Landmark Judgements-

Section 9 – Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat

In the case of Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, the dispute revolved around the eviction of the
plaintiff, Laxmi Chand, from a piece of land by the Gram Panchayat (village local government).
The Gram Panchayat claimed that Laxmi Chand had illegally encroached upon the land and
sought his eviction. The court examined the evidence and found that Laxmi Chand had, indeed,
encroached upon the land without lawful authority. The court noted that the Gram Panchayat was
the rightful owner and custodian of the village common land, and it had the power to evict
encroachers.
The court held that the Gram Panchayat's decision to evict Laxmi Chand was valid and justified.
The court emphasized that the rights of the Gram Panchayat as the custodian of village land
should be respected, and unauthorized occupation or encroachment on such land should not be
allowed. Furthermore, the court observed that Laxmi Chand had failed to provide any evidence
or legal basis to support his claim over the land. As a result, the court upheld the Gram
Panchayat's decision and ordered Laxmi Chand's eviction from the encroached land.
In summary, the court ruled in favor of the Gram Panchayat in the case of Laxmi Chand v. Gram
Panchayat, holding that Laxmi Chand had unlawfully encroached upon village common land.
The court upheld the Gram Panchayat's authority to evict encroachers and ordered Laxmi
Chand's eviction from the land. The judgment emphasized the importance of respecting the rights
of the custodian of village land and preventing unauthorized occupation or encroachment.

Section 9A- Foreshore Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, 2008
In the case of Foreshore Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, the dispute
centered around the possession of a parking space by Praveen D. Desai, a member of the
cooperative housing society.The court examined the facts of the case and determined that
Praveen D. Desai was allotted the parking space by the society. However, the society later
attempted to take back the parking space, claiming that it was allotted to Desai by mistake.
The court held that once the parking space was allotted to Desai, it became his property right,
and the society could not unilaterally withdraw or revoke the allotment without any legal basis.
The court emphasized that such actions would be arbitrary and against the principles of natural
justice. Additionally, the court noted that the society's argument that the allotment was a mistake
lacked merit because Desai had relied upon the allotment and had been using the parking space
for a considerable period of time. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Praveen D. Desai,
declaring that he had a valid right to the parking space allotted to him by the cooperative housing
society. The judgment emphasized the importance of respecting property rights and preventing
arbitrary revocation of allotments without proper legal grounds.
In summary, the court in the case of Foreshore Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D.
Desai upheld Praveen D. Desai's right to the parking space allotted to him by the society. The
court ruled that once an allotment is made, it cannot be revoked without valid legal grounds and
without considering the principles of natural justice.

Section 10 – V.P. Vrinda vs K. Indira Devi And Ors.

The correction candidate for this situation is the second respondent in Unique Area 811 of 1993
and the applicant in I.A. 3082 of 1993. She requested a stay of all further proceedings in the suit
until the outcome of O.S. 106 of 1993, which she had initiated, by filing a petition in accordance
with Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). In any case, the learned Munsiff didn't
permit the request for stay yet permitted the union of the two suits. In the revision, the petitioner
challenges this order.
The parties and subject matter of both suits are virtually identical. The plaintiffs in O.S. 811 of
1993 are the defendants in O.S. 106 of 1993; the plaintiff and her husband are the defendants.
The amendment candidate guarantees that the second respondent in O.S. 811 of 1993 has no free
case and is caring for the property as her significant other. A decree of permanent injunction is
the goal of both suits.
Section 10 of the C.P.C. can be used because all conditions have been met. According to Section
10, the parties or their representatives must be involved in both suits, identity of title must be
agitated, and the issue in the earlier suit must be directly and substantially in issue in the
subsequent suit. The fact that the petition does not include a copy of the plaint in O.S. 106 of
1993 does not make it possible to maintain the petition. The allegations made in the affidavit
submitted in this case demonstrate the petitioner's claim in O.S. 106 of 1993. Hence, the request
isn't excused on the ground of not delivering the duplicate of the plaint or not documenting a
composed assertion in O.S. 811 of 1993.
O.S. 106 of 1993 directly and substantially addresses the issue at hand in this case. While the
reason for activity may not be indistinguishable, Area 10 of the C.P.C. doesn't need personality
of the reason for activity. The possession of the respective plaintiffs on the date of institution of
the suits is what matters, and a decision regarding possession in one suit will have a significant
impact on the other suit. The petition filed under Section 10 asks for a halt to all further
litigation. However, Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code only permits a stay of the suit's trial.
Regardless of whether the preliminary is remained, the court holds purview to pass interlocutory
orders like directives, arrangement of recipients, or orders of connection before judgment.
Consequently, the court can engage interlocutory applications while the preliminary is remained.
In view of these contentions, the court saves the upbraided request and stays the preliminary of
O.S. 811 of 1993 until the removal of O.S. 106 of 1993. The court clarifies that the trial stay will
not affect its jurisdiction to consider interlocutory applications like injunctions.
Section 11 – K.T. Suresh Kumar v. P. Kunhappa Nair
In the case of K.T. Suresh Kumar v. P. Kunhappa Nair, the dispute centered around the
ownership of a property. The plaintiff, K.T. Suresh Kumar, claimed that he had purchased the
property from the defendant, P. Kunhappa Nair, and sought a declaration of ownership. The
court examined the evidence presented and found that the plaintiff had indeed purchased the
property from the defendant. The court observed that there was a valid agreement of sale
between the parties, and the plaintiff had fulfilled all the necessary requirements for a valid
transfer of ownership.
However, the defendant disputed the sale and claimed that the agreement of sale was invalid.
The defendant argued that the agreement was executed under coercion and duress, and therefore,
it should not be enforced. After considering the arguments and evidence, the court held that the
defendant failed to establish that the agreement of sale was executed under coercion or duress.
The court found that the agreement was voluntarily entered into by both parties and that the
plaintiff had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. Consequently, the court declared the
plaintiff as the rightful owner of the property and directed the defendant to hand over possession
of the property to the plaintiff.
In summary, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, K.T. Suresh Kumar, in the case of K.T.
Suresh Kumar v. P. Kunhappa Nair, recognizing his ownership rights over the property. The
court rejected the defendant's claim that the agreement of sale was invalid and held that the
plaintiff had lawfully acquired the property. The judgment ordered the defendant to transfer
possession of the property to the plaintiff.

