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Consolation of Philosophy and The Gentle Remedy of Music
Consolation of Philosophy and The Gentle Remedy of Music
Férdia J. Stone-Davis
I n The Myths We Live By, Mary Midgley addresses the tendency to divide science
from myth (and fact from story) by showing that science is not a disinterested
enterprise, but an ‘ever-changing imaginative structure of ideas by which scien-
tists continue to connect, understand and interpret’.1 In particular she addresses
how certain concepts within scientific discourse act not just ‘as passive pieces of
apparatus like thermostats’, but exert an influence on the materials they examine.2
Her ultimate point is that ‘truth’ is situated in and shaped by frames of experience
and modes of reference. A precedent of Midgley’s view is found directly in Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s ‘language-games’,3 but extends across history, including Martin
Heidegger’s understanding of language as the ‘house of being’, Herder’s ‘consti-
tutive’ view of language,4 and Plato’s theory that world disclosure depends upon
epistemic perspective.5
Drawing upon Plato and the Greek tradition, Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy
brings into sharp focus the fluid and narrative character of reality pointed out by
Midgley, as well as the broader validity of her case. As we shall see, the Consolation is
a form of autobiography and as such can be seen as a performative exercise through
which Boethius comes to an understanding of himself. In the light of the situation
he finds himself in, Boethius struggles to tell a story that makes sense of the events
in his life. He requires the intervention of Lady Philosophy, who reveals their coher-
ence. Importantly, the therapeutic mechanisms that Lady Philosophy brings to bear
* This chapter builds on and develops the author’s previous research on Boethius’s Con-
solation of Philosophy in Musical Beauty: Negotiating the Boundary between Subject and
Object (Eugene, 2011).
1
Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (Oxford, 2004), p.3.
2
In particular, Midgley looks at the concepts of the machine, the self-interested individ-
ual and competition between individuals.
3
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulter, rev. 4th edn (Oxford, 2009), section 23.
4
See Johann Gottfried Herder, ‘On the Origin of Language’, On the Origin of Language:
Essay on the Origin of Languages / Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Essay on the Origin of Lan-
guage / Johann Gottfried Herder, trans. John H. Moran and Alexander Gode (New York,
1966). Charles Taylor classes Herder’s view of language as ‘constitutive’ in The Lan-
guage Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity (Cambridge, 2016),
pp.16–20, 28.
5
See in particular the allegory of the cave in Plato, Republic, Book VII, 514a–517a,
in Plato: Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve and ed. John M.
Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997), pp.97–1223.
in her dialogue with Boethius rely upon an ‘imaginative pattern’6 that sees God as
creator and source, and the world’s existence as dependent on order and harmony.
This manifests not only in terms of the arguments that Lady Philosophy sets
out but underpins the role of music, which is decisive to the re-telling; music is the
principle of harmony and permeates every aspect of the created order, including
Boethius, whom it acts upon to re-order and re-harmonise. Ultimately, however,
music gathers force in the Consolation not simply as a concept within an imagina-
tive structure, but as an action, a means of being in the world. As such, music facil-
itates world-making: the process through which humans attempt to make sense of
themselves and the environment in which they are situated.
6
Midgley, The Myths We Live, p.1.
7
John Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford, 2003), p.97.
8
Thomas Mathien, ‘Philosophers’ Autobiographies’, Autobiography as Philosophy: The
Philosophical Uses of Self-Presentation, ed. Thomas Mathien and D.G. Wright (Oxford,
2006), pp.14–30 (14).
9
Ibid., p.20.
10
Garry L. Hagberg, Describing Ourselves: Wittgenstein and Autobiographical Conscious-
ness (Oxford, 2008), espec. chap.6.
11
Férdia J. Stone-Davis, ‘Music and Worldmaking: Haydn’s String Quartet in E-Flat
Major (op.33, no. 2)’, Music and Transcendence, ed. Férdia J. Stone-Davis (Aldershot,
2015), pp.125–46 (136–7).
