DUE PROCESS CLAUS
court is reversed and the injunction issued
Ermita Malate Hotel vs. City Mayor of
Manila, G.R. No. L24693, 31 July 1967
Facts
The Ordinance in question was seen to be
violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
Ordinance imposes a P6,000.00 fee per
anum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels; it requires the
owner, manager, keeper, or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining
accepting any guest of customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence. Also, inspections
of such lodging houses would be open for
inspection by the City Mayor or the Chief of
Police; this was seen to be arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive. The lower
court issued an injunction to the Mayor it
was questioned but made permanent.
Issue
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process
clause.
Ruling
That is all then that this case presents.
As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity
of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect
for constitutional law principles so uniformly
held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by
this Court compels a reversal of the
appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower
lifted forthwith. With costs.
There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of
The life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from
or the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly
it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty
"to those strivings for justice" and judges the
act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19decisions based on such
a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases.21
It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an
abdication of the power to govern is inaction
in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure.
It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must
be found in the records, and, as has been
set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the
taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement. Nor does it
lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process
grounds to single out such features as the
increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to
contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
As was explained more in detail in the
above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for
non-useful occupations are also incidental
to the police power and the right to exact a
fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations
are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle
that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware
that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by
Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus:
"One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and
order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good x x x
The liberty of the citizen may be restrained
in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within
the proper scope of the police power."28
To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle
has been consistently upheld that what
makes a statute susceptible to such a
charge is an enactment either forbidding or
requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. Is this the situation before us? A
citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."
Villegas vs. Hiu Chong, G.R. No. L-29646,
10 November 1978
Facts
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho was employed in
Manila then filed a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance no. 6637 and
judgment for Ordinance no. 6537 null and
void. It is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens
who are thus, deprived of their rights to life,
liberty and property and therefore, violates
the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. A writ was
issued by the Judge and declaring
Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.
Issue
Whether respondent judge further
committed a serious and patent error of law
in ruling that ordinance no,. 6537 violated
the due process and equal protection
clauses of the constitution.
Ruling
The ordinance in question violates the due
process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse
it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law.
This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under
the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995,
31 May 1957
Facts
This Court has before it the delicate task of
passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment,
fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and
equal protection of the laws. It also poses
an important issue of fact, that is whether
the conditions which the disputed law
purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. —
Basically a regulation in conducting
business in the Philippines providing strict
measures as to death of the individuals,
certifications, etc.
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the
means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when
the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police
power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or,
shall it be said, the indispensable means for
the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license
and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the
equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be
a reasonable basis for said distinction.
Issue
Ruling
The law in question is deemed absolutely
necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free national
economy from alien control and dominance.
It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (11 Am.
Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to
carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged
by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary,
must be considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
Law expressly held by Constitutional
Convention to be within the sphere of
legislative action. —  . . . . And the guaranty of due process, as
The framers of the Constitution could not
have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment
of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the
exercise of the police power. The fathers of
the Constitution must have given to the
legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and
liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief
that the legislation in question is within the
scope of the legislative power.
As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty
bound to face the problem and meet,
through adequate measures, the danger
and threat that alien domination of retail
trade poses to national economy.
Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend
the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution.
Remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature; they
are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs
against petitioner.
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation
on the exercise of the police power. It has
been stated by the highest authority in the
United States that:
has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to
the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx     xxx     xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is
concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The
courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory,
requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia
vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given
to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional
sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by
the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to
individuals by the Bill of Rights
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes
any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx     xxx     xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must
also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the
annoyance of a particular class, and must
not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec.
302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed.
385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing
its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of
Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this
test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the
Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a
business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the
court is whether the power as exercised has
a sufficient foundation in reason in
the connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of
that power, without substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, comfort, and
general welfare of the public.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional
Convention to be within the sphere of
legislative action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not
have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment
of such a noble motive as freedom from
are economic control and domination, thru the
exercise of the police power. The fathers of
the Constitution must have given to the
legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and
liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief
that the legislation in question is within the
scope of the legislative power.
Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
143802, 16 November 2001
Facts
incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos
Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his
political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an
alleged shootout in Barangay Caparispisan
of said municipality after a heated
altercation between them. After the shooting
incident, petitioner surrendered and placed
himself under the custody of the municipal
police then asked that he be brought to the
Provincial PNP Headquarters in Laoag City.
The next day, August 3, 1999, Police
Chief Inspector Crispin Agno and private
respondent Thelma Benemerito, wife of the
victim, filed a criminal complaint for Murder1
against petitioner at the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch approved by the Ombudsman on June 16,
127, presided by Judge Melvin U. Calvan. 2000.
Owing to the urgency of the matter,
Judge Calvan then conducted a petitioner opted to directly resort to this
preliminary examination of the witnesses, in recourse eschewing the filing of a motion for
accordance with Section 6 (b), Rule 112 of reconsideration on the grounds that —
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, found "the
existence of probable cause," and thereafter Issue
issued an order dated August 3, 1999 for whether or not the proper procedure was
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of followed and whether petitioner's
petitioner with no bail recommended.2 By constitutional rights were safeguarded
virtue of the warrant of arrest, petitioner was during the preliminary investigation
transferred on August 4, 1999 from the conducted before the filing of an Information
Provincial PNP Headquarters to the for Murder against him and the issuance of
Provincial Jail. a warrant for his arrest by respondent
Sandiganbayan.
the appellate court granted the petition for
habeas corpus and ordered the release of Ruling
petitioner from detention subject to the
outcome of the proper preliminary As this Court pointed out in Duterte v.
investigation Sandiganbayan,18 "[t]he purpose of a
preliminary investigation or a previous
Judge Calvan as well as petitioner- inquiry of some kind, before an accused
accused's counter-affidavits, the Ilocos person is placed on trial, is to secure the
Norte Provincial Prosecutor, instead of innocent against hasty, malicious and
conducting a preliminary investigation of his oppressive prosecution and to protect him
own, merely forwarded the said records to from an open and public accusation of a
the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the crime, from the trouble, expenses and
same. anxiety of a public trial…
Although a preliminary investigation is
On January 27, 2000, petitioner received a not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
notice from the Ombudsman directing him to function of the trial court, it is not a casual
file his counter-affidavits. Considering that affair. The officer conducting the same
petitioner had already submitted his investigates or inquires into the facts
counter-affidavits to the Ilocos Norte concerning the commission of the crime with
Provincial Prosecutor as far back as August the end in view of determining whether or
20, 1999, he found the directive superfluous not an information may be prepared against
and did not act on it. the accused… A preliminary investigation
On May 25, 2000, Graft Investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a
Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar issued a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a
Resolution13 recommending the filing of an judicial proceeding when there is an
Information for Murder against petitioner opportunity to be heard and for the
and four others14 before the production of and weighing of evidence, and
Sandiganbayan. The recommendation was a decision is rendered thereon.
 Measured vis-a-vis the foregoing legal the preliminary investigation is conducted by
yardsticks, we hold that the proper an investigating prosecutor, in this case the
procedure in the conduct of the preliminary Ombudsman,42 the determination of
investigation was not followed probable cause by the investigating
First, the records show that the prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis
supposed preliminary investigation was for the issuance by the court of a warrant of
conducted in installments by at least three arrest. This is because the court with whom
(3) different investigating officers, none of the information is filed is tasked to make its
whom completed the preliminary own independent determination of probable
investigation. cause for the issuance of the warrant of
Second, the charge against herein arrest.
petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense.
