What Do Economists Contribute?

: Introduction Page 1 of 14

W h at D o E con om is t s Con t r i bu t e?: I ntr oduction

by

Daniel B . K lein
dk lein@ s cu.edu

T his paper is the I ntr oduction to What Do Economis ts Contr ibute? (Macmillan and New
Yor k Univer s ity Pr es s , 1999). T he contents of the volume ar e indicated in the Refer ences
of this paper . © Copyr ight Daniel B . K lein.

Acknowledgments : T he author thank s the following individuals for us eful comments :

David B oaz , Peter B oettke, T yler Cowen, Henr y Demmer t, John Maj ews ki, and T om
Palmer .

W h at D o E con om is t s Con t r i bu t e?

T he es s ays gather ed her e s peak of the choices economis ts make. Which s ubj ects to wr ite
on, which pr emis es to follow, which author ities to appeal to, which methods to us e, which
tones to as s ume, which audiences to addr es s , which challenges to r es pond to, which
s ocial pur pos es to s er ve - - all thes e choices ar e made each time an economis t acts as an
economis t. Ar e economis ts today, in mak ing their individual choices , led to pr omote ends
of human better ment? Mos t of the pr es ent author s s us pect that much choos ing by
economis ts is not for the better .

Economis ts ar e quick to find flaws in mar k ets , gover nments , and other ins titutions . Yet
they r ar ely aim their flaw- finding at their own pr ofes s ional ins titutions . Not publicly,
anyway. I n s uch matter s , their public attitude is r ather like their attitude towar d their
childr en: acceptance without cr itical ex amination. S ome economis ts har bor doubts about
nor mal pr ofes s ional pr actice and s tandar ds , doubts confined to pr ivate thought and
dis cr eet conver s ations . A few, s uch as Ar j o Klamer , David Colander , T homas Mayer ,
Deir dr e McClos key, and Lawr ence S ummer s ex pr es s their doubts publicly.

T he impetus for the pr es ent volume s tems fr om the belief that academic ins titutions ar e
failing, that they tak e a dim view of cer tain r es ear ch activities which do advance the
s ound pr actice of political economy. I f s o, the economis t might find that pr es s ur es to
pur s ue academic wor k diver t him fr om contr ibuting to the ar t and s cience of political
economy. He is tor n between doing well and doing good. T he pr es ent volume has been
as s embled in the hope that it will find its way into the pr ivate chamber of the academic
economis t. I t is meant to s ugges t that the economis t r eally does face a tens ion between
doing well and doing good. T he ex is tence of s uch a tens ion is addr es s ed es pecially by the
s elections fr om Fr ank Gr aham, Ronald Coas e, William Hutt, and Clar ence Philbr ook. T he
dates of thos e ar ticles , as well as the allus ions they make to Fr ank Knight, E dwin Cannan,
and other s , indicate that economis ts have for gener ations pr otes ted cer tain bar r en
tendencies of academic well- doing. I t is als o hinted at in Gor don T ullock's mor e upbeat
ar ticle (wr itten dur ing the ear ly 1970s ). T he s elections fr om Deir dr e McClos key, T homas
S chelling, I s r ael K ir z ner , and Fr iedr ich Hayek als o deal with the par ts economis ts play in
the caus e of human better ment.

Each es s ay has its own impor tant points , and s ometimes they have points in conflict. B ut
in the main they conver ge. T aken together the es s ays offer a s tatement about economics
as a pr ofes s ion, and a vis ion of the economis t's r es pons ibility. Her e I r ais e a s er ies of key
ideas of the s ever al es s ays .

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What Do Economists Contribute?: Introduction Page 2 of 14

T h e P r act it i on er of P oli t ical E con om y I s t h e E ver ym an

Hutt and Hayek point out a maj or differ ence between political economy and s uch
dis ciplines as phys ics , chemis tr y, engineer ing, and medicine. For the latter , ex per ts ar e
appointed to mak e impor tant decis ions . Pr actitioner s in thos e fields ar e ther efor e
confident that bas ic lear ning will be us ed to impr ove man's conditions . I n political
economy, however , the pr actitioner is not the ex per t economis t, but ever y public official
and or dinar y voter - - the E ver yman. T he pr actitioner of political economy is typically
highly ignor ant of bas ic economic ideas . " T he r es ult," s ays Hayek (pp. 36, 35), " is that in
economics you can never es tablis h a tr uth once and for all but have always to convince
ever y gener ation anew." Economis ts as a gr oup do not s ucceed in continued inculcation of
bas ic ideas (ideas that pr ofes s ional economis ts might s ee as " infr amar ginal" ).
Cons equently, in this field, " almos t mor e than any other , human folly dis plays its elf." T hat
the pr actitioner of political economy is the E ver yman places the pr ofes s ional economis t in
a dilemma: S hould he s tr ive to enlighten the pr actitioner of political economy by teaching
the bas ics , in the manner , s ay, of Fr eder ic B as tiat or Henr y Haz litt? I f s o, will it pay off in
pr ofes s ional es teem and s ecur ity? I f the academic pr ofes s ion r ewar ds , r ather ,
par adigmatic s tudy addr es s ed mer ely to other academics , how does the economis t who
r es ponds accor dingly j us tify his s alar y? Can he find a r es pons ible belief that doing well
pr ofes s ionally is als o doing good for s ociety?

E l em en t al I deas F or s aken

Many of the author s in this book s ugges t that becaus e the pr actitioner is the E ver yman,
elemental economic ideas and s imple policy s olutions ar e for s aken in public affair s . Coas e
(pp. 53, 49) s ays , " the advice we do have to offer which would be valuable, if followed,
cons is ts of a few s imple tr uths . . . . What is dis cour aging is that it is thes e s imple tr uths
which ar e s o commonly ignor ed." Gr aham (p. x vi) s imilar ly s ays that economic policy has
fallen far s hor t of attainment of " clear ly des ir able, and patently r ealiz able, ends ." Hayek
(p. 38) notes that " knowledge once gained and s pr ead is often, not dis pr oved, but s imply
los t or for gotten." I ndeed, Coas e quotes s imilar r emar k s fr om Fr ank K night, E dwin
Cannan, and Adam S mith. T he es s ays indicate that ther e is a tr adition within economics
of coping with the pr actitioner dilemma and s tr iving to keep elemental ideas alive in
public dis cour s e, gener ation after gener ation.

I f the author s feel that elemental ideas and s imple s olutions ar e being for s aken, they
mus t have in mind s pecific ideas and s olutions . Mos t of the author s feel that gover nment
policy s hould move s ignificantly in the dir ection of pr ivate pr oper ty and fr eedom of
contr act. B ut the mos t bas ic mes s age of the volume does not depend on liber tar ian policy
views . I t depends only on the belief that elemental ideas , whatever one believes them to
be, would better r each the E ver yman if economis ts focus ed mor e on public policy and
took gr eater par t in public dis cour s e.

