Comparative Political Studies

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Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legislatures

Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova
Comparative Political Studies 2008 41: 99 originally published online 13 July
2007
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007303651

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 Comparative Political Studies
Volume 41 Number 1
January 2008 99-127
© 2008 Sage Publications
Parliamentary Cycles 10.1177/0010414007303651
http://cps.sagepub.com
and Party Switching in hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com

Legislatures
Carol Mershon
University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Olga Shvetsova
Binghamton University, New York

This article examines politicians’ changes of party labels during the life of a
legislature. The authors view a legislator’s choice of party as a strategic deci-
sion recurring throughout the parliamentary cycle. In their approach, individu-
als are open to switching parties as they pursue goals specific to the stage in the
parliamentary cycle. Analyzing Italy and Russia, they identify among legisla-
tors in both countries patterns of heightened switching for office benefits,
policy advantage, and vote seeking at distinctive moments in the parliamentary
cycle. The commonalities across the two systems provide compelling support
for their theoretical framework. The evidence also points to a midterm peak in
switching in both countries. Differences appear, however, in the timing of
preelectoral positioning—contrasts that the authors attribute to differences in
the degree of party system institutionalization, the age of the democratic
regimes, and thus the information available to players in electoral politics.

Keywords: legislative parties; party switching; Russia; Italy; parliamentary

cycle; midterm effect

C ompetition among elites for popular support, along with widely shared
rights to participate in the selection of representatives, defines a demo-
cratic regime (Dahl, 1970). Political parties organize the teams and terms
of elite competition and thus offer and defend alternative choices to voters.
Parties also organize the agenda and work of legislatures and thus translate
citizen preferences into policy decisions. Fittingly, one of the most fre-
quently cited judgments in political science is that democracy without
parties is “unthinkable” (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1).
A standard assumption in the vast literature on parties and legislative
politics is that parties operate as fixed units from one election to the next.
Recently, however, a small, still-growing body of research has emerged to
challenge that conventional wisdom and to investigate changes in party
99

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100 Comparative Political Studies

affiliation among elected legislators and candidates for legislative office

(e.g., Heller & Mershon, 2004; Laver & Benoit, 2003). Contributors to this
school have documented and sought to explain frequent party switch-
ing among legislators in both new and established democracies, including
Australia (Miskin, 2003), Brazil (Desposato, 2006), the European Parliament
(McElroy, 2003), Hungary (Àgh, 1999), India (Miskin, 2003), and the United
States during periods of realignment (Canon & Sousa, 1992; Nokken & Poole,
2004).
Notwithstanding the achievements of studies on party switching, none to
date has tied the phenomenon to the stage in the parliamentary cycle. In
particular, no study so far has explored whether patterns differ systemati-
cally across distinct stages of the legislative term—across, for instance, one
stage devoted to committee assignments early in the term and another at the
end of the term, dominated by the view of elections on the horizon. That is
what this article does.
We examine politicians’ choices—and changes—of party labels during
the legislative term, in different stages of the parliamentary cycle. As we
define it, the parliamentary cycle includes legislative stages and also the elec-
toral stage that occurs before or during the official campaign for the next legis-
lature and that, assuming backward induction, affects behavior in the term. The
next section elaborates on this conception of the parliamentary cycle and
hypothesizes that the cycle leaves its imprint on switching behavior. Third, we
outline our research design, specifying our operationalization of stages and our
rationale for studying Italy and Russia. Fourth, we assess our hypotheses
against data from the 1996-2001 Italian Chamber of Deputies and the 1993-
1995 Russian Duma. The fifth part draws out the implications of our study.

The Parliamentary Cycle:

Stages, Motives, and Behavior

In our approach, individuals can change their choice of parties as they pur-
sue the goals of the moment—goals specific to the stage in the parliamentary

Authors’ Note: Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2005 Workshop of the Party
Switching Research Group, Charlottesville; the 2005 Midwest Political Science Association
annual convention, Chicago; and the 2005 International Studies Association annual convention,
Honolulu. We thank Rado Iliev for research assistance and Will Heller and other members of
the Party Switching Research Group for rich and probing conversations about party switching.
We are also grateful to John Aldrich, Jim Caporaso, Mikhail Filippov, Rado Iliev, Tim Nokken,
Lucio Renno, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments on the article. The first
author acknowledges support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-0339877.

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 101

cycle. Again, that cycle is composed of legislative stages and the electoral
stage toward the end of a given term.1 In some institutional contexts, addi-
tional electoral stages (e.g., for subnational offices) may occur during the
term. The different stages of the parliamentary cycle hold out different mixes
of incentives to legislators, make some incentives more prominent at some
times than others, and thus highlight different motivations for legislators.
Positing variations in the salience of incentives and motivations over time, we
differentiate types of switching according to the location of switching behav-
ior within the parliamentary cycle.
The first step in elaborating this sketch of our approach is to treat why
legislators might switch parties. We assume that the reasons for switching lie
in legislators’ utility functions. A distinguished tradition holds that parties
and individual politicians are motivated by office, policy, and votes (e.g.,
Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990). Consistent with the conventional wis-
dom, we assume that members of Parliament (MPs) may switch partisan
affiliation to obtain parliamentary offices and privileges, to increase the like-
lihood of achieving preferred policy outcomes, or to gain advantage in posi-
tioning for reelection. All of these motives may prove relevant to some
degree (cf. Strøm, 1990) in each individual decision to change a party, and
thus none should be ignored when evaluating a particular switch. We add,
however, that their relative salience differs across specific periods of time,
depending on what dominates the parliamentary agenda and hence which
payoffs are most prominent, immediate, and available. To our knowledge,
this addition is a novel argument in the literature.
Figure 1 depicts key elements of our approach by identifying the stages
within the parliamentary cycle where we expect switching to be motivated
by distinct goals. The figure serves as a device for separating the motives for
switching as they acquire salience over time. Again, we posit that variations
in activities in the legislature determine variations in the salience of differ-
ent motives. We assume that the period of greatest salience of each motiva-
tion inducing switching can be identified at the outset, on the basis of the
paper (or electronic) trail of parliamentary activity, institutional constraints,
and events dominating decision making on an overarching dimension. Thus,
by associating changes of partisanship with the periods when they occur, and
by differentiating periods according to the set of payoffs being decided, we
assess the relative impact of the aims of office (including legislative perks),
policy, and (re)election.
What we call Stage A (for Affiliation) in the parliamentary cycle marks
the transition from the popular vote to the taking up of legislative seats in
the first legislative session. At this stage, although seats are being assigned

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102 Comparative Political Studies

Figure 1
Switching Behavior During the Parliamentary Cycle

Pre-cycle
campaign Stage A:(Affiliation)Reaffirm
affiliation with the electoral
party

Stage B:(Benefits)
Taking up seats and Determination of committees,
announcing group government participation,
membership portfolios