The gravity of the offense alone, not to All told, the Court cannot accept the
mention the fact that the principal accused Sandiganbayan's assertions of having found
is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment probable cause on its own, considering the
during the pendency of the case would Ombudsman's defective report and findings,
deprive his constituents of their duly-elected which merely relied on the testimonies of
municipal executive, should have merited a the witnesses for the prosecution and
deeper; and more thorough preliminary disregarded the evidence for the defense.
investigation. WHEREFORE, in view of all the
Given the foregoing circumstances, the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Ombudsman for all practical purposes did 1.] SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions of the
an even worse job than Judge Calvan for, Sandiganbayan dated July 13, 2000 and the
by adopting in its entirety the findings of the Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II
investigating officer despite its obvious Cynthia V. Vivar dated May 25, 2000 in
flaws, he actually did nothing at all and, in Criminal Case No. 26115;
effect, threw everything to the 2.] Ordering the Sandiganbayan to QUASH
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. the warrant of arrest it issued against
Third, a person under preliminary petitioner;
investigation by the Ombudsman is entitled 3.] REMANDING the case to the
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman for completion of the
adverse resolution. preliminary investigation.
Fourth, it was patent error for the SO ORDERED
Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the
Ombudsman's certification of probable El Banco Espanol vs. Palanca, G.R. No.
cause given the prevailing facts of this case L-11390, 26 March 1918
much more so in the face of the latter's Facts
flawed report and one-sided factual findings. An action instituted by Banco Espanol-
Filipino to foreclose a mortgage upon
Stated differently, while the task of various parcels of real property in Manila.
conducting a preliminary investigation is The Mortgage in question was executed by
assigned either to an inferior court Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
magistrate or to a prosecutor,41 only a Limquingco as security for a debt he owes
judge may issue a warrant of arrest. When to the bank. The debt exceeded the original
amount borrowed due to an 8% interest per
annum. Palanca died in China where he
was a native of. A publication of summons
were sent but to no avail leading to the
judgment of the Court of First Instance with
no defendant which led to a default. Moving
to the sale of the property in question and
acquired by the Bank.
7 years after a motion from Vicente
Palanca was made. Requesting to set aside
the order of default by the court. Said
request was denied by the court.
Issue
Whether those proceedings were conducted
in such manner as to constitute due process
of law.
Ruling
The conclusions stated in this opinion
indicate that the judgment appealed from is
without error, and the same is accordingly
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
The judgment in question is not void in
any such sense. It is entirely regular in form,
and the alleged defect is one which is not
apparent upon its face. It follows that even if
the judgment could be shown to be void for
want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due
process of law, the party aggrieved thereby
is bound to resort to some appropriate
proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted
principles of law and practice, long
recognized in American courts, a proper
remedy in such case, after the time for
appeal or review has passed, is for the
aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin
the judgment, if not already carried into
effect; or if the property has already been
disposed of he may institute suit to recover
it.
The idea upon which the decision in
Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that
the process from the tribunals of one State
cannot run into other States or countries
and that due process of law requires that
the defendant shall be brought under the
power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary
appearance, in order to authorize the court
to pass upon the question of his personal
liability. The doctrine established by the
Supreme Court of the United States on this
point, being based upon the constitutional
conception of due process of law, is binding
upon the courts of the Philippine Islands.
Involved in this decision is the principle that
in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem
against a nonresident who is not served
personally within the state, and who does
not appear, the relief must be confined to
the res, and the court cannot lawfully render
a personal judgment against him.
We now proceed to a discussion of the
question whether the supposed irregularity
in the proceedings was of such gravity as to
amount to a denial of that "due process of
law" which was secured by the Act of
Congress in force in these Islands at the
time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of
July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with
questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due
process of law the Supreme Court of the
United States has refrained from attempting
to define with precision the meaning of that
expression, the reason being that the idea
expressed therein is applicable under so
many diverse conditions as to make any
attempt ay precise definition hazardous and
unprofitable. As applied to a judicial
proceeding, however, it may be laid down
with certainty that the requirement of due
process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There
must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the disqualification from employment in
defendant or over the property which is government service.
the subject of the proceeding; (3) the President of Combat Security &
defendant must be given an opportunity Executive Protection Agency (CSEPA)
to be heard; and (4) judgment must be Doromal participated in a bidding for the
rendered upon lawful hearing. PPA and filed a complaint against
In the progress of this discussion we Bungbung due to some Balato being
have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the requested from the wife of Doromal for
failure of the clerk to send the notice to the winning the bid. Allegations of expensive
defendant by mail did not destroy the requests by Bungbung was being stated by
jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such Doromal. A “blue book” was given of
irregularity did not infringe the requirement CSEPA where it stated the distribution of
of due process of law. As a consequence of monthly payola or balato being handed out
these conclusions the irregularity in question to PPA officials. Hence, the memo from
is in some measure shorn of its potency. It Ombudsman Mabini for investigation.
