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Chapter 3 Eisourcebook2017
Chapter 3 Eisourcebook2017
Chapter 3 Eisourcebook2017
3
–
www.eisourcebook.org
The
Extractives
Industries
Investment
in
the
EI
sectors
(oil,
gas
and
mining)
has
features
that
present
particular
challenges
to
policy
makers.
They
arise
from
the
outset,
at
the
policy
design
and
legal
framework
stage,
and
are
evident
in
subsequent
stages
to
the
management
and
allocation
of
revenues
–
and
ultimately,
the
sustainable
development
of
these
resources.
Some,
perhaps
many,
of
these
features
are
common
to
all
three
sectors,
such
as
the
extraction
of
resources
from
under
the
ground
or
the
sea-‐bed1,
their
ultimate
exhaustibility,
or
their
exposure
to
a
high
degree
of
price
volatility.
Others
are
unique
to
each
sector.
For
example,
oil
and
gas
are
very
alike
at
the
upstream
stage
(exploration
and
production),
but
natural
gas
takes
on
distinct
‘network’
characteristics
in
its
transportation
and
distribution
phases.
From
a
commercial
point
of
view,
oil
is
riskier
to
find
than
the
mineral
deposits
typically
sought
by
mining
companies
but
once
found
in
commercial
quantities,
that
risk
is
reduced
relative
to
the
commercial
risk
of
producing
mining
deposits
(although
that
does
not
apply
to
the
environmental
risk).
Gas
is
different
again,
with
its
risk
profile
requiring
a
complex,
highly
expensive
infrastructure
and
a
detailed
contractual
regime
to
support
it.
Effective
management
in
the
public
interest
requires
recognition
of
both
the
common
and
the
unique
features
of
EI
in
the
design
of
sector
policies
and
institutions.
This
Chapter
critically
examines
the
fundamental
characteristics
of
EI
sector
investment,
from
a
perspective
that
gives
priority
to
public
policy
making
and
the
design
of
appropriate
institutional
arrangements
in
the
public
sector.
It
identifies
the
common
features,
the
key
differences
between
EI
sectors
and
the
investment
dynamics.
Its
focus
is
on
the
relationships
that
governments
have
or
seek
to
have
with
investors
in
the
EI
sector
rather
than
on
how
governments
themselves
can
respond
to
the
challenges
and
opportunities
of
natural
resource-‐
led
development
(the
subject
of
Chapter
2).
Some
features
of
this
investor-‐state
relationship
are
relatively
constant
over
time,
while
others
are
more
dynamic,
such
as
industry
structure,
showing
significant
changes
and
greater
complexity
in
recent
years,
not
least
due
to
companies
from
emerging
markets
making
strategic
investments
aimed
at
securing
future
supplies
of
energy
and
minerals.
1
In
this
sense,
the
‘extractives’
industries
by
definition
stand
in
contrast
to
the
renewable
energy
industries
which
typically
rely
upon
natural
resources
located
above
the
surface
(wind,
solar
power,
for
example).
1
There
are
many
aspects
of
this
investor-‐state
dynamism
that
present
challenges
to
policy
advisers
and
decision
makers
in
resource-‐rich
states.
For
example:
What
kind
of
company
or
pattern
of
companies
is
best
suited
to
achieve
a
country’s
policy
on
extractives
and
development
generally?
The
choice
is
wide.
Alongside
long
established
companies
from
the
OECD
countries
there
are
state
owned
enterprises
(SOEs)
from
Malaysia,
South
Korea
and
the
Middle
East,
and
new
players
from
China,
Russia,
Brazil
and
India,
all
making
significant
impacts.
Significant
diversity
of
ownership
and
financing
structures
has
emerged
from
the
resulting
south-‐south
pattern
of
investment,
with
the
use
of
resource-‐for-‐infrastructure
deals
being
one
example
of
this.
Moreover,
the
growing
number
of
so-‐called
junior
or
mid-‐cap
companies
as
investors
means
that
a
focus
by
policy
makers
and
their
advisers
on
the
‘super-‐major’
companies
that
long
dominated
the
EI
sector
is
now
inappropriate.
This
diversity
is
also
evident
in
the
destinations
of
investment,
the
points
along
the
exploration
to
extraction
cycle
and
across
key
energy
and
other
minerals
commodities2.
A
further
element
of
complexity
in
investor-‐state
relations
is
presented
by
the
international
character
of
investment
in
the
oil,
gas
and
mining
sectors.
More
than
ever
before,
there
are
opportunities
for
investors
to
structure
their
operations,
on-‐
and
offshore,
to
take
advantage
of
this
context.
As
a
result,
national
tax
and
regulatory
authorities
face
greater
challenges
in
regime
design,
in
monitoring
and
enforcement.
2
See
background
paper
to
Rents
to
Riches
book
by
Kaiser
and
Vinuela:
Rents
for
the
Future?
(author’s
copy),
p.
3.
2
CHAPTER
3
–
www.eisourcebook.org
3.1
Common
Features
Long,
Risky,
and
Costly
Exploration
and
Development
Periods
Each
of
the
EI
sectors
is
characterized
to
a
greater
or
lesser
degree
by
long,
risky
and,
in
the
case
of
oil
and
gas,
costly
and
exceptionally
capital-‐intensive
exploration
and
development
periods1 .
For
a
state
that
wishes
to
go
it
alone
in
the
EI
sector,
these
features
mandate
significant
financial
resources,
and
an
economy
with
sufficient
diversity
to
allay
concerns
about
EI
sector
investment
risk.2
For
states
that,
more
typically,
choose
to
attract
and
rely
upon
international
investment,
these
features
underscore
the
importance
of
having
in
place
a
legal,
contractual,
and
fiscal
regime
that
investors
are
able
to
understand
and
trust.
These
states
must
also
satisfy
a
political
track
record
that
can
provide
investors
with
reasonable
assurances
against
adverse
changes
in
terms
if
a
major
discovery
has
been
made
and/or
exploitation
is
underway
(see
Chapter
4).
