Indian Buddhism by A. K.

Warder
Review by: Patricia Bjaaland and Arthur E. Lederman
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), pp. 537-544
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Indian Buddhism, by A. K. Warder.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. Pp. ix + 622 + 2 maps. Rs. 60.00.

There is probably no beginning student of Buddhism who has not realized

that there is a tremendous amount of material given in the canon that, with
the requisite time and abilities, could bring one nearer to the original Buddhist
teachings. The abilities required, however, are difficult and twofold: language
capabilities and a thorough knowledge of Indian philosophy, history, and cul-
ture. Those who have previously attempted this Herculean task have rarely
been successful.1 A. K. Warder, following what seems to be an almost un-
breakableprecedent, does not succeed either.
Indian Buddhism is an attempt to survey Buddhism historically from its
conception through its annihilation in India utilizing various Tripitaka texts
and their recensions (Pali and Sanskrit primarily, but also Chinese and Ti-
betan), while simultaneously presenting the culture and religious heritage
from which Buddhism emerged. The latter, as Warder himself notes, is
"merely sketched in as part of the elucidation, as situations to which Buddhist
thinkers were responding and as a framework in which successive ideas may
be placed in order" (p. 2). The dustjacket indicates that the work is designed
to fulfill the "needs of specialists and students ... in such a way [also] as to
be accessible to the general reader."
Despite this description, it is still unclear by which audience Warder wishes
to be judged. Indeed, by attempting to be all things to all people, Warder often
fails to fulfill the needs of any readership. If "students" means those to whom
the subject of Buddhism is being introduced, the text presupposes far too
much Indian history and philosophy to serve as an introduction. The failure
to provide an adequate setting for the ensuing discussions is a recurring prob-
lem. Warder is perhaps correct in not spending much time on Vedic thought,
but Upanisadic speculation is covered with the same rapidity (twenty-five
pages of text for both). While certain Upanisadic concepts (Brahman, atman,
dharma, etc.) are reconsidered in later chapters, it is unfair to present Bud-
dhism as being so little indebted to its philosophical predecessors.
A second problem for those unfamiliar with Buddhism is the general as-
sumption of a knowledge of Buddhist terminology. While the index is both an
index and glossary of terms of considerable length (Sanskrit/Pali-English,
English-Sanskrit/Pali, etc.), it is disappointing that Warder has not devoted
more time to discussing these terms-a task he is well qualified to perform.
For example, a student looking up the term nirvana in the index confronts
the translation "extinction"; duhkha emerges as "unhappiness"; moksa as
"freedom"; and sa.msaraas "transmigration."While they may be linguistically

1 For a short summary of the present condition of Buddhist studies, see Chapter 1,
"Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies," in Edward Conze's Thirty Years of Buddhist
Studies (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1967).
538 Bjaaland and Lederman

accurate, these translations reveal neither the full philosophical nor the
theological implications of these terms in Buddhist thought.
The bibliography is of conflicting values to the novice. A bibliography
should serve as a reference to which a student may turn for further reading
and elaboration. Thirty-seven pages of Warder's bibliography is concerned
exclusively with primary source material (Tripitaka, Works of the Schools,
Buddhist Histories, the Mahayana Tripitaka, the Mahayana Schools, the
Mantraydna, Mantraydna Commentaries and Manuals, Belles-lettres), and is
of value to those seeking to determine which texts are identified with which
schools. It also contains listings of the various translations available in West-
ern languages and is therefore a particularly valuable reference tool for the
beginner. It would have been convenient for the student, however, if a chart
of the Tripitaka and its divisions had been included. An even more serious
omission, though, is the fact that only six pages-marked "Miscellaneous"-
list secondary sources. Warder has paid homage to several of the great names
of Buddhist studies here, but regrettably omits some of those very works
which have become "standard" and which one would hope a novice would
read.2
One section well worth recommending to any student is the one least ex-
pected, "The Life of the Buddha." While all histories of Indian Buddhism
include a biography of the Buddha and handle it in the most unimaginative
(or overly imaginative) manner possible, this one is positively refreshing. It
is handled brilliantly and sensitively; it separates fact from fancy, and is
exactly the product one would hope for from textual criticism well done. It
maintains the drama of the story while not being weighted or inflated by the
mythical.
On occasion the text is as mismatched for the advanced student and the
scholar as it is for the novice. Regardless of which position Warder might
select in issues which are still unsettled, as a scholar committed to critical re-