12
Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy
(Oxford, 1981), p.54.
From the beginning, all things whatever which have been created may be seen by
the nature of things to be formed by reason of numbers. Number was the principal
13
Marenbon, Boethius, p.96. References to the Consolation are to the book, section, verses
(where appropriate) and page numbers in the translation by Victor Watts (London,
1999). For further information about the context giving rise to Boethius’s situation,
see his own account in Consolation, Book I.4, pp.8–15. Cf. also Chadwick, Boethius: The
Consolations of Music, chap.1, especially pp.46–56.
14
‘There is no good reason to suppose that the circumstances of its composition were
other than they are described – those of a man in the condemned cell, with little hope
of reprieve. But this is not to say that the states of mind attributed to the character Boe-
thius need ever have been those of the real Boethius. Boethius the character is a per-
sona, very possibly fictional in many of his thoughts and feelings, although sharing the
events of Boethius the author’s life. It is important that the two figures be kept distinct.’
Marenbon, Boethius, p.99.
15
Boethius is also a pattern for humankind. The Consolation is written in such a way as
to identify Boethius with humankind. Examples of this synonymy extend throughout:
see ibid., Book I.3, p.7 and Book II.2, pp.25–6. Moreover, Lady Philosophy addresses
Boethius in the plural: see for example Book III.3, p.51 and Book IV.6, p.106.
16
Marenbon says, ‘It is Boethius himself, alone, who is consoled and does the consoling,
but the fiction of the dialogue suggests that he is consoled by another.’ He notes that
the form of the Consolation, ‘in which the author consoles a representation of himself,
through a fictional figure, is unprecedented’. Marenbon, Boethius, p.97.
17
Boethius wrote treatises on all four subjects (although not all have survived) and
reputedly coined the term. For more information on the quadrivium and the partic-
ular importance of music, see Férdia J. Stone-Davis, Musical Beauty: Negotiating the
Boundary between Subject and Object (Eugene, 2011), pp.2–13.
18
See Stone-Davis, Musical Beauty, pp.8–10.
exemplar in the mind of the creator. From it were derived the multiplicity of the
four elements, from it were derived the changes of the seasons, from it the move-
ment of the stars and the turning of the heavens.19
Music also appears within allusions to the three classes of music identified by
Boethius in his treatise The Fundamentals of Music – cosmic, human and instru-
mental music – and their dependence upon consonance and harmony.20 Through
the interrelation of movement, sound, ratio and consonance, each class of music
exists: each sphere contains a number of movements and thus a plurality of sounded
notes that cohere through harmony. Consonance emerges laterally within the dif-
ferent spheres through harmony, which draws the individual movements within
each sphere of the cosmos into concord. Yet it also appears cosmically as each
sphere is harmoniously fitted to its cosmic counterparts. Cosmic music involves
the consonance of celestial bodies, the binding of elements and the arrangement
of seasons.21 Human music is the harmony of the cosmos embodied within human-
kind, in the consonance of body and soul, in the joining of the parts within the soul
itself, of the rational and irrational parts, and in the mixing of the elements and the
fixed proportioning of members within the body alone.22 Instrumental music is
harmony which rests in various instruments.23
Boethius’s recognition in the Consolation that the world is ordered invokes the
quadrivium and connects music both ontologically and epistemologically to real-
ity. Soon after her entrance, Lady Philosophy makes it clear that formerly Boethius
spent a great deal of time studying the quadrivium.24 She remembers how Boethius
as an ‘Astronomer once used in joy / To comprehend and to commune / With
planets on their wandering ways.’25 Boethius’s study of the movement of the sky
implicitly invokes cosmic music: ‘The world in constant change / Maintains a har-
mony, / And elements keep peace / Whose nature is to war.’26 Moreover, both
Boethius and Lady Philosophy recall how he previously rendered the secrets of
19
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Boethian Number Theory: A Translation of the
De Institutione Arithmetica, trans. Michael Masi (Amsterdam, 1983), p.xxx. See also
Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. Calvin M. Bower, ed. Claude V. Palisca (New
Haven, 1989), Book I, section 2, pp.9–10.