is still necessary, however, to consider its Where Bungbung was dismissed from
effect considered as a simple irregularity of service and barred from reemployment. A
procedure; and it would be idle to pretend motion for reconsideration was filed by
that even in this aspect the irregularity is not Bungbung in the CA, after being found
grave enough. From this point of view, guilty, which led to the reversal and
however, it is obvious that any motion to acquitting Bungbung in finality. The
vacate the judgment on the ground of the Ombudsman filed a motion for
irregularity in question must fail unless it reconsideration thus the petition to this
shows that the defendant was prejudiced by court.
that irregularity. The least, therefore, that
can be required of the proponent of such a Issue
motion is to show that he had a good THE reliance by the ombudsman on the
defense against the action to foreclose the affidavits of roberto doromal and his
mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, witness in determining [bungubung]'s
shown either in the motion or in the affidavit administrative liability was proper. IT
which accompanies the motion. DID NOT DEPRIVE [BUNGUBUNG] OF
DUE PROCESS;
Ombudsaman Simeon V. Marcelo vs.
Leopoldo F. Bungubung, G.R. No. Ruling
175201, 23 April 2008 The present Petition must fail.
Facts based solely on position papers,
Ombudsman Marcelo found manager of affidavits or documentary evidence
the Post Distrct Office Leopoldo Bungbung submitted by the parties as affidavits of
adiminstratively liable for grave misconduct, witnesses may take the place of their
dismissing him from the service and direct testimonies.
imposing the accessory penalties of Before proceeding to the merits of the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of instant Petition, this Court deems it
retirement benefits, and his perpetual necessary to first address the allegation of
Bungubung that he was denied due process
by the Ombudsman. The fact that no formal
hearing took place is not sufficient ground to
say that due process was not afforded
Bungubung. It is well-settled that in
administrative proceedings, including those
before the Ombudsman, cases may be
submitted for resolution on the basis of
affidavits and pleadings. The standard of
due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due
process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimonies.20 Undoubtedly, due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of,21 which requirement was
afforded Bungubung.22
In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa
Pilipinas v. National Labor Relations
Commission,23 this Court held that:
[A]ctual adversarial proceeding becomes
necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to propound searching
questions to unclear witnesses. This is a
procedural right which the employee must,
however, ask for it is not an inherent right,
and summary proceedings may be
conducted. This is to correct the common
but mistaken perception that procedural due
process entails lengthy oral arguments.
Hearings in administrative proceedings and
before quasi-judicial agencies are neither
oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes
where cross examination skills are
displayed. Non-verbal devices such as
written explanations, affidavits, positions
papers or other pleadings can establish just
as clearly and concisely aggrieved parties'
predicament or defense. What is essential is
ample opportunity to be heard, meaning,
every kind of assistance that management
must accord the employee to prepare
adequately for his defense.
After the filing of the Complaint, Bungubung
was allowed by the Ombudsman to submit
the following: (a) a counter-affidavit refuting
the charges against him; (b) a rejoinder-
affidavit; and (c) a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 11 January 2005
Order of the Ombudsman. Moreover,
Bungubung had the option to subject the
case to a formal investigation, but his
Manifestation dated 21 February 2002
before the Ombudsman was evidence that
he did not choose to do so and, instead,
agreed to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the affidavits on record. These
facts establish that Bungubung was not
deprived of his right to due process, having
ample opportunity to present his side before
the Ombudsman. In fact, it was only later on
in a Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002
that Doromal changed his mind and
informed the Ombudsman that he was
opting instead for the conduct of a formal
investigation.
Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29
December 1986.
