Energy Policy 165 (2022) 112930

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

The EU needs to improve its external energy security

Matúš Mišík
Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The spike in energy prices and feared natural gas supplies shortage during the winter of 2021/2022 indicate a
European Union limited ability of existing energy measures to deliver energy security for the European Union. Moreover, the lack
Decarbonisation of a common external energy security policy made it difficult for the EU to assume a common energy position
Energy security
towards Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. While the pace of decarbonisation needs to increase for
Natural gas
the EU to achieve its 2050 goals, the Union must support its member states’ energy security (including its
external dimension) during the transition period, until it will be provided by domestic low-carbon energy
sources.

1. Introduction bankruptcy, leaving millions of their customers covered by suppliers of

The second half of 2021 witnessed an increase in natural gas and
electricity prices unseen for decades, with prices remaining exception­
ally high also at the beginning of 2022. While this is the result of
numerous factors, including exceptional weather situations, the
pandemic recovery-related increase in demand, and technical chal­
lenges at upstream, many observers tried to use the situation as an op­
portunity to criticise the green agenda and the employment of
renewable energy sources (Economist, 2021). However, major energy
actors, including the International Energy Agency, have argued that
renewable energy sources are not to blame; rather, a perfect storm of
different factors caused energy prices to soar. If anything, the inability of
governments to support the scaling up of renewables to replace low
investments in fossil fuels contributed to the situation (Fernández
Alvarez and Molnar, 2021). This has impacted European citizens both
indirectly, via final consumer prices which are starting to reflect the
increased inputs, and directly, via rising prices of electricity, natural gas,
and gasoline. Moreover, due to high natural gas prices, burning coal to
generate electricity has once again become an economically viable op­
tion. However, since coal burning produces more emissions than natural
gas, this led to increased demands for CO2 permits. Together with other
factors, including the agreement on establishing global carbon trade,
this drove CO2 permits price to record levels, adding to already high
electricity prices (Reuters, 2021a).
Unable to cope with high wholesale electricity and natural gas prices
on a heavily regulated household and small businesses market, retail
energy companies in several European countries have filed for
last resort (Reuters, 2021b). The problem has become so prominent that
the autumn 2021 European Council placed it on its agenda, promising
support for citizens and small companies (European Council, 2021).
Moreover, the EU member states’ energy ministers met at the end of
October 2021 to discuss possible solutions to the ongoing problem, as
well as to explore how to prevent its recurrence in the future (Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy Council, 2021). The French Presidency
of the Council of the EU which started on January 1, 2022 put “rising
energy prices” on its agenda (French Government, 2022).
In addition to its price (i.e., accessibility), the availability of natural
gas during the upcoming winter came into question during the autumn
of 2021, as exceptionally low levels of gas in underground storages
across the EU raised concerns. With their gas level at 75% on October 1,
2021 (15% below the average), EU storages reached a ten-year low. This
trend continued in early 2022, when EU facilities reached new mini­
mums (Bruegel, 2022). Record low filling levels of storage facilities
controlled by Gazprom were especially responsible for this situation, as
they were filled to only one fourth of their capacity at the beginning of
2022 compared to the previous year – a trend that started already in the
second quarter of 2021 (Bruegel, 2022). ENTSOG, the European agency
connecting national authorities responsible for natural gas transmission,
expected that in case of a cold winter of 2021/2022, the European
market would need 5–10% more imports compared to maximum vol­
umes from previous years in order to satisfy all its customers (ENTSOG,
2021). Repeated assurances by President Putin that Gazprom would
increase supplies if necessary to guarantee there would be enough nat­
ural gas for the upcoming winter came into question after Gazprom

E-mail address: matus.misik@uniba.sk.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112930
Received 29 November 2021; Received in revised form 6 March 2022; Accepted 18 March 2022
Available online 1 April 2022
0301-4215/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Mišík
halted natural gas supplies to Germany via the Yamal pipeline at the end
of October 2021 (Reuters, 2021c). The situation escalated towards the
end of 2021, when Russian representatives started to claim that the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline needed to be immediately approved by the German
regulator in order to provide enough gas for the European market
(Reuters, 2021d). Gazprom started to prepare the (at that time already
finished) pipeline for commencement at the beginning of 2022, but this
did not happen. Such an activity was in contradiction with the position
of the German regulator responsible for approving the pipeline at the EU
end, which requested significant changes to the operator’s legal position
within the EU. Another interruption of gas supplies to the EU via the
Yamal pipeline on December 21, 2021 and the reversal of gas flow from
Germany to Poland via the same pipeline meant further intensification
of tension and increase in gas price on the European market, which
reached a new all-time high at the very end of 2021 (Financial Times,
2021). Moreover, at the beginning of 2022, transit via Ukraine and
Slovakia (the Brotherhood gas pipeline) was lowered to approximately
one third compared to December 2021, further decreasing Russiaʼs
overall import to Europe (eustream, 2022).
