Drexel School of Economics Working Paper 2021-10 Revised

Drexel Economics
Working Paper Series

WP 2021-10
School of Economics
LeBow College of Business
Drexel University
The Global Sanctions Data Base:

An Update that Includes the Years of the Trump Presidency
Aleksandra Kirilakha Gabriel Felbermayr
Drexel University Kiel Institute
Constantinos Syropoulos Erdal Yalcin Yoto V. Yotov

Drexel University Konstanz University of Applied Sciences Drexel University
Abstract
We introduce and discuss 381 previously unrecorded sanction cases among which 75 emerged
during 2016-2019, a period that coincides with the Trump presidency. These newly considered
cases are included in the updated Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of Felbermayr et al.
(2020), thus raising the total of sanction cases recorded there to 1101. Our descriptive analysis
reveals that a number of sanctions were lifted in 2016. However, in 2017 we witnessed a substantial
increase in the deployment of new – primarily ‘smart’ (i.e., …nancial and travel) – sanctions of
which more than half were imposed by the United States. Moreover, we observed a signi…cant
rise in the number of sanctions aiming to ‘change’the policies of sanctioned states and to …ght
‘terrorism’. Almost all sanctions initiated by the Trump administration are still in place, so
assessment of their success remains open.
JEL classi…cation: F1; F13; F14; F5; F51; H5; N4

Keywords: Sanctions; the GSDB; Trump Administration
The Global Sanctions Data Base:
An Update that Includes the Years of the Trump Presidency†
Aleksandra Kirilakha,
Gabriel Felbermayr, Constantinos Syropoulos,
Erdal Yalcin and Yoto V. Yotov∗
Abstract
We introduce and discuss 381 previously unrecorded sanction cases among which 75 emerged
during 2016-2019, a period that coincides with the Trump presidency. These newly considered
cases are included in the updated Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of Felbermayr et al.
(2020), thus raising the total of sanction cases recorded there to 1101. Our descriptive analysis
reveals that a number of sanctions were lifted in 2016. However, in 2017 we witnessed a
substantial increase in the deployment of new – primarily ‘smart’ (i.e., financial and travel) –
sanctions of which more than half were imposed by the United States. Moreover, we observed
a significant rise in the number of sanctions aiming to ‘change’ the policies of sanctioned states
and to fight ‘terrorism’. Almost all sanctions initiated by the Trump administration are still in
place, so assessment of their success remains open.
JEL Classification Codes: F1, F13, F14, F5, F51, H5, N4.
Keywords: Sanctions, the GSDB, Trump Administration.
______________________________________
† We are indebted to numerous scholars for their positive feedback and specific suggestions on the initial release of the
GSDB. We are especially grateful to, and thank, Keenan Kassa, David Comtsyan, Tobias Weirowski, James Smith,
Matteo Pinna, Ruth Gibson, Zachary J. Kramer, Thmbinkosi Rushwaya, Abhinada Nandy and Carla Norrlof. We also
thank Peter A.G. van Bergeijk for numerous construction comment on the version of this paper that would be contributed
to the Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions he is editing. The development and maintenance of the GSDB require
substantial time and effort. In return, we expect researchers who use it to cite the current paper and Felbermayer et al.
(2020). Moreover, if you identify errors or omissions in the GSDB, please notify us at GSDB@drexel.edu, where you
can also obtain the latest version.
∗ Contact: Kirilakha – School of Economics, Drexel University, ak3494@drexel.edu; Felbermayr – Kiel Institute,
felbermayr@ifw-kiel.de; Syropoulos – School of Economics, Drexel University, CESifo, c.syropoulos@drexel.edu;
Yalcin – Konstanz University of Applied Sciences, CESifo, erdal.yalcin@htwg-konstanz.de; Yotov – Schoool of
Economics, Drexel University, CESifo, yotov@drexel.edu.
“The Trump administration has imposed sanctions at a record-shattering pace
of about three times a day during the president’s time in office: a slew of
measures targeting companies, individuals and even oil tankers tied to Iran,
North Korea, China, Venezuela and Russia. President-elect Joe Biden’s team is
promising a top-to-bottom review of sanctions operations, but don’t expect a
significant slowdown on his watch.”
Bloomberg Businessweek, Dec. 8, 2020
1 Introduction
While, depending on the definition of a sanction, one may question the statement from the
opening quote that the Trump administration has imposed sanctions at a pace of about three
times a day, two parts of this quote are undeniable. The first is that, indeed, President Trump
imposed sanctions at a record-shattering rate, more than any other US president. The second is
that most of the sanctions that were imposed during the Trump presidency would probably
remain in place during the Biden administration as well. Given the prominence of the United
States in the global economy, it is natural to expect its sanctions to have significant economic
and geopolitical consequences. What’s more, the US sanctions during the Trump presidency
may trigger retaliation or, more broadly, elevate the use of sanctions to a commonly accepted
norm that stretches the length of their worldwide reach and magnifies the depth of their impact.
For these reasons, among others, the Trump administration’s sanctions underscore the need to
work to improve our understanding of their effects.
A natural starting point – and our primary objective in this Chapter – is to collect data on
sanctions and use these data to describe their key features. Accordingly, our contribution to the
related literature is threefold. First, we have been able to trace 75 publicly reported sanctions
that were imposed between 2016 and 2019 (i.e., during most of the years of the Trump
presidency). This allowed us to extend the coverage of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB)
of Felbermayr et al. (2020) to 2019. Second, we have identified 306 additional sanction cases
during the period 1950-2016. These cases have also been recorded in the GSDB. As a result, the
updated version now includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral, plurilateral, and
unilateral sanction cases over the period 1950-2019. Third, in addition to providing a report on
the salient feature of the expanded GSDB, in the Chapter we offer a descriptive analysis of the
sanctions during the entire period with a focus on the most recent sanctions (2016-2019) and
2
especially on the new US sanctions employed by the Trump administration.
The inclusion of the newly identified cases in the GSDB was possible for the following
reasons. First, we relied on new sources (e.g., the Sanctions Alert initiative), which were
especially useful for sanction cases during 2013-2017. Second, we used the Intrastate Dispute
Narratives of the DADM Project led by the Political Science Department of the University of
Central Arkansas (UCA) to add cases related to financial and military aid cuts, travel bans and
diplomatic sanctions. Third, we revisited and cross-checked with existing sanction databases
(e.g., Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Morgan et al. (2014)) as well as newly-constructed datasets
(e.g., Weber and Schneider (2018)). Lastly, some of our additions to the GSDB were due to the
feedback we received from researchers who used it.

