Afghanistan

A. Introduction
Illicit drug cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption flourish in
Afghanistan, particularly in parts of the south and southwest where instability is high and
state institutions are weak or non-existent. More than 90 percent of illicit poppy cultivation
takes place in these regions. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
estimated that Afghanistan cultivated 154,000 hectares (ha) of opium in 2012, with a total
yield of 3,700 metric tons (MT) of raw opium. This was an 18 percent increase in cultivation
and a 36 percent decrease in opium production from 2011. Poor weather and naturally-
occurring crop disease contributed to the lower yields. A symbiotic relationship exists
between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. Traffickers provide
weapons, funding, and other material support to the insurgency in exchange for the protection
of drug trade routes, fields, laboratories, and their organizations. Some insurgent commanders
engage directly in drug trafficking to finance their operations. The trade in narcotics
undermines governance and rule of law in all parts of the country where poppy is cultivated
and traffickers operate.
According to the United States government’s 2012 assessment of the drug problem in
Afghanistan, poppy cultivation increased by 57 percent, from 115,000 ha in 2011 to 180,000
ha in 2012, while potential opium production remained steady at 4,300 MT, compared to
4,400 MT in 2011. The U.S. and UNODC estimates differ due to dissimilar methodologies
for estimating poppy cultivation and opium yields.
Afghanistan is involved in the full narcotics production cycle, from cultivation to
finished heroin to consumption. Drug traffickers trade in all forms of opiates, including
unrefined opium, semi-refined morphine base, and refined heroin. Some raw opium and
morphine base is trafficked to neighboring and regional countries, where it is further refined
into heroin. While estimates are imprecise, approximately 95 percent of the opiates produced
in Afghanistan are ultimately trafficked out of the country; roughly 5 percent are consumed
inside Afghanistan. Afghanistan is also struggling to respond to a burgeoning domestic opiate
addiction problem.
Afghanistan generally relies on assistance from the international community to
implement its national counternarcotics strategy. Greater political will, increased institutional
capacity, enhanced security, viable economic alternatives for farmers, and more robust efforts
at all levels are required to decrease cultivation in high-cultivating provinces, maintain
cultivation reductions in the rest of the country, and combat trafficking.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Government of Afghanistan is publicly committed to confronting the drug
problem in Afghanistan, particularly focusing on what it identifies as the root causes of the
drug economy including instability, poverty, unemployment; and organized crime. The
Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is the lead governmental agency for developing
counternarcotics policy and coordinates the activities of other governmental bodies involved
in issues related to the drug trade. MCN is currently drafting Afghanistan’s National Drug
Control Strategy (NDCS) for the period 2012–2016. The draft NDCS vision is “to implement
a five–year plan that seeks to reduce by 50 percent the cultivation of poppy from its 2011
baseline of 131,000 hectares and to increase the capacity to treat drug addicts by 40 percent.”
MCN is also working to insert counternarcotics into the activities of the entire government by
“mainstreaming” counternarcotics efforts into other existing national strategies and programs.
Afghanistan has no formal extradition or mutual legal assistance arrangements with
the United States. The 2005 Afghan Counter Narcotics Law (CNL), however, allows the
extradition of drug offenders to requesting countries under the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

2. Supply Reduction
According to UNODC, Afghanistan cultivated 154,000 ha of opium poppy in 2012,
up 18 percent from 2011. UNODC estimated that Afghan opium poppy crops in 2012 yielded
3,700 MT of raw opium, down 36 percent from 5,800 MT in 2011. According to the UNODC
and MCN, the number of poppy free provinces (those provinces with less than 100 ha of
poppy under cultivation) remained the same at 17. (Note: The U.S. and UNODC estimates
differ due to dissimilar methodologies for estimating poppy cultivation and opium yields.)
There is significant evidence of commercial cultivation of cannabis in Afghanistan.
The UNODC and MCN’s 2011 cannabis survey found that commercial cannabis cultivation
in 2011 was approximately 12,000 ha, capable of producing 1,300 MT of hashish per year.
According to the survey, the number of households growing cannabis for commercial
purposes increased by 38 percent from 47,000 in 2010 to 65,000 in 2011. UNODC also noted
that, like poppy, most cannabis cultivation takes place in insecure areas.
 MCN implements the U.S.-funded Good Performers Initiative (GPI) to reward
provinces which successfully reduce poppy cultivation within their borders. Provinces that
are determined to be poppy-free by UNODC, or where poppy cultivation has declined by 10
percent, receive funding for development projects proposed by provincial development
councils and governors’ offices. In 2012, 21 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces received $18.2
million in GPI awards, including two provinces that received special recognition awards of
$500,000 each. The MCN-run Governor-Led Eradication program reimburses governors for
expenses incurred for eradicating poppy fields. Eradication is verified by UNODC. In 2012, a
total of 9,672 ha was eradicated, an increase of 154 percent over 2011. Both the quality and
efficiency of eradication improved substantially, but attacks by criminals and insurgents on
eradication teams killed over 100 civilians and security personnel during the course of the
year. An additional 127 people were injured in such attacks.
The Afghan government’s efforts to enforce its drug laws also enjoyed growing
success. The Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) is a vetted, self-contained unit that consists
of prosecutors, investigators, and first instance and appellate court judges. Under
Afghanistan’s 2005 Counternarcotics Law, the CJTF prosecutes all drug cases that reach
certain thresholds (possession of two kilograms of heroin, ten kilograms of opium or 50
kilograms of hashish or precursor chemicals) before the Counter Narcotics Tribunal. The
Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) is a central facility for the investigation,
prosecution, and trial of major narcotics and narcotics-related corruption cases and is
considered a model of excellence within the Afghan justice system. Between April 2011 and
March 2012, the CNJC primary court heard 468 cases and tried 788 suspects, involving more
than 185 metric tons of illegal drugs. Those convicted receive sentences ranging from 11 to
20 years. The CNJC has a conviction rate of over 97 percent.
Afghan authorities made some progress in improving their capacity to interdict large
quantities of narcotics and arrest narcotics traffickers. According to authorities, the police
apprehended seven out of ten of the “most wanted” drug traffickers in 2011. Over the first
nine months of 2012, Afghan and Coalition Forces conducted a total of 481 counternarcotics
operations, 62 percent more operations than the previous year. They seized approximately
three MT of heroin, 72 MT of opium, and 176 MT of hash in those operations. The Counter
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was established in 2003 as a specialized element of
the Afghan National Police and is responsible for counternarcotics investigations and
operations. The United States supports several specialized units within the CNPA, including
the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), the Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), and the
National Interdiction Unit (NIU). These units are partnered with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). The NIU is the tactical element of the CNPA and is capable of
conducting independent evidence-based interdiction operations and seizures in high threat
environments. The TIU and SIU are specially vetted and trained law enforcement units The
SIU carries out complex CN and counter corruption investigations using intelligence
developed by the TIU. Outside these special units, low capacity and corruption within law
enforcement institutions and the lack of CNPA’s direct authority over its resources in the
provinces hampers counternarcotics efforts.
Primary trafficking routes into and out of Afghanistan are through Iran to Turkey and
Western Europe; through Pakistan to Africa, Asia, the Middle East, China and Iran; and
through Central Asia to the Russian Federation. Drug laboratories within Afghanistan still
process a large portion of the country's raw opium into heroin and morphine base. Traffickers
illicitly import large quantities of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan; UNODC estimates
that 475 tons of acetic anhydride are imported each year for manufacturing heroin.

