Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00291-3

Education as a Critico‑Creative Impulse: Discerning

a Russellian Stand

Jahnabi Deka1

Received: 21 June 2022 / Revised: 21 June 2022 / Accepted: 25 May 2023

© Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2023

Abstract
Education, a creative impulse, according to Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), must
vouch a platform for the creation of genuine thoughts in children. In order to discern
how genuine thoughts are to be inculcated in education, Russell’s concept of ration-
ality needs to be paid special attention. This is so because it is by adhering to the
theoretical as well as practical sides of rationality, thoughts can progress genuinely.
Once rationality gets implanted in children, they learn to grow freely. To learn to
grow freely here means to learn to preserve individuality and also to grow socially.
For the preservation of individuality in children, Russell argues, education needs to
pay heed to one principle of growth which is instinctive nature—the principle which
directs impulses and desires. It follows therefore that the growth of children depends
both on the principle of growth which is creative and instinctive in nature, and also
on rationality which is critical in its outlook. The present paper argues that Russell,
by considering education as a creative impulse, in fact, provides a special stature
to education, i.e. he throws a critico-creative light to the nature of education. By
arguing so, the paper commemorates Russell on his 150th birth anniversary and re-
emphasizes his much underrated relevance to the field of education even in contem-
porary times.

Keywords  Education · Bertrand Russell · Genuine thoughts · Rationality · Principle

of growth · Critico-creative impulse

* Jahnabi Deka
jahnabideka@gmail.com
1
Department of Philosophy, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India

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Introduction

In the preface to his book Principles of Social Reconstruction, Bertrand Russell

(1872–1970), while deliberating on the nature of education, marks education as one
of the three1 creative impulses (1916, p. 5). He divides impulses into two types, viz.
creative and possessive, and says: “Possession means taking or keeping some good
thing which another is prevented from enjoying; creation means putting into the
world a good thing which otherwise no one would be able to enjoy” (1916, p. 235).
This suggests that creative impulses, in contrast to the possessive one, are “essen-
tially harmonious” (Russell, 1916, p. 237). Again, from the claim Russell makes
that the supreme principle, both in politics and in private life, is to “promote all that
is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and desires that centre round posses-
sion” (Russell, 1916, p. 236) it follows that there is the necessity of promoting all
that is creative as against that which is possessive in life. Education, being a creative
impulse, must aim at vouching all that is creative. To carry out this task, according
to Russell, education has to proceed in accordance with a principle, i.e. the principle
of growth. Growth is an instinctive principle, which may vary from person to person,
but due to its harmonious nature it is always creative, and not possessive. Neverthe-
less, Russell critiques education for getting “vitiated by the intrusion of possessive
motives” (1916, p. 236). The chief objection he levelled against education is this:
“Education is usually treated as a means of prolonging the status quo by instilling
prejudices, rather than of creating free thought and a noble outlook by the example
of generous feeling and the stimulus of mental adventure” (Russell, 1916, p. 236).
These words distinctively highlight Russell’s advocacy of free2 thought. What Rus-
sell believes is that education, being a creative impulse, must inculcate free thought
for enabling children grow generous feelings, and make them capable of becoming
mentally adventurous. Russell argues that a person who is free “must be free of two
things: the force of tradition, and the tyranny of his own passions” (1944, p. 3). A
free thinker, “will not bow to the authority of others, and he will not bow to his own
desires, but he will submit to evidence. Prove to him that he is mistaken, and he
will change his opinion; supply him with a new fact, and he will necessarily aban-
don even his most cherished theories” (Russell, 1944, p. 3). A free thinker does so
because “his desire is to know, not to indulge in pretty fancies” (Russell, 1944, p. 3).
As the desire to know is the mark of a free thinker, and education aims at yielding
such desire, education has to take recourse to rationality—knowledge and rationality
are intertwined. An educated man is a free thinker who can think rationally or one
who can inculcate genuine thoughts. Russell says that the genuine thoughts arise
out of intellectual curiosity which is impulsive in nature. Although these thoughts
arise out of creative impulse, a genuine thinker needs to be spirited by rational bent
of mind. It is education by means of which children grow their  rationality. Since
rationality, for Russell, is critically spirited, it is only by nurturing rationality/
critical outlook children learn how to grow or what they learn what it means to be

1
  The two other creative impulses are—marriage and religion.
2
 By free thought, Russell does not mean absolute freedom.