Allocating
parliamentary/cabinet Stage C:(Control of
offices policy)Advantage in
agenda control

Parties in elections Stage E:(Elections)

Active policy- Coalition formation to
making ensure personal re-
election

Campaign Positioning for

advantage in the next
election

to parties and candidates in accordance with electoral rules, MPs have the
opportunity to alter the label on which they won election—when they
announce (party) group affiliation for the legislative session. At this time,
too, any independents might choose to join an organized parliamentary
group.2 We posit that MPs are motivated primarily by perks during Stage A,
for they respond to the availability of goods (from office space and staff to
leadership posts within a group) tied to membership in one parliamentary
group or another, as shaped by internal legislative rules. To be sure, policy
motives are not absent during this stage. Office serves as an instrument to
affect policy (cf. Laver & Shepsle, 1996). Moreover, Stage A offers MPs an
important strategic opportunity, for they can maneuver to seize those elec-
torally or legislatively advantageous policy positions left vacant when some
parties failed to win representation, for example, by missing an electoral
threshold; MPs should make this sort of policy-driven move above all in
systems with a relatively well-defined policy space, such as Italy.
Stage B (for Benefits) is when on the one hand executive portfolios and
on the other committee seats, committee chairs, and other legislative posts
are allocated. We posit that this division of positions of power heightens
office-seeking goals for MPs. Again, policy does not disappear as a concern,

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 103

for office permits the pursuit of policy. But when offices are up for grabs,
MPs’ choices to switch or stay with their original party are driven chiefly
by interest in office.
The main task of legislatures is to make policy, of course. How, then, do
we conceive of a discrete Stage C (for Policy Control)? In our view, when
the legislative agenda focuses most heavily on policy domains relevant to a
broad range of issues and decisions, it should bring to a peak the salience of
policy aims for MPs. We isolate the phases of greatest legislative activity in
policy domains carrying special weight: finance and, as applicable, security
and foreign affairs and constitutional questions (cf. Laver & Shepsle, 1996;
Lijphart, 1984). Thus, whereas some analysts, mindful of the executive’s role
in policy making, might paint an entire legislative term as something like a
continuous Stage C shaded gray to capture the Parliament’s overall contribu-
tion to policy decisions, we see a noncontinuous sequence of shorter, near-
black, phases of concentrated attention to the most important policy domains.
We posit that, given MPs’ heightened focus on policy in this noncontinuous
sequence of phases, switching in Stage C should occur so as to affect policy
choices and secure agenda control.
Stage E (for Elections) closes the parliamentary cycle in Figure 1. In this
stage, we posit, electoral motivations should come to the fore, and switch-
ing should chiefly serve as a means for preelectoral positioning. Figure 1
simplifies reality, of course, and in some institutional contexts, Stage E may
recur during the cycle. Nonparliamentary elections—subnational, presiden-
tial, or supranational—may fall during the term and may affect the way
MPs perceive their reelection prospects. As we see it, then, stages linked to
nonparliamentary elections enter into Stage E. MPs’ seats are not at stake,
but MPs learn from opinion polls, which proliferate before elections, and
from voting returns, which reveal stances and affiliations that promise or
pay electoral benefits. Electoral aims should thus bring MPs to switch in
proximity to nonparliamentary elections.
One stage, D (for Dormant), does not appear in Figure 1. Stage D is
simply all periods other than Stages A, B, C, and E—a residual set of intervals
between the active stages. We expect no distinctive switching by politicians
driven by office, policy, or reelection—that is, we expect no switching—to
occur during Stage D, because it is more advantageous to switch in the rel-
evant active stages. All stages but D may overlap or coincide.
Given the general premise that MPs are goal minded, the general expec-
tation is that they switch when their goals are best served by such action.
That expectation leads to more specific testable hypotheses.

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104 Comparative Political Studies

Hypothesis 1: The rate of switching should vary during the course of the
parliamentary cycle. Switching should be relatively frequent in Stages
A, B, C, and E.
Hypothesis 2: Attributes of switchers should vary by stage. Office-driven
switching should predominate in Stages A and B, policy-driven switching
should predominate in Stage C, and vote-driven switching should predom-
inate in Stage E. Thus, independents should switch in Stages A and B.
“Notables” (those MPs, who, by virtue of seniority or other distinction,
are most capable of strongly influencing policy) should switch, if they
switch, in Stage C. MPs who see themselves as on the brink of electoral
victory (given the distribution of voter preferences) should move in
Stage E.3
Hypothesis 3: Stage C switches should aim for clear policy effect. Those
switches identifiable by timing as policy driven should hunt the core, grab
agenda advantage, or break the government. Otherwise, the switches
would not change policy outcomes.
Corollary to Hypothesis 3: New parliamentary groups formed in Stage C
should locate at the center of the policy space. Assuming policy goals,
political entrepreneurs should found new groups in the center of the policy
space. They should, in other words, hunt the core.
Hypothesis 0: Null. No or very little variation between Stage D and the active
stages should emerge in rates of switching and attributes of switchers.

Research Design and Method

Hypotheses in hand, we address five issues of research design entailed

in testing them. First, like others in this field, we define a switch as “any
recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding or
competing for elective office” (Heller & Mershon, 2005b, p. 4).
Second, the key advantage to examining Italy and Russia is that these two
very different countries have strikingly similar institutions. No two electoral
systems are fully identical because of their inherent complexity. Yet for the
terms we study, Italy and Russia both used hybrid laws, combining propor-
tional representation (PR), thresholds for PR, and plurality in single-member
districts (SMDs). Other institutional similarities include powerful sub-
national governments (although Italy is not federal) and nonconcurrence
between parliamentary and other major elections.4 These similarities are
essential to discerning the imprint of timing in the parliamentary cycle on
patterns of switching, as formal institutions should strongly affect politi-
cal actors’ choices in partisan competition. Given the selection of cases

