Professional Documents
Culture Documents
10 1080@1554477x 2012 694779
10 1080@1554477x 2012 694779
JOHN HÖGSTRÖM
Mid Sweden University, Östersund, Sweden
The author thanks the four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on a
previous draft of this article.
Address correspondence to John Högström, Department of Social Sciences, Mid Sweden
University, Kunskapensväg 1, Building P, 83125 Östersund, Sweden. E-mail: john.hogstrom@
miun.se
263
264 J. Högström
INTRODUCTION
EARLIER RESEARCH
RESEARCH DESIGN
H1: The geographic region to which a country belongs affects the level of
women’s representation in national politics. It is expected that Scandinavia
will show a greater female representation in national politics than other
regions.
H2: The dominant religion of a country affects women’s representation in
national politics. It is expected that countries with Protestantism as a
dominating religion will have higher female representation in national
politics.
H3: Level of economic development (gross domestic product [GDP] per
capita) affects women’s representation in national politics. It is expected
that countries with higher levels of economic development will show
greater female representation in national politics.
H4: The length of democracy experience affects women’s representation
in national politics. It is expected that “old” democracies will have a
Women’s Representation in National Politics 267
There are no strong theoretical arguments for including quotas (H6) and elec-
toral systems (H7) as independent variables when the dependent variable
is women’s representation in national politics. However, previous research
has found that electoral systems and quotas affect women’s representa-
tion in parliaments. As a result, I theorize that a proportional system will
also have a positive contagion effect on women’s representation in gov-
ernments. Similarly, I also theorize that the use of quotas for increasing
women’s representation in parliaments will also have a contagion positive
effect on women’s representation in governments. According to these the-
oretical assumptions, electoral systems and quotas should affect women’s
representation in national politics. I use quantitative empirical analyses to
test these hypotheses. I test H1 through H7 using a number of indepen-
dent variables, and I test H8 with a bivariate correlation analysis. I consider
the explanatory power and the level of statistical significance when the
hypotheses are confirmed or rejected.
Selection of Cases
Many earlier studies examining women’s representation in politics either
have included Western industrial democracies or have featured large num-
bers of democratic countries and nondemocratic countries. This research
studies the democratic countries of the world, and its purpose is to include
as many democracies as possible, not only industrialized democracies. I use
the Freedom House definition for free country, which follows, as a defini-
tion for democracy: “A free country is one where there is broad scope for
open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant
268 J. Högström
Method/Statistical Analyses
The empirical section starts by analyzing the new combined measure,
women’s representation in national politics, using a correlation analysis
between women’s representation in parliaments and women’s represen-
tation in governments. The empirical section then continues with simple
regressions and controls for whether there are some statistically significant
relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables.
A p value less than 0.10 is accepted as statistically significant evidence in
the simple regressions. The independent variables that achieve a statisti-
cally significant relationship to the dependent variable are then used in the
multivariate analyses. The multivariate regressions will depart from the inde-
pendent variable that achieved the highest statistical significance and highest
explanatory power in simple regressions. I use the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method when I run the regression models.
Dependent Variable
In this study, the dependent variable consists of the percentage of
women’s representation in democratic countries’ national politics in 2008.
Women’s Representation in National Politics 269
Independent Variables
Seven independent variables are included in this study. The independent
variables consist of two political culture variables (region and dominating
religion), two political institutional variables (electoral system and quotas),
one economic development variable (GDP per capita) and two historical vari-
ables (women’s suffrage and old/new democracies). In terms of the region
variable, I follow some previous research (Kenworthy and Malami 1999;
Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Tripp and Kang 2008) and sep-
arate Scandinavia from the rest of Western Europe because of its specific
political culture (Paxton and Hughes 2007, 222–23). Due to their particu-
lar political culture, Scandinavian countries traditionally display high gender
equality when compared with other countries.2 The variable region is divided
into eight different categories: Scandinavia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
Africa, Asia, South America, North and Central America, and Oceania. In the
analyses, the regions are measured through eight dummy variables. The
Scandinavian region is used as the baseline variable.
The independent variable dominating religion is divided into four dif-
ferent categories: (1) countries that do not have any dominating religion;
(2) countries with Protestantism as the dominating religion; (3) countries with
Catholicism as the dominating religion; and (4) countries with a dominating
religion other than Protestantism or Catholicism. These categories are then
applied in regression models in four different dummies, where the dummy
for Protestantism is used as the baseline variable. Dominating religion is the
religion that 50% or more of a country’s population worships. Other dominat-
ing religions, such as Islam, Judaism, Shintoism/Buddhism, and Hinduism,
dominate in only a few democratic countries. To avoid making the regression
too complex, I combine these countries into one category.
Previous research (Caul 1999; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Paxton 1997;
Tripp and Kang 2008) coded the electoral system as a dummy variable. In the
recent time period, there are 12 democratic countries that use a mixed elec-
toral system. As a result, the independent variable electoral system is divided
into three categories: proportional systems, mixed systems, and majority
systems (first-past-the-post, alternative vote, two-round systems). In the anal-
yses, electoral system is measured through three dummies, and proportional
systems are used as a baseline variable.
The independent variable quota has been divided into three different
categories:3 (1) countries that do not use legislative quotas or voluntary party
quotas for women; (2) countries where one or several parties that are rep-
resented in the parliament use voluntary party quotas; and (3) countries that
use legislative quotas. Denmark and Ghana are not coded as having quotas
270 J. Högström
because they abolished their previously used quotas. These categories are
applied in the regression models using three different dummies, where the
dummy for no use of quotas is used as the baseline variable. To measure
economic development, I use GDP per capita for each of the countries. GDP
per capita is in thousands of US dollars.
Earlier research has shown that historical variables can explain some
of the variation of women’s representation in parliaments and governments.
For example, the length of time that women have had political rights has
a certain explanatory power for the proportion of women’s representation;
one indicator which has been used is the period of time that women have
had the right to vote, and another indicator which had been used is the
number of years women have had the right to run for office. In this research
I include women’s suffrage as an independent variable, and the variable
consists of the number of years prior to 2007 that women had voting rights
in national elections. However, I suggest it is not the period of time women
have had the right to vote or the number of years women have had the
right to run for office that has the main explanatory power for the historical
variables; rather, how long these various countries have been democratic is
of more importance to the degree of women’s representation. This suggests
countries which have been democratic for a longer period of time would
have a higher percentage of women in parliaments and governments than
would countries which have been democratic for a shorter period of time.
For certain countries, the advent of democracy concurs with the introduction
of women’s right to vote.
I adopt a wide classification of old and new democracies from Samuel
P. Huntington’s (1991) concepts of waves of democratization described in
his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
I classify countries that are included in the two first democratization waves
(1828–1974), which democratized before 1974, as old democracies. Countries
democratized during the third democratization wave and later (1974 and on)
are classified as new democracies. This independent variable is applied in
the regression analyses as a dummy variable where new democracies are
given the value zero and old democracies are given the value one. In the
appendix, databases from which materials were acquired are named.
RESULTS
The first part of this empirical section examines the correlation between
women’s representation in parliaments and women’s representation in gov-
ernments. As Figure 1 shows, there is a relatively strong, positive correlation
between women’s representation in parliaments and women’s representa-
tion in governments (r = 0.665, p = 0.000). This correlation is in accordance
with the correlation (r = 0.693) found in Siaroff’s (2000) study. This scenario
Women’s Representation in National Politics 271
countries with the highest and the lowest female representation in national
politics in 2008.
The results displayed in Table 1 show that Finland, with a value of
49.70%, is the country with the highest proportion of women in national
politics among the democratic countries of the world. There are three addi-
tional countries with a female representation in national politics of more than
40%: Sweden (47.30%), Norway (45.85%), and Spain (40.20%). Accordingly,
three of the Nordic countries have the highest level of female representation
in national politics. The countries with the lowest levels of female represen-
tation in national politics, as mentioned, are Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu, with
0.00% female representation. It is of note that the three countries with the
lowest levels of female representation among democratic states in the world
belong to the same region, Oceania.
This empirical section concerning women’s representation in national
politics continues with simple regressions. Table 2 presents the results of
regression analyses where each of the seven independent variables is related
to the dependent variable, women’s representation in national politics.
As the results in Table 2 show, all seven independent variables achieve
a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The
political culture variable for region is the independent variable that achieves
the highest level of statistical significance and the highest explanatory power
in simple regressions, followed by GDP per capita and electoral system. The
next step is to test the independent variables’ statistical relationship with
the dependent variable in multivariate analyses, holding the other variables
constant.
The multivariate models depart from the independent variable region,
which was the variable that achieved the highest explanatory power in sim-
ple regressions. The first model consists of the region dummies and the other
culture variable, dominating religion. The second model adds the politi-
cal institutional variables for electoral system and quotas with the region
dummies. The third model consists of the Region dummies and the two his-
torical variables, women’s suffrage and old/new democracies. In the fourth
model, the socioeconomic variable for GDP per capita is added together
with the region dummies. In the fifth, and last, model, the region dummies
are dropped, and the model consists of the other independent variables
(dominating religion, electoral system, quotas, women’s suffrage, old/new
democracies, and GDP per capita). VIF statistics indicated that the models
do not have any problems with multicollinearity. (The highest VIF value for
a dummy variable was 6.80 and for a quantitative variable 2.52). Table 3
shows the results of the five models examining women’s representation in
national politics.
As Table 3 shows, models 1 through 5 explain between 31.5% and 44.9%
of the variation in the dependent variable. In models 1 through 4, all the
region dummies are statistically significant and negative, which indicates that
Scandinavia has a higher female representation in national politics compared
with other regions when controlling for other variables. The results from
models 1 through 4 show that dominating religion, electoral system, quotas,
women’s suffrage, old/new democracies, and GDP per capita do not have a
statistically significant relationship with women’s representation in national
politics when controlling for geographic region.
In the fifth and final model, where the region dummies are dropped, the
dummy variable for another dominating religion other than Protestantism or
Catholicism achieves statistically significant relationship with women’s rep-
resentation in national politics. The coefficient is negative (−11.248), which
indicates that countries with a dominating religion other than Protestantism
or Catholicism have 11.25% less female representation in national politics
than countries with Protestantism as dominating religion, when controlling
for the other variables in model 5. The dummies for countries without
dominating religion and countries with Catholicism as dominating religion
achieve no statistical significant relationship with the dependent variable.
The coefficient for majority system is negative (−9.513), as expected, and the
coefficient achieves statistical significance. The findings indicate that majority
system affects women’s representation in national politics negatively when
compared with proportional system even when controlling for dominating
TABLE 3 Multivariate Regressions, Women’s Representation in National Politics
Constant 43.020∗∗∗ (3.673) 41.653∗∗∗ (3.868) 33.086∗∗∗ (5.917) 36.993∗∗∗ (5.156) 23.207∗∗∗ (4.696)
Western Europe −21.801∗∗∗ (5.604) −18.923∗∗∗ (4.190) −15.164∗∗∗ (4.303) −17.865∗∗∗ (4.117)
Eastern Europe −27.208∗∗∗ (5.798) −25.429∗∗∗ (4.376) −20.746∗∗∗ (4.862) −21.329∗∗∗ (4.812)
Africa −24.306∗∗∗ (5.604) −20.197∗∗∗ (4.591) −15.359∗∗∗ (5.155) −16.659∗∗∗ (5.422)
Asia −31.346∗∗∗ (6.850) −30.580∗∗∗ (5.545) −27.811∗∗∗ (5.347) −28.444∗∗∗ (5.521)
South America −23.305∗∗∗ (6.235) −20.470∗∗∗ (5.092) −14.652∗∗∗ (5.388) −15.135∗∗∗ (5.625)
North and Central America −25.419∗∗∗ (5.196) −19.668∗∗∗ (4.859) −18.598∗∗∗ (4.504) −18.594∗∗∗ (4.862)
Oceania −36.029∗∗∗ (5.408) −28.153∗∗∗ (5.294) −27.802∗∗∗ (4.962) −28.416∗∗∗ (5.290)
No dominant religion 3.611 (3.866) −4.930 (3.391)
Catholicism 3.734 (3.939) −5.127 (3.633)
Another dominant religion −1.395 (4.853) −11.248∗∗ (4.227)
Majority systems −4.375 (2.979) −9.513∗∗∗ (2.767)
274
Mixed systems 1.148 (2.890) −1.847 (2.996)
Voluntary quota 2.279 (2.222) 1.482 (2.589)
Legislative quota 2.933 (2.946) 2.027 (3.317)
Women’s suffrage 0.073 (.055) 0.049 (.054)
Old/new democracies 2.972 (2.557) 5.707∗ (3.222)
GDP/capita 0.147 (.089) 0.006 (.101)
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
1. Andrew Reynolds (1999) and Alan Siaroff (2000) produced two studies that deal with women’s
representation in parliaments and in governments. Rebecca Howard Davis (1997) produced a study that
deals with women’s representation in governments.
2. In this study, Scandinavia refers to the Nordic countries: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark,
and Iceland.
3. None of the countries included in this research uses quotas as reserved seats.
4. The mean for women’s representation in governments is 22.73%, and the mean for women’s
representation in parliaments is 18.79%.
REFERENCES
———. 2001. “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A
Cross National Analysis.” Journal of Politics 63(4): 1214–29.
Dahlerup, Drude, ed. 2006. Women, Quotas, and Politics. New York: Routledge.
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2005. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to
Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia Is no Longer the Model.”
International Feminist Journal of Politics 7(1): 26–48.
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2008. Kvotering. Stockholm, Sweden: SNS
Förlag.
Davis, Rebecca Howard. 1997. Women and Power in Parliamentary Democracies:
Cabinet Appointments in Western Europe, 1968–1992. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace.
1995. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. September 15, Beijing,
China. http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/BEIJIN_E.
PDF (January 29, 2009).
Hughes, M. Melanie, and Pamela Paxton. 2008. “Continuous Change, Episodes,
and Critical Periods: A Framework for Understanding Women’s Political
Representation over Time.” Politics and Gender 4(2): 233–64.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. “Gender Inequality in Political
Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis. ”Social Forces 78(1):
235–68.
Matland, Richard. 1993. “Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in
National Legislatures: The Case of Norway.” Journal of Politics 55(3): 737–55.
Matland, Richard E. 1998. “Women’s Representation in National Legislatures:
Developed and Developing Countries.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(1):
109–25.
Matland, Richard E., and Donley T. Studlar. 1996. “The Contagion of Women
Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral
Systems: Canada and Norway.” Journal of Politics 58(3): 707–33.
McAllister, Ian, and Donley T. Studlar. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Women’s
Representation: A Long-Term Perspective.” Representation 39(1): 3–14.
Paxton, Pamela. 1997. “Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Analysis.”
Social Science Research 26(4): 442–64.
Paxton Pamela, and M. Melanie Hughes. 2007. Women, Politics, and Power: A Global
Perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Paxton, Pamela, and Sheri Kunovich. 2003. “Women’s Political Representation: The
Importance of Ideology.” Social Forces 82(1): 87–114.
Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. “Women in Legislatures and Executives of the World:
Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling.” World Politics 51(4): 547–72.
Rosenbluth, Frances, Rob Salmond, and Michael F. Thies. 2006. “Welfare Works:
Explaining Female Legislative Representation.” Politics and Gender 2(2):
165–92.
Rule, Wilma. 1981. “Why Women Don’t Run: The Critical Factors in Women’s
Legislative Recruitment.” Western Political Quarterly 34(1): 60–77.
———. 1987. “Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women’s Opportunity
for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies.” Western Political
Quarterly 40(3): 477–98.
278 J. Högström
Dominating Religion
Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. “Central Intelligence Agency: The
World Factbook 2008.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook (January 29, 2009). CIA World Factbook available to down-
load from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-
2008/index.html
Electoral Systems
Lundell, Krister, and Lauri Karvonen. 2005. A Comparative Data Set on
Political Institutions—An Update. Department of Political Science, Åbo
Akademi University, Occasional Papers Series. Nr 28/2008.
Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis, eds. 2005. Electoral
System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, Sweden:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
Old/New Democracies
Freedom House. 2009. “Freedom House: Freedom in the World.” http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (January 29, 2009).
Quotas
Quota Project. 2009. “Global Database of Quotas for Women.” http://www.
quotaproject.org (January 23, 2009).
Region
Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. “Central Intelligence Agency: The
World Factbook 2008.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook (January 29, 2009). CIA World Factbook is available to down-
load from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-
2008/index.html
Women’s Suffrage
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). 2009. “Women’s Suffrage.” http://www.ipu.
org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm (January 23, 2009).
Copyright of Journal of Women, Politics & Policy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may
not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.