2 Among those works which are surprisingly omitted are Edward Conze's Buddhist
Thought in India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), a good survey of Bud-
dhist doctrine; Sukumar Dutt's Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), which traces the history of the monastic aspects
of early Buddhism; George Grimm's The Doctrine of the Buddha, ed. M. Keller-Grimm
and Max Hoppe, trans. Bhikkhu Silacara, 2d rev. ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958),
a thought-provokingstudy of the Pali texts of the first caliber; T. R. V. Murti's The
Central Philosophy of Buddhism, a Study of the Madhyamika System (New York:
Humanities, 1960), a standarddetailed analysis of Nagarjuna's thought; and Guy Wel-
bon's The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1968), a well-needed study of western research on Buddhism.One of the
very few footnotes to secondarysources found in the text proper is to Junjiro Takakusu's
Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, trans. and ed. Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A.
Moore-hardly the ideal text with which an introductory student would most profitably
pursuehis studies.
539

search and analysis, he is expected not only to recognize issues but also to
discuss evidence detrimental to his position. For example, neither novice nor
initiate profits from Warder's unequivocal acceptance of the traditional Bud-
dhist position of asserting Asoka to be the archetypal Buddhist monarch-a
position obviously in the best interests of Buddhists. While aware that there
is much which is legendarily associated with Asoka, Warder cites page after
page of edicts (Chapter 8, "The Popularisation of Buddhism") as evidence
for his position. One of the inherent difficulties Warder encounters in relying
almost solely on primary sources is not taking into careful consideration the
possible apologetic motivations which often influence the writing of a text. S.
Dutt, for example, finds it impossible to accept this kind of Buddhist evidence
at face value. In his critical examination of the edicts, and based on what is
known about traditional Indian kingship, Dutt proposes that Asoka, while
personally a Buddhist, was not "the great Buddhist monarch."3 Further evi-
dence given by Warder includes "proofs" which also are not necessarily evi-
dence of Asoka's Buddhist concerns. He asserts of Asoka that:

He found he was sincere: whatever problems he faced as emperor, he believed

Buddhism offered what was needed to solve them; overriding everything is
his evident and deep conviction that non-violence is the primary principle of
conduct, the greatest moral value. This was precisely the primary moral prin-
ciple of Buddhism: "abstentionfrom taking life" (p. 246).
"Abstention from taking life" is indeed a Buddhist concept, but it is not a
uniquely Buddhist concept. Noninjury is one generally universal aspect of
Indian ethics commonly prevalent in India before the time of Asoka and prob-
ably even of Buddhism.4
Granted there are some scholars5 (and many South Indians) who would
claim that some link exists between the Indus River Valley Civilization
(IRVC) and Tamil Nadu, but the discussion is still open-ended and the evi-
dence insufficient to enable Warder to assert that "the most likely hypothesis

3 "But from all these edicts discovered so far the figure of Emperor Asoka as an en-
thusiast and propagandistfor Buddhism scarcely emerges. All that appears is-that the
emperor was a Buddhist himself; that he had some personal contacts with the monk-
community and visited at least one of its centres (in Magadha); and that, in his ca-
pacity as a ruler whose constitutional duty obliged him to see that corporate bodies like
the Buddhist satnghasdid not come to shipwreck through internal dissensions, he revived
and proclaimed the Vinaya rule of 'unfrocking' and expelling schism-mongers."Dutt,
BuddhistMonks and Monasteriesof India, p. 110.
4 See E. Washburn Hopkins, Ethics of India (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1924), Chapter 4, "Ethics in the Upanishads." It is commonly accepted that the Up-
anisads precededthe Buddha.
5 For a summary of the history and contents of these discussions see Chapter 2 of
Fred W. Clothey's "The Many Faces of Murukan: The History and Meaning of a
South Indian God," (at the time of this writing the manuscriptis being consideredfor pub-
lication by the University of CaliforniaPress).
 540 Bjaaland and Lederman

