Anonymous marking code Z0966332, word count 2998

What is a pragmatic theory of truth? Is

it plausible?

Introduction

In this essay I will outline a pragmatic theory of truth and argue in favour of it being the best option

we have to understand truth. The essay is split into four main parts. In the first one I outline the theory

and explain some of the key terms in my definition of it. The second one offers reason to accept it as

a theory of truth. Then I proceed to argue in favour of it through Darwinian Natural Selection and

finally I reply to two major objections which the theory faces.

The Theory

The pragmatic theory of truth, which I shall defend in this essay, is expressed as follows: A belief can

be classified as true if it is able to withstand all possible inquiry on the matter. A true belief would

survive all potential future investigation and debate without being overturned (Misak, 1999, p. 49).

Therefore, the pragmatic theory places truth outside of the metaphysical realm and into the human

one. As James said, “True ideas are those that we can validate, corroborate and verify” (James,

Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, 1907, p. 142). Consequently, the beliefs which survive this

vigorous testing are the ones which have the highest utility for humans because they have survived

all human investigation available. Truth is a property of our own beliefs, not a property of the physical

world. The physical world just is, it is neither true nor false, these concepts only become meaningful

when applied to beliefs of human minds. Therefore, truth can only be considered in a grounded

context, it cannot be an abstraction.

At this point it is important to explain what is meant by the word “inquiry”. It acts as a substitute for

all the tests that could be used in order to scrutinise a belief. In this essay it is used interchangeably

with the words “investigation” and “research”. This includes testing coherence with the set of all true

beliefs, explanatory power and correspondence to empirical observations. It is difficult and beyond

the scope of this essay to construct the appropriate formula which weighs all these aspects of a belief

fairly or the correct methodology for calculating the ‘score’ of a belief in each one. If three theories

are competing for truth, theory A could have more explanatory power but theory B is more grounded

in experience, theory C could require the least amount of assumptions to coherently fit with the belief

system as a whole. In the field of moral truth, different cultures have different balances between

individual freedom and social cohesion which they regard as desirable in terms of utility. While these

difficulties are recognised, it is still theoretically possible to find the optimal solutions to these issues.

Accepting a pragmatic theory of truth does not necessarily commit us to relativism about truth. On

the contrary, it allows us to set our own criteria of what should be considered true that best serve

human affairs. The reference frame in which they all fit is natural selection, which will be more

extensively argued later in the essay.

Why be a pragmatist?

In this section I will justify preferring the pragmatic theory of truth. In order to achieve that I will

firstly explain its metaphysical advantages, then contrast it with the popular correspondence theory

of truth and finally reply to the deflatiationist argument.

It metaphysically preferable to have a pragmatic theory of truth, because according to it truth is not

another abstract concept. We can only reach a belief we hold true through human experience and

inquiry. Aspiring for truth is not a metaphysical endeavour but instead a very grounded and common

one. We undertake it every time we investigate an issue or attempt to verify an opinion. Instead of

allowing truth to be this mystical and inaccessible feature of reality, it is more intuitive and better to

claim the concept for ourselves. Every attempt to identify an objectively true belief is always done

through subjective human inquiry. Although that does not make the belief subjective by default, it
does provide a reason for a pragmatic approach to truth, since it is the only one which considers the

limited human element of our collective understanding of the world.

A popular theory of truth, outlined by Russell among is the correspondence theory of truth. According

to that theory a statement is true if and only if it corresponds with the “facts” others (Russell, On the

Nature of Truth and Falsehood, 1966, p. 142). This is a powerful definition of truth, according to Ayer

even Peirce would have accepted it as a formal definition (Meyers, 1975, p. 47). However the theory

is still problematic in different ways which the pragmatic theory accommodates for. Firstly, the very

nature of correspondence is not sufficiently questioned. Attempting to define a correspondence

relation, one inevitable has to use their own sense perception and judgement. The result is inevitably

a correspondence which is fallible because it is human. There is nothing metaphysical about the

process that would warrant us putting truth above and beyond our limited human capacities. How

could we possibly access truth if we do not define it in inquiry and belief but rather in concepts which

are beyond our minds? The second problem with the correspondence theory is that it does not provide

us with a sufficiently good method to reach true beliefs. Its account for truth is so reductive that it

does not give us enough reason to try to obtain beliefs which not only have a certain correspondence

with our experience but are also internally coherent and have explanatory power. Finally, in the

pragmatic theory of truth, a statement which qualifies as true has already been investigated in terms

of its correspondence with reality, to the best of our abilities. The pragmatist is not against the

principle of correspondence, he just understands our own limitations which prohibit us from perfectly

achieving it, as well as recognising that there are other criteria to which a true belief should be

subjected to. A similar argument can be used against the coherence theory of truth. Although it

provides a strong account of truth, it is too limiting since it does not consider correspondence and at

the same time it is too abstract for the same reasons the correspondence is, because it places truth

above human endeavours.