Section 27 T. Rangayya Reddy vs V.S. Subramanya Aiyar And Ors.

A member of an undivided Hindu family for specific performance of a contract to sell his share.
The creator examines the reasonability of joining different individuals from the family as
litigants in such a suit to get segment and ownership of the supposed seller's portion.
It isn't reasonable to join different individuals from the family as litigants in a suit for explicit
execution fully intent on getting segment and ownership of the seller's portion as against them.
The author argues that if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate his contract, the other members of the
family—who were not parties to the alleged contract—should not be required to defend a
partition suit. The author is of the opinion that partition suits can be difficult to navigate and
ought not to be considered merely an add-on to a suit for specific performance.
The rule established in Tasker v. Small states that a purchaser cannot enforce equities attaching
to the property against strangers to the contract before the contract is carried out. The author also
makes reference to this rule. The creator refers to different cases and specialists to help the view
that it isn't admissible to bring suits against people who are aliens to the agreement and have no
reason for activity at the date of the suit.
The Civil Procedure Code's Order I and the Specific Relief Act's Section 27 regarding the joining
of parties to a lawsuit. The rules for joining parties have been expanded to include defendants
against whom it is alleged that there is a right to relief arising from the same act or transaction.

Section 28 C.S. Govindaraja Mudaliar, ... vs Alagappa Thambiran And Ors.

In this case, the Full Bench had to decide if a suit brought by a Receiver of temple properties to
set aside leases granted by a previous trustee of the temple and to recover the demised portions
from tenants was bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Section 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which permits the drafting of a plan and the removal of a trustee, was the basis
for the lawsuit. The leases granted by the previous trustee were challenged by the plaintiff, who
had been appointed Receiver, on the grounds that they exceeded the trustee's authority. The
defendants argued that the leases were legitimate and that the plaintiff could only request a
shorter lease term at most. In the case, there were common questions of law and fact that all of
the defendants had to answer.

The Full Bench looked at Order 1, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lets defendants
and causes of action join together in a lawsuit. They noted that two requirements must be met
before this rule can be applied: 1) the help guaranteed should emerge from a progression of acts
or exchanges associated with one another, and (2) there should be a typical inquiry of regulation
or reality in the suit. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that both requirements were met in
this case. The judges cited precedents from Madras and Calcutta that supported defendant joinder
in cases involving improper property alienations. They stressed the solidarity of title in the
current case, as the offended party professed to be the appropriate delegate of the sanctuary
home. The leases conceded by the past legal administrator shaped a progression of exchanges
that were comparable and relied upon the powers of that legal administrator. As a result, the Full
Bench decided that Rule 3 of Order 1 was applicable and that the lawsuit was not bad for
misjoinder.

