggestions et critiques.
Il est loin le temps où Henry Ford pouvait affirmer que toutes les couleurs étaient possibles à
condition que ce soit le noir... Pour l'heure, Fiat n'a pas encore arrêté les options qui seront
disponibles : le lancement est encore trop éloigné. Une certitude, plus la date se rapproche, plus il
y aura de nouveaux rendez-vous pour entretenir le suspense. Comme celui d'aujourd'hui : à neuf
mois de la sortie, un concours est lancé en forme de clin d'oeil à destination des futures mamans.
Les gagnantes dont l'enfant naîtra le 15 septembre 2007 auront dans le berceau du petit... la
nouvelle Topolino, pour de vrai !


VII. « Chrysler pourrait assembler des Fiat 500 au Mexique »,
Latribune.fr, reuters.com, 17 août 2009.
NEW YORK (Reuters) - L'Américain Chrysler envisage d'assembler des Fiat 500 dans son usine de
Toluca, au Mexique, a rapporté dimanche le Wall Street Journal sur son site internet, en citant des
sources proches du dossier.
Chrysler étudie également quels modèles de Fiat il introduira sur le marché américain, en fonction
des directives de son partenaire italien.
Parmi les pistes envisagées figure la production de moteurs pour la Fiat 500 dans l'usine de
Trenton, dans le Michigan, ou l'assemblage d'un modèle de voiture compacte un peu plus grande
que la Fiat 500 aux Etats-Unis, ajoute le quotidien.
L'usine de Toluca, qui produit actuellement le crossover Dodge Journey et le PT Cruiser, est
intéressante pour la petite Fiat en raison de sa proximité avec les marchés d'Amérique du Sud et
centrale, où la marque italienne est populaire.
Depuis la déclaration de faillite de Chrysler, Fiat a acquis 20% du constructeur, auquel il a donné
accès à une partie de ses technologies et de ses modèles.
(Anupreeta Das, version française Gregory Schwartz)
VIII. Extrait de Gilles Lipovetsky G,

L’ère du vide. Essais sur l’individualisme contemporain, Gallimard, Paris, 1983.
La société postmoderne est celle où règne l’indifférence de masse, où le sentiment de

ressassement et de piétinement domine, où l’autonomie privée va de soi, où le nouveau est
accueilli comme l’ancien, où l’innovation est banalisée, où le futur n’est plus assimilé à un progrès
inéluctable. La société moderne était conquérante, croyante dans l’avenir, dans la science et la
technique, elle s’est instituée en rupture avec les hiérarchies de sang et la souveraineté sacrée,
avec les traditions et les particularismes au nom de l’universel, de la raison, de la révolution. Ce
temps se dissipe sous nos yeux, c’est en partie contre ces principes futuristes que s’établissent nos
sociétés, de ce fait postmodernes, avides d’identité, de différence, de conservation, de détente,
d’accomplissement personnel immédiat ; la confiance et la foi dans l’avenir se dissolvent, les
lendemains radieux de la révolution et du progrès ne sont plus crus par personne, désormais on
veut vivre tout de suite, ici et maintenant, se conserver jeune et non plus forger l’homme nouveau.
Société postmoderne signifie en ce sens rétraction du temps social et individuel alors même que
s’impose toujours plus la nécessité de prévoir et d’organiser le temps collectif, épuisement de l’élan
moderniste vers l’avenir, désenchantement et monotonie du nouveau, essoufflement d’une société
ayant réussi à neutraliser dans l’apathie ce qui la fonde : le changement.
Les grands axes modernes, la révolution, les disciplines, la laïcité, l’avant-garde ont été désaffectés
à force de personnalisation hédoniste ; l’optimisme technologique et scientifique est tombé (…) tout
cela a fait place, dit-on, à une culture post-moderne décelable par plusieurs traits : recherche de la
qualité de la vie, passion de la personnalité, sensibilité verte, désaffection des grands systèmes de
sens, culte de la participation et de l’expression, mode rétro, réhabilitation du local, du régional, de
certaines croyances et pratiques traditionnelles (...) La culture post-moderne est décentrée et
hétéroclite, matérialiste et psy, porno et discrète, novatrice et rétro, consommative et écologiste,
sophistiquée et spontanée, spectaculaire et créative ; et l’avenir n’aura sans doute pas à trancher
en faveur de l’une de ces tendances mais au contraire développera des logiques duales, la
coprésence souple des antinomies


IX. « Analyse des réactions des Italiens et des Français suite à la
démarche participative de Fiat concernant la préparation du
lancement de la 500 »
enquête réalisée par Jean-Marc Pointet et Marjolaine Moille, Esiee Management, 27 juin 07.
1) Réactions spontanées recueillies sur différents sites Internet, quelques verbatims

significatifs
Adresses des sites Internet Contexte Quelques verbatims significatifs
Raceway News Réactions initiées suite à une vidéo « […] J’ai essayé des tests de
présentant la nouvelle Fiat 500 sur le colorations avec le concept Lab
http://www.racewaynews.net/articolo.ph site internet. situé sur le site
p?a_id=821 www.fiat500.com, trop amusant
!! »
My Marketing Site italien relatant du marketing. « […] Dans ce cas Fiat s'est
montrée capable de campagnes
http://www.mymarketing.it/dblog/articolo de marketing innovantes. Le site
.asp?articolo=614 a créé encore plus d’engouement
pour le lancement de ce nouveau
modèle. »
Info Motori Forum de réactions d’un site italien « […] j'ai participé, mais je vois
de passionnés de mécanique. que mes conseils ou préférences
http://www.infomotori.com/a_972_IT_17 n’ont pas été pris en
882_1.asp?Pag=5&idArticolo=4762 considération. »
You Tube Réactions initiées à partir de la « Vraiment belle !! sur le site

diffusion du premier trailer de la Fiat officiel il y a un tas d'initiatives
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJEJg 500 et du site «500 wants you» sur intéressantes, […] Des
uIKusg You Tube. compliments Fiat !! »
« […] À cette intention j’ai

trouvé très intéressante
Blog Personnel Réaction suscitée à partir d’un article l'initiative de Fiat pour la
d’un blogueur intitulé « L’infiltration nouvelle 500. Vous connaissez ?
du Marketing ». En somme ils se servent
http://fluido.wordpress.com/2006/11/17/
confessioni-di-una-ex-infiltrata vraiment des caractéristiques de
participation, de partage sur
lesquelles on fonde toutes les
communautés qui fonctionnent,
et ils les utilisent pour une
opération de « Consumer
Generated Product », dans le
sens il y a vraiment en jeu la
possibilité de voir appliquée la
caractéristique inventée
directement sur le véhicule
prochainement dans le
commerce […]»


« Fiat continue à détourner les
initiatives intéressantes sur le
Site italien relatant du marketing. web. Après le blog de la Bravo et
Internet Marketing
la customisation online de la
nouvelle Fiat 500, il se jette,
http://www.imli.com/imlog/archivi/cat_20
.html toujours pour cette dernière, sur
l’ «user generated advertising ».
Le "Concours", 500 wants your
adv, donne la possibilité à
n'importe qui de proposer des
idées originales pour le
lancement des 500 […] cela me
semble vraiment un très beau
mode d’implication des usagers
(et potentiels clients) dès le
début du processus créateur
avant produit et ensuite de la
communication/commercialisatio
n. »
Google Group Réaction recueillie sur Google Group. « Il est clair que son design et le
passé de sa devancière
http://groups.google.fr/group/Personnali allaient créer un buzz naturel
ser-sur- puissant. Néanmoins, Fiat a
mesure/browse_thread/thread/af5df90c choisi de l'amplifier en créant un
33b79fbd/b949fb0b5ac73f97?lnk=st&q= site internet très participatif […]
fiat+500+participatif&rnum=1&hl=fr&_d On peut y customiser son
one=%2Fgroup%2FPersonnaliser-sur- modèle, participer à un
mesure%2Fbrowse_thread%2Fthread challenge […] c'est une
%2Faf5df90c33 excellente idée... »
Ces réactions concernent les internautes « lambda », réceptifs à la démarche de Fiat et conscients
de l’ascension d’image et de résultats de la marque.
Il ressort un engouement pour la démarche participative. L’aspect ludique de la personnalisation en

ligne ressort souvent, suivi de l’aspect fortement innovant de la démarche elle-même. Il semble
que l’on félicite une conduite où le client n’est plus simplement passif devant le produit mais
devient lui-même acteur, surtout dans un contexte où les marchés de masse semblent inhiber la
perception du consommateur.
Un non respect des engagements de Fiat serait dangereux. Le risque est celui de la déception. Cela
entraînerait une perte de crédibilité du projet participatif et un retour du client vers une résistance
des messages publicitaires.
2) Réactions sollicitées sur le forum du Club « Fiar500.com »


