G.R. No.

128540 April 15, 1998

EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order
requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if,
earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil
indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of
the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the
other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.

The Case

This is the gist of this Court's resolution of the petition for review on certiorari, assailing the
November 5, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR SP No. 41096. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision, which set aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, 4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent
Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the promulgation of the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to
serve imprisonment for the duration stated in the decision of the said respondent Court dated
February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been promulgated
earlier.

SO ORDERED. 5

The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the "Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Promulgation" filed by the accused thru counsel, is meritorious and
accordingly, the same is hereby granted.

The Facts

The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo

Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and
therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day
of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by
 law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also
the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that
the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of
this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby

MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of
Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also
the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-
86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation
of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of
[the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did
not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.

Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and
requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision  dated
July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On
August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent
portions thereof:

In the dispositive portion of this Court's decision, We simply modified the

appealed decision of the court a quo in one respect only — the increase of
the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in
Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.

In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the

lower court was not touched on at all by this Court especially in the light of
[o]ur [o]bservation in the said decision, as follows:

After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no

doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of
Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the following
findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight
and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:

x x x           x x x          x x x

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or

manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that
 the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the
same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp.
127-129)

Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby

declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with
regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial court's
decision.

Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however,
filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds:

1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April 1995
and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore.

2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused's
constitutional right against jeopardy.

In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion
holding:

Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals
promulgated on 17 August 1995 which "clarified" the dispositive portion of its
original decision, be considered as an amendment, alteration or modification
of the decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that in the execution
of the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the decision which controls.
We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already
promulgated the said decision by reading to the accused the dispositive
portion, and that to the best of our knowledge, he had already complied
therewith by paying the damages which were awarded. It may be relevant at
this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 393 that

Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data
from the records, it would have arrived at the right conclusion.

The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:

Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the

dispositive portion of the decision, the Supreme Court may clarify such
ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.
(emphasis supplied)

The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in
the case of Buan vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the Supreme Court
said:

". . . Thus the respondent Court stated, "it is undisputed that the Decision of
the Court of Appeals . . . had become final and executory." Taken in this light
 the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a
final decision being unreviewable and conclusive.

But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that
serious injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were
to be followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation.
(emphasis supplied)

It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court therefore,
that it may suspend the operation of the rules of procedure by virtue of its rule-making
power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court has the power to promulgate the Rules of
Court, then it has the power to suspend its operation in order to promote substantial justice.
Unquestionably, however, the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making
authority. Therefore it may not suspend the operation of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the same doctrines apply to
criminal cases as in the cases before us? The accused thru his counsels raised the issues of
the effect of a promulgation already once made arguing in the process that another
promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy will not be violated.

We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which the Honorable Supreme
Court has imposed, i.e., to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate
courts. However, we feel that we must equate this with another injunction, that trial judges
must keep abreast with the jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant
of the law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Since the very
jurisprudential authority relied upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the power
of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this Court therefore conclude that the
Honorable Court of Appeals does not have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the
decision which has not only become final, but has already been previously promulgated?

Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the observation made by counsel for
the accused in paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote:

4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the same had

already been promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise,
nothing to promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 2,
1996 and much less in the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals.

Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to re-
promulgate the Decision.

On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, filed
[before the Court of Appeals a] petition for certiorari and mandamus contending that the
respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute
the penalty of imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals'] Decision of July 30, 1991 and
Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent
 Judge be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be
enforced. 6

Ruling of the Appellate Court

In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:

Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of imprisonment was not
affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it increased the civil liability from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00. He failed to recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of
Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would not have been
imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked carefully into the
text of the decision he would have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of
conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said decision:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court entertains no doubt as to the
participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The
Court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court
accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:

1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same table with Sgt. Bustarde
and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the arrival of Leo Petete and his
companions;

2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes after the arrival of Rulo
Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes and boarded the same yellow car
owned and driven by accused Eduardo Cuison.

3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of Poblacion, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, a disinterested witness in the evening of May 27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house
of said accused Eduardo Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo
Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his house and after coming out of his house was
seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo Cuison called for his brother
Warling to whom he handed the carbine pistol and received by the latter.

Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot Cuison arrived, he,
Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car proceeded towards the north.
Obviously, these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.

4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt.
Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the car of accused
Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their respective firearms simultaneously fired
several shots in the air;

5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt.
Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic] Sapigao;
6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo Cuison, Bot and Domy
Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously to see to it and make sure Sapigao was already
dead;

7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo
Castro to come outside the restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged at the door, accused
Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison, Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde
simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo Castro hitting the latter;

8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and uncles of Bot and Domy
Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his brother Warling
and his two nephews Bot and Domy;

9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other before the incident;

10. After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away from the scene of
the crime on board the same car.

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r] manner in which
the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and
helped each other in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited
in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, '88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560).

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged,

but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be
accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them for concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et.
al., 55 O.G. 2393).

In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant "to indemnify the
heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the heirs of Rulo Castro
also the amount of P30,000.00" (Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the new policy of the
Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified amount of P30,000.00 should be
increased to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).

It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability in accordance
with new rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the accused [was] guilty of the
offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission of the
criminal liability is an error.

Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion
through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court
affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed upon the accused.
 This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already
final decision. It is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. The Court of Appeals
simply stated in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision — that the
conviction of the accused is affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is increased.
The dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a reading of
the decision can lead to no other conclusion.

It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after paying the heirs the
civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his participation in the act of killing the two (2)
victims in these cases, because of a wrong interpretation of a decision. 7

Hence, this appeal. 8

The Issues

In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following "assignment of errors":

I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that
the Solicitor General failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.

II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that
the Solicitor General failed to show the existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ
of Mandamus.

III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding
that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified, over objection of the accused.

IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding
that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the
Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in deciding as it
did and in denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 9

Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues:

(1) whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and
(2) whether petitioner's right against double jeopardy was violated.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified

A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 10 Grave abuse of discretion " . . . implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law." 11

Petitioner points out that the solicitor general's petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court
of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of discretion in the assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the
trial court. In the said Resolution, the trial court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and,
thus, effectively refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which, in turn, clarified that
the CA's earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount of indemnity but did not
delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it had
already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased
amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial court's Order, "far from being whimsical,
capricious or malevolent, [was] valid and substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution
was issued after a careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and points of applicable
law." 12

We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision convicting Petitioner Eduardo Cuison of double homicide.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the
appellate court merely imposed an indemnity and deleted the penalty of imprisonment. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision in no way communicated that the appealed
Decision of the trial court was modified only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it
be gleaned that the penalty of imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the entire
records of this case contain no legal or factual basis for acquitting petitioner or dismissing the
criminal cases against him.

In granting petitioner's motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily decided not to
promulgate the Court of Appeals' July 30, 1991 Decision. 13 He had no discretion to refuse; his
refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his jurisdiction.

We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of Appeal's July 30,
1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of petitioner. The trial court's assailed April 12, 1996
Resolution was therefore "tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of
the land affirming the judgment of conviction of respondent Court" and "unmistakably a very grave
abuse of discretion." 14

Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judge's justification that he has previously promulgated the
Court of Appeals' Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil indemnity. In ordering only the payment of
the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA Decision in its entirety. Notwithstanding the
subsequent CA Decision clarifying — and this Court's dismissal of the petition questioning — the
said earlier CA Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent refusal of the
trial court is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion.