The
challenge
here
is
that
the
conditions
and
assumptions
that
exist
at
the
beginning
of
a
project,
at
the
time
when
laws
are
to
be
drafted
and
contracts
awarded,
are
almost
certain
to
change
in
the
course
of
the
length
of
the
project
investment.
When
they
are
made,
there
will
usually
be
great
uncertainty
about
the
sector’s
potential,
based
on
what
is
known
about
the
geology
at
the
time
of
exploration
and
also
about
the
economics,
markets,
risks
and
politics.
The
incentive
for
a
state
to
revisit
the
terms
of
the
initial
bargain
struck
is
increased
by
the
shift
in
bargaining
power
that
occurs
in
the
event
of
a
commercial
discovery
and
a
substantial
investment
by
the
foreign
investor.
1
For
large
mining
projects,
this
distinction
will
be
less
apparent.
2
See
Boadway,
R.,
and
Keen,
M.
(2010).
Theoretical
Perspectives
on
Resource
Taxation
Design.
In:
Daniel,
P.,
Keen,
M.
and
McPherson,
C.
(eds.).
The
Taxation
of
Petroleum
and
Minerals:
Principles,
Problems,
and
Practice.
London:
Routledge.
3
This
clearly
does
not
include
the
ASM
sector
but
it
is
nonetheless
an
integral
part
of
EI
generally.
1
Looking
beyond
the
short
term,
the
challenge
here
lies
in
finding
ways
of
enabling
a
transfer
of
expertise
and
sourcing
of
business
to
local
firms
so
as
to
ensure
a
long-‐term
benefit
to
the
domestic
economy.
Asymmetric
Access
to
Information
Partly
due
to
the
complex
management
skills
and
technology
that
characterize
the
EI
sectors,
a
third
feature
common
to
EI
sectors
in
developing
states
is
the
informational
disadvantage
that
governments
have
vis-‐à-‐vis
international
investors
and
operators.4
The
government
is
likely
to
be
better
informed
as
to
its
own
future
fiscal
intentions
but
the
private
investor
undertaking
exploring
and
development
will
probably
be
better
informed
on
technical
and
commercial
aspects
of
a
project.
This
has
important
implications
for
the
design
of
license
or
contract
award
procedures,
fiscal
design,
and
fiscal
administration
as
well
as
the
engagement
of
outside
technical
assistance.
It
can
also
be
the
root
of
subsequent
dissatisfaction
by
a
government
about
the
terms
negotiated
with
investors
by
its
predecessor(s)
and
trigger
demands
for
a
review
of
those
terms.
With
increasing
sources
of
competition
in
the
EI
sector,
and
the
role
of
national
resource
companies,
this
is
less
of
a
problem
than
it
once
was.
This
remains
a
challenge
however
for
many
governments
in
resource-‐rich
economies
and
is
compounded
by
a
tendency
of
some
of
them
to
be
overly
secretive
about
such
information
once
it
has
been
obtained.
Price
Volatility
A
fourth
feature
common
to
both
the
petroleum
and
mining
sectors
is
the
volatility
of
prices,
costs,
and
rents.
The
extreme
volatility
of
prices
not
only
poses
macroeconomic
management
challenges,
but
also
raises
issues
with
respect
to
the
design
of
fiscal
terms.
A
fundamental
policy
issue
with
which
governments
must
constantly
grapple
is
the
question
of
who
should
bear
the
risk
of
price
and
revenue
volatility:
the
investor
or
the
government?
The
volatility
or
variability
of
costs
receives
much
less
attention,
but
deserves
more.
EI
costs
vary
widely
across
time,
and
especially
across
projects,
creating
significant
issues
for
both
the
design
of
fiscal
regimes
and
their
administration.
When
costs
soar
for
investors,
as
can
happen
in
both
mining
and
hydrocarbons
sectors,
tensions
with
governments
are
likely
to
result
from
the
necessary
remedial
actions.
Rents
(discussed
below)
are
also
volatile
as
a
result
of
dramatic
fluctuations
in
price
(see
Figure
2.1
on
oil
prices
in
Chapter
2
above).
4
On
the
asymmetric
information
and
principal-‐agent
problem,
see
Stiglitz,
J.
(1989).
Principal
and
Agent.
In:
Eatwell,
J.,
Milgate,
M.,
and
Newman,
P.
(eds.).
The
New
Palgrave.
Allocation,
Information
and
Markets.
New
York:
W.
W.
Norton;
see
also
Nutavoot,
P.
(2004).
Partnerships
in
Oil
and
Gas
Production-‐Sharing
Contracts.
International
Journal
of
Public
Sector
Management,
Vol.
17,
Issue
5,
pp.
431-‐442.
2
The
challenge
lies
less
in
the
wide
variability
of
prices
than
in
the
difficulty
in
predicting
them.
Most
forecasts
about
pricing
turn
out
to
be
wrong5.
And
the
consequences
can
be
severe:
apart
from
the
impacts
of
variation
on
the
size
of
resource
rents,
long-‐term
price
trends
can
make
reserves
uneconomic
for
investors
to
extract,
even
if
technology
has
improved,
and
can
leave
assets
stranded.
Substantial
Rents
Both
the
petroleum
and
mining
sectors
are
capable
of
generating
very
substantial
economic
rents.
By
‘rent’
is
meant
the
excess
of
revenues
over
all
costs
of
production,
including
those
of
discovery
and
development,
as
well
as
the
normal
return
to
capital.
The
cost
of
extraction
can
be
significantly
less
than
the
price
that
the
resource
can
obtain
on
the
market,
not
least
when
there
is
an
important
oligopolistic
element
in
world
markets
as
is
the
case
with
oil
and
some
minerals.
These
rents
can
be
a
very
attractive
tax
base
for
governments
on
both
efficiency
and
equity
grounds6.
Rent
capture
for
the
state
without
prejudice
to
investment
requires
care
in
design
of
the
fiscal
regime,
particularly
since
rent
revenues
can
be
highly
volatile.
By
way
of
illustration,
the
average
profit
measured
in
per
cent
of
revenues
among
EI
companies
was
between
25-‐30
percent
in
2006.
