Chapter Five

Virtue ethics (Part One)

Self-actualization ethics,
Distributive justice and
Ethics of care
 Basic concepts and issues
• Although differing in the answers they give,
the consequentialist and deontological
theories both address the same questions:
“What am I obliged to do?” “What is the
right action to do?” “Is this act or that act
morally right?”
• Virtue ethics, rather than focusing on right
or wrong actions, concentrates on the
character of the agent.
• It answers the question: “What kind of
person should I be?”
• It is more interested not in what makes an
act right, but in what makes a person good.
• The starting point for virtue ethics is not the
question of what acts are right or wrong, but
what characters are virtuous or vicious.

• The virtuous person is not simply one who

does the right act; rather, the virtuous person is
one who consistently does the right acts for the
right motives.
 A. Self-actualization ethics
• Aristotle’s(384-322 BCE)
ethics is mainly derived
from the philosophical
treatise, Nicomachean
ethics (so named because
his son Nicomachus is said
to have edited the work
after his father’s death).
• Aristotle opens his treatise with a definition of
good: “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly
every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at
some good, and for this reason the good has
rightly been declared to be that at which all
things aim.”
• Thus, there can be various things that can be
considered good such as health, power, victory,
and wealth.
• Aristotle then further inquires: “But what is it
that we desire for its own sake, and end which
determines all other desires? What is intrinsically
and ultimately good, and not merely
instrumental to some other good?”
• Money, for example, is an instrumental good for
no one derives complete satisfaction in gazing at
money. But we desire money for the sense of
security which it affords or the many things one
can but with it.
 Eudaimonia
• It is the Telos (ultimate aim or function) of all
human actions, which has been roughly translated
as “happiness.”
• Aristotle: “We always choose happiness as an end-
in-itself and never for the sake of something else.”
• It is also translated as “well-being,” “flourishing” or
“living well” – which is said to be nearer to the
Greeks’ understanding of the term.
• No person tries to be happy for the sake of some
further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the
ultimate end (intrinsic good), and all other goals –
fame, money, health – are sought because they lead
to happiness, not because they are what happiness
consists in (instrumental good).
• The question now is: “How do we know our
happiness if happiness itself is relative from person
to person?” A child definitely has a different
requirement from an adult.
 Entelechy
• An inherent force that drives all beings from
their potential states to reaching their telos or
actualities.
• A seed is bound to become a tree so is an
infant to become an adult. The “psyche” or
soul is the entelechy within us humans since
we are an embodied spirit or a formed matter.
• As from Aristotle: “The Good at which all
things aim is their entelechy.”

• All things are purposive, this is to reach their

inherent goals. However, some interference
can obstruct this path; death, disability and
poverty are primary examples.
• As from the Greek maxim: “Mens sana in
corpore sano” which means A healthy mind
in a healthy body.
• We need physical, social, emotional
nourishment in as much as we need
intellectual pursuits.
• Wealth, according to Aristotle is not a
guarantee to happiness but poverty is a
hindrance as well to its attainment.
• Aristotle: “Man is a political animal.”
• Aristotle: “He who is outside the society is
either a beast or a God.”
• Nobody is self-sufficient. Our essence as
humans is dependent on our utilization of
our inherent intellectual, creative and social
faculties, only possible within a human
community.
 Telos
• A being’s essence or nature lies in its unique or proper
function. And the fulfillment of one’s nature is what
leads to happiness. Entelechy came from this root word.
• Example: A good knife is functional if it cuts well, or if
a flute player plays the flute well he or she is also
functional.
• The proper and peculiar end or goal of human beings is
to live a life in accordance with reason.
• Aristotle: “Man is a rational animal.”

• Although we share some faculties like

growth with plants and animals, sentience
and mobility with animals, the cultivation
and enhancement of our rational faculty
prevails over other lower faculties of desire
and passion.
 Concept of Arete
• Aristotle: Attainment of life in accordance with reason
“consists in the activity of the soul in conformity with
virtue (arete).”
• He categorizes virtue into two kinds: (a.) intellectual –
owes its origin and development chiefly to teaching,
and (b.) moral virtues – is formed by habit.
• The former enables us to think rationally while the
latter enables us to handle our desires and emotions
rationally.
 Nine intellectual virtues
Primary virtues Secondary virtues