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 105

with institutional parallels, we would be able to reject our hypotheses

with confidence if differences in switching behavior appeared (unless some
detail in rules differed too). Similarities in switching would equally clearly
corroborate our reasoning. Moreover, differences in the party systems and
the age of the democratic regimes offer an opportunity to assess the exter-
nal validity of our hypotheses. Individual parties and the party system in
Italy are well institutionalized compared with the Russian.5 The policy
space is well defined in Italy compared with Russia, despite changes in the
Italian party system, which are due, in part, to the 1993 electoral reform. If
similarities in switching appeared in the different contexts, the relative party
system institutionalization and democratic consolidation in Italy would pre-
clude interpreting whatever patterns Russia evinced as mere aberrations
because of the uncertain and transitional nature of its politics.
Our third choice in research design might draw criticism, which we must
confront squarely. We deliberately select for intensive study in each country
the particular legislative term that qualifies as that with the highest per-
centage of switchers and highest number of switches for any term to date—
1996-2001 in Italy and 1993-1995 in Russia. Specifically, about one fourth
of Italian MPs switched parties at least once during the 1996-2001 term,
with the total number of switches in the 630-member Chamber standing at
277. Almost one third of the MPs in the Russian Duma switched at least
once from 1993 to 1995, and switches totaled 342 for the 450-member
House. Critics might argue that our criterion is problematic because it
directs attention to the first post-Communist Duma, when legislators might
have still been learning to read and respond to institutional incentives
(Kaminski, 2002; Kunicová & Remington, 2005). One might also imagine
that the Italian deputies under scrutiny were still adapting to a new institu-
tional and partisan environment, especially because the share of neophytes
in the 1996-2001 Chamber was relatively high (Verzichelli, 1996; Zucchini,
2001, p. 172). Yet we see these possibilities as sources of strength in our
design: If we find that, even during the relatively uncertain first Duma and
1996-2001 Chamber, switching varies according to type of incentive dom-
inant in distinct stages, then we are likely to find elsewhere that switching
varies by stage in the parliamentary cycle.
Fourth, we must spell out the procedures used to operationalize legisla-
tive and electoral stages. Central to our approach to demarcating the bound-
aries of stages is the proposition, again, that the time of the relative salience
of each motivation that induces switching can be readily identified accord-
ing to the record of activity in the legislature, institutional prescriptions, and

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On Operationalizing Stages of the Parliamentary Cycle
106
Stage Concept
A Affiliation: MPs take up
seats and announce
group affiliation
B Benefits: Legislative and
executive offices are
allocated
C Control of policy: Policy
making dominates agenda
D Dormant: All periods other
than A, B, C, and E
E Reelection: MPs position for
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advantage in next legislative
election (includes
nonparliamentary elections
in some contexts)
Note: All stages save D can overlap or coincide. For details on operationalized stages, see Appendix B. MP = member of Parliament; SMD = single-member
district; PR = proportional representation.
Table 1
Factors Shaping Operationalization
Electoral laws affecting
independents; legislative rules
on groups and on start of
legislative session
Relative strength of president
versus premier; number of
cabinets per legislative term
Rules on introducing, considering,
and approving bills, including
committee role
Definition of other stages
(this is residual stage)
Rules on dissolution of legislature
before elections; rules on
registration for ballot; rules
on timing of elections; duration
of legislative term
Operationalized Stage
Italy
Election day to last day
MPs must state group
membership
With > 1 cabinets, B stages can
recur; day groups announced
to day legislative and first
executive payoffs completed;
day Nth cabinet falls to day
N + 1 cabinet named
Legislative record, from day
executive sends budget to
house to day bill passed; day
constitutional bill presented to
day committee dissolved
As indicated by other stages
E not observed; Parliament
dissolved (many
nonparliamentary elections
in 5-year term; 90 days before,
30 days after election day)
Russia
Election day to day of group selection
for SMD MPs; for PR MPs, from
date of bill where Duma specified
rules on group selection
Given strong presidency, no
governing coalition formed;
period of allocation of legislative
committee posts as reflected
in legislative records
Legislative record, from first vote
on finance and until finance
moves off the agenda; on war:
as indicated by key events that
open and close policy episode
As indicated by other stages
Day marking 90 days before
election to end of ballot
registration, 30 days before
election (no nonparliamentary
elections included)
 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 107

events that force decision making on a key policy dimension. Table 1 illus-
trates how we move from the general principle to specific definitions of
stages in each case.
We identify Stage A (Affiliation) as the interval between election day
and the last day that MPs have to announce parliamentary group member-
ship. The latter might or might not be the day that Parliament first meets,
depending on specific rules. We locate Stage B (Benefits) from the last day
of announcement of group membership to the day that the distribution of
all legislative offices and executive portfolios is completed. As Table 1
shows, our operationalization takes into account institutional differences
between our cases in that the strength of the Russian presidency removes
the need to form a governing coalition, and at Stage B, committees and
internal parliamentary governance posts are the only offices divided. Stage
B can cover multiple substages in a single legislative term, involving, for
example, multiple cabinets.
Stage C (Policy Control) must be decomposed into multiple stretches of
time so as to isolate the substages of the most active, controversial policy
bargaining. As indicated, we limit the focus to budgetary questions and, as
applicable, security and foreign policy and constitutional matters.6 We set
exogenous criteria for locating the periods of most intense policy bargain-
ing on these dimensions, attending to such steps in the legislative process
as the executive’s transmittal of the annual budget bill to the legislature.
Appendix B supplies details, as indicated in Note 8.
As Table 1 emphasizes, Stage D (Dormant) is the residual set of intervals
between the active stages. Operationalization here is thus simple. Whatever
spans do not qualify as Stage A, B, C, or E become, by definition and
default, Stage D.
All stages except D can overlap or coincide. For the terms we analyze,
the legislative agendas show that overlap sometimes occurs in Italy and
never in Russia. On the one hand, the first Duma handled tasks sequentially,
rather than simultaneously, because it was a new governing body and built a
new framework of legislation from scratch, rather than maintaining, amend-
ing, and extending the corpus of existing legislation. Moreover, all Dumas
operate under an extremely strong presidency. On the other hand, the Italian
Chamber continued quite active deliberations during campaigns for subna-
tional and supranational elections.
Approaches to measuring Stage E (Elections) can be several. One set of
boundaries would be the start of registration for the ballot for the next leg-
islative elections and election day itself. Yet we find this approach inade-
quate for tapping strategic behavior in anticipation of decisions on lists and

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108 Comparative Political Studies

candidacies. Given the evident capacity of Italian and Russian MPs to

anticipate electoral competition—well in advance of scheduled parliamen-
tary elections—we opt for designating an arbitrary Stage E, specific to
practices in each national setting. Table 1 summarizes our rules of thumb,
and Appendix B details them. Note that for electoral stages tied to nonpar-
liamentary contests, found only in Italy, we can observe switching before
and after the elections during the same parliamentary cycle. For legislative
elections, we only observe switches before the elections, and any switches
afterward belong to the next parliamentary cycle.
The final component of research design to address is our integration of
descriptive statistics with the logic of event history analysis (Allison, 1984;
Beck & Katz, 1995; Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998; Box-Steffensmeier &
Jones, 2004). Although we do not estimate event history models in this arti-
cle, we analyze our data in ways conforming to the event history approach.
Figures 2 to 5 report standardized measures of switching behavior—the rates
of occurrence of the event of switching, in the terms of event history models.
The stages organizing Tables 2 and 3 constitute risk periods in event history
analysis. Whereas a continuous-time approach is sometimes used with event
history data, we choose a discrete-time approach for two reasons. The first is
practical: The only way that the time of an MP’s switch can be registered is
by calendar dates—discrete intervals. The realities of measurement suggest
too that the recorded day of a move is an indicator whose seeming precision
is illusory. The press of items on the agenda, ongoing debates, or even twists
on the paper trail may slow the announcement and processing of a switch. We
thus adopt the week rather than the day as our discrete interval. Second, we
use the discrete approach because we view party switching as, in essence,
strategic behavior: The probability that an MP changes affiliation differs
systematically across different stages of the parliamentary cycle (different
exogenously given risk periods) because of his or her period-specific strate-
gic concerns. The date attached to the record of the switch (as caught in con-
tinuously unfolding time) is less important than the observation that the MP
makes the switch during a discrete phase when it is opportune.