L’article ci-dessous reprend l’essentiel des réponses à la question que nous avons posée en mai sur
ce forum : «J’étudie les réactions des clients face à la démarche participative de Fiat pour
l’élaboration de sa nouvelle 500…Pourriez vous me donner vos réactions sur le sujet ? »
http://club.fiat500.free.fr/forum/forum_3.php?msg=72401&return=1#top
(20 messages au 9 juin 2007)
« Je pense qu'ils se servent plus du terme "démarche participative" pour se faire une bonne
image que ce qu'il en est en réalité [...] Une vraie démarche participative aurait été plus
subtile a mon avis avec la participation de vrais passionnés, présidents de clubs et
d'associations qui sont à mon avis les seuls garants du patrimoine histoire de fiat en
perpétuant depuis des années l'image sympathique de la voiture... »
« La démarche participative c'est AVANT pas APRÈS »
« Et s’ils nous avaient consultés, elle aurait un moteur à l'arrière.... »
« Après tout ils essayent de vendre une nouvelle voiture et la démarche commerciale
'participative' n'est pas si critiquable en soi ... (plus critiquable est leur attitude envers les
noms de domaine des clubs ... belle erreur) »
« Moi je pense que c'est comme la Coccinelle de Volkswagen, la Mini qui se retrouve chez
BMW, on peut trouver ça beau, plus ou moins joli, ou carrément indifférent. En voulant
reprendre l'esprit, mais ça reste une nouvelle voiture. La différence entre la nouvelle et
l'ancienne, c'est que l'ancienne à une histoire, une nostalgie d'une époque, ou d'une période,
une idée de la forme que les modernes n'auront jamais (...) Une démarche participative ce
serait faire des contrôles d'opinion de la clientèle, faire participer les collectionneurs, pour
arriver à la fois a satisfaire les besoins et l'attente de la clientèle classique, et celle de la
collection. Reprendre l'idée du moteur arrière, proposé des modèles Abarth comme ils vont le
faire, Pour moi petit gars en classe de vente, la démarche participative c'est ça. Pas attaquer
les collectionneurs pour des noms de domaines, ces collectionneurs qui ont donné une âme à
leur voiture. Sans eux qui véhiculent une image positive de cette voiture rigolote et originale,
et les publicitaires qui l'utilisent pour leur spot télé, elle ne seraient qu'un bout de tôles
froissées, avec 4 roues ; une voiture comme une autre. Ils n'auraient pas eu matière a
exploiter si pas d'image a exploiter. Qui ne connaît pas le pot de yaourt ? Voilà ce que j'en dis
de la démarche participative ».
Ces réactions sont très critiques vis-à-vis de la démarche de Fiat. Elles se situent dans un contexte
particulier :
Les responsables de Fiat ne semblent pas avoir pris contact avec les fans de la 500 qui se sentent
délaissés. Une démarche participative s’intéresse pourtant aux vrais passionnés de la 500.
Fiat France souhaite empêcher à ces passionnés d’utiliser les noms de domaine www.fiat500.fr et
www.clubfiat500.fr sous prétexte de ne pas avoir reçu l’autorisation de Fiat pour utiliser la marque.
Une procédure judiciaire pourrait être entamée.
Cette démarche ne fait pas honneur à la marque et à l'image sympathique que les fans véhiculent
depuis tant d'années autour de leur modèle préféré. Selon eux, la direction marketing de Fiat se
trompe de cible, car ils se situent pour la Fiat 500 et non contre. (Source :
http://club500.free.fr/Forum/viewtopic.php?p=1080#1080)


Le tableau suivant reprend quelques réactions spontanées à la demande de Fiat France de ne plus
utiliser les noms de domaine www.fiat500.fr et www.clubfiat500.fr :
Adresses des sites Internet Quelques verbatims significatifs
http://club500.free.fr/Forum/viewtopic.php?p=1080#1080 « Toutes les réactions reçues à ce jour au Club

sont unanimes : personne ne comprend cette
attitude de FIAT France qui est totalement anti-
commerciale, tout au moins pour les possesseurs
de 500. Beaucoup sont très déçus au point de
5 messages au 1er juin 2007 boycotter toute manifestation organisée pour le
lancement de la nouvelle ‘Nuova500’ ».
« FIAT se distingue encore une fois de plus dans

sa maîtrise de la communication envers les
clubs… »
http://new500club.superforum.fr/500-Les-News-c2/Le- « Je trouve minable cette manœuvre de FIAT.

marketing-publicitaire-pour-la-Fiat-500-f17/La-surprise-venue- Depuis des années, des clubs font survivre la Fiat
de-chez-Fiat-t80.htm 500 et la passion qui l'entoure, et là, simplement
pour du marketing, ils veulent tout saborder ».
3 messages au 1er juin 2007
3) Conclusion
Fiat utilise Internet comme vecteur de liens pour que la communauté de passionnés vibre par
rapport à des affinités communes.
Le coup de cœur, l’engouement suscité par la 500 permet d’exploiter sur Internet les atouts du
marketing tribal (cf le verbatim de Google Group).
Créer une attente, apporter du rêve, passionner autour d’un produit centré sur son design ; le pari
de Fiat a été d’investir dans le style d’une voiture, au capital de rêve et de sympathie colossal, ce
qui n’est pas mis en prestations (positionnement opposé à la Panda, l’achat « raison », voiture
rationnelle pas chère). Internet était un outil adapté aux caractéristiques d’un produit « passion »,
favorable à la construction d’une très forte image et d’un pouvoir de marché.
Les réactions spontanées font apparaître une prise de conscience des internautes de l’impossibilité
de modifier le produit au stade de pré-lancement. Cette action participative semble plus proche
d’un objectif de promotion (voir de manipulation) que d’un objectif de prise en compte du client.
Les réactions des fans club, spontanées et sollicitées, représentent une menace lors du lancement
de la nouvelle 500 (voir si la presse communique là-dessus au moment du lancement).


X. “Fiat Auto 2008, an Arabian phoenix in the international auto
industry”
Giuseppe VOLPATO, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, 15th GERPISA International Colloquium, 20 - 22 juin
2007.
1. CRISES AND REORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVOLUTION OF FIAT AUTO

Fiat Auto, the group that controls automotive manufacturing activities within Gruppo Fiat SpA, has
undergone through many crises in its ultra-centennial age10. The crisis arisen in a dramatic way in
2002, albeit it has roots in the previous decade, presents however some peculiar aspects. On the
one hand it was certainly the most serious since only the support by other Fiat group businesses
and a team of banks have avoided that the “virtual bankruptcy” of Fiat Auto turned into an actual
one. On the other hand, however, the crisis has been followed by a recovery that has astonished
scholars and observers for the speed and character of the turnaround. We could define such
recovery a “rebirth” from the ashes like the Arabian Phoenix, given the many elements of novelty
and marked change compared to the past, that the management of Sergio Marchionne, CEO of
Gruppo Fiat SpA and Gruppo Fiat Auto SpA, has achieved since 2004. To describe and to interpret
the new strategic trajectory requires, right considering its peculiarities, to outline the situation
11
facing Gruppo Fiat Auto in 2004, after a long stage of managerial and competitive involution .
In the years of strong economic development following World War II Fiat had undergone a stage
featuring typical elements of the fordist model12. During such stage, thanks to a rapidly growing
domestic demand, Fiat had launched small and cheap cars, made possible also by considerable
scale economies derived from a marked standardization and automation of manufacturing
processes13 Such evolution was favored also by the limited role of international competition, given
the high tariff barriers for import-export, due to cease in July 1968 with the establishment of a
common European market for cars14.
10
The Fiat company (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino) established in 1899 started as a car manufacturing
firm (cars and commercial vehicles), but it soon expanded entering many industrial businesses, acquiring the
motto: “Fiat: Terra Cielo, Mare” (Fiat: Land, Sky and Sea) that meant the presence, besides in the automotive
field, also in the manufacturing of railroad materials, marine engines, aircraft engines, etc. Notwithstanding such
wide diversification the company maintained a highly centralized structure where businesses were just parts of a
single company Fiat SpA also after the reorganization following World War Two. These were the years of the
presidency of Vittorio Valletta, who previously was the right arm of the firm’s co-founder Giovanni Agnelli (the
“Senator”). Valletta led the company at the end of World War Two after the Senator, and left the presidency to
Gianni Agnelli (frequently named as “avvocato” - the “lawyer”) in 1966. in 1970 Umberto Agnelli, who had
become CEO of Fiat SpA, under Gianni Agnelli’s presidency, started the process of reorganization of the
company into individual industrial groups (defined “sectors”), each with juridical independence, and controlled
by Fiat SpA, that became the finance holding company in 1975 (the holding was controlled by the Agnelli
family’s holdings IFI and IFIL). On the economic and industrial history of Fiat and of its most important
business (Fiat Auto) there is a large bibliography. Among the contributions that provide a thorough picture of its
historical evolution we single out: Volpato (1996), Castronovo (1999), Volpato (2004b) and Berta (2006).
11
The Fiat Auto group includes the whole of manufacturing and commercial activities carried out worldwide
with the Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Lancia and Fiat Commercial Vehicles brands. With respect to the consolidated
balance sheet, Ferrari and Maserati are excluded, albeit there are clear inter-relationships between these two
entities and the Gruppo Fiat Auto.
12
For a description of the conceptual structure of this model see: Boyer and Freyssenet (2000).
13
See: Sassi (1960) and Volpato (1996).
14
See: Volpato (1983).


Such profit strategy, based on typical traits of the fordist model and on the willingness to keep
unions in a subordinate position15, appeared in the second half of ‘60s less and less adequate, also
due to political reasons, putting under scrutiny: both the governance of the firm and its
organizational structure and industrial relations. The crisis exploded in the autumn of 1969 (“hot
autumn”) with union protests that imposed the beginning of a long process of reorganization that
triggered the move to a structure with industrial sectors, differently from the previous rigid criteria
of functional nature16.
The Fiat crisis, that started with the “hot autumn”, stretched for long, also due to the effect of the
first oil shock in 1973, whose repercussions were particularly serious in Italy, and later on due to
the deterioration of industrial relations and the emergence of a dangerous political dimension
played by terrorism (“Red Brigades”). In 1980 the company managed to regain the initiative on the
union and political front and in 1983 a season of strong economic recovery began for the whole Fiat
group, and for Gruppo Fiat Auto in particular, following the launch of the “Uno”, a small car that
had strong innovative elements compared to the competition. Then other successful models
followed such as Fiat “Croma”, Fiat Tipo and Lancia “Thema”. In 1987 Fiat had recently acquired
the Alfa Romeo company, surpassing the offer by Ford, and began a transformation towards the
“sloanist” model represents by volume and diversity growth. So the Alfa-Lancia Industriale
company was established, that received the Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands, that were given
particularly ambitious objectives: moving from 360,000 to 620,000 units manufactured in three
years; developing the product range upwards in competition with brands such as Mercedes and
BMW; returning to the US market with Alfa Romeo with sales of 60,000 units thanks also to an
17
agreement with Chrysler . On the manufacturing standpoint such stage featured a heavy
automation effort by the Italian automaker: such automation was then seen as the strategic factor
capable of allowing not just a productivity increase, but also a marked quality enhancement, that
was made necessary by the objective of expansion into higher segments of demand.
In the second half of the 1980s such approach was rewarded, albeit the growth objectives for Alfa
Romeo and Lancia were largely unmet, and Fiat Auto ended the decade with brilliant results:
• Both in terms of market performance, with a market share in 1989 equal to 12.30% in Western
Europe and 57.18% in Italy;
• And in terms of profits that in 1989 totaled 28,424 billion lire, equal to € 14,679 million,
corresponding to a Return On Sales (ROS) of 8.3%.
But the end of the 1980s also marked the exit of Fiat Auto’s CEO, Vittorio Ghidella, due to contrasts
with Fiat SpA’s CEO, Cesare Romiti. The wish of the latter not to name the new CEO of the auto
group among Ghidella’s collaborators induced him to lead the group ad interim, without having the
technical competences and without the necessary commitment to leverage its potential18. So a
stage of slow renovation in models and process technologies began right when both nationally and
internationally new conditions were maturing, conditions that would have had to push Fiat Auto to
a significant redefinition of its own strategies and of its positioning in the global competitive
landscape.
15
See: Berta (1992 and 1998).
16
Fiat’s reorganization from a monolithic structure based on managerial functions (design, purchasing,
manufacturing, distribution, etc.) to a structure based on sectors each with its own CEO and its own functional
structure was meant to be a long and troubled stage. The reorganization started in 1970 undergone an important
moment in 1975 with the establishment of the Iveco company, in charge of coordinating the brands and the firms
specialized in commercial and industrial vehicles, and concluded in 1979 with the establishment of Fiat Auto
SpA, in charge of coordinating the car and light commercial vehicle businesses (derived from cars). See Mosconi
and Rullani (1978) and Volpato (1996).
17
Volpato (1996).
18
A very interesting analysis to understand the power struggles that took place in the management of Gruppo
Fiat over those years, made by an insider, is in Garuzzo (2006).


