Halpem 1996

International Journal of Conflict Management
VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALES AND FEMALES IN PROCESS AND

OUTCOMES IN A LOW-CONFLICT NEGOTIATION
Jennifer J. Halpem Judi McLean
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Jennifer J. Halpem Judi McLean, (1996),"VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALES
AND FEMALES IN PROCESS AND OUTCOMES IN A LOW-CONFLICT NEGOTIATION", International
Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7 Iss 1 pp. 45 - 70
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The International Journal of Conflict Management
1996, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January), pp. 45-70
VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

MALES AND FEMALES IN PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES IN A LOW-CONFLICT
NEGOTIATION
Jennifer J. Halpem
Cornell University
Judi McLean Parks
Washington University
This paper considers whether negotiation outcomes and processes of

groups of males and females differ. Previous research examining such
differences has had mixed results, in part because of "cueing" effects
contained in typical, high-conflict negotiation cases. Low-conflict nego-
tiation cases, such as the one used in this study, provide an opportunity
to observe a wider range of negotiation behaviors than are commonly
revealed in negotiation research. Fifty advanced undergraduate stu-
dents negotiated funding in a low-conflict, public policy negotiation
case. Analysis of the negotiated outcomes revealed that females allo-
cated less than males. Content coding of audio transcripts revealed very
different negotiation processes and styles underlying these different out-
comes. Implications and directions for future research are discussed
Males and females are different—or are they? Gender, as a social context
variable, has been studied extensively, but results seem inconclusive as to whether
there are in fact gender differences in many contexts, among them negotiation out-
comes and processes. Although results are mixed, with many researchers conclud-
ing that behavioral differences between males and females matter little, if at all, it
is important to remember that negotiations always occur in a social context, and
thus the context in which research has been conducted can easily suppress or mag-
nify the effects of the variables of interest. Studying people's bargaining behavior
only in context-free settings may induce some distortions in our understanding of
that behavior. In the context of a negotiation, specific behaviors or demands of the
Thanks to Susie Chung for coordinating and executing the content coding project for this
paper. Catherine P. Hope assisted with data collection. Debra Connelley helped develop the
community board negotiation case. Krista Knout's many hours typing the transcripts were
invaluable.
46 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN A LOW-CONFLICT NEGOTIATION
negotiators, or the norms of handling a particular type of negotiation, may prime

particular behaviors in the negotiators, excluding other behaviors that those same
people might exhibit in other circumstances. A number of researchers have
concluded that the gender of the negotiators may interact with other aspects of the
negotiation context, sometimes leading to differences in negotiation outcomes or
processes (e.g., Bixenstine, Chambers, & Wilson, 1964; Rubin & Brown, 1975;
Crow, Fok, Hartman, & Payne, 1991). It may be that females and males respond to
different cues, or may have different goals for an interaction. Females, for
example, are morefield-dependentthan males, and are therefore more sensitive to
environmental cues than are males (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). In a departure from
traditional economics-based research, current social psychological research is
considering the effects of social relationships, affect, coercion, traditions and
institutionalized norms on negotiations (cf. Halpern, 1992, 1994; Greenhalgh &
Chapman, 1995; Friedman, 1994). The current paper examines the differences
between male and female negotiating dyads using a low-conflict setting, on the
process and outcome of public-policy style negotiations.
Male and Female Negotiation Styles

Historical Perspective
Sex is a powerful social cue, usually discernible with relatively little other
information (unlike social status, which, at least in the middle ranges, is difficult to
detect accurately without asking questions). Gender is a socially constructed phe-
nomenon which prescribes different roles and behaviors for people based on their
classification as male or female (e.g., Bern, 1992; Deaux, 1976; Deaux, 1984;
Gilligan, 1982). Thus, it is not surprising that strong expectations have developed
for different behaviors for females and males, forming the basis of gender stereo-
types. Moreover, there is substantial evidence of different behaviors in general by
members of the two sexes. For example, females have a harder time expressing
negative feelings such as anger or disagreement than males (Blier & Blier-Wilson,
1989). Females are more adept at noticing nonverbal cues than are males (Natalie
& Papa, 1990). Females believe themselves to be more integrating and compro-
mising than males (Korabik, Baril, & Watson, 1993). The two sexes also display
different ways of dealing with conflict. For example, different behaviors by the
two sexes in outcomes, process, and origins of conflict in the workplace have been
observed (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1994; McLean Parks, Mahoney, & Ostgaard,
1995).
Given the pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, it is logical for researchers to
have searched for such differences in negotiation styles and outcomes. However,
the literature on gender differences in negotiation, although sizable, is inconclu-
sive. Studies of bargaining games tended to focus on specific behavioral variables,
particularly cooperation, in examining differences between female and male nego-
tiators. Some authors found that males were more cooperative than females in
mixed- and same-sex dyads, and while playing against a computer (Crowne, 1966;
The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

J. J. HALPERN AND J. MCLEAN PARKS 47
Love, 1967; Bonoma, & Tedeschi, 1973; Steele, 1967; Steele & Tedeschi, 1967;
McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, & Campos, 1973). Other authors found that
females were more cooperative than males in mixed- and same-sex dyads and
while playing against a computer (Borah, 1963; Benton, 1971; Amidjaja &
Vinacke, 1965; Schiavo & Kaufman, 1974; Conrath, 1972; Lindskold & Tedeschi,
1971). Still other authors found no differences in cooperative outcomes between
situations in which males negotiated and those in which females negotiated
(Kanouse & West, 1967; Notovy, 1969; McNeel, McClintock, & Nuttin, 1972;
Wyer & Malinowski, 1972; Meux, 1973).
A number of other authors have observed that differences between males and
females may be contingent on variables influencing bargaining games (such as
those used in the studies mentioned above) other than cooperation and competi-
tion. For example, Bixenstine, Chambers, and Wilson (1964) observed that
behavioral differences between males and females could be seen as an interaction
of the bargaining game and people's negotiating styles. Rubin and Brown (1975)
reviewed the gender differences literature and concluded that females and males
are sensitive to different cues. For example, Crow, Fok, Hartman, and Payne
(1991) observed that males bargained as if their need for achievement were high,
while female negotiators bargained as if their need for affection/affiliation were
high.
The best current thinking derives from these observations of contingencies,
and suggests that finding differences between male and female negotiating style
"depend on the situation." Most researchers interested in such differences focus on
the negotiation process: suggesting that when and how specific arguments are
introduced affects whether differences will appear. The present study examines dif-
ferences in both the negotiation process and its outcomes between male and female
negotiators, using a low-conflict negotiation task.
Impact of Gender Roles on Behavior
When Spence and Helmreich (1980) reviewed the literature on gender-role
attitudes and gender-role behaviors, they concluded that the various properties of
these attitudes and behaviors could be combined into one trait scale. At the mascu-
line end of the scale, instrumentality dominated; expressiveness dominated at the
feminine end. Characteristic instrumental (masculine) behaviors include proactiv-
ity and self-confidence. In contrast, expressive (feminine) behaviors are character-
ized by a concern for others and an interpersonal orientation (Spence & Helmreich,
1980). Their continuum is the basis for much current gender research work today.
This continuum of characteristics suggests that females will bring different
assumptions concerning appropriate and inappropriate behaviors to a given setting
(such as the negotiation table) than males (Grant, 1988; Tannen, 1990). Crow et al.
(1991) found support for this assertion, demonstrating gender-related differences in
value systems, weights of decision issues, and final decisions. Similarly, Green-
halgh and Gilkey (1993) found females to be more concerned than males with
The International Journal of Conflict Management,Vol.7,No. 1, January 1996