3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment

The Afghan Government acknowledges a growing domestic drug abuse problem,
primarily opiates and cannabis. Funded by the United States, the National Urban Drug Use
Survey released in 2012 provides a scientifically-valid prevalence rate for the country’s urban
population based on interviews and toxicology. The United States will begin supporting a
National Rural Drug Use Survey to complement the urban study and provide a national
prevalence rate. Other recently conducted studies indicate that the prevalence of addiction
and severity of consumption among Afghan children is the highest documented in the world.
The United States expects to fund more than 60 inpatient and outpatient drug
treatment centers across the country by the end of 2012; however, the demand for services
exceeds the capacity ofthe centers, most of which have waiting lists for new patients. The
United States also supports UNODC’s global child addiction program throughout
Afghanistan to develop protocols for treating opiate-addicted children, training treatment
staff, and delivering services through Afghan non-governmental organizations. The current
annual treatment capacity of Afghanistan’s centers is over 15,000 persons. The Government
of Afghanistan is planning an expansion of its treatment system by opening new clinics
across the country. Private clinics have also proliferated in recent years, although many of
these do not apply evidence-based practices, discharging clients after detoxification without
follow-up, thereby resulting in high relapse rates.
 The United States funds a multi-pronged public information program, implemented
by the Colombo Plan with the support of the MCN, focusing on discouraging poppy
cultivation, preventing drug use, and encouraging licit crop production. The United States has
undertaken a vigorous public information campaign to reduce drug demand inside
Afghanistan, including seeking the support of religious leaders in drug demand reduction
efforts, engaging local media, and implementing an anti-drug curriculum in Afghan schools.
In 2012, the U.S. government helped establish a partnership between the Colombo Plan’s
Preventive Drug Education program and the Afghan Premier Soccer League to spread an
anti-drug message to youth. The United States also funds an Afghanistan-specific mobile
preventive drug education exhibit.

4. Corruption
As a matter of government policy, the Government of Afghanistan does not
encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering
proceeds from the sale of illicit drugs. However, many central, provincial, and district level
government officials are believed to directly engage in and benefit from the drug trade.
Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to benefiting from drug trade revenue
streams. The CJTF actively investigates and prosecutes public officials who facilitate drug
trafficking under Article 21 of the Counter Narcotics Law, which criminalizes drug
trafficking-related corruption. The CJTF has successfully prosecuted high ranking
government officials, including members of the CNPA. Between April 2011 and March
2012, 44 public officials were prosecuted in the CJTF primary court.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S. government maintains a counternarcotics strategy that supports
Afghanistan’s four priorities for disrupting the drug trade; developing licit agricultural
livelihoods; reducing the demand for drugs; and building the capacity of the government’s
CN institutions. The strategy is formulated to help restore Afghanistan’s agriculture
economy, build Afghan institutional capacity, and disrupt the nexus between drugs,
insurgents, and corruption.
In 2012, the United States signed agreements with the Afghan government laying the
groundwork for a Kandahar Food Zone in 2013. The Kandahar Food Zone is a multi-sectoral
drug reduction program that combines elements of alternative development, law enforcement
and eradication, public information and drug treatment. Twenty million dollars are
anticipated to be provided over two years to develop the Alternative Livelihoods component
of the Kandahar Food Zone, a comprehensive approach to counternarcotics in the province,
integrating itsactivities with U.S.-funded Counter Narcotics Public Information, Drug
Demand Reduction, and Governor Led Eradication programs.

D. Conclusion
For Afghanistan to enjoy future success in combating the narcotics trade it must
continue to strengthen the capacity of the MCN, actively combat corruption at all levels of
government, and develop the ability of regular CNPA units to carry out operations. The
Afghan government must also demonstrate the political will to challenge vested political and
economic interests.
Farmers and those involved in processing and trafficking drugs must also have viable
economic alternatives to involvement in the narcotics trade. Improvements in security and
market access, as well as continued concentrated efforts to increase agricultural and other
alternative livelihoods, will remain key to undermining the drug economy and the insurgency
in Afghanistan.