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educated. To be educated means to be critically creative—an educated human being

is one who grows creatively in accordance with the principle of growth, and is one
who grows critically. The present paper argues that Russell’s claim that education is
a creative impulse in fact is a claim about the critico-creative nature of education,
because education needs to endorse both—the principle of growth and rationality—
and to consider both means to give a balanced attention to both—creative nature
of impulse and the critical nature of rationality. That is, to consider education as
a creative impulse is to consider it to be a critico-creative impulse. On this count,
no thought can be considered creative unless it is purified with a critical/rational
outlook. By arguing so, the present paper commemorates Russell on his 150th birth
anniversary and re-emphasizes his much underrated relevance even to the contem-
porary field of education.
In the section “Genuine Thoughts and Creative Impulses”, a discussion is
being made to see how genuine thoughts arise out of the intellectual impulse of curi-
osity. Here, a special focus is being given to understand why genuine thoughts can-
not be said to oppose impulses. Moreover, a connection between education and crea-
tion of genuine thoughts is sought to get established in this section. In the section,
“Growth in Education”, the necessity of the principle of growth in education is
being emphasized. In the section entitled “Two Sets of Rationality: Rationality of
Opinion and Rationality in Practice”, a detailed discussion is being made on Rus-
sell’s concept of rationality. The last section is the concluding one.

Genuine Thoughts and Creative Impulses

Russell says: “The only thought which is genuine is that which springs out of the
intellectual impulse of curiosity, leading to the desire to know and understand”
(1916, p. 15). The claim that genuine thoughts arise out of the intellectual impulse of
curiosity suggests that impulses are not opposed to thought, because while impulse
may mean whim or fancy, genuine thought must not be whim or fancy. Moreover,
though the word thought is generally used to refer to that which is rational in nature,
it does not necessarily mean that all thoughts are rational or that thoughts cannot
be irrational. Thoughts might be irrational, but thought, if it is genuine, cannot be
irrational. It is about these genuine thoughts Russell talks of. Now, we may turn our
discussion to see how education, which is proclaimed to be a creative impulse by
Russell, is related to the genuine thoughts.
Russell argues that the best life is “that which is most built on creative impulses,
and the worst that which is most inspired by love of possession” (1916, p. 5). The
intellectual impulse of curiosity out of which genuine thoughts are born is a crea-
tive impulse and not possessive. However, for Russell, impulses as such are blind,
and that “Blind impulses sometimes lead to destruction and death, but at other times
they lead to the best things the world contains. …It is not the weakening of impulse
that is to be desired, but the direction of impulse towards life and growth rather than
towards death and decay” (1916, pp. 17–18). What is significant to note here is Rus-
sell’s emphasis on the need for the direction of impulses. This also means that even
though all impulses are blind (since they are neither creative nor possessive when

