1. Biton vs. Momongan, Per Rec. No.

L-2555, September 3, 1935

LEONARDO S. BITON, petitioner, vs. ANDRES MOMONGAN, respondent.

The administrative case originated from the complaint for malpractice filed against the respondent attorney. The latter was a legal
practictioner and at the same time a notary public in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu. On October 26, 1927, he ratified, as
notary public, a document entitled "Legal Separation", executed by the spouses Leonardo Biton and Fortunata Quijano, as
husband and wife, wherein it was agreed that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and
obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be entitled and each
promising not to be a witness against the other.

The respondent admits that he ratified the document without reading its contents, but that he was not the one who prepared it. The
complainant testified that the respondent prepared the document and that it was drawn up to conform with the respondent's legal
advice to him and his wife. The latter asserts that it was her husband who had prepared the document. In the face of this evidence,
we are of the opinion that it is preponderantly in favor of the respondent's claim that he did not draft the document.

It seems evident that the respondent ratified the document with knowledge of its contents. It is unbelievable that he had merely
asked the parties to the document if the acknowledged its contents without he himself being familiar therewith. The word
"pleases" appearing on the second line of the second paragraph has the respondent's initial's stamped over it. The latter admitted
his initials and the authorship of the amendment. This admission necessarily implies knowledge of the contents of the document,
for otherwise it would not have been possible for the respondent to make the amendment.

The contract acknowledged by the respondent is indubitably illegal and immoral. Its covenants are contrary to laws, morals, and
good customs, and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family. The ratification of a contract of this type, executed
by a notary public who is a practicing attorney at the same time, constitutes malpractice, and as a disciplinary measure, this court
may impose even disbarment. (Pañganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil., 367.)

In imposing the punishment, there should be taken into account the recommendation for leniency made by the judge who
conducted the investigation, and the circumstance that the respondent has been undoubtedly suspended from the office of notary
public to which he will not be reappointed for an indefinite period; wherefore, we hold the respondent Andres Momongan guilty
of malpractice, and he is hereby severely censured. So ordered.

2. [A.C. No. 3324. February 9, 2000]

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR., complainants, vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

BUENA, J.:

Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative sanctions be
imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his
duties as notary public.

In their Affidavit-Complaint,[1] complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint
against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.

Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin’s Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and
Exchange Commission"[2] prepared and notarized by Atty. Resituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:

"V E R I F I C A T I O N
"REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
C A G A Y A N D E O R O C I T Y) S.S.
"WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI
PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in accordance with law
depose and say:
"1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;
"2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are true and correct to the best
of our knowledge and belief.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz (Sgd..) Camagay (Sgd.) M Donato
By (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate
(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado
1
 "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City
of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.
Notary Public"[3]

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the
signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent
Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants averred that
respondent’s act undermined the public’s confidence for which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.

In his Answer,[4] respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the correctness of the
allegations in the motion to dismiss / pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives known by their names as
Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every
signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest of his client backed-up by their
authorization[5]; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written authority.
[6]
 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the said authorization he notarized the said document.

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the
word "By" which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the
fact that his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the
respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the
complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants’ court losses, for
respondent is only a lawyer defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for damages to vindicate
his honor and mental anguish as a consequence thereof.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto
Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent’s Commission for six
(6) months for failure to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss With Answer
prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed
for her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures, because he was
their counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation respondents-Pastors.

But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the same cannot be condoned. He failed to
state in the preliminary statements of said motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their designated
attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as
Notary Public.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. [7] That function would be
defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the
validity thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and
the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. [8]

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

"(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal
and if not, his certificate shall so state."[9]

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts they have
personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representative’s
names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their
signatures and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.

2
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgement or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing
therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. [10]

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an
individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times. [11] For
notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before him and for
notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as
a notary public.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.

3. A.C. No. 6186, February 3, 2004, VICENTE FOLLOSCO and HERMILINA FOLLOSCO, complainants vs. ATTY.
RAFAEL MATEO, respondent.

The present administrative complaint against Atty. Rafael Mateo was originally filed by the spouses Vicente and Hermilina
Follosco with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) some time in 1994. In August of the same year, the CHR referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 4375, was also filed by the spouses Follosco against herein respondent, based on the same acts
complained of in the present complaint.

The complaint was then raffled to Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.. After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and other pertinent pleadings, Commissioner Magpayo, Jr., rendered his Report and Recommendation dated July 24, 2003.

Based on the following findings of facts, to wit:

Respondent was a notary public during all the time (1992 and 1993) material to the complaint.

Complainants are the owners of a certain property (house and lot) located in Tanay, Rizal which was mortgaged to Dr. Epitacio R.
Tongohan for a loan of P50,000.00.

Pursuant to this transaction, several related documents were caused to be executed namely: (1) Sinumpaang Kasunduan Salaysay
Tungkol sa Lupang Sanlaan; (2) Dagdag na Paglilinaw Tungkol sa Lupang Sanlaan; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay; (4) Sinumpaang
Pangako Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaang; and (5) Promissory Note (Sinumpaang Pangako) which were all notarized by herein
respondent in his official capacity as notary public for the Province of Rizal.

Claiming that the signatures appearing on the documents to be forged, complainants filed criminal complaints for falsification of
public documents against Dr. Tongohan, respondent Mateo and the instrumental witnesses which complaints were docketed as I.S.
Nos. 94-269 and 94-2064 of the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Rizal.

I.S. No. 94-269 which involves the document entitled Dagdag na Paglilinaw Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaan" was dismissed by
Pros. Marianito Santos while I.S. No. 94-2064 which was filed at a later time was dismissed as against respondent, but four (4)
counts of falsification of public documents were filed in court against Tongohan and Trinidad Iposadas and one (1) count of
falsification against Veronica Regondola. The latter two were the witnesses to the documents.

Herein complainants not entirely satisfied with the resolution of investigating prosecutor Jison D. Julian elevated I.S. No. 94-2064
to the Department of Justice on a petition for review.

The Department of Justice, speaking thru Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, reversed the resolution in I.S. No. 94-2064 and
directed that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI or PNP Crime Laboratory for appropriate examination and
thereafter to conduct a re-investigation of the case and resolve the case anew based on the evidence adduced by the parties.

After due examination of the questioned document (Sinumpaang Pangako Tungkol sa Lupang Sanglaan), the NBI issued
"Questioned Documents Report No. 661-900 containing the conclusion: "The questioned signatures on one hand and the standard
sample signatures on the other hand were not written by one and the same person."

3
By the use of this forged documents, new tax declarations bearing Nos. 00-TN-001-3661 and 00-TN-001-3147 were issued in the
name of Dr. Epitacio Tongohan effectively canceling Tax Declaration Nos. 00-001-1158 and 001-3217 in the name of
complainant Vicente Follosco.1

Commissioner Magpayo, Jr. found respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months with warning that repetition of the same or
similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.2

In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, The IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Magpayo, Jr., with the modification that instead, respondent’s notarial commission be suspended for one year and that respondent
be reprimanded with warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that respondent failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his duties as
notary public.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:

Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal,
if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.3

In this case, respondent does not deny notarizing the questioned documents. According to him, these documents were already
prepared and executed at the time it was submitted to him for notarization; and because he was familiar with the complainants, he
"unsuspectingly" affixed his signatures thereon. Respondent also stated that he does not have the slightest intention of causing
damage to complainants.4

It cannot be said that respondent acted in good faith in notarizing the questioned documents without requiring the affiants to
personally appear before him and ensuring that the signatures were indeed theirs. Respondent’s claim of good faith cannot relieve
him from the consequences of his reckless failure to comply with the dictates of the law.

Acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act or routine.5 Thus, in Vda. de Rosales vs. Ramos,6 the Court emphasized the
significance of the act of notarization, to wit:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free
act and deed.

A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 7

The Court is not unaware of the careless practice of some lawyers who notarize documents without requiring the physical
presence of the affiants. For one reason or another, they forego this essential requirement without taking into account the
likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. The Court had resolved
numerous cases involving unauthentic notarized deeds and documents. Sadly, public faith in the integrity of public documents is
continually eroding, and the Court must, once more, exhort notaries public to be more circumspect in the discharge of their
functions.

4
It devolves upon herein respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned documents. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 8

As borne by the records, respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainants’
rights over the property subject of the documents but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the
function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent
and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. 9

As the Court has held in Flores vs. Chua:

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, we emphatically pronounced:

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing
therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.10 (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent’s notarial commission should not only be suspended as recommended
by the IBP Board of Governors but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law as recommended by the
investigating commissioner.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rafael Mateo is SUSPENDED from practice of law for three (3) months; his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED; and he is prohibited from being commissioned as notary public,  for one year, effective
immediately, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the personal record of respondent; the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court for dissemination to all lower courts; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper
guidance and information.

SO ORDERED.

4. [A.C. No. 2611. November 15, 2000.], FELY E. CORONADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERNESTO
FELONGCO, Respondent.

This case originated from a letter of complaint on December 19, 1983. Complainant Fely E. Coronado alleged that Atty. Ernesto
Felongco notarized a Deed of Promise to Sell purportedly signed by her deceased mother, Fe Vda. De Esteva. She charged that
Atty. Felongco connived with her brother, Pacifico Esteva, Jr., who caused the preparation of the document. Pacifico allegedly
wanted to get the entire inheritance left by their parents who did not know how to read nor write. The act caused dissension in
their family.

In his comment, respondent Atty. Felongco claimed that the document he notarized was a Deed of Promise to Sell. He alleged that
on September 2, 1982, Fe Vda. De Esteva came to his office with Pacifico and Florenda Faraon, the vendee in the deed for the
purpose of having the document notarized. The deed was prepared the previous day by respondent’s partner, Atty. Ely Pastores. It
was already signed by Esteva when it was presented to Respondent. Esteva acknowledged her signature and told respondent that
she signed it in her house in the presence of Faraon, Pacifico Esteva and her daughter, Irenea Vda. De Cabrera. 2 When
respondent asked for her residence certificate, Esteva said she left it in their house. Respondent told them to return the following
day with Esteva’s residence certificate so the deed could be notarized.

The residence certificate of Esteva was shown to respondent only on September 10, 1982. It was brought by Florenda Faraon
alone. She did not inform respondent that Esteva had died on September 6, 1982. Instead, she told respondent that Esteva could
not come as she was confined at a hospital in Banga, South Cotabato. Thus, respondent notarized the deed without knowledge
about the death of Esteva. 3
5
Respondent also belied that Esteva did not know how to write for she acknowledged her signature before him. He claimed that he
notarized the deed in good faith.

Florenda Faraon executed an affidavit in favor of Respondent. She said that on September 1, 1982, she went to the office of
respondent together with Fe Vda. De Esteva and Pacifico Esteva, Jr. They wanted respondent to prepare a deed of sale. But as
respondent was not present, Atty. Pastores prepared the Deed of Promise to Sell. Atty. Pastores asked them to return the next day
so that respondent could notarize the deed.

Faraon and her companions brought the document with them to the house of Fe Vda. De Esteva. Esteva demanded from Faraon a
partial payment of P7,000.00 and then signed the deed. They agreed that the balance of P5,000.00 shall be paid after the harvest.
Esteva then needed money for her hospitalization. Faraon also requested Pacifico and Irenea to sign the deed as witnesses.

When they returned to the office of respondent, the latter verified their signatures from them. He explained the deed to Esteva and
asked for her residence certificate. Esteva, however, forgot to bring it with her. Respondent told them to return the next day and
present the residence certificate of Esteva. He did not notarize the deed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the morning of September 10, 1982, Pacifico went to the house of Faraon and requested her to bring the deed to respondent for
notarization. Faraon brought the deed to the respondent together with the residence certificate of Esteva. She informed respondent
that Esteva could not come because she was confined at a hospital in Banga, South Cotabato. Pacifico allegedly did not reveal to
her that Esteva had died on September 6, 1982. 4

Pacifico, the youngest child of the deceased, also executed an affidavit 5 that corroborated that of Faraon. He explained that he did
not inform Faraon about the death of Esteva for he feared that Faraon might not pay the remaining balance if she knew about it. In
turn, Atty. Pastores confirmed that he helped prepare the deed. 6

This case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General on June 4, 1984 and then to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On June 14, 1999, Commissioner Lydia Navarro of the IBP submitted a
report finding that respondent violated the notarial law which requires the author of the document to be present before it can
notarized. She recommended that respondent be suspended from his commission as Notary Public for six (6) months. On June 27,
1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Navarro. It denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration on September 27, 1999.

The Court agrees that respondent violated section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, 7 otherwise known as the Notarial Law, which
provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. (a) The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal,
if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state." cralaw : red

It is thus obvious that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents. 8 In the case at bar, the acknowledgment of the Deed of Promise to Sell stated
that on the "10th day of September, 1982 at Koronadal, South Cotabato personally appeared: FE ESTEVA [and] FLORENDA
FARAON" before the Respondent. 9 Esteva died on September 6, 1982, 10 hence, it is clear that the acknowledgment was made
in violation of the notarial law.