Although the author s mainly concur on policy r efor m, it is doubtful that they would agr ee
fully on the " s imple tr uths " of the dis cipline. Per haps all would cite economic pr inciples as
taught in intr oductor y cour s es : mutual gains , the divis ion of labor , oppor tunity cos t,
mar ginal utility, incentives , competition, compar ative advantage, tr ans action cos ts , and
s o on. S ur ely all would favor s tor ies of human wants cr eating, within a pr oper ty r ights
s ys tem, oppor tunities for people to gain by s atis fying thos e wants . S ur ely all would favor
s tor ies of decentr aliz ed coor dination of economic activities . Wr iter s in the Aus tr ian
tr adition, including Hayek, Hutt, and K ir z ner , might als o include dis cover y of oppor tunity,
entr epr eneur s hip, and the diffus enes s of knowledge. T ullock and other s may be keen to
include, among the elements of political economy, analys is of incentives in gover nment.
McClos k ey might emphas iz e the r ole of s peech in economic activities . S chelling
emphas iz es the impor tance of accounting identities for the economic s ys tem. T hus , even

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What Do Economists Contribute?: Introduction Page 3 of 14

wher e opinions concur on how policy s hould be r efor med, minds differ as to which
elemental ideas s hould be s tr es s ed as the ar guments in s uppor t of thos e policy r efor ms .

E con om is t s Can I n f l u en ce P u bl ic Af f air s

Geor ge S tigler , though at an ear lier time appar ently s anguine about economis ts ' coming
influence as policy maker s , is quoted by K ir z ner as follows : " E conomis ts ex er t a minor
and s car cely detectable influence on the s ocieties in which they live" (S tigler 1982, 63).
S tigler (p. 34) tells economis ts not to pr each to the E ver yman. He even as s er ts that
economis ts have nothing of inter es t to tell the E ver yman. T he E ver yman knows his
inter es t and optimizes in s ear ching for infor mation. S tigler tells economis ts they might as
well focus on academic pur s uits .

T he pr es ent author s (with the qualified ex ceptions of Hutt and Hayek), in contr as t, ur ge
economis ts to take gr eater par t in public dis cour s e. T hey affir m economis ts ' influence in
public affair s . T ullock s ays economis ts played a maj or par t in the der egulation of tr ucking,
air line, and banking and the r eduction of tar iffs .

[H] owever an idea may get into a mind, it is capable of dying ther e or of gather ing
immens e for ce. Mor eover , a number of minds can be s eeded with one ex pr es s ion of the
idea. Potentially, then, the for ce may gr ow at an as tr onomical r ate. (Philbr ook , p. 857)

Per haps the hopefulnes s of the author s s tems in par t fr om an intuition about the natur e of
knowledge. I f knowledge wer e mer ely infor mation (as S tigler often s eems to s ugges t),
then ther e is good r eas on to be fatalis tic. I ndividuals have effective incentives to s ear ch
for the bits of infor mation, s uch as a phone number , they lack ; fur ther infor mation thr us t
upon them by economis ts is unlikely to influence them. B ut k nowledge is not mer ely
infor mation; it is als o inter pr etation and j udgment. T he E ver yman may s ometimes
demand infor mation us ed to get por k fr om his congr es s man. B ut the E ver yman has a
s teady, if limited, demand for s ocially- r elevant economic inter pr etation and economic
opinion. T hat demand is s er viced by union leader s , bus ines s s pokes men, envir onmental
activis ts , s o- called cons umer advocates , lawyer s , lobbyis ts , media pundits , politicians ,
bur eaucr ats , and economis ts . B y pr oviding power ful inter pr etation and s cr upulous
j udgment, economis ts can take a mor e vital r ole in public dis cour s e.

T ullock s ays citizens would have oppos ed the Civil Aer onautics B oar d all along if they had
known the car tel inter pr etation of the ar r angement. McClos key s ays that s por ts
metaphor s s uch as " U.S .- ver s us - Japan" damage economic under s tanding, and alter native
inter pr etations of mutual gains and compar ative advantage advance under s tanding.
Coas e cites an ex ample of thought ex per iment - - imagining the incentives faced by an
FDA official in deciding whether to appr ove a new dr ug - - as an inter pr etation with gr eat
per s uas ive power . T he knowledge offer ed in thes e cas es is not pr incipally infor mation - -
facts and figur es - - but r ather inter pr etations - - s tor ies , his tor ies , thought ex per iments ,
and metaphor s .

Wher eas S tigler , cher is hing the notion that knowledge is mer ely infor mation, er adicates
the ver y idea of er r or in s ocial events (s ee for ex ample S tigler 1976), K ir z ner (1979)
ins is ts that er r or is per vas ive in economic pr oces s es , and he s imilar ly applies the idea to
public affair s . E r r or may be cor r ected when the individual dis cover s a new inter pr etation:
knowledge includes not only infor mation, but als o ins ight - - ins ight, that is , to new and
s uper ior inter pr etation. Kir z ner cr iticiz es S tigler for failing to incor por ate a notion of er r or
into his economics and into his public philos ophy. Other author s s ide with K ir z ner and
s peak of economis ts helping people to dis cover the er r or of their ways . Philbr ook (p. 850)
s peaks of the economis t- advis or helping " other s dis cover cor r ect attitudes ." S chelling (p.
22) s peaks of " fr ee lunches all over j us t waiting to be dis cover ed" by economis ts

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pr opos ing policy r efor ms .

And the knowledge- as - mer ely- infor mation view s uppr es s es a thir d facet of k nowledge:
j udgment. When inter pr etations ar e multiple the individual has to decide which to take
s tock in. Judgment is the facet of knowledge wher e ideas ar e not mer ely r ecognized, but
believed and us ed. Judgment is r evealed in action and captur ed mos t ex pr es s ly in phr as es
lik e, " I feel we s hould do s uch- and- s uch." As Michael Polanyi ex plained, ther e is an
element of commitment in believing, in the s ens e that one's beliefs par tly deter mine how
one thinks , what one does , and who one is . T his is the mor al dimens ion of knowledge,
affecting what it is that one will s tand for . E conomis ts can influence the Ever yman not
only by pr oviding facts and inter pr etations , which help him s ee wher e his inter es t lies , but
als o by pr oviding mor al guidance about what his inter es ts s hould be. Rhetor ic s cholar s
fr om Adam S mith to McClos key r ecogniz e that per s uas ive author ity flows fr om the ethos
of the s peak er . When an economis t ar gues agains t licens ing r es tr ictions , the ar gument
per s uades not only becaus e it is cogent and factually s uppor ted, but als o becaus e it is
s incer e and becaus e it is an economis t's . " E conomis ts claim to s ee ar ound and
under neath the economy. T hey claim to do the accounts fr om the s ocial point of
view" (McClos key, p.158). An economis t ur ges der egulation of bus ines s and per s uades
other s that he comes to that conclus ion not becaus e he is pr o bus ines s but becaus e he is
pr o the entir e s ociety. For this r eas on, an ear nes t conver s ation with an economis t can
alter one's values . McClos k ey r efer s to the " mor al author ity" of r egulator y commis s ions
infiltr ated by economis ts . Philbr ook (p. 850) als o s peaks of ex er ting influence by mak ing
evident " the validity of a value."