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they are born), they need to be directed. The direction, Russell says, proceeds from
a central principle—he terms this principle the principle of growth. The principle of
growth is “an instinctive urgency leading them [impulses and desires3] in a certain
direction, as trees seek the light” (Russell, 1916, p. 24). [A detailed account of the
principle of growth is being discussed in the next section of the present paper.] This
means that impulses must be provided with outlets—it is on the nature of the outlets
will depend whether thoughts will grow genuinely or not. Russell puts his excellent
observation on thought and also reflects on to see why men fear thought through
these words: “Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth—more than ruin,
more even than death” (1916, p. 165). He also cites men’s fear for thought in the fol-
lowing way:
Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is
merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought
is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tried wis-
dom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid. ...Thought
is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of men
(Russell, 1916, p. 165).
It is important to note here that the word thought mentioned in the quote above is
used to refer to the genuine thoughts alone.
In the context of education, Russell reaffirms the glory of thought with the help
of few extraordinarily beautiful words:
The powers of thought, the vast regions which it can master, the much more
vast regions which it can only dimly suggest to imagination, give to those
whose minds have travelled beyond the daily round an amazing richness of
material, an escape from the triviality and wearisomeness of familiar routine,
by which the whole of life is filled with interest, and the prison walls of the
commonplace are broken down. The same love of adventure which takes men
to the South Pole, the same passion for a conclusive trial of strength which
leads some men to welcome war, can find in creative thought an outlet which
is neither wasteful nor cruel, but increases the dignity of man by incarnating
in life some of that shining splendour which the human spirit is bringing down
out of the unknown. To give this joy, in a greater or less measure, to all who
are capable of it, is the supreme end for which the education of the mind is to
be valued (1916, p. 164).
The adventurous nature of thought, as Russell depicts it, reveals that education,
being a creative impulse, must opportune children to create genuine thoughts. To
enable a person discover the joy of miraculous nature of thought (genuine thoughts),
for Russell, therefore, is the supreme end of education of mind.
For Russell, impulses are the first movers. Here he observes:

3
 The paper does not take up desire for detailed discussion since its focus is on impulse and not on
desire.

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Our whole life is built about a certain number—not a very small number—
of primary instincts and impulses. Only what is in some way connected with
these instincts and impulses appears to us desirable or important; there is no
faculty, whether “reason” or “virtue” or whatever it may be called, that can
take our active life and our hopes and fears outside the region controlled by
these first movers of all desires (Russell, 2004b, p. 29).
By calling impulses as the first movers, and by holding the view that reason or
virtue cannot be substituted for these movers, Russell, however, does not mean that
rationality cannot play any role in our lives. Rather, Russell’s emphasis on rational-
ity in our lives and education is evidently clear throughout his writings. His state-
ment that the purpose of education is the enlargement of primary impulses and not
the eradication of these impulses carries the significance of impulses in our lives. To
say that the task of education is to enlarge primary impulses is to say that education
must be creative and not possessive. But, education, without taking account of the
instinctive principle, i.e. the principle of growth (as the principle is the directional
one), cannot pursue this task. It is in directing these impulses rationality has to play
a big role, because principle of growth would be unable to direct any impulse unless
impulse is rationally moved or genuine thoughts are created. (For better appreciation
of genuine thoughts of Russell, his understanding on rationality needs to be incor-
porated, because Russell’s deliberation on rationality helps one dive deeper into the
meaning and significance of genuine thought.)
Before dwelling on what Russell means by rationality, the need for growth in
education is  preluded in the next section to understand the directional role of the
principle of growth.

Growth in Education

Russell compares the growth of men with the growth of trees in the following way:
Men like trees, require for their growth the right soil and a sufficient freedom
from oppression. These can be helped or hindered by political institutions. But
the soil and the freedom required for a man’s growth are immeasurably more
difficult to discover and to obtain than the soil and the freedom required for the
growth of a tree (1916, p. 25).
Though difficult, Russell is all set to inquire into the task of discovering the soil
and freedom for the growth of men, and claims that the full growth of men can nei-
ther be defined nor can it be demonstrated. Unlike the growth of trees which depends
chiefly on the physical environment, the growth of men does not merely depend
on physical environment. Men’s growth depends on “beliefs and affections, upon
opportunities for action, and upon the whole life of community” (Russell, 1916, p.
25). He adds further:
A man’s needs and desires are not confined to his own life. If his mind is
comprehensive and his imagination vivid, the failures of the community