Time and again, we have emphasized that notarization is not an empty routine. 11 It converts a private document into a public one
and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. 12 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.

Be that as it may, we note that respondent exerted some efforts to comply with the law. Faraon and Pacifico declared that Esteva
appeared before the respondent on September 2, 1982. Respondent explained the contents of the document and asked Esteva if the
signature appearing therein was her signature.

Unfortunately, Esteva died a few days later and, thus, he notarized the deed not a knowing of her demise. Respondent has
expressed remorse for his negligence. Respondent’s offense is his first, hence, his plea for mitigation of his liability has merit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Ernesto is found guilty of misconduct. He is ordered suspended from his Commission as
notary Public for a period of 2 months effective immediately, with warning that any future breach of his duties will be dealt with
more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
6
SO ORDERED.

5. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1 respondent.

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of
Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.

The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law,
thus:

Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and
forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the
9th of January 1984.

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December
31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st
1989.

b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his commission in December 1989. 2

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or
public servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.

and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the premises. 3

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
which contained the following:

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff.
years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b             February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986

4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after
December 1985.
7
 5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until
December 31, 1989.4

In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a
certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in
the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as
follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized
documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait
Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the
plaintiffs.6

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation to
determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the
matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals
(CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.7

In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de
Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded to the Court,
which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. 8 The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro
City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9

In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a)
notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the
practice of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any, be
revoked.10

According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant presented
documentary evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983
nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed,
he presented no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned)
and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.

On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record Books available in the notarial section" of the
RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains items
on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry appearing was made on
December 1982."

If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983).
However, he did not present said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental,
or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of
appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the
Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath of office of the notary public. 11

Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the complainant, that the respondent notarized
documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12

The Procedural Issues

8
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.

On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts;
and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of
the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for
such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the
CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall
apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.

Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13,
2001.

The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was Still A
Practicing Lawyer

The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the
acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his
appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member
of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:

Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly,
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at
the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government
service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are
jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication.14

The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections
2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided
in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the
investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented in the
investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.

9
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is
not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any
officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action. 15

Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not
immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 16of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore,
at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent
is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. 17

The Substantive Issues

The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge Against Him
For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation.19

However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the
judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC 20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in
part:

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against
any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved
or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.

2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged
cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator
must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court
a report and recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six
(6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may
order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or
justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint
was intended to harass the respondent.

In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on March
26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground
for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the
respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to
be without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of
the foregoing resolution.

A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The Judiciary

10
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. 22 In fact, even the new
Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of
charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not
be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent judge to be
disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of
his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in
this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25

In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative
discipline against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:

...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private
and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ...27

The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by substantial evidence. 28 The complainant therein
presented evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was, however,
adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was
exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the
respondent was appointed to the judiciary.

The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. 29 The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members. 30

Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification
Of Public Documents

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 31 Notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution.32

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. 33 The Court
has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents." 34 For such reprehensible
conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission
and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.35

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.  Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."37

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the
integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.38

The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record

11
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case
on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983,
nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register."
Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for
the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register. 40

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him.41

The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not
prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen
to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43

An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before
he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
practice of law.45

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:47

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48

In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation that the charge for
immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the
respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found
guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the father. The complaint
in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended. 50 The Court held that administrative
offenses do not prescribe.51

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who
was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred
by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect
the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the
respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.

12
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority
therefor.

At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability

Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.  Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards; 53 he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 54 In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent
also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent
was filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of; 56 that there was no private offended party who came
forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits. 57 The Court finds that a
fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

6. PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 125283. February 10, 2006.

QUESTION: C executed a special power of attorney authorizing D to mortgage the former’s property in which the latter did.
C and D executed a letter-agreement whereby D agreed to by the property to pay of the loan and the remaining balance is to
paid quarterly. C executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of D. C’s wife signed the marital consent evidencing her
conformity in advance to the sale days prior to the execution of the deed of absolute sale. Surprisingly, C asked the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent to be declared null and void for being spurious in which the trial court granted mainly
relying on C’s disavowal of his signature and that of his wife’s, together with extrinsic factors which in its opinion evinced
the spuriousness.

Can the deed of absolute sale and marital consent be validly annulled?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and
convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. The presumption of regularity does not hold true
with respect to the Marital Consent which is a private writing. It is subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which states: Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other
private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be. The requirement of proof of the authenticity of the
Marital Consent was adequately met, in this case, through the testimony of D to the effect that, together with the other
witnesses to the document, he was present when C's wife affixed her signature thereon before notary public Benedicto.

7. G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011, ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN M.
CARBONEL-GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217
and its Resolution dated April 5, 2006, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals’ Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch
40 in Civil Case No. D-9040, as the appellate court declared respondent Rosario G. Venturozo the owner of the land in dispute,
and ordered petitioner Adelaida Meneses to vacate and surrender her possession thereof to respondent.

13
The facts are as follows:

On June 8, 1988, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, respondent herein, filed a Complaint 2 for "ownership, possession x x x and
damages" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City against defendant Adelaida Meneses, petitioner herein, alleging that
she (plaintiff) is the absolute owner of an untitled coconut land, containing an area of 2,109 square meters, situated at
Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and declared under Tax Declaration No. 239. Plaintiff alleged that she purchased the
property from the spouses Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale,3 and that the vendors, in turn, purchased the property from defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale 4 dated June
20, 1966. Plaintiff alleged that she has been in possession of the land until May 1983 when defendant with some armed men
grabbed possession of the land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands prompting her to engage the services of counsel.
Plaintiff prayed that after preliminary hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued; and that after hearing, a
decision be rendered declaring her as the owner of the property in dispute, ordering defendant to vacate the property in question
and to pay her ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; ₱1,000.00 as litigation expenses; ₱10,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs of suit.

In her Answer,5 defendant Adelaida Meneses stated that plaintiff is the daughter of Basilio de Guzman, the vendee in the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 that was purportedly executed by her (defendant) covering the subject property. Defendant
alleged that she never signed any Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, and that the said deed is a forgery. Defendant also
alleged that she never appeared before any notary public, and she did not obtain a residence certificate; hence, her alleged sale of
the subject property to Basilio de Guzman is null and void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 31,
1973, executed by Basilio de Guzman in favor of plaintiff, covering the subject property, is likewise null and void. Defendant
stated that she acquired the subject property from her deceased father and she has been in possession of the land for more than 30
years in the concept of owner. Plaintiff’s allegation that she (defendant) forcibly took possession of the land is a falsehood.
Defendant stated that this is the fourth case the plaintiff filed against her concerning the land in question.

In her Counterclaim, defendant stated that in view of the nullity of the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property, and
the fact that plaintiff and her father Basilio de Guzman had never been in actual possession of the property, plaintiff is under legal
obligation to execute a deed of reconveyance over the said property in her favor.

The issue before the trial court was whether the sale made by defendant Adelaida Meneses in favor of plaintiff’s father, Basilio de
Guzman, was valid.6

On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40 (trial court) rendered a Decision in favor of defendant Adelaida Meneses.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20, 1966 (Exhibit "B") and the Deed of Absolute and
Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 (Exhibit "A") null and void ab initio;
2) Declaring the defendant Adelaida Meneses as the owner of the property in question;
3) Ordering the plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo to execute a Deed of Reconveyance in favor of the defendant Adelaida
Meneses over the property in question described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
4) Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant ₱10,000.00 as damages; and ₱1,000.00, as litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court found that defendant Adelaida Meneses inherited the land in dispute from her father, Domingo Meneses; that she
did not sell her property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and that the signature of Adelaida Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery. The trial court stated that the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, is very much different from her specimen signatures and those appearing in the records of
Civil Case No. 1096 in the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan. It held that since there was no valid transfer of the property by
Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de Guzman, the conveyance of the same property in 1973 by Basilio de Guzman to his daughter,
plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, was also invalid. The trial court stated that the claim of plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, that her
parents, Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman, purchased from defendant Adelaida Meneses the subject property in 1966, is
negated by defendant’s continued possession of the land and she gathered the products therefrom.

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

On October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 40) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one rendered declaring plaintiff-appellant the owner of the subject land and ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and
surrender possession thereof to the former.8
14
The Court of Appeals stated that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her signature
on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was a forgery. Instead, she admitted on direct examination that her signature on
the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, thus:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit "6" and Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1)
Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?

A. I do not know this document, sir.

Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was previously marked as Exhibit "6-a" and Exhibit
"A-1" for the plaintiff, will you examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?

A. This is my signature, sir.9

According to the Court of Appeals, such admission is binding on her, there being no showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.10

The Court of Appeals also stated that mere variance of signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were
forged, as forgery cannot be presumed. 11 Appellee Adelaida Meneses should have produced specimen signatures appearing on
documents executed in or about the year 1966 for a better comparison and analysis.12

The Court of Appeals held that a notarized document, like the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, has in its
favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld. 13 Moreover, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala − the notary public before
whom the questioned Deed of Sale was acknowledged − testified and confirmed its genuineness and due execution, particularly
the signature in question. The appellate court stated that as against appellee Adelaida Meneses’ version, Atty. Biala’s testimony,
that appellee appeared before him and acknowledged that the questioned deed was her free and voluntary act, is more credible.
The testimony of a notary public enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary witness.14

The Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
evidentiary force of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1966, which appears on its face to have been executed with
all the formalities required by law.

Adelaida Meneses’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 15 dated April
5, 2006.

Hence, Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her heir, filed this petition raising this lone issue:

I
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.16

Petitioner contends that her statement, made during the course of her testimony in the trial court, was taken out of context by
respondent to be used merely as an argumentative point. The examining lawyer used the words, "Do you know this
signature?" viz.:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit "6" and Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1)
Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?

A. I do not know this document, sir.

Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was previously marked as Exhibit "6-a" and Exhibit
"A-1" for the plaintiff, will you examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?

A. This is my signature, sir.17

Petitioner contends that in the above-quoted transcript of stenographic notes, she was merely asked if she was cognizant of such a
signature as hers or whether the signature appearing on the questioned document was similar to that of her signature, and not if
she was the one who indeed affixed such signature on the said deed of sale.1avvphil

15
She avers that the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party invoking it and does not require proof admits
of two exceptions: (1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake; and (2) when it is shown that no
such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the admission "out of context," then the
one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. 18 This may
be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. 19

Petitioner also contends that a comparison of the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 and her specimen
signatures, as well as her genuine signature on pleadings, were made by the trial court, and it ruled that her signature on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was a forgery. She submits that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect, 20 and the appellate court should have given weight to the trial court’s findings that her
signature on the said Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed cases from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of
errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. 21 Thus, this Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 22 However, this rule
admits exceptions,23 such as when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the
trial court24 like in this case.

The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated
by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, 25 is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. 26 As notarized
documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution 27 and enjoy
the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity.28 The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. 29 A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to
a private instrument.30 Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.311avvphi1

In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did
not comply with the formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496, 32 otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, which
took effect on January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the Act provides:

FORMS

Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases, and discharges affecting lands, whether registered under this Act or
unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective
to convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix form
heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same, in the
presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof , and shall be acknowledged to be
his or their free act and deed by the person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court
of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such acknowledgment x x x.33

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution
of the said deed; hence, there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the residence certificate of petitioner was issued to
petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and notarization; hence, the
number of petitioner’s residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute
Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966. 34 Considering
the defect in the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public document, but only a
private document,35 and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of evidence.

Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In regard to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, 36 the Court
agrees with the trial court that her signature therein is very much different from her specimen signatures 37 and those appearing in
the pleadings38 of other cases filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years when the specimen signatures were
made. Hence, the Court rules that petitioner’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.

16
The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of context, considering that in her Answer 39 to the Complaint,
she stated that the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Basilio de Guzman is a forgery; that she never
signed the said Deed of Sale; that she did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not secure the residence
certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also testified that she never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman; 40 that she
never met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala, 41 and that she did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966. 42 The trial
court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 null and void ab initio.
These circumstances negate the said admission.

The Court finds the Notary Public’s testimony self-serving and unreliable, because although he testified that petitioner was the
one who submitted her residence certificate to him on June 21, 1966, 43 the next day after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on June 20, 1966, Crescencia de Guzman, respondent’s mother, testified that she and her husband got the residence certificate
from petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June 21, 1966. 44 Thus, it is doubtful whether the Notary Public really knew the
identity of the vendor who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale45 dated June 20, 1966.

The Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of
trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. 46 Having observed the deportment of witnesses during
the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility. 47

In fine, the preponderance of evidence is with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 27, 2005 and its Resolution dated April
5, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

8. A.M. No. 528-MJ. September 12, 1977, CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
ALONZO J. TAGABUCBA, respondent.