building and preserving relationships during a negotiation. Males tend to be more

"positional bargainers," focusing more on their personal position and less on the
other's interests, than females (Maxwell, 1992; Spence & Helmreich, 1980). Kolb
and Bartunek (1992) suggest that whereas some males want to be certain that they
receive credit for their contributions (an instrumental orientation), females' contri-
butions are often more hidden.
Other researchers have examined gender's role in a variety of contexts related
to negotiation and the negotiation process, ranging from child development
(Gilligan, 1982; Miller, Danaher, & Forbes, 1986; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987), to
the process, outcomes, and origins of conflict in the workplace (Gwartney-Gibbs &
Lach, 1994; Rossi & Todd-Mansillas, 1990; Tanncn, 1990, 1994; Sheldon, 1992a,
1992b).
There is substantial evidence that the differences between the sexes detected
among children persist into adulthood (McLean Parks, Mahoney, & Ostgaard,
1995). In addition, there has been substantial research into adult gender differ-
ences. Some of this work has considered role schemas (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), as
well as differences in approaches to negotiation (e.g., Kolb & Bartunek, 1992;
Kolb & Coolidge, 1993; Watson, 1993). These researchers have observed that dif-
ferences in orientations and normative expectations lead males and females of all
ages to different approaches to perceiving and managing conflict. Females may be
more likely than males to attempt to maintain relationships while solving conflicts
(Kolb, 1992; Kolb & Coolidge, 1993); males may be more likely than females to
try to "fix" a problem than to simply listen (Tannen, 1994). A substantial body of
research suggests that adult males and females differ in terms of their propensity to
help others (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), as well as in the type of helping behaviors
males and females are likely to perform (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & Wood,
1991). Specifically, males are more likely to perform instrumental helping while
females are more likely to perform interpersonal helping (e.g., Burke, Weir, &
Duncan, 1976). Males prefer persuasion and social influence, while females prefer
negotiation and mediation more than males do (Lind, Hou, & Tyler, 1994). In gen-
eral, females have been found to be more sensitive than males to the needs of oth-
ers or more empathetic and able to take another's perspective (e.g., Santilli & Hud-
son, 1992). They also tend to defer and accommodate more (Chusmir & Mills,
1989).
These behaviors are consistent with an argument that the females' orientation
is similar to a cooperative motivational orientation (MO), while the males' orienta-
tion to a negotiation is similar to an individualistic, and at times to a competitive
MO (e.g., Deutsch, 1958, 1960). However, MO can be influenced by the reward
structure of a negotiation, motivational induction, and by a variety of instructional
or attitude premeasurement variables [see Rubin & Brown's (1975) review of the
MO literature]. The male-female differences we are discussing here are not as
readily manipulable.
Tannen (1990, 1994) highlights differences between the wants and needs of
females and males in discussing an aversive situation with friends and colleagues.
Females relating such an experience to a friend frequently want support, encour-

agement, and understanding. However, if the friend or colleague is male, he may
respond to the discussion by trying to "fix it." This may frustrate the female partner
because the male colleague or friend just doesn't "get it." As Tannen points out,
their goals are quite different: females want to get through the situation, while
males want to change it. This difference in goals is consistent with an instrumental
(male) orientation, where instrumentality is expressed by a desire to see a tangible
(change) outcome, rather than an intangible (got through it) outcome.
Similarly, Ting-Toomey (1991) has found cultural differences in expressions
of emotion in conflict situations, and several authors have argued that socio-cul-
tural gender norms comprise separate cultures for females and males within a soci-
ety. In general, females tend to be higher in emotionality (e.g., Brody, 1985; Stop-
pard & Gruchy, 1993; Williams, 1985) than males, and thus it would not be sur-
prising to find that females are more emotional during negotiations than males. It is
unclear whether differences in emotional expression during negotiations are part of
a specific strategy (e.g., "blackmail" or focusing on emotions in order to engender
cohesiveness), or because of socio-cultural expectations of appropriate behavior
that dictate males suppress emotional displays. What is clear, however, is that there
are differences in the behavior of males and females that are apparent in some
contexts.
Several of these authors suggest that both males and females use some of the
same but also some unique techniques in their negotiations. For example, Sheldon
(1992a) observed in children's quarrels that while boys used more threats and
physical force, girls used some threats, but tended to use more strategies for man-
aging conflict than boys. One such strategy Sheldon labeled "double voice dis-
course" which she characterizes as a dual orientation to the self and to the other,
sacrificing neither. This is consistent with the relational, "other" orientation com-
monly ascribed to adult feminine gender stereotypes.
Differences in childhood socialization around conflict may lead to differences
in the behavior of adult males and females (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1991). For
example, females may have a harder time expressing negative communications
(e.g., anger or disagreement; Blier & Blier-Wilson, 1989; Chiauzzi, Heimberg, &
Doty, 1982). Males spend more time in task communication (which contributes to
achievement of a goal) while females focus on maintenance communication
(statements that contribute to the socioemotional dimensions of the group; Whee-
len & Verdi, 1993). Male managers preferred to use their power to resolve disputes
when dealing with female employees, but to use open communication when deal-
ing with male employees. Female managers were divided between the two
approaches for male or female employees (Rossi & Todd-Mansillas, 1990).
Thus, the instrumental, "autonomous" focus of males and the interpersonal
focus of females should be manifest during a negotiation. Consequently, we
hypothesized that males will appear to be more self-serving and instrumental dur-
ing their negotiations than females. Males, for example, would be more likely than
females to engage in positional bargaining; they will be more likely to emphasize
personal positions and outcomes, responsibilities or viewpoints on an issue by