20
For a detailed explanation of the importance of consonance, see Stone-Davis, Musical
Beauty, pp.19–25, and for a fuller discussion of the classes of music, see ibid., pp.25–30.
21
Boethius, Fundamentals, Book I, section 2, pp.9–10.
22
Ibid., Book I, section 2, p.10.
23
Ibid.
24
On the figure of Lady Philosophy, see Marenbon, Boethius, pp.153–4. Boethius com-
pares his current situation to that in which he and Lady Philosophy used to meet and
study together: Consolation, Book I.4, p.9. Myra L. Uhlfelder notes that the study of
astronomy had revealed the orderly arrangement and movement of heavenly bodies,
and that perception of this order had served as an exemplum for Boethius in developing
a principle of order for his own life: ‘The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’ Consola-
tio’, Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays, ed. Michael Masi (Berne, 1981),
pp.17–34 (24).
25
Boethius, Consolation, Book I.2, verses 10–12, p.5.
26
Ibid., Book II.8, verses 1–4, p.45.
27
Ibid., Book I.2, verses 22–3, p.6.
28
For the assumption that God is source and end, see ibid., Book I.6, pp.19–20.
29
Ibid., Book I.6, p.19.
30
See ibid., Book I.5, verses 1–4, p.15; Book I.6, verses 1–6, p.18; Book I.6, verses 15–16, p.18;
Book I.6, verses 17–18, p.18.
31
See ibid., Book I.5, verses 5–9, p.15 ; Book III.2, verses 1–6, p.50.
32
See ibid., Book I.5, verses 18–22, p.15.
33
Ibid., Book III.6, verses 1–2; 5–6, p.59.
34
Ibid., Book I.1, verses 1–2, p.3.
35
Ibid., Book I.5, p.18.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., Book I.5, pp.16–17.
38
Ibid., Book I.2, verses 1–5, p.5. Supporting this, Lady Philosophy recollects a previous
and contrasting scenario: ‘Now see that mind that searched and made / All Nature’s
hidden secrets clear / Lie prostrate prisoner of night. / His neck bends low in shackles
thrust, / And he is forced beneath the weight / To contemplate – the lowly dust.’ Ibid.,
Book I.2, verses 22–7, p.6.
39
Ibid., Book I.1, p.4. The Muses encourage Boethius to write elegy. Lady Philosophy sets
herself over and against them: ‘poetry plays the painted whore to Philosophy’s virtu-
ous woman’. Anna M. Crabbe, ‘Literary Design in De Consolatione’, Boethius: His Life,
Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp.238–41 (250). Crabbe
continues, ‘The stress in the De Musica on the inherent tendency of certain types of
music to produce demoralizing “affectus” is closely parallel to Philosophy’s analysis of
harm done by the Muses.’
40
Chamberlain suggests that Lady Philosophy is the ‘complete musicus’ since she ful-
fils the criteria of the perfect musician (instrumental skills, creative, judgement of
rhythms, melodies). D.S. Chamberlain, ‘Philosophy of Music in the Consolatio of Boe-
thius’, Speculum 45 (1970), 80–97; Gerard O’Daly, The Poetry of Boethius (London,
1991), p.55. However, one can perhaps go further and suggest that Lady Philosophy
is the complete embodiment of music as the perfection of ‘human’ music, the conso-
nance of body and mind. Thus, it is music rather than Lady Philosophy that stands as
the true physician.
41
‘Someone who cannot sing well will nevertheless sing something to himself, not
because the song that he sings affects him with particular satisfaction, but because
those who express a kind of inborn sweetness from the soul –regardless of how it is
expressed – find pleasure.’ Boethius, Fundamentals, Book I, section 1, p.8.