Administrative complaint, supported by affidavits of the complainants, Crispin MAturan Candia and Justiniano Maturan, charging
Municipal Judge Alonzo J. Tagabucba of Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur, with dishonesty, gross misconduct, false representation
and abuse of authority. Upon referral to respondent of said complaint, he filed his comment thereon, supporting the same with his
own affidavit, whereupon the Court designated Honorable Melquiades S. Sucaldito to conduct the appropriate investigation and
submit his recommendation.

In his report, the Investogator recommends the dismissal of respondent from the service. Accordingly, We have carefully
reviewed the record of the investigation, the oral testimonies of complainants as well as that of the respondent and the documents
submitted by them, and on the basis of such evidence, We have inexorably arrived at the conclusion that indeed, respondent has,
by his impugned actuations clearly proven before the Investigator, shown himself to be unfit to continue performing the
functions of his judicial office and unworthy of being allowed to further enjoy any of the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.

Disregarding matters of less pivotal importance, it appears that respondent has violated on of the fundamental principles
governing the performance of judges of their judicial functions, namely, never to use his office for the promotion of his personal
ineterests. Moreover, while it is true that during the times material to this case, respondent was allowed to engage in the practice
of his profession, it was obviously improper for him, however, to act as counsel for any party whose case would eventually land in
his court. Worse, in the case of the respondent, his professional service were engaged by one of the parties and he subsequently
agreed to act a attorney-in-fact of the other party in connection with the very subject matter of their controversy.

The evidence is conclusive that: During the lifetime of the spouse Marcelo Maturan and Georgina Handog, they owned a parcel of
land measuring 12 hectares. It was mortgaged to the Philippine NAtional Bank , Ozamis City branch. The Maturans failed to pay
their indebtedness, and so, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. Soon after the death of Marcelo, his widow sold 4-1/2 hectares of
the land to Martin Manisan, notwithstanding the mortgage. Respondent was the one who notarized the document.

In his sworn leter to the Secretary of Education and Culture dated March 1, 1973, attached to his 2nd Indorsement of January 10,
1974 by way of Comment on the complaint against him in this case, respondent himself states:

CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA, is one of the heirs of five over a parcel of 12 has. land of their deceased
parents, located at Tuboran, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur. This 12 has. land was mortgaged by their parents

17
with the PNB for P 1,600.00 in January 1957. The proceeds of this mortgage was spent in the marriage of
Justiniano Maturan, a brother. This mortgage was not redeemed despite the lapse of more than 4 years.

In order to redeem the property mortgaged, CRISPINA with her four brothers and their mother (then living) sold
4 1/2 has. portions of the 12 has. land to MARTIN MANISAN for P 2,050.00 in October 1962. The proceeds of
this sale was not however applied to redeem the PNB mortgage as intended but the bigger sum was used by
Justiniano Maturan to open a restaurant business and the rest was spent by CRISPINA to the prejudice of their
thee brothers Pedro, Manuel and Petronillo all surnamed Maturan.

MARTIN MANISAN was led to beleive that the PNB mortgage was redeemed by CRISPINA abd Justiniano
when infact it was not. The whole propoerty including the 4 1/2 has. portion of MANISAN was foreclosed by
the PNB thru public auction in Novemeber 1967. The entire propoerty became the property of the PNB which
unfortunately included the 4-1/2 has. of MANISAN.

MANISAN, from the office of the Chief of Police, came to me for advice as to the possibility of filinfg a case of
ESTAFA aginst CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA, Justiniano Maturan and their three brothers. I prevailed upon
him to take it easy as a remedey was still available for him to recover his 4 1/2 hectares portion from the PNB.
So MANISAN engaged my legal services.

I called CRISPINA and his four brothers for a conference in January 1968. They came to me and I apprised
them of the consequences of the loss of Manisan's 4-1/2 has. to PNB. They asked me whether there was still a
last chance for them to repurchase the property from the PNB after it had been acquired by public auction. I told
them there was a period of one year if the property had not been sold by PNB to a third person but it needs
approval of PNB Manila. With this information, CRISPINA and her four brothers solicited my services to act
for them. I was hesistant to accede as they could not even give me an advance of my sum for the initial follow-
up with PNB, Ozamis City. But earnest requests of CRISPINA and her brothers led me to accede to work for the
rescue or redemption of their 7-1/2 has. from the PNB without a single centavo to start with. They executed
special power of attorney making me as their attorney-in fact authorizing me to repurchase the property from
the PNB.

CRISPINA and her brothers could not put up the sum of P 1,250.00 (part of P 2,542.11) to be deposited with
PNB as earnest money pending approval of Manila PNB. They asked me to produce the sum and other expenses
necessary for the repurchase. So they authorized me by special power of attorney to encumber the 7-/2 has.
portion, to any person who would extend the required and necessary sum, to be repurchased on or before
November 27, 1968, a period of one year from November 27,1967 allowed by the bank. Earnest money was
procured from Mr. Chupuico, a coprax dealer, and deposited with the PNB on January 2, 1968.

With this authority, in behalf of CRISPINA and her 4 brothers, in January, 1968, I entered into a deed of sale
with right of repurchase within 10 months or on or before November 27, 1968. with Mr. Chupuico for price
consisted of the repurchase money deposited with PNB, plus representation expenses with PNB Ozamis and
Manila, payment of subdivision survey and other expenses that will be incurred up to the cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title to TCT for the heirs and TCT for MANISAN The vendee-a-retro insisted to enjoy
the coprax of the land but CRISPINA pleaded that it should be enjoyed her 2 sickly brothers who were
dependent on said produce. The vendee-a-retro agreed but insisted that in the repurchase price should be added
the estimated minimum proceed of coprax by the month to which CRISPINA agreed. The estimated net
proceeds of coprax during the period within which to repurchase is P1,200.00. The price therefore of that
contract I entered into was P 4,250.00.

But the vendee-a-retro, in June 1968, apprehensive of the actuations of CRISPINA, told me that he preferred the
deed signed by CRISPINA and her 4 brothers themselves. And so I explained to CRISPINA that the vendee-a-
retro is reluctant to extend me the sum necessary to accomplish my task, he wanted the deed signed by the heirs
themselves. And so CRISPINA and her 4 brothers executed file the themselves the deed with the same period -
to be repurchased on or before the end of November 1968. In the repurchase price was added the sum of P
340.000 of back taxes and my services' fee in the sum of P 350.00, hence, making the repurchase price to P
4,940.00.

In the last week of October, 1968, Justiniano Maturan came to me that a confided that a bigger portion of 7-1/2
has. was mortgaged for P 1,100.00 by CRISPINA to JUAN PARAGAMAC and CERIACO PICOT all of
Tuboran, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur who were actually the ones who received the produce. When inquired,
PARAGAMAC and PICOT confirmed the information. This explains why CRISPINA pleaded that the coprax
should be enjoyed by her two brothers, who actually did not enjoy the same, to conceal the existing
encumbrance.

18
 After the expiration of the period within which to repurchase or in December 1968, PARAGAMAC and PICOT
gave way or turned over the possession of the 7-1/2 has. portion to the overseer of Mr.
Chupuico. PARAGAMAC filed a case of Estafa againsts public school teacher CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA
on May 16, 1969 before Mahayag Municipal Court, which remanded the case to the Court of First Insurance on
June 30, 1969 for trial on the merits. Copy of complaint and supporting evidence consisting of a promisory note
signed by CRISPINA M. CANDIA, affidavits of JUAN PARAGAMAC and Florentino Saldo which are herewith
attached and worked as Encl. A, B, C D, respectively, and made as integral part hereof.

CERIACO PICOT wanted to file another estafa CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA over the sum of P 600.00
obtained by the latter from the former, simultaneously with that one filed by PARAGAMAC but I prevailed upon
PICOT to hold his complaint meanwhile. This sum up to this date has not been paid or settled. Promissory note
executed by CRISPINA M. CANDIA is likewise attached and marked as Encl. B and made as integral part
hereof.

Thru the intervention of the Provincial Attorney, I promised CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA to accompany
her and her brothers to the vendee-a-retro to request the latter to allow them to repurchase the land despite the
lapse of the lapse of the period.

Meanwhile, in the latter part of 1969 or thereabout, CRISPINA M. CANDIA and Justiniano Caturan thru
fraudulent misrepresentation mortgaged again the 7-1/2 has. portion to Mr. JOAQUIN YAP, a store-owner at
Poblacion- Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur and obtained a loan of P 2,400.00 even though legally the said land
was no longer their own. They having failed to repurchase it within the agreed period from the vendee-aretro.
This act constituted another ESTAFA. The 3 brothers (Pedro, Petronilo and Manuel) were led to believe by
CRISPINA and Justiniano that the money will be accumulated into a repurchase money and so the discriminated
brothers signed the mortgage paper. Over the objection of Petronilo (who reported to me this fact), the bigger
sum was used by Justiniano Maturan for bingo business and the rest was spent by CRISPINA MATURAN
CANDIA to the unfair advantage of their 3 brothers.

In June, 1972, CRISPINA and his brother Justiniano came and asked me to accompany them to Mr. Chupuico at
Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental because they can already produce the repurchase money. I asked then how much
they can raise. They told me, only P3,500. I told then it was not enough, the repurchase money being P4,940. At
any rate. I acceded to accompany them. We fixed a date for us to go together to Bonifacio On the day fixed, they
did not show up, instead a day following they came up and told me that they had gone to Bonifacio alaready.
They saw Mr. Chupuico, who, when requested was amenable to the repurchase but they were not able to
repurchase it as their money was only P3,500.00. Upon their request I told them to add some P1,500.00 to make
it P4,000.00 and I would help them request the to allow the repurchase with that amount. They answered me
they would raise the money. Matters therefore about the 7-1/2 has. ottion which 1, as their attorney-in-fact was
able to rescue or save from being owned forever by the PNB without a single centavo to start with are settled.
The segregation papers to support the cancellation of OCT of the late Marcelo Maturan to TCT for heirs of
Maturan and TCT for MANISAN are ready. It is the turn of CRISPINA MATURAN CANDIA and her brother
Justiniano Maturan to raise the required amount for the repurchase of the parcel of land from the vendee-a-retro.
(pp. 8-11, Record.)

Except for details not very material, the foregoing version of respondent of what happened is what in essence the Investigator
found to be substantiated by the evidence. But it show be stressed that according to the evidence, the vendee aretro repeatedly
referred to by respondent above was none other than his own father-in-law, Mariano Chupuico, whom the complaints never met or
had any direct transactions with, since all the time it was respondent who dealt with them. As found by the Investigator,
respondent was actually the "beneficial vendee", since he was the one who actually took possession of the property after the
ostensible sale to Chupuico. It is also a fact that the judge of the Municipal Court of Mahayag with whom the complaint for estafa
was filed by Paragamac and who remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, as stated in respondent's
abovequoted sworn statement, was none other than respondent himself.

Without going into the other actuations of respondent complained of, such as, particularly, the alleged hasty acceptance by
respondent of the complaint for threats against complainant Justiniano Maturan and his immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him, actuations of respondent admitted by him in his sworn statements aforequoted already bear out the terrible
misconception that respondent has of the nature of his office. He did not only take personal interest in a litigious matter within his
jurisdiction, for he admits that Martin Manisan discussed the possibility of his filing a estafa case against the Maturans, he actually
acted as legal counsel and adviser for all the parties thereto. According to him, Manisan engaged his services and later he agreed
to be attorney-in-fact of the Maturans. In these premises, it is impossible to countenance respondent's plea that he merely tried to
help the family of complainants save their property from remaining forever with the PNB. We cannot escape the conclusion that
respondent always acted in pursuance of his personal self-interest.

19
He claims in his supplemental memorandum that inasmuch as Chupuico has finally allowed the Maturans to repurchase the
property in question for P4,940.00 (without reimbursement of taxes paid) and the same has actually been conveyed back to them
already, "it is painful to realize that while the complainant with her brothers has been enjoying peacefully the fruits of respondent's
labor, respondent is still facing uncertainties of a pending administrative case before YOUR HONORS." Unfortunately for him,
the circumstances revealed in the record show otherwise - at the very least, it has been sufficiently shown that an attempt was
made by him, as judge, to take advantage of his position in purchasing property likely to be, if not actually, the subject matter of a
case before him by acting as counsel and adviser for both parties. Such patently deplorable conduct betrays an utter lack of the
ethical principles and sense of propriety, without which any judge cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in any orderly society.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby dismissed from the service, effective upon notice hereof, with total forfeiture of all
leave and retirement privileges to which he may otherwise be entitled.