is that they [peoples of the IRVC] were Dravidians, akin to, or even the
ancestors of, the modern Tamils and other peoples of South India" (p. 18).
Warder has covered the IVRC in only two pages, making his pronouncement
on the IRVC seem not only hasty, but also adding little to the intended orien-
tation of his first chapter. Another unwillingness to treat debatable issues in
detail occurs in the introduction to Mantrayana in Chapter 12. The dating of
the origins of Mantraydna is still an unsettled problem.6 Warder does provide
evidence leading up to his own conclusion that "the origins of Mantrayana
thus seem to be datable to about the 6th century" (p. 485). Although he de-
votes four pages to his analysis of this dating, he is unconcerned with the
findings others have claimed-either in terms of support for his own position
or in terms of divergence from his position-a divergence of several centuries
in some cases. It is not clear whether Warder was unaware of any debates on
these and other issues or is unwilling to grapple with them. If the latter case
is true, however, it would appear that a far stronger case could have been
made by trying to illustrate where and how, with the aid of these original
sources, others have misunderstood them. The utilization of secondary sources
can often provide a backboard against which one can volley one's findings
and/or positions. Warder, however, appears to have neglected major critical
secondary studies in the field. One could forgive their absence from a bibli-
ography but not from what appears to be the author's preparation.
Warder has identified the central concern of Buddhist dogma as being the
concept of "dependent origination" (paticcasamuppada). The selection of
dependent origination as the central point of Buddhist philosophy is clearly a
defensible, and to our minds excellent, means by which one can then under-
stand the remaining tenets. But in so doing, the religious aspects of Buddhism,
or the reasons why Buddhism is a religion, have suffered. In his intent to
explicate the history of the doctrine, Warder has not paid sufficient attention
to what the Buddhists themselves would insist are equally important elements
of their master's teachings. Initiates are in general agreement that the achieve-
ment of nirvana is based upon the three components of sila, paiina, and sa-
mddhi.?Sila, translated by Warder as "virtue," constitutes an entire discipline
within Buddhism. It is the absolute prerequisite for any further understanding
of the term dukkha; as Warder himself notes, "what was first picked up as
a piece of information will not be fully understood until the trainee seeks its
truth himself" (p. 102). The condition of sila is not emphasized adequately by
Warder, but then neither is his treatment of meditation sufficient. Perfect un-

6 For a history of the solutions given to this dating problem, see Note VI. 1 in Mircea
Eliade's Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, trans. William R. Trask, Bollingen Series 56
(New York: Pantheon,1958).
7 This is the most common division of the Eightfold Path.
See, for example, Chapter 6
of Piyadassi Thera's The Buddha's Ancient Path (London: Rider and Company, 1964).
541