Empirical Analysis of Switching: Italy and Russia

We now assess evidence from the 1996-2001 Italian Chamber of Deputies

and the 1993-1995 Russian Duma. As an initial step, we analyze the fre-
quency of switching by aggregated stage, distinguishing MPs by mode of
election. We then disaggregate the data.

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 109

Switching by Stage: A First Cut

Table 2 compares the distribution of Russian and Italian legislators’
switches by stage in the parliamentary cycle. We standardize the measure of
frequency of switching by examining mean weekly switches per 100 MPs.
Note first, as the top row of the table displays, that the opening weeks of the
term, when newly elected deputies must choose parliamentary group affili-
ation (Stage A), exhibit the highest aggregate rate of occurrence of switch-
ing in both Italy and Russia. Yet the Russian rate is more than 15 times the
Italian rate in Stage A.
The behavior of Russian independents drives this enormous difference.
In 1993, roughly two thirds of Russian SMDs were won by independents,
reflecting not only the electoral rules and weakly institutionalized party
system but also the rushed campaign, a product of Yeltsin’s decision to call
the parliamentary elections on short notice and in conjunction with the con-
stitutional referendum. In Stage A, as revealed in the table’s first row,
Russian independents, having earned SMD seats, engaged quite busily in
party shopping and hopping. Although in Italy the ballot structure inhibited
independents from entering the Chamber, the pattern resembled the Russian
in that in Stage A, substantially more switching occurred among SMD
deputies than among PR ones; all mobile SMD MPs opted for the motley
Mixed Group.7
When office benefits are allocated (Stage B, on the second row), mean
weekly switches per 100 MPs are roughly similar for the full lower house
across Italy and Russia. The occurrence of the event of switching in Stage B
is almost three times higher among PR legislators in Italy than among SMD
ones. In Russia, the proportion is flipped, with SMD MPs switching about
three times as often as their colleagues. The Russian SMD deputies elected
as independents execute the bulk of moves, for joining parties makes them
eligible for internal legislative office.
Switching in the aggregated policy control stage (C) is more than five times
more frequent in Russia than in Italy. The rate of switching in proximity to
Italian subnational elections (the aggregated Stage E) nearly matches that reg-
istered in the Italian policy control stage (C). Switching in the Russian electoral
stage is double that of the Italian E but less than half that of the Russian C.
Mean weekly switches per 100 MPs drop to their lowest rate in the full
house for Italy and Russia in the aggregated Stage D (Dormant), after initial
affiliations are announced, when neither benefits are allocated nor major
questions of policy control dominate the agenda nor elections loom. In both
cases, switching in D dies down. By these data, the null hypothesis fails.

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 110
Table 2
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs by Type of Stage and by MPs’ Mode of Election, 1996-2001
Italian Chamber and 1993-95 Russian Duma
Russian Duma
Italian Chamber
SMD
Aggregate Aggregate
Stage N Weeks All MPs SMD PR N weeks All MPs All Partya Independentsa PR

A 4 0.36 0.43 0.18 6 5.56 11.04 0.90 15.01 0.07

B 9 0.35 0.25 0.67 12 0.30 0.44 0.23 0.52 0.15
C 109 0.20 0.18 0.27 26 1.09 1.62 0.52 2.03 0.56
D 95 0.10 0.11 0.08 53 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.10
E 94b 0.21 0.21 0.27 8b 0.42 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.33

Note: Tukey test for differences of means (all MPs) across Russian stages: p < .005; Tukey test for differences of means (all MPs) across Italian dor-
mant and active stages (given overlapping of active stages): p < .10. MP = member of Parliament; SMD = single-member district; PR = proportional
representation; Stage A = affiliation; Stage B = benefits; Stage C = policy control; Stage E = electoral; Stage D = dormant, that is, all periods other

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than A, B, C, and E.
a. Independents are elected as a subset of single-member district MPs only in Russia, as discussed in the text.
b. The only observable electoral stages in Italy pertain to nonparliamentary elections, whereas the only electoral stage in Russia is associated with
the campaign for the subsequent Parliament.
 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 111

Table 2 documents that when we restrict attention to MPs elected on

party labels, switching rates per aggregated stage look roughly alike across
Russian and Italian MPs, regardless of mandate. It is thus the propensity of
the Russian SMD deputies elected as independents to jump parliamentary
groups, which underpins the statistically significant differences summa-
rized in the table. Overall, Table 2 allows for a preliminary and partial
assessment of our hypotheses. The basic notion that the rate of switching
varies by stage (Hypothesis 1) finds support. Independents switch often in
Stages A and B, in line with Hypothesis 2. Yet Russian independents are
also prone to switch in the aggregated policy control Stage C. Further
inspection of the first two hypotheses calls for scrutiny of substages, just as
evaluation of Hypothesis 3 requires isolating the most intense substages of
policy bargaining. To this we now turn.

Switching Disaggregated by Substage

Like Table 2, Figures 2-5 report mean weekly switches per 100 MPs—the
rates of occurrence of the event of switching.8 Figures 2 and 3 portray the
switching behavior of all MPs and SMD MPs in each of the substages, ordered
chronologically, in the 1993-1995 Duma and the 1996-2001 Chamber; the
behavior of PR MPs, as the remaining category, can be imputed. Two aspects
of Figures 2 and 3 deserve note. The error bars show standard errors in mean
weekly switches per 100 MPs for each substage, and substages with rela-
tively high rates are tagged. Figures 3 and 4 track, for each successive week
of the term, weekly switches per 100 MPs.
Looking first at Figure 2, the frequency of switching among Russian
SMD MPs in the Duma’s first affiliation stage (Stage A.1) is an obvious
outlier. This is, by a very long shot, the highest rate of occurrence of switch-
ing in any substage for either subgroup of deputies (SMD or PR) in the two
legislatures. During the Russian A.1, which lasted only 1 week, SMD (but
not PR) deputies were asked to self-identify as to factional membership.
Whereas the delegation of any party qualifying for PR seats automatically
received official Duma faction status, SMD MPs had the option of register-
ing with groups endowed with the same rights enjoyed by factions, as long
as the group met the minimum size of 35. Seizing the opportunity to affili-
ate, SMD legislators switched with abandon and formed an entirely new
faction during A.1. PR MPs could not create new groups during A.1, which
ended when the Duma shifted its focus to internal institutional matters,
committee assignments, and other office-related votes (Stage B, benefits).
Only after the extant groups had successfully monopolized committee and

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112 Comparative Political Studies

Figure 2
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs (All and SMD), by Sequential
Substage in Term, 1993-95 Russian Duma (SE in Error Bars)

A.1 off chart*

10
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs

C.3

4
A.2 C.2 C.4 E

0
0 4 8 12 16
Substages in Russian Term, Ordered Chronologically

*A.1 is outlier:
mean/100 all MPs mean/100 all MPs = 27.8
mean/100 SMDs = 55.6
mean/100 SMDs Vertical axis truncated so as to
clarify scale for other stages.