2. THE ELEMENTS OF CHANGE IN THE COMPETITIVE SCENARIO IN 1990
In order to highlight the gap with what had to be carried out to maintain the competitiveness level
achieved in the late 1980s throughout the following decade, it is necessary to underline that there
were profound transformations both in domestic and international automotive demand, and in the
reorganization of supply where pressures by Japanese manufacturers were more and more strong,
and there were hints of future competitive aggressiveness by Korean brands. Among the elements
of the new scenario the following should be mentioned.
a. The change in the Italian domestic demand: the big parachute that eased Fiat Auto’s life in
the alternating sequence of crisis and expansion is represented by the domestic demand where the
brands controlled by Fiat operated in a quasi-monopolistic position and, also after 18 years from
the Common European Market, had a market share over 60%. However it was easy to grasp the
signs that such landscape was going to change. In fact, thanks to the growth in motorization that
in Italy had reached particularly high levels after the mid-1980s, as shown in Exhibit no. 1, Italian
automotive demand was gradually moving towards a “preference for variety” that led to grow the
share of cars in niches where Fiat was little present. Moreover, with high motorization levels
demand changed from first purchase to replacement with a set of consequences: lower growth
rates and greater sensitivity to the negative conditions, transition from bargaining power of supply
(seller’s market) to bargaining power of demand (buyer’s market) with the need for all automakers
and their distribution networks to grant higher rebates to end customers. For Fiat such evolution
was particularly critical since the traditional policy of the Turin company was to acquire greater
margins from domestic sales, also to offset the need to have lower prices abroad, where the image
of Italian brands was weaker.
Exhibit no. 1 – Number of Vehicles per thousand of people
Countries 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004
Germany 11 73 216 417 512 577 584

(1)
France 37 111 232 417 495 574 592
U.K. 43 32 167 312 454 526 556
Italy 6 98 210 330 507 629 657
(1) Since 1990 data refer to unified Germany
Source: Our elaboration on OCDE and Anfia data.


b. The downward expansion of product lines both for volume and for specialist
automakers. With the transition in all major markets of developed countries from the stage of
first purchase to replacement demand, and the growth in multi-motorization19, a wide process of
gradual segmentation of the market began, into smaller and smaller portions and niches, with the
need to develop targeted offers for specific consumer clusters20. Volume automakers had begun to
pay more attention to smaller car segments, previously believed to be less important21, since the
second car purchased by a same family was often a city-car model. Such evolution also had a
significant impact on the room for maneuvering for Gruppo Fiat Auto that, pushed by a fiscal policy
that negatively affected large engines22 had historically developed focusing on smaller segments. A
similar process of range expansion was developed also by specialist automakers that had to
consider, besides the greater segmentation of the market, also the growth in R&D investments. In
fact technological innovation in products and processes had become a key driver of
competitiveness and specialist automakers saw the opportunity to dilute these investments over a
larger number of models and units sold through the stretching of their offering to segments
previously not supplied23.
c. The abolition of quotas on Japanese cars. Gruppo Fiat Auto had long benefited from an
agreement between the Italian and Japanese governments that determined mutual restraints on
exports. With the establishment of the Single European Market on 1st January 1993 such
agreements were wiped out, and it was evident that the penetration of Japanese brands into the
domestic market (quite modest up to then), was going to gradually increase, also due to their
availability of both many small car models and off-road models, whose demand was beginning to
be relevant also in Italy24.
d. The emergence of Korean automakers in Europe. The manufacturing growth achieved in

the 1980s by Korean brands was a clear signal of their interest to enter the Triad markets. This
clearly was true also for Italy, with the issue however that these new competitors would have
started their race with models lying at the lower end of their range, that is segments that were in
more direct competition with the Gruppo Fiat’s range, and seemed oriented to practice quite
aggressive price policies. The Korean company that played the role of forerunner in Italy was
Hyundai that started exports in 1982. In 1993 Kia followed, then in 1994 Daewoo.
19
Presence of two or more cars in the same family.
20
A good example of such policy is represented by the choice by Renault to manufacture in 1996 5 variants of
the Mégane model on a single platform.
21
Among the most significant cases of such “descent” towards lower segments were Fiat was particularly
present there are: the launch of Ford Fiesta in 1976, followed by Ka in 1996; the launch of Citroën Ax in 1986,
the launch of Opel Corsa in 1987, the launch of Renault Twingo and Nissan Micra in 1993, and Volkswagen
Lupo in 1998.
22
This type of politics, that sees car purchasing as a sign of wealth to be heavily taxed, arose since the dawn of
the automotive industry, when probably it had a meaning, but then survived indefinitely, both during fascism,
and in the present stage. Hence it came a preference of Italians for smaller cars, less affected by the fiscal
regime. See: Volpato (1999).
23
The Mercedes brand started first with the C Class in 1982, the A Class in 1997 and then Smart in 1998. BMW
too moved along this path, first with the 3 Series Compact in 1993, then the acquisition of the Rover brand in
1994, hence with the Mini in 2001 and the 1 Series in 2004. Audi followed this route with the launch of A3 in
1996 and of A2 in 1999.
24
The agreement proposed in the early 1960s by the Japanese government to the Italian one entailed a mutual
restraint in the export of Italian electric domestic appliances in Japan, in exchange for a similar measure on
Japanese cars in Italy. Such agreement considerably restrained the import of Japanese cars in Italy until the late
1980s. In 1985 Japanese imports were still below 4,000 units, with a share of 0.6%. In the same year Japanese
sales in Germany were 316,377, equal to a share of 13.3%; in UK 200,450 with a share of 10.9%, and in France
53.410 with a share of 3.02%. Since 1985 Japanese imports in Italy began to constantly grow, also due to the
expiration of mutual restraint agreements due to the establishment of the Single European Market, up to reach
5% of registrations in 1995.


3. THE PRIORITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE 1990S
Already in the late 1980s it was evident that a stage of growing competition in Europe was
emerging, mainly for brands operating in the lower end of the range, such as Fiat Auto, that luckily
could rely on a particularly favorable end-of-decade, but that nonetheless had to carry out
25
profound transformations if it was to maintain its chances for success . In particular the necessary
objectives were the following.
a. More balanced sales mix in the different markets. At the end of the 1980s the geographical
distribution of Fiat sales was too dependent on the domestic and Western European markets,
mainly after the exit from the US market in 1982. It was then necessary to adopt a new and strong
policy of internationalization aimed at Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) that were moving to a
promising motorization process.
b. Clearer definition of brand positioning. The purchase of the Alfa Romeo brand, that took
place in 1986, required an overall repositioning since in previous years the Lancia brand was
moving as a pendulum, partly towards classic, comfortable and elegant cars with the larger
models, as in the historical DNA of the brand who came under Fiat’s control in 196826; partly
towards sports cars, with smaller models, and in particular with the “Delta” model that gained
many prizes in the world rally championships. The entry of Alfa Romeo made it necessary to find
an appropriate positioning of the three brands trying on the one hand to carry out economies
through the sharing of parts and platforms, but paying attention not to create brand overlapping.
The issue was made more delicate by the fact that since the 1960s there was a marked
antagonism between the Fiat brand, that also at the political level characterized the private
company, and the Alfa Romeo brand, controlled by IRI (the institute for industrial reorganization),
within public control. The supporters of the public company did not miss the opportunity to
highlight how Alfa Romeo was maintained in a subordinate position versus Fiat, by denying it in the
1950s the possibility to enter the market of popular cars. On the contrary Fiat, mainly in the
1980s, accused IRI to allow Alfa Romeo to carry out unfair competition through a prolonged
deficit27. This friction was also fed by opposing regional preferences between Turin (the city where
Fiat was located) and Milan (Alfa Romeo’s city), and transferred also onto the buyers of the
respective cars. For an Alfa Romeo customer the shift of the brand under the Turin-based company
was seen as an offense, and if Fiat was not to maintain the specific traits that made Alfa Romeo
models famous, this would have determined a market loss of affection among traditional
customers. This objective was complicated further by the fact that it would have been necessary to
launch a policy of shared platforms among the Fiat, Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands in a more
cohesive way, however maintaining the peculiar traits of each brand28. A certainly not easy task,
but clearly possible, as Fiat Auto itself did show in 1982 with the “Tipo 4” experience, when Fiat
and Lancia cooperated with Alfa Romeo (still under public control at that time) and Saab to develop
four different models: Fiat Croma, Lancia Thema, AR 164 and Saab 9000, all models that had
acquired a distinct image and satisfactory market performances29
c. Gradual product upgrading. the fact that the automotive activities were largely leaning
towards smaller segments had to necessarily be correct. If up to that time the specialization on low
end cars had allowed to fully exploit domestic demand (also thanks to lower salaries in Italy versus
other European and US competitors), it was evident that this position would become much harder
to maintain with the entry in the competitive arena of automakers having even lower salary levels:
Eastern European countries, Latin America and Korea. Moreover, there was the certainty that these
25
For more details on this analysis see Volpato (2006a).
26
See: Amatori (1996).
27
On these topics see Cherubini: (1982) and Santagostino (1993).
28
For Fiat this meant an optimal value for money, for Lancia elegance and comfort, for Alfa Romeo sports
image.
29
For a thorough description of this experience and the achieved successes see: Volpato (1996).