The Full Bench stated that it did not properly consider the scope and effect of Order 1, Rule 3, in
opposition to a case cited by the other side. They recognized it from the current case, where the
respondents were all renters holding under comparative leases conceded by the legal
administrator. It was concluded that the suit was not bad for parties and causes of action
misjoinder. They put away the request for the preliminary adjudicator and guided him to
continue with the further preliminary of the case.
Section 38 Dhruv Raj vs M/S Tagore Sr. Sec. School
Court request discarding an application recorded by the Judgment Debt holder (JD) under
various areas of the Common Strategy Code (CPC) and the Modern Debate Act, 1947. In a writ
petition, the application sought dismissal of the execution petition filed by the court to carry out
an order issued by the Delhi High Court.
The court recognizes the contentions raised by the two players and looks at the pertinent
arrangements of the Modern Question Act. In support of its reasoning, it cites decisions from the
Punjab and Haryana High Court as well as the Delhi High Court. According to the Industrial
Dispute Act, the court concludes that the Delhi High Court's decision can be implemented as a
civil court decree. It mentions that the JD had previously sought execution from the Labour
Court; however, the Labour Court rejected the execution petition and instructed the DH (Decree
Holder) to go to the civil court. The court believes that the Labour Court's failure to transmit the
award or order was merely an irregularity and not a legality that would invalidate its jurisdiction.
In addition, the court mentions that the JD has accepted the court's jurisdiction and taken
advantage of the opportunity to obtain a stay on the execution proceedings based on settlement
talks. After accepting the court's jurisdiction and making partial payments, the court argues that
the JD is prevented from raising the issue of jurisdiction. It is vital to take note of that the gave
text is just a little piece of the total request, and the setting might be important to completely
comprehend the case and the court's thinking.
Section 39 Mahesh Fabrics (P) Ltd. And Anr. vs Nirma Corporation And Anr
A court order concerning the implementation of a money decree. It gives an outline of the case,
including the exchange of the pronouncement starting with one court then onto the next for
execution and the protests raised by the judgment debt holder. Additionally, the document
discusses the jurisdictional issues and both parties' arguments.
The court presumes that the revisionist judgment borrower ought to have really expressed their
resources or scarcity in that department inside the regional purview of the executing transferee
court. It finds no proof that the revelation of resources or scarcity in that department would have
brought about a disappointment of equity.
The court has concluded that Rule 41 of the Common Technique Code (C.P.C) should not be
interpreted in a way that would usurp legislative authority. The court should pick a translation
that is in accordance with reason and equity, and the goal of the C.P.C.'s amendments is to speed
up the execution of decrees. The transferee court cannot challenge the judgment-debtor's
residence or assets, and the court finds that the correction needs merit and excuses it, forcing
costs on the revisionist judgment-borrower.
Section 45 Paul Tushar Biswas vs Addl. Dist. Judge And Anr
The petitioner is an Indian National residing in California in the United States of America and is
serving the Sheriffs Department of the County of Fresno, California. The parties were married on
4.10.1990 at All Saints Church, Shillong, under the Christian Marriage Act, 1872. The child, a
minor, is presently residing with the mother, respondent No. 2. In 1999, the petitioner filed an
application under Section 10 of the Divorce Act in the Court of the District Judge at Alipore,
West Bengal, praying for a decree for divorce. The petitioner failed to contest the proceedings.
On the initiative of the respondent No. 2, a proceeding for child support was commenced before
the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, wherein the Fresno County Superior Court
directed the petitioner to pay a monthly support amount of $ 500 payable w.e.f. 1.2.2002 in
favour of the minor son.
The prerequisites for the execution of a decree issued by an Indian court outside the country are
outlined in Section 45 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). There was evidence that
India and the State of California did not reciprocate, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
the essential conditions for execution outside of India were met. The authorities cited in the case
were deemed irrelevant because they dealt with the execution of foreign court judgments in India
under Section 44A of the CPC. It was thought that the petitioner's actions of resisting the
California proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens—a doctrine that allows a court
to dismiss a case if another forum is more appropriate—were inconsistent with his claimed
concern for paying child support through an Indian court order. It was suggested that the
petitioner's actions were motivated by the California court's support order because the petitioner
did not attempt to provide the child with maintenance prior to filing the application with the
Shillong Court. The court concluded that the petitioner's concern before the Shillong Court was
ostentatious and not genuine due to the petitioner's resistance to the California proceedings and
his attempt to obtain a separate order from the Shillong Court. The court expressed that there was
no rationale or reasoning in permitting equal procedures on a similar issue under the steady gaze
of the Shillong Court.
The court discovered that the decried request (the request being tested) contained no basic
legitimate or procedural blunders, and in this way, the appeal was excused. In the case, there
were no costs imposed.

Section 52 Khaja Begum vs Gulam Mohiuddin And Ors.