This
compares
with
less
than
20
percent
for
the
pharmaceutical
industry
and
with
a
mere
five
per
cent
for
the
EI
sector
in
20027.
The
challenge
for
some
states
will
lie
in
the
volumes
of
resource
wealth,
which
will
strain
the
capacity
of
the
existing
state
system,
aggravate
capacity
problems
and
create
tensions
in
its
relations
with
investors
in
turn.
Adverse
Environmental
and
Social
Impacts
The
EI
sectors
can
have
major
adverse
environmental
and
social
impacts.
In
the
past,
these
issues
have
not
always
been
well-‐
recognized
or
addressed
by
governments,
but
good
practice
has
improved
greatly
over
the
past
two
decades.
Avoiding
or
mitigating
these
impacts
depends
on
appropriate
legislation
or
regulation,
enforcement
capacity,
and
fiscal
regimes
that
incentivize
good
behaviour
by
the
investor,
while
recognizing
the
costs
involved
and
the
need
to
internalize
those
costs.
As
more
and
more
EI
companies
sign
up
to
international
standards
or
implement
their
own
in
these
areas,
the
challenge
for
many
governments
is
to
ensure
that
local
communities,
indigenous
peoples
and
other
affected
citizens
are
able
to
participate
in
decisions
relating
to
the
exploitation
of
the
resource
and
benefit
from
the
development
of
the
resource.
5
IMF
(2012)
10.
6
IMF
(2012)
10.
7
Ericsson,
M.,
Mining
Industry
Corporate
Actors
Analysis
(2012),
p.
1.
3
Resource
Exhaustion
By
their
nature,
oil,
gas,
and
mining
resources
are
non-‐renewable8.
They
will
eventually
be
exhausted.
This
critical
feature
distinguishes
these
industries
from
most,
perhaps
all
others,
and
presents
policy
makers
with
a
number
of
important
issues,
ranging
from
decisions
on
optimal
rates
of
exploration,
development,
and
exploitation
(through
fiscal
regime
design)
to
appropriate
frameworks
for
macroeconomic
planning.
It
can
act
positively
to
encourage
fiscal
discipline
and
long-‐term
planning
about
how
much
of
the
resource
wealth
to
consume
and
how
much
to
save9.
The
challenge
for
governments
is
rather
to
take
the
finiteness
of
presently
identified
resources
into
account
in
their
domestic
planning
and
in
their
dealings
with
foreign
investors,
rather
than
to
prepare
for
some
kind
of
unlikely
‘resource
apocalypse’
when
exhaustion
occurs.
Prominent
Political
Profile
Long
viewed
as
strategic
because
of
their
pervasive
influence
on
the
economy
and
the
scale
of
the
revenues
they
generate,
the
petroleum
and
mining
sectors
have
always
attracted
political
attention.
In
certain
circumstances,
this
attention
can
frustrate,
or
at
least
increase,
the
difficulty
of
introducing
good
sector
management
practices.10
Every
effort
should
be
made
to
minimize
this.
Transparency
may
present
challenges
to
both
governments
and
investors
but
helps
to
diminish
the
risk
of
rumour
and
speculation
among
citizens
about
resource
wealth
management.
Enclave
Status
The
production
of
minerals
and
hydrocarbons
is
often
done
in
economic
areas
that
are
small
in
scale,
and
geographically
limited,
with
relatively
few
linkages
to
the
rest
of
the
economy.
For
offshore
petroleum
(both
oil
and
gas),
the
remoteness
from
centres
of
population
is
even
more
evident.
There
is
generally
agreement
now
that
the
challenge
for
governments
and
investors
is
to
ensure
that
such
investments
are
designed
or
shaped
so
as
to
trigger
wider
developmental
impacts.
Lack
of
location
mobility
In
contrast
to
many
other
economic
sectors,
the
extractives
industries
are
less
mobile
about
location
decisions.
They
have
to
locate
where
the
resource
is,
increasing
the
prospects
for
conflict.
8
Note
however
that
metals
can
be
recycled
to
reduce
the
demand
for
virgin
sites.
9
“The
importance
of
the
finiteness
of
petroleum
and
mineral
deposits
to
long-‐term
economic
performance
and
commodity
price
developments
is
questionable”:
IMF
(2012),
p.12.
Proven
oil
reserves,
for
example,
have
continued
to
rise
in
spite
of
increasing
consumption
levels.
10
Van
der
Ploeg,
F.,
and
Venables,
A.
(2009).
Harnessing
Windfall
Revenues:
Optimal
Policies
for
Resource-‐Rich
Developing
Economies.
Conference
on
Public
Sector
Economics,
April
24-‐29,
Munich,
Germany.
Available
at:
http://www.cesifo-‐
group.de/portal/page/portal/CFP_CONF/CFP_CONF_2009/Conf-‐pse09-‐vanderPloeg/Conf-‐pse09-‐
papers/pse09_van%20der%20Ploeg.pdf
(last
accessed
22
May
2012).
4
This
feature
underlines
the
importance
of
community
and
local
engagement
if
a
project
is
to
enjoy
a
sustainable
relationship
in
the
long
term.
Innovation
Both
hydrocarbons
and
mining
industries
are
characterized
by
a
high
degree
of
innovation.
In
the
former,
for
example,
the
introduction
of
hydraulic
fracturing
or
‘fracking’
on
a
commercial
scale
has
made
their
extraction
more
similar
to
conventional
mining.
In
copper
mining,
the
introduction
of
new
techniques
has
increased
processing
efficiency
significantly
and
as
a
result
production
has
continued
to
increase
in
spite
of
a
decline
in
the
quality
of
grades
of
ore
mined.
5
CHAPTER
3
–
www.eisourcebook.org
3.3
EI
Sector
Dynamics
Most
accounts
of
the
EI
sector
emphasize
the
wide
diversity
of
their
structure,
noting
size
and
ownership
patterns1,
and
changing
trends
in
them2.
These
features
continue
to
evolve.
Research
in
recent
years
has
explored
the
important
role
that
National
Oil
Companies
(NOCs)
now
play
in
the
international
oil
and
gas
industry,
for
example3.