competitors active in the 1990s would have been followed over the next decade by India and
China. The upgrading process, albeit difficult, had to be dealt with in time through a gradual
program, but also long-ranging if Fiat wanted to be protected from direct competition from low cost
manufacturers, and to be capable of enjoying a premium price that would allow also in the future a
localization of manufacturing and assembly activities in Italy, at least in part. Besides, to offer high
end models represents the best way to introduce technological innovations and sophisticated
services, as only customers interested to these kind of products and services can pay the higher
costs that innovations bear, and these innovations would be later on transferred on to more
popular models thanks to scale and learning economies.
d. Overall quality enhancement. Another must for the Turin group was represented by the
rationalization of manufacturing processes, both internally and externally, to elevate in a constant
and lasting way vehicle quality and reliability. Without an upgrading of the qualityreliability pair,
also in smaller cars, the gradual erosion of market shares would have manifested to a worrying
degree. Fiat in such field had matured scarce competences, mainly because it could rely on a
strongly growing internal market, but at the end of the 1980s it was evident that Japanese
manufacturers had set new reliability standards, that no one could ignore.
e. Cooperation with Italian designers. A way to consolidate its own product upgrading would
have required to valorize as much as possible the competence tank represented by Turin designers,
both to elaborate three clear identities for the brands, and to be able to manufacture small batches
of cars aiming at niche models with competitive costs. These niches in the past were modest, but
in the emerging competitive landscape were acquiring a greater role. The valorization of the role of
designers such as Pininfarina, Bertone, Giugiaro, Zagato and many others would have provided an
extremely powerful lever in design, absolutely necessary to create a quality product image using
also in this field the appeal of made in Italy that was playing a great role in other fashion
products30.
It is worth underlining that such program would not have taken place without a massiveinvestment
policy, so it would have been legitimate to wonder whether it was worth it. I do not hesitate to
note that in the end 1980s the path hereby sketched entailed considerable risks for shareholders.
However I believe that the available alternatives were just two: either to adopt a strong policy of
commitment in the industry trying to actuate at best the lines of such “slow but systematic”
expansion (possibly also through cooperation agreements with other important automakers), or to
exit the industry by selling the automotive brands and switching into other industries. Once for all,
there was a situation of tertium non datur.
4. THE 1990S DECADE – THE YEARS OF INADEQUATENESS

4.1 Changes at the top
Unfortunately the changes that took place at the top of Fiat Auto in 1989 would turn out to be
seriously inadequate for the competitive challenge that was lying ahead, both for some previous
mistakes, and mainly for the inadequateness of the “new” top management that, even in cases
when it moved in the direction required by the emerging competitive scenario, it did so with delays
and mistakes. The most relevant aspect is that, if strategic deficits were considerable, also the
operational management was largely faulty. Cesare Romiti, CEO of Fiat SpA, who became also CEO
of the Fiat Auto group in the end of 1998, was mainly anxious to reduce the weight of the
automotive sector within the group in order to avoid that a too “auto-centric” character would
subtract power from his management. This translated into a shift of profits generated from the
automotive sector into other ones. In 1989 the investments dedicated to cars began falling below
50% of total investments by the Fiat SpA group, while those directed to “diversified” activities grew
from 14.6% in 1988 to 24.7% in 1990, also due to new acquisitions in the insurance and
distribution arenas. With respect to product renovation there was a clear slowdown, but a program
aiming at upgrading vehicle quality and reliability was launched. However this imitative process of
Japanese practices based on quality circles, Total Productive Maintenance and employee
suggestions, albeit achieving encouraging results at the beginning, did not last.
30
On the role of designers in promoting the success of Italian automobile brands see the essays in Castronovo
(2005).


On the contrary, on the image side the total quality campaign became a true boomerang and
contributed to spread the idea that quality was not a key factor for Fiat Auto up to then31. The
overall outcome was a marked reduction in market shares both in Italy and in Western Europe that
alarmed Gianni Agnelli and induced Romiti to leave in December 1990 the position of CEO of
Gruppo Fiat Auto to Paolo Cantarella, who was his assistant in the past.
Cantarella, differently from Romiti, was a “car guy” an initially gave the impression to beable to
reinvigorate the automotive group through model renovation and to lead it towards a more
adequate business model: more open internationally and structured into a wider range of
segments. In 1993 there was the important success of the launch of the “Punto” model, that
replaced the “Uno”, followed by a promising Fiat range expansion with the “Coupé” and “Barchetta”
models, and “Spider” and “Coupé” for Alfa Romeo, adding to models traditionally offered by Gruppo
32
Fiat Auto in medium cars . However, probably due also to the workload followed to the inertia in
product launches between 1989 and 1992, not all models were up to the task, mainly on the
qualitative standpoint. For the above-mentioned niche models there were relevant reliability issues,
while other cars were inadequate on the design standpoint, as the new Lancia “Delta” (1993),
incapable of replacing the previous model. Similar troubles affected Alfa Romeo “145” and “146”
models and total sales for this brand in 1994 were half of 1990 levels. With the launch of the
combined Fiat models “Bravo/Brava” a turnaround was expected, but quality issues arose from the
beginning that did affect the considerable potential of the “Bravo” model. Also the choice to reduce
forms of cooperation with external designers by initiating a design development program almost
exclusively internal to the design centers of the three brands turned out to be negative for the
image of the Fiat, Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands33. Facing these negative results, the management
of Cantarella became even more authoritarian and centralized, and the manager moved to set
targets for new product introduction and market share recovery that were quite unrealistic. Given
the evident impossibility to meet the expected targets the different management areas began to
worry more and more about finding alibis for their work offloading onto others accusation of unmet
34
timelines and results .
In February 1996 Giovanni Agnelli became honorary president, and its previous position was given
to Cesare Romiti. In March, Cantarella became CEO of Gruppo Fiat Spa, leaving this post to
Roberto Testore. This determined an increase in the decision chain length because Cantarella
maintained the power in approving new models. The new management structure did not achieve
the desired results, on the contrary the situation became much more difficult. On the other hand,
the need to invest on prevailing activities of the Fiat group led Gianni Agnelli to sell many group
businesses35 and to introduce in the board of Fiat SpA a person capable of negotiating international
agreements, if that would become necessary. In the June of the same year Paolo Fresco stepped
in, a man with a long international experience at General Electric as one of Jack Welch’s Vice
Presidents. In 1998 Romiti’s post was occupied by Paolo Fresco and Paolo Cantarella was
reconfirmed as CEO of the Fiat group. In 1998-1999 the Fiat group carried out important
acquisitions including the US companies Case, to consolidate the earth moving equipment
business, and the Progressive Tools & Industries Co. (PICO), for the consolidation of Comau’s
manufacturing systems. Such acquisitions, achieved at high prices, did increase the financial needs
for the whole Gruppo Fiat and led to the exit of the CFO who did not agree with this approach36.
31
See Volpato (2004).
32
Models: Bravo and Marea for Fiat, models “145” and “146” for Alfa Romeo and renewal of “Delta” model for
Lancia, but the lacked renewal of “Croma” model for Fiat.
33
See: Ciferri (2002).
34
Unfortunately the scarce teamwork achieved by Fiat due to decades of autocratic management style represents
a constant factor in the Turin-based company, that during times of crisis lowers overall performance levels
further. See: Volpato (2003b).
35
In 1993 it was the case for Rinascente (fast moving consumer goods distribution), in 1995 CEAC (batteries),
in 1997 FiatImpresit (civil engineering), in 1998 Snia BPD (chemicals).
36
See: Bodo (2002) and Gallo R. (2003).


The prolonged crisis, and the continuous loss of market share in the major markets,
notwithstanding the agreement with General Motors defined in 2000, would have had to impose a
prompt turnover in top management, that instead received full confidence by the Agnelli family and
by the “Avvocato” himself.
4.2 The deficits in the range/product plan

The choice by Paolo Cantarella to change the business model of Fiat Auto towards a “volume and
variety” approach started in the mid 1990s could not be maintained with the quite unsatisfactory
results achieved during the following years, where once again the design stage was deficitary.
Cantarella tried to change course with the launch of the “Stilo” model in 2001, but results were
once again unsatisfactory, and the continuous worsening in the image of the three Fiat group
brands had repercussions onto the whole range with significant losses in market share both in Italy
(below 35% share in 2001) and in Europe (below 10%).
The modesty of such results became even more evident if one considers that at the same time Fiat
Auto exert great pressure to support sales and to limit market share erosion. This determined the
rise of the practice of cars directly registered by dealers (or Fiat’s wholly-owned dealerships), then
sold into the market with very high rebates as “zero-km used cars”. The Turinbased company at
the same time was considerably increasing its direct sales with high rebates to rental companies
and other business customers. It was a disastrous policy both for dealers and for the automaker
itself. Due to this, the achieved results, albeit lower than targets, were met through sales drugged
37
by rebates that were largely greater than the competition . The fact that even in 2001, year when
total registrations in Italy peak, Fiat Auto has an operational loss of € 549 million, suggests the
costs borne to support sales, basically by selling below cost. One should also add that the low
qualitative levels of products determined also high warranty costs, with considerable costs also for
38
dealer networks, some of which had to exit the business or acquire other franchises .
4.3 The internationalization strategy

With respect to the internationalization process, the 1990s were a time of strong commitment for
Fiat Auto, unfortunately partially affected by many causes: a chain of unfavourable events and
some mistakes. Internationalization was a key objective for Gianni Agnelli, who tried to achieve it
already in 1973 with an attempt to merge Fiat with Citroën, a project that did not happen due to
the opposition of other French automakers who feared the entry of their foreign competitors into
their domestic market, and who found a decisive ally in the grandeur of general De Gaulle. Another
attempt was made in the mid 1980s, when the Soviet government decided to give impulse to the
motorization process. Many automakers were interested into the project. Among these, Fiat could
rely on a long-dating attention strategy towards the USSR, and on the demonstration of its
technical and organizational capabilities provided with the creation of the Togliattigrad plant. The
agreement with the Turin-based company was set in November 1989 to develop a plant to
manufacture a small segment car (“B” segment) to assemble in 300,000 units per year. In April
1990 the agencies revealed that Fiat also gained the development of a city-car (“A” segment), and
was running for a “C” segment car as well. With these expansions, the whole program was
expected to reach an annual production volume of 900,000 cars. Unfortunately the economic and
political difficulties and the fall of the Soviet Union itself determined the annulment of the project.
The internationalization envisioned by Avvocato Agnelli came into reality in the mid 1990s with the
“178 Project”. It consisted in a family of cars starting from the same platform, to be manufactured
in a range of countries, but in a highly standardized way, in order to exploit significant scale and
learning economies both for plant construction and in manufacturing, with the possibility to transfer
parts between the different manufacturing locations.
37
Total costs of these rebates were estimated by Giancarlo Boschetti at about 23.7% of turnover, plus the costs
of warranty work at about 7.3%. See: Boschetti (2002).
38
Volpato (2004).