The petitioner claimed that he borrowed Rs. and filed a Small Causes Suit against the first
defendant, Ghulam Mohiuddin. 750 and signed a receipt and promissory note in the petitioner's
favor. Rs. was paid in part by the defendant. 25 and supported it on the rear of the promissory
note. Despite repeated demands, the defendant nonetheless failed to pay the remaining amount.
The suit was petitioned for the recuperation of Rs. 725.
The court concurred with the applicant's advice and held that the suit could be treated as
legitimately organized against the lawful delegates of the departed respondent. They alluded to
the arrangements of Segment 153, which engage the court to alter imperfections and mistakes in
procedures to decide the genuine inquiry or issue between the gatherings. The court additionally
depended on past choices, including K. Ismail v. Pavu Amma and C. Raju v. D.D. Italia, which
upheld the view that the suit could be revised to incorporate the lawful delegates for however
long it was not banned by impediment.
All in all, the court held that the suit was legitimately organized against the lawful agents of the
departed litigant and that the lower court's choice to excuse the suit was mistaken. The court
granted the petition, reversed the lower court's decision, and remanded the case for further
consideration.
Section 60 T.R. Punnavanam Pillai vs V. Muthuswami Achari
The question of whether the tools of a goldsmith are exempt from attachment under Section
60(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code is the primary issue in this revision petition. Section 60
includes a list of properties that are subject to attachment and sale in execution of decrees, as
well as a provision that specifies various classes of properties that are not subject to attachment.
Statement (b) of Area 60(1) absolves the devices of craftsmans from connection.
The court determines the scope of the terms "artisan" and "tool" in relation to the second point.
The court concludes that excluding mechanical trade tools and limiting the definition of "tool" to
straightforward implements is unconstitutional. It cites previous decisions in which a sewing
machine was deemed an artisan's tool and a farm tractor was deemed an animal husbandry
implement. The court comes to the conclusion that the term "tools" in Section 60(1)(b) should
include mechanical tools used in a trade as well as simple tools used by artisans.
The question of whether a goldsmith is an artisan is more difficult to answer. The court takes
note of that there is no particular meaning of "craftsman" in the Common Strategy Code or any
focal authorization. It inspects different word reference definitions and past choices with regards
to this issue. The court concurs with the view that a craftsman is an individual participated in a
mechanical workmanship or exchange, a handicraftsman, or a repairman. Additionally, it points
out that the context in which the phrase "tools of artisans" appears in Section 60(1)(b) suggests
that the legislature intended to exclude only tools used by specific kinds of workers.
The court concluded, based on this analysis, that a goldsmith is an artisan and that the tools the
respondent uses in his trade are tools of an artisan within the meaning of Section 60(1)(b).
Thusly, the court maintains the Locale Judge's structure saving the connection for those things.

Section 63 Rajendra Prasad Bora & Anr vs Lohit Prakash Dutta

As the plaintiff, the respondent no. 1 filed Money Suit no. 23/1992 against M/S Rajashree
Distribution Pvt. Ltd., the respondent No. 5, and the Vernacular Daily "Ajir Batori"'s Editor,
Printer, and Publisher. The suit was petitioned for harms and remuneration because of the
distribution of a slanderous news thing concerning the offended party in the paper.
The candidate Nos. 1 and 2 were impleaded as respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the Money Suit as
M/S Rajashree Publication Pvt.'s owners and directors. Ltd. On December 30, 2000, the Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar, approved the Money Suit ex parte. A decree for the recovery
of Rs. was issued by the court. 10,00,000/- jointly and severally from the defendants, in addition
to interest accruing at an annual rate of 18% from the filing of the lawsuit until it is won. By
filing Money Execution Case No.3/2001 with the appropriate court in Sibsagar, the decree from
December 30, 2000 was carried out. In the execution case, the decretal amount was Rs.
25,76,225.00, which incorporated the chief measure of Rs. 1,000,000.00, plus the interest
component, as stipulated.
The execution of the declaration included selling the landed property, plants and hardware,
saves, and different articles of the Parijat Film Corridor claimed by the candidates. The particular
land being referred to was 3 Bigha 3 Kathas covered by Dag No.172, P.P. No.11 of Nitaipukhuri,
Mouza Rasaigaon, Demow, Sibsagar. The decree holder/respondent No. 1 requested an order
from the Executing Court to prevent the judgment debtors/petitioners from transferring or
charging the aforementioned property in any way on March 14, 2001, in accordance with Order
XXI Rule 54 CPC. This prayer was allowed by the Executing Court. As the warrant of
connection gave by the Executing Court had returned unexecuted, the declaration
holder/respondent No.1 recorded an application under the steady gaze of the Executing Court,
mentioning the distribution of a notification in the neighborhood paper under Request XXI Rule
54 CPC. On June 2, 2001, this application was approved. Consequently, on 20.06.2001, the
declaration holder/respondent No.1 documented one more application under Request XXI Rule
66(3) CPC, looking for the issuance of a decree for the offer of the connected property by open
closeout. This prayer was also allowed by the Executing Court.
The court establishes that there was no substantial connection of the unflinching properties
situated at Sibsagar under the request passed by the Locale Judge, Kamrup. The court declares
that the execution proceeding, does not prevent the court from proceeding with the
aforementioned property. It recommends that whether or not the Executing Court could continue
with the enduring property regardless of the request dated 16.09.1996 needn't bother with to be
chosen for this situation and can be left open for assurance in a fitting case.
The court holds that the Correction Appeal needs merit and excuses it. The court, however,
decides not to make a cost order based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Section 75 M. Selvaraj vs Income-Tax Officer