Economis ts can offer valuable infor mation, inter pr etations , and j udgment. A fuller
appr eciation of the natur e of knowledge may lead economis ts to r ej ect fatalis tic thinking
that s ays whatever is is efficient. T hey may ins tead adopt an attitude ex pr es s ed by Aar on
Wildavs k y (1988, p. 91): " I t is up to the wis e to undo the damage done by the mer ely
good." T he mer ely good mak e er r or s , er r or s that economis ts can cor r ect.

And even if the influence of economis ts is s mall, that s mall influence is pr ecious . As Coas e
(pp. 57, 63) puts it: " An economis t who, by his effor ts , is able to pos tpone by a week a
gover nment pr ogr am which was tes $100 million a year (what I would cons ider a modes t
s ucces s ) has , by his action, ear ned his s alar y for the whole of his life." Coas e encour ages
economis ts to take par t in public dis cour s e, not becaus e he believes their influence to be
lar ge, but becaus e " even a modes t s ucces s is not to be des pis ed."

U n popu lar i t y, S or r ow , an d t h e S t r u ggle Again s t D es pai r

Although the author s ex pr es s hope that economis ts will influence public affair s , s ever al
tell why the hope mus t be tough and deep- r eaching. T he economis t's good wor ks r ar ely
bear fr uit in any dir ect way. T he economis t's advice s eems to fall on deaf ear s . When
good advice is r ej ected, the r ej ection is br us que and ignor ant. Even in the r ar e cas e when
the advice takes r oot, the s age's influence is long los t and he r eceives no cr edit. For the
mos t par t, par ticipation in public dis cour s e is like tutor ing an or ner y and s poiled child. T he
economis t mus t plead to get attention; once he has attention, his appeals cons is t of
elementar y ideas r ehear s ed ear nes tly and pains takingly, and illus tr ated by imaginative
s tor ies and ex amples . Jus t when he thinks the public and policymaker s ar e tak ing his
pr ecepts to hear t, they s uddenly abandon his ins tr uction and for no good r eas on. His only
r ecour s e is to keep on hoping and pleading. T he whole effor t is thankles s and may make
one r idiculous .

A s ens e of fr us tr ation, even des per ation, comes acr os s es pecially in the ear ly pieces by
Hutt, Gr aham, and Hayek, wr itten dur ing the 1930s and 40s when s tatis m, both as public
policy and as intellectual for ce, was advancing r apidly. Hayek s ugges ts that economic

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r eas oning is likely to lead to conclus ions in conflict with univer s al human ins tincts and
s implis tic vis ions of a happy s ociety. I ndeed, we s ee in this addr es s fr om 1944 the ker nel
of ideas that Hayek developed over the s ubs equent four decades , ideas about the tens ion
between the values of tr aditional s ociety and the des ir able r ules for moder n s ociety.
Hayek (p. 47) cautions his young- economis t auditor s that in economics " the r uthles s
pur s uit of an ar gument will lead you almos t cer tainly into is olation and unpopular ity." T he
economis t " mus t not look for public appr oval or s ympathy for his effor ts ."

Hutt's couns el is equally dis pir iting. He s ays that the liber tar ian - or iented economis t mus t
" be awar e of a per iodic r ecur r ence of a s ens e of utter helples s nes s " :

On all s ides he thinks he s ees the s ur vival of ignor ance and confus ion of thought on
matter s which affect human welfar e; and he feels that nothing that it is within his power
to do or s ay can have the s lightes t effect in check ing the accumulation of wr ong ideas and
fals e policies which they br ing for th. He r ecognizes that in s pher es in which policy and
action can be influenced, he is doomed to vir tual dumbnes s to- day. He does not attempt
the impos s ible. He s eldom pr otes ts , for ex per ience and his tor y have taught him that
pr otes ts ar e without avail and mer ely damaging to his r eputation. He r ealiz es that
per s is tent oppos ition to the popular illus ions of his time will s imply br ing him the notor iety
of a cr ank . . . (Hutt, p. 34).

T he s ens e of fr us tr ation and des pair is gr eates t for thos e economis ts who tak e par t in
public dis cour s e. One of Hutt's s ection headings r eads : " I t is as a cr itic of actual affair s
that the economis t is mos t awar e of his ineffectivenes s ." Although s tatis t thinking has , in
r ecent decades , not continued to advance the way it did when Hutt wr ote, and although
Milton Fr iedman has had no appar ent difficulty in r emaining cheer ful in his conver s ation
with the public, the fundamental pr oblems des cr ibed by Hutt and Hayek r emain highly
per tinent to liber tar ian economis ts today.

T h e Gr eat E s cape: F r om P u bli c D is cou r s e t o Academ ic Cr af t s

Hutt (p. 36) continues by des cr ibing how the economis t wor k ing on applied is s ues
r es ponds to the fr us tr ation: " I n pr actice, then, he als o confines his effor ts mainly to
wr iting books and ar ticles that ar e r ead only by other economis ts , and to attempting (if he
is a teacher ) to dis s eminate under s tanding to s ucces s ive gr oups of s tudents who come
under his influence." Hutt builds a br idge fr om the fundamental pr oblems that economis ts
ex per ience in public dis cour s e to the pr oblems within economics as an academic
pr ofes s ion. T his br idge is les s ex plicit in the other es s ays , but many of them s how deep
concer n with the failur es of economics as an academic pr ofes s ion. T he es s ays , ther efor e,
ex plor e the pr oblems an economis t faces in two differ ent r ealms : that of public dis cour s e
and that of academic pur s uits . Hutt s ugges ts a s ociological theor y that br idges the two
r ealms , a theor y implicit in s ever al of the other es s ays .

Hutt clear ly identifies the tur n inwar d - - into the academy, into s tr ictly economis t- to-
economis t dis cour s e - - as an es cape fr om the fr us tr ation of public dis cour s e. (T his theme
had been fr amed ear lier and in pungent ter ms by Cannan, Hutt's teacher ; s ee Cannan
1933.) T he academic pur s uit he identifies with this es cape is " pur e theor y," or model
building: " T he economis t may devote hims elf to 'pur e theor y,' wher e he es capes fr om the
s ens e of fr us tr ated effor t" (Hutt, p. 35). Gr aham (p. x x ) als o r egar ds economis ts ' " logical
gymnas tics " as an " intellectual r etr eat fr om a dis illus ioning contemplation of the mar ch of
events ."