The globalization of the car was aimed at new-motorization countries such as Brazil, Argentina,
Poland, Russia, Turkey, India and China. The objective was to reach a cumulative volume of about
one million cars in 2003, to be manufactured in about a dozen countries39. The idea made sense
even if it would have emerged that even inside these markets the differences in customer
preferences were significant.
After a first encouraging stage in Latin America the international financial crisis of 1998 led to a
40
slowdown in the project . However, even if the results were partly affected by the negative
context, undoubtedly serious mistakes were made both on the program planned for India, with the
development of a plant that was then never utilized and with an excessive degree of product
standardization that was inadequate for that market, and in Russia and China with delays and quite
unsatisfactory results.
The agreement between Fiat and General Motors can be placed within the internationalization
project that the Turin-based company wanted to carry out. Already in 1985 Fiat had seriously
considered to merge with Ford Europe, and opportunity then faded also due to the opposition by
Romiti41. From that experience the company became convinced that the viable solutions were
mainly of industrial kind. In such path lies the agreement with the Detroit-based company in 2000.
It aimed at achieving scale economies through two joint ventures: one specialized into component
purchasing, the other focusing on engine and transmission development to share in future models.
The agreement could undoubtedly yield interesting outcomes42, but the exacerbation of the
respective crises in the two partners called for more radical solutions that the agreement in place
restrained, agreement that was canceled in February 2005.
4.4 The reduction of internal competences and resources and the state of crisis
The gradual worsening of the crisis of Fiat Auto began already in 1997 to trigger a viciouscircle in
which the deficit arising from operations led on the one hand towards greater debt and on the
other hand towards a reduction in internal resources in terms of employees, investments, R& D
expenses. Such involution was led by the attempt to hide the difficult situation through the
emergence of “value creation” for shareholders. The attention to value creation (Value Based
Management) at Fiat derived from the adoption of accounting schemes of North American origin,
and such approach was made official in a document attached to the 1996 consolidated balance
sheet, then developed into a document named “The values of Gruppo Fiat” published in 1998 and
based on value creation objectives:
“Value creation is the obligation we have towards our shareholders. Each one of us
holds the responsibility of contributing to the development of the Group hence to
transfer onto who will come next, shareholders and employees, a company of greater
value. All decisions and all actions must fulfill the objective of increasing the economic
value of the company and of the whole group. Value creation is intended and
measured as the share of operational results exceeding the cost of the capital
employed to achieve it”.
39
See Volpato (2000).
40
Balcet and Enrietti (2002).
41
The project was hindered by the definition of whom had to decide in case of lack of alignment between the
two partners. Ford’s proposal to give precedence to Fiat only as long as Gianni Agnelli remained president (with
Ford then gaining presidency once for all later on) was considered a possibility by Ghidella, but saw the
opposition of Romiti, so the agreement did not materialize. Volpato (2004).
42
See Camuffo and Volpato (2002); Camuffo et al. (2004); Enrietti and Barichello (2006).


The guidelines at the heart of Value Based Management can obviously be agreed with, but the way
in which this tool was used within Gruppo Fiat not only missed to help the recovery, but enhanced
the difficulties. The mass of capital required for Fiat’s globalization project was such that the cash
flows themselves were largely insufficient, so the international capital markets were needed. It was
then necessary that Fiat could stand up to the international financial community as a company led
by the same principia shared within the community itself, showing a management culture
concerned with the interests of shareholders. The idea was that an increased in debt would have to
correspond to a reduction in employed capital in order to exploit the financial leverage in value
creation.
On the one hand the “net financial position” of the Fiat group began to increase fast moving from a
net debt of € 1,142 million in 1996 to € 6,467 million in 2000, on the other hand many internal
activities were externalized reducing employment and replacing fixed costs with variable input
costs43. The objective was to exploit the whole bargaining power of the company to reduce input
costs. This would have led to an improved operational result that compared to the reduced
employed capital would have revealed the value creation for shareholders.
The most evident indicator of the outsourcing of activities in Fiat Auto is represented by t he share
of personnel costs in the income statement. The reduction in employee levels had started already
after Ghidella’s exit. From the peak recorded by the whole of automotive activities in 1989 with
134,270 employees, numbers fell to 114,386 in 1995 and to 74,292 in 2000. A comparison
between the share of personnel costs on turnover of Fiat Auto compared to the Renault and PSA
groups, in the automotive fields, clearly shows the dramatic move to forms of outsourcing carried
out by Fiat44. In 1995 the share of personnel costs on sales was 14.44% for Fiat, already lower
than Renault (18.74%), but in 2000 the share fell to 9.07% for Fiat versus 14.98% for Renault and
13.44% for PSA. A highly relevant aspect is that outsourcing did not involve only component
manufacturing and sub-group assembly activities, but also design and coordination activities of
suppliers’ work45.
In other words Fiat Auto began giving up internal competences in key activities of component
innovation and of definition of the overall architecture of its own models. In this case as well the
gap between R&D expenses and investments for plant upgrading carried out by Fiat Auto and the
automotive divisions of the Renault and PSA groups are quite revealing. In 1995 Fiat Auto spent €
493 million and invested € 1,700 million, versus € 1,212 million and € 1,970 million for Renault. In
2000 the numbers were 776 and 1,412 respectively for Fiat, while the French groups’ automotive
divisions spent 1,817 and 2,739 (Renault) and 1,387 and 2,497 (PSA)46. The outcome of such
approach is represented by a marked increase in the number of parts autonomously designed by
suppliers or developed in co-design between Fiat Auto and first-tier suppliers versus those
exclusively designed by Fiat Auto. Between 1991 and 2000 the parts within Fiat’s own area of
47
responsibility decreased from 76% to 28% .
43
The process of reduction in vertical integration levels of Fiat Auto, through the sale to other players of a
considerable part of internal component manufacturing, had begun already in the 1980s. But then the situation of
Fiat Auto had an anomalous level of vertical integration deriving from the past policy of buying out the most
important suppliers in trouble. It was then a matter of selection depending on components that were considered
more strategic. See: Volpato (2004b).
44
On the organizational forms of model development in Fiat Auto see: Calabrese (1997).
45
On the development during the 1990s of simultaneous activities of concentration in the number of supplier
firms and upgrading and greater delegation to those confirmed, through initiatives named “project of assisted
growth” see: Enrietti et al. (2002).
46
If one calculates the cumulated value of the two items (R&D + Investments) for the 1995-2000 period one
obtains € 12,592 million for Fiat Auto and € 21,391 million for Renault, with a lower effort by Fiat Auto equal to
70%.
47
Volpato (2004b).


The stake for this approach was to be able to maintain product quality and reliability on standards
that were comparable to the competition, but with a leaner structure, hence less costly. As we
have already demonstrated the approach did not work out, both because the design choices of
models turned out to be disputable48, and because the quality perceived by customers in the whole
of Fiat products for all three brands appeared not aligned to the competition. Such involution, that
began in the early 1990s, and apparently soothed in the mid-1990s for a short period of time,
came back in 1998 and started to accelerate at the beginning of 2000: Fiat Auto’s market share,
notwithstanding the policy of strong rebates and direct sales to rental companies, continued to fall
determining a reduction in sales and a precipitation of operational results: a loss of € 549 million in
2001, and a loss of € 1,343 million in 2002. The crisis situation for the Turin-based group, long
underestimated by the great national press starting from the “La Stampa” newspaper directly
controlled by Fiat, manifested in December 2001 with the resignation by Roberto Testore and
shocking declaration of 4 billion loss for Gruppo Fiat of which 2,7 due to Gruppo Fiat Auto, while
Paolo Cantarella remained at his post of President of Gruppo Fiat Auto and CEO of Gruppo Fiat.
Testore was replaced by Giancarlo Boschetti, President of Iveco. Boschetti is a capable manager
who matured a long experience first in commercial activities then as CEO of Iveco and has acquired
a considerable international experience.
He soon understood that the most critical point of the situation lay in the relationship with end
customers that seriously deteriorated over time, and began to lift the excessive pressures towards
dealers to achieve sales volumes. In turn he required dealers to accept a gross margin reduction of
about 2% of list price. Another important step was the development of a new version of the Panda
and the reorganization of management responsibilities that were made independent for the three
brands Fiat, Alfa Romeo and Lancia. But as a matter of fact his role was only temporary, as he was
close to retirement age and would leave in mid 2003. In the year 2003 Avvocato Agnelli died and
his brother Umberto took his place, the latter dying in May 2004. The automobile firm then has
been facing a stage of continuous changes in governance that did not facilitate the recovery. The
turnaround took place only in 2004 with Luca Cordero di Montezemolo becoming President of the
whole Fiat group, and Sergio Marchionne becoming CEO, the latter becoming also CEO of Fiat Auto
in February 2005 to more directly manage the recovery of this sector.
48
As underlined in Volpato and Zirpoli (2006) while a greater delegation in engineering activities is carried out,
vehicle design becomes more “autharchic”.


