European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

14, 431 4 3 7 ( I 984)

Attribution theories of lay epistemology?*

MANFRED EFFLER
faculty of Social Sciences, University of Constance,
Postfach 5560, D- 7750 Konstanz, Federal Republic of Germany

A bstrnct
Different attribution theories differ fiom each other less by their relation to different
epistemic problems than by their taking account of different goals to which causal
attributions can be firnctional. The process of causal attribution is influenced by the
goals to which causal attributions are functional. A second criteria for differentiating
attributions theories is that they proceed from different information bases.

INTRODUCTION

Kruglanski, Hamel, Maides and Schwartz (1978), Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a,b) and
Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) regard attributional problems as a special case within
a general lay epistemology. Lay epistemology deals with the process of knowledge
acquisition of laymen. The search for causal attributions is regarded as one form of
knowledge acquisition.
Knowledge-seeking behaviour follows a certain epistemic sequence. The first
stage of this sequence is problem formulation, the second stage is problem
evaluation. An epistemic problem arises, if several mutually exclusive propositions
are available. (As well as speaking about ‘propositions’, Kruglanski (1982a, b) and
Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) talk of ‘hypotheses’). Problem evaluation implies to
assess the validity of different propositions. The proposition which is finally
adjudged as being valid is considered to be the problem resolution.

PROBLEM FORMULATION

According to Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), the
formulation of an epistemic problem is considered to be motivated behaviour that
is functional to a person’s specific goals. During the process of problem evaluation
only those propositions are tested that appear to be relevant to the goals which are
functional to the problem.

‘This research was supported by a grant of the University of Constance (6/81).

0046-2772/84/04043 1-07$01 .OO Received 5 July 1983

0 1984 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
432 M. Effrr
According to Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), the
different models discussed in attribution research (e.g. Jones and Davis, 1965;
Kelley, 1967, 1973; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and Rosenbaum, 1971) do
not refer to different inference processes, but to different epistemic problems. In
this context, causal factors are comprehended as propositions. As one can
formulate an unlimited number of causal factors, one car! therefore also formulate
an unlimited number of epistemic problems. Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a) and
Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) suggest that attributional models can only be
distinguished from one another because they relate to different epistemic problems.
In Kelley’s (1967, 1973) covariation principle the epistemic problem is to decide
whether an effect was caused (a) by the entity to which an action was directed, (b)
by the acting person himself, (c) by modality or (d) by time. In Kelley’s (1973)
concept of causal schema, the epistemic problem is to decide whether one or
several causal factors have been responsible for an effect. In the Jones and Davis
(1965) theory of correspondent inferences the epistemic problem is to decide
whether an action was prompted by a situation or a disposition. In the model
proposed by Weiner et al. (1971) the epistemic problem is to decide whether
success or failure was prompted by ability, effort, task difficulty or luck/bad luck.
Such epistemic problems which have been investigated in attribution research,
represent for Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), a
more or less arbitrary selection among a large number of possible causal problems.
Kruglanski (1980) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) regard epistemic problems
as being dependent upon their teleological function. When applied to attribution
research this means that the number of epistemic problems depend on the number
of goals to which causal attributions can be functional.
The belief that there are an unlimited number of epistemic problems can be
maintained only if one proceeds from the assumption that an unlimited number
of goals to which causal attributions are functional, can be formulated.
Preceding research in attributional research has shown little interest in single,
specific causal factors. Instead, one was interested rather in their underlying
dimensions (e.g. stability, locus of control, controllability etc.). The number of such
dimensions is substantially smaller than the number of specific causal factors. The
interest in causal dimensions can be explained in that one is more likely to assume a
connection between goals (to which causal explanations are functional) and causal
dimensions than between goals and specific causal factors. In the traditional models
of Jones and Davis (1965), Kelley (1967, 1973) and Weiner et al. (1971) the
stability dimension has been the main point of interest. According to Heider’s
tradition, one was interested in the stability dimension because one regarded the
finding out of predictability and controllability of an action as an essential function
of causal attributions. The finding out of predictability and controllability is
certainly an important function from a large number of other functions to which
causal attributions can be functional to. In the context of finding out predictability
and controllability we should, according to Heider (1958), be interested in the
importance of stable rather than less stable causal factors. If one suggests (like
Kelley does) that the covariation principle is applied during causal attributions, one
proceeds from the assumption that the goal of causal attributions consists in the
decision whether an action or an effect is attributed to (a) stable internal factors
(dispositions of the actor), (b) stable external factors (entity) or (c) unstable factors
 Reply to Krugllanski 433