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to which he belongs are his failures, and its successes are his successes:
according as his community succeeds or fails, his own growth is nourished
or impeded (Russell, 1916, p. 26).
That is, a man must grow by being a part of the society yet s/he must not lose
individuality. In other words, an individual must grow in the way s/he chooses to
grow. The choice to grow cannot be a random choice. It is a choice which needs
to be guided by rationality.
The principle of growth, which is the source of impulse for Russell “differs from
man to man, and determines for each man the type of excellence of which he is
capable. The utmost that social institutions can do for a man is to make his own
growth free and vigorous: they cannot force him to grow according to the pattern of
another man” (1916, p. 24). This means that an individual cannot be forced to grow
just in the pattern another individual grows (Russell, 1916, p. 24). The central Rus-
sellian conviction here is that a man’s natural growth is not to be impeded, because
When a man’s growth is unimpeded, his self-respect remains intact, and
he is not inclined to regard others as his enemies. But when, for whatever
reason/s, his growth is impeded, or he is compelled to grow into some
twisted and unnatural shape, his instinct presents the environment as his
enemy, and he becomes filled with hatred (1916, p. 39).
Again, Russell urges upon the necessity for putting a check upon the impulses
which may grow out of the principle of growth yet may be injurious to the growth
of others. However, he claims that there are some impulses and desires which
do not grow out of the central principle of growth, e.g. impulse towards drug is
harmful and it needs to be checked by self-discipline. It seems somewhat incom-
prehensible as to why Russell says that some impulses do not grow out of the
principle of growth despite he talks about the directionality of impulses.
As against a common belief that “what is instinctive cannot be changed, but must
be simply accepted and made the best of” (Russell, 1916, p. 39), Russell argues
that “the instinctive part of our character is very malleable” (ibid., p. 39). He says:
“Almost any instinct is capable of many different forms according to the nature of
the outlets which it finds” (Russell, 1916, p. 40). Malleability of one’s character
depends on the outward circumstances a man is surrounded by, because man gets
associated with different circumstances, and these circumstances do play enormous
role in his/her life. Hence, Russell argues that the individual’s nature gets “greatly
affected by circumstances” (1916, p. 41). This means that an individual’s growth
depends both on impulses (which is instinctive and hence internal) and on the cir-
cumstances where s/he grows up (which is external). Russell believes that in educat-
ing children, education must take care of both factors—internal and external. For
the growth of impulses (internal) of children, they are to be provided with freedom
in the institutions. It is in the context of growth, Howard Woodhouse refers to the
need for Russellian freedom and reverence, and writes:
It [reverence] implies an active caring and concern for the well-being and
freedom of the young on the part of the educator. Moreover, it entails the

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provision of an environment suitable for the active channelizing of his

impulses in constructive activities by the child. Not only is the child to be
free from the interference of others, but he has to be free to pursue those
interests to which he is led by the natural development of both his growth
and impulses (1983).
That is, education demands attention from both the angles—external, which
comes from factors relating to the circumstances, and for which giving creative
outlets to them becomes necessary; and the other, internal, which requires that the
impulses (creative) of the children need to be revered by the educators. It is for dis-
patching the role with reverence, each educator must have clear-cut idea about genu-
ine thought or rationality. Below is the section which will focus on Russell’s under-
standing of rationality.

Two Sets of Rationality: Rationality of Opinion and Rationality

in Practice

In his essay entitled Can Men be Rational?, by expressing deep concern for the need
for revival of rationality Russell says: “Complete rationality is no doubt an unattain-
able ideal, but so long as we continue to classify some men as lunatics it is clear that
we think some men more rational than others” (1928, p. 36). By claiming complete
rationality to be an unattainable ideal, however, Russell does not mean that people
must not strive for attaining rationality. Rather, his advocacy relating to the varying
degree of rationality in men suffices to see that rationality is not to be understood as
something which can be acquired by men once and for all. The attempt to develop
rationality is an essential condition for keeping rationality alive in men.
Russell commented once: “solid progress in the world consists of an increase in
rationality, both practical and theoretical” (1928, p. 36). He, therefore, pays sufficient
attention to the question of the definition of rationality. He says that the “definition
of rationality has both sides, theoretical as well as practical: what is a rational opin-
ion? and what is rational conduct?” (1928, p. 36). He defines rationality in opinion
“as the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief” (ibid.,
p. 36). Where certainty is unattainable, a rational man “will give most weight to the
most probable opinion, while retaining others, which have an appreciable probabil-
ity, in his mind as hypotheses which subsequent evidence may show to be prefera-
ble” (1928, p. 36). It follows therefore that for Russell (a) a rational man knows that
certainty may not be attainable in all cases, (b) in cases where certainty is almost
obvious to attain, a rational man gives weight to the most probable opinion, (c) a
rational man, while giving weight to the most probable opinion, retains with him/
her other opinions which he/she considers to have an appreciable probability, and (d)
a rational man keeps opinions having appreciable probability in the form of hypoth-
eses in his/her mind as these hypotheses may further come out to be more preferable
than the opinion which was earlier considered to be the most probable one. All (a),
(b), (c), and (d) indicate that wherever certainty seems to be unattainable, a rational
man possesses a mind that welcomes probable opinion. It is interesting to note here