mentioning their stands and concerns more often than females, who will be reluc-
tant to emphasize their own interests.
Hypothesis 1: Males will emphasize their personal position more than
females.
Females also tend to have more interpersonal concerns than males in the
negotiation context. Females tend to judge anger as having greater relationship and
personal costs than males do (Davis, LaRosa, & Foshee, 1992). Moreover, males
tend to regard negotiations as a contest, while females tend to see a negotiation as
an opportunity for providing and seeking confirmation and support while trying to
reach consensus (Tannen, 1990). In a negotiation context, females' concerns with
interpersonal issues, in conjunction with their interests in maintaining group har-
mony and meeting the needs of others, should include making sure the needs of
affected but absent parties are considered. This derives from Kolb's observation
that in the workplace, females' roles include providing support to others' "voices"
or concerns (1992). Similarly, their interpersonal orientation and higher level of
empathy should cause females to be more concerned about each other's feelings
than are males (cf. Carey, Fox, & Spraggins, 1988; Dobbin, 1985; Santilli & Hud-
son, 1992). Males are, in Gilligan's (1982) terms, "autonomous" and concerned
with justice that can be applied objectively. Females, on the other hand, are more
concerned with justice that accommodates context and individual needs (see also
McLean Parks & Kidder, 1994; McLean Parks & Smith, 1994). Males are there-
fore less likely to consider the positions of outsiders, except possibly from a legal-
istic point of view.
Based on these findings, in conjunction with Spence and Helmreich's contin-
uum, we hypothesize that females more than males will emphasize interpersonal
concerns, including understanding each other's role, and considering the needs and
interests of parties who will be affected by the decision but who are not present at
the negotiating table. Following Natalie and Papa's (1990) finding that females are
more adept at noticing nonverbal cues and are more accurate at decoding these
then are males, we also hypothesized the related argument that females will discuss
interpersonal concerns more than males.
Hypothesis 2a: Females will emphasize interpersonal concerns more than
males.
Hypothesis 2b: Females will emphasize the interests of affected but absent
parties more than males will.
We also hypothesized that the negotiation style of males would be more con-
frontational in orientation than that of females for two reasons: first, males' instru-
mentality and apparent concern for their own position over that of others may lead
them to be more aggressive in order to ensure their success; second, gender role
stereotypes indicate that aggressive behavior is stereotypically male, and it is thus
more acceptable in our society for males to display this kind of behavior. Research

evidence supports this surmise: Females have been found to behave less aggres-
sively than males in many situations (Frodi, Macauley, & Thome, 1977). Females
believe themselves to be more integrating and compromising than males (Korabik,
Baril, & Watson, 1993). In contrast, the "other" orientation of females suggests
that they will be concerned about not offending other parties, and may be less
aggressive and more conciliatory (Davis et al. 1992). In addition, research suggests
that people are rewarded for acting in a manner which is congruent with their gen-
der roles, and "punished" for behavior which is incongruent with their gender roles
(O'Leary & Ickovics, 1992). Thus, females, whose gender roles suggest coopera-
tion and passive compliance, will be less likely to use aggressive, confrontational
negotiation tactics. Conversely, males will be rewarded for the use of such con-
frontational tactics, and conciliatory males will be punished. Specifically, we
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3: Male dyads will use confrontational techniques more fre-

quently than will female dyads.
Similarly, we can expect that males and females will make differential use of
a variety of other communication techniques. For example, it is well established
that while both males and females make suggestions, females tend to use a ques-
tion format while males provide direct statements (Marche & Peterson, 1993).
There is also evidence that males and females use humor differently. Males used it
for "razzing": it is an attempt to restore the balance of power between themselves
and their partner. It also serves to smooth over tensions between them. It is gener-
ally initiated by an individual who feels one-down (Tannen, 1990, 1994). Females,
on the other hand, tend to use humor in a self-deprecating fashion during discus-
sions. They use it to decrease their position when they feel tension caused by an
imbalance of power. Generally, females are less likely than males to use humor
during business discussions. We hypothesized:
Hypothesis 4: Male dyads will use humor more frequently than will female
dyads.
How one presents information in a negotiation is important for three reasons.
First, providing information and ideas may provide specific cues which "prime"
the parties to focus on a particular set of issues, perhaps to the exclusion of other
issues and concerns (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Second, statements early in a negotia-
tion may structure the "climate" for negotiation (cf. Walton & McKersie, 1965).
Third, what a person says first and what is said frequently may indicate the relative
importance of the information or issue to the speaker (e.g., Simons, 1993).
Research on social information processing has indicated that information is sought
or requested first when it is relatively more important (Conlon & McLean Parks,
1987; McLean Parks & Conlon, 1990). Similarly, early discussion of issues during
a negotiation may indicate that these issues are relatively more important to the
parties (e.g., Simons, 1993). In a situation in which a goal is to preserve some
resources for a "rainy day" (or for other projects), early mention of those resources

may create a longer discussion of savings and apportionment issues. Such a sav-
ings-oriented negotiation climate may lead to lower allocations of those resources
to the current project.
Hypothesis 5: Longer discussion of resources in a savings-oriented climate
leads to lower allocations of resources to current projects.
Rubin and Brown (1975) observed that males attempt to maximize their
earnings. Thus, the instrumental, self-focus of males would suggest that earnings
are important to them, and males' negotiation climate is likely to reflect this goal.
Therefore, money is likely to be mentioned earlier in males' negotiations than in
negotiations between females.
Hypothesis 6: In negotiations between males, monetary concerns will be
mentioned earlier than in negotiations between females.
Similarly, females' negotiation climate is likely to reflect their concerns with