Facts
Due process was invoked by petitioner on a
number of presidential decrees due to non-
publication. The government stated that
“otherwise provided” is controlling with
regards to any decree that were not
published but was passed to be effective
upon approval.
Issue
Whether or not the publication of the law will
deny an individual due process of law

Ruling
Publication is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the
disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern the legislature could validly provide
that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with but
simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only
of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive
presumption that every person knows the
law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is
to have any legal justification at all. It is no
less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to,
among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all
laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after
fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Javier vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. L-68379-81, 22 September 1986
Facts
The petitioner and the private respondent
were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of
being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the
eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial
for these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and
sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters
against supporting the Opposition candidate
or into supporting the candidate of the ruling
party. It was in this atmosphere that the
voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondent's
proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the
canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private
respondent was proclaimed winner by the also appear to be impartial as an added
Second Division of the said body. assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just.16 The litigants are entitled to no
Issue less than that. They should be sure that
Whether or not due process was denied by when their rights are violated they can go to
the comelec in the canvassing of election a judge who shall give them justice. They
returns to Evelio Javier must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his
Ruling sense of fairness, otherwise they will not
Another matter deserving the highest seek his judgment. Without such
consideration of this Court but accorded confidence, there would be no point in
cavalier attention by the respondent invoking his action for the justice they
Commission on Elections is due process of expect.
law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair
play which is the hallmark of the free Due process is intended to insure that
society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. confidence by requiring compliance with
Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments
he was formerly a law partner of the private of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice.
respondent, he obstinately insisted on There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
participating in the case, denying he was approaches a court already committed to
biased. 14 the other party and with a judgment already
Given the general attitude of the made and waiting only to be formalized after
Commission on Elections toward the party the litigants shall have undergone the
in power at the time, and the particular charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
relationship between Commissioner Opinion also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
and MP Pacificador, one could not be at orchestrated plays in which the parties are
least apprehensive, if not certain, that the supposed to make the motions and reach
decision of the body would be adverse to the denouement according to a prepared
the petitioner. As in fact it was. script. There is no writer to foreordain the
Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
himself and his objection to the transfer of only after all the evidence is in and all the
the case to another division cannot be arguments are filed, on the basis of the
justified by any criterion of propriety. His established facts and the pertinent law.
conduct on this matter belied his wounded
protestations of innocence and proved the The relationship of the judge with one of the
motives of the Second Division when it parties may color the facts and distort the
rendered its decision. law to the prejudice of a just decision.
Where this is probable or even only
This Court has repeatedly and consistently posssible, due process demands that the
demanded "the cold neutrality of an judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of
impartial judge" as the indispensable delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must
imperative of due process. 15 To bolster be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion,
that requirement, we have held that the being a lawyer, should have recognized his
judge must not only be impartial but must duty and abided by this well-known rule of
judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he
divested the Second Division of
necessary vote for the questioned decision,
assuming it could act, and rendered the
proceeding null and void. 17
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the
records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision
of the Commission on Elections dated July
23, 1984, set aside as violative of the
Constitution.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, 27
February 1940 (REQUISITES OF ADMIN
PROCEEDING)
Facts
The case is a motion for new trial given the
factual antecedent regarding a contract of
Toribio with the Philippine Army, unfair labor
practices conducted by said individual.
Issue
Whether or not a motion for new trial be
granted.
Ruling
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant and otherwise proceed
accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.
The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
the requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings
of this character:
The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.
3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached."
4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.
G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial."
5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
in least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.

7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here
that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National
Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law.
we have come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts
is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result.
Further the SC enumerated the requisites of
administrative due process embodied as
primary rights:
1.The right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof.
2. the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented
3.The decision must have something to
support itself
4. the evidence must be "substantial"
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected
6. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7. The CIR should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered.
NASECORE vs. ERC, G.R. No. 163935, 2
February 2006
Facts
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA)
No. 9136, known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) on
June 8, 2001.