All these problems were exacerbated on February 24, 2022, when the
Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. The EU and other Western coun­
tries rushed to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation, its
leadership, and oligarchs. Energy sources were not targeted and, para­
doxically, their imports to Europe have increased significantly after the
invasion (Bruegel, 2022). However, the EU started to prepare for the
following winter (2022/2023) and the replacement of Russian supplies
via source diversification and energy efficiency measures (McWilliams
et al., 2022). For example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) pro­
posed ten steps for the EU to decrease its reliance on Russian gas (IEA,
2022).
2. Energy security problem
Such a development suggests that the EU has an energy security
problem, since availability and affordability are often considered to be
the concept’s main defining features. For instance, the IEA claims that
energy security is “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an
affordable price” (IEA, 2021). Not only is the EU heavily dependent on
energy imports from third countries, but the current development re­
veals it to be more vulnerable to external supply problems and price
shocks than previously believed. Domestic production of hydrocarbons
has been decreasing during the last decade with further reductions
connected to decarbonisation (for example, a sharp decrease in coal
production), as well as the depletion of existing sources (especially
visible in the Dutch case), anticipated. While primary energy con­
sumption decreased only slightly (by approximately 3% (eurostat,
2021a)) between 2000 and 2019, the import of fossil fuels is on the
increase (the overall energy import dependency rose from 56% in 2000
to 61% in 2019 (eurostat, 2021b)).
The European Union began developing its energy policy at the end of
the 1980s, with rules about a competitive and fair internal energy
market emerging during the following two decades. During the second
half of the 2000s, climate mitigation policy became prominent and
started to intertwine with energy policy, a process interrupted by the
2009 gas crisis (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2016), which caused the Union
to refocus on energy security and relations with third countries. Caused
by a dispute between the Russian Federation – being the main supplier of
natural gas to the EU – and Ukraine – at that time a transit country for
the majority of Russian gas intended for Europe – the crisis created a
window of opportunity which the European Commission used to impress
the need to develop common rules for improving energy security on the
reluctant member states (Maltby, 2013).
However, these rules concerned the internal energy market and
focused on improving the mutual interconnections between member
states (the ‘N-1’ rule or solidarity principle). The Commission’s efforts
regarding external energy relations aimed at making intergovernmental
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Energy Policy 165 (2022) 112930
agreements between individual member states and their suppliers
(mostly the Russian Federation) more transparent were unsuccessful
(Herranz-Surrallés, 2017), with many countries switching to other legal
frameworks in order to circumvent these EU rules. Originally initiated as
an energy security project, the Energy Union was turned into an um­
brella scheme encompassing almost all aspects of energy and climate
mitigation policies. Its successor, the European Green Deal, is predom­
inantly focused on climate policy and also views energy security through
this lens. Even EU funds intended to foster a post-pandemic recovery
(Next Generation EU and the Multiannual Financial Framework for
2021–2027) are connected to decarbonisation goals, with the role of
natural gas (as well as nuclear) in this process being the subject of a
complex ongoing discussion (Schreiber et al., 2020).
The internal energy market was not designed to prevent the current
situation with natural gas price or supply, but to react to such a situation
by sending market signals to suppliers (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015). This
has been the case since the end of 2021 as many LNG cargoes were
redirected to the EU from other markets (Reuters, 2021e), in some cases
even in spite of possible fines from their original buyers. Moreover,
while internal energy market rules work within the EU, they have only
limited impact outside its borders and only under certain conditions
(Goldthau and Sitter, 2015). However, the disputes surrounding the
Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, and the applicability of internal energy
market rules (specifically, Third Party Access) have shown how difficult
it is to apply common rules outside the EU, and how easy it is for actors
interested in supplying energy to the EU on their own (rather than the
EUʼs) terms to find loopholes the EU has difficulties closing (Sziklai
et al., 2020).