Similarly,
there
has
been
research
into
the
role
of
new
players
in
the
global
mining
industry
and
into
junior
companies
and
their
effectiveness,
particularly
at
the
exploration
stage,
where
they
are
assumed
to
have
an
advantage,
and
where
they
are
increasingly
in
evidence,
especially
in
sub-‐Saharan
Africa4.
Some
research
has
been
driven
by
the
awareness
among
policy
advisers
that
such
companies
regularly
employ
the
panoply
of
international
taxation
rules
to
maximize
their
advantage,
presenting
a
challenge
to
governments
in
states
with
poorly
developed
fiscal
regimes5.
As
circumstances
change,
many
investors
are
accustomed
to
sell
an
interest,
merge
or
make
other
acquisitions,
as
they
think
is
appropriate
in
their
pursuit
of
value.
The
decisions
they
take
will
usually
be
made
within
a
framework
of
corporate
operations
that
goes
well
beyond
those
of
a
single
country,
and
justified
to
stakeholders
who
are
in
the
vast
majority
of
cases
unlikely
to
reside
in
the
country
hosting
the
investment
in
its
extractives.
These
and
other
ways
in
which
the
contemporary
EI
industries
respond
to
exploration,
development
and
production
activities
in
their
international
operations
may
be
too
little
understood
or
clouded
by
a
lack
of
information
in
host
countries.
This
can
have
negative
effects
on
the
design
of
effective
public
policies.
1
For
example,
UNCTAD
(2012)
Virtual
Institute
Teaching
Material
on
The
Economics
of
Commodities
Production
and
Trade:
Oil,
Gas
and
Economic
Development,
New
York
and
Geneva:
United
Nations;
P
Crowson,
Mining
Unearthed
(2008)(Aspermont,
UK).
2
Ernst
and
Young:
Business
Pulse:
Exploring
Dual
Perspectives
on
the
top
10
risks
and
opportunities
in
2013
and
beyond,
Oil
and
Gas
Report
(2013);
D
Humphreys,
Transatlantic
Mining
Corporations
in
the
Age
of
Resource
Nationalism
(2012),
Transatlantic
Academy:
Washington
D.C.
3
S
Tordo,
BS
Tracy
and
N
Arfaa
(2011).
National
Oil
Companies
and
Value
Creation.
World
Bank
Working
Paper
No
218;
DG
Victor,
DR
Hults,
M
Thurber,
Oil
and
Governance:
State-‐owned
enterprises
and
the
world
energy
supply.
Cambridge
University
Press,
Cambridge;
V
Marcel,
Oil
Titans:
National
Oil
Companies
in
the
Middle
East
(2005),
Brookings
Institution
Press.
Contrast
their
more
tentative
role
in
the
mining
sector:
Raw
Materials
Group,
Overview
of
State
Ownership
in
the
Global
Minerals
Industry
(2011),
World
Bank,
Washington
DC.
4
D
Humphreys,
The
Remaking
of
the
Mining
Industry
(2015),
Palgrave
Macmillan,
London
(restructuring
during
the
boom
years
caused
largely
by
China’s
industrialization
during
that
period).
5
See
for
example,
several
of
the
contributions
to
Keen,
McPherson
and
Daniel
(2010).
1
Box
3.4:
East
African
Hydrocarbons
A
shift
in
the
locus
of
energy
transactions
from
West
Africa
to
East
Africa
during
the
boom
years
was
driven
by
the
sale
of
concessions
and
licences,
and
by
acquisitions.
The
sale
of
a
66
per
cent
interest
in
three
exploration
blocks
in
Uganda
by
Tullow,
which
raised
US$2.9
billion,
was
the
largest
single
deal.
In
Tanzania,
the
energy
transaction
hotspot
in
2011,
activity
centered
on
the
acquisition
of
Dominion
Petroleum
by
Ophir
Energy
and
on
investment
in
exploration
licences
by
various
smaller
players.
In
Mozambique,
the
Thai
energy
company
PTT
purchased
Cove
Energy
for
US$1.9
billion,
thus
acquiring
a
stake
in
the
rich
gas
fields
off
the
coast
of
Mozambique.
In
August
2013
a
further
sale
was
made
in
Mozambique:
ten
per
cent
of
a
large
gas
field
was
sold
by
Anadarko
to
the
ONGC
(India)
for
US$2.64
billion.
For
an
illustration
of
how
this
pattern
of
buying
and
selling
assets
can
impact
on
a
country’s
development
plans,
the
rapid
growth
in
hydrocarbons
activity
in
East
Africa
during
the
boom
years
provides
plenty
of
relevant
material
(see
Box
3.4).
Buying
and
Selling
Assets
The
typical
ways
for
internationally
operating
companies
to
obtain
access
to
new
reserves
need
to
be
understood.
Exploration
activity
is
only
one
way
for
companies
to
gain
access
to
reserves.
Companies
in
the
EI
sector
routinely
buy
and
sell
their
interests
through
mergers
and
acquisitions
(M&A).
In
the
hydrocarbons
sector
it
is
common
for
the
buyers
to
be
cash-‐rich
National
Oil
Companies
from
countries
with
insufficient
domestic
resource
bases
such
as
China
and
India.
In
2011
alone,
the
value
of
upstream
M&A
activity
increased
by
almost
70
percent
to
reach
US$317
billion6.
Cash-‐rich
NOCs
from
China
and
South
Korea
played
an
important
part
in
that
activity.
In
2012
one
of
China’s
largest
oil
companies,
CNOOC,
purchased
the
Canadian
company,
Nexen,
for
US$15.1
billion.
It
thereby
acquired
900
million
boe
(barrels
of
oil
equivalent)
of
proved
reserves
and
1.222
billion
boe
of
probable
reserves,
plus
contingent
reserves
of
5.6
billion
boe,
mainly
in
Canadian
oil
sands7.
At
virtually
the
same
time,
another
Chinese
company,
Sinopec,
acquired
a
49
percent
equity
interest
in
Talisman
Energy’s
UK
operations
for
US$1.5
billion.