The ERC was created under the
EPIRA.3 The said regulatory body
superseded the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) which was created under Executive
Order (EO) No. 172, as amended.4 The
ERC is tasked to promote competition,
encourage market development, ensure
customer choice and penalize abuse of
market power in the restructured electricity
industry.
u) The ERC shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties
imposed by the ERC in the exercise of the
abovementioned powers, functions and
responsibilities and over all cases involving
disputes between and among participants or
players in the energy sector.
Section 36 of the EPIRA required every
distribution utility to file its revised rates for
the approval of the ERC.
After a series of hearings, the ERC
rendered the Decision dated March 20,
2003, approving MERALCO’s unbundled
schedule of rates effective on the next billing
cycle. However, in the same decision, the
ERC directed MERALCO, among others:
a) To discontinue charging the PPA
[Purchased Power Adjustment] upon
effectivity of the approved unbundled rates;
After taking into consideration the positions
of the distribution utilities and the consumer
groups, the ERC promulgated the Order
dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No.
2003-44. In the said order, the ERC adopted
the Implementing Rules for the Recovery of
Fuel and Independent Power Producer
Costs: Generation Rate Adjustment
Mechanism (GRAM) and the Implementing
Rules for the Recovery of the Incremental
Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment
(ICERA). These implementing rules were all
contained or incorporated in the aforesaid
order.
Ruling
It would be allegedly violative of due
process to require respondent MERALCO to
comply with Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR
of the EPIRA and subject it to a long and
tedious process of recovering its fuel and
purchased power costs. Such would be
contrary to the intent and purpose of the
GRAM Implementing Rules.
On the other hand, respondent MERALCO
refutes the petitioners’ claim of denial of due
process. It alleges that the petitioners were
given every opportunity to be heard in a
public consultation and submit their written
comments. Respondent MERALCO quotes
the ERC Order dated February 24, 2003
containing the GRAM Implementing Rules
which states that the same was issued only
after the ERC "has taken into consideration
all the documents, data, comments and
concerns raised by all the parties concerned
who have submitted their respective
positions thereon."
Respondent MERALCO contends that the
petitioners cannot deny any knowledge of
the GRAM Implementing Rules particularly
on the manner and timeline for filing an
application for GRAM and the period within
which the ERC must act and decide
thereon. Accordingly, even without need of
publication, posting and service to the local
government units concerned, the petitioners
should have allegedly filed their opposition
to respondent MERALCO’s amended
application to increase its generation
charge. Further, they should have filed their
comment or opposition thereon within the
forty-five (45) day-period within which the
ERC was required to render its decision.
The petitioners’ omission is allegedly fatal to
their present cause of action.
Respondent MERALCO observes that the
petitioners did not appeal the Order dated
February 24, 2003 of the ERC adopting the
GRAM Implementing Rules. Neither have
they allegedly shown that they were
deprived of their right to be heard when the
said rules were promulgated. For this lapse,
respondent MERALCO stresses that the
petitioners have no personality to claim
denial of due process and prays that the
Court dismiss the present petition.
Indeed, the basic postulate of due
process ordains that the consumers be
notified of any application, and be apprised
of its contents, that would result in
compounding their economic burden. In this
case, the consumers have the right to be
informed of the bases of respondent
MERALCO’s amended application for the
increase of its generation charge in order to,
if they so desire, effectively contest the
same. The following pronouncements are
quite apropos:
With the publication of the application
itself, the consumers would right from the
start be equipped with the needed
information to determine for themselves
whether to contest the application or not and
if they so decide, to take the needed further
steps to repulse the application. On the
other hand, the imposition on the ERC to
consider the comments of the customers
and the LGUs concerned extends the
comforting assurance that their interest will
be taken into account. Indeed,
requirements address the right of the
consuming public to due process at the
same time advance the cause of people
empowerment which is also a policy goal of
the EPIRA along with consumer protection.
The requirement of due process is not
some favor or grace that the ERC may dole
out on a bout of whim or on occasion of
charity. Rather, it is a statutory right to which
the consuming public is entitled.