Note: MP = member of Parliament; SMD = single-member district.

leadership posts did they move to permit new ones to form, with the approval
in March 1994 of the law on registration of Duma factions. This law opened
Russia’s second affiliation stage (A.2) and enabled PR MPs to switch. Even
in A.2, however, SMD MPs—in particular, those elected as independents—
evinced a higher rate of switching. Switching in the single benefits stage was
not as great as in the two affiliation stages, but MPs elected as independents

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 113

Figure 3
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs (All and SMD), by Sequential
Substage in Term, 1996-2001 Italian Chamber (SEs in Error Bars)

2.5
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs

B.3 C.6

2.0
D.5 C.8

1.5

1.0
E.3 D.6 E.4

A
0.5

0.0
0 8 16 24 32
Substages in Italian Term, Ordered Chronologically

mean/100 all MPs mean/100 SMDs

Note: MP = member of Parliament; SMD = single-member district.

provided most of the moves in B as well. The second hypothesis thus finds
additional corroboration.
Aside from the extraordinary behavior of independents in Stage A.1, leg-
islators’ policy disputes dealing with the second major campaign of the
Chechen War (in what we classify as Stage C.3, near the midterm) generated
the highest mean weekly switches per 100 MPs in the 1993-1995 Duma.
Relatively high rates of switching appeared in two other policy stages we
define, one involving the first Chechen War and subsuming legislative
deliberations on the 1995 budget (C.2) and the other composed of legisla-
tors’ efforts to contribute to managing the Budennovsk hostage crisis (C.4).
These Stage C switches created new factions and redefined agenda setting,

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114 Comparative Political Studies

consistent with the third hypothesis. Moreover, as the term unfolded, a

number of SMD MPs originally elected as independents emerged as notables
within the Duma, able to exert strong policy influence, so that their moves
may also be interpreted as supporting the third hypothesis.
As Figure 3 exhibits, the rate of occurrence of Italian switching is high-
est in a policy stage near the midterm. In October 1998, during what we see
as Stage C.6, the Prodi government made a vote on the 1999 budget a matter
of confidence, lost, and resigned. Communist Refounding (RC), not in the
executive but until then routinely in its legislative majority, split on the con-
fidence vote. The dissidents entered the Mixed Group, unable to form a sep-
arate legislative party because of rules on minimum size. The RC’s fission
and its effect comport with the third hypothesis. The chunk of the RC adopt-
ing a new moniker moderated, fitting the corollary.
As Figure 3 also reveals, a benefits stage witnessed the second-highest
peak in Italian switching. In Stage B.3, legislative offices—seats and lead-
ership posts on the large Bicameral Committee on Constitutional Reform
(la Bicamerale)—were allocated. The Prodi government made constitutional
reform one of its top priorities. Politicians, pundits, scholars, and citizens
viewed the work of la Bicamerale as crucial to addressing the ongoing
systemwide crisis that had opened with the vast corruption scandal in 1992
(e.g., Pasquino, 1999). Because the choice of rules carried profound conse-
quences for policy outcomes (e.g., Riker, 1982), the work of la Bicamerale
stirred great controversy; office assignments on it were intrinsically linked
to high-stakes policy. The bulk of switches in B.3 involved MPs from the
Christian Democratic Center–United Democratic Christians (CCD-CDU),
the leftmost group in the Center–Right bloc. The moves were made en masse,
as the CDU portion of what began as the unified CCD-CDU group split off
and entered the Mixed Group; the CDU contained an unusually large share
of PR MPs. The day after the CDU bolted, its leader was named to la
Bicamerale, with a seat on two of its four subcommittees.9 We identify in
Stage B.3 evidence that marches with our Hypotheses 2 (on office and pol-
icy motives, bound together, and on notables) and 3 (agenda advantage).
Figure 3 flags a number of other Italian substages distinguished by rela-
tively high rates of switching. Consider the run-up to and aftermath of the
May 1998 subnational elections, which we code as Stage E.3. To contest
the 1998 elections, Senator and former president Cossiga founded a new
centrist party (the UDR, Union of Democrats for the Republic), which
attracted MPs from the former CDU and CCD, as well as some with center–left
origins. As the campaign unfolded (and overlapped with a policy stage),
Cossiga announced the UDR’s stance on budget legislation and constitutional

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 115

questions (www.cattaneo.org). As we read the record, Cossiga was not only

simultaneously pursuing tightly linked electoral and policy aims but was
also hunting the core of the Italian policy space. His initiatives and the
switches he triggered support the second and third hypotheses and the corol-
lary on the location of new groups.
Next observe the string of stages after the peak in policy Stage C.6. The
single week classified as D.5 occurred in October 1998, between decisions
on benefits in the D’Alema I cabinet (which replaced the ill-fated Prodi I)
and the resumption of committee handling of the 1999 budget; all but one
of the switchers in D.5 moved from the UDR to the Mixed Group. What we
call D.6 preceded the electoral cycle defined by the June 1999 subnational
and European Parliament elections (E.4). In Phase D.6, preparing for the
1999 elections (www.cattaneo.org), former premier Prodi launched the
center–left Democrats–Olive Tree (Dem-U), which fell just shy of the min-
imum size of a separate parliamentary group (20 MPs). Additional moves
during electoral Stage E.4 enlarged the Dem-U and permitted its establish-
ment as a group. Other switches in the wake of the 1999 elections, still in
E.4, created the Democratic Union for Europe (UDEur) as an organized
component of the Mixed Group and as the successor to the UDR, also led
by Cossiga. Chamber membership in the UDEur swelled sufficiently dur-
ing policy Stage C.8 to qualify it as a legislative group, and Stage C.8 wit-
nessed debates on finance so fierce that 2 days after the 2000 budget bill
won approval, the government resigned. Together, these episodes feature
moves responding to notables’ initiatives and coinciding with policy contro-
versy and electoral campaigns. Switchers did not always heed leaders: The
UDR’s shrinkage in Stage D.5 followed policy conflicts that overturned one
executive and ushered in another. Given the timing of D.5 and D.6 relative
to benefit, policy control, and electoral phases, switching in these two sub-
stages of the generally calm D does not upset our hypotheses and even
buttresses them.
In both Italy and Russia, we uncover evidence on vote-driven switching
that aligns with our reasoning. The rate of occurrence of switching in the
Russian reelection Stage E is roughly the same as that in the two Italian non-
parliamentary electoral stages just discussed—notwithstanding the differ-
ences in scale in Figures 2 and 3. (For details, contact the authors.) We cannot
observe a reelection stage for Italy as we do for Russia, given particulars of
the rules. President Ciampi dissolved the Italian Parliament before the date of
the 2001 election had been set and before the mandated day could be iden-
tified for depositing candidate names and party lists. We can define three
preelectoral substages, according to three decisions on the units to enter the