T he r ationale for this es cape is that " s uch an economis t will cor r es pond to the 'pur e
s cientis t' in other fields " (Hutt, p. 35). T his pr es umption of " s cience" br ings a s et of
pr ofes s ional nor ms and s tandar ds , with s tated ideals of " value fr eedom," " obj ectivity,"

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" pos itive analys is ," and " s cientific method." B ut, as Wayne B ooth (1974) has ar gued, the
collection of s uch pr ecepts tur ns out to be mutually dependent, not independently
gr ounded. S cience is the confor ming to accepted s cientific methods . S cience is what
s cientis ts s ay it is , and s cientis ts ar e thos e who do s cience. T he s cience talk amounts to a
faith in favor ed pr ofes s ional ins titutions and pr actices . T hat faith may be a wor thy one;
the point is that economis ts often do not r ecogniz e that it is one inter locking s et of
beliefs , and do not cr itically ex amine it on a br oader plane. As T homas K uhn (1977, x x i)
s ays , " T he hypothes es of individuals ar e tes ted, the commitments s har ed by his gr oup
being pr es uppos ed; gr oup commitments , on the other hand, ar e not tes ted, and the
pr oces s by which they ar e dis placed differ s dr as tically fr om that involved in the evaluation
of hypothes es ."

T hos e tur ning inwar d, ther efor e, do not think of it as an es cape. Rather , they defend the
tur n inwar d on the gr ounds that s cience (i.e., academic well- doing) has its own pace and
for ce. I n the long r un, advancing s cience will do mor e for s ociety than will dir ect
engagement with the public. T his is pr ecis ely how S tigler (1982, 34, 67; 1988, 85, 179)
j us tifies the tur n inwar d.

B ut the legitimation of the tur n inwar d is bas ed on an er r oneous and lar gely unex amined
faith in academic ins titutions - - a faith that I will r efer to as " the Gr eat Faith." As Hutt,
Gr aham, Hayek, Philbr ook , Coas e, T ullock, Kir z ner , and McClos key each indicate in his
own way, that the pr actitioner of political economy is the E ver yman means that the field
mus t r emain fundamentally differ ent fr om the natur al s ciences . T he pr ofes s ion pr oceeds
on tacit pr es umptions about what " it is all about," but thos e pr es umptions ar e
fundamentally wr ong. Gr aham wr ites :

Economics has always been under s us picion as a 's cience,' and the cons equent defens ive
attempts on the par t of its ex ponents to for ce their theor y into r igid s cientific for ms has
fr us tr ated its application to the facts of life. (Gr aham, p. x vi)

Much fir s t- r ate analytical s kill and much s cholar ly indus tr y has mis car r ied becaus e the
r oad to academic r ecognition lay in the r efinement of tr aditional technique, or in
as s iduous dus t- gather ing, with little cons ider ation of ultimate pur pos e. T he means have
been ex alted over the end, and the neophyte, compelled to s how his mas ter y of
technique, has quick ly lear ned to love and pr actice it for its own s ake. (Gr aham, p. x viii)

Var i et i es of P ar adigm at i cis m

T he Gr eat Faith depends on a s tr ong s et of academic s tandar ds and pr actices , which

become the mar k er s of " tr ue s cience." I n other wor ds , the Gr eat Faith is a faith in
dominant for mal modes of s cholar ly dis cour s e, or par adigms (K uhn 1970, 10- 11; 1977,
x viii- x x ). While a par adigm is a for mal mode of s cholar ly dis cour s e, another ter m is
needed to mean a s tr ong and r igid allegiance to par adigm. Wis hing for a les s ugly
alter native that would do the j ob, I adopt par adigmaticis m. (An alter native ter m might be
for malis m, but that ter m does not adequately convey the allegiance to par adigm, which
need not be mathematical.) Par adigmaticis m is what many of the author s find wr ong with
the economics pr ofes s ion. Many s ee a conflict within economics between a public-
dis cour s e or ientation and par adigmaticis m. E x plicitly or other wis e, the pr es ent author s
(with the qualified ex ception of Hayek) pr otes t agains t par adigmaticis m in the pr ofes s ion,
becaus e they feel that it diver ts economis ts fr om as s is ting the tr ue pr actitioner of political
economy.

T he leading for m of par adigmaticis m is undue s tr es s on for mal model- building, and is
ex plicitly pr otes ted her e by Gr aham, Hutt, and Philbr ook. I n their other wr itings , Hayek ,
Coas e, K ir z ner , and es pecially McClos key have done likewis e. Another for m of

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par adigmaticis m pr otes ted her e by Coas e and Philbr ook is undue s tr es s on empir ical wor k
accor ding to favor ed quantitative methods (nowadays , r egr es s ion analys is ). And
Gr aham's (p. x viii) allus ion to the as s iduous fact gather ing of I ns titutionalis m per haps
indicates a pas t for m of par adigmaticis m.

Con f li ct B et w een P ar adi gm at ici s m an d R el evan ce

T he Ever yman does not think or talk the par adigm. Anything valuable that par adigmatic
dis cour s e teaches , ther efor e, mus t be r elayed in a language that the Ever yman
under s tands . Although Gr aham, Hutt, Coas e, K ir z ner , and Hayek ex pr es s appr eciation for
the fr uits of par adigm, mos t of the author s feel that the par adigmatic s pir it is too s tr ong,
and that the findings of mains tr eam r es ear ch ar e too often not wor th tr ans mitting to the
Ever yman. T he obj ection is not categor ical; it is an is s ue of whether economis ts ar e too
far down the par adigmatic end of the pr oduction fr ontier .