Good deliberation
Craft or artistic skill (tehne)
or resourcefulness

Scientific reasoning (episteme) Understanding

Intuitive understanding (nous) Judgment

Philosophical wisdom (sophia) Cleverness

Practical reasoning (phronesis,

cannot be taught)
• Only practical wisdom cannot be taught, as it
is learned through experience.
• Endowments unlike virtue, are given by
nature. We receive the power of using them
and only later exercise them just like our sight
and hearing.
• Moral virtues need practice since they do not
exist in nature. They are like mastering our
skills in arts.
• Virtue emanates from continuous, repeated
practice of doing the right action.
• As the saying goes: “You can act yourself into
right thinking, but you can’t think yourself into
right acting.”
• It is a state of character and thus internally
located. Contrasted with moral action which is
an external exercise or overt act.
• To have a certain character demands that it
becomes a part of one’s nature or personality.
• Moral action is doing the right thing, to the
right person, at the right time, in the right
manner and to the right extent.
• Virtue demands that the right act flow
effortlessly from the personality as its
characteristic trait.
• It is possible for a person to do the right
thing without being virtuous just as it is
possible for a virtuous person to succumb to
an immoral deed without his or her virtuous
nature forfeited.
• One is truly virtuous when one
experiences pleasure rather than pain
when acting virtuously.
• While Kant discourages feelings and emotions
to figure in the performance of a morally right
act, Aristotle believes that feelings and emotions
are an integral part of the morality of our
actions.
• Emphasizing the emotive or affective character of
morality, Aristotle stresses that good education
involves bringing up people from childhood to
feel pleasure and pain towards the proper things.
 The doctrine of the mean
• Virtue is the mean between the two extremes of our
emotions and desires, as well as the actions that they
motivate.
• The undesirable character trait of either the “extreme
of excess” or the “extreme of deficiency” is what vice
is.
• As from the Greek maxim: “Meden agan” which
means: “Nothing in excess. ”
 Mike Martin’s summary of Aristotle’s
moral virtues
Sphere of action: Type of Vice of too Virtue or Vice of too little
Kind of situation emotion or much or excess mean or deficiency
attitude
Responses to Fear, Foolhardiness Courage Cowardice
danger confidence
Satisfaction of Physical Overindulgence Temperance Inhibition
appetites pleasure
Giving gifts Desire to help Extravagance Generosity Miserliness
Pursuit of Desire to Vaulting Proper Unambitionless
accomplishments succeed ambition ambition
Appraisal of Self- confidence Vanity Proper pride Sense of
oneself inferiority
Sphere of action: Type of Vice of too Virtue or Vice of too little
Kind of situation emotion or much or excess mean or deficiency
attitude

Self-expression Desire to be Boastfulness Truthfulness False modesty

recognized

Response to Anger Irascibility Patience Apathy

insults

Social Attitudes to Obsequiousness Friendliness Rudeness

conduct others

Awareness of Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness

one’s flaws

Conversation or Amusement Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness

humor
• It is important to note that there are virtues
that are closer to the mean, for example,
foolhardiness or overconfidence is closer to
courage than cowardice.
• The mean is not applicable to all situations.
Such actions whose very names connote
baseness as in the case of adultery, envy, murder,
etc., there is no such thing as a balanced type.
 Aristotle’s formal relativism
• Aristotle notes that the mean between extremes
does not lie in the act, but is relative to the
moral agent (circumstantial).
• While ten pounds of food is the mean for a
weightlifter, it is not for an infant; or giving fifty
pesos to the typhoon victims is a generous act
from a street vendor but considered stingy for a
billionaire businessman.
 Evaluating Aristotle’s virtue ethics
1. One of the principal criticisms raised against
Aristotle’s virtue ethics is that it fails to lay down a
clear basis to determine what we ought to do and
not to do.
• Although he speaks about acting in accordance with
virtue, such a moral directive seems vague, since one
may be serving the wrong cause by doing what is
virtuous.
2. Also, it seems that neither Aristotle’s directive to look
for the mean is able to provide the needed guidance in
distinguishing between right and wrong in every
situation since what is too much and what is too little
are not quantities on a single scale.
• While he gave several aspects to consider as indicated in
the words, “right time, right object, right person, right
motive, right way,” there is no clear measure to
determine if what is right and moderate has been
achieved after committing or failing to commit an act.
3. It commits a fallacy of circular reasoning.
Saying that an act is virtuous if it is an act
done by a virtuous person, and then
describing a virtuous person as one who is
disposed to do a virtuous act.

• We first have to know what is right before we

can identify someone as a virtuous person.
4. Its claim that we have just one distinctive
function i.e. reasoning.

• Theories such as existentialism and

postmodernism question the idea that there
is such a universal, objective and pre-
conceived nature of human beings.
• Martin’s evaluation of Aristotle’s notion of human
function stresses that humans can do things that
are not reducible to reason like living by religious
faith or being altruistic. Humans cannot have a
function independent of their volition.
• This is the same reaction of Hume through his
“is” and “ought” argument. The world of values is
different from the world of facts.
• It is questionable to claim that natural facts can
tell us what we ought to be. We cannot derive our
moral values from non-moral natural facts.
• Goodness and values should not be confined to
the human capacity to reason. It lies instead in
the developing capacities we share with other
animals; for example, the capacity to care for a
member of one’s species, or even members of
other species.
 Merits of self-actualization ethics
1. Good character is an essential aspect of living a
moral life.
• It is not enough that one knows what the
right action is in order for one to perform
such action.
• Character traits are stable, fixed and reliable
dispositions.
2. It is not so much interested in encouraging
us to act according to the moral duties we
have to each other but to develop ourselves
as fully as possible by identifying the moral
ideal for which we should strive.
3. The utilization of practical wisdom (phronesis).
• It is the capacity that requires a general
conception of what is good or bad (related to the
conditions of human flourishing), the ability to
perceive, in light of the general conception,
what is required in terms of feeling, choice, and
action in a particular situation, the ability to
deliberate well, and the ability to act on that
deliberation.
• Deontologists and consequentialists stress
the point that their action-guiding principles
cannot, reliably, be applied without practical
wisdom, because the correct application
requires situational appreciation – the capacity
to recognize, in any particular situation, its
morally salient features.
 B. Distributive justice
• Distribution is an integral part of any human
organization (family, company, society, etc.).
• Depending on the nature of the organization,
certain things (resources, economic goods,
workload, rights, duties, sacrifices, etc.) need to
be distributed for the organization to function
well.
• To achieve the organization’s goals, its
distribution must be efficient, systematic and
well-organized.
• In addition, they must also be fair in that
persons involved are given what they deserve to
receive.
• To be treated fairly may serve as a motivation to
perform well, but more importantly, it is a basic
right of persons.
• The morality of distributions is evaluated in terms
of their fairness. A distribution that is morally good,
in this light, is one that is fair; and a distribution
that is morally bad is one that is unfair.
• Distributive justice is a philosophical study that
concerns the critical examination of the claims,
arguments and practical applications of the
different perspectives of what constitutes fair
distribution.
 Foundations of distributive justice