Exploiting the updated version of the GSDB, in this Chapter we conduct a descriptive
analysis of the sanctions imposed throughout 1950-2019 and arrive at the following
conclusions. First, 2017 was marked by a new and significant rise in sanction impositions across
the world. Second, the intensified sanction activities among nations are accompanied by an
increase in the number of sanctioning states (“senders”) and sanctioned states (“targets”). Third,
the most frequent policy objectives associated with the imposition of sanctions are
‘improvements in human rights’ and ‘restoration of democracy’, followed by ‘end wars’ and
‘policy change’. The first two of the above objectives are also prevalent in the most recent
sanctions imposed post-2016. Moreover, the relative use of the latter two objectives over the
same period rises. Fourth, during the period 1950-2019, increasingly more sanctions have been
classified as partially or fully successful. A possible interpretation of this observation is that
over time sanctions have become more effective in achieving their objectives.
Next, motivated by the fact that the Trump administration has been notorious for frequently
using sanctions as foreign policy tool, we zoom in on the recent US sanctions. We discern a clear
spike in sanction impositions in 2017 under the Trump presidency, which constitute more than
40% of all sanctions worldwide by 2019. The increased sanction activities by the US are also
accompanied by an increase in the impositions of the so-called ‘smart’ (i.e., targeted financial
and travel) sanctions. In terms of the objectives the recent US sanctions aim to attain, there has also
been an increase in the number of sanctions with the ‘policy change’ and `fighting terrorism’
objectives. In contrast, the number of sanctions with a ‘destabilize regime’ objective decreased.
3
Last, alarmingly, we observe that all US sanctions in 2019 are ongoing.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the GSDB
(including a descriptive analysis of the newly recorded cases) and describes general trends and
characteristics of the new sanctions in the world as a whole. Section 3 zooms in on the sanctions
that were imposed by the United States during 2016-2019. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Updated GSDB: A General Overview
In recent years, a diverse collection of economic sanctions has been used by a large number of
countries to promote a wide range of international policy objectives. Motivated by these
developments, in 2016 we initiated the creation of the GSDB and published its first version in
2020 (cf. Felbermayr et al. (2020)). In this section, we describe the salient characteristics of the
GSDB and explain the new features contained in its first update (GSDB Update 1).1
In the original construction of the GSDB, a number of sanction cases contained therein were
collected from a limited number of sources focusing on the 1950-2016 period. Multilateral
sanctions, which were mostly based on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions,
were collected from publicly available UN documents.2 In the cases of the United States (US)
and the European Union (EU), policy orders and corresponding national sources were screened.
Furthermore, for each individual country in the GSDB, national sources were searched to identify
additional cases. Likewise, international newspapers and history books were screened and keyword
web searches in online search engines were consulted to identify country specific sanctions,
especially for older bilateral sanction cases. With this procedure we were able to identify a total of
729 sanction cases.
The coverage of the first update of the GSDB has improved in two ways. First, due to the
1
Additional information about the GSDB can be found at https://www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com. The dataset
can be obtained by emailing us at GSDB@drexel.edu.
2
We note that most multilateral sanctions, and UN sanctions in particular, require countries to implement local
legislation to comply with them, and it is the responsibility of the countries to comply with UN sanctions. Thus,
it is possible that sometimes some countries do not implement (in whole or in part) some multilateral sanctions.
Felbermayr et al. (2019) offer empirical evidence for the heterogeneous effects of the EU sanctions on Iran across
EU member states. In light of this uncertainty of countries' behavior, in the GSDB multilateral sanctions
are assumed to be implemented by all member states, e.g., if the sanction is imposed by the UN, then all UN
members at that time are recorded as senders of that sanction.
4
discovery of new sources for sanctions and the improved listings in public databases, we were able
to identify additional cases for the period 1950-2016. Second, we extended the 1950-2016 period
by three more years (i.e., 2016-2019) and included the corresponding sanction cases in the GSDB.
As a result, the new version of the GSDB includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral,
plurilateral, and unilateral sanction cases over the period 1950-2019.3 The Appendix to this
Chapter provides a list of all newly identified cases that are contained in the updated version of
the GSDB.
There are several reasons for the increase in the number of sanction cases in the first update of
the GSDB. First, we relied on new sources. Most notably, we utilized the Sanctions Alert (by
https://www.debevoise.com) for new sanctions imposed between 2013 and 2017. Second, we
managed to record additional sanction cases (primarily related to financial and military aid cuts,
travel bans and diplomatic sanctions) by relying on the Intrastate Dispute Narratives of the
Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project led by the Political Science
Department of the University of Central Arkansas. Third, we revisited existing sanction
databases and, once again, cross-checked the GSDB cases against them. In particular, we studied
in detail each sanction case in Hufbauer et al. (2007) and, within a number of sanction policies,
we identified additional cases. We also cross-checked with Morgan et al. (2014) for missing
cases (mostly for the 1950-1990 period). Fourth, we compared the cases in the GSDB with
newly constructed datasets (i.e., the EUSANCT database by Weber and Schneider (2018)).
Lastly, we added some cases per suggestions that we received from some users of the GSDB. As
a result, we discovered 306 additional cases that were imposed up to 2016 and 75 new cases
imposed during 2016-2019.
The GSDB defines sanctions as restrictive policy measures adopted by individual countries,
groups of countries, the UN, and other international organizations, to address various types of
violations of international norms and conventions. Importantly, in the GSDB, the imposition of
tariffs or anti-dumping duties is not considered a sanction. The motivation for this decision is that
3The following pairs of sanction cases are identical in terms of the sender, the target, and the sanction
beginning and sanction end: 19 and 20 (target Algeria), 281 and 282 (target Egypt), 341 and 342 (target
Fiji), 371 and 372 (target Georgia), 398 and 399 (target Guatemala), 474 and 475 (Iran), 550 and 551 (North
Korea), 833-834 and 838-839 (target Russia), and 1061 and 1062 (target Venezuela). However, these cases
are documented separately because they have separate documents/happened separately from one
another/happened in different times of the same year.
5
classical trade policy measures are normally used to protect domestic economic interests within
defined rules (e.g., WTO anti-dumping rules) while sanctions are imposed to punish or compel a
targeted nation to conform to the sanctioning state’s political objective(s). We do recognize,
however, that the distinction between sanctions and standard trade policy tools is increasingly
becoming blurred (Hufbauer and Jung (2021)). For datasets on specific trade policy tools, we
refer the reader to the WTO and to the UN. For an excellent dataset that simultaneously accounts
sanctions and tariffs, we refer the reader to the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
(TIES) by Morgan et al. (2014); see also Morgan et al. (2021). Finally, we note that trade
sanctions take central stage in the GSDB, which distinguishes between export sanctions, import
sanctions, and bilateral trade sanctions, depending on the direction of trade flows, and between
partial and complete trade sanctions, depending on their coverage.
The GSDB features sanction cases that vary along three dimensions. First, the cases are
classified on the basis of distinct types (e.g., trade sanctions, financial sanctions, travel restrictions,
arms sanctions, military assistance sanctions, and other types of sanctions). Second, for each
sanction case, the GSDB identifies the sanctioning country’s policy objectives depending on
official documents and/or press releases.4 When sanctions have several policy objectives, the
GSDB includes up to three of these objectives (though not in order of importance). The third
dimension of the GSDB aims to assess the success of each sanction case under consideration.
This assessment is based on official government statements or indirect confirmations in
international press announcements, but it still comes with the caveat that such statements can
be subjective or biased. Nonetheless, this is a good starting point in that the collected
information allows a first assessment. Moreover, as the following descriptive statistic
illustrates, we can elaborate on some general trends regarding the success or failure of specific
sanction policies.5 Table B.1 and Table B.2 in the Appendix provide several historical examples
of sanction types and sanction objectives that are documented in the GSDB.
The GSDB complements and extends a number of prominent databases such as the
4
It is possible to identify sanction objectives by capitalizing on the fact that related official documents record the
declared objectives associated with specific sanction impositions.
5
In our ongoing data project, we are exploring possible ways to identify the success or failure of sanctions based
on newly developed machine learning techniques that can be used to screen large databases and the internet.
6
HSE/HSEO database (Hufbauer et al. (2007)), the TIES database (Morgan et al. (2014)), the TSC
database (Biersteker and Tourinho (2016)), and the EUSANCT database (Weber and Schneider
(2018)). A novel feature of the GSDB is that it records international trade sanctions and
differentiates these sanctions on the basis of several desirable characteristics. For example, in
addition to identifying the trade sanctions, the GSDB specifies the direction of affected trade
flows (exports and/or imports) and the type of trade sanction imposed (i.e., partial vs complete).
What’s more, the GSDB is available as a case-level version as well as a dyadic version. Thus,
the GSDB is very well-suited for analyses that aim to estimate the effects of alternative types of
sanctions (e.g., trade sanctions, financial sanctions, etc.) using models for bilateral flows of
trade, foreign direct investment, and migration.

Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of all identified sanctions between 1950 and 2019.6
For each year over this period, we identify the total number of imposed sanctions. Several distinct
time spans with changing trends can be discerned. Between 1950 and 1993, the number of
imposed sanctions rises continuously. Interestingly, in the early 1990s, there is a marked increase
in the number of these sanctions. In the subsequent decade, the trend changes significantly. Until
2004, both the total number of sanctions in force and the newly initiated sanction cases drop
slightly. However, a large and sustained increase of initiated sanction policies emerges again and
Figure 1: Evolution of Sanctions, 1950-2019
Note: This figure illustrates: (a) the number of all active sanctions (solid line) and the number of all existing (i.e.,
previously imposed and still active) sanctions (dashed line) in each year of the sample coverage (1950-2019).
Thus, the distance between the two lines captures the number of new sanctions recorded in each year of the sample
coverage; and (b) the yearly number of new sanction impositions over the period 1950-2019. A spike in new
6
The data used to construct Figure 1 can be found in Table A.2.
7
sanction cases occurs in 2017, mostly driven by US sanctions.
remains in place until the beginning of Obama’s second term. At that point, the number of
active sanctions starts to drop until 2016 but begins to rise in 2017 till the end of the sample
period.7 Overall, the number of sanctions has increased continuously since 1950 and this
increase has accelerated since 2018. We view this trend as evidence of the rising popularity of
sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy.8 Consequently, one would expect the economic impact
of these sanctions to rise as well.