6
Ernst
and
Young
Oil
&
Gas
M&A
in
2011:
:
https://webforms.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-‐releases/Oil-‐and-‐Gas-‐M-‐and-‐A-‐
in-‐2011-‐volume-‐up-‐-‐values-‐down.
The
previous
year’s
figures
for
M&A
are
in:
Julian
Fennema,
Industry
Overview,
Cairn
Energy
PLC
Annual
Report
2010:
http://www.cairnenergy.com/files/reports/annual/ar2010/2010_annual_report.pdf
(last
visited
7
September
2013).
7
Oil
&
Gas
Journal,
30
July
2012,
p.
26.
2
For
an
IOC,
this
kind
of
sale
to
an
NOC
(or
other)
buyer
can
represent
a
way
of
raising
funds
for
new
projects,
but
it
can
also
be
a
way
of
generating
a
return
from
selling
an
asset
that
has
been
created
by
identifying
commercially
viable
reserves.
Its
market
value
is
derived
from
its
future
production
potential.
As
the
project
matures,
the
share
value
increases,
and
a
sale
follows.
This
kind
of
IOC
has
a
different
business
model
from
that
of
the
better-‐known
integrated
oil
and
gas
company
(Exxon
Mobil
or
Shell
are
examples
of
such
companies):
instead
of
producing
oil
from
a
successful
exploration
effort
to
realize
a
steady
stream
of
available
cash
to
return
to
its
shareholders
in
the
form
of
dividend
payments,
it
sells
the
asset
at
an
early
stage.
In
this
way
it
avoids
the
complexity
of
bringing
a
large
find
into
production,
drawing
upon
large
upfront
investment
and
often
requiring
a
joint
venture
structure
to
finance
the
development.
Other
IOCs
may
choose
to
produce
any
reserves
found
themselves,
just
as
they
may
acquire
new
projects
in
order
to
gain
access
to
the
reserves
they
contain,
and
thereby
increase
the
volume
of
reserves
under
their
control
(without
having
discovered
them
in
such
cases).
A
similar
trend
is
evident
in
the
mining
sector,
where
the
level
of
spending
on
mergers
and
acquisitions
tends
to
be
greater
than
that
on
exploration
and
development.
In
2011
the
total
value
of
M&A
deals
rose
by
43
percent
to
US$
162.4
billion,
with
mega-‐transactions
of
one
billion
dollars
or
more
accounting
for
two
thirds
of
total
transaction
value8.
Gold
and
coal
were
the
dominant
commodities
in
these
transactions.
In
2012,
nearly
one
in
three
mining
companies
was
reported
to
be
considering
an
expansion
by
means
of
M&A
in
the
coming
12
to
24
months.
When
it
occurs,
such
activity
reflects
a
transfer
of
ownership
of
the
present
stock
of
mines
and
associated
processing
facilities.
Inevitably,
its
value
is
significantly
higher
than
the
value
of
annual
additions
to
that
stock,
which
derives
from
exploration
and
development.
Just
as
in
the
hydrocarbons
sector,
junior
companies
will
expect
to
gain
their
rewards
by
selling
on
any
discoveries
to
larger
mining
companies
for
exploitation.
From
the
above,
it
should
already
be
clear
that
the
business
models
of
companies
in
EI
activities
are
far
from
uniform
and
need
to
be
understood
by
governments
and
their
advisers
in
designing
policies
for
this
sector.
There
are
in
the
EI
sector
companies
that
can
be
classified
as
large,
integrated
IOCs;
junior
or
‘independent’
IOCs;
and
NOCs,
which
can
be
internationally
operating
or
regional
or
simply
of
national
scope
in
their
operations.
The
company
that
is
likely
to
sell
its
asset
in
the
event
of
an
exploration
success
is
also
usually
one
with
a
higher
than
average
appetite
for
risk,
and
that
can
have
advantages
to
governments
looking
for
a
‘first-‐mover’
to
generate
interest
in
their
territory.
8
Resource
Investing
News,
1
March
2012:
Mining
Companies
Poised
for
Mergers
and
Acquisitions,
KPMG
Study
Shows;
http://resourceinvestingnews.com
(last
visited
February
2013).
3
Policy
Effects
Policy
needs
to
take
into
account
the
real
differences
among
types
of
company
and
the
M&A
dynamic
arising
from
the
maturity
of
prospects
from
exploration
to
extraction,
and
a
shift
that
commonly
occurs
from
junior
to
more
major
producers.
This
is
particularly
evident
in
the
petroleum
sector
where
the
investment
returns
on
successful
projects
tend
to
be
higher
and
pay-‐back
periods
tend
to
be
shorter
than
in
mining.
Decisions
need
to
be
taken
about
the
kind
of
companies
that
a
government
wishes
to
see
become
active
as
investors
within
its
borders.
Many
years
ago,
the
Norwegian
government
policy
was
organized
around
its
preference
for
the
larger,
integrated
companies
in
its
emerging
hydrocarbons
sector,
while
its
North
Sea
neighbour,
the
UK,
favoured
the
entry
of
a
diverse
range
of
companies
into
offshore
exploration
activity.
Nor
is
this
a
matter
that
affects
policy
only
at
the
very
beginning
of
the
value
chain
(the
award
of
rights
stage).
It
also
has
impacts
at
later
stages,
with
M&A
activity
being
prevalent
throughout.
This
is
to
some
extent
the
lifeblood
of
a
healthy
industry
but
it
is
also
a
flow
which
governments
will
typically
seek
to
maintain
a
close
eye
on.
In
particular,
they
will
wish
to
ensure
that
the
environmental
conditions
associated
with
the
license
to
operate
are
carried
over
to
the
new
company.
South-‐south
Investment
A
significant
change
in
recent
years
has
been
the
growing
role
of
EI
companies
from
the
emerging
economies,
in
terms
of
supply,
demand
and
investments
overseas,
especially
in
low-‐income
countries.
In
this
group,
China,
India,
and
Brazil
are
the
countries
whose
national
or
private
companies
have
made
the
most
notable
impacts
on
the
international
EI
scene.
Russia
is
also
one
of
the
countries
that
provide
a
home
to
new
corporate
players,
even
though
it
is
not
located
in
the
South.