3. Need to focus on energy security
Non-fossil energy sources are crucial for the EU’s aim to decarbonise
its economy by 2050 (European Council, 2019). However, the continued
importance of natural gas for the Union can be substantiated by (at least)
three points. First, although fossil energy sources will largely be
replaced in the decarbonised EU, that will not mean the end of natural
gas (or oil and coal) in the European energy mix. Natural gas will still be
needed in several sectors, although a sharp decrease in demand expected
by 2050 (Crespo del Granado et al., 2019) is supposed to cause a decline
in natural gas imports (according to the Commission, in the most dec­
arbonised scenario by 81% compared to the 2015 level; European
Commission, 2018). Second, domestic renewable energy sources have a
positive impact not only on decarbonisation, but also energy security
and this impact will increase as the production capacity of said energy
sources grows. Nevertheless, renewables also have drawbacks due to
their intermittent nature, which makes them difficult to incorporate into
existing electricity grids in higher volumes (Bergaentzlé et al., 2019).
One solution to this problem is to create back-up capacity (Liebensteiner
and Wrienz, 2020) supported by a capacity remuneration mechanism
(Lockwood et al., 2019), usually in the form of natural gas or coal- and
oil-fired power plants (other options are also being discussed; Kozlova
and Overland, 2022). However, this solution highlights the need for
natural gas (and other fossil fuels) in decarbonisation (Bolton and
Clausen, 2019).
Third, while the decarbonisation of the EUʼs economy is the ultimate
goal, there will be a long transition period between now and 2050, when
this process should be finalised. During the transition period, the Union
will increase the domestic production of low-carbon energy and
decrease the import of fossil fuels from abroad; however, it will still
depend on external energy supplies to a significant degree. This period is
sure to bring a series of challenges the Union needs to prepare for; for
instance, a set of problems connected to international relations and
changed dynamics between countries (Bazilian et al., 2019). Academic
literature has already paid attention to these new energy security issues
connected to changes in relations between countries at the global level
caused by renewables (Su et al., 2021; Vakulchuk et al., 2020), the EU’s
M. Mišík
growing dependency on the import of critical raw materials crucial for
renewables (Lee et al., 2020; Vakulchuk and Overland, 2021), and the
role of hydrogen in safeguarding the EU’s energy security (Parra et al.,
2019; Sgobbi et al., 2016). This paper claims that while these issues are
important, we should not forget about natural gas and its exporters. The
EU’s fossil fuels suppliers will be under increased pressure to adjust to
the new situation of lower demand, which can cause new crises and
volatility on the market. Some of the energy exporting countries will be
able to adjust to the new situation better than others (for example, by
innovating the forms of increased supply flexibility – including LNG – or
adjusting their infrastructure to non-fossil fuels such as hydrogen),
which will further contribute to pressure at the international level.
The impact of decarbonisation on the international arena will be
further exacerbated by the different access individual countries have to
low-carbon technologies, which has the potential to create groups of
leaders and laggards of energy transition (Eicke and Goldthau, 2021).
Moreover, the EU’s efforts to protect its own decarbonising industry and
support decarbonisation in other countries in the form of a carbon
border adjustment mechanism can have a negative impact, especially on
countries of the Global South, and further increase global inequalities in
energy transition (Eicke et al., 2021). This can amplify tensions between
the different ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of energy transition within the in­
ternational arena. The European Union therefore needs to prepare for
this period by making arrangements within the area of energy security in
general and its sub-area of relations with external energy suppliers in
particular, since these issues have previously taken a back seat to in­
ternal market development and decarbonisation.
The EU’s decarbonisation efforts have heretofore not been very
ambitious; in fact, the latest ‘Fit for 55’ package acknowledges the need
to speed up the decarbonisation process in order to stay on course to
reach a carbon-neutral economy in less than three decades (European
Commission, 2021). Despite their efforts to improve energy efficiency,
employ renewable energy sources, and limit greenhouse gases emis­
sions, EU member states have not decreased their fossil fuels imports
from abroad – their increased energy dependency suggests the opposite
is true. Only once the EU has fully embarked on an energy transition by
limiting its fossil fuels consumption will imports decrease and relations
with energy suppliers change – though not necessarily in a good way (Su
et al., 2021).
The European Union should, therefore, shift its perspective. Its cur­
rent standpoint is based on the idea that internal market workings,
together with the employment of domestic low-carbon energy sources
(mostly renewables, but nuclear energy is also on the table as member
states can decide on the composition of their energy mixes), can deliver
energy security (among other things). However, the current crisis has
shown that existing measures cannot protect EU countries from energy
spikes or supply interruptions that burden the European economy,
especially when combined with the consequences of the COVID-19
pandemic. While renewable energy sources do contribute to domestic
energy production, the energy transition is far from complete, which
means that at this point in time, in many cases there are no viable
renewable alternatives to current fossil fuels (especially in heavy and
chemical industry).