42
Interestingly, Seth Lerer views Boethius’s situation and recovery through the loss,
recovery and retrieval of language. One can relate this to Boethius’s incapacity to
reason: he is thus rendered speechless (the Muses dictate to Boethius) and it is music
that attends to him in the first instance. Seth Lerer, Boethius and Dialogue: Literary
Method in The Consolation of Philosophy (Princeton, 1985).
43
Boethius says of the Pythagoreans: ‘they knew that the whole structure of our soul
and body has been joined by means of musical coalescence. For just as one’s physical
state affects feeling, so also the pulses of the heart are increased by disturbed states of
mind.’ Boethius, Fundamentals, Book I, section 1, p.7. The body and soul are intimately
connected, and music can directly impact the mind, purging and modifying mood.
Boethius refers to the Pythagorean use of music in this regard.
44
Boethius, Consolation, Book I.6, p.19. For the strength of this assertion, see Uhlfelder,
‘The Role of the Liberal Arts’, p.23.
45
Boethius, Consolation, Book I.4, p.13.
46
Ibid., Book I.5, verses 23–7, p.16.
through the body’s effect upon the mind, the mind becomes more receptive to the
unpalatable truths that subsequent stronger treatment and the use of reason will
reveal. Third, the action of music connects with pleasure: music presents truths in
an appealing fashion and Boethius responds accordingly.
Music’s therapeutic benefits are limited, however. Although music introduces
harmony to Boethius, it acts largely as a preparation for reason. Moreover, the
transience of sound means that pleasure is temporary:
it is only while one is actually listening that one is filled with pleasure, and
for the wretched, the pain of suffering goes deeper. So as soon as your words
stop sounding in our ears, the mind is weighed down again by its deep seated
melancholy.55
The benefits of the harmony that music establishes as sound are thus partial. Lady
Philosophy agrees: ‘It is true,’ she rejoins, ‘for none of this is meant to be a cure for
your condition, but simply a kind of application to help soothe a grief still resistant
to treatment. When the time comes I will apply something calculated to penetrate
deep inside.’56
The bitter remedies aim to lead Boethius towards ‘true happiness’ and Lady
Philosophy sketches an idea of ‘the cause of happiness’ through reasoned argu-
ment in the hope that Boethius will recognise ‘the pattern of true happiness’.70 To
this end, Lady Philosophy first examines examples of ‘false happiness’ and returns
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid., Book III.12, pp.79, 82–4.
65
Ibid., Book III.12, verses 5–13, pp.82–3.
66
Ibid., Book III.12, verses 20–8, p.83.
67
Ibid., Book IV.1, p.85.
68
On how Boethius re-writes the Orpheus myth see Lerer, Boethius and Dialogue, pp.159–
64; O’Daly, The Poetry of Boethius, pp.188–207.
69
Boethius, Consolation, Book III.12, verses 52–8, p.84.
70
Ibid., Book III.1, p.47.