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that a rational man’s attitude of endorsing probability rather than certainty (where
attainment of certainty is impossible) is closely bound up with Russell’s concept of
fact (as he defines irrationalism as the disbelief in objective fact). In his philosophy
of logical analysis, fact occupies a central place, more particularly his concept of
analysis centres round fact. As regards to fact Russell says: “When I speak of a fact
–I do not propose to attempt an exact definition, but an explanation, so that you will
know what I am talking about—I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition
true or false” (2004a, p. 182). To know the truth or falsity of a proposition, one
has to depend on a fact because “When we speak falsely it is an objective fact that
makes what we say false, and it is an objective fact which makes what we say true
when we speak truly” (2004a, p. 183). Let us take an example to illustrate this point:
“COVID-19 broke out in 2020” is a fact. If a proposition, e.g. “COVID-19 broke out
in 2020”, is uttered, then the determination of the truth or falsity of the proposition
will depend on the fact, viz. “COVID-19 broke out in 2020”, because the proposi-
tion “COVID-19 broke out in 2020” has been made true by the corresponding fact
that COVID-19 in fact broke out in the year 2020. Although fact remains focal in
Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism (philosophy of logical atomism is technical
in that it endorses a symbolic method of analysis), his emphasis on rationality for
everyday life is indicative of the point that fact remains fundamental for him in the
non-technical domain too. From his statement that “…if fact can be made the test of
the truth of our beliefs anywhere, it should be the test everywhere, leading to agnos-
ticism whenever it cannot be applied” (Russell, 1928, p. 38), it follows that Russell’s
reference to fact as the test of truth of our beliefs anywhere, i.e. rationality in opinion
rests on the adherence to fact.
For Russell, fact is related to objectivity of truth, and the objectivity of truth is
something which is desired by everyone. Even in the field of religion too, he says,
one seeks to obtain objective truth “as long as they hope to find it” (Russell, 1928,
p. 38), but “it is only when people have given up the hope of proving that religion is
true in a straightforward sense that they set to work to prove that it is ‘true’ in some
new-fangled sense” (Russell, 1928, p. 38). The use of the word newfangled is signif-
icant here, because for Russell, it is when men become aware of the non-provability
of the truth of religion in an objective sense, they attempt to prove truth in a new-
fangled way. This implies that the desire to prove truth in a newfangled way in any
discourse is a way to import truth rather than attempting to look at truth in a straight
forward way. Attempt to import truth in a newfangled way, according to Russell, is
as an instance of irrationalism as irrationalism “arises almost always from the desire
to assert something for which there is no evidence, or to deny something for which
there is very good evidence” (1928, p. 38). By following Russell’s take on irration-
alism here, rationalism can be understood as belief in objective fact which arises
almost always from the desire to deny something for which there is no evidence, or
to assert something for which there is very good evidence. It follows therefore that
what is primary in both rationality and irrationality is the desire to believe/disbe-
lieve on good evidence/bad evidence. By analysing the theoretical side of rational-
ity, Russell comes to the point that it is man’s desire to arrive at certainty in every
case that an irrational man desires to disbelieve in objective fact. Theoretical part of
rationality, for Russell, consists “in basing our beliefs as regards matters of fact upon