5. THE REORGANIZATION OPERATED BY SERGIO MARCHIONNE
5.1 Shaking up Fiat Auto management
The lines of activity adopted by Sergio Marchionne to lead Fiat (and in particular Fiat Auto) out of
the tunnel are many. Some are represented by initiatives with short term outcomes, that already
generated significant effects, while others will produce their effects in the medium-long term; some
focus on corporate governance, some focus on the whole of group relationships with the many
industrial and financial partners. Overall, these initiatives constitute a dense web that cannot be
summarized without some simplifications that however do not affect the picture. The priority
initiative is the most delicate and certainly relates to the turnover of some figures located in
highlevel decision-making posts. The marked crisis of Fiat Auto and the disappearance of key
figures such as Gianni Agnelli in January 2003 and Umberto Agnelli in May 2004 had triggered
many rounds of changes at the top of the group49 that, as fatally happens in these cases, did
considerably slow down the initiative of managers and cadres that were facing ever-changing
scenarios without clear guidelines. Moreover, the tradition of the Turin-based company with respect
to management turnover had always been featuring a preference for internal solutions, and this
translated into a modest changes in ideas, managerial styles and approaches, since the dominant
culture was of an elitist nature, when even rare behaviors, different from those included in the
consolidated schemes, generated by some occasional entry of managers coming from a different
background, ended up being isolated, then hindered and finally erased. Even the passion for soccer
of some managers towards Torino Calcio rather than Juventus (that Fiat owned soccer team), was
considered a bizarre trait and poorly tolerated by a diffuse attitude of conformism.
Marchionne profoundly impacted on this too bureaucratic and routinary structure with initiatives
that can be defined as management by stress. One should also consider that the time available to
turnaround the company was limited. On the one hand, he demanded clear commitment from his
direct reports on objectives and times, on the other hand made room for young managers, more
oriented to fight for their ideas and willing to work hard to carry out more with less resources than
their counterparts had available. Moreover, Marchionne did not become CEO of Fiat Spa and then
of Fiat Auto bringing his staff along. He showed to rely on his own capability to choose the right
people: inside the company if they seemed fit, but also outside and abroad if he believed to have
identified the person he needs. If one looks at the number of employees in Fiat Auto one can see
that their numbers decrease dramatically also under Marchionne’s management, but he shows
great leadership abilities dedicating himself to extremely hard working times and asking all Fiat
Auto personnel to do the same, gaining a very high personal commitment. Besides, Marchionne
had begun already in spring 2004 a wide process of assessment of capabilities of individual
managers evaluating both their leadership abilities and the achieved performance (Exhibit no.2).
49
The turnovers were the following: a) as President of Gruppo Fiat there is the exit of Cesare Romiti in 1998
replaced by Paolo Fresco, then replaced by Umberto Agnelli in 2003, then deceased in 2004; Luca Montezemolo
then stepped int, currently in charge;
b) as CEO of Gruppo Fiat there is the exit of Paolo Cantarella in 2002 replaced by Gabriele Galateri coming
from Ifil, finance company of the Agnelli family; Galateri will be replaced in 2003 by Giuseppe Morchio,
coming from the Pirelli tyre making company, then replaced by Sergio Marchionne when Montezemolo became
president;
c) as CEO of Gruppo Fiat Auto there is the exit of Antonio Testore in late 2001, replaced by Giancarlo Boschetti
coming from Iveco; Boschetti will retire in mid-2003; initially it seemed he was meant to be replaced by Martin
Leach, coming from Ford, but in November 2003 Herbert Demel was chosen, coming from Magna Steyr,
specialized in automotive engineering. Demel will be replaced by Marchionne in February 2005 as the Fiat CEO
wanted to cut recovery times for Fiat Auto so he was determined to manage in first person also automotive
activities


In little more than a year the whole of Fiat Auto managers directly reporting to him undergoes a
profound transformation. In mid 2006 40% of the 27 first level top managers are foreign. It is
something that a few years before would have been quite unthinkable.
5.2 The international cooperation agreements

On the field of international agreements Sergio Marchionne initially had to untie the knot
represented by the agreement with General Motors defined in 2000. Such agreement did produce
good outcomes, but it entailed a put option by which Fiat could have asked General Motors to
purchase Fiat Auto. This possibility was a true Damocles’ sword on General Motors since the auto
activities of Fiat in 2003 looked on the verge of bankruptcy and even the North American company
was facing an acute crisis that the absorption of the Italian company would have worsened. This
option was a true time bomb and negatively affected at the roots the opportunities for cooperation
between the two automakers, who had in place a shared structure for component purchasing and
for the development of shared platforms, with the outcome of preventing other international
agreements that Marchionne was interested to develop50. Marchionne acted well, managing to
cancel the agreement, through the price of € 1.55 million to be paid by GM.
50
On organizational aspects of the Fiat-GM agreement and on the outcome of such cooperation see: Camuffo
and Volpato (2002), Enrietti and Barichello (2006).


Right after he moved on to seal a set of agreements51 including:
• With the Indian group Tata for a wide ranging cooperation, including shared manufacturing in
India and in Argentina of some models, but also for forms of cooperation in joint development
of models, component design and manufacturing, joint marketing and distribution in India,
through Tata networks;
• With Ford to use the new city-car platform (Fiat 500) also for the Ka model of the US company,
to be manufactured in the Thichy plant in Poland;
• With Severstal to assemble in Russia the Palio and Albea models manufactured in kits at the
Turkish Tofas plant, owned by the joint-venture between Fiat and the Koc group; With Chery to
strengthen vehicle manufacturing in China.
5.3 Range renovation and comeback of Customer Care

Clearly the central initiative in Marchionne’s turnaround has been backed on the refreshing of the
range of models and of the brands offered. The new CEO could in part benefit from the work of
some of his predecessors who had correctly set the renovation of some important model. The most
evident case is that of the new Panda, set by Giancarlo Boschetti and launched in 2004. The small
car, manufactured in Poland, gained the “Car of the Year” award. It has a significant value for
money ratio, and an undisputed quality. The recovery of the image and quality of the product has
started right from this model that, on the other hand, having been well engineered, allows
interesting profit margins both for the automaker and for the distribution network. This model was
followed with significant results by the new Croma in the third quarter of 2005, by the Grande
Punto in the third quarter, by Alfa Romeo 159 in first quarter of 2006, by Alfa Romeo Brera in third
quarter 2006 and by Bravo (5 year warranty) in the third quarter of 2007, with Linea and 500 in
the second quarter of 2007. The strengths of this range are mainly Panda and Grande Punto with
ambitious volume plans that have been exceeded, also considering that manufacturing of the
previous Punto did not cease, running at about 100,000 units per year. Among the models wholly
developed under Marchionne’s management there are two that are particularly important such as
Bravo and 500.
In the first case it is a model of the “C” segment, the most important in Europe, where lie models
such as Volkswagen Golf, Opel Astra, Peugeot 307. It is then a very important model for the
comeback of Fiat Auto both on contribution to profits, and on the consolidation of the company
image, where in the past the firm suffered the failure of a model like the “Stilo”. Marchionne has
decided to start with a quite prudent policy, declaring for Bravo a target of 120,000 cars per year,
that the whole specialized press judges too prudent. However the signs from the European market
in the early months of sales indicate that the targets are to be exceeded. With respect to the 500
customers are waiting, and many orders came in even before the official disclosure of the price.
The revision in modern terms of the old car launched in 1957 and manufactured in 3.7 million units
represents already a media icon. Also, Fiat Auto activated many months before launch (due for 1st
July 2007) a website to allow potential customers to express their views on many aspects of the
car. A new and involving way to establish direct contact with customers and exploit their
suggestions. With a good commercial performance of the new models Fiat undoubtedly is due to
record another important step in its turnaround. A significant part of the favor among customers
for the new product range of Fiat Auto comes from a considerable enhancement in quality of
product engineering, that generated in turn higher perceived quality and higher satisfaction, plus
lower development and manufacturing costs.
On this front there is wide agreement that the new managers chosen by Marchionne are doing a
good job, notwithstanding the need to control costs, through forms of better capabilities to listen to
and to coordinate suppliers. An important aspect of such evolution is the reduction in the time-
tomarket of new products. The Grande Punto already marked a good performance with 20 months.
With Bravo the TTM was reduced to 18 months, that represents the best performance in Fiat Auto,
and for the 500 the time was down to only 15 months, a true record. These results were achieved
through an intelligent implementation of carryover from the most advanced components of the
previous models, and through relevant technological innovations.
51
During the 24 months following its entry as CEO of Fiat Spa, Sergio Marchionne has sealed 13 international
agreements, of which 10 involving Fiat Auto.


Among these, an important contribution came from the introduction of a system of Digital Mock-Up
(DMU) that during the development stage for a new model avoids physical mock-ups that require
long lead times and much higher costs52. All this has translated into a higher qualitative level for
cars. It is not by chance that the new Bravo was the first Fiat model to be sold with a 5-year
warranty program.
Also on the Customer Care front there was a marked acceleration in change. Fiat Auto did not have
a solid tradition in this arena, the relationship with customers had to be undamentally turned
upside down. The beginning was the establishment of a new Customer Care position assigned to a
manager coming from Iveco who directly reports to Marchionne. Also, the first call center with a
single number for all European markets in 9 languages has been developed, while a performance
monitoring system has been put in place, recording the speed at which Fiat Auto manages to fix
customers’ complaints. With these initiatives the case “closing time” has decreased from 23 to 7.5
days.
5.4 Market share recovery

The launch of new models, favored also by the growth in registrations in the Italian market during
recent years, and a strengthening of the government incentives in early 2007 for the scrappage of
non-catalytic cars, has generated a significant recovery in market share for the brands of the Fiat
Auto group. The lowest point for the whole of the three brands was recorded in 2003 in Italy, while
in Europe the fall continued until 2005. However some signs of reprise started to show up, mainly
for the Fiat brand, whose weight is much higher than the other two in the second half of 2004.
Then the comeback has become faster in the second half of 2005, with the arrival of the Grande
Punto. The year 2006 has confirmed the recovery for the brands, and in 2007 this has consolidated
further (Exhibit no.3 and no.4).
52
Besides, all new models sold by Fiat Auto in Europe gained the 5 stars EuroNcap.