9. Apiag vs. Cantero, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070 – Case Digest

FACTS
Maria Apiag, a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, is legally married to Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
on August 11, 1947. They have two daughters namely Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio Cantero.  
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to Judge Cantero however
there is no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had
another family: the wife’s name is Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu with
five (5) children namely: Noralyn Y. Cantero; Ellen Y. Cantero; Erwin Y. Cantero; Onofre Y. Cantero; and Desirie Vic
Y. Cantero wherein in all of the public documents, Judge Cantero misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves
C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage.
Judge Cantero denied the validity of his marriage to Maria Apiag because it was only dramatized just to shot the
wishes and purpose of their parents without his free will. He added “As a matter of fact, I was only called by my
parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister’s birthday
from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to
acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was
yet 20 years of age, and at my second-year high school days.”  
However, before the marriage, they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted in Maria Apiag’s pregnancy in the
name of Teresita Apiag now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom, one of the complainants. In order to save the name and shame,
the parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an agreement to allow them to get married in the
name, but not to live together as husband and wife. In addition, after the said affair, both will be immediately
separated from each other without living together as husband and wife even for a day, nor having established a
conjugal home. Afterwhich, they have never met each other nor having communication for the last forty years (40)
years.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary to declare the prior marriage void.
RULING
Yes, as per current jurisprudence, “a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact” before any
party thereto “can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void.” This was expressly provided under
Article 40 of the Family Code. 
However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel vs. SempioDiy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat
vs. Amante applies in favor of the respondent. 
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the
bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the
accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge’s belief in good faith that his first marriage was
void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of
public documents, which must be appreciated in his favor.

10. [ Adm. Case No. 137-J, March 27, 1971 ]

MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, RESPONDENT.

20
 On January 9, 1969, Marciana Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), the offended party in a criminal
prosecutions[1] for forcible abduction with rape, and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action [2] for annulment of marriage, filed with
this Court a complaint against the Honorable Mariano V. Benedicto (hereinafter referred to as the respondent judge) in
whose sala both the aforementioned cases fell, seeking his removal from office on the basis of verified charges.
Imputed to the respondent judge are: (1) serious misconduct in relation to the criminal and civil cases; (2) immorality in
connection with both cases; (3) gross inefficiency and incompetence in relation to the criminal action; and (4) knowingly ren-
dering an unjust judgment in the criminal case.
The factual incidents preceding the complainant's administrative action against the respondent judge are not complicated.
On September 13, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija, upon a complaint[3] filed by a sister of the complainant and after
conducting the preliminary investigation required by law, charged Raymundo Mariano and four others with the crime of forcible
abduction with rape committed on the person of the complainant the court, with the respondent judge presiding, heard the case on
the merits.
On October 21, 1967, the complainant filed an action against Mariano for annulment of marriage; this action was docketed in the
same court presided by the respondent judge.
On November 11, 1968, the respondent judge rendered judgment in the criminal case, acquitting the defendants for failure the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
On January 15, 1969, the complainant filed a petition this Court, seeking to inhibit the respondent judge from hearing the civil
case still pending before the latter's sala.  This petition was denied in a resolution dated January 29, 1969.
Returning to the case at bar, on February 8, 1969, the respondent judge filed his answer, denying the charges imputed to him by
the complainant and alleging lack of factual or legal basis of the administrative complaint.  By a resolution dated February 1969,
this Court referred and assigned the administrative case the Honorable Carmelino Alvendia of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Subsequently, on May 6, 1969, this Court, acting upon the complainant's motion for reconsideration of this Court's resolution
dated January 29, 1969 denying the said complainant's petition seeking to inhibit the respondent judge from taking further action
on the civil case, expressed the view of the propriety of the said respondent judge desisting from hearing the civil action to
be subserve the ends of justice.  In compliance with the aforesaid resolution, the respondent judge, on May 14, 1969, issued an
order inhibiting himself from hearing the civil case and from further proceedings in the criminal action against another defendant
not tried with the others.
On December 19, 1969, after proceedings and investigation duly conducted on the administrative complaint, the Honorable
Justice Alvendia submitted his report wherein he states that the complainant failed to prove the charges against the respondent
judge, with four exceptions, to wit:
1.      The respondent judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon, to promulgate decisions in criminal cases, in violation of
the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120[4] of the Rules of Court;
2.      The respondent judge formed a committee to solicit contributions and/or donations of steel filing cabinets, electric fans, and
other office equipment from private parties for his court in contravention of the spirit of section 24 [5] of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics;
3.      The respondent judge, considering that the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by the complainant against one of the
defendants in the criminal action remained pending before his sala, imprudently received the said complainant in his chambers
prior to the promulgation of his decision in the criminal action; and
4.      The respondent judge failed to resolve a motion filed by the prosecution for the suspension of the hearing of the criminal
case until after trial and resolution of the civil case (on the ground that the latter raised a prejudicial question), in violation of the
provisions of section 5, Republic Act 296, as amended.[6]
1. Anent the first recusation of serious misconduct, the Honorable Justice, Alvendia found only one among the acts alleged by the
complainant as constituting the charge proved and, therefore, demanding attention by this Court - that the respondent judge
allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon, to promulgate decision in criminal cases.  In this connection, the investigator also
found that Tuazon, on those occasions when the deputy clerk of court delegated to him the promulgation of the respondent judge'
decisions in criminal actions, promulgated only decisions of acquittal.
Tuazon, the report reveals, even testified during the investigatory proceedings that the deputy clerk of court entrusted to him the
promulgation of the decision in the criminal case involved herein.  This testimony remains unrebutted on record.  Furthermore, the
investigator found that Tuazon, in this particular instance, "went to the extent of assuming the prerogative of postponing the
promulgation of the decision which, according to the evidence, was not even delegated by the respondent judge to the deputy clerk
of court."

21
All these indicate laxity on the part of the respondent judgment in the supervision of his employees, states the
investigator.  Continuing, he says that this practice contravenes the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and
may lead to incident "liable to involve, rightly or wrongly, the integrity of the Court and/or undermine the people's faith in the
judiciary."
In reply, the respondent judge asserts that the documentary and testimonial evidence show that he entrusted his decision
to Tuazon for delivery to the clerk of court and not for promulgation by the said clerk-messenger.  With regard to the decision in
the criminal action involved herein, he explains that he placed the same in an envelope and sealed it before entrusting it to Tua-
zon for delivery to the clerk of court and that he ordered the promulgation of the said decision by the clerk of
court.  If Tuazon himself read the dispositive portion of the decision, then he did so upon the instructions of the clerk of court and
not upon his authorization, the respondent judge adds.
Section 67 of Republic Act 296, as amended, provides two grounds for the removal of judges: serious misconduct and ineffi-
ciency.  The complainant seeks the removal of the respondent judge on the first ground and enumerates a number of facts al -
legedly constituting the imputed charge of serious misconduct, five of which acts the Honorable Justice Alvendia found
unsupported by evidence.  The remaining one - that the respondent judge sanctioned the practice of his deputy clerk of court of
delegating to the clerk-messenger the promulgation of decisions of acquittal in criminal cases - fails to fit into the accepted
definition of serious misconduct. "Serious" means "important, weighty, momentous and not trifling," [7] and ''misconduct" refers to
"a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer."[8] Misconduct" also implies "a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."[9]
In the face of the denial by the respondent judge that he authorized Tuazon to promulgate his decisions plus his explanation why
the act complained of created the false impression that he tolerated the practice of allowing the clerk-messenger to promulgate his
decisions, we have no solid support to hold that the said respondent judge either acted in wanton disregard of or in tended to
violate the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.   We find no reliable evidence on record to demonstrate that
the act complained of was influenced by malice or induced by an intention to violate the law or spurred by a desire to debase the
integrity of the court.
Nevertheless, on this count, although the act charged does not constitute serious misconduct on the part of the respondent judge as
to warrant the severe administrative penalty of removal from the Bench, we believe that this act manifests the insouciance of the
respondent judge in the supervision of the attendants of the court who aid him in the performance of his judicial
functions.  Assuming as true that the clerk-messenger read the dispositive portion of the decision in the criminal case involved
herein upon order of the clerk of court, the respondent judge should have, upon notice and knowledge thereof, called the attention
of the clerk of court and taken appropriate disciplinary measures against those who committed the disservice, instilling in them the
sense of propriety and probity required of those who assist in the performance of judicial functions.
We find the inclination of the respondent judge to leniency in the administrative supervision of his employees an undesirable
trait.  Oftentimes, such leniency provides the court employees the opportunity to commit minor transgressions of the laws and
slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious delinquencies.  The respondent judge should constantly keep a watch-
ful eye on the conduct of his employees.  He should realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of the behavior of his
employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties.  Then, his subordinates would know that
any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked.  The slightest sem-blance of impropriety on the part of the employees of the court in
the performance of their official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators.  The
slightest breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of
the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
 2. Count two surfaced only in the course of the investigation conducted by the Honorable Justice Alvendia.  The complainant
bases the second challenge on the ground that the respondent judge, using his official position and power, formed a committee to
solicit contributions and donations of office equipment for his court from private parties, in contravention of the provisions of
section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.  The respondent judge vigorously refutes this, denying that he participated, directly or
indirectly, in the fund-raising or in the solicitation of donations.
In his proffered explanation, the respondent judge states that when he assumed office in Branch V of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, he found the court premises in a deplorable "state of disarray" - most of the records laid out or placed on the floor,
and the rest kept inside unlocked cabinets.  He also found no available law books at hand.  Clerk and employees of the court
shared and occupied one table.  Twice, the respondent judge tried to obtain financial assistance for the improvement of the court
premises - first, from the provincial treasurer, then, from the Department of Justice - but he received none.  Then, the presidents of
the bar associations of Nueva Ecija and other practicing lawyers of the province approached him and offered
suggestions.  Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a committee to raise funds and solicit donations.  The respondent judge
merely appointed the members of the committee and offered suggestions, Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a committee to
raise funds and solicit donations. The respondent judge merely appointed the members of the committee.
The committee according to the respondent judge, conducted the campaign with the knowledge, if not with the tacit approval, of
the Department of Justice.  In fact, at the end of the campaign, certificates of appreciation were given to those who assisted the
committee and contributed to the success of the undertaking which bore the official notation of the Judicial Superintendent of the
Department of Justice. Eventually, the committee turned over the books and office equipment to the District Judge through the

22
clerk of court, who, in turn, officially turned them over to the provincial government as to form part of the property of the
province.
A careful reading of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics shows that the said section dwells mainly on the prohibi tion
against the use by a judge of his official power and prestige to persuade others to participate or contribute to the success
of business promotions or campaigns for charity.  Briefly, section 24 requires a judge to refrain from private business
ventures or charitable enterprises so as not to give occasion for any suspicion that he utilizes the power of his office or the
influence of his name for the success of such undertakings or to give rise to any situation wherein his personal interest might
conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.  Section 24 thus appropriately and accurately applied, the act of the
respondent judge in appointing the members of the campaign committee does not fall within its contemplation.  To hold otherwise
would countenance an interpretation unduly strained.
Be that as it may, we can not simply ignore the act of the respondent judge and state that we find nothing objectionable at all in
this conduct.  True, his well-intentioned desire to provide the court premises with the necessary equipment motivated him to
accept the suggestion of the lawyers of Nueva Ecija and, then, to appoint the members of the committee for the
campaign.  However, for reasons of extreme probity and delicacy, he should have declined to assume the appointing prerogative
to avoid the slightest hint of involvement, personal or official, in the campaign.
To our mind, although the act of the respondent judge in taking part in the appointment of the members of the campaign
committee constitutes no serious breach of judicial ethics, such act nevertheless could engender several misinterpretations likely
to cause doubt that he enjoys no more than normal social relations with those whom he appointed to the campaign group.  The
respondent judge should have avoided any act giving rise to any suggestion calculated to impair the image of impartiality and
independence of the courts.
We, however, find it disenchanting that the respondent judge had to turn to the private sector for the essential needs of his court
when the obligation is the Government's to provide him the necessities required by the complexity of court work. Circumstances
compelled the respondent judge to do so.  The Government paid no heed to his perfervid pleas for financial assistance in the
acquisition of the equipment necessary for the efficient and productive business of the court.  The Government gave him no sup-
port.  We, therefore, find no cogent reason to blame the respondent judge in accepting the help offered by the lawyers
in Nueva Ecija to provide the court with facilities of great utility to the convenient dispatch of court work.
3. On the third charge, the complainant assails as imprudent the conduct of the respondent judge of receiving her in his private
chambers and of allegedly discussing with her the merits the criminal action, considering that at that time the civil case filed by
the complainant still remained unresolved before his sala.  The respondent judge admits that he met with the complainant when
the latter requested an audience with him but disclaims that he discussed the criminal case with her.   In fact, the respondent judge
alleges that when the complainant tried to start a discussion on the merits of the criminal case, he told her to refer to his decision
on the said case which he ordered promulgated earlier that day.[10] The respondent judge further claims that it is his practice not to
allow any of the parties to confer with him on any case pending before his sala without the presence of the other party.
In the case at bar, he admits that he made an exception and agreed to receive the complainant, then accompanied by her sister,
sister-in-law, a court employee and a court helper, in his chambers.  He states that he wanted to soften, as much as possible, the
impact of her defeat in the criminal case. Moreover, he sought to find out whether the complainant contemplated withdrawing the
civil action or was determined on continuing the same.
We take note of the laudable practice of the respondent judge of not discussing with the interested parties any case pend ing before
him.  We also take note of the fact that the respondent judge, in making an exception re the case at hand, agreed to meet with the
complainant in his chambers only upon the latter's request and insistence.  Although we are inclined to believe that the respondent
judge received the complainant in his chambers not to discuss the merits of the criminal case but to assuage whatever emotional
ache and distress she felt as a result of the decision of acquittal in the criminal action and to find out what course of ac tion she
contemplated to take on the civil case in view of the turn of events, we nonetheless feel that the respondent judge should have
precluded any mention whatsoever of the civil action for the same was then pending before his sala.  This conduct of the judge
indicates lack of reasonable discretion.  Such conduct, too, more often than not, party-litigants misconstrue as personally motivat-
ed.  Many the inferences are, that may be drawn by suspecting minds from acts of judges over-zealously accommodating to in-
terested parties.
On the other hand, we believe that the complainant was not entirely without fault.  For reasons We do not know, for reasons we
can not surmise, she endeavored with utmost persistence to see the respondent judge in his private chambers not only once but
twice.
We might add here, an passant, that the complainant, in her administrative complaint, also imputed to the respondent judge acts of
immorality allegedly committed when the said respondent judge met with her again in his private room.   She claimed that the
respondent judge tried to grab her breasts on the pretext of looking for contusions.  This charge the Honorable
Justice Alvendia discounted as incredible - without any factual basis.  For on that alleged occasion, the respondent judge felt weak
and weary to receive visitors so much so that he refused to see another caller, municipal judge
Sergio Denoga of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.  At that time, too, the respondent judge's wife was in his chambers, attending to his
needs.  Furthermore, the complainant's own witness, the court stenographer, whom she claimed brought her to the respondent