Another statement connecting the internal market to energy security
claims that while the EU is dependent on external energy supplies, third
countries are dependent on revenues stemming from these supplies. This
situation is supposed to create an equilibrium that will safeguard sup­
plies and prevent long-term supply disruptions to the EU as exporting
countries cannot afford a significant decrease in revenues over longer
periods of time. However, as the 2009 gas crisis has shown, such a
symmetrical dependency does not prevent short-term supply in­
terruptions. Moreover, there have been concerns that the current low
levels of gas stocks in Europe are the result of Gazprom’s policy aimed at
exercising pressure on the EU and its member states in connection to the
approval of Nord Stream 2 (Reuters, 2021f). These concerns have
intensified after October 30, 2021, when Gazprom interrupted its
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Energy Policy 165 (2022) 112930
supplies to Germany via the Yamal pipeline that runs through Poland
(Reuters, 2021c).
Such a perspective needs to change, with ‘fossil’ energy security
being considered hand-in-hand with decarbonisation and internal mar­
ket developments, as complementary, rather than juxtaposed objectives.
The EU needs to refocus on external energy security and relations with
third countries which supply it with fossil fuels, which will still be
needed during the transition period, until decarbonisation is almost
complete. Similar to the events of 2009, the current crisis, which will
weaken member states’ opposition to deeper integration in the energy
security area, could serve as an opportunity for the Commission to
pursue energy security policies. Unlike the 2009 crisis, the current one
concerns all member states, so higher levels of their support for initia­
tives that would prevent similar situations in the future are to be
expected.
4. How to increase EU’s energy security?
The EU finds itself in a specific situation: it needs to decarbonise and
at the same time secure a sufficient volume of fossil energy (especially
natural gas) at an affordable price. The question is how to achieve these
essentially contradictory goals. There is no shortage of ideas on how to
improve the EU’s external fossil energy security, many of which have
previously been discussed and rejected. The original 2014 proposal for
the Energy Union revolved around the idea of common purchase of
natural gas, itself based on already existing processes within nuclear
energy policy. While this idea has now resurfaced, other solutions were
proposed as well, some of them connected to gas storage rules or more
thorough applications of already existing rules.
One option is to delink the short-term situation on international
markets and the global political arena from end customers by providing
support for the energy poor, decreasing taxes, freezing energy prices,
etc. This has been happening in many EU member states; however, these
measures are connected to social and fiscal policies that are fully in
national hands. Although efficient when it comes to price curbing from a
short-term perspective (albeit a burden on public coffers), these mea­
sures do not help secure the supplies of sufficient volumes to the EU
since they are mostly connected to (geo)political issues. Therefore,
current challenges can be better dealt with within energy policy where
price and volume of (not only) natural gas can be approached in unison.
The EU has been active in exporting its internal energy market rules
abroad in order to improve its position as a liberal actor in a realist
world, thus creating ‘regulatory power Europe’ (Goldthau and Sitter,
2015). However, this has only had limited effect on the international
energy regime and supported liberalisation mainly in the EU’s imme­
diate neighbourhood, for example, via cooperation and acquis commu­
nautaire transfer within the Energy Community. What is needed is a
common external energy policy that would provide a ‘common voice’
for EU member states. Several EU members from Central and Eastern
Europe have repeatedly proposed uniting their voices in dealings with
energy suppliers (Mišík, 2019). However, these initiatives have been
unsuccessful because many member states were not interested in ceding
such competences to the EU level, as that would hamper their bilateral
relations with third countries (the discussion surrounding the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline is a very suitable example here; Gens, 2019).
The deepening of European integration is difficult in a policy
wherein member states have core competences in their own hands
(Thaler and Pakalkaite, 2021) and a passive stance is sufficient for them
to prevent the transfer of these competences to the EU level. A common
external energy policy which would shift negotiations with third coun­
tries from member states to the EU level would be the most effective
solution for strengthening the EU’s position towards third countries.
This would allow the Union to fully unveil its economic potential as a
unified actor representing 27 member states and their energy needs.
This was one of the points often stressed in connection to the Energy
Union: a united EU presents a huge market with enormous natural gas
M. Mišík
demand and a lot of funds to pay for it (European Commission, 2015).
Moreover, this would disarm the ‘divide and rule’ policy, especially
prominent in Russia’s approach to negotiations with EU member states
(Karlsen, 2019; Siddi, 2018). In the aftermath of the Russian attack on
Ukraine, the EU presented a unified position on security and defence
questions; however, this unity was not visible in the energy policy area,
where the EU’s and member states’ calls to decrease imports of Russian
fossil fuels did not translate into stronger positions (such as sanctions)
during the first two month of the conflict.