We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the
latter's July 30, 1991 Decision was "ambiguous and obscure." 15 Such claim is bereft of factual
basis. Nowhere in its Resolution 16 did the CA so describe its previous Decision. It merely restated
the import of its July 30, 1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or distorted by the
trial court, which stated that "it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not
touched on at all by [the Court of Appeals] . . . ." 17
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of  mandamus, in view of the
trial court's refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating the appellate court's Decision in its
entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted
"[w]hen any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station . . . ." 18 Obedience to a superior court's order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was
improper, because the People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed trial court
Order. 19 This contention is bereft of merit. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition
for certiorari where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case. 20

Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction

Not Barred by Double Jeopardy

Petitioner submits that the trial court's promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 "cannot be
set aside and a second promulgation be ordered" 21 because to do so would contravene the
prohibition against double jeopardy. 22 He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4,
1995 has become final 23 and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case. 24

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:

. . . (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation
omitted). 25

Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent
Court's decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the
criminal cases against the petitioner . . . ." 26 In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy
attached at that point.

The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery
of indemnity. 27 Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil
liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the
criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in
his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned
act of the trial court void. 28 Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy
has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. 29
We must stress that Respondent Court's questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30,
1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full
execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.

Cases Cited Not Applicable

People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner, are

not applicable because they refer either to the lower court's proceeding that is not void or to errors of
judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando, 30 the Court
ruled that the questioned proceedings of the court a quo "were not an absolute nullity as to render
the judgment of acquittal null and void," considering that the prosecution was not denied due
process. In Ramos vs. Hodges 31 the Court found that the trial judge's erroneous conclusion merely
constituted "errors of fact or of law," and not of jurisdiction. Lastly, in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals 32 the Court held that the lower court committed merely "an error of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction as there was no clear showing [that it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that its act was so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law."

Epilogue

This Court takes this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise in their  ponencias,
most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and clarity in substance and in language are
revered objectives in decision-making.

Having said that, we also lament the trial court's convoluted attempt at sophistry, which obviously
enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his imprisonment and to unnecessarily clog the dockets
of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honor's expressed desire "to accept with modesty the
orders and decisions of the appellate court" was, in truth and in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to
his veiled rejection of the superior court's order modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric
justification of his refusal to obey for fear of "being found to be grossly ignorant of the law" does not
deserve one whit of sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be blindfolded but she is neither
blind nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious argument from common
sense.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 127772       March 22, 2001

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP., respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
21, 19961 and of January 7, 1997,2 in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, which denied the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon.
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and the People of the
Philippines.3 Involved in said petition were the orders of Judge Jaime D. Discaya and Judge Tuason
dated October 25, 19954 and April 11, 1996,5 respectively, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-
62 which petitioner claimed were violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy but
which respondent appellate court upheld. 1âwphi1.nêt

The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of
public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the
offended party in both cases.

The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18,
1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases
were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and February 1993,
but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to
this Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto.

The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private
prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24,
1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the
hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on
September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence,
upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued the following order:

When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in Court despite
notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case
against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused
is entitled to a speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby dismissed. With
respect to accused Spouses Susensio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao,
1st warrant be issued for their arrest.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent
court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995.
The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:

In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme
Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e) lapse
without the party having his case tried. At least this right is relative, taking into (the)
account the circumstances of each case.

There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified

postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case, violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-
trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June
21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service
of the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995,
counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to private prosecutor's motion to
postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed
as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused were not
present. There were only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial
for the prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid
reasons.
 The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of
the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and
its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no double
jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1995 dismissing

the charge/case against the accused Roberto Almario is reconsidered and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his assailed Order of
April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 November

1995 is hereby denied for lack of merit considering that, based on the foregoing
facts, the proceedings in this case have not been prolonged unreasonably nor were
there oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in violation of the Accused's
constitutional right to speedy trial.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the People of the Philippines. In a resolution
dated November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied the petition due course and dismissed
it for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion to reconsider it was likewise denied for lack of merit in a
resolution dated January 7, 1997.

Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in
turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the
order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a
violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an
alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.7

The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had set in so that
petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had leaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
 of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

x       x       x

Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.8

In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made
upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the
accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal
case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will
not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. 9 Double jeopardy may attach when
the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial.10

Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that
violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled
that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 11 Both the
trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioner's case was terminated on
October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and
February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was
promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not immediately appointed,
nor another judge detailed to his sala. 1âwphi1.nêt

Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the private
prosecutor without objection from petitioner's counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset,
despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service of notice to
co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz. 12

As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the
control of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were clearly justified on
the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another was made without
objection from petitioner's counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel for petitioner moved
for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private prosecutor due to a severe attack of
gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the court. 13 All in all, there
were only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive events,
the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the
trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner, 14 which order the
appellate court later sustained.

That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the
appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial
and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as
there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of
time.15

There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we
concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's right to speedy trial had
not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was
no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably.16 For as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not transgressed,
this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused -
was not met. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence
made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said
order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244
SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,17 where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial
court predicated on the right to speedy trial -

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the
ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution
of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals
were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not
applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to
speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot
invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed reinstatement
of the cases against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated November
21, 1996 and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 107125       January 29, 2001

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of
homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil
aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner
Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and
Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan
with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
 That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816,
willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at
Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him
to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court,
showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they
(should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon.
The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to
(come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the
Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using
the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At
about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that afternoon,
(defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the
house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one
more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused
invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the
accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they
drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the
accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some
lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store
where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove
the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and
Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused.
The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika
Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when
they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve
the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to
avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the
road.

xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the
highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
 swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the
back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by
a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police
Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he
regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on
top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by
Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car.
Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased
died that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs. 2

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the
prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer
that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:

…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the
road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite
direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car
which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit
"1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car
was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin
and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they
were all brought for treatment.3

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal
Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.4

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial
court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed
that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and
damages.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas
spouses, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is

hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in
the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.5

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred,
Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least
twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m." 6 It found that petitioner's act of driving
while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section
(R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185
negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of
"because the mishap, which occurred, was the
regulation."9
53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
of the Civil Code, 8 a statutory presumption of
violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
precise injury sought to be prevented by the

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992
denied the motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:

FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE
JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON
THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.

SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD

DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH
THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS
WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION
SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT
HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to
his negligence or reckless imprudence?

(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?

(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester
doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings
of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his
civil liability. He argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was
the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for
indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put
him in "double jeopardy."

Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was
not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable
doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a
basis for awarding indemnity and damages. 1âwphi1.nêt

Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed
him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act ."10 When a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense. 11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
the first.12 In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became
immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly
show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order
the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore,
there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed in double
jeopardy is incorrect.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 14 The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code,16 where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two
actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in
evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve
the same act or omission. 17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's
acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from
looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the
criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He
concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.

Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment
of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or
imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt,
allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.

Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the
appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was
not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the
possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent
with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is
consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction." 18 The foregoing
clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and
a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and
indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for
damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that
the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988. 19 He avers that since Manchester held that "The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate
court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity
and damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask
us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July
1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the
promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by
the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was
not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the information,
the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees
for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of
the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal
actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. 20 As correctly pointed out
by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended
party be stated in the complaint or information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages.
 In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in
the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as
in this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual
damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the
filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal,
temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so
alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. 21 Recall that the information in Criminal Case
No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal
action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We
therefore find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid
and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its
resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 136258            October 10, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLOS FELICIANO, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

From being the subject of moral condemnation, the "Kiss of Judas" appears to attain a different
dimension in criminal procedure. Indeed, by entering into a "unholy" contract with an accused, so
that the latter might betray his partner in crime in exchange for an acquittal, the State demonstrates
how far its efforts could go to vindicate crime. That the State should agree to become a party to
setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should reward conduct from which an honorable
man would ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived necessity of such
kind of an arrangement in criminal procedure. 1 It is this doggedness of purpose on the part of the
State which herein accused-appellant, in one of his assignment of errors, decries —

"The trial court [has] erred in discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to be the state witness
against co-accused Carlos Feliciano despite strong objections from the defense." 2
The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a security guard detailed by the Atlantic Security
Agency at the Kingsmen building, also popularly known in the small community as the hub of four
disco pubs located on four floors of the edifice, in Kalibo, Aklan. He was assigned to the "Superstar"
disco pub and his duties ranged from refusing entry to dubious characters to making certain that no
customer would leave without first paying his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a security guard from another
agency, the Rheaza Security Agency, was stationed at the parking lot of the same building. In
keeping with the nocturnal business hours of the establishments at Kingsmen, the two security
guards would report for duty at 7:00 in the evening until the wee hours of the next morning or when
the last customer would have by then left the premises. In the early morning of 05 June 1995,
Feliciano and de la Cruz centrally figured in the investigation over the grisly death of an unidentified
woman whose body was found sprawled in Barangay New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.

Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby Barangay Buswang was big news to the small
community of Kalibo The radio news about an unidentified lifeless female lying in the Sampaton
Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie Ricarto. The dead woman, so described as wearing a
red jacket emblazoned with the words "El-Hassan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and maong pants, fit
the description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer, shared a stall with Teresita, a vendor of
spices, condiments and fruits, at the Yambing Building. Rosalie last saw Teresita on the afternoon of
04 June 1995. Teresita, who regularly went to twice a week to buy goods to sell, was scheduled to
leave the following morning of 05 June 1995. According to Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would
take the 2:00 a.m. trip to Iloilo, should already be back at Kalibo by about 4:00 p.m. of the same day.
But Teresita did not return that afternoon. Rosalie said that Teresita wore pieces of jewelry — a
necklace, a pair of earrings, a bracelet, four rings and a Seiko wristwatch — all of which, except for
the timepiece, were eventually recovered. Anna Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of Teresita, was
able to identify the bag recovered by Myca Banson from the crime scene, as well as all its t contents,
to be those belonging to her mother. Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were twelve P100.00
bills, seven P5.00 bills and the broken windshield of the tricycle owned by Ruben Barte. Turned over
to the police by the manager of the Superstar Disco Club was the sum of P1,000.00.

The autopsy report showed that whoever bludgeoned the hapless Teresita Fuentes to death had
used a blunt instrument, inflicting twelve different wounds on her head and face. The cause of death
was noted to be severe hemorrhage secondary to lacerated wounds and skull fracture.

On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano —

'That on or about the 5th day of June 1995, in the early morning, in Barangay New Buswang,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, while armed with a handgun, by means of force
and violence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away cash money in
the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine currency, more or less,
belonging to TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in
the aforesaid amount; that by reason or in the occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose
of enabling the accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and conspiring with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation and under the cover of
darkness, treacherously attack, assault and wound TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds, to wit:

1. Lacerated wound about 1¼ inches in length left chin.

 2. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower lip.

3. Fracture of the left mandible.

4. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and the left upper canine.

5. Lacerated wound about 1¼ inches in length and about 1½ in depth left face.

6. Punctured wound ½ in diameter and about 1½ inches in depth mid-portion base

nose bridge left.

7. Lacerated wound about 2 inches in length and about 1½ inches in depth left
cheek.

8. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear medially.

9. Lacerated wound about ½ inch in length left face near the left ear.

10. Lacerated wound about 1½ in length below the left eyebrow.

11. Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and about 5 inches in depth left
parietal.

12. Skull fracture occiput right.

"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of the Rural Health Unit, Kalibo, Aklan,
hereto attached and forming an integral part hereof which wounds directly caused the death
of said TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO.

"That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim suffered actual
and compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS." 3

The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify
against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the motion, Carlos
Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08 February 1996. The two accused entered a
plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution and the
name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith stricken off from the
Information.4

A detailed account of the incident presented at the trial by the prosecution was narrated by the Office
of the Solicitor General.

"In the early morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock, appellant went to the guard post of
Dela Cruz to tell the latter to assist him in going after a customer who did not pay the bill. It
was not the first time that they had to run after a non-paying customer. Dela Cruz thus
accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a tricycle from its driver, Ruben Barte,
who stayed behind. Appellant initially drove but about twenty meters past Kingsmen Building,
he asked Dela Cruz to take over while he stayed inside the passenger sidecar of the tricycle.
Somewhere between the Ceres and Libacao terminals, appellant alighted from the tricycle
after instructing Dela Cruz to stop and wait for him. Appellant subsequently informed Dela
Cruz that they shall wait there for the customer they were after. About a half hour later,
however, appellant decided to leave the place, apparently because the person he was
looking for was nowhere in sight. As they passed Banga, New Washington crossing, they
saw a woman walking alone. Appellant waved at her, giving Dela Cruz the impression that
they knew each other. Dela Cruz stopped the vehicle, as he was told by appellant, who then
jumped out. Drawing his service gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the neck and at
the same time poked his gun at her face. He dragged her towards the tricycle and ordered
her to board it. The woman would later be identified as Teresita Fuentes. Dela Cruz was
shocked with what appellant did and was at a loss on what to do. Still stricken with panic,
Dela Cruz asked appellant what was going on and said he was leaving as he did not want to
be part of whatever plans appellant had. Appellant retorted that Dela Cruz was already
involved. Dela Cruz was about to alight from the tricycle when appellant poked his gun at him
and ordered him to drive. Thinking that appellant was in a position to easily shoot him, Dela
Cruz did as he was ordered.

"Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive back to the public market. When they reached
the junction of Toting Reyes and Roxas Avenues, appellant told Dela Cruz to turn right at
Rizal Memorial College of Arts and Trade (RMCAT) They noticed at this point that another
tricycle, which came from the direction of Kingsmen Building, was following them. This
prompted appellant to order Dela Cruz to turn left at Magdalena Village instead and to drive
faster. During the ride, appellant held Fuentes, who was crouching, by her hair, pressing her
head down. He also kicked her and struck her head with the butt of his gun whenever she
struggled. Dela Cruz asked appellant to stop hurting Fuentes and to have pity but his
entreaties fell on deaf ears. Appellant even threatened to shoot Dela Cruz if he does not stop
complaining.