T he Gr eat Faith maintains that par adigmaticis m bes t s er ves s ociety, that doing well
pr ofes s ionally is doing good. B ut the author s point out conflicts between par adigmaticis m
and economic enlightenment. Of quantitative par adigms , Coas e wr ites :

B ut this development is not without its cos ts . I t abs or bs r es our ces which might other wis e
be devoted to the development of our theor y and to empir ical s tudies of the economic
s ys tem of a nonquantitative char acter . As pects of the economic s ys tem which ar e difficult
to meas ur e tend to be neglected. I t diver ts attention fr om the economic s ys tem its elf to
the technical pr oblems of meas ur ement. (Coas e, p. 58)

Gr aham dir ects mor e biting r emar ks at for mal model- building (wr itten in 1942!):

T heor y has , at length, become s o " s cientific" and abs tr act as to intr igue the
mathematicians who have tak en delight in developing the concept of a k aleidos copic and
fr ictionles s play of atomis tic units in a complex and eter nally unfolding equilibr ium. T he
notion of equilibr ium s ugges ted equations ; equations ar e pr olific par ents of their kind;
and the game has gone on until the pages of the mor e es oter ic economic j our nals have
become a mas s of hier oglyphics intelligible only to thos e who know the code. All the
inconvenient fr eight of fact has been dis car ded by the mor e r econdite pr actitioner s until
the " s cience" has come to move in a r ealm of pur e abs tr action us eful for pur pos es of
cer ebr ation but of s teadily declining pr actical impor tance. (Gr aham, p. x vii)

I n a s imilar vein, Hutt inveighs :

Our own s ugges tion is that whils t the impr es s ive developments in the logical s tr uctur e of
Political Economy which the las t for ty year s have witnes s ed ar e valuable contr ibutions to
the phys iology of economic method, they have tended, in their tr eatment by s ome of the
mos t fer tile methodological inventor s , s er ious ly to obs cur e the per s is tent r elevance of the
backbone of the s cience . . . (Hutt, p. 215)

Hutt cr iticiz ed cer tain r emar ks on method made by Joan Robins on, and he identifies a key
implicit and undefended conviction of the Gr eat Faith: that knowledge is not tr ue s cience
until it has been captur ed in a for mal model. T hat conviction j us tifies the denigr ation and
dis mis s al of other , les s par adigmatic, kinds of r es ear ch (s uch as thos e kinds as s ociated
with the collected author s ). B ut Hutt (p. 213) challenges this conviction: " B ecaus e the
theor is ts of the mathematical and diagr ammatical s chools ar e in s ome cas es unable to
find r ealis tic categor ies with which their method can s atis factor ily deal, that does not
pr ove that other means of s o doing do not ex is t." As McClos key has ar gued at length,
model- building is j us t one genr e of metaphor mak ing. T her e is no r eas on to s uppos e that

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it is the only us eful one, and ther e is good r eas on to believe that it is incapable of
captur ing many impor tant theor etical ideas and is uns uitable for many theor etical
pur pos es .

P ar adigm at i cis m I n h ibi t s t h e Cu lt iv at i on of E con om ic Ju dgm en t

T he s ever al es s ays s ugges t that par adigmaticis m inhibits the cultivation of economic
j udgment in the pr ofes s ional economis t. I ndeed, befor e one becomes an economis t, one
is mer ely the E ver yman. And after becoming an economis t one r emains als o the
Ever yman, s ince one continues to be s ubj ect to nonpr ofes s ional cultur al and intellectual
influences . Addr es s ing young economis ts , Hayek tells of our having convictions befor e we
come to economics :

I t is pr obably s till tr ue of mos t of us - - and in this , too, economics differ s fr om mos t other
s ubj ects - - that we did not tur n to economics for the fas cination of the s ubj ect as s uch. . .
. T he fact which we mus t face is that near ly all of us come to the s tudy of economics with
ver y s tr ong views on s ubj ects which we do not under s tand. And even if we mak e a s how
of being detached and r eady to lear n, I am afr aid it is almos t always with a mental
r es er vation, with an inwar d deter mination to pr ove that our ins tincts wer e r ight . . .
Nothing is mor e per nicious to intellectual hones ty than pr ide in not having changed one's
opinions - - par ticular ly if, as is us ually the cas e in our field, thes e ar e opinions which in
the cir cles in which we move ar e r egar ded as 'pr ogr es s ive' or 'advanced' or j us t moder n.
You will s oon enough dis cover that what you r egar d as s pecially advanced opinions ar e
j us t the opinions dominant in your par ticular gener ation . . . (Hayek , pp. 40- 41)

I mplicit in Hayek 's dis cus s ion is his belief that the cultivation of good j udgment in
economics is a pr oces s of coming to under s tand why fr ee, voluntar y, pr ivate activities ar e
much mor e s ocially effective than gover nment enter pr is e and r egulation. T he aver age
college s tudent today has not under gone this lear ning pr oces s . Rather , he is a citiz en of a
s ociety wher e conventional thinking is highly s tatis t. People ar e accus tomed to per vas ive
gover nment - - its ins titutions , r ituals , per s onalities , his tor ies , per manence, and
incompar able power . Gover nment as a binding, guiding for ce for s ociety is a centr al idea
and value in Wes ter n cultur e. T he aver age college s tudent has been s chooled by
gover nment employees and gets his ideas fr om news s er vices that depend gr eatly on the
cooper ation of gover nment officials . T her e is a good chance his or her par ents wor k for
gover nment.

T he pr oces s of cultivating good economic j udgment entails the r igor ous pr obing of maj or
public- policy is s ues . T he pr obing is audacious in its imagination and vis ion, and r uthles s
with conventional think ing. I t is highly ar gumentative and per s onally challenging. I t
s tudies the ar guments on all s ides of the is s ue. T he is s ues ar e genuine and the pos itions
ar e genuinely held by mentor s . S tudents acquir e j udgment by being ex pected to develop
convictions - - not becaus e having convictions is des ir able, but becaus e the pr oces s of
developing convictions impels a s cr upulous awar enes s of what the ar guments ar e and a
s ear ching under s tanding of how the ar guments r eally s tack up. A s ound tr aining in
economics is a pr oces s of edification.

T he pr oblem with par adigmaticis m is that it thwar ts the edification pr oces s . Advanced
cour s es in model- building and econometr ics can in no way s ubs titute for an impas s ioned,
s ear ching s tudy of the FDA, dr ug pr ohibition, occupational licens ing, antitr us t policy, and
the U.S . Pos tal S er vice. S uch s tudy r elies , to be s ur e, on quantitative evidence and
car eful r eas oning bas ed on models , but, as many mains tr eam economis ts have noted, the
evidence and r eas oning with the mos t oomph ar e ver y low tech. Hutt ex plains the
cons equences of par adigmaticis m:

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[T ] he s wamping of economic tr eatis es with mathematics has . . . diver ted attention fr om

fundamentals to points of analytical inter es t, and incidentally ther eby led to s ome actual
cor r uption or unj us tifiable weakening of bas ic tenets . . . . [T he intr icacies of the
mathematical method] appear to have caus ed s ome of thos e pr actis ing it to los e their
continuous intimacy with cer tain br oad unques tionable elements of r eality which ought
always to dominate in applied theor y. Whils t not actually inducing gener alizations fr om
s pecial cas es , s ome economis ts s eem to have given undue s tr es s to cur ios a in a manner
that has tended to dis tor t their j udgment and weaken the author ity of economis ts
gener ally. (Hutt, p. 208, fir s t italics added)

Wher e Hutt r efer s to " cer tain br oad unques tionable elements of r eality," we might
es pecially cons ider the per vas ivenes s of yet- to- be- dis cover ed oppor tunities and the
r adical decentr aliz ation of knowledge, themes pr ominent in the tr adition of S mith and
Hayek. Yet it is pr ecis ely thes e themes that the model- building par adigm s uppr es s es .