relationships. The expressive, other-focus of females would suggest that they will
mention interpersonal concerns with greater priority than males, leading to the
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: In negotiations between females, interpersonal concerns will
be mentioned earlier than in negotiations between males.
We anticipate differences between males and females in outcomes as well as
in process. A logical outcome of the relational focus of females is that they are
concerned with how others besides themselves are doing. Females have been
shown to prefer equality over equity in distributing rewards in ambiguous situa-
tions (e.g., Major & Deaux, 1982). As a result of this concern with others and pref-
erence for equality, females are more likely to engage in behaviors that ensure that
others' needs will be met, perhaps even the needs of others whose needs are not yet
apparent. For example, in resource allocation decisions, females may put money
aside, anticipating the needs of other parties whose projects that they might have to
fund in the near future. In such a case, equality does not necessarily mean that the
females will distribute equal dollar amounts, but rather will provide equal opportu-
nity to obtain funding—by not distributing all of the total budget, leaving some
money for future programs. In negotiations over budgetary concerns, this would
suggest that:
Hypothesis 8: Females will allocate less of the total budget to the current
project than will males.
Method
We tested these hypotheses using a low-conflict negotiation case based on a
community board negotiation over developing a local playground (Halpern &
Connelley, 1996). The case was based on the Bob Leathers' community play-
grounds found throughout the country. Leathers requires that members of the

community commit to volunteering their time and energy before he will undertake
a commission.
This case constitutes a weak situation that does not cue particular behaviors
(see Mischel, 1977). Strong contexts may swamp some differences by cueing par-
ticular behaviors. The weak situation of a low-conflict case is more likely than the
stronger situations of traditional negotiation research to reveal differences between
male and female negotiating styles such as those hypothesized here in the negotia-
tion process.
We intentionally selected a case which would not provide strong economic or
adversarial cues such as found in the typical negotiation case, to avoid cueing
behaviors that we predicted for male negotiators. To the contrary, a low-conflict
case encourages solidarity between the negotiators, encouraging the use of more
egalitarian distributive principles as opposed to the economic, task oriented, or

impersonal distribution rules that would be found in the classic high-conflict case
(cf. Deutsch, 1973). A low-conflict negotiation also permits different interpreta-
tions of materials and provides few cues as to what behavior is appropriate
(particularly what balance of cooperative and competitive behavior is needed).
Low-conflict does not necessarily imply friendly, quiet, or polite proceedings:
many community board meetings are raucous and even vituperative, as, for exam-
ple, when senior and single taxpayers debate the merits of pay increases for music
teachers in neighborhood schools with these teachers and parents of children in the
orchestra. Emotional outbursts or threats may be strategies that negotiators use in
any type of negotiation, whether or not they are appropriate or effective. Partici-
pants on the same side in one negotiation may take opposing sides under other cir-
cumstances. For example, a company's safety committee may include both union
members and managers. While these people may be on opposite sides during a
salary negotiation, they should be on the same side where safety is concerned.
In a low-conflict case there are also no rewards favoring one response over
another, there is no right answer. Consequently, field-dependent individuals are
able to choose behaviors other than those suggested by the situation. Individuals
can be either competitive or cooperative, an opportunity which is not customarily
available in the vast majority of negotiation studies. Individual differences, such as
those based on gender, are thus able to manifest themselves in this context. We
were interested in exploring whether any meaningful differences between males'
and females' interpretations and use of the stimulus materials would emerge when
we used a low-conflict negotiations case. Among the many possible hypotheses
that we could test regarding differences between males and females, we selected
those that, if they are present, are most likely to influence the negotiation. We were
interested in both outcome and process. In terms of process, we expect that some
people may be more inclined than others to discuss certain aspects of a project—
e.g., safety or esthetics. We were also interested in the process revealed by individ-
uals' strategic orientations (e.g., towards other people or towards money) and their
use of threats and humor. Amounts allocated and time until money is first dis-
cussed are critical outcomes of the negotiation.
We also examined anecdotes from the participants' transcripts to illuminate

some of the stylistic differences between males' and females' approaches. We
looked, for example, at males' and females' selection of details from the study to
emphasize, and at the attitudes they expressed towards others' perspectives. This
aspect of the study was a descriptive, rather than hypothesis-testing, endeavor.
Experimental Task
In this negotiation case (Halpern & Connelley, 1996), negotiators played the
role of members of a special projects board, deciding how much of the annual bud-
get to allocate to this project, while saving some for future projects. Allocation
would depend on the structures chosen and how much community vs. Parks
Department involvement occurred. The two negotiators represented different but
overlapping constituencies: the Parks Department was concerned about preserving
jobs, and the Community Volunteer Association was concerned about maintaining
community involvement. Two other projects, as yet undefined, were to be consid-
ered for funding later in the year. Any amount that was given to the playground
would not be available for the later projects; these other projects could be better,
worse, or of the same quality and importance to the community as the playground.
The playground negotiation has the following characteristics of a low-conflict
negotiation: (1) The negotiators are on the same side (a planning board); (2) they
share a common goal; (3) it has no unique, rational solution: the right answer
depends on what the participants believe is important to their constituents; and
(4) their interdependence makes hurting each other disadvantageous. Participants
were aware of the low-conflict nature of the case for a week before they negoti-
ated.
Sample and Procedures
Sample. Fifty advanced undergraduate students in a bargaining class partici-
pated as part of a class exercise. All students were industrial and labor relations
majors. None had previous professional bargaining experience. The average age
was 20.6 years, SD = 0.85 year. Four participants were Hispanic, one was African-
American. The remainder were Caucasian.
Students were assigned same-sex partners. Same-sex dyads have been found
to polarize participants along gender lines (e.g., Carli, 1989; Mulac, Weimann,
Widenmann, & Gibson, 1988). It also avoids opposite-sex cueing effects which
would have confounded our study. Twelve female dyads and thirteen male dyads
resulted.
Procedures. Participants were paired, and randomly assigned to the roles of
either Community Volunteer Association representative or Parks Department rep-
resentative. They prepared their roles in advance and, as with other class assign-
ments, the roles were not discussed. On the assigned day, participants negotiated
for 30 minutes. They recorded their negotiations on audiotape.
The materials for the participants' roles included descriptions of playground
structures varying in size, cost, quality, and need for Community Volunteer Asso-

ciation or Parks Department involvement. Participants received information on the

current year's budget, as well as on the apportionment of the past two years' bud-
gets to other projects.
Participants were instructed to decide whether or not to fund the playground,
and how much of the $64,000 annual budget to allocate. They were reminded that
two other projects would be proposed later in the year. They did not know anything
about these projects, but any money allocated to the playground could not be redi-
rected later. Participants answered questions about themselves and their partners.
The study was debriefed in class.
Measures
We used both outcome and process measures. The outcome-related dependent
variable of interest is the percentage of the total available budget allocated to the
playground (%Allocated). Negotiators could allocate any amount from 0 to