'When they reached New Buswang, they noticed that the other tricycle they saw earlier was
still trailing them by about 15 meters. As they approached Magdalena Village after passing
Camp Martelino, Fuentes struggled so appellant hit her again. Dela Cruz told appellant to
desist from striking her. Appellant did not take kindly to the unsolicited advice and fired his
gun in the air. Seeing an opportunity for escape, Dela Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle
towards Magdalena Village until the vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle was lifted from
its fallen state, Dela Cruz immediately jumped out of it and ran towards a feeder road leading
to the Cooperative Rural Bank. He was resting at the back of the bank for a few minutes
when appellant also arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his service firearm and
aimed it at appellant, demanding from the latter an explanation why he had to involve him
(Dela Cruz). With an assurance that he would own up the responsibility for everything that
had happened, appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After returning his service gun to
the holster, Dela Cruz headed back to the road. Behind him following was appellant. Then,
they saw Barte, from whom appellant rented the tricycle earlier, trying to start the engine
thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in the other tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael.
Appellant assured Barte that he will pay for all the damages of the rented tricycle.

"Meanwhile, Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building aboard Yael's tricycle to look for his
dancer girlfriend, Myka (or Mika) Banzon (or Vanson), but she was not there. Dela Cruz, with
Yael in his tricycle, were about to go to Banzon's boarding house when appellant
approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to Magdalena Village. Afraid of appellant,
Yael agreed. When they got there, particularly where Barte's tricycle turned over earlier,
appellant walked towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed him. Dela Cruz saw
appellant hitting Fuentes on the head with his gun. She was lying down face up, groaning.
Dela Cruz admonished and pushed appellant away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes.
Since he did not want to get involved further nor did he want to. see any more of what
appellant was up to, Dela Cruz walked back to the tricycle He took a last look back and saw
appellant getting something from the pocket of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of his
 chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with Dela Cruz and Yael as they were about to
leave and they all went back to Kingsmen Building.

"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the building and informed her that he was
going to bring her home already. She passed by the ladies' room while he stood watch
outside. Appellant arrived and told Dela Cruz and Banzon that they had to talk inside the
ladies' room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00 each, but they declined to
accept the money. Appellant threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows or
appellant will kill him and his family. When appellant insisted in giving the money, Dela Cruz
took it only to place it on the sink, then, he and Banzon left.

"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding house aboard Yael's tricycle when
appellant caught up with them again and ordered Yael to first take him to Ceres terminal. As
they passed the Tumbokan Memorial Hospital, they came across Barte driving his tricycle.
After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant gave him money. Dela Cruz and Banzon quickly
transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take appellant to the terminal. In the
course of the transfer to the other tricycle, appellant placed something inside the pocket of
Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he was in a hurry to go home. In Banzon's boarding
house, Dela Cruz found out that what appellant had put in his pocket was a blood-stained
necklace wrapped in a piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she found at the
place where Barte's tricycle turned turtle. Dela Cruz planned to return the necklace and the
bag the next day.

"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for work. Appellant asked him for the
necklace so that he could pawn it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give the necklace
back because in the morning of June 6, 1995, the police raided the boarding house of
Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his wallet where he placed the
necklace. The police invited Dela Cruz to the police station to shed light on what he knew
about a murder committed in Magdalena Village. The police had earlier confirmed an
anonymous call that a dead woman was found at New Buswang. Twelve 100-peso bills were
found at the scene, as well as a broken windshield that was traced to the tricycle rented by
Barte to appellant. The dead person was identified as Fuentes by her daughter, Analiza
Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz revealed everything that appellant had done. The police
asked Dela Cruz to go with them to Lalab, Bataan where appellant was arrested. Appellant
was then brought to the Kalibo Police Station for investigation." 5

Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the asseverations of state witness de la Cruz. He claimed
that the accusations were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility between
them due to work-related differences. An altercation arose between him and de la Cruz two months
before the incident, on 06 April 1995, when a customer had complained to the Kingsmen Building
manager that the toolbox of his tricycle, parked near the building, was missing. The manager then
ordered Feliciano to go to the parking lot and summon de la Cruz. Feliciano r reported back to say
that he did not find de la Cruz in his designated post, a fact that de la Cruz later resented. The next
incident happened the following month. On the evening of 01 May 1995, Myca Banson, the live-in
girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be "taken out" by a customer. Feliciano upon orders of the
management, refused de la Cruz entry within the premises of the pub house, in order to avoid any
possible trouble, which culminated in a physical tussle between the two men and ended with de la
Cruz aiming his gun at Feliciano. The third incident occurred when a motorcycle parked at the
Kingsmen parking lot could not be located and de la Cruz again was not at his post. Feliciano
reported the matter to the manager and, two days later, de la Cruz was fired from work. Feliciano
admitted having seen de la Cruz at about 9:30 on the evening of 04 June 1995 escorting Myca
Banson to the pubhouse. De la Cruz stayed at the billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while waiting for
Myca to finish work, often at 4:00 in the early morning of the next day. Feliciano said that he knew
Ramon Barte, the driver, being a habitue of the Kingsmen premises. It was Barte who would often
fetch Rodel de la Cruz and Myca Banson from work during early mornings.

The defense placed at the stand two additional witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette vendor
at the Ceres terminal, testified that on the late evening of 04 June 1995, de la Cruz went to see him
at the Ceres Terminal to inquire whether Teresita Fuentes had already arrived. Magsangya
responded in the negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking for Teresita four times that
night. Magsangya knew Teresita as being a biweekly passenger of the 2:00 a.m. bus for Iloilo and
de la Cruz as a security guard at Kingsmen where he would at times sell his wares. Jefferson Arafol,
a pahinante of Ideal Trucking, testified that at approximately 2:30 on the early morning of 05 June
1995, he and truck driver "Oca"," were transporting coconut lumber to Iloilo, when, at the vicinity of
Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle running at high speed, eventually overtaking them. Its fast
pace caused the vehicle to turn turtle. When Arafol approached, the tricycle diver, Rodel de la Cruz,
pointed a gun at him and told him not to come any closer. Arafol was acquainted with Rodel de la
Cruz and Carlos Feliciano because he frequented Kingsmen on Sundays after getting his salary.
The pahinante saw two more persons with de la Cruz, one male and the other female Arafol was
certain that the male companion of de la Cruz was not Carlos Feliciano. While de la Cruz was
pointing his gun at him, his male companion was dragging an unidentified woman towards the
nearby mango tree.

When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, found for the prosecution and
pronounced accused Carlos, Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and r sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death —

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO Y MARCELINO guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 x x x, with three aggravating
circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said accused the supreme penalty of
DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Teresita Fuentes the sum of P50,000.00.

"The caliber .38 revolver Squires Bingham with SN #14223 (Exhibit J) used by Feliciano is
hereby forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance
with law.

"Costs against the accused."6

In an automatic review before this tribunal, appellant Carlos Feliciano raised the following
assignment of errors —

"I.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE ACCUSED RODEL DE LA CRUZ TO BE

THE STATE WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED CARLOS FELICIANO DESPITE STRONG
OBJECTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE.

"II.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE WELL-REHEARSED TESTIMONY

OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"III

'THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR

THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM."7

The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far
from being the inculpable young man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant accomplice to
a gruesome crime. Several incidents militate against his innocence. The events, related by him,
make tenuous the purported threat and intimidation exerted by appellant over him.