• We need to address two questions:

First, “In what way is justice an ethical
concept?”, Second, “In what way is distributive
justice a fundamental kind of justice?”
 Justice as virtue
• For both Plato and Aristotle, as it was for the other
Greek philosophers, virtue (arete) refers to the
“excellence of a thing, and hence to the
disposition to perform effectively its proper
function. ”
• Excellence, for both is attributed to individual
virtues necessarily forming a unity – called “unity
thesis” by scholars.
Plato (428-347 BCE)
believes that the human
individual and state have
corresponding functions
such that social justice is
basically seen as having the
same structure as
individual human justice.
• A human organism is composed of body and
soul, which is the more essential component.

• A body whose parts work harmoniously

achieves excellence in the form of health while
society achieves it in the form of justice.
 The allegory of the chariot
• The individual soul (psyche) has three fundamental elements:

Faculty Corresponding virtue

Reason Wisdom (sophia)
Spirit (passion, will or
Courage (andreia)
volition)
Temperance, self-control or
Appetite (or desire)
moderation (sophrosyne)
• When reason dictates both passions and
appetites, human justice will be achieved.
Justice (dikaiosyne) is the master virtue of the
soul.
• In the chariot, the white, noble breed is the
passion, the black, ignoble breed is the
appetite. The charioteer is the reason and must
be in control of both the horses moving in
opposing directions.
 The noble lie
Plato believes that the ideal state should
consist of three main classes as indicated
below:
Guardians or
philosopher-kings:
Must master
wisdom
Auxiliaries or
soldiers: Must
Justice or
master Dikaiosyne
courage
Workers (artisans, farmers
and merchants): Must
master temperance
• His noble lie emphasizes the inherent differences of
people through their possession of skills: rulers are
gold, soldiers are silver and the workers are brass.
• This is one of the earliest versions of Utopia
(etymologically means nowhere).
• Social classes should not interfere with one another’s
functions. The result is the confusion of roles, loss of
objectivity in carrying out one’s roles and eventually
disharmony and instability of the city-state.
 Aristotle’s account of justice
• He distinguishes two senses of justice:
a. General sense – justice is defined as lawfulness or
being law-abiding;
b. Particular sense – justice i s defined as fairness.
• In equating justice with lawfulness, ideally the
laws of the state are intended to cultivate all the
moral virtues (excellence of character) of the
citizens.
• The existence of the state is morally
legitimate if its laws are intended to aid
people to develop the right habits.

• Justice, in this sense is described by Aristotle

as complete virtue, the complete package of
moral virtues therefore a system virtue.
• In equating justice with fairness, the just
person is considered fair in his or her
dealings with other people.

• Justice here is treated as an individual virtue

and on the same level as individual virtues.
 Two kinds of justice as fairness:

a. Distributive justice (justice in distribution)

• refers to the fairness in allocating or
distributing benefits and burdens.
b. Corrective justice (justice in rectification)
• refers to the fairness in correcting injustices
or in restoring justice.
 Principle of proportionality
• The formula to determine fairness in both kinds of
particular justice.
• In distributive justice, people should receive things
from their group in proportion to their
contributions to the success of the goals of the group.
• In corrective justice, it includes the right amount of
both punishment and compensation to correct an
injustice.
 Kinds of justice
1. Distributive justice – as already noted,
refers to the fair contribution or allocation
of certain things, which are generally
classified as burdens and benefits.
• Example: Parents assigning household
chores in determining their allowances or
students dividing their tasks for a project.
 2. Retributive or retaliatory justice
• Refers to the fair imposition of punishments
and penalties on those guilty of performing
wrongful acts to other persons. It is closely
connected to the notion of accountability.
• The imposition of punishment is fair if: the
person deserves to be punished or it is
proportional to the degree of accountability.
 Two controversial issues of retaliatory
justice
1. Whether there can be an objective way of
determining the commensurability of the
degree of punishment to the degree of
accountability.
• “An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth”
standard does not seem to work on some cases.
Example: Should rapists be raped?
2. The question of whether the primary goal
of punishment is to make the wrongdoer
suffer or to restrain him or her from
performing the same wrongdoing (making
punishment a secondary priority).
 3. Compensatory justice
• Fair way of compensating people, usually by providing
them certain goods, for what they lost as a result of
wrongful actions done to them.
• As assumed, people lost certain things such as resources,
functionality (attacked or injured), or well-being or
balance (embarrassed or put to shame).
• To measure the sufficiency of compensation is not
objective however, as some lost goods cannot be restored.
 4. Procedural justice
• Fairness in the process by which a decision
is made, especially in resolving disputes and
allocating resources.