Companies
from
other
countries
such
as
Malaysia
and
Thailand
(hydrocarbons),
Peru
(silver),
South
Africa
(platinum)
and
Botswana
(diamonds)
have
made
significant
impacts
on
global
EI
markets
in
recent
years.
Countries
in
this
group
are
taking
a
much
larger
share
of
global
spending
on
exploration
in
the
mining
sector,
amounting
to
60
per
cent,
according
to
one
study9.
Much
of
the
literature
on
the
development
implications
of
EI
has
focused
upon
the
impacts
of
FDI
from
OECD
or
developed
countries
or
‘north-‐south’
flows.
However,
the
rise
of
these
players
from
emerging
economies,
and
so-‐called
BRICs
in
particular,
raises
questions
about
how
‘south-‐south’
flows
will
affect
established
patterns,
which
it
is
still
too
early
to
answer.
As
David
Humphreys
notes,
in
a
study
of
such
companies
in
the
mining
sector:
9
D
Humphreys
(2009),
Emerging
Players
in
Global
Mining,
p.
2
4
mining
project
and,
on
the
other
hand,
the
benefits
of
such
investments
taking
place
within
the
context
of
a
broader
government-‐to-‐government
financial
and
cooperation
agreement”.10
The
various
kinds
of
company
that
are
typically
found
in
the
oil,
gas
and
mining
sectors
may
be
distinguished
according
to
one
or
more
of
five
principal
indicators:
ownership
structures;
size;
the
resources
they
concern
themselves
with;
risk
strategy
and
method
of
financing.
They
are
summarized
below.
Large,
integrated
companies
which
operate
internationally
at
all
stages
of
the
petroleum
cycle:
exploration,
production,
transportation,
refining
and
marketing.
These
are
usually
known
as
the
IOCs
and
are
privately
owned
for
the
most
part,
based
in
the
USA
and
Europe.
The
six
companies
commonly
attributed
to
this
group
are
BP,
ExxonMobil,
Shell,
Chevron,
ConocoPhillips
and
Total.
Sometimes
called
‘super-‐majors’,
these
companies
account
for
about
two
thirds
of
the
world’s
Exploration
and
Production
(E&P)
investments,
with
the
balance
being
invested
by
NOCs.
They
are
especially
prominent
in
deep-‐water
exploration
and
development
and
LNG
projects
where
their
size
and
resources
allow
them
to
manage
and
finance
such
projects
more
easily
than
other
companies,
and
to
face
the
risks
that
these
projects
entail.
National
Oil
Companies
(NOCs)
are
common
among
resource-‐rich
states,
with
around
90
percent
of
the
world’s
oil
and
gas
reserves
under
their
control
and
75
percent
of
the
production.
The
largest
is
Saudi
Aramco
(Saudi
Arabia).
Some
NOCs
have
become
more
and
more
active
beyond
their
home
base,
increasing
competition
with
the
more
established
IOCs
for
access
to
new
or
existing
petroleum
reserves.
Examples
of
companies
that
have
ventured
outside
their
national
territory
are
the
Chinese
companies,
CNOOC,
CPNC,
and
Sinopec,
the
Indian
ONGC,
Petrobras
(Brazil),
Gazprom
(Russia)
and
Petronas
(Malaysia).
NOCs
are
also
used
by
their
home
states
as
vehicles
to
secure
much
needed
energy
resources
for
domestic
industries’
needs.
Junior,
sometimes
called
independent,
companies
do
not
have
the
high
overhead
costs
of
the
IOCs.
Their
size
can
vary
considerably,
with
the
smaller
ones
typically
hoping
to
significantly
10
Ibid
(2009),
p,
21.
5
profit
from
the
sale
of
promising
prospects,
sometimes
to
larger
‘independent’
companies.
They
are
usually
prepared
to
accept
higher
risks
at
the
exploration
stage,
both
in
terms
of
the
hydrocarbons
they
target
and
in
terms
of
the
countries
in
which
they
explore.
For
this
reason
they
often
dominate
in
initial
exploration,
especially
in
frontier
settings.
They
tend
to
respond
quickly
to
the
current
demand
and
change
their
exploration
focus
rapidly.
For
the
most
part,
they
operate
on
the
basis
of
funds
raised
from
individual
investors
and
equity
finance,
often
in
provincial
stock
markets
such
as
those
in
Canada
and
Australia,
making
their
expenditure
highly
volatile.
Oil
service
companies
are
usually
confined
to
the
provision
of
services
and
supplies
to
the
operating
companies
that
manage
exploration
and
production
on
behalf
of
their
consortium
partners.
Drilling
wells
and
oilfield
management
are
frequently
out-‐sourced
by
operators
to
specialized
service
providers.
The
larger
service
companies,
like
Halliburton
or
Schlumberger,
are
capable
of
becoming
involved
in
pre-‐exploration,
exploration
and
production,
but
may
take
a
business
view
that
to
do
so
would
pit
them
competitively
against
their
oil
company
clients,
and
refrain
from
such
activities.
Within
the
industry
three
segments
are
commonly
distinguished:
‘upstream’,
meaning
the
exploration,
development
and
production
activities;
‘midstream’,
meaning
the
storage,
trading
and
transportation
of
crude
oil
and
natural
gas,
and
‘downstream’
meaning
refining
and
marketing.
Some
companies,
such
as
ExxonMobil,
Shell,
and
BP,
perform
activities
in
each
of
these
segments.
However,
many
of
the
thousands
of
firms
in
the
oil
and
gas
industry
are
specialists
or
niche
players,
while
others
carry
out
different
activities
that
fall
within
one
or
more
of
the
above
segments.
In
the
Value
Chain
that
is
used
in
the
Source
Book,
the
upstream
activities
fall
within
the
first
and
fifth
chevrons,
while
some
of
the
activities
in
the
midstream
and
downstream
segments
are
treated
in
the
second
chevron,
Sector
Organization.