5.5 The economic and financial performance
If one looks at the recovery of the Gruppo Fiat by considering economic and financial indicators
then the magnitude of the turnaround appears much higher than what market shares in Italy and
in Europe reveal. The reasons are twofold. On the one hand the fast comeback from the huge
losses recorded in 2003 with net losses equal to € 2.739 million, Fiat could benefit from the
contribution of profits gained internationally, and mainly in Brazil. After the crisis in the end 1990s
the Brazilian market showed an interesting growth trend and the Fiat Group, that fights head-
tohead for first place with the Volkswagen Group, could benefit from this situation through the
development of models and motorizations consistent with that market53. In particular Fiat has
introduced very early the flex-fuel system, internally developed by Magneti Marelli. On the other
hand the return to profitability was obtained in accordance with the capability of the group to
operate by exploiting as much as possible the modest resources available in order to reduce as fast
as possible the debt levels, and improve the ranking among international rating agencies.
If one looks at the main balance sheet indicators one can see that Sergio Marchionne has
maintained the previous policy of employee reduction and of control of R&D and fixed capital
expenditures. The difference lies in the fact that he could act so that the reduction in resources
could be compensated by greater leadership abilities among his managers and by a stronger
commitment by all employees. In such way the number of Fiat Auto employees maintains at
minimal levels and the increase in the number of high-level professionals (managers and
engineers) has been compensated by a reduction in the number of low-skill profiles, with a further
reduction of the share of employee costs on total turnover54. Also on the investment front, whose
approval procedures require fast lead times and significant payback rates, the maximum was
extracted from available resources through carryover actions from previous models. For example,
according to Sergio Marchionne, the new Bravo, albeit featuring technological content that is in line
with the best competitors, has required a limited dedicated investment, equal to € 350 million, and
55
this allows to reach break-even with an annual production of just 75,000 units , with a target,
judged by observers as highly prudent, of 120,000 units.
The objectives of economic recovery for Fiat Auto declared by Marchionne in 2004 were:
The move from an operating income of a negative 4.5% on turnover in 2004 to a negative 1.5% in
2005.
The return to positive numbers in 2006 both for operating income and for operational cash flow.
As these targets were achieved as expected, the objectives were set at an operating income
between 0.5% and 1% of turnover for 2006, and between 2% to 4% in 2007. In reality the results
were much higher and in 2006 ROS was equal to 3.06%. For the time being the perspectives
indicate that 2007 objectives can be met.
53
In city-cars Fiat do Brasil produces the “Mille”, “Palio” and “Idea” models. The “Idea” was awarded “Carro
do Ano” (car of the year) in 2006.
54
At the end of 2006, the employees were 44,691 and the share was 4,82% for Gruppo Fiat Auto. The same data
were respectively 125,827 and 14,08% for Renault Automobile and 139,500 and 13,79% for PSA Automobile.
55
Quoted from the speech to the press at the presentation of the car in January 2007.


6. THE OTHER OBJECTIVES UNDER MARCHIONNE’S LEAD
In November 2006 Sergio Marchionne and some of its staff met the financial analysts in Turin. In
such occasion many information were given both on achieved results, and on the most significant
objectives to be reached before 2010. Among these there is that of manufacturing and sales of cars
and commercial vehicles derived from cars. According to the CEO of the Fiat Auto Group (Exhibit
no.5) sales in 2010 should reach a level of 2.8 million units for the brands falling within the
consolidated balance sheet (Fiat, Fiat Commercial Vehicles, Alfa Romeo and Lancia) and of 3.5
million including also production developed in joint-venture (mainly in Turkey).
Such growth, clearly ambitious, would require also a very high increase in the registrations for the
Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands that in the 2007-2010 stage should mark a 87.5% and 150%
increase respectively (compared to 2006 sales levels). On the economic and financial front Fiat
Auto targets are set by 2010 (Exhibit no.6) to sales of about € 32.5 billion, versus the € 23.7 billion
recorded in 2006, and a Trading Margin on sales growing from the range 0.8-1.3% on sales in
2006, to the estimated range 4.5-5.3% in 2010.


Source: Fiat Auto, November 2006
Facing the expansion of the presence in all segments by premium brands, and the equally strong
current expansion of Korean brands, and the incoming one by Chinese and Indian brands, the
meeting of Fiat Auto objectives implies the need for Fiat to reposition its offering upwards for all
three brands, but mainly for Lancia and Alfa Romeo that were given extremely ambitious targets,
mainly considering that without the possibility to command a premium price over a significant
share of domestic production it will become harder and harder to keep manufacturing in Italy.
Besides it must be reaffirmed that the success of this program does not depend just on the
initiatives promoted by Marchionne, who undoubtedly proved to be able to lead the group with
great determination, but also on competitors’ actions. On this front it is not hard to ascertain how
all major automakers are very committed to undertake heavy programs of investment and model
range renovation, with growing R&D expenses. One can consider for example that the Audi division
in the Volkswagen Group has announced in 2006 the launch for the 2007-2011 period of an
investment program for € 8.4 billion to move its range to 40 models. It is similarly evident that the
recovery of Fiat market share in the European markets could benefit from the current difficulties
troubling two of its most direct competitors such as Renault and PSA. However it is known that the
two French groups are in turn developing massive recovery plans. For example Renault has
announced in March 2007 to plan over the next three years the launch of 26 novelties between
“new models” and “silhouettes”.
As it is widely known, the upgrading of the Fiat Auto brands looks a tough route that will have to
be faced gradually, without leaps. For example the launch of the new Lancia model Thesis in 2001
represents a mistake not to be repeated. It is evident that it would have been much better to
invest in an anticipated renewal of the Lybra model, whose late introduction had compromised its
success, rather than to propose a model such as the Thesis, inadequate to play the too ambitious
role it had been given. To develop in a gradual and fine-tuned way, but systematic, the strategy of
upgrading requires not just industrial agreements, as those recently signed with Ford and with the
Indian company Tata, that in reality are focusing on cost reduction and investment sharing, but
rather a strong commitment on research and development aimed at product innovation, being clear
now that in the most advanced markets only innovation is capable of allowing the acquisition of a
premium price.


Fiat Auto has demonstrated, mainly in the design of diesel engines, to have the necessary
innovative capabilities, but the issue is to stretch these capabilities. Over recent years, as said, Fiat
Auto has been required to reduce the scope of its own research and development initiative,
acquiring more innovation than in the past through outsourcing. This approach, useful besides
being required by the search for a fast economic and financial equilibrium, must however be
replaced in a stage of upgrading by a greater emphasis on internal innovation. It is just too evident
that to rely on the marketplace to acquire a relevant share of innovation prevents from recovering
versus competitors, hence to overcome them.
Currently the innovation spend is still too limited, less than half versus the main competitors, but if
the R&D spend would double, as it should, the share on the cost per manufactured unit would
increase eroding margins. Facing this dilemma the most reasonable solution would be to carry out
besides industrial agreements also a financial agreement to source the additional resources
necessary to fight competition simultaneously on two fronts: greater product innovation, also and
mainly towards medium-high segments, and volume growth investing in networks abroad. In the
years of the crisis Fiat Auto led a policy of dramatic reduction in its distribution networks, both in
Italy and abroad. In part this choice was conditioned by the need to concentrate sales on a smaller
number of dealers in order to support their profitability that was worsened by the loss of
competitiveness of the product on the quality standpoint, and by very costly sales support policies
(fleet sales, zero-km used cars, etc.).
Fiat must then manage to obtain greater financial resources to dedicate to:
a. the development of new models. In the 2007-2010 Product Plan, disclosed in November 2006, 23
new models and 23 model upgrades are foreseen. It is undoubtedly a considerable effort, but the
fact that it does not include neither the substitution of the Lancia Lybra (the new HPE model aims
at a completely different customer segment) or the launch of a SUV for the Alfa Romeo brand,
represents two weaknesses that should be overcome.
b. The development of more powerful engines, but at the same time more fuel efficient and with
lower CO2 emissions.
c. The expansion of distribution networks, mainly for the Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands that are
under-represented in Europe. In the meeting with financial analysts in November 2006 the
manager in charge of dealer development has announced that the total number of dealers in
Europe (4,400 in 2006) will increase to 4,800 in 2010. It is a step forward, but that appears still
small versus the needs for a complete consolidation of the company over the long term. It is not by
56
chance that network sizes for its major competitors are quite larger, starting from Renault and
PSA.
d. The strengthening of marketing policies abroad, where the number of running vehicles is much
smaller than in Italy and therefore it does not allow to provide the same level of visibility to the
new offering of the Turin company.
Marchionne’s management has been capable of carrying out miracles with a very limited set of
resources, but over the medium-long term it seems necessary to move from a management by
stress approach to forms of growth that are supported mainly by a broadening of investments and
innovation initiatives.
56
Renault declares a network of 9,764 Point of Sales in Europe as sum of Direct Dealerships, Independent
Dealers and Agents (2006 Annual Report).


References bibliographiques de cet article de G. Volpato
Amatori F. (1996), Impresa e mercato – Lancia 1906-1969, Il Mulino, Bologna.

Balcet G., Enrietti A. (2002), “The Impact of Focused Globalisation in the Italian Automotive
Industry”, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 13 (1–3).
Berta G. (1992), Le commissioni interne nella storia delle relazioni industriali alla Fiat, in AA.VV.,
Le relazioni industriali alla Fiat, Progetto Archivio Storico Fiat, Fabbri Editori, Milano.
Berta G. (1998), Conflitto industriale e struttura d’impresa alla Fiat, 1919-1979, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Berta G. (2006), La Fiat dopo la Fiat – Storia di una crisi: 2000-2005, Mondatori, Milano.
Bodo G. (2002), “Una rivoluzione non annunciata – La Fiat nell’ultimo decennio”, in L’Industria, 23
(1), pp.33-55.
Boschetti G. (2002), “Interview”, in Professional – Periodico di informazione manageriale del
gruppo
Fiat, n.12.
Boyer R., Freyssenet M. (2002), The Productive Models – The Conditions of profitability, Palgrave-
Macmillan, Houndmills, Hampshire.
Calabrese G. (1997), Fare auto – La comunicazione e la cooperazione nel processo di sviluppo
prodotto, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
Camuffo A., Volpato G. (1997), Nuove forme di integrazione operativa: il caso della
componentistica
automobilistica, F.Angeli, Milano.
Camuffo A., Volpato G. (2002), “Partnering in the Global Auto Industry: the Fiat-GM Strategic
Alliance”, in International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management, 2 (3-4),
pp.335-352.
Castronovo V., ed., (2005), Storia della Pininfarina – Un’industria italiana nel mondo 1930-2005,
Editori Laterza, Roma.
Cherubini S. (1982), Settore industriale e strategia aziendale – L’esperienza Alfa Romeo, Il Mulino,
Bologna.
Ciferri L. (2002), After Years of Neglet, Fiat Rediscovers Tourin’s Design Houses, “Automotive News
Europe”, november 18th.
Clementi E.R., Piazza P.A., Volpato G. (2005), “Competitive Assembly: Brown or Green Field Site –
Conventional or Flexible Plant – What’s the Best?”, in International Journal of Automotive
Technology and Management, 5 (3), pp. 351-373.
Garuzzo G. (2006), Fiat – I segreti di un’epoca, Fazi Editore
Garuzzo G. (2006), Fiat – I segreti di un’epoca, Fazi Editore, Roma.
Enrietti A., Follis M., Whitford J. (2002), “Improving Performance at the Second Tier of the
Automotive Supply Chain”, in Supply Chain Governance and Regional Development in the
Global Economy, September 10th.
Enrietti A., Barichello F. (2006), Fiat-GM Powertrain: chi ha guadagnato dall’alleanza?, in AA.VV.,
Annali di Storia dell’impresa, n.17, Marsilio Editore, Venezia.
Gallo R. (2003), “Evoluzione della struttura economico-finanziaria di Fiat e dei suoi competitors
mondiali”, in L’Industria, 24 (3), pp.433-55.
Jürgens, U., Lung Y., Frigant V., Volpato G., (2004), The Arrival of Shareholder Value in the
European Auto Industry – A Case Study Comparison of Four Car Makers, in: Clarke T. (Ed.),
Corporate Governance – Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, Vol.3,