• It is usually associated with the legal concept

of due process.
• Fairness of procedures includes the following
components: (a.) consistency in the
implementation of procedures, (b.) objectivity
or impartiality of those implementing the
procedures, (c.) representation of affected
persons in the formulation of procedures; and
(d.) transparency in the implementation of
procedures.
• Distributive justice is the most fundamental in
that it accommodates the other kinds or is
essentially involved in them.
• Procedural justice concerns fairness in
processes or procedures that include those
involved in distributions.
• Retributive and compensatory justice are
regarded as objects to be distributed.
 Theories of distributive justice
1. Egalitarian justice – this theory claims that certain
distribution is fair if every member of a group
receives an equal share of the distribution.
• Two versions of egalitarianism:
a. Political egalitarianism – all citizens should enjoy
the same basic legal rights (right to suffrage,
education and due process) regardless of color,
ethnicity and social class guaranteed by the state.
b. Economic egalitarianism – all citizens should
enjoy the same basic economic goods or
resources such as those pertaining to health,
shelter and income (like what is contained in
the minimum wage law and laws on tax
exemptions) guaranteed by the state.
c. Luck egalitarianism – concerns whether all
instances of inequality, which put people at a
disadvantageous position, are unfair.
• As a modern version of egalitarianism, only
inequalities brought about by bad luck are unfair, say,
people have no control over or they are not responsible
for.
• Lippert-Rasmussen used the place and time where
apartheid was practiced as an example. Being black is
not something within our control and we do not
deserve to suffer.
• In contrast, inequalities we are responsible for are fair
because whatever disadvantages may bring us are our own
doing.
 2. Capitalist justice
• Claims that a certain distribution is fair if every
member of a group receives his or her share in the
distribution in proportion to his or her contribution
to the success of the goals of the group.
• A kind of justice system that thrives in the free
market system where the monetary value of goods and
human labor is determined by the market forces, such
as how they fare in an open and free competition, and
the law of supply and demand.
 3. Socialist justice
• Certain distribution is fair if every member of a
group receives his or her share in the
distribution according to or in proportion to
his or her needs.
• This view seeks to balance off natural inequalities
– referring to the inequality in our initial
endowments in life, which include our genes,
natural talents, inherited economic resources
and the social status of our parents.
• Marx: “from each according to his abilities, to each
according to his needs.”
• According to this principle, the kind of work
people should be assigned should be based on their
natural talents. This is to ensure that their work will
be fulfilling and not dehumanizing or alienating.
• On the other hand, their share of the proceeds of
their work inputs should be based on their needs;
and this is to help correct the initial inequalities in
life.
 4. Justice as fair opportunity
• A certain distribution is fair if every member of a
group receives his or her share in the distribution
according to or in proportion to the effort exerted
in achieving the goals of the group.
• John Feinberg: The proper criterion for a just
distribution is something that everyone should have
a fair opportunity to achieve or work for in varying
degrees.
• He rejected the criteria of needs, merits,
achievements and contribution or productivity –
all of which he regarded as heavily determined by
one’s initial endowments in life.
• He advanced effort as the basis of fair
distributions, for he believed that human effort is
the one human feature where everyone has the
fair opportunity to responsibly work.
• Effort is best understood in contrast to
contribution. By contribution we mean actual
productivity; but by effort, we only mean the
amount of work one puts in or the energy one
exerts to make a contribution.
• Giving a person a larger share in the distribution
because of his or her CONTRIBUTIONS or
NEEDS IS UNFAIR, as it is largely determined by
one’s initial advantages or disadvantages in life
which one is not responsible for.
 5. Utilitarian justice
• As the previous chapter contends, any
distribution is fair so long as it results in the
maximization of the aggregate good or welfare
for all persons involved in the distribution.
• In principle, distribution can follow any
pattern, say, contribution, needs or effort, but
this is not the ultimate goal of distribution.
• This pattern is just the means, and thus can
only have an instrumental value, to bring the
maximum aggregate welfare.
• Utilitarianism can be judged as egalitarian by
its emphasis on aggregationism but not at all
since it depends on the good preferred.
 6. Justice as fairness
• As advanced by John Rawls, this theory claims
that a certain distribution among the members in
a group is fair if the principles that govern such
distribution were chosen by the members in a fair
manner (impartial or objective).
• We are aware that we are naturally inclined to
promote our self-interests, in that we prefer a
criterion of justice that would benefit us.
• Rawls had a mechanism that would ensure the
fairness of the choice of principles of
distribution, he calls this the original position,
where people are to imagine that they are under
the veil of ignorance – people are supposed to
forget the particular characteristics of their lives,
such as their status, gender, religious beliefs and
others.
 The principle of equality and the principle
of fair inequality
•Principle of equality – states that everyone
should be equal in terms of having basic rights
(like rights to vote and run for public office) and
liberties (like freedom of speech and assembly).
•Principle of fair inequality – states that social and
economic inequalities should be:
(a.) “attached to positions and offices open to all”
– to provide equal opportunities for everyone to
improve their lot in life (this sub-principle is called
the principle of fair equality of opportunity); and,