The
market
for
crude
oil
is
shaped
by
many
players:
refiners,
speculators,
commodities
exchanges,
shipping
companies,
international
oil
companies,
national
oil
companies,
independent
companies
and
the
Organization
of
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
(OPEC).
For
the
most
part,
the
Source
Book
focus
is
on
the
upstream
activities.
Gas
Natural
gas
is
commonly
found
in
association
with
oil.
The
techniques
for
discovery
are
the
same.
Hence,
the
larger
oil
companies
are
often
also
among
the
largest
producers
of
natural
gas.
Some
companies
have
started
out,
however,
as
gas
companies
and
moved
into
oil:
Encana
(Canada);
ENI
(Italy);
BG
(UK)
and
ELF
(France)
are
examples.
Gas
is
very
much
like
oil
in
the
upstream
segment,
and
very
different
from
it
in
the
midstream
segment.
Even
so,
there
are
important
and
distinct
characteristics
of
gas
within
the
upstream
segment
which
differ
from
those
of
oil:
in
particular,
gas
processing
and
natural
gas
liquefaction
(LNG).
In
the
midstream
segment,
transportation
of
natural
gas
is
more
complex
and
much
more
challenging
than
crude
6
oil,
albeit
with
fewer
environmental
risks:
constructing
and
operating
pipelines
to
bring
natural
gas
from
remote
locations
to
markets
gives
rise
to
complex
issues
of
cross-‐border
regulation
(Chapters
5
and
6).
However,
transportation
of
gas
has
become
significantly
easier
over
the
past
decade
with
the
expansion
of
the
LNG
industry,
dominated
by
the
largest,
international
oil
companies,
offering
significant
opportunities
to
countries
along
the
coast
of
Africa
and
the
Aceh
province
of
Indonesia,
where
large
gas
deposits
have
been
found
far
from
the
main
consumer
markets.
In
turn,
however,
this
has
infrastructure
implications
for
emerging
gas
producers
that
the
Source
Book
takes
note
of
(Chapters
5,
6
and
9).
3.3.2 Mining
Large,
international,
multi-‐product
mining
companies
are
relatively
few
in
number,
and
have
become
more
concentrated
than
ever
in
recent
years.
They
comprise
Anglo
American,
BHP
Billiton,
Rio
Tinto,
and
Glencore.
They
are
involved
in
every
stage
of
the
industry
value
chain
and
typically
have
an
interest
in
several
types
of
minerals.
The
rationale
behind
this
diversification
in
the
minerals
sector
is
to
spread
the
risk
of
their
activities
and
achieve
a
higher
average
rate
of
return
than
would
be
achieved
with
a
single
product
such
as
gold,
coal
or
iron
ore.
Looking
at
the
largest
companies
more
closely,
many
are
much
less
diversified
than
at
first
appears.
Of
the
top
15
companies,
six
are
more
than
50
percent
iron
ore
producers,
four
are
copper
producers
and
three
are
gold
producers11.
For
the
most
part,
then,
they
are
dependent
upon
one
metal
for
more
than
50
percent
of
their
production.
These
companies
tend
to
be
diligent
in
their
approach
to
environmental
and
social
performance
standards
and
social
investments.
They
commonly
adhere
to
international
standards
and
reporting
requirements,
through
for
example
ICMM’s
Sustainable
Development
Principles,
and
the
IFC’s
performance
standards.
National
Resource
Companies
are
fewer
in
number
and
much
less
influential
in
mining
than
their
counterparts
in
hydrocarbons.
Typically,
they
focus
on
a
limited
number
of
minerals
and
sell
them
on
the
international
market.
Early
efforts
at
state
ownership
and
control
included
significant
failures
in
Africa
such
as
the
nationalization
of
copper
mines
in
Zambia,
and
the
various
state
companies
established
in
centrally
planned
economies,
largely
in
East
Europe
and
parts
of
Asia
where,
for
a
long
time,
it
was
associated
with
a
heavy
industry
development
model.
The
former
was
part
of
a
wave
of
nationalizations
of
foreign
mining
companies
in
developing
countries
in
the
late
1960s
and
early
1970s.
During
the
1960s
there
were
32
11
Ericsson,
M.,
Mining
Industry
Corporate
Actors
Analysis
(2012),
p.
8.
7
expropriations
of
foreign
mining
companies
and
during
the
period
1970-‐1976
the
number
reached
4812.
Governments
retreated
from
state
control
in
the
1990s
but
it
remains
high
in
many
metals,
partly
due
to
the
growth
of
state-‐controlled
mining
in
China.
In
the
diamond
industry
there
are
examples
of
successful
state
holdings
in
Botswana
and
Namibia,
where
both
countries
have
formed
joint
venture
companies
with
De
Beers 13 .
In
copper,
there
is
the
example
of
Codelco,
the
Chilean
producer.
In
iron
ore,
there
is
the
Indian
mining
company,
National
Mineral
Development
Corporation.
Junior
mining
companies
are
typically
medium
or
smaller
sized
companies
focused
on
exploration
activities
in
one
country
or
region
or
a
specific
mineral
or
group
of
minerals,
and
may
be
owned
by
domestic
entrepreneurs
or
international
firms,
sometimes
backed
by
venture
capital14.
There
are
hundreds
of
such
companies.
Indeed,
many
mineral-‐rich
countries
have
a
group
of
such
companies
of
differing
sizes,
sometimes
operating
only
one
mine
each.
Examples
of
this
are
Chile,
Peru
and
Mexico.
They
will
usually
have
local
ownership
and
staffing.
Such
companies
can
accept
higher
risk
than
the
larger
ones,
both
in
terms
of
the
type
of
mineral
target
sought
and
the
countries
in
which
they
explore.
They
also
“tend
to
seek
the
products
that
are
presently
fashionable,
and
they
can
and
do
change
their
exploration
focus
quickly”15.
For
exploration
companies
that
focus
solely
on
exploration,
they
are
likely
to
recoup
their
capital
not
by
developing
the
reserves
themselves
(by
which
stage
their
interests
are
likely
to
be
diluted
significantly),
but
by
selling
on
most,
if
not
all,
of
their
discoveries
to
larger
companies
with
the
technical,
financial
and
marketing
skills
and
access
to
the
capital
markets
for
the
necessary
funds.