Panel (b) of Figure 1 displays the number of new sanctions in each year for the period 1950-
2019. This panel captures two patterns. First, the number of new sanction cases has, on average,
increased over time. Second, while the number of new sanction impositions fluctuated in the
2000s, their number has on the average risen. As we argue next (and as can be inferred from
Figure 2 that follows) this is so primarily because of the adoption of ‘smart’ (targeted) sanctions
(i.e., sanctions that typically target specific individuals, companies, or organizations with
financial and/or travel restrictions.
The early 2000s were marked by a rise in humanitarian concerns largely in response to the
damage and suffering that comprehensive sanctions inflicted on innocent civilians. This led to a
decrease in the usage of these sanctions and to a re-evaluation of their effectiveness as a foreign policy
tool. The new smart sanctions, or targeted sanctions, appeared at that time and were quickly
proclaimed “superior” because they aimed to target entities that were deemed to be directly
involved in the conflict that instigated the initiation of sanctions in the first place. The frequent
deployment of this novel instrument led to another increase in sanction impositions starting in
2010. In 2016, many sanction regimes (i.e., Iran, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Myanmar) were
revoked. Yet, as indicated by the large gap between the previously existing case (captured by
the dashed-line curve in panel (a) of Figure 1) and all active cases (captured by the solid-line
curve), 2017 was different. That was the year during which the Trump administration imposed
a number of new sanctions (which account for the rise in that year shown in panel (b) of Figure
7It should be noted that, while many sanction regimes were lifted in 2016 (i.e., Myanmar, Liberia, Ivory Coast,
and Iran), the year 2017 was marked by the imposition of new sanctions.
8 In the next section we zoom in on the most recent years in the GSDB with a special focus on the U.S. sanctions
that were imposed under the Trump administration.
8
1). We focus on these sanctions in the next section.
Among other things, the two panels in Figure 2 illustrate the large and expanding role of
smart sanctions (travel and financial sanctions) throughout the sample period. The same figure
also captures the idea that the frequency and the share of trade sanctions in the total number of
sanctions have decreased over time, while the popularity of arms and military sanctions has
remained relatively stable over the last couple of decades.
Figure 2: Sanction Implementations by Type, 1950-2019
Note: This figure presents the evolution of sanctions by type. Panel (a) depicts the number of imposed
sanctions by type for the period 1950-2019 while panel (b) illustrates the share of sanction impositions by
type in each year for the period 1950-2019. To facilitate readability the order of different sanction types in
the legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the two panels.
The dyadic structure of the GSDB makes it easier to visualize who imposes sanctions and
on whom. Figure 3 exhibits two snapshots of chord diagrams by major regions classified
according to the UN Geoscheme. Arrows starting in a specific region and pointing to a
particular region capture the number of imposed sanctions (of all types). Panel (a) of Figure 3
refers to global sanction activities between regions for the year 2019. Accordingly, governments of
North-Western Europe (NW Europe) and African countries imposed the largest number of
sanctions on African countries mostly in response to coups/civil wars that occurred prior to or
during 2019. In contrast, not a single country from Africa imposed a sanction against any North-
Western European state. It turns out that some regions in the world rarely experience sanctions
while others (such as South Asian (S-Asia) and East Asian (E-Asia) countries) are confronted with
sanctions from all over the world. Moreover, sanctions are not imposed in a symmetric way;
that is, in most of the identified sanctions in the GSDB, we do not observe retaliation.
9
Figure 3: Bilateral Structure of Sanctions
(a) 2019
(b) 1950
Note: The above chord diagrams help visualize sanctions between different regions in the world for the years
1950 and 2019. Regions are classified according to the UN Geoscheme. See the Appendix for a description of the
classification of regions according to the UN Geoscheme.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 depicts a chord diagram that illustrates the sanction activities between
10
regions for the year 1950.9 Panel (b) also ascertains, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the
presence of substantially fewer sanctions across the world. The biggest arrow indicates that
sanctions among Eastern and Western European countries, which are mostly related to the Cold
War events, represent the largest share at the time. A comparison between the two panels of
Figure 3 also confirms that sanctions have indeed become a more popular tool, and that the
network of sanctions in the world has become more complex. At the same time, the figure also
reveals that the US and the EU have been the most active users of sanctions, followed by North-
African nations and Canada (cf. Felbermayr et al. (2020)), during all years in the sample period.
For each sanction case, the GSDB identifies the sanctioning countries’ policy objectives
we have collected from official documents. Figure 4 presents the distribution of nine distinct
Figure 4: Sanctions by Objective - Over Time
Note: This figure depicts the yearly number of observed policy objectives declared in all sanctions listed in
the GSDB (1950-2019). For each sanction considered, up to three objectives are documented (but not ranked
in terms of importance/significance). A visible spike occurs post 2016 in sanctions that aim to restore human
rights, fight terrorism, and change policy objectives.
objectives that recur in sanction policies. Between 1950 and 2019, several changes can be
9
For comparison purposes, the figure maintains the regional classification of nations fixed (and according to the
UN Geoscheme in 2019).
11
observed. First, until 1960, two policy sanction objectives dominate the field: sanctions that
aim to solve territorial conflicts and to destabilize regimes. Second, from the mid-1960s onward,
a continuously rising number of sanctions emerges which aim to change policies in targeted
countries. The just noted objectives appear to diminish in importance in the early 1990s,
especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Figure 4 also depicts a third structural change:
sanctions aiming to address issues related to human rights and democracy start to rise
continuously from the 1970s onward. Similarly, sanction objectives that aim to end wars start to
play an increasing role.
Figure 5 summarizes the distribution of all sanction objectives over the period 1950-2019
and separates the objectives during the three new years of data (2016-2019) we introduced to
the GSDB. The overall distribution of sanction objectives enables us to us to classify them in
three broad categories depending on their frequency of use. The most frequently defined policy
Figure 5: Frequency of Sanctions by Objective
Note: This figure depicts the number of observed policy objectives declared in all sanctions listed in the GSDB
for the period 1950-2019. The dark bars capture the cases imposed during 1950-2015, while the light bars show
the most recent cases imposed during 2016-2019. For each sanction up to three objectives are documented (but
not ranked by importance/significance). The most common objectives of sanctions imposed during 2016-2019
are: restoring human rights and democracy and fighting terrorism.
12
objectives of sanctions are improvements in human rights and restoration of democracy. The
second group of most frequently defined sanction objectives aim at ending wars and changing
policies in target countries. Finally, the third group includes sanctions with objectives to prevent
war, fight terrorism, resolve territorial conflicts and destabilize regime.
Comparison between the frequency of sanction objectives before and after 2016 reveals several
patterns. First, consistent with the pre-2016 trend, most of the post-2016 objectives of sanctions
are improvements in human rights and restoration of democracy. Second, the post-2016 period
sees a significant relative (in percentage terms) increase in sanctions with objectives that aim at
terrorism and policy change in the target countries. Third, and also consistent with the pre-2016
pattern, we see very few new cases that target preventing war or resolving territorial conflict
and, in fact, no new cases that aim at destabilizing regime. Finally, we document a relative
increase in the number of sanctions with ‘other’ objectives. A possible explanation for this
trend could be the use of new smart sanctions that do not fit within the standardly defined
objectives. The implication for the GSDB is that future updates should pay closer attention to
the objectives of new sanctions in an effort to classify them better.
We conclude this section with an analysis of the success of sanctions. While, as noted earlier,
we recognize that the identification and quantification of sanctions’ success is a complex
problem that is inevitably accompanied with numerous caveats, we believe that the trends that we
identify and describe here with the help of GSDB are informative. Figure 6 presents the shares
of sanctions with different success rates over the entire sample period. Overall, the average
success rate of all identified sanction cases that have been classified as fully successful over the
1950-2019 period is around 42%, while sanctions with partial success account for about 16%.
These percentages are calculated without taking into account ongoing sanction cases. If the
latter were taken into account then the sanctions with at least partial success would account for
about 30%, which is very much in line with the effectiveness rate of 34% reported in Hufbauer
et al. (2007).
Figure 6 unveils several patterns in the evolution of sanctions depending on their success.
First, throughout the period of investigation (and with the exception of the 1990s) the share of
sanctions classified as successful increased steadily. Second, over the same period, the share
13
of sanctions that were considered unsuccessful (or ‘failed’) declined steadily.
Third, we see a clear decreasing trend in the fraction of sanctions classified under
‘negotiation settlement’. Finally, after a decreasing trend until the 1970s, we see a sharp
increase in the share of sanctions with ‘partial success’ in the late 1970s and a stable share
since then. In sum, Figure 6 suggests that over time increasingly more sanctions have been
classified as partially or fully successful, thus suggesting that over time sanctions have become
more effective in achieving their goals.
Figure 6: Success Rate of Sanctions
Note: This figure depicts the registered yearly policy outcome associated with the declared policy objectives
during 1950-2019. For each sanction case considered, up to three objectives are documented. To ease readability
the order of sanctions classified by outcome in the legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the
graph. The graph identifies a significant increase in the number of ongoing sanction cases over time.
3 Economic Sanctions during the Trump Presidency

This section zooms in on the economic sanctions during 2016-2019, with a specific focus on the
sanctions imposed by the United Sates. The types of questions we are interested in answering
here may be summarized as follows: Did the Trump administration impose more sanctions than
previous administrations? Did the types of sanctions it used differ? And if they did, what are the
salient differences? Our consideration of the 2016-2019 period is motivated by two ideas. First,
14
because the original edition of the GSDB included sanction up to the year 2016, all cases
recorded during 2016-2019 constitute new additions to the GSDB and, as such, deserve some
attention. The second idea is that these years coincided with most of Donald Trump’s
presidency. Our focus on the US sanctions can be attributed to the following reasons. First, as
motivated by the opening quote to the chapter, it is widely believed that the Trump administration
imposed more sanctions than any other US administration.10 Second, according to the GSDB,
since 1950 the United States has been the most frequent sanctioning nation, averaging more than
one third of all sanction cases in the world. Third, for various reasons, the US sanctions have been
of keen interest to scholars and analysts in the sanctions literature (e.g., Kohl (2021)). Finally,
due to the primacy of the United States in international affairs, its sanction policies differ
substantively from the ones imposed by other countries in the world (e.g., Schneider and Weber
(2020) and Dai et al. (2021)).
We start by considering the fraction of US sanctions over all sanctions imposed in the world
(according to the GSDB) and by commenting on whether there were significant changes during
the Trump presidency. Figure 7 plots the fraction of sanctions imposed by the United States vs. the
United Nations vs. the European Union vs. all other countries in the world during 1950-2019.
Three key observations stand out upon inspection of this figure. First, the United States has
been the single most frequent user of sanctions throughout this period: on average, more than
35% of all sanctions during 1950-2019 were imposed by the United States. A noteworthy
exception appears in the early 1970s. At that time, we observe a substantial decrease in this
fraction. The primary reason behind this fall is the resolution of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and
the lifting of many sanctions on India and Pakistan.