$64,000 (the total available). Actual allocations ranged from $21,500 to $57,000.
The independent variable in the analysis was Sex, a discrete factor, balanced
in the original design; $FirstT (number of minutes elapsed before money was first
mentioned); the amount of time (in minutes) that money was discussed
($OnTableT, derived by subtracting the time at which money was first mentioned
during the negotiation by either partner from the length of the entire negotiation);
and the number of sentences a person used (Sentences, a proxy for how verbose a
particular negotiator was) were continuous covariates.
Process Measures: Content Coding
Process-related dependent variables were counts within several categories of
comments, based on content coding of the transcripts. The content coding used a
modified version of the Pruitt and Lewis (1975) content coding scheme. This con-
tent coding scheme has been used repeatedly in studying negotiations, particularly
in the communications field.
We analyzed "units" of speech acts with a specific purpose or function. If a
negotiator spoke for two minutes, for example, depending on the content, the sev-
eral sentences might constitute only one speech act. A sentence is defined as the
natural grammatical unit of a subject, verb, and predicate; or as a phrase or a ques-
tion intended as a sentence, even if not completed. For example, "Do you think it'll
. . ." was counted as a sentence, because the verb was either swallowed by the
speaker or cut off by the partner.
The content of the transcripts were coded into six classifications, following
the Pruitt and Lewis coding scheme: (1) Positions, which included statements of
position in the negotiation, such as "I represent the Parks Department here"; or
about how much they were willing to spend; (2) Personal information, in which
speech acts provided or requested personal information ("Have your children
played on one of these wooden structures before?"); (3) Other's feelings ("How do
you feel about this?"); (4) Community groups (mentions of senior citizens, "yup-
pies," or ethnic groups; these are the "absent but affected parties"); (5) Confronta-

tional techniques (the use of threats or ultimatums); and (6) Monetary concerns.
These classifications were mutually exclusive.
One coder coded all 25 transcripts, and two other coders coded a random
sample of 10 transcripts each. All coders were blind to the study's hypotheses and
experimental conditions, and had not been involved with the design or running of
the experiment. The entire transcript was coded. References to speakers' gender
were removed by a secretary unassociated with the project before coding began.
There was no expectation of every dyad demonstrating behaviors in every cate-
gory, nor was there any assumption that discussions would be limited in any par-
ticular way (e.g., we did not assume that once money was mentioned, nothing else
would be discussed).
Intercoder agreement was calculated by comparing frequencies supplied by
the different coders in each category for each dyad. Intercoder agreement averaged
71.8%, a reasonable value given the number of nonoccurrences in different cells

(cf. Frick & Semmel, 1978). Discrepancies were resolved by discussion between
the senior coder and the researchers.
Analyses
Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b were analyzed using a Chi-square test because the
dependent variable was categorical in nature, and because we are testing that the
probability of a dyad exhibiting the behaviors in question is independent of gender.
We purposely differentiated between statements that demonstrate intensity
when repeated, as opposed to statements that tend not to be repeated. Such behav-
iors are best recorded as present or absent and tested with tests such as Chi-square,
which addresses independence of the presence (or absence) from gender. Personal
information and position statements are types of statements that tend not to be
repeated. For example, once an individual reveals that she or he worked on a Bob
Leathers playground, that particular fact isn't usually repeated during a 30-minute
negotiation. It is sufficient for our purposes to note the presence or absence of the
revelation of personal information.
By contrast, some behaviors occur more or less often, or with more or less
intensity. For example, a given dyad may use only one, or several, confrontational
techniques. The dynamics of the negotiation are fundamentally different if the
dyad uses only one such technique or instead chooses to use many. For behaviors
such as these, it is more appropriate to compare means of behavior frequencies
between the two genders. Nor is there any reason to believe a priori that the vari-
ances of the frequencies should be the same. Thus, a 2-sample t-test is appropriate,
and was used for Hypotheses 3, 6, and 8. The dependent variables for these
hypotheses were number of confrontational techniques used, when money was first
mentioned, and how much of the budget was allocated. Hypothesis 5 was tested
using least squares regression; its dependent variables were mentions of positions
and of personal information.
Hypothesis 7 was tested with a Fisher's exact test because it is appropriate for
data in a 2 × 2 table. The dependent variable was frequency of discussion of inter-

personal concerns. We also used Fisher's exact test for the exploratory analyses of
the frequency counts of mentions of various elements of the case by males and by
females. Because these behaviors could not be hypothesized a priori, they cannot
be examined in formal hypothesis tests. Nevertheless, Fisher's exact test provides
an appropriate measure of the degree to which the pattern of occurrences deviates
from random.
Results
Hypothesis Tests: Negotiation Outcomes
% Allocated was the central concern of the subjects, although not of the
researchers. It informs all of the other outcomes and observations. We therefore
discuss it first, out of hypothesis order.
We examined a negotiation outcome, the budgetary allocations to the play-

ground equipment, as a percent of the available budget to test Hypothesis 8.
Females allocated less of their total budgets to the playground equipment than
males. Specifically, average allocations by females to the playground equipment
was $37,964 (SD = $9,304); or 58.9% of the total budget. By contrast, males allo-
cated more, a mean of $44,185 (SD = $5,295), or 68.6% of the total budget. The
male-female difference of 9.7% was only marginally significant [t (13) = 1.96, p <
.10]; however, more than half of the female dyads allocated less than males, and
the means were in the predicted direction, providing weak support for the hypothe-
sis.
Supporting Hypothesis 6, males mentioned monetary concerns earlier than
females did [$FirstT: F (1, 19) = 8.68, p < .01]. Males began discussing monetary
concerns on average after about 4.5 minutes of discussion; females first discussed
monetary concerns after 11 minutes. Males discussed money for a longer time on
average than females did [males' mean $OnTableT = 25.1 minutes (SD = 2.47
minutes); females' mean $OnTableT = 12.45 minutes (SD = 6.28 minutes)]. The
difference of 12.6 minutes is highly significant, t (13) = 6.17, p < .0001.
Gender is important not only as a main effect but also in interaction with
other variables. The differences between men and women on some variables can
hide significant effects of other variables. Figure 1 illustrates such a situation.
When gender is ignored, $OnTableT appears to have no effect on %Allocated
(Figure la). A least squares regression analysis of percent of the budget allocated
(%Allocated) on time discussing money ($OnTableT) (with Sentences used by the
individual as a factor to control for verbosity) is not significant [t (19) = –.24, ns].
This figure incorporates both males' and females' responses. This finding seems to
contradict Hypothesis 5.
However, when analyzed separately for each gender, there is a clear and con-
sistent trend of lower allocations with longer discussions of money. The tendency
of females to discuss money later and for less time (confirmed by the test of
Hypothesis 6) interacts with the tendency of females to allocate less (confirmed by
the test of Hypothesis 8) to disguise this effect. Figure lb shows males in the upper
right quadrant, talking longer about money and allocating more; females in the
lower left, talking less about money and allocating less. Thus, it is necessary to
look within each gender to see whether Hypothesis 5 holds. As Figure lb shows,
the slope of the change in %Allocated with $OnTableT is virtually identical for
both genders. This justifies introducing Sex as a 0/1 indicator variable into a
regression analysis of these variables.
When Sex is included as an indicator variable in the least squares regression