The common order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals-III), Madras, dated February
28, 1996, serves as the basis for these appeals concerning assessment years 1990-91 and 1991-
92. The assessee reported a construction cost of Rs. Rs. and 1.75 lakhs 1.52 million for each of
the assessment years. However, the Evaluating Official alluded the make a difference to the
Valuation Cell of the Personal Duty Division to decide the expense of development. The
Surveying Official embraced the expense not set in stone by the Valuation Cell, i.e. Rs. 5,91,660,
and the difference in rupees was distributed. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) took
into account the assessee's arguments and the Departmental Valuation Officer's estimate of the
cost of construction. The Chief of Annual expense (Requests) found it unreasonable to
acknowledge either the expense of development proclaimed by the assessee or still up in the air
by the enrolled valuer. The Commissioner determined that the property's basic cost was Rs.
4,58,217 and made an impromptu expansion of.
Court concludes, based on the preceding analysis, that the commission the Assessing Officer
issued without recording satisfaction regarding the assessee's incorrect cost of construction is
invalid. They also come to the conclusion that the Valuation Officer's valuation report is not
reliable and that no addition should be made based on the Departmental Valuation Officer's
report in accordance with Section 69 of the Income Tax Act. As a result, they grant the assessee's
appeals and respond to the question in its favor and against the Revenue.
They conclude by stating that the matter will be remanded to the regular Bench for additional
consideration and appropriate orders.

Section 79 Natwarlal Gowardhandas vs Union Of India (Uoi)

Manilal (P. W. 4) booked 52 bags of tobacco for transportation to Damoh on the Great Indian
Peninsula Railway on July 11, 1947, at Bhaili station on the Gaekwar Baroda State Railway.
After dumping at Damoh on August 16, 1947, 39 sacks were totally harmed due to downpour.
The plaintiff claimed proportionate duty and harms at a pace of 20% of the value, but the court
decided that the profit rate should be 10%. The offended party's case depended on charges of
wrongdoing by rail line workers of either the Bombay, Baroda and Focal India Rail line or the
Incomparable Indian Promontory Rail line. The Association of India shielded the suit and
contended that the risk of the Association can't stretch out to the activities of the Bombay,
Baroda and Focal India Rail route. The plaintiff is responsible for establishing that the servants
of the railway administration engaged in misconduct. The railway administrations would be
liable as bailees even in the absence of the Risk Notes. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs
after the appeal was finally denied by the court.

Section 80 State Of A.P. & Ors vs M/S. Pioneer Builders, A.P

The contractor sought various reliefs when he brought a lawsuit against the defendants, which
included the State government. On the merits, the defendants opposed the suit, but they did not
challenge its maintainability. Under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), the
contractor's requests for dispensation with notice and amendment of the plaint were granted by
the trial court. The orders passed in these applications were not tested by the litigants. The suit
moved on to the framing of issues and the subsequent trial after additional written statements
were submitted. The preliminary court proclaimed a portion of the project worker's cases and
dismissed others. The two players then, at that point, spoke to the High Court, which excused
every one of the requests.
Due to an alleged violation of Section 80 C.P.C., the suit's maintainability was one of the legal
issues brought before the court. Unless urgent relief is sought, Section 80 C.P.C. requires that a
notice be served on the government or public officer before filing a suit against them. Unless the
suit falls under one of the exceptions listed in sub-section (2), the court ruled that Section 80
C.P.C. must be followed. The court noted that the provision aims to provide sufficient notice to
the government and an opportunity for it to reconsider the claim prior to litigation. Nonetheless,
the court saw that as a rule, the public authority doesn't answer the notification. For this situation,
the court observed that the suit was at first documented as a request under Segments 8 and 20 of
the Mediation Act yet was, as a matter of fact, a common suit. The court likewise noticed that the
litigants mentioned no criticism regarding the suit's practicality in view of resistance with
Segment 80 C.P.C. Besides, the respondents took part in the procedures without testing the
orders permitting the corrections and forgoing notice. The court held that by not protesting and
taking part in the procedures, the respondents had deferred any issue with the suit's practicality.
In a nutshell, the court determined that, although Section 80 C.P.C. compliance is required, the
defendants had waived their right to raise the issue of non-compliance by participating in the
proceedings without challenging the orders. As a result, the court concluded that the suit could
be maintained.
Section 89 M/S.Afcons Infrastructure ... vs M/S.Cherian Varkey Construction
The petitioner documented a claim to recuperate cash owed to them. The respondents in the suit
are the solicitors (1 and 2). The Goshree Bridges that would link Cochin City to the Vypeen
Islands were the subject of an agreement between petitioners 1 and 2 and defendants 3 and 4. In
addition, petitioners 1 and 2 had a contract with the plaintiff that stipulated that the plaintiff
would serve as their subcontractors for a portion of the project. The work was finished, and
defendants 3 and 4 paid some money to petitioners (1 and 2). The plaintiff was compensated in
part for the work that was done by defendants 1 and 2. Concerning the remaining amounts owed
to the plaintiff by defendants 1 and 2, there was a disagreement. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit
before the remaining amounts were paid by defendants 3 and 4 to defendants 1 and 2. The
petitioner mentioned that respondents 1 and 2 be coordinated to pay the exceptional sums.
Petitioner additionally mentioned a connection before judgment under Request 38 Rule 5, and an
in-between time ex parte request of connection was conceded. The requests of defendants 1 and
2 to vacate the interim order of attachment were denied when they appeared in court. It would
appear that the plaintiff is requesting payment from the first and second defendants for the work
they did as subcontractors.
The court emphasized that courts should not routinely refer to any alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) mechanism in accordance with Section 89(1). Avoid using Section 89(1) rashly because
it can cause additional delays in the proceedings. Courts ought to painstakingly think about all
important elements prior to settling on a choice. Beyond the preferences of the litigants, the court
has the authority to make decisions. Arbitration, on the other hand, should only be mentioned in
exceptional circumstances and infrequently. Due to special reasons that justify invoking the
powers, the court in this case approves the lower court's decision to make the reference for ADR.
The court alerts against thoughtlessly alluding to any of the four techniques for elective debate
goal under Segment 89, particularly discretion. A party cannot return to regular court
proceedings after entering arbitration. The court acknowledged the rarity of such comprehensive
assistance in today's society and expresses gratitude to the counsel representing the parties for
their competent assistance. The modification request is excused, and no expenses are granted.