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evidence rather than upon wishes, prejudices, or traditions” (1928, p. 38). Thus, a
rational man is “the same as one who is judicial or one who is scientific” (1928, p.
38). To be judicious or to be scientific, then, means to consider an objective truth to
be a “very mundane and pedestrian affair—that is sought in science” (1928, p. 38).
Practical side of rationality in opinion, Russell says, is more difficult. He states
two sources from which the differences of opinion on practical questions arise:
“first, differences between the desires of the disputants; secondly, differences in their
estimates of the means for realizing their desires” (Russell, 1928, p. 39). Difference
of the second kind, Russell considers “really theoretical and only derivatively practi-
cal” (1928, p. 39). He cites an example to illustrate this point. If some dispute arises
regarding the adoption of first line of defence, some authorities may hold that such
defence should consist of battleship, while some others may opine that it should
consist of aeroplanes. It can be observed here that the dispute is not with regard
to the proposed end, because disputants on both sides are in agreement with the
end, i.e. national defence. Here, difference arises only with regard to the means. The
dispute here can be settled “in a purely scientific manner, since the disagreement
which causes the dispute is only as to facts, present or future, certain or probable”
(Russell, 1928, p. 40). However, Russell considers few cases where complication
may crop up in rationality in practice. An example he picks up is from gambling:
despite knowing that the system of gambling itself is irrational, gamblers believe
(irrationally) in the system of gambling that it “must lead them to win in the long
run” (Russell, 1928, p. 40). A gambler who desires to play gamble persuades to her/
his own self to play it on the ground that “by so acting he will achieve some end
which he considers good…” (Russell, 1928, p. 40). Similar example is in case of a
man who likes tobacco and who may say that it soothes the nerves; again a man who
likes alcohol may say that it stimulates wit. All these cases reveal that the desire to
play gamble, to like tobacco, to like alcohol—all are biased in that despite knowing
that these are not good activities, they desire to act it. In all the cases, people are
biased about their desires and they justify their desires by dragging into some ends.
What Russell wishes to mean here is that “the bias produced by such causes falsifies
men’s judgments as to facts in a way which is very hard to avoid” (1928, p. 40). This
happens because a biased person judges “quite differently as to matters of fact and
as to probabilities from the way in which a man with contrary desires will judge”
(Russell, 1928, p. 40). Hence, it leads men to believe practically that in such matters
“it is impossible to be objective” (Russell, 1928, p. 40). In such cases, Russell sees
psychoanalysis to be particularly useful, “since it enables man to become aware of
a bias which has hitherto been unconscious” (1928, p. 40). Though Russell hints at
the usefulness of psychoanalysis in the aforementioned cases, he does not spell it out
fully.
Rationality in practice, like rationality of opinion, is a matter of degree for Rus-
sell. He defines rationality in practice as the “the habit of remembering all our
relevant desires, and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strong-
est” (Russell, 1928, p. 41). In contrast to a rational man (rationality in practice),
an irrational man “…forgets that, by indulging the desire which he happens to feel
most strongly at the moment, he will thwart other desires which in the long run are
more important to him” (Russell, 1928, p. 41). In contrast to an irrational man, a