analysis of %Allocated on SOnTableT with Sentences used by the individual as a
factor, the coefficients of both Sex [ β = -30.8, t (19) = –4.8, p < .0001] and
SOnTableT [β= -1.7, t (19) = –4.08, p <.001] are significant (see Figure lb). This
supports Hypothesis 5: longer discussions in the savings-oriented climate of this
negotiation lead to a lower allocation of money.
Once it was brought up, money would be repeatedly discussed within the
dyad. While it was not the sole topic of conversation, it had a strong effect. Within
a single-sex dyad, more time to discuss money is associated with significantly
lower allocations (Figure lb). For each additional minute that a group spoke about
money, the negotiators allocated 1.7% of the total budget less. Thus, it appears that
the process of additional discussion resulted in reducing the allocation outcomes
(see Table 1).
Process Results
The coding revealed several patterns indicative of differences between male
and female dyads based on different social orientation. For these analyses, we
examined what happened within a dyad, as opposed to among individuals as in the
previous analyses. These results are summarized in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that males were more likely than females to empha-
size their perceived positions, responsibilities, or viewpoints. We found support for
this prediction: Males discussed positions, while females did not [all 13 male
dyads vs. 2 female dyads; x 2 (1) = 18.06, p < .0001]. All position statements (often
regarding how much they were willing to spend) were made in the first five min-
utes of the negotiation.
In keeping with hypothesis 2a, we found that females emphasized interper-
sonal concerns more than males. For example, females discussed personal infor-
mation, while males did not [11 of 12 female dyads, vs. 3 of 13 male dyads, x 2 (1)
= 11.91,/? < .001]. Females requested more information about the other's feelings
than did males [t (24) = 2.27, p < .03]. Males requested information about the
other's feelings less than half as often as females.

Table 1
Means of Outcome and Process Variables
Outcome and Process Males Females Results of tests

(13 dyads) (12 dyads)
Negotiation Outcomes
%AIIccated 68.6% 58.9% t = 1.96+
Negotiation Process
$FirstT 430 min 13.82 min t = 8.68***
(2.20) (5.65)
$OnTableT 25.10 min 12.45 min t = 6.17***
(2.47) (6.28)
Sentences 218.80 213.80 ns

(70.60) (75.90)
Content Coding of Transcripts
Number of dyads revealing
***
personal information 3 11 X 2 (1) = 11.91
Number of dyads making
position statement 13 2
X2(1) = 18.06***
Average number times dyad
requested information
about others' feelings 54 138 t = 2.27*
(.88) (1.38)
Average number community
groups mentioned 1.9 3 t = 3.13**
(.86) (.85)
Average number instances of
confrontational bargaining 1.54 .17 t = 2.10*
(2.18) (.58)
Salience of Case Information and
Spontaneous Concerns (all
Fisher's Exact Tests)
Number of dyads mentioning
baseball field 7 0 p < .005
senior citizen's home 0 6 p<.005
legal liability 7 1 p < . 0 3
Note: SDs are in parentheses.

+
p<.10. *p<.05. **P<01. ***p<.001.
We also found support for H2b, that female dyads will consider absent but
affected parties: Female dyads discussed more community groups than did male
groups [t (24) = 3.13, p < .005]. On average, female dyads discussed an additional
3 community groups (e.g., senior citizens, "yuppies," and ethnic groups) while

male dyads discussed an additional 1.9 groups on average.

Male dyads engaged in more confrontational techniques than did female
dyads [t (24) = 2.10, p < .05], supporting Hypothesis 3, that male dyads will use
more confrontational techniques than female groups will. Neither male nor female
dyads used very many such techniques.
Supporting Hypothesis 4, we found that male dyads engaged in more use of
humor than did female dyads [t (23) = 3.80,p < .001].
As hypothesis 7 predicted, all of the female dyads mentioned personal infor-
mation earlier than male dyads did. Eleven of the 12 female dyads, but only three
of the 13 male dyads mentioned interpersonal concerns (Fisher's exact test, p <
.001). Female groups mentioned interpersonal concerns for the first time within the
first 5 minutes of the negotiation. However, the male groups who discussed per-
sonal information did so only after 20 minutes of negotiation. These male dyads
were experiencing difficulty reaching an agreement.
Participants' Orientations
What people say and how they say it can also reveal differences in process.
Below, we provide a sampling of comments or perceptions about elements of the
playground case, as these comments were made during the negotiation. The first
section considers the participants' selection of details in the case materials; the sec-
ond section considers their attitudes towards different issues in the case.
Selection of Details
Females and males selected different information from the case materials, or
from their general experience, to use in their arguments during the negotiation. The
materials discussed the existence of baseballfieldsnear the playground. None of
the females, but 7 of the 13 male dyads discussed it (significant difference: Fisher's
exact test:p<.01).
The materials discussed the existence of a senior citizen's home near the
playground. None of the male, but 6 of the 12 female dyads, discussed how the
playground would affect the residents (significant difference: Fisher's exact test, p
< .01). This finding is additional evidence supporting Hypothesis 2b, that females
will consider absent but affected parties.
Issues of legal liability were not mentioned in the case materials. However, 7
of the male dyads discussed the community's or board's liability. Only 1 of the
female dyads considered this issue (significant difference: Fisher's exact test: p <
.05). This finding is consistent with the male orientation towards relying on rules
as a metric of justice, in contrast to the female focus on the interaction of the indi-
vidual in the situation as a metric of justice (Gilligan, 1982).
Expressing Attitudes
Females and males may see a situation in the same way, but may express
their attitudes towards it differently. These differences may create strikingly differ-
ent solutions to a problem. As one example, the playground case materials dis-

cussed the possibility of hiring a community coordinator to organize volunteers to

help with building the playground.
The males considered the coordinator a burdensome expense to be avoided.
Their comments revealed that they thought the coordinator was needed only
because the community was not enthusiastic enough to organize itself. Females, by
contrast, saw the coordinator as useful. The females believed a coordinator would
provide helpful assistance and would be a worthwhile expense. To the females, the
need for a coordinator did not reflect negatively on the community. As another
example, the case materials observed that some parents had concerns that using
sand as a ground cover might attract cats who would use the playground as a litter
box. Males tended to dismiss these concerns:
Male Participant: "Well, I don't agree that there are any sanitary concerns
with sand, so let's not worry about it."