23
judge's chambers, denied having done so.  All these compelled the investigator to disbelieve the charge of immorality against the
respondent judge.
4. The fourth and final charge relates to the respondent judge's alleged failure to resolve a motion filed by the prosecu tion to
suspend the hearing of the criminal case until after final disposition of the civil action for annulment of marriage.   In his
explanation, the respondent judge states that when the prosecution raised the possibility of the existence of a prejudicial question
and asked for the suspension of the proceedings, he suggested it would be better for him to continue hearing both the criminal and
civil cases.  In effect, the respondent judge alleges, such ruling constituted a denial of the motion for suspension.   In fact, he
continues, the prosecution construed the same as a denial of the motion for suspension and the fiscal neither raised the question
again in the subsequent hearings on the criminal action nor made any reference thereto in his memorandum.
The record reveals that the respondent judge made an earnest effort to act on the motion for suspension of the hearings on the
criminal action.  In his honest belief that the civil case posed no prejudicial barrier, he decided to continue hearing the criminal
case.  The only error, if error it may be called, the respondent judge committed consisted of not denying the motion for suspension
in clear and categorical terms so as not to leave any room for misinterpretation and controversy.   The respondent judge should
have made a formal ruling on the motion to enable the parties to know the reason or ground for such ruling and to provide the
party aggrieved by the action on them motion sufficient opportunity to avail of the necessary action for relief from the ruling.
In the case at bar, however, if the respondent judge really failed to act on the motion as the complainant points out, then, the
subsequent hearings on the criminal case afforded the prosecution all the opportunity to ask the respondent judge to make a
definitive ruling on the matter.  Yet, the prosecution proceeded to the termination of the trial, filed its memorandum, and sub-
mitted the case for decision without any further mention of the question.
At this point, we pause to make an observation. We have examined the decision of the respondent judge in the criminal case
involved herein; the same prima facie appears to be correct.  This decision of sixty-six pages includes a complete statement of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and by the defense, a painstaking analysis of the said evidence and of the applicable law, and
the reasons why he entertained reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we find that the respondent judge:
1.      Has been remiss in the supervision of his court employees by failing, upon learning that the deputy clerk of court on three
occasions had entrusted to the clerk-messenger the promulgation of decisions of acquittal, to take corrective action and to
discipline the erring court employees;
2.      Had involved himself in a program to furnish his court, ill-equipped at the time of his assumption of office as presiding
judge thereof, with the necessary facilities, by appointing the members of the campaign committee which solicited donations and
contributions;
3.      Failed to exercise requisite care and discretion by receiving the complainant in his private chambers, considering that the
civil case for annulment of marriage filed by the said complainant (against one of the accused in the criminal action) was yet
pending before his sala; and
4.      Failed to resolve in explicit unmistakable terms the prosecution's motion for suspension of the criminal action based on the
ground that the civil action for annulment of marriage constituted a prejudicial question.
All told, the respondent judge, to our mind, is not guilty of serious misconduct or inefficiency.   We nevertheless are of the
considered view that the acts of commission as well as of omission properly imputable to him, while not warranting the imposi-
tion of any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate the need for greater care, prudence and discretion in his future actuations.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court admonishes the respondent Judge Mariano V. Benedicto (a) to exercise close and unremitting
supervision over his Subordinates, and (b) at all times to adhere to the full intendment of each and all of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

11. A.M. No. 1765-CFI October 17, 1980

ARNALDO R. BORRE, complainant, vs. CFI JUDGE FELIX L. MOYA of Tagum, Davao del Norte and CITY JUDGE
GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Branch III, Davao City, respondents.

Arnaldo R. Borre in his verified complaint of November 27, 1977 charged with serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion
Judge Felix L. Moya of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Tagum Branch IX and Judge Gumersindo Arcilla of the
city court of Davao City, both Bicolanos and alleged to be cronies.

Borre specifically charged Judge Arcilla, his second cousin, with having engaged in business and having collected P1,400 as
professional and notarial fees while acting as ex officio notary.

A referral of this case to an investigator is not necessary because the ultimate facts, on which the decision can be based, may be
gleaned from the complaint and respondents' comments.
24
Judge Moya's case. — On September 8, 1977, Calvin R. Borre filed with the Court of First Instance at Tagum, Davao del Norte a
complaint against his brother Arnaldo, Inapsa Obon Prieto (an illiterate member of a cultural minority) and the Register of Deeds
of Davao (Civil Case No. 886).

In that complaint, Calvin prayed that a certain deed of sale covering a parcel of land, which deed was executed by Mrs. Prieto in
favor of Arnaldo, be declared void (because the land had previously been sold to Calvin) and that the registration of that deed of
sale be enjoined. Calvin asked for a writ of preliminary injunction or a restraining order (pp. 88-95, Rollo).

On that same day, September 8, 1977, when the complaint was filed, Executive Judge Felix R. Moya, without raffling the case,
issued an order wherein he (1) directed the service of summons, (2) set on September 16, 1977 the hearing on the preliminary
injunction and (3) issued a restraining order which reads:

Instead of granting a writ (of preliminary injunction) ex parte, said defendants are restrained from performing
the acts sought to be enjoined in the complaint, while the motion for preliminary injunction is pending
unresolved (p. 106, Rollo).

The next day, September 9, 1977, the case was allegedly assigned to Judge Moya who was presiding over Branch IX. The only
other Judge, assigned to Branch VIII, was Judge Alejandro C. Silapan.

After hearing, Judge Moya issued an order of injunction dated November 2, 1977. The writ was issued on November 28, 1977.
The next day, November 29, Judge Moya inhibited himself from the case in order that "the court should be above suspicion". The
case was re-assigned to Judge Silapan who, on February 2, 1978, rendered a decision approving the compromise settlement
between the brothers Calvin and Arnaldo. Hence, the case was terminated.

Arnaldo's charge against Judge Moya is that by issuing before the raffle, the said order of September 8, 1977, he violated Circular
No. 7 of the Supreme Court dated September 23, 1974 which prohibits an Executive Judge from acting on any incidental or
interlocutory matter in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle. The pertinent provisions of the circular read
(paragraphing supplied):

IV. IN CASE OF URGENT OR INTER

LOCUTORY MATTERS
Whenever an incidental or interlocutory matter in a case is of such urgent nature that it may not wait for the
regular raffle, the interested party may request the Executive Judge in writing for a special raffle.
If the request is granted and the special raffle is conducted, the case shall immediately be referred to the branch
to which it corresponds.
The Executive Judge shall have no authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter in any case not yet
assigned to any branch by raffle.

Judge Moya's repeated disclaimer that he did not issue a restoring order but merely ordered the preservation of the status quo and
that he did not violate the circular is belied by his own order.

His pretension that he thought that the case was raffled to him because it was placed on is table by his clerk does not justify his
negligence in not ascertaining, as he could have easily ascertained, from the expediente itself that the case was not yet raffled to
him.

His pretext that, to avoid irreparable injury, he had to order the preservation of the status quo so as to prevent Arnaldo R. Borre
from registering the questioned deed of sale, is not an excuse for not holding a special raffle before acting on the case. He could
not be mistaken as to the fact that the case was new and that under the circular he could not act on it, even as Executive Judge,
without first holding a special raffle.

He could have known that the alleged irreparable injury could be prevented by Calvin R. Borre through the simple expedient of
registering a notice of list pendens which would render futile any registration to be made by Arnaldo R. Borre.

Arnaldo R. Borre also charged that it was not by coincidence that the case was assigned to Judge Moya and that, because there
were no stenographic notes of the raffle and the expediente of the case did not bear the signature of the Executive Judge, the
requirements of Circular No. 7 were not complied with. The circular provides (paragraphing supplied):

III. MANNER OF RAFFLING

... The raffle proceedings should be stenographically recorded, and minutes thereof shall be prepared and signed
by the Judges (or their representatives) and the Clerk of Court in attendance.
25
 Immediately after the raffle on any particular day the Executive Judge shall indicate the particular branch to
which the case is assigned, the same to be written in words and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the
first page of the original complaint or information and initialed by the Executive Judge and the other two
officers who attended said raffle.

Judge Moya admits that no stenographic notes were taken of the raffle and that he did not initial the assignment of that case to his
sala.

His explanation was that his failure to comply with those requirements was due to the oversight of his clerk who did not follow his
instructions.

We are not satisfied with Judge Moya's artful and disingenuous comment on the charges, which comment does not do him honor
nor enhance his image as a presumably honest, competent and diligent Judge.

He should be censured for his failure to comply with the circular and required to pay a fine equivalent to his compensation for ten
(10) days.

Case of judge Arcilla. — Arnaldo R. Borre alleged that Judge Arcilla notarized the deed of sale executed by Mrs. Prieto in favor
of Calvin R. Borre covering a parcel of land which Mrs. Prieto already sold to Arnaldo and of which prior sale Judge Arcilia was
cognizant.

Arnaldo alleged that Judge Arcilla wanted to have a share in the water project which he (Arnaldo) had established on the land and
that, as previously stated, the judge collected Pl,400 for his legal and notarial services and as treasurer of the Mindanao Water
Spring Supplier Corporation (Annex H, p. 26, Rollo). He was an incorporator of the Mindanao Spring Water Supplier, Inc. (p. 22,
Rollo.)

On the other hand, Judge Arcilla in his comment pointed out that Arnaldo's administrative complaint was induced by the fact that
an assistant fiscal of Davao City gave due course to the charges of estafa and falsification filed against Arnaldo by his brother
Calvin in connection with the disputed land and that on November 29, 1977, informations for estafa and falsification were filed in
court against Arnaldo.

Judge Arcilla said that Arnaldo's suspicion that the judge sided with Calvin was baseless. He (Judge Arcilia) endeavored to effect
an amicable settlement between the two brothers but his efforts were fruitless. He even wrote to the father of the brothers in
Catanduanes to go to Davao to make them come to terms but the father was not able to patch up their controversy.

Judge Arcilla revealed that he was the legal adviser of his cousins, Arnaldo and Calvin. He gave them advice free of charge. He
prepared and notarized several documents for Arnaldo. He denied having received Pl,400 from Arnaldo.

He said that the Borre brothers did not honor their written commitment to pay him five percent of the net income from their water
supply business. He admitted that he was later given a 2.5% equity in the corporation organized by the Borre brothers and
Mariano Nasser for supplying water.

Judge Arcilla said that there is no law prohibiting him from involving himself as legal consultant and notary in the business of the
Borre brothers operated outside the limits of Davao City.

He denied that he was close to Judge Moya and that in behalf of Calvin he talked with the Judge regarding Civil Case No. 886.
His impression was that Arnaldo wanted to use the instant administrative complaint to bring about the dismissal of Civil Case No.
886 and the criminal cases against him.

Judge Arcilla concluded that Arnaldo's complaint against him, made after he had gratuitously rendered legal and notarial services
to Arnaldo for more than ten years, is an illustration of the saying that "ingratitude is stronger than a traitor's arm".

In a letter dated January 27, 1978 or after respondents' comments were submitted, which letter was under oath, Arnaldo requested
that his complaint against Judge Arcilla be considered withdrawn or dropped because it was spawned by a misunderstanding. He
said that he was no longer willing to testify against Judge Arcilla.

He reiterated the same request in his letter, also under oath, dated July 15, 1980 wherein he said that his complaint had become
moot because the parties in Civil Case No. 886 had entered into compromise which, as already noted, was approved by Judge
Silapan in his decision of February 2, 1978. Arnaldo did not withdraw his complaint against Judge Moya.