McClos k ey (p. 153) wr ites of the br eak down of j udgment in economics : " Economics
ar ound 1950 gave up s ocial philos ophy and s ocial his tor y to become a blackboar d
s ubj ect . . . . [ W] hy s hould his tor ical and philos ophical doubts that the wealth [ of nations ]
ar is es fr om planning be enter tained if a s weet diagr am can pr ove that planning wor ks ?"
Economis ts tr ained only in par adigm s imply do not have an oppor tunity to cultivate
economic j udgment.

Hutt (p. 214) ex plains that the pr oblem then s pills over to the public at lar ge: " the public
mind would be led away fr om bas ic es s entials . . . owing to the diffus ion of effor t . . . to
ingenious futilities ." Par adigmaticis m under mines economis ts ' author ity with the
Ever yman, fir s t, by inhibiting the cultivation of good j udgment and ther eby r educing wis e
cons ens us among economis ts , and, s econd, by leading economis ts to pur s ue ir r elevant
ques tions and s peak an es oter ic language. E conomis ts tur n their back on the E ver yman,
and the E ver yman tur ns his back on economis ts . I t is this br eakdown in author ity, a
br eakdown in economics as a mor al and intellectual bulwar k agains t ex panding
gover nment, that s ever al of the author s s ee as the gr eat tr agedy of moder n economics .

Cyn i cis m an d Accept an ce of t h e S t at u s Qu o

T he attitude of s ome mar ket- or iented economis ts br ings to mind a par able fr om S or en
Kier k egaar d:

I t is s aid that two Englis h noblemen wer e once r iding along a r oad when they met a man
whos e hor s e had r un away with him and who, being in danger of falling off, s houted for
help. One of the E nglis hmen tur ned to the other and s aid, " A hundr ed guineas he falls
off." " T ak en," s aid the other . With that they s pur r ed their hor s es to a gallop and hur r ied
on ahead to open the tollgates and to pr event anything fr om getting in the way of the
r unaway hor s e. I n the s ame way, though without that her oic and millionair e- lik e s pleen,
our own r eflective and s ens ible age is lik e a cur ious , cr itical and wor ldly- wis e per s on who,
at the mos t, has vitality enough to lay a wager . (K ier kegaar d 1978, p. 15)

Many economis ts s ee the gr eat power of economics both to find viable s olutions and to
convince other s , yet nonetheles s feel no r es pons ibility to mak e economics s ing in the
body politic. I f j udgment within the pr ofes s ion is to be impr oved and the author ity of the
pr ofes s ion enhanced, the fir s t tas k is to get economis ts with good j udgment to wor k
together . T her e is a r ift within the mor e liber tar ian- or iented half of the pr ofes s ion, a r ift
over par adigmatic wor k ver s us nonpar adigmatic, policy- r elevant wor k. T he par adigmatic
comr ades s ometimes s light nonpar adigmatic wor k as " nons cience" and policy wor k as
" advocacy." T hey us ually have (or hope to have) oppor tunity in pr es tigious academic
cir cles . T hey ar e s ometimes caught between two conflicting per s onal goals : winning

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academic es teem and favor , and winning ideological es teem and favor .

T he tur n inwar d often tr iumphs . T hough not advancing ideas in oppos ition to wis e policy,
the economis t abandons his ideological inter es ts and neglects r es ear ch topics that could
advance wis e policy. He j us tifies his choices with the notion that advancing s cience does
mor e good, ultimately, than does " advocacy," and s cience is " value neutr al." B ut as
Gr aham (p. x ix ) s ays , " [ t] he as s er tion that the s cientis t s hould be completely fr ee of
value j udgments , even if it wer e r ealiz able, is in its elf, of cour s e, a value j udgment." T he
tr ouble is not that, at bottom, implicit value j udgments ar e, after all, s nuck in; the tr ouble
is that the implicit value j udgments ar e unex amined, and tur n out to be unwor thy.
Gr aham wr yly ex pos es the weak nes s of the inwar d faith:

[S ome] wr iter s have been content to affir m that s cience is concer ned only with means
and not with ends and that the final deter mination of ends mus t be left to thos e fitted to
make value j udgments , whoever they might be. (Gr aham, p. x x , italics added)

Gr aham's s tatement could be r ead with Geor ge S tigler in mind; S tigler (1982, 3) wr ites :
" Economis ts have no s pecial pr ofes s ional k nowledge of that which is vir tuous or j us t."

Gr aham s ugges ts that the inwar d tur n mus t r es t on a belief that the academic s ys tem is
dr iven by intelligent for ces and beneficial mechanis ms , that economis ts , like gr ocer s , will
bes t s er ve s ociety by taking cons umer tas tes (" ends " in Gr aham's language) as given,
playing their par t quies cently in the vas t divis ion of labor , and getting on in their car eer s .
B ut economis ts have not, of cour s e, actually done the economics that would be neces s ar y
to s uppor t s uch a view of their own " indus tr y." Again, the pr oblem is not that economis ts
ar e going on faith and mak ing value j udgments - - s uch is ineluctable - - but that the
implied faiths and j udgments ar e s o ill- cons ider ed.

Gr aham's s ar cas ticwhoever they might be z er os in on the er r or . T he s ocial ends that

economis ts ar e pr es ented with ar e not deter mined by ex per ts in s uch a tas k, but by our
collective foolis hnes s as democr atic s ociety. Her e the " cons umer " is not choos ing wis ely.
T he " cons umer " is the Ever yman, who ignor antly and negligently mak es the r eal choices
in political economy. T o believe that ther e is an efficacious connection between what is
decided by r efer ees at the pr es tigious academic j our nals to what s hould be known by the
Ever yman- pr actitioner is tr uly a gr eat faith.

S ever al of the ar ticles s ugges t that the acceptance of the s tatus quo is r eally a fleeing of
r es pons ibility. Often the r ationales for the pr ofes s ion's nor ms ar e lacking or half - hear ted,
and cynicis m is r ife. T he author s dis like this tr end. T heir r es pons e is clear : Whoever they
might be might as well be us , economis ts . I t is up to the wis e to undo the damage done
by the mer ely good.

Gr aham ar gues that it is not enough for economis ts to under s tand how the s tatus quo
oper ates . I f economis ts ar e to lead s ociety towar d better things , they mus t ex plor e
" things as they could and ought to be" (Gr aham, p. x x ). E conomics , s ays Gr aham (p. x ix ),
" mus t be not only analytical but imaginative." An ex ample fr om the moder n liter atur e
comes to mind: ther e is a pr olifer ation of technical ar ticles that analyz e par ticular as pects
of moder n centr al banking s ys tems , but r elatively s cant attention is given to the ques tion
of whether centr al banking s hould ex is t in the fir s t place, and of how a lais s ez - fair e
s ys tem of bank ing would wor k. Wor k that pos its maj or policy r efor m and ex plor es how
s uch r egimes might wor k in pr actice ar e often dis par aged as " nons cience," " nonr igor ous ,"
" s peculative," and " unr ealis tic."