Females, on the other hand, demonstrated a greater tolerance of, compassion
for, and responsiveness to, others. Even when females disagreed with the parents'
concerns, they still acknowledged that using sand might create a problem simply
because the parents had doubts about it.
Female Participant A: "Well, I don't agree, but if the mothers aren't comfort-
able, the children won't use it."
Female Participant B: "Maybe we could start an educational campaign?"
There were relatively few uses of confrontational techniques by males or by
females in this negotiation. However, males tended to use humor confrontationally.
Jokes appeared in the males' transcripts only. These jokes tended to be strategic.
As an example, one of the male participants did not want to spend a lot of money
on sand for ground cover. His negotiation partner had suggested a much higher
dollar allocation for sand. The first negotiator responded:
"Yeah, we need to get some sand, but we're not trying to build Malibu Beach
here, man."
With this joke, he made the other negotiator's request for more sand look ridicu-
lous. They ordered less sand.
In another example, a negotiator wanted to limit the expenses associated with
the number of playground structures being considered. His issue was whether to
allocate money for a climbing tower with a turret.
"A turret? You want to pay to build a turret? Ivanhoe needs a turret. Rapunzel
needs a turret. These kids do not need a turret."
They did not build a turret.
Conclusions
This study demonstrated differences in both process and outcome between
male and female dyads because low conflict negotiation provides an opportunity to
observe a wider range of negotiation behaviors than are commonly seen in much

negotiation research. Using gender roles of participants as an example of a social

context variable, this study demonstrated that social context can influence both
negotiation outcomes and process. Specifically, we found that males mentioned
money before females did. Females emphasized interpersonal concerns more than
males did, discussing personal information and requesting information with regard
to other people's feelings, and mentioned personal information sooner than males
did. Males used more confrontational techniques than females did.
We chose to examine dyads of two male and two female negotiators because
while the literature reveals many contrasting results about differences between the
sexes, the general consensus among many conflict researchers at the current time is
that there are no substantive differences between females and males at the negotia-
tion table. In fact, most recent studies do not consider possible differences of
effects of stimuli on females and males. However, the distribution of females and
males in a workgroup is likely to affect behavior (Kanter, 1972). Specifically,
Kanter suggests that females will be more feminine in the presence of males and
vice versa. Thus, we used single-sex dyads. Future research should test whether the
gender effects that we found are, in fact, exacerbated in mixed sex environments.
Females and males use some of the same but also some different techniques.
Their different orientations reflect different perspectives on conflict. These per-
spectives are sometimes so different that females and males seem to be creating a
different reality or world out of the materials provided. Fiske and Taylor (1993)
suggest that the environment provides cues that prime certain tendencies in our
personalities; our upbringing may "prime" females and males to respond differ-
ently to these cues. For example, the participants saw different things in the same
materials: males saw legal liability issues, for example, when none had been intro-
duced explicitly. Such issues were not salient to females. Females introduced other
community groups not mentioned in the materials, while other interested con-
stituencies appeared to be less salient to males. It might be argued that males dis-
cussed the baseball field while females did not because the field is salient to the
males; they have grown up thinking about baseball. The matter is not so simple,
however. Neither males nor females typically grow up thinking about senior citi-
zen homes on a daily basis, and yet the females mentioned the senior citizens' con-
cerns while the males did not.
Males and females also expressed some of their concerns differently: males,
for example, used humor as a manipulative strategy, while females did not.
Females explicitly addressed concerns of others, even when they did not agree with
those concerns; males tended to dismiss perspectives that did not agree with their
own.
The low conflict negotiation is a weak situation in Mischel's (1977) sense. It
provides no "right answer" according to classic economic frameworks, which
would cue negotiators. Participants had to interpret the materials provided and act
without a clear monetary or self-interest based goal. The community members, not
the negotiators themselves, benefited or were harmed by their efforts. This case, or
others like it, holds great potential for exploring social contextual variables.
Specifically, we used this weak situation to establish a context in which negotiators

would be free to make their own interpretations of what was happening in the
negotiation and of what could be done. In order to demonstrate this diversity of
response, any two groups that are usually considered to respond identically in a
constrained negotiation situation, but that may have different norms for negotiation
behavior in a more life-like setting, could be examined. For example, dyads of dif-
ferent ethnicities could be contrasted, or dyads representing different negotiation
styles could be opposed.
Aspects of the social context other than gender roles may likewise affect
negotiation outcomes and processes, but research efforts to study these have been
limited. Some inroads have been made in studying friendship (Halpern, 1992,
1994), cooperation (e.g., Greenhalgh, 1987), and ethnicity of negotiators (Swingle,
1969; Ting-Toomey, 1991). Research should continue to examine context in life-

like settings of both weak and strong situations, where cooperation and competi-
tion can both be viewed by different negotiators as viable options.
The study showed that if the researcher fails to consider gender as a factor,
she or he can easily overlook a strong effect. In this case, we demonstrated that it is
necessary to consider gender in looking at the pattern of negotiations. The simple
effect of lower allocations resulting from lengthier discussions of money could not
be seen without gender as a factor. For both males and females, Hypothesis 5 holds
within the same-sex dyad. More interestingly, the slope of the decline in allocation
with the time that money is on the table is virtually the same within the male and
female dyads. It is also interesting that despite the fact that male dyads mention
money sooner than female dyads and thus discuss money longer (reducing their
allocation by a greater amount), they still allocate more on average than female
dyads.
Hypotheses 5,6, and 8 interact in an important way: males mention monetary
concerns earlier than females; allocations decline as money is discussed so that
longer discussions of money create lower allocations of resources; yet, females
allocate less to the current budget than males. This interaction explains why, while
there seemed to be no trend in resource allocation over time, when both males and
females are examined together, there is a significant trend when gender is intro-
duced. As Figure lb makes clear, males start their discussion of money at an allo-
cation value sufficiently higher than that of females so that, although both show
virtually the same decline in allocations versus discussion time, the final alloca-
tions of males are still greater than those of females, even after a longer period of
declining allocations under discussion. That males' and females' slopes are identi-
cal suggests that this is a real effect that bears further study.
These results provide strong, multiple indicators of a basic, underlying pro-
cess that is inherently different for males and females: a process that is consistent
with typical gender stereotypes which suggest that males are more instrumental,
and females more expressive. While in isolation, any one of our indicators might
not seem particularly robust or generalizable, in the context of the total evidence
presented, there can be little doubt that there are differences in how males and
females negotiate. Failure to control for the effects of gender, or to consider it