26
Arnaldo's desistance implies that he has no proofs to substantiate his charge that Judge Arcilla committed a serious misconduct by
exerting pressure on Judge Moya to favor Calvin. (See Maravilla vs. Arcilla, Adm. Matter No. 401-CJ, August 31, 1976, 72
SCRA 485)

Judge Arcilla listed in his comment twenty-three documents which he notarized at the behest of Arnaldo during the period from
June 4, 1968 to January 30, 1977.

Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea believes that Judge Arcilla's engaging in private business and acting as legal
consultant of the Borre brothers are prejudicial to the public service because he (Judge Arcilla) should devote his full time to the
performance of his official duties.

We hold that respondent city judge was not empowered to act as notary public ex officio. A city judge is not among the ex
officio notaries enumerated in section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. Neither the charter of Davao City (Republic Act
No. 4354) nor the Judiciary Law allows a city judge to act as notary ex officio.

In contrast, there is statutory authorization for a justice of the peace, now municipal judge, to act as notary ex officio (Sec. 76,
Judiciary Law and sec, 235, Revised Administrative Code). It should be noted that the fees collected by a municipal judge acting
as ex officio notary accrue to the government funds.

A notary ex officio should notarize only documents connected with the exercise of his official duties. That is the reason why he is
designated as a notary ex officio. He should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions and sign the
document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint).
In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.

As to engaging in business as a sideline, there is no compelling reason for a city judge to engage in private business, considering
that under Letter of Implementation No. 93, dated August 9, 1979, a city judge of Davao City is entitled to receive P43,332 as
annual compensation excluding allowances. Indeed, the public expects him to devote full time to his judicial work.

Moreover, as a Civil Service employee he cannot engage in private business without the written permission of this Court (See Par.
5, Rule XIII, Civil Service Rules found in Executive Order No. 5, dated January 9, 1909 in relation to Executive Order No. 103,
Series of 1913, quoted in the Tenure of Civil Service Officers, by Abelardo Subido, pp. 164-165; See Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures in the Philippine Civil Service by Commissioner Abelardo Subido, 1976, pp. 235-236).

It is noteworthy that one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a Civil Service employee is the "pursuit of private business,
vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations" (Par. 24, Sec. 36, Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, P.D. No. 807 dated October 6, 1975).

However, before this decision can be promulgated, Providence terminated this case against Judge Arcilla. He died on August 29,
1980.

WHEREFORE, Judge Moya is censured and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary for ten (10) days for having violated
Circular No. 7 of this Court. The case against Judge Arcilla is dismissed for having become moot. A copy of this decision should
be attached to the personal record of Judge Moya.

SO ORDERED.
12. ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, respondent.
“A.M. No. RTJ 08-2119 | June 30, 2008 | 579 Phil. 46 | Second Division | Justice Carpio- Morales
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this
Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to
discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a
judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
argumentum ad hominem.
The acts and statements of Judge Belen questioning the capability and credibility of Atty. Mane by sole reason of his alma mater is
considered conduct unbecoming of a judge.”

27
FACTS:
Atty. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the OCA charging Judge Belen of “demeaning, humiliating and berating” him during
hearing on the case Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Malabanan, et al. in which he was a counsel for the plaintiff. In the course of
the proceeding, Judge Belen asked Atty. Mane if he was from the UP College of Law to which Atty. Mane answered in the
negative and stated that he is from Manuel L. Quezon University. Judge Belen then told him that since Atty. Mane is not from UP
College of Law, he cannot equate Atty. Mane to himself as not all law students and law schools are not created equal.
Further, Judge Belen seemingly disregarded the case at hand as Atty. Mane’s motion remained unacted. The OCA, found that
Judge Belen’s statements and actions made during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, his insulting statements which tend to question Atty. Mane’s capability and credibility
is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and
a violation the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the
law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the
basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity
were being “assaulted”, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He
went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a
supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Supreme Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they
ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.

13. Fuentes v. Buno 560 SCRA 22 (2008)

FACTS:
1. Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is one of the nine  heirs of Bernardo Fuentes, their father, who
owned an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol.
2. He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of
Sale" of the said agricultural land, executed by complainant’s mother Eulalia Credo Vda. de Fuentes, widow of Bernardo Fuentes,
and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own behalf and on behalf of his brothers and sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors
and one Ma. Indira A. Auxtero, as vendee.
3.In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, transferred and conveyed by the heirs/vendors to the
vendee despite the fact that in his Special Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to
mortgage said agricultural land but not to partition, much more to sell the same.
4. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized said document as ex-officio Notary Public, thereby
abusing his discretion and authority as well as committing graft and corruption.
5. In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of graft and corruption, since in a municipality where a
notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize the documents
RULING: No. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code
authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio, the Court laid down the scope of said
authority.
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other deeds of conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge
admitted that he prepared both the document itself, entitled "Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale"

28
and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These
acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judge’s territorial jurisdiction, as shown by
the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically
requires that a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the
notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale.
Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if
so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the
sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No.
1-90, even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or
circuit to which he was assigned.
14. [ A.C. No. 10294. July 12, 2022 ]
MARYANNE MERRIAM B. GUEVARRA-CASTIL, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMELY REYES TRINIDAD, RESPONDENT.

For Our review is Resolution No. XXII-2017-1086[1] issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
(Board), which adopted the findings and recommendation[2] of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) to impose
the ultimate penalty of disbarment against respondent Atty. Emely Reyes Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad), for violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Factual Antecedents

The present case arose from a Complaint[3] dated November 29, 2013, filed by Maryanne Merriam B. Guevarra-Castil
(Maryanne), accusing her husband, Orlando L. Castil, Jr. (Orlando), and Atty. Trinidad, of maintaining an extra- marital affair.

Maryanne narrated that Atty. Trinidad and Orlando are both officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), and got to know each
other by reason of their work. Several years back, Maryanne started receiving reports from friends and Orlando's co-workers of
the pair's supposed fling. Consumed by her deep love for Orlando, Maryanne chose to shrug off these rumors and discount them
as exactly that: rumors.

However, sometime in January of 2009, unable to contain the doubts and speculations any longer, Maryanne confronted Orlando.
It was at this point that Orlando confirmed his infidelity with Atty. Trinidad – likewise a married woman. [4] Desperate to save her
marriage, Maryanne contacted Atty. Trinidad to beg her to stop seeing Orlando, and end their romantic entanglement. However,
instead of showing remorse, Atty. Trinidad allegedly insulted and demeaned Maryanne, bragging about her being a lawyer and a
ranking PNP personnel. Atty. Trinidad allegedly said, "kayang-kaya ko maging business[person] tulad mo, pero ikaw hindi mo
kaya maging abogado tulad ko!"[5] Moreover, Atty. Trinidad belittled Maryanne, saying that any complaint against her would be
futile because of her legal knowledge and position in the PNP. In one of their exchanges, Atty. Trinidad allegedly told
Maryanne, "kahit na ipatanggal mo ako sa trabaho ko, lawyer pa rin naman ako. Na hindi kamukha mo, pag nawala si Orlando
wala nang mangyayari sa buhay mo!"[6]

Maryanne recounted that after the incident, her marriage with Orlando started falling apart. However, her nightmare did not end
there. One day, as she was cleaning their room, Maryanne stumbled upon a birth certificate. This surprised her because she and
Orlando do not have any children. Upon perusal, Maryanne was shocked to see the child's name – and the indicated parents – Atty.
Trinidad and Orlando. The birth certificate also contained an "Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity" executed by
Orlando. Maryanne confronted Orlando about the birth certificate and demanded from the latter an explanation. Eventually,
Orlando admitted that the child, whose details are indicated in the birth certificate Maryanne found, belongs to him and Atty.
Trinidad. Maryanne likewise alleged that Atty. Trinidad shamelessly flaunted online the fruit of their unfaithfulness by uploading,
and posting photos of her with Orlando, and their child.

In her defense, Atty. Trinidad contended that she does not personally know Maryanne, nor does she have any knowledge of the
latter's relationship with Orlando. Atty. Trinidad claimed that she only got to know of Maryanne being the wife of Orlando, when
she started receiving complaints from the former. She likewise vehemently denied that she communicated with Maryanne, and
asserted that the complaint filed against her is based on nothing but hearsay, self-serving claims, and illegally obtained
documentary evidence. Nevertheless, Atty. Trinidad admitted that she had "committed some acts which are not to be proud of." [7]

Report and Recommendation of

the Commission on Bar Discipline

On June 7, 2016, the Commission, through Investigating Commissioner Joel L. Bodegon, released a Report and
Recommendation[8] finding Atty. Trinidad guilty of the acts complained of. The Commission noted that Atty. Trinidad never
denied her relationship with Orlando, never showed remorse, and instead, even flaunted her illicit relationship with Orlando, and
the child it produced.
29
The Commission declared that Atty. Trinidad's actions amount to gross immorality and misconduct, and constitute a violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR. Thus, the Commission recommended that Atty. Trinidad be disbarred, to
wit:
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent ATTY. EMELY R. TRINIDAD be DISBARRED from the
practice of law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[9]
Report and Recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors

In its Resolution[10] dated May 27, 2017, the IBP Board approved the report and recommendation of the Commission. The
Resolution partly reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing the penalty
of disbarment.[11]
Atty. Trinidad filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[12] but it was denied by the Board in a Resolution[13] dated December 6, 2018.

Issue

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is whether Atty. Trinidad should be disbarred for the acts complained of.

Our Ruling

Before We delve into the merits of the present case, the Court notes that Atty. Trinidad, aside from being a lawyer, is also a
member of the PNP. In the past, this Court has made varying rulings concerning Our jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving
government lawyers. Necessarily, We must determine first if this Court has jurisdiction over the present case; and to answer this
issue, a cursory review of these rulings must be done.

In Fuji v. Dela Cruz[14] (Fuji), We held that generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against
lawyers in government service. Instead, the complaint is referred to either the proper administrative body that has disciplinary
authority over the erring government lawyer, or the Ombudsman.

In line with Fuji, the Court in Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay[15] (Alicias), favored the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
the delinquent government lawyers for lack of jurisdiction. In Alicias, it was declared that the acts or omissions complained of
were "connected with [the respondents'] duties as government lawyers working in the [Civil Service Commission]. Hence, the IBP
has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint."[16]

Further, in Trovela v. Robles[17] (Trovela), this Court likewise dismissed the disbarment complaint filed against respondent
government lawyers for lack of jurisdiction. Again, the lack of jurisdiction was premised on the principle laid down in Fuji, the
government lawyers embroiled having been charged with administrative offenses involving the performance of their official
duties.

In Spouses Buffe v. Gonzalez[18] (Spouses Buffe), a more in-depth explanation of the Court's apprehensive stance towards certain
disbarment complaints was provided. We held:
Considering that both Exconde and Madrona are public officers being charged for actions, which are allegedly unfair or
discriminatory, involving their official functions during their tenure, the present case should be resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman as the appropriate government agency. Indeed, the IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged
with administrative offenses involving their official duties. For such acts, government lawyers fall under the disciplinary authority
of either their superior or the Ombudsman. Moreover, an anomalous situation will arise if the IBP asserts jurisdiction and decides
against a government lawyer, while the disciplinary authority finds in favor of the government lawyer.[19]
The common element in Fuji, Alicias, Trovela, and Spouses Buffe, which led to the dismissal of the disbarment cases in these
rulings, is the fact that the government lawyers concerned committed acts and omissions primarily involving their official duties.
While these respondents are lawyers, their offenses had more to do with their government position, and less with them being
lawyers. In other words, they were charged in their capacity as public servants, and not as members of the Bar.

Despite the foregoing, the Court has nevertheless refused to shirk away from its constitutional mandate to regulate the admission
to, and the practice of law, which necessarily includes the authority to discipline, suspend, or even disbar misbehaving members of
the legal profession, whenever proper and called for. Indeed, "if the government official's misconduct is of such character as to
affect his [or her] qualification as a lawyer[,] or to show moral delinquency, he [or she] may be disciplined as a member of the bar
on such ground."[20]
30
This mandate is enjoined no less by the 1987 Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph (5), which states:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to this mandate, the Court has codified conditions before one may be admitted to the practice of law, as well as ethical
conduct legal practitioners must always abide to. Foremost of these are Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to the Bar), and Rule
139-B (Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys) of the Rules of Court, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and the CPR. Indeed,
compliance with these issuances are so strictly enforced that our legal landscape is replete with cases stripping undeserving
lawyers of their licenses to practice law.

However, in another line of cases, the Court has seemingly exhibited a hesitant attitude towards disbarment complaints against
government lawyers. In these cases,[21] the Court held that when a public official's misconduct in the discharge of official duties
constitutes a violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the ensuing disciplinary proceedings necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of the IBP
and this Court.[22] Yet, if we look back at Fuji, Trovelas, Alicias, and Spouses Buffe, it may be argued that all the violations
committed by the government lawyers involved therein necessarily touches upon their being lawyers, but the Court nevertheless
shunned jurisdiction.

Thus came an apparent confusion: when should the Court exercise jurisdiction over erring government lawyers, and when should
it not?