(special circumstances). Jones and Davis (1965) deal also with predictability and
controllability of behaviour. Predictability and controllability seem to be given
when the behaviour of a person can be attributed to a disposition (which
is conceived as a stable attribute).
Kelly’s ANOVA (1967, 1973) formulation and Jones and Davis (1965) theory
of correspondent inferences do not relate to different, more or less arbitrary
epistemic problems; however, the ANOVA model was conceived for the case of
several possibilities of observations, whereas the correspondence-inference theory
was conceived for a single observation. The theory of Weiner ef al. (1971) is less
concerned with the kind of information that is used or not used during the process
of causal attribution. Rather, it deals with the consequences, especially those of
motivation following from the judgement of an action according to stability and
locus of control.
Attribution theories can be criticized on the grounds that their assumptions
concerning functionality of causal attributions have not been expressed concerning
the relationship between the goal of causal attributions (to find out controllability
or predictability of behaviour) and the stability dimension, at least in parts, are
not conclusive enough. There is, however, no justification to criticize attribution
theories for relating to a small number of more or less arbitrarily chosen epistemic
problems.

PROBLEM EVALUATION

According to Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), the
second stage of the epistemic sequence is controlled by the principle of logical
consistency. The principle of logical consistency is that implications are being
deduced from different propositions and then, evidence relevant to these
implications is searched for.
Kruglanski (1980, 1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) call this
‘deductive relevance’. Evidence is relevant if it is consistent or inconsistent with the
implications. Further, it is important that from propositions, implications are
deduced that allow discriminations between single propositions in favour of other
propositions. Kruglanski (1980, 1982) talks of ‘noncommonly deducible
implications’. The principle of noncommon deduction should, according to
Kruglanski (1980), represent a general principle to which inference rules (e.g.
covariation principle, discounting-augmentation-principle etc.) could be submitted
to.
In more recent publications, Kruglanski (1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen
(1983) regard the principle of noncommon deduction as a necessary, but not as a
sufficient condition for the resolution of an epistemic problem. Equally, in the case
when a proposition has already been accepted, alternative propositions can be
generated at any time. If additional alternative propositions can be generated, it is
necessary, according to Kruglanski (1982 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) to
indicate which conditions have led to a temporary standstill of the epistemic
process.
Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) differentiate between two categories of freezing or
434 M. Effler
unfreezing mechanism: The first category relates to capacity. The more background
information one receives, the least likely is the unfreezing of the epistemic
sequence. With regard to motivation, the second category of freezing or unfreezing
mechanism Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) differentiate between three relevant
motivations: the need for structure, the fear of invalidity, and the preference for
desirable conclusions. ‘The need for structure is a desire to have knowledge on a
given topic, as opposed to a state of ambiguity. The need is assumed to exert in
inhibiting or braking influence on the hypothesis-generation process because the
generation of alternative hypotheses endangers the existing structure. It stands to
reason that one’s need for structure is heightened in situations where immediate
action is required’ (Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983, p. 16).
Fear of invalidity, however, is supposed to enhance the search for alternative
propositions. If fear of invalidity prevails, one continues to seek the most optimal
problem resolution. The preference for desirable conclusions can enhance as well
as inhibit the search for alternative propositions. Likewise, Kruglanski (1982b) has
named this need ‘wishful thinking’. The willingness to freeze or unfreeze the
epistemic sequence depends upon the congruence between problem solution and
‘wishful thinking’ .
If one assumes the existence of freezing or unfreezing mechanisms, then such
mechanisms cannot only have influence on whether the process of generating
alternative propositions is enhanced or inhibited. They also have influence on
whether or not a problem to which the principle of noncommon deduction can be
applied, is at all formulated.
In extreme cases, such mechanisms can have the effect that only one proposition
is generated. This proposition is then recognized as problem resolution without
having applied the principle of noncommon deduction. For example, a person can
attribute succes to his high abilities without applying the principle of noncommon
deduction in connection with other factors.
Nisbett and Ross (1980) have indicated that one is often satisfied with the first
plausible causal attribution. Subjects in psychological experiments often have little
experience in performing a certain task. Generally, they are not given the
possibility to observe more than once. Even in such cases, it is assumed that they do
not apply the principle of noncommon deduction, but rather, that they use simple
judgemental heuristics (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973, 1974).
If one regards the results found, for example, in connection with inference
processes during assessment of covariation (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Crocker,
(1981) it shows that people often tend to use hypotheses-confirming strategies. They
formulate hypotheses and then they search for evidence that can support their
hypotheses. However, they do not look simultaneously for evidence that weakens
their hypotheses. This means, that the principle of noncommon deduction is not
being applied in this case. It does not mean, however, that it could not be applied. It
only means that it is often not used.
The discussion concerning the function of freezing or unfreezing mechanisms of
the epistemic sequence cannot be limited to the question to which degree the
principle of noncommon deduction is applied. It has to be extended to the question
as to when one can expect the application of this principle in general.
Freezing or unfreezing mechanisms (need for structure, need for validity and
 Reply to Kruglanski 435
need for desirable conclusions) can be equally seen as needs or goals to which
causal attributions are functional. Such goals can also influence the process of causal
attributions. They can influence whether the principle of noncommon deduction is
applied or whether one proceeds less systematically e.g. by using heuristics or by
motivational tendencies directing the process of causal attribution towards the
satisfaction of needs. The need for positive self-presentation (Forsyth, 1980;
Tetlock and Levi, 1982) can be compatible with the need for validity, if public
scrutiny of causal attributions is anticipated and positive self-presentation can only
be obtained if one gives causal attributions in accordance with the rules of logic or
statistics. Need for positive self-evaluation can be satisfied, for example, by
attributing success to ability and failure to bad luck.
It is therefore to be assumed that the goals because of which causal attributions
are being made influence the process of causal attributions. Goals influence
whether rules of logic and statistics, judgemental heuristics or motivational
tendencies determine the process of causal attributions. Different attribution
theories relate therefore to different goals for which causal attributions are being
made. In attribution research this point has not yet been adequately expressed.
One can imagine an unlimited number of such goals. Attribution research has
only been interested in a limited number of such possible goals. The selection of
goals has not, however, been made arbitrarily. One selected the goals, that would,
one assumed, be of most significance to a large number of people.
The process of causal attribution should also be determined from the present
information. The application of the covariation principle presumes the possibility
of several observations. If such information is missing, then the covariation
principle cannot be applied. When judged by a second set of criteria, attribution
theories differ from each other in that they proceed from different information
bases.