Section 96 Gurram Seetharam Reddy vs Gunty Yashoda

A suit for the recuperation of a specific sum against the second respondent in the Court of Junior
Common Adjudicator. The first respondent filed an objection to the property's attachment. The
Executing Court granted the claim of the first respondent and authorized the property's
attachment. The petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Senior Civil Judge
Miryalaguda, but the lower Appellate Court ruled that the appeal could not be sustained. The
Civil Revision Petition was referred to a Division Bench to address the issue.
Although the appeal fee required by Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) may appear
insignificant, it demonstrates Parliament's and the Law Commission's intention to provide
citizens with cost-effective legal options, particularly in terms of court fees. Through
notifications issued under the Court Fees Act, the State Governments have reduced the court fee
for appeals against orders under Section 47. Similar notifications are recommended for appeals
against orders under Order XXI, Rule 58, and others. It is held that requests against orders under
Rule 58(3), Rule 98, and Rule 100 of Request XXI ought to be normal requests under Segment
96 of the CPC, not random requests under Area 104 read with Request XLIII, Rule 1.
According to Clause 11(i) of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act or Article 3(i) of Schedule II, as
applicable, and Section 49 of the AP Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, the court fee for these
appeals must be calculated. An appeal made in response to an order made in accordance with
Rule 58(3), Rule 98, or Rule 100 of Order XXI is subject to a second appeal under Section 100
of the CPC.
The Civil Revision Petition (CRP) is denied and the revision order is upheld. Taking advantage
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner has the right to appeal the Executing Court's
decision under Section 96 of the CPC. The court communicates appreciation for the significant
help given by the learned Senior Direction who filled in as amicus curiae and recognizes their
careful entries and the voluminous record they made accessible, which enormously added to
noting the reference.
Section 97 Smt. Prema vs Nanje Gowda And Ors.
A Civil Revision Petition, submitted by the defendant No. 6 in a partition litigation. The
respondent is abused by a request passed by the preliminary court and is looking to save it. The
record gives an outline of current realities and procedures of the case, including references to
different lawful arrangements and court choices.
The trial court had initially issued a preliminary decree establishing the parties' rights in the
partition suit. The defendants filed an appeal against the preliminary decree, but it was denied.
They then recorded a subsequent allure, however it was dismissed because of postponement in
documenting. The preliminary decree was therefore made final. The plaintiff then began the
process of drafting the final decree. At this point, the defendant named 6 submitted an
application to the trial court, requesting that the preliminary decree be modified and that she be
granted a larger share of the joint family properties. The plaintiff objected to the application,
claiming that it could not be maintained and that defendant No. Six was prevented from claiming
a larger share.
The trial court took into account the arguments presented by both parties and referred to
pertinent legal provisions before rejecting defendant No. Application 6 The defendant number in
the Civil Revision Petition is 6 difficulties the accuracy of the preliminary court's structure,
refering to the arrangements of the Hindu Progression (Karnataka Change) Act and different
court choices. The plaintiff, the first respondent, defended the trial court's decision by arguing
that the preliminary decree is final unless it is appealed. They back up their position with
provisions of the law and decisions made by courts.
The court analyzed the contentions introduced by the two players and necessities to decide if the
reproved request requires mediation through its revisional purview.
Section 100 Gurdev Kaur & Ors vs Kaki & Ors
The plaintiffs, Kaki and Har Kaur, are the deceased Chanan Singh's daughters from Sham Kaur,
his first wife. Chanan Singh likewise had a subsequent spouse named Bhagwan Kaur, who had
three little girls of her own: Mukhtiar Kaur, Dalip Kaur, and Gurdev Kaur No sons were born to
Chanan Singh from either of his wives. The plaintiffs have requested joint possession of Chanan
Singh's property in a civil suit filed with the Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Barnala. They assert
that Chanan Singh did not execute a valid will due to his mental inability to safeguard his own
well-being and his inability to execute any will. On June 6, 1969, Chanan Singh passed away in
Barnala. Based on an alleged will dated 18.1.1969, the defendant, Bhagwan Kaur, obtained
Chanan Singh's mutation of inheritance from the relevant authority. However, the plaintiff’s
claim that Bhagwan Kaur conspired with the revenue authorities to carry out the mutation
without their knowledge or consent, and that they were never informed about the approval of the
mutation.

