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Explain and evaluate Kripke’ s theory that

proper names are rigid designators
Introduction
This essay is divided into two major sections. In the first section I will explain Kripke’s theory using
the example of ‘Michael Jordan’ as a rigid designator. The second section contains the evaluation of
the theory. Due to the restrictions on the length of the essay, I will focus on how the theory
performs against two challenges instead of attempting to evaluate all aspects of the theory which
are explained in the first part. The first challenge is case where a name is born from an explicit
description. The second one investigates how the theory performs with the highly unlikely case of
two names, one of which undergoes a transformation, switching references. I believe the theory
overcomes the first challenge but struggles with the second.

Explanation
In Naming and Necessity Kripke outlines the theory that proper names are rigid designators. By rigid
designators he means a word that “designates an object in every possible wold” (Kripke 1980, p.48),
as opposed to a non-rigid designator that only refers under some particular circumstances. This
implies that the name of a person always refers to the same person, independently of the descriptions
that are attached on that person. For example, the name ‘Michael Jordan’, who was the Most Valuable
Player of the 1987-88 NBA season would refer to Michael Jordan even if he was not declared Most
Valuable Player on that year, this is because although any description of Michael Jordan could have
been false in a counterfactual alternative world, ‘Michael Jordan would still be Michael Jordan’ in
every possible world in which Michael Jordan exists. In fact, Kripke suggests that ‘Michael Jordan’
would refer to the person we recognise as Michael Jordan even if in the possible world in which he is
not known by that name to the inhabitants of that alternative world. This theory is in stark contrast to
the descriptivist theory which argues that a name is merely a description or a bundle of descriptions
of an object. In that theory the name Michael Jordan gets its meaning by ‘being the person who was
MPV of the 1987-88 season’ or by any other of the facts which describe him such as ‘the person who
won six NBA championships in the nineties’.

Therefore, in Kripke’s theory of reference, names have a meaning through another route, which
consists of the times the name was used to refer to that person, originating in a first occurrence. In
this case when Michael Jordan was born, his parent chose the name and referred to him by that name,
then the rest of the family was introduced to new-born Michael by the name ‘Michael’ and so on.
Through this process the name becomes the reference to the person Michael Jordan, so even
someone who does not possess a definitive description of the man, can still to successfully refer to
him.

One implication of Kripke’s statement that a rigid denominator is necessarily true in all possible worlds
is that it leads to statements that are both a posteriori and necessarily true insofar as they are true at
all. For example, fire would necessarily involve a reaction of a substance with oxygen in all possible
worlds, making it impossible to imagine fire without oxygen. Yet this is a posteriori true considering
that before the discovery of oxygen gas, the scientific explanation of fire involved a substance known
as phlogiston that eventually was found to be non-existent. This is quite a revolutionary idea because
before Kripke it was commonly believed (and perhaps still is) that only a priori truths can be necessarily
true and all a posteriori truths are contingent.

1st Challenge- Blackbeard

A tough issue for Kripke is how his theory treats names which have explicit origins in descriptions. I
believe that this challenge does not debunk Kripke’s theory, despite it seeming like the perfect
descriptivist case.

An example of that is Edward Teach, the legendary 18th century pirate known as Blackbeard. There is
the possibility of his actual name being lost, so that he would be known as just ‘Blackbeard’, although
he would still be a historical figure. According to the classic descriptivist view, the name ‘Blackbeard’
is just the description of the pirate, for example it means, “the pirate famous for his black beard” or
“The 18th century pirate from Bristol” or “The most famous English pirate” and infinite other
possibilities.

However, according to Kripke’s theory after the initial baptismal, which occurred due to his black
beard, the name ‘Blackbeard’ does not have any connection with his appearance, since its source is
the casual chain of reference. Since Kripkean names are rigid designators it follows that ‘Blackbeard’
is Blackbeard in every possible world, so there is world where Blackbeard does not grow a beard but
should still be referred to as ‘Blackbeard’. Considering that his name is an explicit description it can be
intuitive to some that the name ‘Blackbeard’ does not apply. Does the name ‘Blackbeard’ necessarily
work on Blackbeard through all possible worlds just as ‘Jordan’ would be Jordan?

The answer is yes. Kripke is correct in saying that even when the name seems to be a description it is
still a rigid designator. Despite ‘Blackbeard’ also meaning in the English language ‘someone who has a
black beard’, the name still operates the same way as any other name. Although the cause chain of
reference begins with the unusual assignment of a name due to an external characteristic, it would
still operate in the exact same way. In fact, there could be a possible culture in which the names of all
people are chosen due to an aspect of their appearance but it does not necessarily follow that this
would cause a change in the way the names are used in language and society. In fact, a lot of Greek
surnames used to refer to the occupation of the father of the child, (one of the most common Greek
surname is Papadopoulos which translates as the son of the priest) but this does not mean that names
in Greek society played a different role than a surname like Smith would when referring to a person.
Kripke’s understanding of the ways in which names are used in society is good enough to overcome
this challenge.