to beauty, wealth and fame. This time she places them within their proper order,71
suggesting that the happiness they offer is only partially true since humankind
treats them as absolutes apart from God.72 The problem is plain: humankind has a
faint vision of its origin and an instinctive desire to pursue absolute happiness and
goodness, but is misguided and led astray.73 Elucidating the partial goodness of
those things pursued by humankind, Lady Philosophy signals their source, self-suf-
ficient goodness.74
Lady Philosophy informs Boethius that if he turns his ‘mind’s eye in the oppo-
site direction’ he will see the ‘true happiness’ that Lady Philosophy has promised;
she reasons from effect to cause, thereby locating perfect goodness and happiness
in God.75 Lady Philosophy clarifies by contrasting perfect and imperfect goodness,
and perfect and imperfect happiness, focusing on the contrast between unity and
multiplicity, and the striving of all things for unity. Lady Philosophy maintains that
everything strives towards unity.76 The underlying assumption is that unity is iden-
tical with goodness, and therefore that it is true that everything desires goodness.77
This realisation is pivotal to Boethius’s recovery, confirming to him the order of
the world.78
This prepares the way for the confirmation that is shortly to follow, that Boethius
has recovered well. Boethius confirms his belief in God as creator, which he articu-
lated at the beginning of his journey. However, this time Boethius substantiates it
with reasons, saying, ‘I still do think it is beyond doubt, and will always think so. I
will briefly explain the arguments which convince me in this matter’ [my italics].79 The
arguments that he gives are: (1) the unification of the diverse elements of the world
into a whole; (2) the necessity of a power that holds together the unity of diverse
elements; and (3) the necessity of a stable power which maintains the order of
unstable elements.80 All that has gone before has led Boethius to this recognition
that God is the source of everything. Lady Philosophy acknowledges the signifi-
cance of this progression;81 however, to complete the final leg of Boethius’s recov-
ery, Lady Philosophy addresses Boethius’s continuing conviction that although
71
Ibid., Book III.2, pp.49–50. The rest of Book III.3, pp.52–3, deals with wealth; ibid.,
Book III.4, pp.54–6, deals with appointments of high office; ibid., Book III.5, pp.56–8,
deals with power; ibid., Book III.6, pp.58–9, deals with fame; ibid., III.7, pp.59–60, deals
with bodily pleasure.
72
Ibid., Book III.2, p.49; ibid., Book III.8, p.62.
73
Ibid., Book III.3, pp.51–2.
74
Ibid., Book III.9, p.64.
75
Ibid., Book III.10, pp.68–9.
76
Ibid., Book III.11, p.77.
77
Ibid. The main reason for seeking all things is goodness: ‘For it is quite impossible for
that which contains no good in itself whether real or apparent, to be an object of desire.
On the other hand, things which are not good by nature are sought after if they never-
theless seem as if they were truly good.’ Ibid., Book III.10, p.72.
78
Ibid., Book III.11, p.77.
79
Ibid., Book III.12, p.79.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
God orders creation, his order excludes humankind. She does so by echoing her
former assertion that knowing God as the beginning of creation is to know him as
its end. She argues that all things, including humankind, strive towards unity and
therefore goodness, that God is supreme, and that all things thus strive towards
God through their own nature and accord, and not by means of some imposition.82
82
Ibid., Book III.12, p.80.
83
Ibid., Book IV.1, p.85.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid., Book IV.6, p.104. Lady Philosophy is clear that everything that comes under Fate
‘is also subject to Providence’. However, ‘certain things which come under Providence
are above the chain of Fate’. Such things ‘rise above the order of change ruled over by
Fate in virtue of the stability of their position close to the supreme Godhead’. The dis-
tinction between Providence and Fate is not clearly defined, but graduated. Ibid., Book
IV.6, p.105.
86
Ibid., Book IV.6, p.106.
87
Ibid., Book IV.5, verses 18–22, p.103.
Within this final stage, the importance of reason is clear.88 The Consolation has
demonstrated the growing strength of Boethius, such that he can now tackle ques-
tions such as the existence of evil, and problems such as providence and foreknowl-
edge without the sweetening of rhetoric and music. It is pure reason that aids the
remainder of Boethius’s recovery; Lady Philosophy says to Boethius: ‘But seeing
you are so quick of understanding, I will pile the arguments on.’89 As a result, the
sweetness and pleasure of music that coaxed Boethius through the earlier stages of
his treatment now provide a temporary relief to the application of reason:
You are worn out by the prolixity of the reasoning and have been looking for-
ward to the sweetness of song. So take a draught that will refresh you and make
you able to apply your thoughts more closely to further matters.90
Conclusion
The transmission of the Greek worldview to the Latin-speaking world was a central
motivation to Boethius as author, hence the emphasis in his treatises upon number
as the foundation of the created order and music as the manifestation of harmony.