(b.) arranged in a way that will benefit everyone

especially the worse-off members of society (this
sub-principle is called the difference principle).
 7. Libertarian justice
• As advanced by Robert Nozick, also called
Entitlement theory, claims that distributions are
fair when no moral rights are violated in
acquiring and transferring ownership of the
goods to be distributed.
• Distributive justice is achieved when in these two
processes, no moral rights – specifically property
rights are violated.
• That is, the owner of these things acquired the
properties in morally correct means (say they were
not stolen), and the transfer of their ownership to
other people was done in morally correct means
(say the owner was not forced to sell his or her
properties).
• Nozick: “Things come into the world already
attached to people having entitlements over
them.”
• Nozick has a mechanism to determine whether a
distributive process violates moral rights – the
moral side constraint.
• This follows Kant’s second principle of respect of
persons. In its modern version, this states that
we should treat our fellow humans only in a
manner to which they will give their informed
and voluntary consent.
 C. Ethics of care
• It does not focus on the analysis of the rightness
or wrongness of certain actions but on the
development of certain moral attributes.
• It deviates from the rationalist and universalist
approaches of Kantian and Utilitarian theories
which, it believes, are distant from the concrete
human realities of the moral experience.
• Although it subscribes to Aristotle’s emphasis on
character building and development of human virtues,
it criticizes Aristotelian ethics for being biased in favor
of male-oriented virtues such as justice, courage, self-
control and autonomy.
• This is brought by the writings of women psychologists
and philosophers, this is why it is related to feminist
philosophy. Some thinkers argue that it should not be
gender-specific, therefore ethics of care should be
considered universal because both sexes have an
inclination to this ethical perspective.
• Mary Wollstonecraft’s A vindication of rights of women
(1792) is one of the earliest western writing that challenges
the traditional and mainstream ethical theories that are
considered male-oriented or dominated. John Stuart Mill’s
The subjection of women (1869) is also against the attempt
to relegate women to secondary moral status.
• Aristotle’s portrait of a virtuous person was associated with
upper-class Athenian gentleman. Being “masculine” and
military cast, the virtues of independence, courage, bravery,
self-control, loyalty and so forth have been carried on from
ancient to modern moral philosophy (Hobbes, Locke, Mill
and Kant) which a person is viewed as an isolated individual
and separated from everyone else.
• According to this view, human beings begin in a state
of nature where everyone is at war with one another.
• For feminist moral philosophers, such a view reflects
a very odd picture of the human world and a picture
that is in fact very much removed from reality. For
them, the basic state of human beings in the world is
one of connectedness and relationship, and the basic
unit is not the isolated individual but rather the
mother-child combination.
• Another characteristic of the traditional moral theory
being questioned by feminist thinkers is its emphasis on
impartiality and universality.
• The ideal moral agent is one who has been stripped of
personal identity; thus, any special relationships that
one may have with particular individuals such as
relatives, friends, or fellow members of a particular
religious or ethnic group should be set aside when
determining what one should do. For feminist thinkers,
the traditional moral stance seems out of touch with
reality (e.g. Utilitarianism, Deontology).
• Our desire to care is an essential ingredient and
motivator to respond ethically. Unlike the stance of the
rationalists who consider emotions as the direct
opposite of impartiality.
• Such feminist critique of the traditional moral theory
has gained waves with the publication of the work of
psychologist Carol Gilligan (1936-present) on moral
development from the perspective of women. It is
particularly interesting to see how her ideas developed
because she did not set out to develop a feminist theory
at all.
• Gilligan was a research assistant to the great theorist of
the psychology of moral development, Lawrence
Kohlberg. He originally grappled with the problem:
“How is it that some people come to obey a higher law
than the written law of the land?”
• Her criticisms of Kohlberg’s theory were published in
her 1982 book, In a different voice: Psychological
theory and women’s development. She expressed her
belief that morality must not be looked at merely in
terms of rules and justice. Although justice is a very
important component of morality, it is not the ultimate
criterion of moral rightness.
• The justice perspective stresses abstract rules which deal
primarily with the right to be left alone, free from the
interference of others. Within this perspective, moral
dilemmas are questions of conflicting rights that are
resolved by identifying which right has the highest
priority in general.
• The “Heinz dilemma” illustrates the kind of reasoning
used within the justice perspective. A man named Heinz
broke into the druggist store after the latter sold him a
drug with a price ten times the cost. This would save
Heinz’s wife who was near death because of a particular