Sometimes
the
larger
companies
provide
the
junior
ones
with
the
necessary
capital
to
support
their
operations
and
an
assurance
of
a
market
for
their
discoveries
if
successful.
Small-‐scale
miners
and
artisanal
workers
play
a
key
role
in
mining
which
has
no
parallel
in
the
hydrocarbons
sector.
Their
work
may
take
on
a
corporate
character,
with
workers
employed
to
mine,
but
this
is
generally
on
a
very
small
scale.
The
sub-‐sector
is
the
equivalent
of
subsistence
agriculture
and
is
labour
intensive,
employing
on
a
conservative
estimate
as
many
as
30
million
people
around
the
world,
always
operating
informally
but
sometimes
also
illegally16.
These
companies
and
workers
usually
account
for
minor
shares
of
global
mining
production.
They
12
UNCTAD,
World
Investment
Report,
New
York
and
Geneva
2007,
p.
108.
13
Raw
Materials
Group,
Overview
of
State
Ownership
in
the
Global
Minerals
Industry,
World
Bank;
Washington
D.C.
(2011),
p.
10.
14
In
some
classifications
the
medium
and
junior
companies
are
separated
out
into
two
categories:
for
example,
in
the
Oxford
Policy
Management
study
(2013),
Extractive
Industries,
Development
and
the
Role
of
Donors,
p.13.
15
P
Crowson,
‘Mining
Unearthed’
(2008),
Aspermount,
UK,
p.118.
16
This
includes
a
significant
number
of
child
laborers,
In
2011
Human
Rights
Watch
estimated
that
the
number
of
child
laborers
in
artisanal
gold
mining
in
a
single
African
country,
Mali,
numbered
between
20,000
and
40,000,
with
many
of
them
starting
work
as
young
as
six
years
old:
A
Poisonous
Mix:
Child
Labor,
Mercury
and
Artisanal
Gold
Mining
in
Mali,
Human
Rights
Watch,
USA.
8
tend
to
concentrate
on
high
unit
value
products,
such
as
gold
and
gemstones,
and
are
widely
found
in
developing
countries.
Health
and
safety
conditions
among
such
miners
are
often
poor;
they
exhibit
a
high
degree
of
employment
of
women
and
children
and
they
often
cause
significant
environmental
damage.
The
benefits
to
a
host
country
of
such
mining
are
unlikely
to
be
reflected
in
any
tax
returns
and
mining
codes
and
tax
systems
are
usually
not
responsive
to
this
kind
of
activity.
This
sector
is
on
the
increase
with
impacts
on
the
sensitive
or
protected
ecosystems
and
biodiversity
and
encroachment
on
World
Heritage
Sites
(although
large
scale
mining
also
can
have
such
impacts).
It
is
relatively
insulated
from
the
rise
and
fall
of
commodity
prices
(in
contrast
to
large-‐scale
mining
operations)
because
the
economic
returns
will
remain
-‐
even
in
a
downturn
in
prices
-‐
significantly
higher
than
similar
artisanal
activities,
such
as
fisheries
and
agriculture.
A
‘rush’
of
activity
can
have
sudden,
dramatic
impacts:
in
Madagascar,
gemstone
rushes
have
attracted
as
many
as
100,000
miners
congregating
in
limited
areas
with
slash-‐and-‐burn
agriculture
used
in
support
of
the
Artisanal
and
Small-‐scale
Mining
(ASM)
communities.
Diversification
In
the
1970s
and
1980s,
a
number
of
very
large
oil
companies
such
as
Exxon
and
Shell
moved
into
the
mining
sector
to
create
genuinely
EI
companies.
They
assumed
that
the
prospects
for
long-‐term
growth
within
the
oil
industry
were
being
challenged
by
the
spread
of
state
ownership
and
NOCs,
and
had
the
cash
available
from
high
oil
prices
to
fund
programs
of
diversification.
Mining
and
petroleum
were,
they
thought,
so
similar
in
their
characteristics
and
basic
requirements
that
it
would
be
possible
to
operate
profitably
across
both
sectors.
This
proved
an
economically
unsuccessful
series
of
experiments,
underlining
differences
in
the
respective
businesses,
and
they
were
soon
brought
to
an
end.
The
leading
companies
in
the
development
of
shale
gas
and
oil
include
super-‐majors
like
Shell,
Total
and
ExxonMobil,
large
international
energy
companies
like
Anadarko,
Pioneer,
Encana,
Talisman
and
BHP
Billiton,
and
smaller
independent
companies
that
specialize
in
shale
gas
(Cuadrilla
in
the
UK
is
an
example).
Most
of
these
operate
in
the
United
States
and
Canada,
since
markets
for
unconventional
oil
and
gas
outside
of
North
America
are
still
in
their
infancy.
9
CHAPTER
3
–
www.eisourcebook.org
3.4
Conclusions
Investment
in
the
EI
sectors
(oil,
gas
and
mining)
has
features
that
present
particular
challenges
to
policy
makers.
There
are
significant
differences
between
oil
and
gas
on
the
one
hand
and
mining
on
the
other,
and
indeed
within
the
mining
sector
itself,
in
spite
of
their
undoubted
similarities
in
certain
areas.
Both
are
capable
of
playing
a
major
role
in
a
government’s
plans
for
resource-‐led
development.
Effective
management
in
the
public
interest
requires
recognition
of
both
the
common
and
the
unique
features
of
EI
in
the
design
of
sector
policies
and
institutions.
However,
it
will
also
involve
strategic
decisions
about
the
kind
of
company
or
pattern
of
companies
that
is
best
suited
to
achieving
the
kind
of
overall
policy
held
by
a
country
hosting
these
investments.
Some
features
of
this
investor-‐state
relationship
are
relatively
constant
over
time,
while
others
are
more
dynamic,
such
as
industry
structure,
showing
significant
changes
and
greater
complexity
in
recent
years,
not
least
due
to
companies
from
emerging
markets
making
strategic
investments
aimed
at
securing
future
supplies
of
energy
and
minerals.
1