Second, we detect a significant and steady rise in the EU and UN sanctions since the early
1990s. Finally, we document a clear contrast between the evolution of the fraction of US sanctions
under the Obama and the Trump administrations. Specifically, at the end of the Obama
presidency in 2016, US sanctions accounted for 30% of all sanctions in the world. In contrast,
in 2019 this fraction rose to more than 40%. In summary, Figure 7 documents the dominant
10
To complement the opening quote, “On average, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on more than
900 entities or individuals each year for the last four years, nearly 80% more than the annual number of
designations imposed by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2016.” (The Wall Street Journal, October 30,
2020).
15
reliance of the United States since 1950 on sanctions to achieve its foreign policy objectives as
well as the increase in the frequency of their usage by the Trump administration.
Figure 7: US vs. UN vs. EU Sanctions (% Worldwide)
Note: This figure depicts the yearly % of the sanctions imposed by the US vs. the % of sanctions imposed
by the UN, the EU, and the rest of the world. The US has been the most frequent imposer of unilateral
sanctions throughout 1950-2019. The percentage of the US sanctions significantly increases during the
Trump administration.
Next, consistent with our analysis in the previous section, we analyze Trump’s sanctions
across two primary dimensions of the GSDB: type and objective.11 Figure 8 depicts the types of
sanctions employed by the US. In addition to confirming the increase in the absolute number
of sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, two clear patterns emerge from panel (a) of
Figure 8. First, while trade sanctions appear to have risen significantly during the Obama years,
there is a sharp fall in 2017 due to the lifting of many active Obama era sanctions in 2016. The
Trump administration did not appear to favor trade sanctions. In contrast, though arms sanctions
remained relatively steady during the 2016-2019 period, military sanctions increased marginally.
11
Since these sanctions were imposed recently and are ongoing, it is too early to gauge their success.
16
Figure 8: Evolution of US Sanctions by Type, 1950-2019
(a) US Sanctions by Type (Number) (b) US Sanctions by Type (%)
Note: This figure illustrates the evolution of US sanctions by type. Panel (a) depicts the number of imposed
sanctions by type in each year for the period 2005-2019, and panel (b) illustrates the share of sanctions by
type in each year for the same period. To facilitate readability the order of different sanction types in the
legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the two panels. There has been a significant increase
in financial and travel sanctions during the years of the Trump presidency (2017-2019), followed by a
decrease in the share of arms sanctions during these years.
Second, and more interestingly, the Trump and Obama administrations differ very starkly in
their imposition of smart (i.e., travel and financial) sanctions. Specifically, we observe a sharp
increase in the number of smart sanctions under Trump’s term. This pattern is even clearer in panel
(b) of Figure 8 which reports the sanction cases in percentage terms. A possible explanation for this
relative increase in the number of smart sanctions, which is consistent with a general worldwide
trend, is that by design smart sanctions aim to influence policymakers in sanctioned countries by
imposing economic pain on targeted individuals, companies, and/or sectors in the hope of limiting
the negative impact on ordinary people. Of course, some targeted sanctions (e.g., US visa
denials, border rejections, and local currency devaluation) often still have unintended
consequences on civilians. Next, we ask whether the sanctions of the Trump administration
differ in terms of their objectives. The answer is contained in Figure 9 which suggests that,
indeed, this is the case. Specifically, panel (a) depicts the number of sanctions by objective, while
17
panel (b) converts these numbers in percentages. Figure 9 unveils a significant increase in the
sanctions whose objectives belong to the ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ categories.12 We also
detect a small rise in 2019 in the ‘human rights’ objective. Prominent examples of US sanctions
targeting ‘policy change’ include the visa sanctions on Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone for failing to accept the nationals that were ordered to move out of the United States. As
for the sanctions aiming to fulfill the ‘terrorism’ objective, the Trump administration imposed
travel bans on Iranian nationals, as well as nationals of numerous other Muslim countries, to
restrict immigration from regions that it viewed as “terror-prone.”
Figure 9: Evolution of US Sanctions by Objective, 1950-2019
Note: For clarity, this figure depicts the yearly number of observed policy objectives associated with US sanctions
listed in the GSDB during 2005-2019. For each sanction considered, up to three objectives are documented (not
ranked by importance/significance). Clearly, during the Trump presidency, we observed a significant rise in
sanctions whose objectives belong to the ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ categories. The number of sanctions
with a ‘destabilize regime’ objective decreased in the same years.
The increased use of sanctions with ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ objectives is even
clearer in panel (b) of Figure 9. Panels (a) and (b) also reveal a significant decrease in the use of
sanctions aiming to destabilize regime primarily due to the easing of the Cuban sanctions by the
Obama administration.
12
The GSDB allocates sanction objectives to the ‘Policy Change’ category when sanctions aim to enforce a
domestic (i.e., an economic, political or social) policy change in a sanctioned state. The ‘Terrorism’ sanction
objectives aim to motivate a sanctioned state to stop supporting or tolerating terrorist groups.
18
4 Conclusions
Under the leadership of the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, the
number of economic sanctions has increased since 1950. As a result, sanctions have become one
of the most popular tools of coercive diplomacy in foreign affairs. Normally, a larger number of
sanctions generates increased economic and political effects. Predictably, this has stimulated the
interest of academics and policy makers in understanding the reasons for the imposition of
sanctions and their consequences. In order to analyze and understand sanctions, good data are
required.
In this Chapter, we described the first update of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of
Felbermayr et al. (2020) along two dimensions. First, we extended the original coverage period
(1950-2016) to include three more years (2016-2019) and 75 new sanction cases. Second, on the
basis of various new sources, we were able to identify 306 additional sanction cases during the
1950-2016 period, which we recorded in the GSDB. As a result, the first update of the GSDB
includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral, plurilateral, and unilateral sanction cases
over the period 1950-2019.
We utilized the new version of the GSDB to document the following stylized facts and
trends related to usage, types, objectives, and outcomes of sanctions in recent years. First, after a
drop in the number of active sanction cases in 2016 (due to the lifting of the sanctions on
Myanmar, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Iran), the year 2017 was marked by impositions of new
sanctions, and this trend accelerated since 2018. Second, our descriptive analysis reveals that the
increased number of sanctions was accompanied by a larger number of target countries and,
especially, by an increased number of sender countries. Third, in terms of objectives, we see that
the most frequently defined policy aims of sanctions were ‘improvements in human rights’ and
restoration of democracy’, followed by the objectives to ‘end wars’ and to ‘change policies’ in
target countries. ‘Improvements in human rights’ and ‘restoration of democracy’ are also the
most frequent objectives of sanctions in the post-2016 period. However, during this period, we also
observe a relative increase in the sanctions that aim to address ‘terrorism’ and ‘policy change’.
Fourth, in terms of success, we find that, during the 1950-2019 period, more and more sanctions
have been classified as partially or fully successful, possibly suggesting that over time
sanctions have become more effective in achieving their goals.

19
Consistent with the general belief that the Trump administration has been notorious for its
imposition of sanctions, we find that the sanctions imposed by the United States indeed
increased (both in absolute and in relative terms) during Trump’s term, reaching more than 40%
of all sanctions in the world in 2019. We also observe a sharp increase in the number of
smart (financial and travel) sanctions under Trump’s term. Consistent with the general trend in
recent years, we see a significant rise in the US sanctions with objectives to ‘change policy’ and
to ‘fight terrorism’, and a decrease in the use of sanctions that aim to ‘destabilize regime’ in the
target countries. Based on our analysis, we conclude that economic sanctions are indeed an
extremely popular foreign policy tool and that they are here to stay.
20
References
Attia, Hana, Julia Grauvogel, and Christian von Soest, “The Termination of International
Sanctions: Explaining Target Compliance and Sender Capitulation,” unpublished manuscript,
2020.
Dai, Mian, Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal

Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, “Timing the Impact of Sanctions on Trade,” School of Economics
Working Paper Series 2021-7, Drexel University, 2021.
Dizaji, Sajjad Faraji and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, “Potential Early Phase Success and
Ultimate Failure of Economic Sanctions: A VAR Approach with an Application to Iran,”
Journal of Peace Research, 2013, 50 (6), 721–736.
Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and