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116 Comparative Political Studies

2001 race; only one MP moved during any of these spans. Thus, in Italy,
jockeying for electoral advantage occurred in conjunction with subnational
and supranational elections (cf. Heller & Mershon, 2005a). And because
Italian MPs synchronized vote-seeking switching to nonlegislative elec-
tions, they had tested the performance of their new electoral vehicles by the
time the next parliamentary elections were held. In Russia, instead, rela-
tively many MPs switched immediately before the parliamentary campaign.
We attribute this contrast in timing to differences in institutions, the degree
of party system institutionalization, the age of the democratic regimes, and
the information available to the players in electoral politics.
We have adduced evidence in favor of all three hypotheses. We have seen
too that in both cases (the spectacular Russian Stage A.1 aside), the peak in
switching fell near the middle of the legislative term. We now focus on this
phenomenon, which we name the “midterm effect.”

The Midterm Effect and the Dynamic of Switching

To document further the dynamic of partisanship, we disaggregate the
switching data down to each week observed. Figures 4 and 5 use three
symbols to plot three attributes of each successive week in the legislative
term: weekly switches per 100 MPs, mean weekly switches per 100 MPs
for substages as we operationalize them, and weekly differences in switch-
ing rates from substage means. Visual inspection of Figures 4 and 5 thus
offers a simple but effective way to take stock of the sensitivity of our find-
ings on switching rates to our parsing of stages in the parliamentary cycle.
The figures suggest that a slightly different parsing of stages would not yield
substantially different results.10 The dynamic of the distribution of switches
over time—a primary characteristic of switching behavior—stands indepen-
dent of the researcher-imposed borders in the coding of stages. The figures
lend backing to our analytic approach.
A midterm peak in switching stands out in the figures as a feature common
to the two countries. The midterm phenomenon is visible when we disag-
gregate both Russian and Italian legislators by mode of election (results
available from the authors). What is more, although the discernible dynamic
of switching rarely roams far from the means created by our coding of stages
in the parliamentary cycle, as stressed, the largest week-by-week deviations
from the substage mean rates fall at the midterm in Russia and at or near the
midterm in Italy. The contrast in scale, plain on the figures’ horizontal axes,
echoes country differences already identified: The midterm apex of switch-
ing in Russia is roughly 5.5 switches per 100 MPs, and in Italy, it is 2.1.

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 117

Figure 4
Weekly Switches per 100 MPs, Substage Mean Weekly
Switches per 100, and Differences From Substage
Means, Russia 1993-1995

A.1 off chart*

10 weekly switch/100
Weekly Switches per 100 MPs

A.2 C.2 C.3

substage mean
diff from mean
5

*A.1 is outlier (weekly switch/100 = substage

-5 mean = 27.8). Vertical axis truncated so as to
clarify scale for other stages.

-10
0 26 52 78 104 130
Weeks in Legislative Term, Russia

Note: MP = member of Parliament.

The effect we isolate is most pronounced in the midterm policy stages

in both cases. Yet the relative increase in rate of switching is not limited to
policy stages but also occurs in other stages near the middle of the term.
Thus, underlying the midterm effect is a peak not so much in the press of
policy items on the agenda or in policy controversies as in legislators’ will-
ingness to respond to available opportunities and hence to switch.
We believe that the common midterm peak in switching—the midterm
effect—is at bottom electorally driven. Precisely because party labels serve
MPs and voters, party switching reaches its apex neither immediately after
one parliamentary election nor immediately before the next parliamentary
election. MPs reason that to build a record in a new party, they cannot
switch too late in the term. Yet they also need time in the sitting legislature
and its policy-making environment to accumulate experience—and perhaps
disappointment—in the party (or independent status) in which they won

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118 Comparative Political Studies

Figure 5
Weekly Switches per 100 MPs, Substage Mean Weekly
Switches per 100, and Differences from Substage
Means, Italy 1996-2001

3
Weekly Switches per 100 MPs

B.3 E.3 C.6

E.4 C.8
2
D.5

1 D.6

-1
0 65 130 195 260
Weeks in Legislative Term, Italy
weekly switch/100 substage mean
diff from mean

Note: MP = member of Parliament.

election. At the midterm, too, backward induction from the next parliamen-
tary elections acquires special force. Even where, as in 1993-1995 Russia,
parties do not monopolize ballot access, lack strong organizations, and face
voters with fluid ideological orientations, they impart some structure to elec-
toral competition and to voter response. That is why timing a switch at
midterm maximizes advantage and minimizes uncertainty for the MP.

The Location of New Legislative Parties

The narrative on Italy yielded evidence consistent with the corollary to
the third hypothesis, which we now assess in greater detail. The logic is

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 119

that, assuming the predominance of policy goals, new parliamentary groups

should be located at the center of policy space. On Italy, Table 3 reports the
size of each group at the start and end of the term and at the ends of the two
substages with the highest switching rates. We array groups along the
left–right spectrum following convention and MPs’ choice of seating in the
Chamber. As expected, the three new groups founded during the 1996-2001
term—the DemU, UDR, and UDEur—emerge in the center. The table
shows, moreover, that the new groups occupy areas opened up by the
shrinking or disappearance of parties extant at the term’s outset.
The Russian analysis is complicated by the extreme fluidity of the policy
space and the instability of the relative locations of parties and parliamen-
tary factions. All the same, we can study the location of new entrants to the
Duma party system, for a good portion of Duma switching occurred in the
form of coordinated moves to establish new factions, and four new factions
arose during the 1993-1995 term. We use the spatial placements of groups
that are generated by the Duma statistical service INDEM and are based on
roll-call votes.11 The data support our corollary. The two new groups
appearing when the primacy of policy goals is assumed (Stage C) adopt
centrist positions, whereas the two entries created when office aims are
assumed to dominate (in the affiliation stage, A) locate on the periphery of
the policy space.