The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and immediately after the crime could not be that of a
threatened, frightened man. If he indeed wanted to escape, he had in his possession his own service
gun, and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough advantage and chances to escape, if he
really wanted to, from Feliciano who was at that time engrossed at restraining a struggling victim. In
fact, it was de la Cruz who was caught in the possession of the dead woman's necklace. Another
damning evidence against de la Cruz was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie Jereza,
Chief of Intelligence of the Philippine National Police of Kalibo, Aklan, who, after taking the witness
stand for the prosecution, testified for the defense. The letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one
Roger R. Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security Agency, addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F.
Ingenerio of the Kalibo Police Station, to the effect that the detail order of Rodel de la Cruz to the
Kingsmen Disco pub had expired as of 31 May 1995. According to Zaradulla, de la Cruz was
nowhere to be found and his whereabouts were unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone
on AWOL without first surrendering to the agency the firearm issued to him, Zaradulla sought the
arrest of de la Cruz by the police.

The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state witness to mitigate his own culpability
did not adversely affect his discharge nor did it render completely weightless the evidentiary value of
his testimony.

The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the state 8 is
not a home grown innovation but is one with a long and interesting history. It has its origins in the
common law of ancient England where faithful performance of such an agreement with the Crown
could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a recommendation for executive clemency.
The practice, soon recognized through widespread statutory enactments in offer jurisdictions, finally
has found its way to our own criminal procedure in a short and compact military General Order No.
58 issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis placed by the new system on the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, on the requirement that the State must first
establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be called upon to defend
himself, and on the proscription against compelling an accused to be a witness against himself as
well as against drawing inferences of guilt from his silence. 9 Underlying the rule is the deep-lying
intent of the State not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused
who appears not to be the most guilty to testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more
guilty co accused. It is aimed at achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most
guilty and the greatest number among the accused for an offense committed. 10

In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the
conditions prescribed by the rules exist. 11 This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but rather a
sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct dispensation of
criminal justice.12 But that there would be the possibility of error on the part of the judge is
understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may develop in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the
complaint.13 If that were possible, the judge would conveniently rely on large part upon the
suggestion and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to the conclusion as to
the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the "availability
of other direct or corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused is the "most guilty," and
so the like.14 Then, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. 15 Thus, here, even while one
might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately
submitted, appear to be equally as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos
Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption of the
witness from punishment.

It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect
as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and
quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from
prosecution.16 A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is
equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging
on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in doubt jeopardy. The
rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill
his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can
be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense.

In US vs. de Guzman,17 one of the earlier cases discussing this issue, Justice Carson had occasion
to briefly touch on the immunity clauses in the Acts of the United States Congress and some States.
In Wisconsin, the immunity clause contained a proviso providing that persons committing perjury
when called upon to testify could be punished therefor. 18 Oklahoma law suffered from the absence of
any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson —

"x x x We have no such reservation in our constitutional provision; and, as before said, if we
should follow the precedents, when the witness does not speak the truth, the State would be
left without redress, although the witness had violated the purpose and spirit of the
constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the intelligent and justice-loving
people of Oklahoma, when they voted for the adoption of the constitution, to grant immunity
to any man, based upon a lie, or, in other words, that they intended that the commission of
perjury should atone for an offense already committed. It is a familiar rule of common law,
common sense, and common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We
therefore hold that the witness who claims immunity on account of self-incriminatory
testimony which he had been compelled to give must act in good faith with the State, and
must make truthful replies to the questions which are propounded to him, and which he had
been compelled to answer, and that any material concealment or suppression of the truth on
his part will deprive him of the immunity provided by the constitution; and the witness must
testify to something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This immunity is only granted
to those who earn it by testifying in good faith. In our judgment any other construction would
be an insult to and a libel upon the intelligence of the people of Oklahoma, an outrage on
law, and a prostitution of justice."19

Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de la
Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough
to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial
court. On significant points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant was
corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the incident, Feliciano hired his
vehicle and drove it himself while De la Cruz was seated on its passenger seat. When the two did
not return at the appointed time, Barte asked Ramon Yael, another tricycle driver who happened to
be at the Kingsmen parking area, to accompany him to look for them. Myca Banson decided to come
with them. After a while, the trio spotted Barte's tricycle being driven by de la Cruz, and followed it.
Barte testified how the first tricycle turned turtle at the junction towards Magdalena Village. When the
tricycle tilted, he saw a person in red falling from the vehicle, while another person who was in white,
lifted the first person. When the first tricycle precariously lurched, its occupants hurriedly abandoned
the vehicle. The obfuscating foliage, however, blocked his view so Barte was not able to identify who
was with appellant and de la Cruz nor ascertain where the two men were later headed. When the
three of them approached the overturned tricycle they found no one. Near the vehicle, they saw an
abandoned bag which Myca Banson hastily retrieved. While Barte struggled to turn his vehicle
upright, Myca left with Ramon Yael. Later, while riding his vehicle on his way back, Ruben Barte was
forced to stop because its engine stalled. While inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la
Cruz approached him, and the former told him not to worry as he would pay for the damages. After a
while, at the parking lot of the Kingsmen Building, appellant told him to take his vehicle to a dark
place where he wiped off the blood from the tricycle's seats. When they met again several hours
later, appellant gave him P450.00 for the damages sustained by the vehicle. Much later, Yael
handed him another P250.00 given by appellant as additional payment. Ruben Barte kept quiet
about the incident because appellant warned him against reporting the matter to anyone. Ramon
Yael corroborated the testimony of Barte, adding that while they were chasing appellant and de la
Cruz, one of the two fired a gun in the air, constraining them to decrease their speed. Militating
against the unbiased nature of the testimony of these two witnesses was their admission of having
willingly accepted the blood money which appellant gave them that could well qualify them as being
themselves accessories to the crime.20

Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently dispute his participation therein. Neither his
blanket denial nor his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was amply proved.

Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides —

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death [shall be imposed], when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson." (Emphasis
supplied.)

Given the evidence in this case, heretofore narrated, the Court is not convinced that the prosecution
has succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt any of the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information that can warrant the imposition of the maximum of the penalty prescribed
by law. Evidence is wanting that appellant has especially sought nighttime to perpetrate the crime or
that the criminal act has been preceded, required in evident premeditation, by cool thought and
reflection. Not only is treachery an aggravating circumstance merely applicable to crimes against
persons but neither also has the mode of attack on the victim of the robbery been shown to have
been consciously adopted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED except insofar as it imposed on
appellant Carlos Feliciano the penalty of death which is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C. J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago,
De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan and Panganiban, JJ., on official leave.
G.R. No. 124171            March 18, 2002

LETICIA R. MERCIALES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO
NUADA, PAT. EDWIN MORAL, ADONIS NIEVES, ERNESTO LOBETE, DOMIL GRAGEDA, and
RAMON "POL" FLORES, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341,
denying her petition to annul the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, 2 in
Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312, which dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on a
demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents, accused therein.

The antecedent facts as succinctly synthesized by the respondent court are as follows:
 On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310, 6311, and 6312, for rape
with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales, were filed
against the private respondents, Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves, Ernesto
Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol" Flores, before the Regional Trial Court, Fifth
Judicial Region, Legaspi City. The said cases were consolidated in Branch 8, presided over
by the respondent judge.

During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the
discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness.
However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present evidence to warrant
the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been admitted into the Witness
Protection Program of the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge
denied the motion for discharge, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence as
provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition 3 for certiorari [G.R. No. 113273-78]
before the Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the motion to
discharge the accused Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not contain a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, the trial judge did not set the case for further hearing so as to
give the prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining order from the Supreme
Court.