illness. Was his stealing of the drug justifiable?
• Kohlberg lists three levels of moral development, each
with a characteristic view of right action:
1. Preconventional level – right action is defined in
terms of what brings pleasure or reward to oneself.
2. Conventional level – right action is interpreted as
loyalty to others and respect for law and custom.
3. Postconventional level – right action is identified in
terms of general principles discerned with one’s
autonomous judgment.
• Gilligan charges that this schema of moral development
is gender-biased as it is based narrowly on research that
studied only white, upper-class men and boys.
Kohlberg’s theory does not represent women’s moral
perspective.
• Gilligan believes that males typically have a justice or
rights orientation because of their individualistic and
separate conceptions of self—their detached objectivity
and their proclivity for abstract and impartial
principles. Thus, she holds that males view morality as
involving issues of conflicting rights.
• On the other hand, Gilligan believes that females typically
have a care orientation because of their perception of the
self as connected to and interdependent with others, their
sensitivity not to endanger or hurt, their concern for the
well-being and care of self and others, and their desire to
build and cultivate a harmonious relationship.
• Thus, she holds that females view morality as involving
issues of conflicting responsibilities.
• Gilligan theorizes that sex differences in moral reasoning
stem from the ways in which girls and boys are raised.
• Boys learn to be independent, assertive, and achievement-
oriented—experiences that encourage them to consider
moral dilemmas as inevitable conflicts of interest between
two or more parties that laws and other social conventions
are designed to resolve.
• By contrast, girls are taught to be nurturing, empathic, and
concerned about the needs of others—in short, to define
their sense of “goodness” in terms of their relationships
with other people. These experiences should encourage
females to think of moral dilemmas as conflicts between
one’s own selfishness and the needs or desires of others.
• As noted by Schaffer (1996), Gilligan maintains that the
interpersonal orientation that women adopt when
thinking about moral issues is neither more nor less
mature than the rule-bound morality of men. Instead,
she views these two moralities as “separate but equal”
and suggests that females go through different series of
moral stages than males do.
• Gilligan interviewed two children, both eleven-year-olds
with pseudonyms of Jake and Amy. Both were
presented with Heinz’s dilemma devised by Kohlberg to
measure moral development in adolescence.
• Jake is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug.
Constructing the dilemma as a conflict between the values of
property and life, he discerns the logical priority of life and
uses that logic to justify his choice. Jake describes the dilemma
as a “sort of math problem with a human,” a problem that
needs solving by logically working out the priorities that
should be given to certain rules.
• In contrast, Amy’s response to the dilemma conveys a very
different impression. She suggests that Heinz should talk to
the druggist—she finds the puzzle to lie not in the druggist’s
assertion of rights, but in his failure to respond; if Heinz and
the druggist talk it out long enough, they would find some
solution other than stealing.
• Amy argues that the actors in the dilemma “arrayed not
as opponents in a contest of rights but as members of a
network of relationships on whose continuation they all
depend.” Both children “recognize the need for
agreement but see it as mediated in different ways—he
impersonally through the systems of logic and law, she
personally through communication in relationships.”
• Jake sees a conflict between life and property while Amy
sees a failure or fracture in human relationships.
• According to Gilligan, in Kohlberg’s account of the
moral development of children, it would seem that Jake
was at a “higher” stage than Amy.
• Kohlberg’s theory is incomplete; there is a need to restore the
missing text of women’s development and to include the
perspectives of both sexes. But Gilligan does not conceive this
task as a purely additive one.
• Women tend to be oriented towards a conception of
responsibility to others and the primacy of relationships with
others in their lives, that they can have real problems in
developing a conception of their own rights, needs or
responsibilities towards themselves.
• Men, on the other hand, may feel threatened by intimacy with
others; they may find it less easy to feel a sense of connection
with others, and to understand or negotiate problems of
communication in relationships.
 Alternative theory of moral development
• Gilligan studied the moral development of females by
asking pregnant women to discuss an important dilemma
that they were then currently facing—should they
continue their pregnancies or have abortions? After
analyzing the responses of her 29 subjects, Gilligan
proposed that women’s moral judgments progress
through a sequence of three levels: Levels one, two and
three.
Level one: Individual survival orientation
• At this first level, a woman’s thinking about
abortion centers on her own needs and desires.
The issue is individual survival and the needs of
others are largely ignored.
First transition: From selfishness to responsibility