If we allow that the notion of truth resides within the human realm, we expose our flank to those the

idea that truth should be deflated altogether. Philosophers have argued that truth is not a genuine
property of an idea, but simply a linguistic tool used in communication. However, truth is such a

common and fundamental concept of human understanding that to reject it as a basic property of a

belief seems completely counter intuitive. The pragmatist wants to deflate the truth by linking it to

other human concepts, while the deflationist wants to isolate it from them (Misak, 1999, p. 65). The

notion of truth, in its pragmatic formulation, is incredibly valuable in its role in inquiry. Inquiry and

truth hold a reversible relation, without inquiry it is impossible to have any notion of truth and at the

same time the quest for truth is the motivator for human inquiry. Truth is the primary motivator for

investigation and research which leads to progress in both the moral and the technological sphere. A

deflated notion of truth is too weak to act as motivation for these crucial human activities. While the

pragmatists and the deflationists agree with not giving truth abstract metaphysical meaning,

completely surrendering the notion leaves an ontological gap that is very difficult to fill.

Darwinian Justification

In this section I will explain how the pragmatic theory of truth is compatible with and derivable from

the theory of Natural Selection. I start by giving a microscopic example and then extrapolating it to

the macroscopic Darwinian Theory. Then I respond to two objections that could be raised against this

account.

An example which illustrates truth through utility is the following scenario: A police officer needs to

diffuse a bomb within a short time frame or great damage will be done. She correctly identifies the

blue wire to cut and successfully diffuses the bomb. In this case her true belief that cutting the blue

wire would work provides great utility. Although this is an example both distinctly human and

modern, it is not functionally different from scenarios all living beings face. A new-born sea turtle

knows that it should move towards the sea as soon as she is out of her egg. This is a true belief for

the turtle because it is the one that provides utility, it operates similarly to how we use beliefs about

biology to create lifesaving medicine. A different being such as an insect might have a completely

different world view than ours, through their point of view a plainly true human statement might be

considered false. A spider which eats her partner after sex has a completely different set of moral
truths because its evolutionary journey as a species has been different. That is the reason why it only

makes sense to talk of truth within human society itself. It is the only domain where a true statement

can have an objective meaning, because the utility they provide might be uniquely human, although

there is a substantial amount of beliefs which are true across species, not all are.

In the macroscopic scheme of things, the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection provides a very

strong case for a pragmatic theory of truth. The beliefs that are true, and therefore useful, are the ones

which most successfully allow for the survival and flourishing of the species. Placing truth within

this Darwinian frame of reference is the only option in order to have a meaningful understanding of

the term. Even if we accept that there is truth outside of that, it would be completely inaccessible to

us since we operate within the limited sphere of our mental capabilities as a species. Believing the

Darwinian hypothesis that the fundamentals of our minds were shaped through the process of natural

selection, and truth is a fundamental concept we possess, our very notion of truth becomes a concept

derived due to its practical human utility. The scientific method is historically our best tool to generate

useful predictions, it is therefore the best method in order to examine the usefulness-truth of our

beliefs.

An objection to the Darwinian basis for a theory of truth is a research programme that although it is

successful in its limited aims, it later has very catastrophic consequences for humanity. Due the

scientific work undertaken in the Manhattan Project, we discovered new ideas concerning atomic

physics, which allowed us to construct nuclear bombs. It is possible that these bombs could eventually

be used to make the human species extinct. Would that entail that these truths about nuclear physics

become falsehoods? I am willing to concede that. Of course it is very difficult but not impossible, to

identify the belief about nuclear physics which made the bomb possible, as opposed to being able to

use nuclear technology for energy production, medical treatment etc. In the exceptional circumstance

in which a belief eventually causes human extinction, that belief would be considered false in the

frame of reference of the mind, which is the only one available. Since truth is associated with utility,

a belief that causes maximum destruction could only be considered false. However, the case in which
the species becomes extinct is an extremely rare one, so the counter intuitive result in this case will

be allowed. In cases where complete destruction does not, there is still utility for the identified

“nuclear belief”, since it provide strategical advantage for a nation or group.

Another possible objection is that by using Natural Selection to argue for the pragmatic theory of

truth, I privilege a particular belief above all others. There seems to be no reason why a falsifiable

scientific idea should be the basis of explaining the fundamental property of truth. However, the

concept of truth has been defined through the use of ‘utility’, a concept which needs further

elaboration. I consider utility, in the macroscopic sense, through an evolutionary perspective,

therefore Darwinism is entangled within the very definition of the pragmatic theory of truth, and it is

not just another belief to be explained by it. It is thus justifiably privileged and more fundamental

than truth. It is possible that it could be falsified in the future, if for example it is shown that the story

of Creation was the correct account of humanity’s origin. If that happens, the pragmatic theory of

truth will not crumble, it will adapt. We would need to find a different explanation of ‘utility’, but this

is not a fatal problem for the pragmatic account. It is common for the constituent parts of a concept

to change and the object to retain its original operative properties, similarly to how our understanding

of oxygen did not fundamentally change because we discovered quarks. In addition, allowing the

definition of utility and therefore our account of truth to be contingent on the results of human inquiry

is entailed in pragmatism itself. A theory of truth which is ultimately fallible due to its own rules

seems like circular reasoning, however it is an inevitable consequence for any theory of truth that

does not claim to be infallible and since all theories are constructed by human minds, none of them

could possibly have that property. How could rational minds accept a hypothesis which claims to be

above all experience and revision?