The High Court went against the established rule of interpreting the will. According to the court's
observations, a prudent man would typically leave the property to his legal heirs and would never
disinherit his daughters. Notwithstanding, it is critical to take note of that the court's job is
restricted to deciding the realness of the will and whether it mirrors the deceased benefactor's
free and sound arranging mind. The court shouldn't sit in judgment of the deceased benefactor's
choice or substitute its own perspective for the departed benefactor's aim. Instead of looking at
the rules for intestate succession, the contents of the will should be understood in relation to the
circumstances of the testator. For the purpose of determining the validity of the will, the court
should only investigate the nature of the bequest. A will is written to express the testator's wishes
and can benefit some people while leaving others out of the estate.
Bhagwan Kaur, the testator's wife, was the only person who had lived with the deceased and
cared for him throughout his life in this particular case. The testator had spent a lot of money on
the weddings of the other daughters, which was more than what they would have received as
shares of the testator's property. The other daughters were already happily married. There is a
presumption of proper execution and attestation when a will appears to have been duly executed
and attested in accordance with legal requirements. It is important to note that there was no
substantial question of law formulated in the memorandum of second appeal submitted to the
High Court, and the High Court did not formulate a question of law prior to hearing the appeal in
its judgment.
In many instances, the High Courts have not correctly understood and applied the scope of
Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), despite clear declarations of law made by the
Supreme Court and the Privy Council over the years. Even after the 1976 amendment of Section
100 C.P.C., the High Court still interfered with straightforward factual findings in this case. Even
before the amendment of Section 100 C.P.C., the High Court's judgment clearly contravenes the
provisions of Section 100 and goes against the legislative intention. The High Court should not
have justified interfering with the concurrent findings of fact.
The High Court should not have interfered with the lower courts' straightforward findings of fact
because of the legislative mandate established by various judgments from 1890 to 2006. As a
result, the appeal is granted with costs by the Supreme Court, which overturns the challenged
judgment.

Section 101 Sankaralinga Mudali vs Rathnasabapathi Mudali And Anr

The Advocate-General made a preliminary objection stating that the appellant is not entitled to
make an application under Section 108 raising the same issue that had already been decided
against them under Section 101 because an order was already passed against the second
defendant (appellant) under Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Code and no appeal was filed
against the ex parte decree to challenge that order. The Advocate-General contends that the
appellant should not be permitted to appeal the Section 108 order.
Notwithstanding, the court finds that the phrasing of Area 108, which states "regardless," is very
wide. As a result, the court cannot rule that the defendant is unable to submit a Section 108
application. Consequently, the defendant has the right to file the current appeal under Section
588. The Advocate-General's argument that the proceedings would be pointless even if an appeal
were granted and the ex parte decree was overturned is also rejected by the court. This is because
the order issued under Section 101 cannot be challenged in the current appeal. The court is of the
opinion that the reversal of any previous order under Section 101 that denied the party the right
to appear and defend the lawsuit is necessary if an ex parte decree is set aside under Section 108.
Any other position would result in an absurd outcome.
In terms of the case's merits, the question of whether the serving officer "cannot find" the
defendant in accordance with Section 80 must be determined according to each case's particular
circumstances. It may be appropriate for the serving officer to wait and, if possible, attempt
personal service if the information provided to the officer indicates that the defendant will only
be absent for a short time. However, the serving officer may affix the summons to the
defendant's regular residence's exterior door if the defendant is unable to be reached for service.
In this instance, the serving officer's report states that, based on the information he was given, it
was unlikely that he could personally serve the appellant in a timely manner. Therefore, the
District Judge was justified in accepting the summons as sufficient service, and the serving
officer was justified in affixing it to the door of the house.