… apprehension of being subjected to a long
The requirement of publication
applications for rate adjustment is not
without reason or purpose. It is ancillary to
the due process requirement of notice and
hearing. Its purpose is not merely to inform
the consumers that an application for rate
adjustment has been filed by the public
utility. It is to adequately inform them that an
application has been made for
adjustment of the rates being implemented
by the public utility in order to afford them
the opportunity to be heard and submit their
stand as to the propriety
reasonableness of the of the rates within the
period allowed by the Rule. Without the
publication of the application,
consumers are left to second-guess the
substance and merits of the application.
Such power is intended precisely for
the ERC to, as Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno
in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
succinctly put it, "be able to swiftly and
flexibly respond to the exigencies of the
times."33 He elucidated further on the
raison d’etre of the power of interim rate-
regulation particularly in the context of our
country’s economic history:
…Our economic history teaches us that the
Philippines is vulnerable to the rapid
fluctuations in the exchange rate. In recent
years, we saw how numerous industries
the failed to survive the Asian financial crises
fueled by the uncertainties of exchange
rates. All these have had adverse financial
impact on public utilities such as Meralco in
terms of skyrocketing costs of debt
servicing, and maintenance and operating
expenses. A regulator such as the ERC
should have sufficient power to respond in
real time to changes wrought by multifarious
factors affecting public utilities.34
Thus, respondent MERALCO’s
in and tedious process with respect to the
recovery of its fuel and purchased power
costs is, in fact, addressed by the power of
the ERC to grant provisional rate
adjustments. The ERC is not, of course,
precluded from promulgating rules,
guidelines or methodology, such as the
GRAM, for the recovery by the distribution
the utilities of their fuel and purchased power
costs. However, these rules, guidelines or
methodology so adopted should conform to
the requirements of pertinent laws, including
and Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the
EPIRA.35
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed
the Article 2 of the Civil Code, provides that
"laws shall take after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of Office of the National Administrative
general circulation in the Philippines, unless Register (ONAR), the said implementing
it is otherwise provided." rules and regulations were not likewise filed
The basic requirement of publication of with the said office in contravention of the
statutes was explained in Tañada v. Administrative Code of 1987.38
Tuvera36 as follows: Applying the doctrine enunciated in
We hold therefore that all statutes, including Tañada, the Court has previously declared
those of local application and private laws, as having no force and effect the following
shall be published as a condition for their administrative issuances: (1) Rules and
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of
after publication unless a different effectivity Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
date is fixed by the legislature. Accreditation Committee regarding the
Covered by this rule are presidential accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics
decrees and executive orders promulgated and laboratories;39 (2) Letter of Instruction
by the President in the exercise of No. 1416 ordering the suspension of
legislative powers whenever the same are payments due and payable by distressed
validly delegated by the legislature, or at copper mining companies to the national
present, directly conferred by the government;40 (3) Memorandum Circulars
Constitution. Administrative rules and issued by the Philippine Overseas
regulations must also be published if their Employment Administration regulating the
purpose is to enforce or implement existing recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong
law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Kong;41 (4) Administrative Order No.
Interpretative regulations and those merely SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the International Trading Corporation regulating
personnel of the administrative agency and applications for importation from the
not the public, need not be published. People’s Republic of China;42 (5)
Neither is publication required of the so- Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10
called letters of instructions issued by issued by the Department of Budget and
administrative superiors concerning the Management discontinuing the payment of
rules or guidelines to be followed by their other allowances and fringe benefits to
subordinates in the performance of their government officials and employees;43 and
duties.37 (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2
Nowhere from the above narration Series of 1983 which provided for the
does it show that the GRAM Implementing schedule of placement and documentation
Rules was published in the Official Gazette fees for private employment agencies or
or in a newspaper of general circulation. authority holders.44
Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both In all these cited cases, the administrative
the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules issuances questioned therein were
uniformly provide that they "shall take effect uniformly struck down as they were not
immediately." These clauses made no published or filed with the National
mention of their publication in either the Administrative Register.
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of The Court likewise emphasized therein
general circulation. Moreover, per the that the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of
Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the
the people to information on matters of
public concern."48
With respect to the GRAM Implementing
Rules, its publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation is
mandated by the fact that these rules seek
to implement key provisions of the EPIRA.