2nd Challenge- The Prince and the Pauper

Consider the story of the Prince and the Pauper written by Mark Twain. In this story a common born,
poor boy named Tom Canty is indistinguishable in appearance with Prince Edward, the son of Henry
VIII. In the story the two boys change places, with Tom living the life of the prince in the castle.
However, just before the coronation of King Edward VI, they switch back to their original places.
Now imagine a possible world where they do not switch back and it becomes real history instead of
fiction. Therefore, the person known to himself as Tom Canty is named during the coronation as
Edward VI and is known with this name to the public. That person would be referred to using the
designator Edward VI. However, this designator would not be a designator that is true in every
possible world, because there could very well be a world where Tom and Edward never switch
places in the first place. Therefore, the designator cannot possible be described as rigid.
Under Kripke’s theory this leaves us with the option of admitting that his proper name is still Tom.
However, anything he does in his life from that point would be written in the history books as the
actions of Edward VI. In that sense the causal chain of reference is broken. According to Kripke, the
person who was the best basketball player of all time could be different in counterfactual situations,
but ‘Michael Jordan’ refers to Michael Jordan. Is it true that similarly, that the King of England in
1550 is different in different situations but ‘Edward’ is still Edward although he now lives the life of a
commoner in poverty and is not called Edward by his peers who do not recognise him as a royal?
The intuitive answer to this question and the one Kripke would give is yes. Despite him being
unrecognisable, the person baptised Edward is still Edward even in this predicament. He is still the
same person just like ‘Jordan’ would be Jordan even if he was a football player.

However, this puts us in the bizarre situation where two Edwards exist at the same time, in the same
possible world. The king and the pauper. In order to avoid this, there are three suboptimal options:

1. Kripke argues that the name Edward VI is different to just Edward, a new baptismal event
occurred during the coronation when Tom became Edward VI. At the moment Tom is
crowned, ‘Tom’ ceases to exist. Therefore, there is no contradiction in both Edward the
commoner and Edward VI existing simultaneously. There is a problem with this claim: it is
still a contradiction to have two objects that should be identical be different. To everyone in
that world, the person named ‘Edward’ is analytically identical to Edward VI. The claim is
equivalent to α=α being actually two different entities which do not equal each other.
2. Kripke argues that ‘King Edward VI’ is just a title created in the coronation, a mere
description of Tom. Tom remains as Tom although he is now King and ‘Edward’ continues to
refer to Edward. The problem with this argument is that the sleight of hand of making
‘Edward VI’ a title and not a name, despite everyone in the world considering it the name of
the king allows a descriptivist theory of reference through the back door. The same logic
could be used on any proper name that would be a rigid designator under Kripke.
3. A third option to solve this and retain Kripke has been suggested by Evans for a similar case
(Evans 1973), that the name which should be attributed to the object is the one with the
strongest causal chain. In that case since everyone knows Tom as Edward VI, his name is
effectively Edward VI without resorting to descriptions. However, I do not see how this
allows us to escape the original problem. We would still have a person who is aware that his
name is Tom and that he is not actually Edward VI.

Therefore, Kripke has to say that Tom is still Tom and Edward is still Edward despite this
predicament. There cannot be two Edwards. That is still problematic because we have arrived at the
situation in which the causal chain between a person and their name has been broken. There cannot
be such a thing as a private name, since names are de facto tools we use to make references.

I consider this challenge to be a very hard problem for Kripke. A descriptivist using a bundle theory
of descriptions could bypass the problem by declaring the holder of the name ‘Edward VI’ to be the
one to fit the most descriptions and that would be true of him. However, this cannot be done if
names are held to the standards of rigid denominators, being true in every possible world which
entails that there should be no difference whether Tom and Edward switch places or not.

Conclusion
In this essay I have briefly explained Kripke’s theory of reference, then I evaluated it against two
challenges. Kripke’s account of how names are used in society is adequate to overcome the
challenge of Blackbeard, since the reasons a name is chosen does not intuitively affect the use of the
name as a rigid designator. Theory struggles against the challenged posed by an alternative account
of the Prince and the Pauper, where every option available to Kripke to escape the problem seemed
unsatisfactory.

Bibliography
Baumann, P. (2010). Are proper Names Rigid Designators? Axiomathes, 333-346.

Chakravarti, S. (1979). A note on Kripke's Distinction between Rigid Designators and Non-rigid
Designators. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 309-313.

Evans, G. (1975). The Causal Theory of Names. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 187-225.

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusets : Harvard University Press.

Li, C. (1992). Kripke's Two Definitions of Rigid Designation. Iyyun: The Jerusalam Philosophical
Quarterly, 63-71.

Various. (2013, March 19). Names. Retrieved from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/