Section 104 M. Srinivas vs Jawaharlal Nehru Technological

Writ petitioner claimed selection as a member of the Konda Kapu Scheduled Tribe after passing
the common entrance exam in 1988 for admission to the B.E. (Bachelor of Engineering)
program. The Director of Social Welfare must verify his social status as a member of the
Scheduled Tribe before granting him a seat in B.E. (Electronics) as a provisional selection. After
that, there was some legal action, but it was decided that the Director sent the petitioner a show-
cause notice. The petitioner provided his explanation and documentary evidence to back it up.
On 11-11-1988, the Chief gave a request expressing that the applicant doesn't have a place with
the Booked Clan.
Indeed, even before the Chief's organization was given, the solicitor documented a writ request
looking for admission to the B.E. course. Afterward, the alleviation looked for in the writ request
was corrected to incorporate the suppress of the Chief's organization dated 11-11-1988. The writ
appeal was excused on 3-8-1989 in view of its benefits. After that, the petitioner submitted a
review petition, which was also upheld by orders dated September 17, 1989. It is against this
excusal request that the current writ bid is recorded under Condition 15 of the Letters Patent,
despite the fact that the first respondent mentioned a criticism regarding its viability by
summoning Request 47, Rule 7 of the Common Method Code (CPC). The current reference was
made considering this complaint.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent grants independent
jurisdiction, granting the right to appeal judgments handed down by learned Single Judges of the
High Court, regardless of whether they were handed down in the original or first appellate
jurisdiction. However, it cannot be held that Order 47, Rule 7(1) of the Civil Procedure Code
(CPC) also prohibits Letters Patent Appeals against orders of learned Single Judges refusing to
review an earlier order. The urgent test is whether the'request' qualifies as a 'judgment' as
perceived in Provision 15 of the Letters Patent. The High Court disagrees from the Full Seat
choice of the Kerala High Court in Mr. Abraham Mathews v. lllani Pillai, which stated that
granting a second appeal would prolong the process of reaching a final decision.

Section 113 Court On Its Own Motion In Re Reference Made By The District Judge,
Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

The Arbitration Tribunal in Chennai issued an arbitration verdict. Section 36 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act of 1996 was used to sign the award. Nonetheless, the Area Judge in Raigarh
held that the honor ought to draw in promotion valorem court charges. The District Judge stated
that because the award only had a stamp of Rs. 150/- and was being executed in the state of
Chhattisgarh, court fees of Rs. Under Section 19(a) of the Indian Stamp Act of 1899, a tax of
10,550 rupees would be imposed. The High Court heard a case challenging the District Judge's
order, which it overturned and instructed the executive court to carry out in accordance with the
law. The District Judge then referred the matter to the High Court for six reasons:
The State, addressed by the Extra Backer General and the Appointee Government Promoter,
contended that the reference was not viable. Under Order 46 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, they argued that the issues raised in the reference were not valid grounds for
making a reference. Additionally, they argued that the Presiding Officer cannot participate in the
proceedings. The Court stated that the reference could not be maintained due to the District
Judge's previous opinion, which the High Court later overturned. The Court likewise noticed that
the reference didn't include an inquiry regarding the legitimacy of any Demonstration, Mandate,
or Guideline, as expected under the stipulation to Section 113. The reference also fell short of
Section 60 of the Indian Stamp Act of 1899, according to the Court.
In conclusion, the Court ruled that the District Judge's reference could not be sustained and
rejected the State's arguments.

Section 114 Smt. Rajeshwari & Ors. vs Smt. Meharunnishan & Ors.
The instant review-petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 24.02.2021
passed in Second Appeal No. 375 of 2001. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the
review-petitioner on admission of the aforesaid review-petition. The appellants are the legal heirs
of the original defendant, Sri Darshan, who was the bonafide purchaser for valuable
consideration of the property. Sri U.S. Sahai has submitted that after the sale deed was executed
in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the review-petitioners, there was no cause of action to
press the suit for specific performance of contract without assailing the sale deed in question.
The following conclusions have been reached by the court after taking into account the record's
pleadings, issues, and evidence, the issue of readiness and willingness, as well as the issue of
whether the review petitioner is a legitimate buyer for valuable consideration, have been noted.
The argument that the cause of action will run out when the sale deed is signed is deemed
frivolous. Furthermore, this request was not raised by the survey solicitor in their past pleadings
under the watchful eye of the lower courts. The counsel for the review petitioner cites no
decisions that pertain to the scope of the review. After taking into account important legal
questions, the arguments made, and the information that was in the record, the court issued the
judgment that is currently under review. The court did not find any obvious error in the record.
Beyond the scope of the review, the petitioner for the review is attempting to request a rehearing
of the appeal. After considering the situation, the court comes to the conclusion that no grounds
for review have been established. The court found no obvious error on the face of the record, and
the submissions made by the review petitioner's counsel do not fall within the parameters of
Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. The review petition is denied with costs because it
lacks merit.

Section 115 - Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway
In the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, the
plaintiff, Tarway, had applied for the position of Assistant Works Manager at Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), but his application was rejected due to a lack of requisite experience.
Tarway filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful rejection of his application.
The court ruled in favor of HAL and the Managing Director (Mig), stating that the rejection of
Tarway's application was not arbitrary or discriminatory. The court acknowledged that the job of
Assistant Works Manager required specific technical knowledge and managerial skills, which
Tarway did not possess. It emphasized that qualifications and experience for a position are
subjective assessments made by the employer, and the court should not interfere unless there is
evidence of mala fide or bias. The court also clarified that since there was no contractual
relationship between the parties for the post of Assistant Works Manager, Tarway's claims for
compensation and damages were not valid. It highlighted that employees do not have an
automatic right to promotion unless there is a contractual or statutory provision supporting it.
In summary, the court dismissed Tarway's lawsuit, upholding HAL's decision to reject his
application. The judgment established that an employer's assessment of qualifications and
experience for a particular job is subjective, and the court should only intervene if there is
evidence of mala fide or bias.