derstanding of the doctrine is the goal achieved by meditation, and while it

is dangerous to overemphasize the importance of meditation, it is no more
desirable to undervalue it. What Warder might have been attempting in his
emphasis on paiiii (with comparable neglect to samddhi), was to present
wisdom in such a way as to serve as a corrective to the appearance of recent
volumes that have tended to overemphasize the role of meditation.8
Swinging to the other extreme (and as the Buddha himself pointed out,
extremes are unproductive), Warder is very quick to suggest that Buddhism
is basically "scientific." It is very Buddhistic to insist that the truths of West-
ern science simply bear out what the Buddha taught, and Warder concurs.
He writes when speaking of Upanisadic India, "the law of the gods gives way
to natural law, a concept which becomes all powerful later, when Buddhism
and other extra-Vedic philosophies develop" (p. 33), and "in place of this
authoritarian tradition the sramanas sought to find satisfactory explanations
of the universe and of life by genuine investigations and reasoning" [italics
ours] (p. 35). The problem occurs later with "the nature of the universe,
therefore, about which the Buddha teaches his doctrine, is taken in the Tripi-
taka as something objectively real .... These facts of conditionality, these
natural laws, moreover, are universal and apparently immutable, though every-
thing that exists is impermanent, constantly changing" [italics ours] (p.
135); and finally, "this 'science' of Buddhism . . ." (p. 102). Intentionally or
unintentionally, Warder leaves one with the distinct impression that Buddhism
is more scientific than religious-a dogmatic stance that is certainly in ac-
cordance with what Buddhists, but no scientists, in fact, claim. But this depic-
tion ignores the spiritual dimension of Buddhism or why Buddhism is a
religion.
Practically every writer on the subject recognizes that Buddhism must go
beyond science, that it must supplement science, even that it must correct or
oppose science in its quest for what Buddhism calls the spiritual, which is the
real goal of all Buddhist teaching. If the spiritual means anything, it must in
some way transcend savksara and the physical, and in this sense Buddhism
must go beyond science and reject any attempt to identify the two in method
or scope.9
From these discussions one can only come to a misunderstanding of why the
Buddha taught.
Original and/or productive insights might have compensated for these
shortcomings, but unfortunately, such insights are rare. While the initial

8 See, for example,DonaldSwearer'sSecretsof the Lotus: Studiesin BuddhistMedita-

tion (New York:Macmillan, 1971)for the othersideof the spectrum.
9 CharlesA. Moore,"Buddhismand Science: Both Sides,"in Buddhismand
Culture,
ed. SusumuYamaguchi(Kyoto: NakanoPress, 1960), p. 119,providesa detailedanal-
ysis of bothsidesof thisissue.
542 Bjaaland and Lederman

methodology of textual criticism seems promising, Warder has resolved little.

There is much documentation but little real exegesis. Textual methods alone
are insufficient. While the texts might be perfectly presented, they are of little
value without adequate commentary. The essentially philosophical task of
determining the precise meaning of what is being presented remains. An ex-
ample of this is found in Warder's treatment of Nagarjuna in Chapter 10, an
otherwise good chapter. Warder understands Nagarjuna's position-that he
held a doctrine of no own-nature and emptiness-but then goes on to say of
each of these views in turn that each "is not itself an 'assertion,' a speculative
opinion, it is only not holding any such opinion" (p. 378). But denying the
efficacy of philosophical views is obviously itself a philosophical view. While
an exact description, Warder is still describing a metaphysical view which
requires explication. Another instance of this lack of philosophical concern is
the discussion on "Is there a Soul?" (pp. 118-126). Excerpts from original
sources are given in support of the Buddhist premise of "no-soul" (anatta)
and the section ends with a long quotation from the Samyukta. But once
again, texts are of little value without adequate commentary. One learns
nothing more from this section than that "the Buddha taught anatta."10It is
not enough merely to repeat what Buddhists might have taught; it is also
mandatoryto question precisely what was meant.
In contrast, there are certain topics which Warder has handled well in
terms of interpretation and presentation. There is no one point within the
chapter on the life of the Buddha which can be singled out as exemplary, but
the entire unit is treated rationally and with fine results, as indicated earlier.
It is not until later in the text that Warder retells the life of the Buddha with
the amplifications of later dogma and recounts "The legend of the Buddha"
(in Chapter 9). "In a sense," he writes, "the legend of the Buddha belongs
not to the schools but to the popular Buddhism of the ordinary laity in which
the doctrinal differences which split the schools count for practically nothing"
(p. 334).
While not ideal, Warder's treatment of the doctrinal reasons for the schisms
which resulted in the Theravada/Mahayana split is competently surveyed.
Warder's depiction gives a clearer image than most of the continuity between
Theravada and Mahayana and is especially effective in an area in which others
have tended to emphasize the points of variance. Warder performs an ex-
emplary task in presenting Mahayana as a clearly self-contained and later
development in Buddhism (while not ignoring the fact that some of the seeds
of Mahayana lay in Theravada scripture) by not only covering the doctrinal
differences (pp. 215 ff.), but also pointing out that there is no need to seek