CONCLUSIONS

Kruglanski (1980 a, b) and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have tried to show that
different attribution theories differ from each other only in the respect that they
relate to different epistemic problems. However, epistemic problems depend on the
goals because of which causal attributions are being made. Kruglanski (1980,1982a)
and Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) suggest that such goals have not been con-
sidered in attribution research. However, such an assumption is not justified. In the
traditional theories of Jones and Davis (1964) and Kelley (1967,1973) the purpose
of causal attributions was considered to be the finding out of controllability and
predictability of behaviour. In the discussion concerning the influence of
motivational tendencies on causal attributions (Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979;
Tetlock and Levi, 1982) the main issue has been the need for positive
self-evaluation, respectively, the need for positive self-presentation. Without
doubt, such goals are important to many individuals in many situations. Therefore,
one cannot conceive them as a more or less arbitrary selection from a large number
of goals to which causal attributions can be functional. If different attribution
theories relate to different goals that one regards as being of importance and
epistemic problems depend on these goals, then one cannot criticize attribution
436 M. Effler
theories on the grounds that they only relate to a small, more or less arbitrary
selection from an unlimited number of epistemic problems.
One can only talk about the use of the principle of noncommon deduction if at
least two propositions are formulated from which noncommon implications can be
deduced. Freezing o r unfreezing mechanisms of an epistemic sequence as discussed
by Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), can lead in extreme cases-it does not have to be
a rare case-to the principle of noncommon deduction not being used at all. It is
suggested t o understand the mechanisms ‘need for structure’, ‘fear of invalidity’
and ‘preference for desirable conclusions’ as goals to which causal attributions are
functional. These or other goals will decide whether the principle of noncommon
deduction is used or whether other strategies are being used in causal attributions.
Different attribution theories do not only differ from each other in that they
relate to different goals to which causal attributions can be functional, but they
also differ because they proceed from different information bases.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author thanks Mrs. Angelika Zimmerle for her help with the translation from
German into English.

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the fact or fiction question’, Joirrnal o,f Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 56-71.
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Forsyth, D. R. (1980). ‘The functions of attributions’, Social Psychology Quarterly, 43:
184-189.
Heider, F. (1958). 7he Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, Wiley, New York.
Jones, E. E. and Davis, K. E. (1965). ‘From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in
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Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1972). ‘Subjective probability: A judgement of
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 Reply to Kruglanski 437

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&SUME
Les diffkrentes theories d’attributions se distinguent moins par leurs relations ? diffkrents
i
problemes kpistkmologiques que par le fait qu’elles tiennent compte de buts pour lesquels
des attributions causales ne sont pas uniformkment fonctionnelles. Le processus
d’attribution est influenck par les buts pour lesquels les attributions causales sont
fonctionnelles. Un second critere qui diffkrencie les thtorie d’attribution est qu’elles partent
d’informations diffkrentes.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die verschiedenen Attributionstheorien unterscheiden sich weniger danach, daI3 sie sich auf
verschiedene epistemische Probleme beziehen, sondern danach, daI3 sie unterschiedliche
Ziele beriicksichtigen, denen Kausalerklarungen dienen konnen. Die Ziele, denen
Kausalerklarungen dienen, beeinflussen den ProzeI3 der Kausalattribuierung. Ein zweiter
Gesichtspunkt, nach dern sich die verschiedenen Attributionstheorien unterscheiden lassen,
besteht darin, daO sie von unterschiedlichen Inforrnationsbasen ausgehen.
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