On July 13, 1994, herein private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing,
invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the motion,
and set the case for hearing on July 29, 1994.

On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting
further evidence. The respondent Judge postponed the hearing and reset the same for
August 9, 1994.

On August 9, 1994, again the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking its
pending petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The private respondents, thru counsel,
objected to any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of their right to a speedy
trial. The respondent judge called for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide whether or
not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to prove the due execution of the
accused Nuada's extrajudicial confession.

However, after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI agent, and
instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence. The defense then
moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence.

On August 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed [in G.R. No. 113273-78] a motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order with the Supreme
Court, to enjoin the respondent judge from proceeding with the resolution of the case.
However, on September 19, 1994, the motion was denied by the Supreme Court.

In due time, the accused filed their demurrer to evidence x x x.4

On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, all
the accused in all these cases are hereby ACQUITTED and the cases filed against them are
hereby DISMISSED. The accused in all these cases, being detention prisoners, are hereby
ordered RELEASED from detention, unless they are being detained for some other legal
cause.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said criminal cases, filed before
the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the foregoing Order of the trial court. However,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on October 4, 1995.

A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 6, 1996. Hence, the instant petition based on the
ground that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED

TO NULLIFY THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 21, 1994 OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR
BEING NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED
AND/OR COMMITTED INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO
PRESENT ALL THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF SUPPRESSING THEM APPARENTLY TO
FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE TO DUE PROCESS, OUSTING THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION. 6

The case was set for oral argument on December 11, 2001. Counsel for petitioner and the Solicitor
General appeared. During the oral argument, the Solicitor General manifested that he was joining
the cause of petitioner in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda in amplification of the points raised during the oral argument.

Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused's right to
double jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue
haste which attended the prosecution's premature resting and the trial court's grant of the demurrer
to evidence when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed.

Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum, arguing that petitioner, being the private
complainant in the criminal case below, has no legal standing to appeal the acquittal of private
respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant
either a petition for annulment of judgment or certiorari; and that the reopening of the criminal case
will violate the accused's right against double jeopardy.

It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a judgment of acquittal,
except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is concerned. 7 In the case at bar, we agree with
petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when the Solicitor General, in representation of the
People, changed his position and joined the cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 8

In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution, being the
mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court
which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they
cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.9
The criminal case below was for rape with homicide. Although the public prosecutor presented
seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the commission of the crime. It was only Joselito
Nuada, one of the accused, who came forward and expressed willingness to turn state witness. His
testimony was vital for the prosecution, as it would provide the only eyewitness account of the
accused's complicity in the crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor to present evidence
to justify Nuada's discharge as a state witness, but the latter insisted that there was no need for such
proof since Nuada had already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the
Department of Justice. The public prosecutor's obstinate refusal to present the required evidence
prompted the trial court to deny the motion to discharge Nuada.

The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the
accused moved to set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial
court granted the motion. The public prosecutor moved for a continuance, and the trial court
acceded. At the next scheduled hearing, however, the trial court denied a similar motion by the
prosecution in view of the objection of the accused. The trial court directed the public prosecutor to
present Atty. Carlos S. Caabay, the NBI Agent who took Nuada's extrajudicial confession. At the
resumption of the hearing, the public prosecutor declared that he was resting the prosecution's case,
knowing fully well that the evidence he has presented was not sufficient to convict the accused.
Consequently, the ensuing demurrer to evidence filed by the accused was granted by the trial court.

It is clear from the foregoing that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It is the
duty of the public prosecutor to bring the criminal proceedings for the punishment of the
guilty.10 Concomitant with this is the duty to pursue the prosecution of a criminal action and to
represent the public interest. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal x x x." As the representative of the State, the public prosecutor has
the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an accused. 11 If
the public prosecutor commits a nonfeasance in refusing to perform a specific duty imposed on him
by law, he can be compelled by an action for mandamus.12

In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient evidence to
convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused for the trial court to continue
hearing the case, he deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court
to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect
the interest of the offended parties. More specifically, the public prosecutor in this case was guilty of
blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended party. Indeed, the
family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales, could do nothing during the proceedings, having
entrusted the conduct of the case in the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do was
helplessly watch as the public prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on
their behalf, renege on that obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty.

Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9 (now Section 17) of the Rules of Court expressly requires the
presentation of evidence in support of the prosecution's prayer for the discharge of an accused to be
a state witness, viz:

When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, xxx xxx xxx.
By refusing to comply with the trial court's order to present evidence, the public prosecutor grossly
violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect
the interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial
court denied his motion to discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to
complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead, he willfully and deliberately
refused to present an available witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date
and time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to establish the guilt
of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against the injured party.

Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the
evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor
tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the
public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of
the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented. Given this circumstance, the trial
court, motu proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them
himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. 13

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not
only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases.
Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process
of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot
constitute a claim for double jeopardy.14

By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right
of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only
when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has
jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.

Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in
double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without
jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist.15

Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite,
that is, due process.16 In rendering the judgment of dismissal, the trial judge in this case acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent
to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 17 Indeed, "jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to
determine without hearing.18

Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts. 19 Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner before
the Court of Appeals was correct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 6307-6312 is ANNULLED, and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8, for further proceedings. The public prosecutor is ORDERED to complete the
presentation of all available witnesses for the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, and Mendoza, JJ., in the result.

THIRD DIVISION

[G. R. No. 143547. June 26, 2002

JOEY POTOT y SURIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LOLITO

DAPULAG, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

After the accused has filed with the trial court a manifestation that he is not appealing
its Decision convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to serve his sentence , can
the same court, upon motion by the private complainant with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and remand the records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing of
the corresponding charge? This is the issue raised in the instant petition for review on
certiorari.

Joey S. Potot, Petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. The information
against him, filed on December 12, 1999, alleges:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at about 3:00 o clock in the early
morning in the public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a knife locally called dipang, with deliberate intent to kill
and without justifiable cause, did then and there wifully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @ PILI with the use of said weapon which
the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Rodolfo
Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound which caused the death of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein the information was read to him in his
own dialect, Petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge. 2 Forthwith, he
invoked not only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the
circumstance of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he surrendered
voluntarily to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters immediately after the
commission of the crime. The public prosecutor did not raise any objection. Instead, he
manifested that there is no aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of
the crime.

Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied that petitioner understood the meaning
and consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its Decision 3 in open
court convicting him of homicide, with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court accepts the plea of guilty of Joey Potot y Sorio, and finds him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and appreciating in his favor
the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from two (2) years four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo Dapulag y Conge, also
known as Pili, in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.

The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
deducted in full from the foregoing sentences involving deprivation of liberty should the
records reveal that he expressly agreed in writing to abide by the same rules and
regulations governing convicted prisoner during his entire detention period and if the
records show that he is entitled to the privilege under the law.