The answer lies in the complaint.

Nature of a disbarment complaint

- a sui generis proceeding

Unlike regular civil and criminal cases, disbarment proceedings are sui generis in character, and are not meant to inflict criminal
or civil sanctions. Instead, the main question to be resolved is whether the lawyer involved is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice.[23]

In Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona,[24] the Court had the occasion to discuss the nature of an impeachment
proceeding:
By sharply distinguishing a criminal prosecution from an impeachment, the Framers had made it clear that impeachment
is not the means intended to redress and punish offenses against the state, but rather a mere political safeguard designed to
preserve the state and its system of laws from internal harm. Precisely, it was not crafted to mete out punishment.

In the same vein, impeachment does not imply immunity from court processes, nor does it preclude other forms of
discipline.

xxxx

The nature and effect of impeachment proceedings is so limiting that forum shopping or alleged violation of the right against
double jeopardy could not even be successfully invoked upon the institution of the separate complaints or Information.
[25]
 (Citations omitted, emphasis on original)
Although impeachment is a political process, and disciplinary cases against lawyers are judicial in nature, they are similar in the
sense that they are designed to preserve the integrity of the institution concerned. Hence, in similar fashion, it may be said that the
main purpose of a disbarment proceeding is to "pick out the bad apples," in a manner of speaking; no more, no less.

Further, owing to the sui generis nature of a disbarment complaint as with impeachment, forum shopping can neither be invoked
by a government lawyer against whom separate complaints have been filed. The Court emphasizes that it is not unaware of this
unethical practice – which may be called effective forum shopping – whereby complainants weaponize the law and file,
successively or simultaneously, multiple complaints against government lawyers: usually one before the IBP, and another before
the concerned agency. While technically, there is no forum shopping as the reliefs commonly sought are different, such is a
practice that should strongly be shunned for it serves no other purpose than to vex government lawyers.

31
Then, in order to do away with the ostensible confusion, and the unethical practice of effective forum shopping, taking into
account the suggestions of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe during the deliberations on this case, the Court
hereby lays the following rules in the filing and handling of complaints against government lawyers, to serve as guidelines for
both the bench and the bar:

1. All complaints against and which seek to discipline government lawyers in their respective capacities as members of the Bar
must be filed directly before this Court. Conversely, complaints which do not seek to discipline them as members of the Bar shall
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and referred to the Ombudsman or concerned government agency for appropriate action.

2. In connection with paragraph 1, upon filing, the Court must determine whether the concerned agency, the Ombudsman, or the
Court, has jurisdiction over the complaint against the government lawyer. In making such determination, the following must be
considered: did the allegations of malfeasance touch upon the errant lawyer's continuing obligations under the CPR and/or the
Lawyer's Oath? To put it more simply, the primordial question to be asked in making this determination is this: do the allegations
in the complaint, assuming them to be true, make the lawyer unfit to practice the profession?
2a. If the question in paragraph 2 yields a positive answer, the case properly lies before the Court, which shall retain
jurisdiction. This is so because again, the power to regulate the practice of law, and discipline members of the bar, belongs to Us.
Necessarily, proceedings to be had before this Court should concern these and only these matters. This rule shall hold, even if the
complaint also contains allegations of administrative and/or civil service rules infractions. In such situation however, the Court
shall limit its ruling only to the matter of the respondent's fitness as a lawyer.

2b. On the other hand, if the question in paragraph 2 yields a negative answer, the Court, for lack of jurisdiction, shall dismiss the
case and refer the same to the appropriate government office or the Ombudsman.
3. If multiple complaints have been filed, the process shall be the same.

In the event that paragraph 2b shall apply, and results in a situation where one or more complaint/s have been dismissed and
referred to the appropriate government office or the Ombudsman, and one or more complaint/s have been retained by this Court,
the cases shall proceed independently from one another.

To reiterate, the fitness to be a lawyer is a continuing requirement, measured against the standards laid out in the Lawyer's Oath
and the CPR, and apply to all facets of their life, including private dealings.[26] Needless to say, the same standards of honesty and
fairness expected of a lawyer apply to all, whether privately or publicly employed.[27] Accordingly, with such guidelines, the
doctrine in Spouses Buffe and similar cases, which state that the Court has no jurisdiction to discipline, as member of the bar,
government lawyers who committed acts or omissions involving their official duties, are thus abandoned.

We now apply these guidelines and principles to the present case. To recap, Maryanne specifically alleged in her complaint the
following:
21. Upon consultation with a counsel, I learned that Atty. Trinidad's actions are clearly against the Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01, which states, "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."[28]
While it is mentioned that Atty. Trinidad is a police officer, and that she allegedly threatened to leverage her position to dissuade
Maryanne from pursuing the complaint, that is not the principal act complained of. Instead, Maryanne complained of Atty.
Trinidad's illicit affair with Orlando – something which is totally unrelated to, and may be accomplished, even without Atty.
Trinidad's position in the PNP. In other words, Atty. Trinidad was not acting as a police officer when she allegedly committed the
deed.

Assuming that these allegations are true, do they make Atty. Trinidad unfit to be a member of the legal profession? We answer in
the positive. Thus, We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to resolve the present disbarment complaint.

Atty. Trinidad's actions warrant

the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment

The Court adopts the findings of the Commission, as affirmed by the Board, and sustains the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment upon Atty. Trinidad.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, 7.03 of the CPR state:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

32
Meanwhile, Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar ay be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied).
In Hosoya v. Contado,[29] the Court held that to warrant the imposition of disbarment on the ground of immorality, the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. Grossly immoral conduct is defined as "one that is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."[30]

In Dantes v. Dantes,[31] the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for maintaining an illicit relationship. The Court held:
Undoubtedly, respondent's acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage
to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition [of] appropriate sanctions. Complainant's
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent's commission of marital
infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. [32]
In Zerna v. Zerna,[33] the philandering respondent-lawyer met a similar fate, to wit:
There can be no doubt that it is morally reprehensible for a married person to maintain intimate relations with another person of
the opposite sex other than his or her spouse. All the more reprehensible is respondent's act of leaving his wife and three children
to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman with little to no attempt on his part to be discreet about his liaison. Such acts
of engaging in illicit relationships with other women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly
immoral conduct warranting the imposition [of] appropriate sanctions.[34]
In the present case, there is no denying that Atty. Trinidad's actions of maintaining an adulterous affair with Orlando, which even
produced a child, falls under the definition of grossly immoral conduct. As correctly found by the Commission, these acts are not
only grossly immoral and unlawful, but more importantly, "adversely reflects on [Atty. Trinidad's] fitness to practice law." [35]

While Atty. Trinidad claims that the pieces of evidence, such as the photographs, submitted by Maryanne were illegally obtained
and unauthenticated, she nevertheless failed to dispute the same on their merits. Further, Atty. Trinidad's denial of her relationship
with Orlando is unsupported by even the slightest hint of proof. Lastly and most importantly, Atty. Trinidad never entertained the
issue of the birth certificate containing the details of their love-child, and instead acted as if the document does not exist. The other
allegations – such as the public flaunting of their adulterous flirtations, and the abandonment by Orlando of his family to live with
Atty. Trinidad – all remain unanswered. In our view, this inaction and reticence on the part of Atty. Trinidad signal nothing but
guilt and shame for the despicable acts she had committed. Instead, all that Atty. Trinidad has to say for herself is that she is a
"God-fearing mother, who worked very hard for the future of her children."[36] Unfortunately for Atty. Trinidad, God does not
tolerate extra-marital affairs, and neither does this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Emely Reyes Trinidad GUILTY of Gross Immorality, in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby
ordered DISBARRED, and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as
member of the Bar; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and, (c) the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
15. [ A.C. No. 9457 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3883). April 05, 2022 ]
ABNER R. MANGUBAT, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REYNALDO L. HERRERA, RESPONDENT.
This administrative case for disbarment arose from a Complaint [1] filed against respondent Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty.
Herrera) charging him with violation of several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the Rules of
Court.

The Antecedents

The complainant, Abner Mangubat (Abner), is one of the heirs of Aurelia Rellora Mangubat (Aurelia), who in turn, predeceased
her husband, Gaudencio Mangubat (Gaudencio). The other heirs of Aurelia are: (1) Elizabeth M. Bragais (Elizabeth); (2) Ruth M.
33
Pacia (Ruth); (3) Josue Mangubat (Josue); (4) Ester M. Agna (Ester); (5) Job Mangubat (Job); and (6) Raquel M. Azada (Raquel).

It was alleged in the complaint of Abner that in May 1998, Gaudencio engaged the services of Atty. Herrera to institute a
complaint for revival of judgment involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6337[2] against Orlando Seva (Orlando) and
Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) docketed as Civil Case No. P-2145. In the
complaint,[3] Gaudencio was identified as the complainant together with the "Heirs of Aurelia represented by Raquel Azada
(Raquel)." Atty. Herrera enumerated the heirs of Aurelia and stated that Raquel joined the Complaint "for herself and as attorney-
in-fact of her co-plaintiffs."[4] Abner was also listed as a co-plaintiff. The complaint sought the revival of Civil Case no. P-279.
Atty. Herrera admitted that the engagement was only at the instance of Gaudencio, in the form of a verbal agreement, and that the
latter undertook to secure the special power of attorney (SPA) from his children. However, no SPA was presented to the trial court.
[5]

On February 22, 2001, a Compromise Agreement[6] was executed between Gaudencio, represented by Atty. Herrera, Belen, and
the counsel for the DBP. Belen agreed to pay the amount of P72,600.00 plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees in exchange for the
transfer of TCT No. 6337 in her favor on or before June 30, 2001.[7] After the compromise agreement was approved by the court,
[8]
 Atty. Herrera filed a motion for execution.[9] The motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued on October 5, 2001.
[10]
 The sheriff reported that on January 18, February 20, March 18, May 6, and June 3, all in 2002, he went to the house of Belen
but failed to execute the judgment as she was not there.[11]

Incidentally, on January 31, 2002, Gaudencio died.[12] Abner went to the office of Atty. Herrera to discuss the possibility of
nullifying the long overdue compromise agreement and to inform him of his father's demise. [13]

Subsequently, Abner hired Atty. Haide Gumba (Atty. Gumba) to represent him in the subject case.[14] On September 10, 2002, Atty.
Gumba filed a motion to substitute Gaudencio with Abner and prayed that the sheriff be ordered to explain why no return has been
made.[15] The trial court eventually granted the substitution.[16]

On October 30, 2002, Atty. Herrera filed an "Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion to Hold in Custody of the Court the Award in
this Case Pending the Settlement of Estate of the Late Gaudencio Mangubat."[17] He prayed that the listed heirs be appointed as
substitute plaintiffs, and that the award in the decision, once paid by the Sevas, be deposited to the clerk of court, and released to
the heirs of Gaudencio.[18]

Abner, however, claimed that Atty. Herrera did not secure any authority from the heirs when he filed the motion and manifestation
and even omitted Job in the enumeration of heirs.[19] Nevertheless, the trial court granted it.[20]

On December 18, 2003, two years and two months after the writ of execution was issued, Atty. Herrera filed a
Compliance[21] stating that he received P91,280.00[22] from Helen's son.[23] On even date, a deed of conditional sale Atty. Herrera
drafted was executed between one Silvestre Seva, Jr. (Silvestre), who claimed to be the attorney-in-fact of Belen, and the Spouses
Ricardo and Rosemarie Biag (Spouses Biag) involving 600 square meters of the 16,320 square meters covered by TCT No. 6337.
[24]
 Atty. Herrera notarized the deed of conditional sale. However, it was only on April 7, 2005, or one year and four months after
Atty. Herrera received the money that he deposited it with the clerk of court.[25]

On December 17, 2004, Atty. Herrera filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Designate the Clerk of Court to Draft and Execute the Deed of
Sale or Conveyance in Favor of the Defendants."[26] Noticeably, this pleading was filed before the judgment award was actually
deposited with the clerk of court on April 7, 2005. In an Order[27] dated January 17, 2005, the trial court granted the motion of Atty.
Herrera. This prompted Belen to file a case against Abner to compel him to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
6337.[28]

On the part of Atty. Herrera, he claimed that Abner filed a complaint against him, as a form of retaliation. Atty. Herrera raised the
estranged relationship between Abner and Gaudencio and the Decision dated September 19, 2001 of the probate court in Special
Proceedings No. P-984 disinheriting Abner from the estate of Gaudencio.[29] He also questioned the motive of Abner in filing the
motion for substitution without including his siblings, implying that Abner intended to keep all the monetary award for himself.
[30]
 Atty. Herrera nonetheless admitted filing pleadings for Gaudencio long after his death. He, however, insisted that after he
received the money from Belen's son, he notified Elizabeth, Esther, Josue, and Raquel, but none of them claimed their respective
shares.[31] He posited that the heirs could receive their respective shares provided that they turn over the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 6337.[32]