Objections

In this section I will reply to two more general objections which are offered against the pragmatic

theory of truth. The first one concerns beliefs which although false, provide great utility. The second

is the consequence of the pragmatic theory of truth when considering theistic beliefs.
A significant objection to a pragmatic theory of truth is the case of white lies, statements which despite

being false have the intention of producing positive effects and therefore utility. For example if some

parents convinced their child that Santa Claus is real, that could have the positive consequence of the

child being well behaved throughout the entire year in the anticipation of Santa Claus arriving at

Christmas. This belief could be considered of high utility, but surely that should not make the claim

that there is a person called Santa Claus, who lives in the North Pole and travels around the World

using flying reindeer, true. However, the belief in Santa Claus is also a plainly testable and therefore

falsifiable one. According to William James truth operates similar a credit system. The beliefs are

used and passed around as true insofar that they are accepted, when faced with direct verification they

are liable to collapse, just like a financial system in which the notes seize to be accepted (James,

Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, 1907, p. 145). This condition of reliability for a belief solves the

apparent problem above. Since the belief in Santa Claus will fail an inquiry such as coherence with

the rest of our beliefs, it would seize to be accepted as a true belief by society, just like a banknote

that has lost all value due to loss of confidence. Therefore it will be considered untrue. Similarly, any

white lies could not be considered true because under maximum inquiry, which was one of the

conditions of truth as set out in the first section, these beliefs would be found false.

A more potent objection of similar manner is the belief in God. It is crucially different from the case

of Santa Claus because it is believed by a substantial amount of society as a whole, therefore it has a

good “credit rating” and seems to be unfalsifiable. We should therefore examine religious claims

more carefully since the combination of the above characteristics, especially being unfalsifiable

makes them fundamentally different from claims which the scientific method could attempt to answer.

If we allow that a belief in God has positive consequences for society as a whole, even from an

evolutionary perspective, then they are considered true from the pragmatic standpoint. However, the

problem arises once we consider that there is a huge variety of religious beliefs that could have similar

pragmatic credentials and yet they contradict each other. The pragmatist can still respond using the

tools the theory provides them. We should investigate them in terms of coherence to find groups of
beliefs which do not contradict each other. Then by applying the utility principle, we arrive at one set

of religious beliefs that is both useful and internally coherent. Under the pragmatic theory, these

beliefs are true. Although they cannot be considered true in the usual scientific sense, they are true in

a different way. They are principles by which we should live our lives in order to maximise the

calculus of personal and societal benefits, they are moral truths and all other moral truths could be

found using the same technique. From the point of view of natural selection, these moral-religious

beliefs are as valid as scientific beliefs concerning thermodynamics. Through their utility, they both

contribute to human survival and flourishing, therefore both are true.

Conclusion

In this essay I have outlined and argued in favour of the pragmatic theory of truth. Firstly I outlined

the theory and explained my definitions of its two key words, inquiry and utility. I then proceeded to

show why it is superior to both the metaphysical theories of truth and the deflationist reduction. In

the next section, pragmatism is justified through the theory of Natural Selection and I reply to the

counter arguments this account would give rise to. Finally I consider and successfully reply to two

general objections, the first one concerning the utility of demonstrably false beliefs and the other

concerning theistic beliefs.

Bibliography

Boffetti, J. M. (2004). Rotry's Nietzschean Pragmatism: A Jamesian Response. The Review of Politics,

605-631.

Gupta, A. (1993). A critique of deflationism. Philosophical Topics, 57-81.

Horwich, P. (1998). Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

James, W. (1907). A Word More about Truth. The Journal of philosophy, psychology and scientific

methods, 396-406.
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. The Journal of philosophy, psychology and

scientific methods, 141-155.

Meyers, R. G. (1975). Ayer on Pragmatism. Metaphilosophy, 44-53.

Misak, C. J. (1999). Truth, politics, morality: pragmatism and deliberation. London: Routledge.

Rescher, N. (1973). The coherence theory of truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Russell, B. (1966). On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Russell, B. (1996). History of western philosophy. London: Routledge .

Seddon, F. (2006). Rand and Rescher on Truth. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, 41-48.

White, A. R. (1971). Truth. London: Macmillan.