• There is a transitional period between Levels one and

two reasoning where women first recognize that there
may be a clash between their own desires and the
responsible course of action—a conflict between
“doing something for oneself” and “doing the right
thing.”
 Level two: Goodness as self-sacrifice
• At this level, women have adopted many traditional
feminine values and have come to evaluate themselves in
terms of their interpersonal relationships. Now, the
orientation is to do the right thing to others and avoid
hurting them if possible—even if one’s decision represents
a personal sacrifice. Clearly, the issue of hurting others is
of primary concern when women reason about abortion.
When there is no decision that she can make that seems
in the best interests of everyone, a female finds it difficult
to choose the “right” course of action.
• For example, a woman who feels protective toward her
unborn fetus and yet knows that her partner wishes
her to abort is clearly a no-win situation. When forced
to choose between two things she loves, the woman
feels that she must make a large personal sacrifice,
regardless of whether she serves the needs of her
partner by undergoing an abortion or her fetus by
continuing the pregnancy.
 Second transition: From goodness to truth
• Between Levels two and three comes a transitional period
in which women begin to question the logic of moral self-
sacrifice. Once again, the issue of selfishness versus
responsibility comes to the forefront but this time the
woman also considers the “rightness” of hurting oneself
as well as the issue of hurting others. She strives to be
responsible to others and thus “good” but also to be
responsible to herself and thus truthful or “honest.”
 Level three: The morality of nonviolence
• At this level, the woman have largely rejected the notion
of moral sacrifice as immoral in its power to hurt the self.
The principle of non-violence—an injunction against
hurting—becomes the basic premise underlying all moral
judgments.
• Looking after the welfare of people is now a self-chosen
and universal obligation that permits the woman to
recognize a moral equality between herself and others
that must be considered when making moral judgments.
• The concern here is to hurt neither oneself nor the baby.
Although the decision to terminate the pregnancy was
described as a “very heavy thing” that obviously
compromised the woman’s principle of nonviolence, she felt
that the ultimate harm to herself and to an unwanted child
could be greater had she decided to continue her pregnancy.
• In dealing with moral dilemmas, women think more about
the caring thing to do rather than the thing the rules
allowed. Women developed in a way that focused on
connections among people (rather than separation or non-
interference) and with an ethic of care for those people
(rather than an ethic of justice).
 Natural and Ethical caring
• Gilligan’s emphasis on the virtue of caring has been
developed by several writers, one of the most important
of whom is Nel Noddings.
• In her book, Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and
moral education (1984), she works out the ethics of care
philosophically. She disagrees with Kant’s view that, since
doing things we ought to do is better than doings we want
to do, ethical caring is better than natural caring.
Carol Gilligan (left) and Nel Noddings (right)
• Noddings believes that our “oughts” build on our
“wants”—that ethical caring is dependent upon natural
caring. “The source of ethical behavior, is then, in twin
sentiments—one that feels directly for the other and one
that feels for and with the best self, who may accept and
sustain the initial feeling rather than reject it.”
• She cites Hume’s contention that morality is founded
upon and rooted in feeling—that the final sentence on
matters of morality depends on some internal sense or
feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole
species. As part of the human condition, we want to care
and be cared for.
• There are situations in which one cares quite naturally
and in those encounters, no ethical effort is required.
In these cases, the concepts of “what I want to do” and
“what I and/or others judge I ought to do” are
indistinguishable.
• While conceding that one cannot conjure up the
feeling of response or inner voice that says, “I must do
something” in response to the need of another, she asks
if there is also an obligation to care.
• She believes that though there exists no demand
requirement on an emotion related to caring, we
consider those totally devoid of empathy or care to be
beyond the realm of normalcy and to be avoided. We
cannot require but can accept the natural impulse to
act on behalf of another, as this is part of the human
condition.
• While acknowledging the feeling and associated
impulse to act, we have a choice to accept what is felt
and act or to reject it and not act.
• Noddings gives the example: “when my infant cries at
night, I not only feel that I must do something but I
want to do something.” The “I must” is not a dutiful
imperative, not yet a moral/ethical ought.
• In contrast, the “I want” is based on love and caring.
Taking care of one’s child is first a natural act and it is
from this connection where it derives its morality.
• This premise serves to support Nodding’s suggestion
that our inclination toward and attention to that which
is moral attention derives from caring.
• She believes the impulse to act on behalf of another in
need is itself innate and in caring, on accepts the
natural impulse to act on behalf of the other. Again,
one has the choice to accept what is felt or reject it. A
strong desire toward morality precipitates acceptance
and is derived from the innate desire to relate and
remain related to others.
• Noddings does not subscribe to the view espoused by
Kant and other mainstream philosophers that an action
motivated by natural feelings of care and concern is not
as morally praiseworthy as an action motivated by a
conviction that one should care for others out of a sense
of duty.
• For Noddings, such an attitude tends to separate our
biological nature and our natural human inclinations
from the more purely “ethical.” The dualism between
the body and emotion on the one hand and the
“ethical” and “rational” on the other is typical of much
of the ethics Noddings criticizes.
 Persons or Principle
• The ethics of care puts emphasis on caring and doing no
harm as opposed to acting for the sake of principles such
as justice. Noddings is identifying two parties in a caring
relationship—“one-caring” and “one cared-for.”
• Both parties have some form of obligation to care
reciprocally and meet the other morally, although not in
the same manner. The individual is always considered to
be the end and never the means.
• Noddings relates this concept of caring to the
philosopher Martin Buber and his existential encounter
of the I and thou. Buber acknowledged the paradox
inherent in every relationship—one party remains
himself/herself even as he/she draws close to the other.
• Thus, since we keep our identity in every relationship
that we engage in, it is important that we recognize the
individuality of the other—his/her autonomy and
subjectivity. In genuine relationships, one accepts and
affirms others in their personhood.
• Noddings speaks of the caring-one as the I and the
cared-for as the Thou. The Thou is a subject and not an
It, and thus an object of analysis.
• Care is foundational to ethics and definitely opposed to
the impartialist masculine view of ethics. Impartial
principles are inadequate because they require you to
extract from a situation the very details that may be
morally relevant.
• Noddings (1984): “it has been traditional in moral
philosophy to insist that moral principles must be, by