Yoto V. Yotov, “The Global Sanctions Data Base,” School of Economics Working Paper
Series 2020-2, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University., 2020.
https://www.debevoise.com.
Hufbauer, Gary C. and Euijin Jung, “What’s New in Economic Sanctions?,” unpublished
manuscript, 2020.
Hufbauer, Gary C. and Euijin Jung, “Economic Sanctions in the 21st Century,” in the
Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021.
Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly A. Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, “Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered,” (3rd edition). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics., 2007.
Kohl, Tristan, “In and Out of the Penalty Box: U.S. Sanctions and Their Effects on
International Trade,” in the Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G.
van Bergeijk, 2021.
Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “Threat and Im- position of
Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset,” Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 2014, 31 (5), 541–558.
Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “The Threat and Imposition
of Economic Sanctions Data Project: A Retrospective,” in the Research Handbook on
Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021.
Schneider, G. and P. Weber, “How Many Hands to Make Sanctions Work? Comparing EU and US
Sanctioning Efforts,” Manuscript 2020.
Thomas, Eckert Sue Biersteker and Marcos Tourinho, Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and
Effectiveness of United Nations Action, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. and Charles van Marrewijk, “Why Do Sanctions Need Time to
Work? Adjustment, Learning and Anticipation,” Economic Modelling, 1995, 12 (2), 75–86.
Weber, Patrick Maximilian and Gerald Schneider, “Making the World Safe for Liberalism?
Evaluating the Western Sanctions Regime with a New Dataset,” 2018.
21
A Appendix
This Appendix includes (A) the list of the new sanction cases that were added to the GSDB
(2021 edition) and the table with the yearly number of sanctions by type from the GSDB, (B) the
classification of regions based on UN Geoscheme that has been used to construct Figure 3, and
(C) tables with examples of sanctions for each type and objective from the GSDB.
22
Table A.1 List of Newly Added Cases
Case ID Sanctioned State Sanctioning State Begin End
1 Afghanistan US 1979 1979
2 Afghanistan EU + aligned countries 1999 2001
3 Afghanistan EU + aligned countries 2002 2019
4 Afghanistan UN 2002 2019
5 Albania, Montenegro, Liechtenstein, Iceland Russia 2015 2019
6 Algeria US 1962 1962
7 Algeria France 1965 1971
8 Algeria US 1992 2002
9 Algeria EU 1992 1994
10 Angola US 1993 2003
11 Antigua and Barbuda US 2001 2003
12 Argentina Iran 2003 2007
13 Argentina New Zealand 1982 1982
14 Argentina Australia 1982 1982
15 Argentina UK 1982 1989
16 Argentina Switzerland 1982 1982
17 Australia Russia 2014 2019
18 Austria EU 2000 2000
19 Austria US 2000 2000
20 Belarus EU + aligned countries 1998 1999
21 Belarus Russia 2010 2010
22 Belarus US 2004 2006
23 Belarus US 1998 1999
24 Belize EU 2014 2014
25 Belize US 1997 2004
26 Belize US 2018 2019
27 Belize EU 2001 2004
28 Benin US 2003 2005
29 Benin EU 2009 2017
30 Bolivia US 1978 1978
31 Bosnia and Herzegovina FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 1994 1995
32 Brazil NAFTA 2001 2001
33 Bulgaria US 1950 1966
34 Bulgaria EU 2008 2019
37 Bulgaria Turkey 1985 1992
38 Bulgaria Turkey 1989 1992
40 Burkina Faso US 2018 2019
41 Burundi France 1996 2005
42 Burundi Belgium 2015 2019
43 Burundi Belgium 1996 2005
44 Burundi EU 2016 2019
45 Burundi EU 1997 2001
46 Burundi US 2016 2019
47 Cambodia Japan 1975 1992
48 Cambodia US 2017 2019
49 Cambodia UK 1975 1991
52 Cambodia EU 2017 2018
53 Cambodia Australia 1975 1992
55 Cambodia Germany 1975 1979
56 Cambodia Thailand 1977 1978
57 Cambodia Australia 2018 2019
59 Cameroon US 2019 2019
60 Canada Russia 2014 2019
61 Canada Taiwan 2015 2016
62 Canada Korea (South) 2015 2016
63 Canada US 2003 2005
64 Canada Mexico 2003 2016
65 Canada Japan 2003 2006
66 Canada China 2003 2016
67 Canada Spain 1995 1995
68 Canada League of Arab States 1973 1974
69 Central African Republic EU 2013 2019
70 Central African Republic US 2002 2005
73 Central African Republic Kimberly Process Participants 2013 2016
74 Chad Central African Republic 1969 1969
75 Chad US 2017 2018
76 Chile Sweden, Finland, Norway, Netherlands 1973 1990
77 Chile UK 1974 1980
78 Chile US 1974 1983
23
79 Chile Germany 1973 1990
80 Chile Denmark 1973 1990
81 Chile Belgium 1973 1990
82 Chile USSR 1973 1990
83 Chile German Democratic Republic 1973 1990
84 Chile Mexico 1974 1990
85 China US 2017 2019
86 China Japan 1952 1954
87 China Hong Kong 1951 1954
88 China UK 1950 1956
89 China Italy, Belgium 1989 1989
92 China US 2019 2019
93 Colombia US 2003 2003
94 Colombia EU 2002 2016
98 Congo (Brazzaville) EU 1997 2001
99 Congo (Democratic Republic) Canada 1993 1997
100 Congo (Democratic Republic) US 2006 2019
104 Costa Rica US 2001 2006
105 Costa Rica US 2003 2016
106 Croatia US 2003 2008
107 Croatia US 2003 2006
108 Cuba Organization of American States 1964 1975
109 Cuba US 1958 2019
110 Cuba Germany 1963 1969
111 Cyprus US 1987 2018
112 Denmark League of Arab States 1973 1974
113 Dominica US 2003 2004
114 Dominican Republic Venezuela 1963 1963
115 Dominican Republic US 1963 1963
116 Dominican Republic US 2011 2019
117 Ecuador US 2013 2014
118 Ecuador US 1968 1969
119 Ecuador US 1971 1972
120 Egypt US 2017 2018
121 Egypt US 2013 2015
122 Egypt Saudi Arabia 2016 2017
123 Egypt EU 2013 2019
124 Egypt UK 1951 1954
125 Egypt US 1952 1952
126 Egypt US, UK, France 1956 1957
127 Egypt US 1963 1964
128 Egypt US 1964 1965
129 Egypt Germany 1965 1972
130 Egypt France 1967 1974
131 Egypt USSR 1976 1984
132 El Salvador, Honduras US 1969 1969
133 Equatorial Guinea Spain 1977 1979
134 Equatorial Guinea EU 1978 1979
135 Equatorial Guinea US 1992 1997
136 Eritrea US 2017 2019
137 Eritrea US 1977 1993
138 Eritrea US 2007 2019
139 Eritrea Russia 2009 2018
140 Eritrea Russia 2013 2018
141 Estonia Russia 1992 1992
144 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania USSR 1990 1990
145 Ethiopia Eritrea 1998 2018
146 EU Russia 2014 2019
147 EU Canada 1996 2015
148 Fiji Australia, New Zealand 2009 2012
149 Fiji US 2003 2003
150 Finland USSR 1958 1959
151 France US 1982 1982
152 France US 1998 2017
153 France China 1992 1994
154 France UK 1995 1996
155 France US 1995 1996
156 France US 2003 2003
157 France US 1985 1985
158 France Denmark 1995 1995
159 Gambia US 2017 2019
24
160 Gambia US 2016 2017
161 Gambia EU 2014 2017
162 Georgia Russia 2009 2011
163 German Democratic Republic Germany 1961 1989
164 German Democratic Republic Germany 1949 1973
165 German Democratic Republic US 1954 1974
166 Germany League of Arab States 1965 1979
167 Germany US 1977 1977
168 Ghana US 2018 2019
169 Ghana US 2019 2019
170 Gibraltar Spain 1965 1984
171 Greece US 2013 2019
172 Greece US 1967 1970
173 Greece US 1967 1972
174 Guatemala US 1954 1954
175 Guinea EU 2002 2006
176 Guinea US 2009 2010
177 Guinea US 2017 2019
178 Guinea US 2003 2004
179 Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS 2018 2019
180 Haiti US 1962 1964
181 Haiti France 1991 1994
182 Honduras Venezuela 2009 2009
183 Honduras US 2019 2019
184 Hungary US 1951 1973
185 India UK 1965 1967
186 India US 1974 2008
187 Indonesia Australia 2018 2019
188 Indonesia Malaysia 1963 1967
189 Indonesia US 1999 2010
190 Indonesia US 1964 1966
191 Iran US 1980 1981
192 Iran US 1984 2016
193 Iran UN 2008 2016
194 Iran Korea (South) 2010 2012
195 Iran Korea (South) 2018 2019
196 Iran US 2017 2019
197 Iran US 2019 2019
198 Iran US 1996 2019
199 Iraq US 1997 2009
200 Iraq EU 2004 2019
201 Iraq US 2017 2017
202 Iraq US 2019 2019
203 Ireland US 1998 2014
204 Israel France 1950 1955
205 Israel Egypt 1950 1957
206 Israel Egypt 1959 1979
207 Israel France 1967 1974
208 Israel Spain, UK 2014 2019
209 Israel UK 1982 1994
210 Ivory Coast Canada 2005 2017
211 Jamaica USA 2011 2019
212 Japan League of Arab States 1973 1974
213 Jordan Egypt, Syria 1957 1958
214 Jordan France 1967 1974
215 Kenya Norway 1990 2002
216 Korea (North) Korea (South) 2010 2019
217 Korea (North) Burkina Faso 2017 2019
218 Korea (North) Japan 1983 1984
219 Korea (North) US 2017 2019
220 Korea (South) US 1961 1961
221 Kuwait Japan 1990 1991
222 Kuwait US 1990 1991
223 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2005 2006
231 Laos US 1962 1962
232 Laos US 1975 1995
233 Laos US 1958 1958
234 Laos Thailand 1977 1978
235 Laos Thailand 1975 1976
236 Laos US 2018 2019
237 Lebanon US 2018 2019
238 Lebanon Israel 1995 1995
239 Lebanon Israel 2006 2006
240 Lesotho UK 1970 1970
25
241 Lesotho US 2003 2006
242 Libya Gambia 2011 2012
243 Libya UK 1984 1999
244 Libya US 2017 2019
245 Libya US 1996 2019
246 Lithuania Russia 2013 2014
247 Lithuania Russia 1992 1992
248 Malawi UK 2011 2012
249 Malawi UK 2014 2019
250 Malawi Japan 2018 2019
251 Malawi EU, US, Norway 2001 2003
252 Malawi US 2003 2003
253 Mali UN 2017 2019
254 Mali Algeria 2012 2012
255 Mali US 2019 2019
256 Mauritania EU 2005 2006
257 Mauritania US 2008 2009
258 Mauritania African Union 2009 2009
259 Mauritania EU 2009 2009
260 Myanmar China 1967 1971
261 Myanmar US 2018 2019
262 Myanmar US 2019 2019
263 Myanmar Japan 2007 2008
264 Nepal India 2015 2016
266 Nepal US 2005 2005
267 Nepal UK 2005 2005
269 Nigeria US 2003 2019
270 Nigeria Czechoslovakia 1968 1970
271 Nigeria UN 2014 2019
272 Nigeria US 2013 2019
273 Nigeria US 2019 2019
274 Norway China 2010 2017
275 Norway Russia 2014 2019
276 Norway China 2010 2018
277 Pakistan India 1949 1951