P h il br ook' s Cou n t er at t ack Again s t t h e ' R eali s t s '

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Clar ence Philbr ook evidently had been der ogated for lack ing " r ealis m" one too many
times . His ar ticle, publis hed in the Amer ican E conomic Review in 1953, r es ponds to the
char ge of " unr ealis m" that one s uffer s when pr opos ing or mer ely ex plor ing maj or policy
r efor m, s uch as lais s ez - fair e banking. T he ar ticle is pithy and difficult, and s ome
intr oductor y r emar ks may be helpful.

I magine an economis t pr es enting r es ear ch on how lais s ez - fair e banking would wor k, and
ar guing in its favor . His colleagues do not s er ious ly cons ider his ar guments , but s imply
s ay the whole notion is " unr ealis tic" and dis mis s the r es ear ch as " advocacy." B ut the
cr itics do not ex plain what they mean by " unr ealis tic," nor how the char ge j us tifies their
dis mis s al. Philbr ook s ear ches for the implicit j us tification of the " r ealis m" cr iter ion, and
then ans wer s it. T hus , he has the j ob of s cr upulous ly ar ticulating his opponents ' ar gument
and then knocking down that ar gument.

Philbr ook's opponents , the " r ealis ts ," ar e not model builder s , but r ather applied
economis ts wor king on ins titutional and policy topics . Per haps the " r ealis ts ," s ays
Philbr ook, take the view that ever ything in s ociety s hould be tak en as given and
unalter able. B ut the ver y act of conducting r es ear ch and giving advice mus t pr oceed on at
leas t a pr etens e that s ome pieces of the s ituation may be s ubj ect to influence by the
economis t- advis or . Other wis e, ther e would be no point to the whole enter pr is e. Philbr ook
(p. 850) notes that any policy change r equir es " a change of attitudes on the par t of a
lar ge number of per s ons ." T hus , s hor t of confes s ing to char ade, " r ealis ts " mus t j oin
Philbr ook in pr es uming that economics is capable of influencing citiz ens and public
officials , if only r emotely.

T he " r ealis m" philos ophy mus t, ther efor e, come down to a s et of beliefs about which
policy r efor ms ar e politically viable and which ar e not. I t mus t r es t on a s et of beliefs
about the pr obabilities as s ociated with var ious r efor m pr opos als . Fr ee banking, for
ex ample, however des ir able it may be thought to be, is r egar ded to have s uch a s mall
pr obability of r ealiz ation that it is foolis h to even dis cus s it, and hence is dis mis s ed as
" unr ealis tic." Or , Philbr ook s ays , " r ealis ts " might have in mind a cr iter ion that mix es the
r ealization pr obability with the degr ee of des ir ability of the r efor m. " Men called
'unr ealis tic' ar e thos e who dis r egar d this pr inciple and pr es umably thos e who as s ign
pr obability weights incor r ectly" (Philbr ook , p. 854). When r eading Philbr ook, bear in mind
fr om the s tar t that he r ej ects the entir e pr obability philos ophy which he attr ibutes to the
" r ealis ts ." His own view is that pr ofes s ional es teem and r ewar ds s hould not be withheld
fr om economis ts who s tudy the des ir able, r egar dles s of its pr obability of being r ealized.

Philbr ook's counter attack is r ich and multifaceted. One point of his valiant es s ay des er ves
s pecial attention. T he pr obability that fr ee banking, for ex ample, will be r ealized depends
on how many other economis t- advis or s advocate the r efor m. " I f all, however , follow the
'pr obability' pr inciple, no one can commit hims elf until many other s (near ly all?) have
committed thems elves ." I f making their choices s imultaneous ly, economis ts ' advice will
" be the pr oduct of infinite involutions of gues s es by each about what other s ar e gues s ing
about what he is gues s ing about what they will advocate" (Philbr ook, p. 857). Philbr ook is
pointing out that if s cience is what s cientis ts s ay it is , and s cientis ts ar e thos e who
pr actice s cience, then s cientis ts ar e playing a coor dination game with bad equilibr ia. One
equilibr ium in par ticular s tands out for its focal pr oper ties . Philbr ook (p. 858) wr ites of the
" mutual anticipation ending only in univer s al s uppor t of the s tatus quo." T he focal power
of the s tatus quo s hapes the evolution of pr ofes s ional (" s cientific" ) nor ms . T he pr ofes s ion
s uffer s fr om what path- dependence theor is ts call " lock - in." Philbr ook (p. 847) r emar k s :
" T her e has gr own a wides pr ead pr actice of cooper ation with 'things as they ar e,' without
ex plicit cr iticis m of them, which is bound to have the effect of active appr oval r egar dles s
of whether s uch is intended." E mpir ical economis ts teas e out r egr es s ion r es ults about the
s tatus quo, but neglect candid compar is on with maj or policy r efor m - - abolition of the

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FDA, the S EC, gover nment s chools , gover nment r oads , etc. - - even though s uch r efor ms
may be thought des ir able. Philbr ook's ar ticle is aimed at applied economis ts who pull their
punches with s tatus - quo policies , in the name of " pos itive analys is ," " r ealis m," " s cience,"
etc.

W h at S pecif icall y E con om i s t s S h ou l d D o Mor e Of

With the qualified ex ception of Hutt and Hayek , the author s encour age economis ts to
become mor e engaged in public dis cour s e. T his means effor ts at gener al education - -
T ullock s ugges ts talk ing to Rotar y and wr iting news paper ar ticles - - or it might mean
wr iting as advis or to policymaker s , or it might mean s imply focus ing one's wor k mor e on
public- policy is s ues . All thes e activities ar e likely to be les s par adigmatic than what now
pr evails as nor mal pr ofes s ional wor k . S ince the pr actitioner of political economy is the
Ever yman, however , one could ar gue that thes e activities advance the ar t mor e than does
highly par adigmatic wor k.