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rational man takes “more correct view of their own interest” (Russell, 1928, p. 41).
Considering these points as to how a rational man rationalizes in practice, Russell
says further: “…if all men acted from enlightened self-interest the world would be
a paradise in comparison with what it is” (1928, p. 41). Enlightened self-interest is
the catchword here because it is by way of enlightening one’s interest or by broaden-
ing one’s interest men can be said to have rationalized practically. This, however,
does not mean that enlightened self-interest is the highest morality for Russell. He
endorses it because “the less rational a man is, the oftener he will fail to perceive
how what injures others also injures him, because hatred or envy will blind him”
(Russell, 1928, p. 41).
A man is rational “in proportion as his intelligence informs and controls his
desires” (Russell, 1928, p. 41). Russell’s deliberation on rationality conceived both
theoretically and practically steers clear of one fundamental point about rationality,
i.e. one must be intelligence in order to become rational. By intelligence, he does not
mean holding higher degrees or achieving certificates in examinations. Being intelli-
gent here means to rationalize both theoretically and practically. That is why Russell
opines that it is the control of our acts by intelligence alone which makes social life
possible (1928, p. 42). What is needed here is the individuals’ “effort towards a more
sane and balanced view of our relations to our neighbours and to the world” (Rus-
sell, 1928, p. 42). It is to such increasingly widespread intelligence; Russell says that
“we must look for the solution of the ills from which our world is suffering” (Rus-
sell, 1928, p. 42). Rationality, by virtue of being such an increasingly widespread
intelligence, points towards a big world—a world where no room is left either for
importing newfangled truth or for thinking only for one’s own self. It follows there-
fore that Russell, by providing a detailed account of both theoretical and practical
aspects of rationality, in fact prepares a stage for becoming genuine thinkers.

Conclusion

Russell’s utterance that “in these days rationality has received many hard knocks, so
that it is difficult to know what one means by it, or whether, if that were known, if
something which human beings can achieve” (1928, p. 36) can be understood as a
serious question about rationality being posed to the whole human race. Russell wit-
nessed two world wars and experienced the devastating aftermath. This leads him
foresee the possible threats which irrationality may breed and hence warns everyone
against irrationality. For the prevention of irrationality, the topics he chose to reflect
on were diverse—education, politics, war, peace, and so forth and so on. However,
his emphasis on education seems to cover a wide literature. The reason perhaps is
that as education is a vast platform, it can inculcate rationality in children from early
childhood. Once the seed of rationality gets implanted in the children in accordance
with the principle of growth via education, they would learn to focus on enlarging
creative impulses. To learn to enlarge creative impulses means to learn to inculcate
genuine thoughts. Inculcation of genuine thoughts would enable them learn preserve
individuality on the one hand; on the other, it would help them grow socially. Alter-
natively speaking, to grow both individually and socially is to mean to grow the

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theoretical and practical aspects of rationality. Unless individuality in each child is

preserved in education, education cannot make children grow freely. It is by growing
freely children learn to imbibe genuine thoughts. Genuine thoughts are not scared
of anything else, they are fearless. The fearlessness of genuine thoughts is due to its
rational character—genuine thoughts seek uncover what is the case—fact, which is
the nerve of Russell’s philosophy of logical analysis. It is not the case that ration-
ality, considered theoretically, moves towards objective truth, it is also equally the
case that rationality in its practical aspect also aims at attainment of increasingly
widespread intelligence. As the best life, Russell argues, is one which is built on
creative impulses, education by virtue of being a creative impulse has to provide
sufficient room for the growth of children (or students). As soon as children start
learning how to grow, they would start leading best lives in future. This means that
leading best lives depends on how children are being grown. Moreover, rationality as
laid down by Russell contains element of dynamicity, because he says that all men
are not equally rational which in turn means that it can be sharpened continuously.
Rationality is not bestowed upon men once and for all. It is by sharpening rationality
or by growing genuine thoughts men afford become rational. To become rational, on
this count, would mean to become educated. In short, to become educated means to
become critical and creative.

Funding  The author has no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Declarations 
Conflict of interest  The author has no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this
article.

References
Russell, B. (1916). Principles of social reconstruction. George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Russell, B. (1928). Sceptical essays. Routledge.
Russell, B. (1944). The Value of Free Thought. Retrieved 12 May 2022, from http://​colle​ctions.​mun.​ca/​
PDFs/​radic​al/​TheVa​lueOf​FreeT​hought.​pdf
Russell, B. (2004a). Logic and knowledge. In R. C. Marsh (Ed.). Routledge
Russell, B. (2004b). Mysticism and logic. Dover Publications, Inc.
Woodhouse, H. (1983). The concept of growth in Bertrand Russell’s educational thought. The Journal of
Educational Thought, 17(1), 12–22.

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