278 Pakistan Afghanistan 1961 1963
280 Pakistan Netherlands 2007 2008
281 Pakistan US 2012 2013
284 Pakistan South Africa 1999 2001
287 Pakistan, India UN 1965 1975
288 Pakistan, India US 1965 1975
289 Pakistan, India UK 1965 1975
290 Panama US 1968 1968
291 Paraguay UNASUR 2012 2013
292 Peru Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic 1962 1963
293 Peru US 1968 1968
294 Peru US 1962 1962
295 Philippines US 2002 2019
296 Philippines EU 2002 2019
297 Philippines Malaysia 1963 1964
298 Philippines Malaysia 1968 1969
299 Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia US 1961 1991
300 Portugal India 1954 1975
301 Portugal India 1954 1954
302 Qatar Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt 2017 2019
303 Qatar Mauritania, Djibouti, the Comoros, Jordan, Libya, Yemen, Niger 2017 2019
304 Qatar Chad 2017 2018
305 Qatar Senegal 2017 2017
306 Qatar Maldives 2017 2019
307 Romania US 1957 1960
308 Russia Switzerland 2014 2019
309 Russia Georgia 2008 2011
310 Russia EU + aligned countries 2014 2019
311 Russia EU + aligned countries 2014 2019
312 Rwanda EU 2012 2013
313 Rwanda Germany, Netherlands, Sweden 2012 2013
314 Rwanda UK 2012 2012
315 Rwanda US 2012 2013
316 Saudi Arabia US, France, Germany, Canada 2018 2019
317 Sierra Leone US 2018 2019
318 Sierra Leone US 2017 2019
319 Sierra Leone Commonwealth 1997 1998
320 Singapore Indonesia 1963 1966
321 Somalia US 2012 2019
26
322 Somalia US 2017 2019
323 South Africa Japan 1964 1994
324 South Africa France 1986 1994
325 South Africa US 2019 2019
326 South Sudan EU 2014 2019
327 South Sudan US 2018 2019
328 South Vietnam China 1978 1991
329 South Vietnam France 1981 1989
330 South Vietnam France 1978 1981
331 Sri Lanka US 2012 2019
332 Sudan US 1992 2019
333 Sudan US 2006 2019
334 Sudan US 2017 2017
335 Suriname Venezuela 1990 1991
336 Suriname Netherlands 1998 2000
337 Sweden US 1968 1970
338 Switzerland US 1951 1951
339 Syria US 2017 2019
340 Syria, Russia, Iran US 2019 2019
341 Taiwan US 1994 1995
342 Taiwan US 2013 2019
343 Taiwan US 1950 1953
344 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 2009 2009
347 Tanzania Canada, EU, Japan, Norway 2014 2015
348 Tanzania Denmark 2018 2019
349 Tanzania US 2016 2016
350 Tanzania EU 2018 2019
351 Thailand EU 2014 2017
352 Thailand US 2006 2008
353 Thailand, Vietnam Cambodia 2004 2007
354 Turkey US 2018 2018
355 Turkey US 1974 1978
356 Turkey EU 2019 2019
357 Uganda UK, Norway, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden 2005 2007
358 Uganda Sweden 2014 2014
359 UK Spain 1966 1984
360 UK League of Arab States 1973 1974
361 Ukraine Russia 2006 2006
364 Ukraine Vietnam 2015 2018
365 US Japan 2003 2013
366 US Brazil 2003 2016
367 US Canada 2003 2006
368 US Russia 2014 2019
369 USSR EEC 1991 1991
370 USSR Japan 1991 1991
371 USSR UK 1991 1991
372 Venezuela Peru 2017 2019
373 Venezuela US 2017 2019
374 Venezuela Canada 2017 2019
375 Venezuela EU + aligned countries 2017 2019
376 Venezuela Switzerland 2018 2019
379 Yemen US 2017 2019
380 Yugoslavia (former) Germany 1957 1968
381 Zimbabwe UK 2002 2009
27
Table A.2: Evolution of Sanctions by Type
Year Trade Arms Military Assistance Financial Travel Other
Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Total
1950 13 1 0 2 2 3 21
1951 15 4 0 4 3 4 30
1952 16 4 0 5 3 4 32
1953 16 4 0 4 3 4 31
1954 19 4 0 5 7 7 42
1955 18 2 0 5 7 7 39
1956 17 2 1 7 7 7 41
1957 18 2 1 10 8 9 48
1958 18 3 1 11 8 9 50
1959 17 3 1 9 8 10 48
1960 20 4 4 10 5 10 53
1961 19 5 4 12 9 11 60
1962 19 5 5 16 9 13 67
1963 24 8 7 19 10 19 87
1964 28 10 4 19 9 15 85
1965 29 16 6 20 9 15 95
1966 31 18 6 17 8 17 97
1967 27 23 6 15 8 15 94
1968 27 26 5 17 9 19 103
1969 29 27 5 17 10 16 104
1970 28 25 5 20 9 15 102
1971 28 22 8 22 9 14 103
1972 27 20 5 17 9 14 92
1973 40 20 4 20 8 16 108
1974 45 22 6 22 7 17 119
1975 34 18 7 28 8 18 113
1976 34 16 6 31 7 16 110
1977 37 18 15 37 6 18 131
1978 42 19 16 41 7 20 145
1979 41 20 17 54 6 21 159
1980 33 16 15 43 5 16 128
1981 35 15 14 46 9 17 136
1982 41 20 12 53 15 21 162
1983 37 18 11 50 17 21 154
1984 35 18 9 46 14 20 142
1985 38 18 9 41 6 17 129
1986 41 22 10 48 8 19 148
1987 44 23 14 53 10 25 169
1988 40 24 15 56 8 22 165
1989 44 26 17 58 10 23 178
1990 50 29 25 67 9 24 204
1991 50 35 27 75 10 20 217
1992 55 45 34 85 15 22 256
1993 60 44 35 91 19 21 270
1994 60 49 36 77 22 21 265
1995 49 42 31 64 21 20 227
1996 42 47 33 74 21 20 237
1997 37 45 29 79 26 22 238
1998 43 48 32 78 26 20 247
1999 42 51 34 77 23 20 247
2000 47 55 40 74 29 23 268
2001 47 55 43 75 30 21 271
2002 47 48 38 66 34 22 255
2003 53 48 48 62 35 18 264
2004 44 43 41 56 29 15 228
2005 42 48 45 63 37 18 253
2006 60 48 46 78 50 18 300
2007 55 50 42 81 49 20 297
2008 54 53 45 81 51 22 306
2009 59 58 46 88 61 31 343
2010 66 61 48 89 60 34 358
2011 82 70 58 120 72 38 440
2012 91 72 67 137 77 39 483
2013 100 77 66 140 75 36 494
2014 116 84 67 162 91 38 558
2015 111 83 64 153 87 30 528
2016 112 82 63 151 88 29 525
2017 84 70 58 133 92 33 470
2018 88 70 58 144 92 30 482
2019 84 65 54 148 93 29 473
Note: This table shows the number of sanction impositions by type in each year in the period 1950-2019.
Source: GSDB
28
B Classification of regions based on UN Geoscheme
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Réunion, Republic Congo, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha,
São Tomé and Prìncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Northern America Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of America.
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, Clipperton Island, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Caribbean Anguilla, Antigua and Bermuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Marinique,
Montserrat, Navassa Island, Puerto Rico, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands.
Southern America Argentina, Bolivia, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana,
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Northwestern Europe Shetland Islands, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Faroe
Island, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lichtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Sark, Slovakia, Svalbard
and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Southern Europe Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Republic of Macedonia,
Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Spain, Vatican.
Eastern Europe Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine.
Western Asia Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
Southern Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Southeastern Asia Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thai- land,
Timor-Leste, Vietnam.
Eastern Asia China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, DPR Korea, Republic of Korea.
Oceania Australia Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Island, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau,
American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna.
29
Table B.1: Different Types of Sanctions. Historical Examples
Trade Sanctions
Case Formulation Reference
In paragraph 5 of this resolution the UN calls upon all States, in accordance
Multilateral with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
UN sanction against Iran based UN Resolution
(Partial trade sanction) international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items,
on resolution 1696 1696 (2006)
(Export sanction) materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-
related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.
In paragraphs 2 and 3 the proclamation states that the president does 2. hereby
prohibit, effective 12:01 A.M., Eastern Standard Time, February 7, 1962, the
importation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods
imported from or through Cuba; and I hereby authorize and direct the
Secretary of the Treasury to carry out such prohibition, to make such
Unilateral exceptions thereto, by license or otherwise, as he determines to be consistent
US sanction against Cuba based with the effective operation of the sanction hereby proclaimed, and to US Proclamation
(Full trade sanction)
on proclamation 3447 promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to perform such 3447 (1962)
(Total trade sanction)
functions. 3. and further, I do hereby direct the Secretary of Commerce, under
the provisions of the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. App.
2021-2032), to continue to carry out the prohibition of all exports from the
United States to Cuba, and I hereby authorize him, under that Act, to continue,
make, modify or revoke exceptions from such prohibition.
In Section 2, the Executive order states that except to the extent provided in
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
Unilateral
US sanction against Liberia order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit E.O. 13348 of July
(Partial trade sanction)
based on E.O. 13348 granted prior to the effective date of this order, the direct or indirect 22, 2004
(Import sanction)
importation into the United States of any round log or timber product
originating in Liberia is prohibited.
Financial Sanctions
In paragraph 6 of the UN resolution 1737 (2006) it is stated that all States shall
also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any
technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or
UN sanction against Iran based UN Resolution
Multilateral other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to
on resolution 1737 1737 (2006)
the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4
above.
4. Political progress is essential in order to ensure Mali's long-term stability.