SO ORDERED.4 cräläwvirtualibräry
On February 3, 2000, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a manifestation with
motion5 informing the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying
that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately serve his sentence.
Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he does not intend
to appeal from its Decision.6
cräläwvirtualibräry

However, on February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the
victim), filed through counsel, a motion for reconsideration/retrial 7 praying that the
Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because there were irregularities
committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice. The motion,
which bears the conformity of the public prosecutor, alleges, among others, that:

The true facts surrounding the commission of the crime as revealed by the
eyewitnesses, EDUARDO BOYSON and JIMUEL MARQUITA, on December 8, 1999 is that
RODOLFO DAPULAG, private offended partys deceased husband, was killed on that
fateful morning by accused JOEY POTOT with the aid of DOMING JARILLA and MARLITO
NAZAM who respectively held the right and left arm of Rodolfo Dapulag to ensure the
commission of the crime by accused Joey Potot.

This information was deliberately withheld by the said eyewitnesses, especially

EDUARDO BOYSON, during the investigation conducted by the police and the
preliminary investigations conducted by the presiding judge of MCTC of
Mondragon-San Roque and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor upon the
solicitations of Mayor Elito Dapulag, who in good faith believed that the inclusion of
Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam would make the prosecution of the case more
difficult. The eyewitnesses, who are likewise in the belief that indeed the
inclusion of the above-named persons would complicate the case, withheld the
said information until witness Jimuel Marquita revealed the same to the private
offended party on December 8, 1999.

xxx

The private offended party (not in her capacity as such, but as a citizen) has the right
to demand from the State the punishment of heinous crimes in accordance with law.
And such right is now in jeopardy of being lost for some causes not attributable to her.

xxx

Hereto attached and made integral parts hereof are the affidavits of eyewitnesses
JIMUEL MARQUITA and EDUARDO BOYSON. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner opposed8 the motion, asserting that there was no irregularity in the

preliminary investigation of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court; and
that the decision can no longer be modified or set aside because it became final when
he formally waived his right to appeal.

The trial court, in its order dated May 3, 2000, 9 granted private complainant's motion
and set aside its February 1, 2000 Decision as proceeding from a rigged, hence, sham
hearing. It likewise ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding
charge, thus:

From the records are gathered that the case, as originally referred to the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, was for murder. In the conduct of the preliminary investigation, said
court determined that a prima facie case exists and recommended the accused be held
for trial on the charge. In his resolution reviewing the records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the municipal court, the prosecutor entirely missed
discussion of the participation of two others allegedly in conspiracy with the
accused. The exclusion of the two others identified as Doming Jarilla and
Marlito Nazam was orchestrated by the Municipal Mayor who, in good faith,
prevailed upon the witnesses not to implicate them. To these foregoing, the
Provincial Prosecutor is in conformity.

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court shall remand the records hereof to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding
charge supported by the same. The motion or manifestation requesting for the issuance
of a commitment order filed by the defense is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 10 contending that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to issue the February 1, 2000 order as the Decision had become final, and
that the said order would place the accused in double jeopardy. In the order of May 26,
2000,11 the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration for the reason that the
State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence,
jeopardy does not attach.

Petitioner now assails the orders of May 3 and 26, 2000.

The Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that the challenged orders should be set
aside and that the February 1, 2000 Decision should be reinstated. 12

We find the petition meritorious.

Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the

accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphasis ours)

It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a
judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final
or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following
ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of
automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; 13 (b) when he has
partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal
the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for
probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered
the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. 14
cräläwvirtualibräry

It is an undisputed fact that on February 3, 2000, or three days after the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his
right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further indicated by his prayer
in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of a commitment order so he
could serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to
become final and unalterable.15 Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to
issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its February 3, 2000 Decision which had
attained finality.

In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City 16 and in a long line of cases, this Court
(En Banc)  held that a judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes
immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.

It is likewise procedurally impermissible for the trial court to grant private

complainant's motion for reconsideration of its Decision. Section 1, Rule 121 of the
same Rules provides:

SECTION 1. New trial or reconsideration. - At any time before a judgment

of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its
own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration. (1a) (Emphasis ours)

Since the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by
the accused (petitioner) or at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the same
should have been denied outright as being violative of the above provision.

At any rate, the records do not show any irregularity in the preliminary investigation of
the case before the Provincial Prosecutors Office. The motion for reconsideration filed
by the private complainant questions the (1) alleged failure of the Provincial Prosecutor
to appreciate the sworn statements of two prosecution witnesses implicating two other
individuals in the commission of the crime; and the (2) downgrading by the Provincial
Prosecutor of the initial charge of murder to homicide. But the motion for
reconsideration itself reveals that the supposed vital information from two witnesses
implicating two other persons in the crime was deliberately withheld by the said
witnesses during the police investigation and the preliminary investigation conducted
by the MCTC Judge and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Hence, the Provincial
Prosecutor who reviewed the records could not have possibly appreciated the alleged
vital facts. Besides, the complainant did not appeal from the Provincial Prosecutors
finding of probable cause for the crime of homicide against petitioner. It bears stressing
at this point that the public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial prerogative to determine
what crime should be filed in court and who should be charged therefor. He always
assumes and retains full discretion and control of the prosecution of all criminal
actions.17 As held by this Court in People vs. Vergara:18
cräläwvirtualibräry
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that
[a]ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. It must be remembered
that as public prosecutor he is the representative not of the ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. Hence, the fiscal or public
prosecutor always assumes and retains full direction and control of the
prosecution of the case. The institution of a criminal action depends upon his
sound discretion. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court; whether a prima facie case exists
to sustain the filing of an Information; whether to include in the charge those
who appear to be responsible for the crime; whether to present such evidence
which he may consider necessary. (Emphasis ours)

Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. 19 Such right prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety
of a second charge against him for the same offense. 20 cräläwvirtualibräry

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1)
a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 21 cräläwvirtualibräry

These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial court
which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On
the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As
petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged.22
cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated May
3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued in Criminal Case No. 2739 by the trial court are
SETASIDE. Its Decision dated February 1, 2000 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 141518            April 29, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CLARENCE ASTUDILLO, CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias "ANTENG" or "ENTENG", HILARIO
ASTUDILLO, alias "BODA", appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 1698, convicting appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario
Astudillo of the crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and
ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino,
Jr.

The Information filed against the appellants reads:

That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening at Zone 7,
Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed
with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter, the accused rode on
an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they
used in escaping from the crime scene.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded not guilty. 3 Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.

The prosecution's account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At around 7:00 p.m., of November
12, 1995, brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto Damian who
was celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the victim,
Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to go with him. 4 Silvestre acceded and the two walked
towards Floras' Store, where they were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store,
Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument.5

At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years
of age, respectively, were selling balut in front of Floras' Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre
with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows
at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell to the ground. Thereafter, the three
appellants fled on board a tricycle.6
Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced
dead on arrival. The Autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Milagros Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the
victim sustained 15 stab wounds and 1 abrasion, as follows:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Stab wound 2 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, neck, [r]ight
Stab wound #2, penetrating 3 cm., each. Antero-lateral aspect, neck, left
[2 cm.], penetrating …, 3rd Intercostal space, paresternal area,
left
2 cm., 7th mid axillary line, left
1.5 cm., anterior superior iliac spine, left
1.5 cm., upper outer quadrant, left
1.5 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, middle third thigh, left
2.0 cm., infrascapular area, left
3.0 cm., dorsolateral aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2 cm., dorsomidial aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2.0 cm., suprascapular area, right
1.5 cm., infrascapular area, paravertebral area, right
1.5 cm., paravertebral area, right
2.5 cm., Level of T8, midscapular area, right
#2, 1.5-2.0 cm., lumbar area, paravertebral area, right
Abrasion #2 1.0 – 2.0 cm., Level T7, paravertebral area, left and right
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Pericardium, 1.5 liter
LW, Right atrium traversing the right ventricle Hemothorax, left
1 liter
LW, 1.0 cm., posterior lobe, lung left
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound. 7