Routledge, London & New York.
Mosconi A., Rullani E. (1978), Il gruppo nello sviluppo dell’impresa industriale con una analisi del
caso Fiat, Isedi, Milano.
Santagostino A. (1993), Fiat e Alfa Romeo – Una privatizzazione riuscita?, Edizioni Unicopli, Milano.
Sassi O.M. (1960), Considerazioni sul progresso tecnologico alla Fiat nella produzione
automobilistica, in AA.VV., Il progresso tecnologico e la società italiana: effetti economici
del progresso tecnologico sull’economia industriale italiana 1938-1958, Giuffré, Milano.
Volpato G. (1983), L’industria automobilistica internazionale, Cedam, Padova.
Volpato G. (1996), Il Caso Fiat - Una strategia di riorganizzazione e di rilancio, Isedi, Torino.
Volpato G. (1999), Il processo di internazionalizzazione della Fiat in campo automobilistico, in
Annibaldi C., Berta G., (eds.), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano – Studi per i cento anni
della Fiat, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Volpato G. (2000), La filière automobile italienne vers la globalization, in Dupuy G., Bost F., (eds.),
L’automobile et son monde, Éditions de l’Aube, La Tour d’Aigues.
Volpato G. (2002), “Una crisi che viene da lontano – Il marketing strategico di Fiat Auto”, in
Economia e politica industriale, 29, n.116, pag. 63-86.
Volpato G. (2003a), Fiat Auto: From “Forced” Internationalization Towards Intentional
Globalization, in Freyssenet M., Shimizu K., Volpato G., (eds.), Globalization or
Regionalization of the European Car Industry?, Palgrave-Macmillan, Houndsmills,
Hampshire.
Volpato G. (2003b), La Fiat di Gianni Agnelli: grandezza e fragilità di un grande gruppo industriale,
in AA.VV., Annali di storia dell’impresa, n.14, Marsilio Editore, Venezia.
Volpato G. (2004a), “The OEM-FTS relationship in Automotive Industry”, International Journal of
Automotive Technology and Management, 4 (2-3), pp.166-197.
Volpato G. (2004b), Fiat Auto – Crisi e riorganizzazioni strategiche di un’impresa simbolo, Isedi,
Torino.
Volpato G. (2006a), L’evoluzione
Volpato G. (2006b), La riorganizzazione della catena del valore nella filiera automobilistica, in Bardi
A., Garibaldo F., Telljohann V, (eds.), A passo d’auto - Impresa e lavoro nel settore
automobistico, Maggioli Editore, Rimini.
Volpato G., Zirpoli F. (2006c), “Fiat Auto: crisis and resurrection? A critical analysis”, in Finanza,
Marketing, Produzione, 24 (4), pp.106-122.
Zirpoli., Caputo M. (2002), “The Nature of Buyer-Supplier Relationship in Co-Design Activities: the
Italian Auto Industry Case”, in International Journal of Operation and Production
Management, 22 (12), pp.1389-1410.


XI. Annexes
1. Références Internet utiles pour des recherches relatives au cas

• Marketing de la Fiat 500
• http://marketingdelafiat500.over-blog.com/
• Site du GERPISA http://www.gerpisa.univ-evry.fr/
• Le blog du GERPISA http://leblog.gerpisa.org/aggregator/categories
• Site du Comité des Constructeurs Français d'Automobiles http://www.ccfa.fr/
• Marketing tribal et des passions http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3Xfc6wW7Vk
• Blog de marketing automobile http://automotivemarketing.e-monsite.com/
2. Références bibliographiques générales relatives au cas

Amine A. et Sitz L., « Emergence et structuration des communautés de marque en ligne »,
Décisions Marketing, n°46, avril-juin, pp. 63-75, 2007.
Badot O., « Marketing méditerranéen et marketing postmoderne: un oxymaore? », in Silva F., Carù
A. et Cova B., 2005.
Barthes R., Mythologies, Editions du Seuil, 1957.
Baudrillard J, Le Système des objets, Gallimard, 1968.
Berthon P.R., Pitt L.F., McCarthy I. et Kates, S.M., « When Customers Get Clever : Managerial
Approaches to Dealing with Creative Consumers », Business Horizons, Vol. 50 pp. 39-47, 2007.
Cancellieri G. et Ramaciotti., Fiat 500, ieri, oggi, domani, Giunti Editore, 2007.
Cova B., « Consumer Made : Quand le consommateur devient producteur », Décisions Marketing,
Avril-Juin, n°50, pp. 19-27, 2008.
Cova V. et Cova B., Alternatives Marketing, Dunod, 2001.
Fridenson P., préface de Broustail J et Greggio R, Citroën, Essai sur 80 ans d’antistratégie, Vuibert,
Institut Vital Roux, 2000.
Gadrey J, Zarifian P., L’émergence d’un modèle du service : Enjeux et réalités, Liaisons sociales,
2002.
Garel G, Rosier R., « De la valeur client à la valeur amont : management de l’exploration et

analyse de la valeur », Revue Sciences de Gestion, 64, avril, pp. 43-60, 2008.
Godin S., Tribes : We need you to teach us, Portfolio Hardcover, 2008.
Greggio R., « Croissance externe horizontale et cohérence stratégique : le cas du groupe Fiat dans
l’automobile », thèse de doctorat ès sciences de gestion, HEC, 1995.
Greggio R., Fiat, une crise automobile, croissance externe et management de marque, Les Editions
de l’officine, Paris, avril, 2003.
Gröntoos C., « Service logic revisited: who creates value? And who co-creates? », European
Business Review, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 298-314, 2008.


Le Masson P., Weil B. et Hatchuel A., Les processus d’innovation, conception innovante et croissance des entreprises,
Hermès Lavoisier, 2006.
Lipovetsky G., Le bonheur paradoxal, essai sur la société d’hyperconsommation, folio essais,
Gallimard, Paris, 2006.
Maffesoli M., Le temps des tribus, le déclin de l’individualisme dans les sociétés postmodernes, La
Table Ronde, Paris, 1988.
Maffesoli M., L’instant éternel, le retour du tragique dans les sociétés postmodernes, La Table
Ronde, Paris, 2003.
Maffesoli M., Le rythme de la vie. Variations sur les sensibilités postmodernes, Paris, Ed. De la
Table ronde, 2004.
Maillet C., Le marketing adulescent, comment les marques s’adressent à l’enfant qui sommeille en
nous, Village Mondial, 2005.
Midler C., L’auto qui n’existait pas, management des projets et transformation de l’entreprise,
InterEditions, Paris, 1993.
Milenovitch M., « Cinquante ans de design, Direction du Design industriel Renault », document
présenté chez Renault à Boulogne Billancourt, 6 avril, 1993.
Ravasi D. et Rindova V., « Exploring the dynamics of symbolic value creation in and around
organization », Academy of management Conférence, Honolulu, 2005.
Simms C.D. et Trott P., « The perceptions of the BMW Mini Brand : the importance of historical
associations and the development of a model », Journal of Product & Brand Management, vol. 15,
n°4, 228-238, 2006.
Tisseron S., « Comment l’esprit vient aux objets » et « Petites mythologies d’aujourd’hui », Aubier,
2002.
Volpato G., Fiat Auto – Un’araba fenice nell’industria automobilistica internazzionale, II Mulino,
Bologna, 2008.
Warnier J.P., Construire la culture matérielle : l’homme qui pensait avec ses doigts, Paris, PUF,
1999.


Cas FIAT

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Cas FIAT

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cas FIAT

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

81 avenue de la République

75543 PARIS Cedex 11

Nouvelle Fiat 500 : développement et perspectives G1677

Par Jean-Marc POINTET

Intégration CCMP : 2010

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

Pour ce produit, l'établissement acquéreur est autorisé à :

Auteur : Jean-Marc POINTET

Etablissement créateur : Université Paris Est, ESIEE Management et IRG-PRISM

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

I. “Fiat paints picture with rebirth of street icon” ............................................ 4

II. « Le succès de la Fiat 500, l'exemple à suivre »........................................... 5

III. « Le contexte global : la 500, au cœur d’un mouvement rétro dans

V. « La 500 renaît, Fiat aussi », Eric Jozsef, Libération, 6 juillet 2007............ 10

VII. « Chrysler pourrait assembler des Fiat 500 au Mexique »,.................... 13

VIII. Extrait de Gilles Lipovetsky G, ............................................................... 13

X. “Fiat Auto 2008, an Arabian phoenix in the international auto industry”.... 18

1. Références Internet utiles pour des recherches relatives au cas ............................... 39

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 2

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

1. Pourquoi le rétro représente-t-il un moyen de rompre avec des conventions du

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 3

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 4

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 5

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

Légendaire et familière, la 500 apparaît régulièrement aux yeux du public (merchandising,

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 6

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 7

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 8

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 9

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

Rome de notre correspondant

En quelques mois, l'administrateur délégué a réorganisé la production, accéléré la sortie de

Bénéfices. Au total, en 2006, Fiat a affiché un chiffre d'affaires en hausse de 11 %, à

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 10

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 11

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 12

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

(Anupreeta Das, version française Gregory Schwartz)

VIII. Extrait de Gilles Lipovetsky G,

La société postmoderne est celle où règne l’indifférence de masse, où le sentiment de

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 13

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

1) Réactions spontanées recueillies sur différents sites Internet, quelques verbatims

Adresses des sites Internet Contexte Quelques verbatims significatifs

You Tube Réactions initiées à partir de la « Vraiment belle !! sur le site

« […] À cette intention j’ai

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 14

Licence d'utilisation accordée à : Université Paris Dauphine

Il ressort un engouement pour la démarche participative. L’aspect ludique de la personnalisation en

2) Réactions sollicitées sur le forum du Club « Fiar500.com »

© CCMP 2010 – Nouvelle Fiat 500 – Jean-Marc POINTET 15