In the Consolation, the guiding principle of Boethius-the-figure’s life – that there
is a divinely instantiated order that gives coherence both to the world and to his
own life – is unsettled by the turn of events that lead to his imprisonment. This
obscures Boethius’s vision so that he is no longer able to make sense of his life and
its place within the larger scheme of the cosmos. He spent time studying the order
of things and yet there seems to be no order to his own life. Over the course of the
Consolation Boethius’s vision is restored; he is able to find meaning in life events.
This occurs through a dialogical interaction with Lady Philosophy, who employs
medicines that simultaneously rely upon and demonstrate the importance of har-
mony and consonance to every level of existence.
Music is important among these medicines. While reason provides the final and
most effective remedy, music is integral throughout the process; it is part of the
fabric of the cosmos and yields knowledge of how things really are. Thus it offers
a way into an imaginative pattern that encourages a reading of the world in terms
of harmony. More significantly, however, music is an action performed by Lady
Philosophy for Boethius, who in experiencing it is affected, and his own mode
of being in the world is altered as a result. The power of music in the narrative of
the Consolation is thus evident: against the physical limitations imposed by the
prison cell, and the psychological obstacles generated by his circumstances, the
performance of music by Lady Philosophy for Boethius has the capacity to draw
Boethius’s gaze so that, rather than being inwardly focused, he turns outwards, rais-
88
Lady Philosophy thinks that ‘useful as it is to know about these matters, they are
somewhat aside from our proposed path’ and that Boethius ‘may be so worn out by
digressions’ that he will be ‘unable to complete the journey.’ Nevertheless, she does as
Boethius wishes. Ibid., Book V.1, p.116.
89
Ibid., Book IV.2, p.90.
90
Ibid., Book IV.6, p.110.
ing his vision beyond the confines of his prison cell, and creating a different under-
standing of his own life and relationship to the world in which he finds himself.
Attempts to situate musical meaning in a metaphysical framework, such as
Boethius’s, are less commonplace now than they once were, and are often plagued
with difficulty when made, since any kind of absolute frame has come to be
regarded as suspicious. However, a case for music as a means of making sense, or
world-making, is still viable in contemporary terms without recourse to a grand
frame. A range of current cultural and sociological accounts of music and its uses
powerfully demonstrate that music can be both what we know and how we know.
Philosophically articulated, and in line with the action of music in the Consolation,
music has the capacity to negotiate the tension between the constraining features
of existence and the transcendence of these, even if this transcendence is only
temporary.91 It is in this manner that music enables individuals to find significance
in their lives by allowing them to relate to the world in different ways: musical
activity can be a primary means of perceiving and interpreting an environment,92
it can enable individuals to create ‘manageable sites of habitation’ when traversing
and inhabiting environments not of their making,93 it can challenge the construc-
tions of existing worlds,94 and it can act variously as a ‘technology of the self ’95 or a
‘prosthetic technology of the body’96 that negotiates the entangled emotional and
physical aspects of existence. Thus, just as music in the Consolation acts upon the
limiting conditions of Boethius’s circumstances, allowing him to find and express
a structure to his life and the world, so it continues to do so. Music remains an
integral means through which humankind tells stories and finds meaning.
91
See Andrew Bowie, ‘Music, Transcendence, and Philosophy’, Music and Transcendence,
ed. Férdia J. Stone-Davis (Aldershot, 2015), pp.213–23.
92
See for example, Steven Feld, ‘Waterfalls of Song: An Acoustemology of Place
Resounding in Bosavi, Papua New Guinea’, Senses of Place, ed. Steven Feld and Keith
Basso (Santa Fe, 1997), pp.90–135.
93
Michael Bull, Sounding Out the City: Personal Stereos and the Management of Everyday
Life (Oxford, 2000), p.2.
94
Férdia J. Stone-Davis, ‘Worldmaking and Worldbreaking: Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer”’,
Contemporary Music Review 34 (2015), 101–20.
95
Tia DeNora, Music in Everyday Life (Cambridge, 2014), p.46.
96
Ibid., p.102.