Mos t of the author s feel that economis ts have gotten car r ied away with par adigm. Mos t
favor an adj us tment at the mar gin towar d les s par adigmatic, mor e policy- or iented wor k.
S uch an adj us tment would not be without its difficulties and dr awback s . I ndeed, the gr eat
vir tue of par adigmaticis m is that it pr ovides r elatively clear cr iter ia for r ating r es ear ch.
Academic affair s call for a s et of s tandar ds which can, r elative to other pos s ible s tandar ds ,
be applied cons is tently, to r educe vex ing inter necine conflict over ever y or als
ex amination, j ob candidate, or tenur e cas e. Without common s tandar ds and values an
academic community is not a community. Par adigmaticis m pr evails pr ecis ely becaus e it
s er ves thes e ins titutional functions . T emper ing the s tr es s on par adigm - - by giving mor e
cr edit in pr omotion cas es , for ex ample, to gener al- r eader s hip ar ticles , think - tank r epor ts ,
and lectur es to Rotar y, and les s cr edit to ar ticles in pr es tigious j our nals - - could lead to a
les s definite s et of s tandar ds and les s pr edictable decis ion making. Academic economis ts
s hould find the mar ginal r ate of tr ans for mation that max imizes , not their own comfor t and
s anctuar y, but the s er vice economics r ender s to s ociety.

D oin g W ell Can Mean D oi n g Good

Gor don T ullock's lectur e, " How to Do Well While Doing Good!," was wr itten for a s eminar
at Vir ginia Polytechnic I ns titute s ome time dur ing the ear ly 1970s (it r emained
unpublis hed for mor e than a decade). He s ays vir tue does not have to be its own r ewar d.
T alking to Rotar y can pay off pr ofes s ionally. Maybe things wer e differ ent in the ear ly
1970s , or maybe T ullock is dis guis ing the facts to s er ve a gr eater good. T ullock (p. 232)
in fact belies his upbeat pr omis e of pr ofes s ional payoff when he des cr ibes what he
pr opos es as " unpr ofes s ional."

T he r eal point is that economis ts s hould do good s ometimes r egar dles s of pr ofes s ional
cons ider ations . T ullock s ays :

Even if ther e wer e no beneficial impact on your car eer , never theles s , I would ur ge it on
you. . . . I t is lik ely that you will do mor e good for the wor ld by concentr ating on
abolis hing s ome [ was teful gover nment] or ganiz ation in your locality than the aver age
per s on does - - indeed, ver y much mor e. I t is an unus ual for m of char ity, but a for m in
which the payoff would be high. (T ullock , p. 239)

S imilar ly, S chelling (p. 22) concludes his addr es s to the Economics gr aduating clas s at
B er keley: " T o thos e of you who become pr ofes s ional economis ts I ur ge you: get out ther e
and help find thos e fr ee lunches ." All of the author s es teem economis ts who br ing
economic enlightenment to the E ver yman. Doing s o may not help you to do well

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What Do Economists Contribute?: Introduction Page 13 of 14

pr ofes s ionally (it may even hur t); however , s ome find knowing that they would have their
es teem to be well- doing of another s or t.

R ef er en ces

B ooth, Wayne C. 1974. Moder n Dogma and the Rhetor ic of As s ent (Chicago: Univer s ity of
Chicago Pr es s ).

Cannan, Edwin. 1933. " T he Need for S impler Economics ," E conomic Jour nal, 43
(S eptember ), pp. 367- 78.

Coas e, Ronald H. 1975. " Economis ts and Public Policy," in J. Fr ed Wes ton, ed., Lar ge
Cor por ations in a Changing S ociety (New Yor k : New Yor k Univer s ity Pr es s ). Repr inted in
Coas e'sEs s ays on Economics and E conomis ts (Chicago: Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s ,
1994), pp. 47- 63. Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Gr aham, Fr ank D. 1942. S ocial Goals and the E conomic I ns titutions (Pr inceton: Pr inceton
Univer s ity Pr es s ). S election (fr om pages x v- x x ) r epr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Hayek, Fr iedr ich A. 1944. " On B eing an Economis t," an addr es s given to economics
s tudents at the L ondon S chool of E conomics in 1944, fir s t publis hed in T he T r end of
Economic T hinking: E s s ays on Political Economis ts and Economic His tor y (vol. I I I of T he
Collected Wor k s of F. A. Hayek ), edited by W. W. B ar tley and S tephen Kr es ge (Chicago:
Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s , 1991), pp. 35- 48. Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Hutt, William H. 1936. Economis ts and the Public, r epr inted by T r ans action Publis her s ,
New B r uns wick , N.J., 1990. S election (fr om pages 34- 37, 207- 217) r epr inted in the
pr es ent volume.

Kier k egaar d, S or en. 1978. Par ables of K ier kegaar d, edited by T homas C. Oden (Pr inceton:
Pr inceton Univer s ity Pr es s ).

Kir zner , I s r ael M. 1979. Per ception, Oppor tunity, and Pr ofit: S tudies in the T heor y of
Entr epr eneur s hip. Chicago: Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s .

Kir zner , I s r ael M. 1983. " Does Anyone L is ten to E conomis ts " (A r eview of Geor ge S tigler 's
Economis t As Pr eacher and Other Es s ays ), I nquir y, Apr il, pp. 38- 40. Repr inted with new
title in the pr es ent volume.

Kuhn, T homas S . 1970. T he S tr uctur e of S cientific Revolutions . S econd ed. Chicago:

Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s .

Kuhn, T homas S . 1977. T he Es s ential T ens ion: S elected S tudies in S cientific T r adition and
Change (Chicago: Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s ).

McClos k ey, D. N. 1990. " T he Common Weal and Economic S tor ies ," chapter 11 of I f
You'r e S o S mar t: T he Nar r ative of E conomic E x per tis e (Chicago: Univer s ity of Chicago
Pr es s ), pp. 150- 62. Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Philbr ook, Clar ence. 1953. " 'Realis m' in Policy E s pous al,"
Amer ican E conomic Review, 43,
December , pp. 846- 59. Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Polanyi, Michael. 1962. Per s onal K nowledge: T owar ds a Pos t- Cr itical Philos ophy. Chicago:

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Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s .

S chelling, T homas C. 1995. " What Do E conomis ts K now?," T he Amer ican E conomis t, 39,
S pr ing 1995, 20- 22. Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

S tigler Geor ge J. 1976. " T he Xis tence of X- Efficiency." Amer ican E conomic Review, Mar ch,
213- 16.

S tigler , Geor ge J. 1982. T he Economis t as Pr eacher and Other E s s ays (Chicago:

Univer s ity of Chicago Pr es s ).

S tigler , Geor ge J. 1988. Memoir s of an Unr egulated Economis t. New Yor k: B as ic B ooks .

T ullock , Gor don. 1984. " How to Do Well While Doing Good!," an addr es s deliver ed dur ing
the ear ly 1970s at Vir ginia Polytechnic I ns titute. Publis hed in David C. Colander , ed.,
Neoclas s ical Political E conomy: T he Analys is of Rent- S eeking and DUP Activities
(Cambr idge, Mas s achus etts : B allinger Publis hing Company, 1984), pp. 229- 240.
Repr inted in the pr es ent volume.

Wildavs k y, Aar on. 1988. S ear ching for S afety (New B r uns wick , N.J.: T r ans action
Publis her s ).

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