On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On November 12, 1995 at around 7:00
p.m., Clarence passed by the house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others were
playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which he declined. Silvestre got
embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to leave the house. However, Silvestre followed him in
front of Floras' Store and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre struck
him on the head and arm with an empty one-liter softdrink bottle. 8

Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter attacked him. As he retreated, he saw a
knife which he then swung at the victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left with no
choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed
to the succor of his elder brother, Clarence. 9 Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from shock and remained
seated on the ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the roadside and called for
help.10 The appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house of Clarence's in-
laws. On the same night, they surrendered to the Philippine National Police, stationed at Bangued,
Abra.11
On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the crime of Murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength. 12 Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged in the information,
cannot be appreciated against them. 13 Appellants' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
dated July 13, 1998. 14 However, an Amended Decision 15 was rendered where the phrase "abuse of
superior strength" was replaced with "TREACHERY" in the body of the Decision and in the decretal
portion thereof, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep Act
No. 7659, qualified by TREACHERY AND for having conspired together and helping one
another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle, [which is] however, offset by the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amount of P65,288.50 [as] actual
damages, P50,000.00 for his death and suffering plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and
exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT ACQUIT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF MURDER.

THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND DECISION
DATED JULY 10, 1998.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM PENALTY. 17

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. The settled rule is that
the matter of assigning value to a declaration on the witness stand is more competently performed
by a trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the witnesses' demeanor,
conduct, and behavior while testifying. In the absence of a clear showing that some fact or
circumstance of weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, the trial
judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies shall not be disturbed on appeal.

A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not miss any such
material circumstance, nor did it commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as established by
the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, that the appellants ganged up on the
defenseless victim. These witnesses were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely
testify against the appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 18

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their
affidavit are too inconsequential to merit consideration. Specifically, appellants point to the failure of
Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn statement that appellants Crisanto and Hilario restrained the
victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well as the alleged unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny
Bareng with the Ilocano words "bagsol" and "binagsol" (which mean stab and stabbed, respectively),
in his sworn statement. Suffice it to state that inconsistencies between the sworn statement and
direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being
taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are
much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually being incomplete
and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for
want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not
prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's
statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the
prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements. This is especially so because their testimony to the effect that Crisanto and
Hilario held the victim's wrists while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even under cross-
examination.19

The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' self-defense theory. When an accused invokes self-
defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on him to
prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused.20

In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of aggression came from the deceased, still
the appellants' plea of self-defense will not prosper. As stated above, the evidence overwhelmingly
shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able to restrain the victim by the wrists. At that point,
any unlawful aggression or danger on the lives of the appellants ceased, hence, it was no longer
necessary for appellant Clarence to repeatedly stab the victim. Verily, their act could no longer be
interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill. 21 Furthermore, the number of
wounds sustained by the victim negates self-defense. It certainly defies reason why the victim
sustained a total of 15 wounds on the different parts of his body if appellants were only defending
themselves. Parenthetically, the number of wounds was eloquently established by the physical
evidence, which is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.22

From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that appellants' collective and individual act of
holding the victim's wrists and delivering several stab blows demonstrated the existence of their
common design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be
inferred from the acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a
common intent or design to commit a crime.23

Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants' contention that the
trial cannot validly appreciate the same in its amended decision because the attendance of treachery
was not one of the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants
posit that the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be limited only to the issues
raised in their motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence and/or the propriety of
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of "abuse of superior strength" which was not alleged in the
information.

Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, 24 a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court,
with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, 25 a judgment of conviction
may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused. 26 These provisions changed the
previous rulings27 of the Court to the effect that such modification may be made upon motion of the
fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an appeal has been
perfected.28 The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification
is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or
penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. 29 Accordingly, once the judgment
has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial
error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous
comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in
the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for
reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.30

It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may
be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion
for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived
his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion.31 His motion gives the court an opportunity to
rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them
conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. 32 The raison
d'etre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals
from being taken.33 In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of
the accused renders the entire evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however,
conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.

Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment of
conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to
acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the
defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open for the review
of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in the case at bar
was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser offense
of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength which was not alleged in the information. Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but
also under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength instead of treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a
qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information did not allege such facts. 34 Even before the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure35 took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances
were required to be so specified in the complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be
appreciated against the accused.

In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the employment
of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from
defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender. 36 Here, it is clear that treachery qualified the killing of the
deceased to murder, considering that the appellants deliberately restrained the victim so as to
enable one of them to successfully deliver the stab blows without giving the latter a chance to defend
himself or to retaliate.
As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the trial court erred in
appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately
used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime could not have
been committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use thereof was
merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to
render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. 37

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated in favor of appellants.
To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture.38

In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of the
incident when they learned that the authorities were looking for them. 39 Though they did not give a
statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
nonetheless be considered in their favor. What matters is that they spontaneously, voluntarily and
unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law
indicates a moral disposition favorable to their reform. 40

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellants, in
accordance with Article 63 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which
is reclusion perpetua.41

With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the award of moral and exemplary damages cannot
be lumped together as was done by the trial court. These kinds of damages are different in nature,
and require separate determination. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the felonious act. 42 The award of
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In People v. Catubig,43 we
explained:

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
 should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 44

As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death of her husband brought grief and emotional
suffering to their family. 45 Hence, they are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
pursuant to current jurisprudence.46 Likewise, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery in the killing of the deceased justifies the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 47

The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order that actual damages may be
recovered, the amount actually expended in connection with the death of the victim must be
substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the instant case, the records show that the amount of
P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court as actual damages is not fully substantiated by
receipts.48 However, as the heirs of the deceased actually incurred funeral expenses, they are
entitled to temperate damages. 49 In the recent case of People v. Abrazaldo,50 we ruled that where the
amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of absence or lack of receipts to prove
the amount claimed, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded.

Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil
indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact
of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's responsibility therefor. 51

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued,
Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo
@ "Anteng" or "Enteng", and Hilario Astudillo @ "Boda", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the civil liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to
pay the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 172716               November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite
the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus,
without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case
from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because
his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal
of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366
for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief
in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by
the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of
his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals
to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition
contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of
death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the
Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the
30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of
his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the
order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not
disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is
an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
 lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem
proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of
a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a
modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic
rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges
for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in
1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species
of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions
for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act
upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay 30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova,
J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where,
in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was
based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court
of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea
of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal
Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless
act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries.
Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the
trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence
arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without
the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal
complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision
one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner
of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of
these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted
of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by
the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief
of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners
of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay
after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand,
the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading
double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of
double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and
vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits
that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the
order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga
case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated
the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669,
April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under
either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of
the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article
365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue
of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC
has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is
prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because
there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one
of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light
offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects
of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty
for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for
the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime
by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize
a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the
Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the
application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line
of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article
365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall
be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2

May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice