Security Journal

What is Security?

Giovanni Manunta1

This paper discusses the need for, and the possibility of, a shared definition of
security. This is done by investigating the concept of security in the areas of
international relations, crime prevention, risk management, and loss prevention.
In particular, it discusses to what extent a common framework of understanding
can be applied to investigate the concept in the different areas. One is offered for
analysis and discussion.

Key Words: Security; international relations; national security;

crime prevention; risk management; loss prevention

Introduction

It is obvious that, in the absence of agreed definitions, the concept of security means different
things to different people in different contexts.2 Starting from different premises and having
different visions and expectations, different paradigms are derived from the perception, study
and analysis of a security problem, leading to different solutions.3 Such a complicated situation
makes an answer to the question ‘What is security?’ extremely hard to provide, not least because
of the divergence of interests involved. This unfortunate predicament opens problems of
methodology and justification, which the need of measuring performance, investigating blame
and attributing responsibility makes it imperative to address.4 Security methodology, decisions,
measures and performances have no meaning in the absence of a definition of security.

This urgent need for clarification, which is felt by many in the profession, does not seem
particularly compelling in academia. A number of scholars seem quite happy to discuss
‘security’ without defining it, some of them assuming that the concept of security is ‘in the
eye of the beholder’, being as wide and indefinite as that of poverty, beauty or happiness.5
The author disagrees. This article demonstrates that there is both a need for and a possibility
of a definition of security that encompasses the generality of the contexts, so as to assist the
interpretation of the existing divergences. After a general discussion on the reasons why a
definition is considered essential to both the understanding and practice of security, one is
offered. This is applied to analyse the different positions on security in different contexts
(international relations, crime prevention, risk management, and loss prevention), with a view
to providing a basis for research and discussion.

The need for a definition of security

The opinion that security cannot be defined because of its multidimensionality cannot be
accepted in academia, in court, or in the field. As Socrates demonstrated 2,400 years ago, if
terms have no common meaning, it is impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood.6 Precision

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of language is essential to convey common meaning and knowledge in all fields of study;
Locke, Frege, and Wittgenstein have proved it possible by means of formal logic, precise
definitions and well-articulated sentences. Governments, top models and psychologists give
daily evidence that a definition of poverty, beauty, and happiness is feasible, and even fuzzy
logic suggests some sort of measurement of their quality. Why this feat should be considered
impossible in security matters is not immediately obvious, as it affects communication,
exchange of knowledge, and judgement amongst those who have made a profession of studying,
teaching, assessing, and operating security. If the concept of security has different meanings,
how could people work effectively at the same problem? How could it be judged, for example,
whether ‘someone, or something, is secure or not’? How could a particular case or situation
be assessed and performance measured? How could essential matters such as liability and
responsibility be decided? Without having first clarified this premise, no scholar, professional
or practitioner is entitled to claim the validity of his/her proposals, unless he asks for an act of
faith in his own judgement. This point is essential to those concerned with truth, knowledge,
ethics, responsibility and performance. A subjective definition of security may serve the interests
of power, aggression and blame, as it makes it possible to invoke the need for, or the violation
of, an elastic interpretation of ‘security’ as a pretext for aggressive actions, from war and
assassination to use of the law.7

It seems then that a definition of security is unavoidable. That offered in dictionaries, ‘freedom
or protection from danger and worry’8 is considered inadequate by a number of authors, who
have suggested discarding the term security, or have offered their own.9 In this article, security
is defined as ‘a function of the presence and interaction of Asset (A), Protector (P) and Threat
(T)10 in a given Situation (Si)’. This concept is synthesised by the formal definition of security
as S = f (A, P, T) Si,11 and explained as follows.

The definition is based on the assumption that, as distinct from the philosophical notion,
operational security is a dynamic, contrived condition of coexistence of security activities and
feelings of non-security. This condition is the resulting unstable balance of rational activities
conducted by intentional and reactive counterparts, not of nature or chance. The premises of
rationality, intention, and antagonism imply that the activities intended to achieve and maintain
this condition are driven by opposite interests, wills, and reasoning about somebody, or something,
considered worth the efforts. In this view, the absence of one of the core elements (A, P, or T)
voids the concept of security of its significance: without an asset, there is nothing to protect;
without a threat, there is no reason to protect; without a protector, there is no one striving for
security. In order to apply the concept to reality, these three elements are seen as the components
of an open system interacting with the environment. Situation (Si) is then the term defining the
complex of circumstances that identify the ‘here and now’ of the context under scrutiny.12

The way the formal definition [S= f (A, P, T) Si] is drawn means that the concept responds to
a systemic-functional perspective. Once the existence of A, P, T has been verified, the
understanding of the problem at hand needs focusing on the whole process rather than on
single parts and effects. The analysis should comprehend all the main elements of a security
context, their relations and effects, with and within their environment. Only after these dynamics
have been identified, analysed and considered, can it be decided which criteria should be
applied in the particular context, and why, how, where and when.13

This definition has several advantages. It separates philosophical and fortuitous from contrived
security; it helps to distinguish security from other, contiguous, concepts (eg, safety); being
general enough to embrace all types and levels of Assets, Protectors, and Threats in all possible
Situations, it is independent from the immediate context of application. The next step is to

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discuss different contexts where the concept of security is applied, identify areas of doubt and
verify that the application of this definition may assist analysis and clarification.

The concept of security in international relations

In the context of international relations, the concept of security is ‘an essentially contested
concept’.14 Some theorists15 interpret it as that state of affairs where warfare is

… so highly improbable as to be practically out of question.16

Others17 prefer to see it as the result of interdependence and integration amongst nations.
Those concerned with national security describe the concept as:

… the defence of the realm as a whole from external and internal dangers arising from
attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations, whether
directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the
security of the State.18

These positions tend to be ambiguous. Confusion between defence and security in the first
definition, faith in commerce, diplomacy and goodwill in the second, and tautology in the
third (security is the defence from threat to security) do not help clarity.19 The fact that ‘security
theories’ in International Relations Studies include such concepts as ‘balance of power’,
‘deterrence’, ‘deterrence and détente’, ‘balance of terror’ and ‘first-strike capability’, is not
obviously helpful.20

The incongruity of achieving security by means of military superiority and threat of

retaliation21— worst, nuclear annihilation—opens questions such as ‘What kind of security
are we pursuing?’ and ‘Is this genuine security?’ It is hard to see how positive answers can be
provided to these essential queries. These ‘security theories’ imply that the only state whose
national security is achieved is the one with military supremacy over all possible competitors.
It is not clear how this could be attained without them feeling threatened, therefore insecure.
Nor is it clear how freedom of action, national interests, core values and sovereignty could be
guaranteed under a condition of military inferiority. In the pursuit of their own security those
states concerned may feel themselves obliged to join in the race for armaments, thus contributing
to the general condition of insecurity. This has led Herz22 to describe this situation as a ‘security
dilemma’, and Dillon to argue that security may make human life and relations worse, instead
of improving them, and to invoke (perhaps cryptically) the necessity of ‘securing security’.23

We now know that the very will to security— the will to power of sovereign presence in
both metaphysics and modern politics—is not only a prime incitement to violence in the
Western tradition of thought, and to the globalisation of its (inter) national politics, but
also self-defeating; in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders
dangers in response to its own discursive dynamic.24

Unease with the established concept of security, which served the state and military power,
has led a number of theorists25 to the growing recognition of a ‘more holistic and dynamic
concept’ which implies:

… first, a concept of security which focuses not just on the state, but which includes
individuals and the world community as a whole; second, a concept which is not status
quo oriented, but which is future oriented and seeks progressive change; and third, a

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concept which is not synonymous with military problems, but which encompasses a broad
agenda of threats (economic, environmental and human rights for example) which prevents
peoples and groups living full and free lives.26

This suggestion does not find enthusiastic support amongst those concerned with the
understanding and the application of the concept of security. To most of them, holism may
look more like a buzzword than an illuminating beacon when it comes to attributing blame,
costs and responsibility.

The formal definition S = f (A, P, T) Si, may perhaps assist those concerned to make a more
structured analysis. In the traditional concept,27 the state is the Asset (A), the government the
Protector (P), and the Threat (T) is made by all those states who, intentionally or not, are seen
as jeopardising loosely-defined ‘national interests’ and ‘core values’, in a given historical
condition (Si). Clearly, with such indefinite factors, no serious analysis is possible. A, P, and
T must be described in detail, if we are to understand which problems pertain to security, and
which are, for example, defence or policing issues. What do we mean by ‘state’? What are the
components of the Asset ‘state’? Is the Asset to be protected the physical integrity of the state,
its welfare, its inhabitants, its sovereignty, its government, its political structure, its military
primacy or its cultural values? Until the above values and interests are defined, it is difficult to
discern who is protecting what, from whom, and for which purpose.

Within the current ‘holistic and more dynamic concept of security’ these problems have become
practically irresolvable. The definition of A tends now to embrace the Universe, rather than
just the world. Threats range from asteroids, flooding, earthquakes and thermal changes to
hostile states, organised crime, money laundering, ethnic movements, and dictators. Within
this spectrum of Threats, it is not clear what the Assets are and, more importantly, who is, or
should be, the Protector. The answers offered by International Relations scholars can hardly
satisfy those concerned with a genuine concept of security. The realist position that the Protector
is the one with military supremacy is not appealing to those who believe that security is
inseparable from peace, independence and freedom. Idealists, who believe that security comes
from a condition (strengthening the UN, building of interdependence and integration, stabilising
of democratic regimes…) rather than from an actor, seem to have no answer. They appear to
overlook that this condition must be pursued and maintained by somebody (be it a state or an
international coalition) with a clear purpose, commitment and resources. A security condition
resulting from chance would only be ephemeral, which, in the presence of such a terrifying
spectrum of threats, is not secure enough. The necessity for the UN to create and appoint a
protector in order to ensure security to a dissolving Yugoslavia is an example.

The concept of security in crime prevention

This idea has its roots in the appearance of social organisation.28 Within this vision, the concept
of security is connected with the concept of law and order, as it focuses on unlawful or antisocial
events, their perpetrators, and connected causes and effects.29 Security is then both the
operational arm which helps to ensure law and order and also the resulting condition. Three
main problem areas are opened by the acceptance of this position.

The first problem comes from the idea that crime prevention and security always go together.
This belief is frequent in literature, where the terms are at times used interchangeably, and it
seems to derive from the assumption that security is for the good, as it impedes crime. The
conclusion is that if there is more security, the more crime is prevented, and the safer we all

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live. However, this postulate leaves out some activities and events that certainly pertain to
security but have nothing to do with crime. Also, it sees security as a bona fide activity performed
by law-abiding citizens and organisations against spies, terrorists and criminals. Both are
disproved by contrary evidence. Dictators and criminals are more concerned with security
than the average person. A patrol bivouacking in enemy territory, a spy, a terrorist or a kidnapper
barricading himself against a police raid, are examples. Besides, no such discriminating position
is to be found in law. Security is a natural human right; and no law limits the right to security
to a particular category of persons, no matter how defined.30 In short, concern with security is
not restricted to the law-abiding, it is not necessarily for the good, nor is it necessarily directed
against crime.

The second problem area is linked to the interpretation of public security. Today, many authors
tend to identify this with crime prevention. Thus, public security is frequently seen as being
directed to the prevention and repression of activities defined as unlawful. Problems come
from both the interpretation of ‘public’ and the definition of ‘unlawful’. In many countries,
public security tends to be valued by rulers for the role it could play in the stability of
government, ultimately in their own power and security. This Machiavellian interpretation of
public security (the ‘Prince’s Order’) is not beyond abuse, and too often it has been more a
threat than a shield to the subjects.31 The definition of unlawful activities can also be arbitrary
and instrumental, so as to practically nullify opposition. The potential encroachment of public
security measures onto democratic freedoms and civil liberties may reach— and indeed has
reached— the level where, in the name of the security of the state, that of the individual is set
aside. Hitler’s, Pol Pot’s and Stalin’s past regimes are examples.

Nor can the concept of unbounded individual security be considered free of dangers. For
Hobbes, Herz and Dillon, the unrestricted achievement of one’s own security may jeopardise
that of others, by threatening them, or by transferring threats onto them (eg, through
displacement), and may even challenge the authority of the state. Henry VIII of England and
Louis XIV of France were particularly aware of the problem when they compelled aristocrats
to destroy the defences surrounding their castles. Today, the same reasoning is applied to the
security of private communications, and a number of states make it illegal for private citizens
to use codes they cannot break.

The third problem is linked to the utilitarian opinion that, provided everyone ensures his own
security, then crime would be reduced and public security would be consequently improved.
The similarity with international relations theories is as evident as the inconsistency of the
premise (that security is for the good). With security being driven by self-utility and not being
confined to the law-abiding, nor necessarily pursued for a good purpose, the greater each
person’s private security, the more problems are likely to be created to governance and public
security. A security problem is not only, and not necessarily, a crime prevention problem.

All these seem good reasons to doubt whether law and order and crime prevention concepts
can be considered consistent with security concepts. Nor is the contribution of private security
activities to crime prevention and public security, and vice versa, altogether clear. The
application of the formal definition of security may assist clarification. In private security, the
Protector is only concerned with protecting his/her own Assets, and not the community, from
the Threat (which may be a police officer or a thief). In public security, the ultimate Protector
is the government, the Asset is affected by an ‘acceptable’ level of crime and the enforcement
of law and order (whatever they are), and the Threat is whoever breaks the law, or disturbs
public order. The formal definition of security may also be useful in analysing mixed public-
private security problems. Here the fundamental issue is co-ordination, but also (in some less

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than democratic countries) the avoidance of conflicts created by Protectors at one level who
may turn into Threats at a different level. The definition offered may help to distinguish the
two areas, then to find a balance between different security needs and expectations at different
levels of public and private security, with regard to the consistent Assets. This requires the
identification of who is protecting what, for whom, in which situation, according to which
priorities and to which effect. Once the fundamental dynamics and their effects are clear, the
extent to which different Protectors at different levels interact with different Assets and Threats
in the different Situations is, presumably, more easily assessed and addressed.

The concept of security in risk management

Risk management concepts and methods are popular amongst security practitioners for a number
of reasons. First, their techniques assist the simplification and analysis of very complex problems.
Second, they address the problem of allocating limited resources against limitless expectations.
The belief is that, by assessing and prioritising potential risks, limited resources can be focused
to achieve the best results (ie, the reduction of total risk). Finally, there is the notion that following
risk management procedures gives ‘scientific’ support to security choices, measures and activities.
The fact that basic risk management techniques do not require a scientific education adds to their
general appeal to practitioners. These beliefs and features have led many in the literature to
equate risk-management methodology with security decision-making methodology.

Unfortunately, these beliefs and this equation are not sound as they may seem. For a start, risk
management concepts derive from other areas than security (insurance, engineering, safety, and
general management), and have different (and at times irreconcilable) premises. Their methods of
analysis tend to be inspired by a mechanistic vision of the processes under scrutiny, which does not
help to address those security problems created by the dynamics of antagonism. In security, the
presence of intentional and reactive sources of danger tends to make all analyses, assessments, and
decisions very complex, and processes anything but deterministic. Secondly, risk theories are based
on ‘informed’ bets (based on statistics) that a given event will probably not take place, while
another probably will. Security decisions are based on a different type of ‘informed’ bet, which
derives not from probability calculus, but from confirmed and continuous intelligence. Statistics
have to be used with caution in security decisions because of their incompleteness and unreliability.
Not even perfect knowledge of the past leads to prediction of the future, when intentional and
reactive antagonists, not all and not perfectly identified, are looking for security gaps and trends to
be exploited, or new opportunities to be created and used.32

There are, as well, different opinions on the position risk management methodology should
take with regard to the whole decision-making process. Risk scholars and managers tend to
consider security as one of the operational tools they can use to prevent or reduce those assessed
risks which cannot be accepted or transferred.33 Security consultants and managers, more
pragmatically, tend to see risk management methodology as useful for justification rather
than analysis. This opens a discussion on the (perceived) utility of risk management
methodology, which is then related to the way decisions are taken by individuals and
organisations. A number of decision-making theorists argue about the rationality of the
procedure, and stress the importance of imponderable factors, such as the ‘black box’ inside
the brain of the decision-maker.34 Many practitioners agree that risk management techniques
look good at school, but are impracticable in real life.35

The formal definition of security suggests that this approach is incomplete, as it is mainly
informed by considerations of expected damages to a set of identified assets. If the definition

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is applied, then no reasoning about Assets can be done without considering all interactions
with Threat and Protector and their Situation. This systemic analysis may reveal, for example,
that not all Assets, Protectors and Threats have been identified and not all possible negative
events, thus not all of the possible outcomes. Damages to the same asset have different
perceptions, aspects, values and impacts, depending on whether they derive from interference,
theft, or sabotage, to name but a few of the possible negative events. It is difficult to see how
a vulnerability analysis can be conducted otherwise. The interference of the Protector with the
Threat and the event itself is generally not considered, or, when it is, is mainly seen as a factor
of efficiency to be added to the mathematical formula.36

It seems that risk assessment methodology is not wrong in itself, but is frequently used at the
wrong time and place. To start a security analysis from the calculation of expected damages
before obtaining a general understanding of the dynamics of the context looks very much like
putting the cart before the horse. Better understanding is accomplished by first identifying the
relationship between A, P, T, and by then appraising the possible effects of such a relationship,
which are not limited to consideration of damage. Vulnerability, motivation, interest, utility,
determination and expectations are examples of effects to be appraised which interfere with
the dynamics of damage. The existence of antagonism means that this relationship is not
linear (if…then), but a spiral of inputs, processes and feedback. Understanding this essential
feature allows, rather than an incomplete and hypothetical prediction of expected damages,
the assessment of both the capability of the Protector and the feasibility and effectiveness of
the possible protective actions. This is a matter for intelligence rather than the outcome of
simple multiplication of probabilities by magnitudes. Only when the whole process is clear
can the potential damages (risks) be assessed, and only then are decision-makers presented
with enough data to make an informed choice.

The concept of security in loss prevention

In the last two decades the concept of security has been frequently associated with, and replaced
by, that of loss reduction. This last concept is inspired by risk management studies, with the
assumption that, since risks cannot be totally removed, losses will anyway be suffered. The
focus is then on reduction rather than removal, and reasoning tends to be directed to the
effects (losses) rather than to the causes (sources of damage). The condition of security is
therefore defined by a standard (eg, the accepted percentage of losses in proportion to the turnover)
and the cost-effectiveness of security measures is to be judged against that standard. This idea
has proved effective in those areas of retail and commercial security where the asset to be protected
is the overall profit, and not any particular item. Consequently, a number of security scholars
and practitioners have inferred that a similar approach can be successfully applied to other security
contexts than retail and commerce. The concept of loss has therefore been stretched to include
life and limb, property, money, valuables, information, reputation, and image.

However, including the notion of loss acceptance within the concept of security has proved
unpalatable for a number of security scholars and practitioners. There are many fields in
security (eg, national, personal and information) where the concept of security is incompatible
with that of accepting a loss. Those who believe that security is in principle risk-averse find it
difficult to explain, and certainly hard to understand, how the concept of security can be
reconciled with voluntary risk-taking and confined to an accepted standard of losses. The
contrary argument is that some minor risks and losses are anyway to be accepted, because
scarce resources should be directed towards more important ones. This position does not hold
academic water, however, as it confounds acceptance a priori with acceptance a posteriori.

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The formal definition of security may be of assistance, as it requires that A, P, T must all be
present and interacting. If losses are deliberately accepted a priori (the ‘do nothing’ option in
risk management), then the relative Assets have no Protector, and nothing but chance is
providing security. No Protector can consider the idea of accepting a priori losing his Asset
without questioning his own role. This is not the case when losses are to be accepted a posteriori.
Here, the Protector is true to his role and only forced to accept what he has been incapable of
impeding. It is plausible then to say that the loss reduction perspective of security is but
another definition of risk management, which includes security-related measures, but is not
driven by security concepts.

Conclusion

This article has, hopefully, demonstrated that there is both a need for and the possibility of a
definition of security that encompasses the generality of the contexts and assists the studies in
the different areas.

Having considered the different approaches to security in different disciplines, the analysis
has highlighted a number of issues to be addressed. To begin with, the concept of security
should not be confused with the context of its application. Second, the concept of security
appears at times deliberately ambiguous, and those who use it are not always inspired by the
best of intentions. As well as being a protective umbrella for dictators, extremists, bullies,
criminals and terrorists, security has in too many circumstances been a pretext for reducing
sovereignty, freedom of action and civil liberties. Third, examples have been provided of
confusion between means and ends, causes and effects. The most relevant are: the use of an
all-embracing meaning to shift responsibilities or to attribute undue blame and liability; the
confusion between security, risk management and loss prevention in the absence of an identified
Protector; and, more essentially, the pretext of security to gain and maintain power. In light of
these issues, the opinion that security is as wide and as indefinite as poverty, beauty or happiness
seems, at best, unwise.

If we are to proceed in the direction of truth, ethics and justice, a number of steps should be
taken. The first is distinguishing the concept of security from the context of its application.
Clarification as to whether decisions should be taken according to criteria, say, of security,
defence, law and order, safety or budget, is the following step. Both would facilitate explanation,
justification and attribution of blame, liability and responsibility.

An approach to building a common base of understanding has been suggested in the application
of a definition of security. This should be precise enough for analysis, but general enough to
be applicable to all security-related investigations. Of the many possible definitions, one has
been offered which has the required features of precision and universality. This preliminary
test has allowed some conclusions to be drawn. First, there is the possibility of drawing a
definition that embraces a number of areas of security studies and operations. The one offered
has proved to be robust and comprehensive enough to be tested against different visions and
approaches. Second, the suggested approach has proved to be of some utility. The application of
a definition of security (not necessarily the one which has been offered) may offer a criterion for
demarcating security from other contexts, identifying the actors at the different levels, and focusing
the attention upon their resulting dynamics and effects from a systemic-functional perspective.

To conclude: neither the definition offered nor the investigation purport to be definitive; they
are matter for discussion and progress. It would be imprudent to state that a panacea has been

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found to heal the wounds inflicted over time on the body of security by a number of incautious,
and perhaps at times malicious, inquisitors. However, it is important to recognise that this
unfortunate condition has been facilitated by the absence of a serious academic debate.
This article, hopefully, will stimulate, with discussion, further and more rigorous investigations,
which should include a number of different definitions of security. The first step has been
taken. Others can only be taken with the co-operation and criticism of the readers.

Notes

1 Senior Lecturer in Security Concepts and Models, Academic Leader in the MSc in Corporate
Security Management, Cranfield University at RMCS Shrivenham.
2 Dillon, M. (1996) The Politics of Security. London: Routledge; Golsby, M. (1992) Four Steps
to Success. Security Management. August, p 53; Sutherland, G. E. (1992) Answering the
Question: What is Security? Security Management. June, p 59.
3 For a survey of the existing approaches to security, see Manunta, G. (1997) Towards a Security
Science Through a Specific Theory and Methodology. PhD thesis, Leicester University.
4 Manunta, G. (1996) The Case Against: Private Security is not a Profession. International Journal
of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention. Vol. I, No. 3.
5 Sutherland, op cit.
6 Plato: Cratylus, 385.
7 In the context of war, see Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) Security: a New
Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, pp 21–45. In the context of
litigation and liability, see Chovanes, M. H. (1994) Corporate Liability: Security’s Emerging
Role. Security Management. February, p 64; Ingberg, C. J. (1993) A Duty to Protect. Security
Management. December, p 63; Kahn, J. R. (1994) The Premises behind Premise Liability. Security
Management. February, p 61.
8 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary.
9 See, for example, Cahalane, M. (1998) Is Security the right word? International Journal of
Risk, Security and Crime Prevention. Vol 3, No. 3; Post, R. S. and Kingsbury, A. A. (1991)
Security Administration. Stoneham, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, pp 1–13; and Purpura, P.
(1991) Security and Loss Prevention: an Introduction. Newton, MA: Butterworth Heinemann.
10 The term is used here in the sense of source of damage. See Manunta (1997) op cit, Glossary.
11 Manunta, G. (1998) Security: An Introduction. Cranfield: Cranfield University Press, p 57.
12 For a discussion, see Manunta (1998) op cit, pp 40–72.
13 Ibid, pp 104–120.
14 Booth, K. and Wheeler, N. (1992) Contending Philosophies about Security in Europe. In
McInness, C. (ed.) Security Strategy in The New Europe. London: Routledge, p 4.
15 See ‘Realist’ theories in International Relations.
16 Hyde-Price, A. (1992) Future Security Systems in Europe; Pout, P. (1992) The End of
Eurocentrism and its Consequences. In McInness (ed.) Security Strategy in The New Europe.
London Routledge, pp 38–39 and 84.
17 See ‘Idealist’ theories in International Relations.
18 The Maxwell-Fyfe Directive to the Director-General of the British Security Services. In (1996)
MI5: The Security Service. Second edition. London: The Stationery Office, p 8.

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19 See also Clutterbuck, R. (1993) International Crisis and Conflict. London: Macmillan; Dougherty,
J. E. and Pfaltzgraff L. R. Jr, (1980) Contending Theories Of International Relations. Third
edition. New York, NY: Harper Collins; and Kitson, F. (1971) Low Intensity Operations. London:
Faber and Faber.
20 Booth and Wheeler, op cit, pp 4, 10–11; Hyde-Price, op cit, pp 38–39.
21 Security studies can be defined as ‘the study of the threat, use and control of military force’.
See Walt, S. (1991) The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly. Vol.
35, No. 2, pp 211–239.
22 Herz, J. H. (1950) Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics. Vol. 2,
pp 157–80.
23 Dillon, op cit, pp 1–11, 113–128.
24 Ibid, pp 24–25.
25 Buzan, B. (1991) People, States & Fear. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Mandel, R.
(1994) The Changing Face of National Security. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
26 Booth and Wheeler, op cit, p 4.
27 See ‘Realist’ theories in International Relations.
28 The earliest written evidence is found in codes of laws, such as the Sumeric (3,000 BC) and
Hammurabi’s (2,000 BC).
29 For example, Post and Kingsbury, op cit, p 3.
30 UN General Assembly (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3.
31 Attempts to limit the abuse of power started in ancient Rome with the Lex Julia de Vi Publica.
In England there were the Magna Carta (1215) and the Bill of Rights (1689), in America the
Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), and in France the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen (1789).
32 Malik, O. (1995) The Future of Information and Technology Requirements. In 12th International
Symposium in Terrorists Devices and Methods. ASET, RMCS Shrivenham, p 37; Manunta
(1997) op cit, Section I, Ch 4; Whidden, G. (1994) A Guide for the Beginning Sweeper.
Washington: Technical Services Agency, p 4; and Wilkinson, P. (1993) Technology and
Terrorism. London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, p 7.
33 ‘Security, in its generic form, and the security survey audit, in its specific application, are essential
elements of the total risk management function. The precise role that security plays will depend
on the particular business at hand.’ Broder, J. (1984) Risk Analysis and the Security Survey.
Stoneham, MA: Butterworth, p xvii.
34 Dixon, N. (1976) On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. London: Pimlico, pp 29–33;
Easton, D. (1965) A System Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley; and Garnham, A. and
Oakhill, J. (1994) Thinking and Reasoning. Oxford: Blackwell, p 176.
35 Stefankiewicz, S. (1998) Practical Solutions. Security Management. June, p 6.
36 As an example, see Marcello, A. (1993) Il Rischio Aziendale. Milano: PEG Spa.

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