To that end, the EU urges the Malian authorities to adopt and implement a
roadmap for the restoration of democracy and constitutional order in Mali as
soon as possible. It encourages a national inclusive dialogue open to the European Union
EU sanction against Mali northern populations and to all groups which reject terrorism and recognise Council
Multilateral based on Council Conclusions the country's territorial integrity. In that context, the Council reiterates its Conclusions on
on Mali from January 18, 2013 willingness to gradually resume its development cooperation and invites the Mali from January
European Commission to prepare the relevant decisions so that the 18, 2013
development funds can be rapidly disbursed as soon as the conditions are met.
It also invites the HR/VP to explore the possibilities of rapid assistance
through the stability instrument.
As a result of the election boycott and human right violations that happened in
Haiti in November 2000, the US withheld government-to-government Foreign Operations
Unilateral US sanction against Haiti economic aid to Haiti in 2001 as per the Foreign Operations Appropriations Appropriations Act
Act for FY2001. The aid was resumed in 2004 when the new parliament was for FY2001.
elected and the improvements in human rights.
In February 2012 the Belgium-based SWIFT, which provides banks with a

system for moving funds around the world, blocked Iranian banks from using
Multilateral SWIFT sanction against Iran its network to transfer money. This was the first case of cutting off the country
from SWIFT, and it basically shut the ability of Iran to do business outside the
country.
Travel Sanctions
In paragraph 3 of the UN resolution 1054 (1996) it is stated that all states shall
a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese
diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement
UN sanction against Sudan UN Resolution
Multilateral within their territory of all such staff who remain; b) Take steps to restrict the
based on resolution 1054 1054 (1996)
entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of
Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed
forces.
As a consequence of tensed relations between Russia and Georgia that

aggravated in 2006, Russian authorities expelled thousands of Georgians to
Russia sanction against Georgia,
Unilateral Georgia, including those residing legally in Russia. The act was explained as
October 2006
the illegal immigration prevention procedure. Georgia subsequently appealed
to the Russian Government in the European Court of Human Rights.
The Nagorno-Karabakh War is an ethnic and territorial conflict between

Armenia and Azerbaijan. The dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia-Azerbaijan border
Reciprocal with the majority of Armenian population which is located in Azerbaijan has
closure, 1989
not been resolved since 1989. As a major consequence of the conflict, the
border between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been closed since then.
Arms Sanctions
Australian law prohibits the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Russia,
for use in Russia, or for the benefit of Russia, of the following ‘export
sanctioned goods’ for Russia: arms or related matériel; and items suited to any Expanded sanctions
of the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, against Russia from
including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf: (i) oil September 1, 2014
Australia sanction against exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres; (ii) oil
Unilateral (Australian
Russia from September 1, 2014 exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; (iii) Government
projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale website-Sanctions
formations by way of hydraulic fracturing (other than exploration and Regimes-Russia)
production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale
reservoirs), specified in the Autonomous Sanctions (Russia, Crimea and
Sevastopol) Specification 2015. without a sanctions permit.
The US imposed arms sanction on Afghanistan in June 1996 after the Taliban
rule got established there. The regime was notorious for its extremist views
US sanction against and provided home to the al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. SUMMARY: The
Unilateral Afghanistan, Taliban regime Department of State is amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 61 FR 33313
based on 61 FR 33313 (ITAR) to reflect that it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other
approvals, exports and imports of defense articles and defense services,
destined for or originating in Afghanistan.
In paragraph 15, the Security Council decides further that all States shall take
the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories
or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or
UN sanction against Lebanon UN Resolution
Multilateral individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including
based on resolution 1701 1701 (2006)
weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating
in their territories.
Military Assistance
1. The supply, sale and transit of armaments of all kinds, including weapons
and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment
Verordnung
and accessories and spare parts therefor, to Somalia are prohibited.
Switzerland sanction against über Massnahmen
Unilateral 2. The provision of services of all kinds, including financing, Mediation
Somalia from May 13, 2009 gegenüber Somalia
services and technical training relating to the supply, sale, transit, production,
vom 13. Mai 2009
maintenance and use of goods referred to in paragraph 1 and to military
activities in Somalia shall be prohibited.
In paragraph 15, the Security Council decides further that all States shall take
the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories
or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or
individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including
UN sanction against Lebanon weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary UN Resolution
Multilateral
based on resolution 1701 equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating 1701 (2006)
in their territories; and (b) The provision to any entity or individual in
Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a)
above;
Other
Sanctions
The Turkish restrictive measures were originally introduced in April 1987

and concerned exclusively the prohibition of Cyprus flagged vessels to call
at Turkish ports. In May 1997 Turkey issued new instructions to its ports
and harbours to clarify uncertainties arising from the imposition of the
Republic of Cyprus
restrictions, thus extending them against vessels under a foreign flag (of
Ministry of Foreign
any
Turkey sanction against Affairs website,
Unilateral nationality) sailing to Turkish ports directly from any Cypriot port under
Cyprus from April 1987 Turkish Measures
the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus (Limassol, Larnaca), or
Against Cyprus'
against vessels of any nationality related to the Republic of Cyprus in
Shipping
terms of ownership or ship management. The immediate effect of the May
1997 instructions was to restrict the use of Cypriot ports for transshipment
operations of shipping lines in the Mediterranean. (from the Republic of
Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)
In paragraph 8, the AU Council decides, in the light of the foregoing, to

immediately suspend the participation of the CARin all AU activities, as
African Union sanction well as to impose sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, on
PSC/PR/COMM.
Multilateral against Central African leaders of the Seleka group, as indicated in the attached Annex, pending
(CCCLXIII)
Republic from March 25, 2013 the submission by the Commission of a more exhaustive list as requested
by Council, in paragraph 6 of communiqué PSC/PR/Comm. (CCCLXII) of
23 March 2013.
Fiji Islands’ membership lapsed in 1987, after a military coup imposed a
constitution contrary to Commonwealth principles, and returned to
membership in October 1997, when it had embarked on constitutional
reform. Then following overthrow of the democratically elected
government in May 2000, the country was suspended from the councils of
the Commonwealth. Suspension was lifted in December 2001 when
democracy and the rule of law had been restored in accordance with the
constitution, but was then imposed again in December 2006 when the
democratically elected government was again overthrown by the military.
In May 2008 CMAG reiterated that it was essential that elections be held
by the deadline of March 2009, as agreed between the Pacific Islands
The Commonwealth
Commonwealth sanction Forum and Fiji’s interim government. Elections did not, however, take
Multilateral website (Withdrawals
against Fiji place and CMAG subsequently deplored the fact that Fiji remained in
and Suspensions)
contravention of Commonwealth values and principles. At the end of July
2009, CMAG noted that Fiji’s situation had deteriorated strikingly with
the purported abrogation of its constitution and further entrenchment of
authoritarian rule. It also expressed grave concern at the regime’s
intention to further delay a return to democracy by more than five years.
Fiji was fully suspended from the Commonwealth on 1 September 2009
(only the second such case of suspension of a country’s membership –
Nigeria being the first in 1995). The Commonwealth Secretariat has
nonetheless remained engaged with Fiji Islands to support and promote
inclusive political dialogue and the return to civilian constitutional
democracy.
Table B.2: Different Objectives of Sanctions. Historical Examples
Policy Change
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the United States

will no longer authorize the export of defense articles and
US sanction against Venezuela based on 71 FR defense services to Venezuela. Furthermore, all licenses and
Unilateral 71 FR 47554
47554 approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles
and defense services to Venezuela pursuant to section 38 of
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) are revoked.
The Japanese government released this list of new [targeted]

sanctions against Russia amid Ukrainian crisis on July 28.
The measures envisage the freezing assets of individuals
Unilateral Japan sanction against Russia (2014) sputniknews.com
and entities “involved in the Crimea annexation and
responsible for destabilizing the situation in Ukraine."
(sputniknews.com)
Destabilize
Regime