Less demanding solutions that do not necessitate unanimity among
the member states on issues connected to their foreign policy interests
can also help improve their negotiation positions. First, increased
transparency within the EU on the prices of imported energy (for
example, ‘pipeline’ natural gas) can improve member states’ starting
positions in negotiations with their energy suppliers. Although the EU
has a common energy market, companies from various countries buy
natural gas from the same suppliers (Gazprom Export) at different pri­
ces. These prices are not connected to differences in markets or various
shipping costs but solely to political issues and are part of Russiaʼs
strategy (Siddi, 2020). This was quite visible in the Baltic States during
the early 2010s when each country was paying a different price
depending on its political relations with Russia and obviously not on the
differences in shipping costs (Mišík and Prachárová, 2016). While
diversification and the 2018 antitrust settlement (Chyong et al., 2023)
have solved this problem to a certain degree by enhancing access to the
internal market for all member states, increased transparency would
further improve the negotiation positions of the member states paying
the highest gas prices.
Second, a better position in relation to energy suppliers can also be
achieved via cooperation among member states in external energy pol­
icy on a regional, rather than an EU-wide level, although this has proven
to be difficult. A regional approach exists in connection to Projects of
Common Interests – the EU’s priority infrastructural energy projects
aimed at improving diversification within the EU energy market (Jir­
ušek, 2020). For example, unsuccessful efforts of the Baltic States to find
a common stance on an LNG terminal (Grigas, 2013) resulted in a
Lithuanian solo project (Mišík and Prachárová, 2016). This activity is
internally focused and not connected to relations with third countries.
However, this type of regional cooperation would probably not generate
enough momentum to change the engaged member states’ position to­
wards energy suppliers and would also echo problems connected to
multi-speed Europe (Jensen and Slapin, 2012).
Third, although the results have so far been mixed
(Herranz-Surrallés, 2017; Thaler and Pakalkaite, 2021), the evaluation
of Intergovernmental Agreements (IGA) by the Commission also pre­
sents a way to strengthen member states’ positions in relation to energy
supplying countries by making sure they follow the rules. With these
rules, the Commission gained the competence to evaluate energy
agreements between member states and their energy suppliers against
existing internal energy market rules (for example, Third Party Access).
The original ex post evaluation (i.e., after signing the agreement) was
changed to ex ante (i.e., positive evaluation by the Commission is a
prerequisite for the agreement to be signed) since, according to the
Commission, the former did not achieve the desired outcomes (Batzella,
2021). The challenge this system has to face are changes to the legal
relationships between EU member states and third countries that are
moving away from IGA. However, the Commission’s practice of ex ante
evaluation can also be a suitable model for other areas of external energy
policy.
No matter what the concrete proposal will be, the most important
question is whether it will in fact materialise or merely become one of
the Commission’s many initiatives aimed at increasing external energy
security that was rejected by the member states. However, on an inter­
connected internal energy market like the one within the EU it is almost
impossible to protect one’s own national interests without negatively
impacting the rest of the Union. The current energy crisis can serve as a
4
Energy Policy 165 (2022) 112930
catalyst for change and help persuade the reluctant member states that a
common approach to external energy security can support decarbon­
isation by creating a stable transition period and achieve internal market
stabilisation by preventing the recurrence of price hikes.
It is highly possible that the Russian invasion on Ukraine will trigger
the EUʼs response in energy security policy but its actions in this area
have been rather slow and once again point towards the revision of the
Unionʼs internal mechanisms (as was the case after the 2009 gas crisis)
rather than the creation of a common external energy policy. The crisis
can increase the pace of decarbonisation within the EU as an energy
security measure; for example, already at the beginning of March 2022,
Germany announced that it aims to fully decarbonise its electricity
sector by 2035 (Reuters, 2022). However, such a step will not change the
fact that the EU needs to develop a strong common policy towards fossil
fuels suppliers to prevent critical situations from repeating. Increased
decarbonisation will just shorten the transition period during which the
EU would need to safeguard its fossil energy security since it will still be
dependent on these types of energy sources.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Matúš Mišík: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis,
Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administra­
tion, Resources, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization,
Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development
Agency Grant No. APVV-20-0012. The author would like to thank the
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions, Andrej Nosko
and Veronika Oravcová for their comments on an early draft of the text,
and Nada Kujundžić for language editing.
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