More importantly, the GRAM Implementing
Rules, insofar as it lays down the procedure
by which generation costs of distribution
utilities are recovered, affect ultimately the
public as consumers of electricity and who
pay the charges therefor.
Clearly, the GRAM Implementing
Rules affects the public inasmuch as it
determines the costs of electricity
consumption. The public, not only the
parties to the cases before the ERC, has the
right to be apprised of the contents of the
GRAM Implementing Rules by publication of
the same in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines – to the end that it be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition it may have, and to ventilate its
stance on the matter.49
In light of the foregoing disquisition, the
assailed ERC Order dated June 2, 2004 in
ERC Case No. 2004-112 approving the
increase of respondent MERALCO’s
generation charge from ₱3.1886 to ₱3.3213
per kWh effective immediately is nullified for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed ERC
Order dated June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No.
2004-112 is DECLARED VOID and
accordingly SET ASIDE.
Napare vs. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426,
31 January 2008
Facts
Respondent Amando Barbarona is the
registered owner of Lot No. 3177, situated in
Barangay San Sotero (formerly Tambis),
Javier, Leyte and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7350. Lot
No. 3176, covered by OCT No. 1110 in the
name of Anacleto Napere, adjoins said lot
on the northeastern side. After Anacleto
died, his son, Juan Napere, and the latter’s
wife, herein petitioner, planted coconut trees
on certain portions of the property with the
consent of his co-heirs. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that in April 1980, the
spouses Napere, their relatives and hired
laborers, by means of stealth and strategy,
encroached upon and occupied the
northeastern portion of Lot No. 3177; that
the Naperes harvested the coconut fruits
thereon, appropriated the proceeds thereof,
and, despite demands, refused to turn over
possession of the area; that in April 1992, a
relocation survey was conducted which
confirmed that the respondents’ property
was encroached upon by the Naperes; that
on the basis of the relocation survey, the
respondents took possession of this
encroached portion of the lot and harvested
the fruits thereon from April 1993 to
December 1993; but that in January 1994,
the Naperes repeated their acts by
encroaching again on the respondents’
property, harvesting the coconuts and
appropriating the proceeds thereof, and
refusing to vacate the property on demand.
Issue
Whether or not due process was denied
Ruling
The Court has repeatedly declared that
failure of the counsel to comply with his duty
to inform the court of the death of his client,
such that no substitution is effected, will not
invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the
death of such party.5 The trial court’s
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite
the death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party
is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision. The party alleging nullity
must prove that there was an undeniable
violation of due process.6
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by
heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process.7 The rule on
substitution was crafted to protect every
party’s right to due process.8 It was
designed to ensure that the deceased party
would continue to be properly represented
in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his
estate.9 Moreover, non-compliance with the
Rules results in the denial of the right to due
process for the heirs who, though not duly
notified of the proceedings, would be
substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when
there is a denial of due process, as when
the deceased is not represented by any
legal representative or heir, that the court
nullifies the trial proceedings and the
resulting judgment therein.11
Formal substitution by heirs is not
necessary when they themselves voluntarily
appear, participate in the case, and present
evidence in defense of the deceased.12 In
such case, there is really no violation of the
right to due process. The essence of due
process is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence available
in support of one’s defense.13 When due
process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and
protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
validity of a promulgated decision.14
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court
and the judgment rendered therein because
the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-
defendant of the deceased, actively
participated in the case. The records show
that the counsel of Juan Napere and
petitioner continued to represent them even
after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel,
petitioner was able to adequately defend
herself and the deceased in the proceedings
below. Due process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard and this opportunity
was not denied petitioner.
Finally, the alleged denial of due
process as would nullify the proceedings
and the judgment thereon can be invoked
only by the heirs whose rights have been
violated. Violation of due process is a
personal defense that can only be asserted
by the persons whose rights have been
allegedly violated.15 Petitioner, who had
every opportunity and who took advantage
of such opportunity, through counsel, to
participate in the trial court proceedings,
cannot claim denial of due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 9, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 56457,
is AFFIRMED.