The United States will suspend about 27 million dollars in
aid to Niger and ban visits by Niger President Mamadou
Tandja’s supporters to force Tandja to step down, []. "We
believe that he should peacefully relinquish power, and
allow transparent elections to take place. He does not want
to do so," a State Department official told AFP on the Agence France
Unilateral US sanction against Niger, 2009
condition of anonymity. "We have decided to announce that Presse
we are going to impose travel restrictions on Tandja
supporters and we are going to suspend assistance to Niger,"
the official said. The official added that the decision
concerned roughly 27 million dollars in non-humanitarian
aid. (Agence France Presse)
Territorial
Conflict
Lisa L. Martin,
Institutions
On April 3, the British government also broke diplomatic and Cooperation:
relations with Argentina and imposed economic sanctions. Sanctions during
These sanctions, which were clarified over the next few the Falkland Islands
Unilateral UK sanction against Argentina, 1982 days, included a freeze on Argentine assets in British Conflict,
banks (valued at about $1.5 billion), embargo of arms sales International
to Argentina, suspension of export credit insurance, and a Security,
ban on Argentine imports. Volume 16, Issue 4
(Spring, 1992), 143-
178.
Prevent War
Calling upon all States in the region, particularly the

National Transitional Government of Liberia, to work
together to build lasting regional peace, including through
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the International Contact Group on Liberia,
the Mano River Union and the Rabat Process,..Noting with
concern, however, that the ceasefire and the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement are not yet being universally implemented
throughout Liberia, and that much of the country remains
outside the authority of the National Transitional
Government of Liberia, particularly those areas to which the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has not yet
deployed,...
Determining that the situation in Liberia and the
UN sanction against Liberia based on proliferation of arms and armed non-State actors, including UN Resolution 1521
Multilateral
resolution 1521 mercenaries, in the subregion continue to constitute a threat (2003)
to international peace and security in West Africa, in
particular to the peace process in Liberia,... As a
consequence the UN decides that all States shall take the
necessary measures to (a) prevent the sale or supply to
Liberia, by their nationals or from their territories or using
their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of
all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare
parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in
their territories; (b) Decides that all States shall take the
necessary measures to prevent any provision to Liberia by
their nationals or from their territories of technical
training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance or use of the items in subparagraph (a) above.
Terrorism

President of the United States of America, determine that
it is in the interests of the United States to (1) assist the
international independent investigation Commission (the
“Commission”) established pursuant to UNSCR 1595 of
April 7, 2005, (2) assist the Government of
Lebanon in identifying and holding accountable in
accordance with applicable law those persons who were
involved in planning, sponsoring, organizing, or
perpetrating the terrorist act in Beirut, Lebanon, on
February 14, 2005, that resulted in the assassination of
US sanction against Syria based on E.O. former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, and the E.O. 13399 of April
Unilateral
13399 deaths of 22 others, and other bombings or assassination 25, 2006
attempts in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, that are
related to Hariri’s assassination or that implicate the
Government of Syria or its officers or agents, and (3) take
note of the Commission’s conclusions in its report
of October 19, 2005, that there is converging evidence
pointing to both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in
terrorist acts, that interviewees tried to mislead the
Commission’s investigation by giving false or inaccurate
statements, and that a senior official of Syria submitted
false information to the Commission.
End War

In paragraph 3, the Council deems it appropriate to
maintain the arms sanction against Sudan. The policy
objective of the European Union in this regard is to
promote lasting peace and reconciliation within Sudan. In
Article 1 of the same declaration it is stated: In accordance
with UNSCR 1591 (2005), restrictive measures should be
Council Common
EU sanction against Sudan based imposed against those individuals who impede the peace
Multilateral Position
on 2005/411/CFSP process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the
2005/411/CFSP
region, commit violations of international humanitarian or
human rights law or other atrocities, violate the arms
sanction and/or are responsible for offensive military
overflights in and over the Darfur region, as designated by
the Committee established by paragraph 3 of UNSCR
1591(2005).
Human Rights

From the Export Controls to Belarus: 1. This Notice is to
advise exporters that the Government of Canada has
decided to add Belarus to the Area Control List (ACL), the
list of countries to which the exportation of all items is only
permitted with a valid export permit. 2. This Notice reflects
the Government of Canada’s response concerning the
deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus, following
the March 19, 2006 presidential election which was deemed
by international observers to be severely flawed. The
campaign was marred with widespread harassment and
detention of opposition party campaign workers, the
physical assault of senior opposition figures, arbitrary use
of state powers to support the incumbent president, pressure
on state workers and students to support the President,
restrictions on the ability of opposition campaigns to
Government of
Unilateral Canada sanction against Belarus, 2006 communicate with the electorate, and control of the state
Canada
media to severely restrict access by opposition candidates.
These elements resulted in a climate of intimidation and
insecurity, further undermining democracy and the respect
of human rights in Belarus. Since the election Belarusian
authorities have continued their unwarranted imprisonment
of democratic supporters. 3. All applications for permits to
export items to Belarus will be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis. Permits for humanitarian goods, including food,
clothing, medicines, medical supplies, information
material, casual gifts and personal effects belonging to
persons leaving Canada for Belarus, will generally be
approved. Permits for other items will generally be denied.
For information concerning the export permit application
process, please contact the Exports Controls Division at the
information provided below.
Democracy

Decision 2012/237/CFSP provides for the adoption of
restrictive measures against certain persons, entities and
bodies who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political
process, or who take action that undermines stability in
the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. This concerns in
particular those who played a leading role in the mutiny
of 1 April 2010 and the coup d’état of 12 April 2012 and
whose actions continue to be aimed at undermining the
rule of law and the primacy of civilian power. These
measures include the freezing of funds and economic
EU sanction against Guinea- EU Council
resources of the natural or legal persons, entities and
Multilateral Bissau based on Council Regulation Regulation
bodies listed in the Annex to that Decision. In Article 2 of
No 377/2012 No 377/2012
the same regulation specific sanctions are listed to achieve
the defined policy objective: 1. All funds and economic
resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by
natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in
accordance with Article 2(1) of Decision 2012/237/CFSP,
have been identified by the Council as either (i) engaging
in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace,
security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau or
(ii) being associated with such persons, entities or bodies,
as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.
Other Objectives

In Article 1, it is stated: 1. All funds and economic
resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by
persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian
EU Council
EU sanction against Tunisia State funds, and natural or legal persons or entities
Multilateral Decision
based on 2011/72/CFSP associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be
2011/72/CFSP
frozen. 2. No funds or economic resources shall be made
available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of,
natural or legal persons or entities listed in the Annex.

Drexel School of Economics Working Paper 2021-10 Revised

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Drexel School of Economics Working Paper 2021-10 Revised

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Drexel Economics

Working Paper Series

The Global Sanctions Data Base:

Constantinos Syropoulos Erdal Yalcin Yoto V. Yotov

JEL classi…cation: F1; F13; F14; F5; F51; H5; N4

Gabriel Felbermayr, Constantinos Syropoulos,

Erdal Yalcin and Yoto V. Yotov∗

work to improve our understanding of their effects.

feedback we received from researchers who used it.

2 The Updated GSDB: A General Overview

countries to promote a wide range of international policy objectives. Motivated by these

729 sanction cases.

imposed during 2016-2019.

targeted nation to conform to the sanctioning state’s political objective(s). We do recognize,

information allows a first assessment. Moreover, as the following descriptive statistic

trade, foreign direct investment, and migration.

Figure 1: Evolution of Sanctions, 1950-2019

of these sanctions to rise as well.

financial and/or travel restrictions.

that were imposed under the Trump administration.

Figure 2: Sanction Implementations by Type, 1950-2019

Figure 4: Sanctions by Objective - Over Time

Figure 5: Frequency of Sanctions by Objective

the objectives of new sanctions in an effort to classify them better.

more effective in achieving their goals.

Figure 6: Success Rate of Sanctions

3 Economic Sanctions during the Trump Presidency

(2020) and Dai et al. (2021)).

the lifting of many sanctions on India and Pakistan.

Figure 7: US vs. UN vs. EU Sanctions (% Worldwide)

Figure 9: Evolution of US Sanctions by Objective, 1950-2019

sanctions have become more effective in achieving their goals.

Dai, Mian, Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal

Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and

Eastern Europe Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine.

Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

4. Political progress is essential in order to ensure Mali's long-term stability.

In February 2012 the Belgium-based SWIFT, which provides banks with a

As a consequence of tensed relations between Russia and Georgia that

The Nagorno-Karabakh War is an ethnic and territorial conflict between

The Turkish restrictive measures were originally introduced in April 1987

In paragraph 8, the AU Council decides, in the light of the foregoing, to

Case Formulation Reference

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the United States

The Japanese government released this list of new [targeted]

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

Calling upon all States in the region, particularly the

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

Case Formulation Reference

You might also like