explicitly in research on conflict and dispute resolution is a serious omission.
The playground negotiation does not offer explanations for why we see the
behaviors observed here; it only provides opportunities to see behaviors that are
frequently missed in other negotiations cases. Past work has emphasized "scorable
tasks" which are strong situations which encouraged competitive behaviors.
Scorable tasks may prime people to focus on monetary, tangible, or instrumental
concerns, rather on social and other concerns. Thus, even when integrative solu-
tions are possible, negotiators approach a scorable negotiation with a zero-sum
mindset. Such an overly strong task may not be sufficiently meaningful or gener-
alizable to negotiators' experiences.
Potential payoffs of such work are great: viewing conflict within its social
context may in fact lead us to reconsider our assumptions about "normative"

behavior. Some challenges are already being raised; in linguistics, for example,
Sheldon (1992b) has observed that as a society, North Americans assume that
"aggression" is the norm for dealing with conflict. Other societies, including
Native American tribes such as the Lakota (Sioux), do not consider aggression
acceptable as a norm for intra-tribal dispute resolution.
There are other practical implications of this work. Because people interpret
cues subjectively and are likely to act on the reality they perceive, different people
may react differently to similar situations in the absence of strong cues for
"appropriate" behavior. Negotiations within or between companies may be hin-
dered if negotiators act as if they are faced with different realities because their
social context leads them to interpret their information differently. The effect is
still more potentially devastating if neither side is aware of the differences in per-
ception. On the other hand, these different perceptions may permit the negotiators
as a coordinated group to see more alternatives, thus potentially expanding the pie
and leading to more opportunities for integrative solutions.
The principal limitation of this study is that while this negotiation case was
based on an actual community board-style decision process, it is still not real life.
Research that contrasts the decision process used by actual male and female deci-
sion-makers would be extremely helpful in investigating the interaction of gender
roles and the negotiation process.
Another possible limitation is that our subjects were undergraduates. Students
are more likely than "real" negotiators to worry about their roles, and what might
and might not occur during a negotiation like this. As a result, elements of the case
and their roles may have been more salient than their gender, leading to an under-
estimation of the effect of gender. While it can be argued that female MBA's have
been trained to negotiate like male MBA's, and that the results based on under-
graduates might have overstated the case, the vast majority of negotiators
(particularly on community projects) do not have MBA's—and therefore training is
far less likely to shape their responses.
In the playground negotiation, it is not possible to know whether it is "better"
to allocate more now to the playground, or to hold onto the money for later pro-
jects. There are many instances like this in our lives where the decision is not
clear-cut, and where we can't even imagine the trade-offs and ramifications of our
decision. Different people may make different choices for a variety of reasons. The
best a negotiator can do is to be aware that there is usually more than one best way.
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Biographical Note
Jennifer J. Halpern
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Cornell University
387C Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
Phone/Fax: 607–255–8859/7774
E–mail: jh35@cornell.edu.
Dr. Halpern graduated from the University of California, Berkeley. An Assistant Professor
at Cornell University, she teaches negotiation, mediation, and social psychology. Her
research examines the social context of negotiation and of individual decision making, par-
ticularly the effects of relationships. She also studies the effects of perception on decisions.
Judi McLean Parks graduated with a Ph.D. from the University of Iowa. An Assistant Pro-
fessor at Washington University, St. Louis, she teaches organizational behavior, negotia-
tions, and diversity. Her research investigates the formation and violation of psychological
contracts and their outcomes, including fairness, citizenship behaviors, and organizational
deviance. She is also interested in how roles form.
Received: January 1,1996

Accepted after two revisions: January 15,1996

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International Journal of Conflict Management

VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALES AND FEMALES IN PROCESS AND

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*Related content and download information correct at time of

VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

This paper considers whether negotiation outcomes and processes of

negotiators, or the norms of handling a particular type of negotiation, may prime

Male and Female Negotiation Styles

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

The International Journal of Conflict Management,Vol.7,No. 1, January 1996

building and preserving relationships during a negotiation. Males tend to be more

Females relating such an experience to a friend frequently want support, encour-

personal positions and outcomes, responsibilities or viewpoints on an issue by

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Hypothesis 3: Male dyads will use confrontational techniques more fre-

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Similarly, females' negotiation climate is likely to reflect their concerns with

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

egalitarian distributive principles as opposed to the economic, task oriented, or

We also examined anecdotes from the participants' transcripts to illuminate

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

ciation or Parks Department involvement. Participants received information on the

playground (%Allocated). Negotiators could allocate any amount from 0 to

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

71.8%, a reasonable value given the number of nonoccurrences in different cells

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

We examined a negotiation outcome, the budgetary allocations to the play-

When Sex is included as an indicator variable in the least squares regression

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Outcome and Process Males Females Results of tests

Sentences 218.80 213.80 ns

Note: SDs are in parentheses.

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

male dyads discussed an additional 1.9 groups on average.

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

cussed the possibility of hiring a community coordinator to organize volunteers to

with sand, so let's not worry about it."

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

negotiation research. Using gender roles of participants as an example of a social

Specifically, we used this weak situation to establish a context in which negotiators

1969; Ting-Toomey, 1991). Research should continue to examine context in life-

females negotiate. Failure to control for the effects of gender, or to consider it

context may in fact lead us to reconsider our assumptions about "normative"

Amidjaja, I. R., & Vinacke, W. E. (1965). Achievement, nurturance, and competition in

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 68–78.

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. NY: Random House.

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Kolb, D. M., & Bartunek, J. M. (1992). Hidden conflict in organizations: Uncovering

Stanford University Press.

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

Williams, D. G. (1985). Gender, masculinity-femininity, and emotional intimacy in same-

Received: January 1,1996

The International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996

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