their very nature as universifiable.”
• If I am obliged to do X under certain conditions then
under sufficiently similar conditions, you are also
obligated to do X. As she notes, the principle of
universifiability seems to depend on a concept of
“sameness.”
• In order to accept the principle, we should establish
that human predicaments exhibit sufficient sameness
and this we cannot do without abstracting away from
concrete situations those qualities that seem to reveal
the sameness.
• In doing this, we often lose very qualities or factors that
gave rise to the moral question in the situation. The
condition which makes the situation different and
thereby induces genuine moral puzzlement cannot be
satisfied by the application of principles developed in
situations of sameness.
• Moral judgments must be done on a case-to-case basis.
A and B struggling with a moral decision, are two
different persons, with different factual histories,
different projects and aspirations, and different ideals.
• It may indeed be right, morally right for A to do X and
B not to do X. We may, that is connect “right” and
“wrong” to faithfulness to the ethical ideal. But
Noddings clarifies that this does not cast us into
relativism because the ideal contains at its heart a
component that is universal which is the maintenance
of the caring relation.
• Noddings also addresses how to make judgements
under the ethics of care. Cautiously, she notes that the
task is not primarily to judge; but rather to heighten
moral sensitivity and perception.
• While ignoring the principles and rules associated with
judgments of right and wrong, the focus is to consider
them in the light of caring. Take as an example the rule
that stealing is wrong. Rather than simply applying
some principle associated with stealing being wrong,
under this ethic, one must ask why is it wrong (or not
wrong) to steal in this case?
• No rule is immutable or without exception, setting up
such a principle or rule also implies that there are
exceptions but fails to succinctly state them.
• One must consider the act in its full context before any
decision regarding the morality or rightness of the act
can be determined.
• For ethics of care, an individual is a nexus of
relationships. The relationships are essential to the
person. It assumes that individuals are primordially
independent, forming relationships by voluntarily
relinquishing their autonomy.
• Individuals are primordially related. We cannot exist or be
who we are in isolation from caring relationships with
others. We need others to feed and care for us when we are
born; we need others to educate and care for us as we grow;
and always, we must live in a community in whose
language, traditions and culture we share and with which
we find our identity.
• It is in these concrete relationships with others that we
form our understanding of who or what we are. Therefore,
the extent of the value of the self is the same extent of the
value of relationships that are necessary for the self to exist.
• Who you are is at least partially a function of those to
whom you are related to and how you are related to
them. Howard Curzer (1999) aptly summarizes the
point of ethics of care by stating that according to this
ethical perspective, “one should act partially (rather
than impartially), according to one’s passion (rather
than just one’s reason) for particular people (rather
than for people in general).
 Objections to Care ethics
• One of the criticisms rallied against the ethics of care is that it
projects a kind of slave morality that valorizes the oppression
of women.
• Slave morality is traced from Nietzsche, suggests that in periods
of oppression, the underrepresented and disempowered have
the tendency to promote moral systems that advocate
subservient attributes as exhibiting increased moral capital. In
this fashion, the negative externalities associated with their
work can be revalued as positive, empowering and the
authentic voice of the oppressed.
• However, there is a political danger lurking in the very
idea that care ethics is a woman’s moral theory. It risks
perpetuating the existing division of labor based on sex.
It is quite evident in our society that women are
traditionally identified with caring and nurturing tasks
(homemaker, nurse, social worker, etc.). Such outlook
strengthens the social set-up where women’s role is
subordinate to that of men.
• By reinforcing these gender roles, the woman is caught
in the role of the subservient person, caring for others
but not for herself.
• It also reinforces an obligation to care while forgetting
one’s own needs. If care ethics is to serve the genuine
development and liberation of women and promote
real gender equality, it has to include a critical inquiry
as to who is caring for whom and whether these
relationships are just.
• If women are to be liberated, they must be able to
think for themselves and make autonomous decisions.
Therefore, the ethics of care needs an element of
justice, self-development and autonomy incorporated
into it.
• Care ethics is also criticized for being parochial, giving
more value on the needs of particular people one has
close affinity or relation with. Targeting Nodding’s
original assertion that caregivers have primary
obligations to proximate others over distant others,
critics fear that such view will obscure the larger social
dynamics and lead to favoritism and patronage towards
one’s family and friends.
• Pursuit for fair and impartial judgment will be
compromised in favor of preserving personal
relationship.
• Victoria Davion (1993) offers an insightful critique of
Nodding’s ethics of care, suggesting that moral
principles are based on more than the virtue of caring.
The variety of reasons why other virtues—aside from
care—are necessary for an outline of ethics.
• One suggestion is that total engrossment in another
individual could be dangerous, as well as a crutch to
one’s own morals. Davion discusses Nodding’s example
of the woman who is torn between standing by her
racist family or her black friend who is fighting against
her family.
• She does not want to break the ties with the family, so she
eventually sides with them. Ultimately, she is making the
choice of acting immorally by displacing her own values for her
family. The incorporation of other virtues into her decision-
making in the light of certain dilemmas should be included,
such as in the case in the idea of justice that all humans are
equal.
• Noddings responded to this criticism by resisting arbitrary
favoritism and extending care ethics to public and international
domains. However, she maintains the primacy of domestic
sphere as the source and cultivator of justice in the sense that
the best social policies are identified and modelled by practices
in good personal relationships.
• Care ethicist Virginia Held (2006) speaks of a
globalizing theory of care ethics, recommending
international practices of “cultivating relations of trust,
listening to the concerns of others, fostering
international cooperation and valuing interdependence.
• She offers a meshing of care and justice in order to
improve the social relations and public policy, stating
that the two are complementary and a useful
combination.
• Contemporary supporters of the theory affirm that
care ethics is compatible with the rational and
impartial view of morality because it relies upon a
universal injunction to care and requires a principle of
caring obligation.
• An adaptation of the traditional perspective can be
used to ground the obligation to care in the universal
necessity of care and the inconsistency of willing a
world without an intent to care.
Reference:
Evangelista, Francis Julius N., Mabaquiao Jr.,
Napoleon M. Ethics (Theories and
Applications). Mandaluyong: Anvil Publishing
Incorporated, 2020.