10An interesting comparisonis that of Warder's handling of anatta with that of Grimm's
The Doctrine of the Buddha,pp. 112 ff.
543

outside rationale for the eventual split. Few scholars have emphasized the role
of the Five Points of Difference as competently as Warder." In the Introduc-
tion to the text he wrote, "We shall follow the history of the rise of the
schools in detail in the appropriate chapter. The result of comparing their
answers to the above questions and attempting by a sort of textual criticism
of the eighteen (or more) traditions to establish the original opinion suggest
that the earliest Buddhists thought that: An arhant can relapse . . . [etc.]"
(p. 12). This he has done and has done well as a textual critic. Despite handling
the doctrinal differences well, however, later in Chapter 10 ("Mahayana and
Madhyamaka") more weight could have been placed on the origins of the
development of Mahayana in terms of finding a satisfactory place for the
layperson within Buddhism (pp. 352-355).
The inclusion of materials concerning Buddhist social ideals and the
selections of Buddhist poetry provide insight into important but little-discussed
aspects of Buddhism. Warder has attempted to include many samplings of
Buddhist literature. In providing such a broad spectrum he has sought to show
the relationship diverse elements of the canon (cf. the Therigdthd) have with
the whole. What is beneficial in this approach is the realization that Bud-
dhism has, in fact, provided a legitimate place for those individuals not yet
desiring to become bhikkhus.l2 As the author rightly points out, Buddhism is
more than a doctrine of renunciation (pp. 183-184). The use of the term
"republicangovernment" (p. 173) in reference to Buddhist social ideals may
be misleading, but it does conjure up an appropriate image of the sort of
society Buddhism sought as an alternative to the orthodox Hindu view. In
suggesting that a place for the laity was an inherent aspect of the doctrine,
we can only concur with Warder that this provision does not represent a
degeneration from the Buddha's original teachings-the Buddha did, however,
teach his doctrine at two levels, one for laypersons and one for monks. In thus
taking this interpretive position, Warder has worked out a convenient struc-
ture by which apparent inconsistencies in the Buddha's teachings can be re-
solved; the various teachings need not be mutually exclusive.13
Warder has also treated capably the legalistic and political aspects of In-
dian Buddhism-how the congregation was formed and how it was run. This

11 "(1) that an arhant can be seduced by another person, (2) than an arhant may be
ignorant of some matters, (3) that an arhant may be in doubt, (4) than an arhant may
receive information from (be instructed by) another person, (5) that one may enter
the Way as the result of spokenwords" (pp. 215-216).
12 For an equally interesting and diametrically opposed
stance, consult F. Sierksma's
handling of this topic in Tibet's Terrifying Deities (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co.,
1966), pp. 33-47.
13 For example, achieving rebirth in the heavens (for laypersons) and
achieving nir-
vana (for monks) are not mutually exclusive goals once it is understood that achieving
the higher rebirthcan be a step toward the achievementof nirvana.
544 Bjaaland and Lederman

very practical information concerning exactly how these "congresses" worked

also gives an excellent picture of the social politics of the age. The Vinaya,
in turn, becomes more than dry legalism and becomes a dynamic aspect of
Buddhism. While covered by some other scholars with equal skill,14 these
units are worthy of attention.
As stated at the outset, it is difficult to determine for whom this work was
intended. While containing much material that is new and exciting, the over-
all impression left, as one wends one's way through this chronologically ori-
ented and textually overendowed volume, is a sense of purposelessness-and
thus frustration. In sum, Indian Buddhism has enough deficiencies to make
one still long for the definitive history of Indian Buddhism.
PATRICIA BJAALAND
ARTHUR E. LEDERMAN
Boston University

14See also Dutt, BuddhistMonks and Monasteries,and CharlesEliot, Hinduismand

Buddhism3 vols. (London: Routledge& Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), 1, ChapterXI,
"MonksandLaymen."