Conclusion
In both Italy and Russia, we find that switching patterns are linked to
stages in the parliamentary cycle. We identify in our evidence significant
differences in switching rates across stages of the cycle and heightened switch-
ing for perks, office, policy advantage, agenda grabbing, and preelectoral
jockeying at distinctive stages. Phases of relative calm in the legislative agenda
induce relatively low rates of switching. The commonalities across the two
different systems provide compelling support for our overarching theoretical
framework. The salience of distinct activities on the legislative calendar thus
does affect switching behavior.
Differences in the timing of vote-driven switching across the two cases
can be attributed to differences in the degree of party system institutional-
ization, the age of democratic regimes, and thus the information held by
elites and voters. In the older, more institutionalized Italian system, electoral
positioning via switching occurs in anticipation of and, to a lesser extent,
after subnational elections, as MPs adjust expectations about voters (cf.
Heller & Mershon, 2005a). In Russia, preelectoral positioning occurs during

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 120
Table 3
Party Group Sizes and Left–Right Positions, Endpoints of Two Substages With Highest
Mean Weekly Switches per 100 MPs and at Start and End of Legislative Term,
1996-2001 Italian Chamber
Group and Size

Time RC-Rump RC DS PD DemU RI UDEur UDR CCD-CDU Lega FI AN Mixed

Start 0 35 171 67 0 26 0 0 29 59 121 89 25

B.3 0 34 170 68 0 20 0 0 19 58 117 90 46
C.6 14 21 169 67 0 24 0 31 0 55 108 88 59a
End 14 21 165 56 20 0 21 0 0 46 107 89 82a

Note: Except for the mixed, groups are arrayed here from left to right according to convention among Italianists, which in turn reflects the groups’
self-identification of positions as manifested in their choice of seating in the Chamber hemicycle. Start of term here is the first day that the newly
elected Chamber met, which falls within Stage A. Stages are listed in chronological order. Key to party groups: RC = Communist Refounding (name
change experienced); DS = Democratic Left (started legislature as PDS, Party of Democratic Left); PD = Popular Democrats; DemU =
Democrats–Olive Tree; RI = Italian Renewal; UDEur = Democratic Union for Europe; UDR = Union of Democrats for the Republic; CCD-CDU =

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Christian Democratic Center–Christian Democratic Union; Lega = Northern League (name changes experienced); FI = Forza Italy (Go, Italy); AN
= National Alliance; Mixed = Mixed Group.
a. Total for Mixed excludes RC-Rump, an organized mixed component and not a separate group.
 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 121

national election campaigns. Driving home the import of party system insti-
tutionalization is the rough resemblance, displayed in Table 2, in partisan
Russian MPs (regardless of mandate) and those in Italy.
Our study aligns with elements of the conventional wisdom on Italy and
Russia and is original at the same time. Europeanists have analyzed Italian
episodes that appear in our narrative, such as the fall of Prodi I on a confi-
dence vote or the rise of centrist parties during the term. Studies of change
in the Italian party system abound (e.g., D’Alimonte & Bartolini, 2002), and
research on switching in Italy, though less common, has been conducted
(Verzichelli, 1996). To our knowledge, however, no scholar so far has
located the Italian phenomena in the dynamic of switching, a dynamic
attuned to the stages of the parliamentary cycle as we define them. Similarly,
experts on Russia are well aware of the level of opportunism motivating par-
ticipation in organized factions in the Duma (Moser, 2001). But to show the
broader relevance for party competition requires a systematic analysis of the
dynamic of party switching as synchronized to stages of the parliamentary
cycle. We thus advance understanding of Italian and Russian politics.
Attention to the timing of switches brings us to findings that are novel
within the still-developing literature on changes in party affiliation. The
approach and its results constitute the “value added” of this research. Yet once
more we must confront a possible criticism of our study, that we increase
the chances of favorable findings by examining two legislatures that evince
relatively frequent switching. A stiffer test of our hypotheses, continuing in
this vein, would extend to legislatures with relatively few switches and party
systems commonly viewed as relatively stable. Although a full response to
such criticism lies beyond the scope of this article, we briefly turn to the
United States to sketch the broader lessons of the Russian and Italian cases.
The United States offers a mix of similarities and differences important
to suggesting the external validity of our study. Like Russia and Italy, the
United States has strong subnational governments. As to differences, the
United States is a presidential system with plurality laws; candidate selec-
tion via primaries; and, despite the organizational weakness of parties at the
mass level, a well-institutionalized party system. And switching is rare.
We borrow data from Tim Nokken, who counts a total of 19 switches
in the House of Representatives from 1950 to 2000.12 No Democrat or
Republican but the sole third-party member of Congress (MC) (during this
span switched in what we call Stage A (Affiliation), between election day
(the first November Tuesday in even-numbered years) and the start of a
term (January 3 of odd years). We consider Stage B (Benefits) to overlap
with A, because the two parties begin negotiating ratios on committees in

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122 Comparative Political Studies

December; committee assignments are typically complete by early February

(e.g., CQ Weekly [CQW], December 8, 1984, p. 3051; February 2, 1985, p.
177; November 12, 1994, p. 3222; December 3, 1994, p. 3427; November 28,
1998, p. 3218).13 Four of the 19 switchers (including the third-party MC)
moved in Stage B, so defined. Only one switched after mid-March of a term’s
2nd year, reflecting risk avoidance in primary season (personal communica-
tion, Tim Nokken, June 28, 2006), which we code as the electoral stage, E. The
lone late switcher faced late primaries (in autumn; United Press International,
1984), saw that his district had, like him, “become more Republican”
(Gillespie in Hickey, 2003), and won reelection as “part of the Reagan land-
slide” (his postswitch campaign manager, Rove, in Gillespie, 2005).
Even in a survey of 25 terms, for a legislature with very short terms, fixed
election dates, and well-established internal procedures, it is relatively easy
to demarcate Stage A, the initial B, and the official E (although primary
dates vary across states in U.S. federalism). Isolation of Stage C (Policy
Control) is another matter. Only intensive study of multiple terms would per-
mit tracking of C stages and observation of more than a handful of switches.
This effort lies beyond our reach.
Even so, switchers in the 104th Congress (1995-1997) illustrate that MCs
have timed moves within a term in the quest for policy influence. Five MCs
elected as Democrats went Republican; no one moved the other way. This uni-
directional flow suggests a search for policy advantage, because the 104th
marked the Republicans’ return to majority status in the House, with the sub-
stantial agenda powers that entailed (Cox & McCubbins, 2006). More telling is
the timing of switches relative to policy stages (C). Policy debates centered on
finance began as soon as the House convened, as the Republicans pushed hard
for balanced budgets, spending cuts, tax cuts, and fulfillment of the “Contract
With America” (CQW, January 7, 1995, pp. 3, 118; January 21, 1995, p. 193;
January 28, 1995, p. 266). One key to the drive for spending cuts was welfare
reform (CQW, January 21, 1995, p. 205), and the term’s first switcher (Deal,
Georgia) moved a few weeks after the House rejected a welfare bill that he had
drafted (CQW, April 15, 1995, p. 1084) and a few days after the House passed
the last item in the “Contract” (CQW, April 8, 1995, p. 1010). In a mini-Stage
B in late May, Deal was appointed to the Commerce Committee, retaining
seniority earned as a Democrat (CQW, June 10, 1995, p. 1612). Laughlin
(Texas) joined the Republicans in late June, “expecting” and receiving a seat on
Ways and Means (CQW, July 1, 1995, p. 1894); in the same week, the House
and Senate approved the conference report on plans to balance the budget
(CQW, July 1, 1995, p. 1899). Tauzin (Louisiana) jumped on the heels of
“feverish” work on spending bills (CQW, July 29, 1995, p. 2231; August 12,
1995, p. 2458). In December 1995, Tauzin said that “he expected to chair” a

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 123

subcommittee “and serve as the vice chairman of the full Commerce

Committee in the 105th Congress” (CQW, January 6, 1996, p. 67). Hayes
(Louisiana) hopped right before negotiations resumed on the balanced-
budget reconciliation bill (CQW, December 2, 1995, p. 3627). The recon-
ciliation bill figures also in the case of Parker (Mississippi), who switched
at the end of a “frenetic week” of House work on it and on a short-term
continuing resolution (CQW, November 4, 1995, p. 3347). As a Democrat,
Parker had worked with Republicans on the Budget Committee in drafting
legislation (CQW, November 11, 1995, p. 3433); as a Republican, Parker
gained a seat on Appropriations (CWQ, March 16, 1996, p. 682). Even this
cursory review of one term furnishes evidence of policy motives as linked to
office benefits. Given the role of committees in the U.S. Congress, MCs who
belong to committee majorities have maximal ability to influence policy.
Our empirical investigation yields strong support for our hypotheses.
When we turn to the most studied legislature in the world, our approach
points to findings consistent with those of other research (e.g., Yoshinaka,
2005, on U.S. committee rewards). Our conception of the parliamentary cycle
and our attention to the timing of switches generate new evidence—for
Italy, Russia, and the United States—of purpose and strategy in changes of
party affiliation.
Taking timing into account enriches research on party affiliation and
partisan competition. Some phases of the parliamentary cycle present leg-
islators with relatively many stimuli to reconsidering choice of partisan-
ship. In other phases, such stimuli are in low supply. Not just the quantity
but also the quality of stimuli counts: Distinct categories of activity domi-
nating discrete stages of the parliamentary cycle elicit a particularly strong
focus on particular goals on the part of legislators. Temporal stages leave
their imprint on changes of partisanship in legislatures. Timing matters for
switching, parties, and legislative party systems.

Notes
1. Institutions determine whether the official campaign occurs near the end of an ongoing
term or after the legislature is dissolved and no longer meets. We focus on legislators, behavior,
and events during the term.
2. Group labels need not be party ones; some legislatures permit an Independent group.
3. Members of Parliament (MPs) who foresee defeat should also move in Stage E. Testing
this notion requires fine-grained data on MPs’ performance in the preceding legislative elections
and so lies beyond the article’s scope.
4. Given the fundamental similarities, smaller institutional differences do not undermine
the logic of case selection. Whereas Russia permits independents in single-member districts
(SMDs), Italy from 1993 to 2005 required that every SMD candidate be linked to at least one

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124 Comparative Political Studies

party list on the proportional representation (PR) ballot. In Italy, not Russia, SMD wins were
compensated in the PR tier (Katz, 1994; Moser, 2001). Russia has equal shares of SMD and
PR MPs, and in Italy, about three fourths of MPs came from SMDs. PR thresholds were 5%
in Russia and 4% in Italy.
5. The only relatively institutionalized party in 1993-1995 Russia was the ex-Communists.
On post-1992 Italy, see, for example, D’Alimonte and Bartolini (2002) and Mainwaring (1999).
6. We do not examine security policy in Italy, because internal warfare appears only in
Russia.
7. What is more, all SMD switchers in the Italian Stage A were center–leftists who in the
1996 race mounted broad appeals. The candidates won, but all seven MPs moved to the Mixed
Group instead of joining the legislative group of the largest party sponsoring their list (Di Virgilio
1997, 2002). It is noteworthy that, according to the Chamber’s internal rules (Articles 14 and 15),
the Mixed Group enjoys much the same rights and privileges as do party groups.
8. Appendixes A and B report mean weekly switches per 100 MPs and other substage
data. The appendixes are posted on Mershon’s Web site, at http://people.virginia.edu/~cam6m/
datasets.html.
9. Similarly, the rightmost group in the center–left bloc split the day the Chamber passed the
1997 budget. The breakup reflected preordained lines, those defining the miniparties joined to sur-
pass the 4% barrier in 1996 (http://www.istcattaneo.org/archivi/avvenimenti/1996.htm). On the
CDU, see http://www.cattaneo.org; http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/composiz/home.
htm. Like Italian scholars, we see the hybrid laws as creating the conditions for eventual splits
(e.g., D’Alimonte & Bartolini, 2002; De Micheli & Verzichelli, 2004).
10. To investigate further, we created dummies to mark weeks at either boundary of any
stage lasting more than 2 weeks. For both countries, differences in the means of switches
per 100 MPs for those weeks at the borders of substages and those weeks comprising the
main parts of substages do not attain statistical significance (separate and pooled variances
t tests, 0.33 < p < .72).
11. INDEM maps are available only when the entrant begins to vote on legislation. Given
extreme spatial fluidity in the Duma, post-entry placement does not reliably correspond to the
policy setting immediately preceding entry. Maps are available upon request from the authors.
12. We thank Tim Nokken for sharing and discussing his data on U.S. switching.
Americanists debate how to treat the affiliation choices of the few MCs elected as independents
(cf. Hatcher & Oppenheimer, 2003, pp. 5-7; Nokken & Poole, 2004). One independent “upon
his election . . . was accepted as a member of the [majority] Democratic caucus” (Hatcher &
Oppenheimer, 2003, p. 5); another in the 2nd week of his first term compromised with the
Democratic majority so as to receive committee posts without joining the caucus (CQ Weekly,
January 12, 1991, p. 115). The first event fell in what we see as Stage A (and perhaps B), and
the second, in Stage B. Despite cross-checks with the Biographical Directory (United States
Congress, 2005), we cannot locate specifics on when other MCs elected as independents from
1950 to 1998 joined or negotiated with one of the major parties.
13. This discussion relies on Nokken’s data and the online CQ Weekly, CQW in the text.

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 Mershon, Shvetsova / Party Switching 127

Carol Mershon is an associate professor in the Department of Politics at University of

Virginia. Her research examines the politics of multiparty government, intraparty competi-
tion, and the dynamics of party systems. Recent publications include The Costs of Coalition
(Stanford, 2002) and “Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-2001” (with
William B. Heller, Journal of Politics, 2005).

Olga Shvetsova is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton

University. She studies the connection between political institutions and party systems’ devel-
opment. Recent publications include Designing Federalism (with Mikhail Filippov and Peter
Ordeshook, Cambridge, 2004) and “Compromising a Long Lasting Transitional Formula” (in
J. Colomer, ed., The Handbook of Electoral System Design, St. Martin’s, 2005).

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