Atty. Herrera also maintained that there was no conflict of interest when he drafted and notarized the deed of conditional sale for
Silvestre. He pointed out that: (1) the subject of the conditional sale does not belong to Gaudencio anymore pursuant to the
Decision in Civil Case No. P-279 on August 27, 1985, the judgment sought to be revived in Civil Case No. P-2145; (2) the
Compromise Agreement was executed by the parties; and (3) Belen voluntarily paid the award, thus terminating the case along
with their client-counsel relationship.[33]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

34
On January 20, 2014, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Victor Pablo C. Trinidad (Investigating
Commissioner) made the following recommendations:
A. For Violation of Canon 5 Involving the Duty to Keep Abreast of Legal Development – the Commissioner finds the
respondent GUILTY as charged and recommends that he be penalized with DISBARMENT, in accordance with Section
4.51 of the IBP-CBD Guidelines for imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter, "CBD Guidelines");
   

B. For Violation of Rule 10.01 involving the Duty of Fidelity to the Courts – the Commissioner finds the
respondent GUILTY as charged and recommends that he be penalized with DISBARMENT, in accordance with Section
6.11 of the CBD Guidelines;
   

[C] For Violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court by "willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so." – the Commissioner finds the respondent GUILTY as charged and
recommends that he be penalized with DISBARMENT in accordance with the Rules;
   

[D.] For Violation of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court involving the duty of counsel to x x x to inform the
court of the death of his client – the Commissioner finds the respondent GUILTY and recommends that he be penalized in
accordance with the Rules;
   

E. For Violation of Rule 15.03 involving the Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest – the Commissioner finds the
respondent GUILTY as charged and recommends that he be penalized with DISBARMENT, in accordance with Section
4.31 (D) of the CBD Guidelines;
   

F. For Violation of Canon 16 involving the Duty to be a Trustee of Client's Moneys and Properties; Rule 16.01 Duty of
Accountability; and Rule 16.02 Duty not to Commingle Funds and Properties – the Commissioner finds the
respondent GUILTY as charged and recommends that he be penalized with DISBARMENT, in accordance with Sections
4.11 of the CBD Guidelines; and
   

G. For Violation of Canon 18 involving the Duty to serve with Due Diligence; Rule 18.03 Duty not to be Negligent; and
Rule 18.04 Duty to keep Client informed – the Commissioner finds the respondent GUILTY as charged and recommends
that he be penalized with DISBARMENT, in accordance with Sections 4.41 (c) of the CBD Guidelines.

The commissioner finds the presence of: (i) pattern of misconduct; (ii) multiple offenses (ii) [sic] refusal to acknowledge wrongful
the nature of conduct; (iv) vulnerability of the victims who are senior citizens; and (v) the substantial experience of the respondent
in the practice of law (Roll No. 28561), as AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE and recommends that the same be considered
for the imposition of penalty based on the charges.[34]
The Investigating Commissioner found that the following acts of Atty. Herrera warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of
disbarment: (1) indicating that the heirs of Aurelia were represented in the suit by Raquel when it was not true; (2) failing to
timely inform the court about the death of Gaudencio; (3) filing of pleadings in court without authority and despite the objections
of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio; (4) failing to immediately remit the money he collected to the clerk of court or to the heirs;
and (5) moving for the surrender of the owner's duplicate title and drafting and notarizing the deed of conditional sale in favor of a
party whose interest is in conflict with that of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio.

Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-792[35] dated October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, the pertinent portion of which states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and for violation of Canon 5, Rule 10.01, Rule 15.03, Canon 16, Rule 16.02, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Section 27, Rule 138 and Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[36]

35
In Resolution No. XXII-2015-68[37] dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of Atty. Herrera and affirmed the Resolution No. XXI-2014-792, suspending him from the practice of law for three years. [38]

Issues
I.
Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for indicating that the heirs of Aurelia were represented by Raquel in
the complaint for revival of judgment when it was not true;

II.
Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for his failure to timely inform the court about Gaudencio's death;

III.
Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for filing pleadings in court without authority and despite the
objections of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio;

IV.
Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for failing to promptly account for the funds he received as a result of
the Compromise Agreement; and

V.
Whether Atty. Herrera must be held administratively liable for failing to observe the rule on conflict of interest.
Our Ruling

After a judicious review of the records of the case, We resolve to modify the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors and impose the more serious penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. We find that the repeated and brazen acts
committed by Atty. Herrera violates the CPR, Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE), and the Rules of Court. His acts reveal his
proclivity to commit unethical and dishonest practices to the detriment of the legal profession.

Atty. Herrera must be held

administratively liable for indicating
that the heirs of Amelia were
represented by Raquel in the
complaint for revival of judgment
when it was not true.

As correctly determined by the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Herrera failed to secure the consent and authority of all the heirs
of Aurelia and committed falsehood by indicating in the pleadings that Raquel represented them when, in truth, she did not. He did
not attach the corresponding SPA to substantiate the capacity of Raquel as a representative and merely relied on Gaudencio's
purported commitment to provide him one at a later time.[39]

Atty. Herrera cannot simply rely on Gaudencio's promise to secure the requisite SPA from the other heirs at a later time. As a
lawyer, he should have known the required documents to be attached in the pleadings to be submitted to the trial court. Thus, Atty.
Herrera misled the trial court by stating in his pleadings "Heirs of Aurelia Rellora Mangubat represented by Raquel Azada" when
no such SPA accompanied the complaint, more so, with Raquel denying the purported representation. Further, Elizabeth and
Abner also denied any participation in the complaint.

Even if Abner was disinherited from the estate of Gaudencio through a court judgment, this does not negate the fact that at the
time the complaint for revival of judgment was instituted, he should have been impleaded and his consent should have been
obtained. This must be so because the Decision[40] on the disinheritance of Abner was promulgated three years and four months
after the complaint for revival of judgment was filed.

Assuming arguendo that Gaudencio instructed Atty. Herrera not to implead Abner due to their estranged relationship, he could
still not be exonerated from any liability. Rule 19.03 of the CPR commands that "[a] lawyer shall not allow his/her client to dictate
the procedure in handling the case." Being the counsel on record, Atty. Herrera is expected to be knowledgeable about substantive
law and procedural rules and should not merely accede to the instructions of his client. After all, "a lawyer shall keep abreast of
legal developments" as mandated by Canon 5 of the CPR.

Atty. Herrera must be held

administratively liable for his failure
to timely inform the court about
Gaudencio’s death.

36
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.

Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

x x x.
Atty. Herrera failed to promptly inform the court about the death of Gaudencio who died on January 31, 2002.[41] Noticeably, it
was the counsel of Abner, Atty. Gumba, who first informed the court about Gaudencio's death through the "Motion to Substitute
Plaintiff Gaudencio Mangubat and to Require the Provincial Sheriff to make Return of Execution"[42] that she filed on September
10, 2002. It was only on October 30, 2002, or approximately nine months from the date of death of Gaudencio, that Atty. Herrera
reported his death to the trial court.[43]

Atty. Herrera must be held

administratively liable for filing
pleadings in court without authority
and despite the objections of the
heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio.

As a consequence of Atty. Herrera's failure to secure the proper authorization to represent the other heirs of Aurelia, and the
subsequent death of Gaudencio, he cannot be said to have been equipped with authority to file pleadings in their behalf. He thus
also violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SECTION 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for x x x corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. x x x [44]
Here, Atty. Herrera continued to render legal services and represented Gaudencio and the heirs of Aurelia in entering into a
compromise agreement without the requisite authorization. His blatant disregard of the rules on representation of parties in civil
cases is revealed in the following exchanges:
COMM. TRINIDAD:
Did you not find it irregular that you signed the Compromise Agreement without the conformity of the other heirs of Aurelia?

ATTY. HERRERA:
I cannot say, Your Honor, because I just rely on the manifestations of the father [Gaudencio] that he will take [care of] everything
for his children.

COMM. TRINIDAD:
Yes, counsel, but we know for a fact that these are compulsory heirs of the deceased Aurelia. So any document representing their
ownership over any property must include them. And it's up to you to give the legal advise [sic] to the father.

ATTY. HERRERA:
I did not see too much important [sic] on that, Your Honor, because this is just a revival of judgment.

COMM. TRINIDAD:
But this is a Compromise Agreement. It will bind them. How it can [sic] bind them if they did not agree? And now we have three
heirs assailing that Compromise Agreement already. Your manifestation was on [sic] the death of Gaudencio was October 30,
2002, meaning the heirs. You omitted one of the heirs, not only Abner but Job.

ATTY. HERRERA:
Because he was then abroad, Your Honor.[45]
It is clear from the foregoing that Atty. Herrera simply brushed aside the absence of authority to represent the heirs of Aurelia as
he did not consider this important, although property rights of the heirs are at stake. It must be clarified that while Gaudencio may
bind himself to the compromise agreement through counsel, the same cannot be said about the other heirs of Aurelia who did not
give him authority to act on their behalf.

Incidentally, it is worthy to point out that it was improper for the Investigating Commissioner to rule on the validity of the
compromise agreement entered into by Atty. Herrera for the heirs of Aurelia in his Report and Recommendation. [46] In this case,
Our discussion is limited only to the administrative liability of Atty. Herrera for the acts complained against him. We will refrain
from ruling on other substantive issues that should be properly addressed in a full-blown trial.
37
Atty. Herrera's unauthorized representation was compounded when he continued to represent Gaudencio after his death, without
his services being retained by the heirs. Upon Gaudencio's death, his attorney-client relationship with Atty. Herrera was
terminated. Since he was not retained by the remaining heirs of Gaudencio and Aurelia, he misled the trial court and breached his
duty under Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR which prohibits committing "any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor x x x mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

Atty. Herrera must he held

administratively liable for failing to
promptly account for the funds he
received as a result of the
Compromise Agreement.

Atty. Herrera likewise violated Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court when he collected the proceeds of the Compromise
Agreement in favor of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio without authority, and took an unreasonably long time before he turned
it over to the clerk of court. Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. — (a) Immediate payment on demand. — The officer shall enforce
an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated
in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment
obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the
judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under
proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the
court that issued the writ.

xxxx

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that issued the writ
whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided
by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.[47]

xxxx
In handling money or property belonging to clients, lawyers are reminded of their responsibility under Canon 11 of the CPE and
Rule 16.02, Canon 16 of the CPR. Canon 11 of the CPE states:
Canon 11. Dealing with trust property

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported
and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Meanwhile, Rule 16.02 of the CPR mandates that a "lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.

It must be recalled that the Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court on February 23, 2001, while Atty. Herrera
filed a motion for execution[48] on September 5, 2001. The motion was later granted on September 20, 2001. Then on December
18, 2003, or almost two years and three months from the issuance of the writ of execution when he, knowing fully well that his
lawyer-client relationship with Gaudencio had already ceased due to the latter's death (on January 31, 2002), filed a "Compliance"
and informed the trial court that he received P91,280.00.[49]

Assuming that Atty. Herrera was authorized to receive the proceeds of the compromise agreement for the heirs of Aurelia and
Gaudencio, he should have given it to the executing sheriff who shall then turn it over within the same day to the clerk of the court
that issued the writ, in accordance with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. However, Atty. Herrera deposited the amount of
P84,480.00[50] with the clerk of court only on April 7, 2005, or approximately one year and four months after he received the
money.[51] Moreover, he did not inform Abner and Job about receiving the money and merely kept it at his office.[52]

Atty. Herrera must be held

administratively liable for failing to
observe the rule on conflict of
interest when he moved for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate

38
title and drafted the deed of
conditional sale in favor of a party
whose interest is in conflict with the
interest of the heirs of Aurelia and
Gaudencio.

Rule 15.03 of the CPR states:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
Atty. Herrera violated the aforementioned rule on conflict of interest when he drafted and notarized a deed of conditional sale
between Silvestre, in representation of Orlando and Belen Seva, and the Spouses Biag for a portion of the land covered by TCT
No. 6337.

Further, Atty. Herrera also filed an ex-parte motion to designate the clerk of court to draft the deed of sale or conveyance in favor
of the Sevas.[53] A cursory reading of Atty. Herrera's ex-parte motion reveals that while he presented himself as "Counsel for the
Plaintiff," he was, in truth, advocating for the interest of the opposing party, as revealed in the following statements:
      x x x x
2. That the defendant's [sic] heirs failed and refused to execute a Deed of Conveyance or Deed of Sale to the defendants,
despite of [sic] counsel letter sent to the heirs x x x;

3. That likewise the plaintiffs['] heirs failed and refused to turn over the owner's copy of TCT No. 6337 issued to
Gaudencio Mangubat hence the undersigned counsel could not. have the said title reconstituted and transfered [sic] to
the defendants.[54]
      x x x
This conduct prejudiced Abner because it prompted Spouses Biag to file a petition against him to compel him to surrender the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6337. It is the counsel of the Sevas who should have moved for the surrender of the owner's
duplicate copy of the title and not Atty. Herrera because he originally represented the interest of the heirs of Aurelia and
Gaudencio, albeit without authority from some of the heirs. The interest of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio precludes him from
representing the adverse interest of the Sevas.

A Final Note

In sum, Atty. Herrera committed the following acts: (1) indicating that the heirs of Aurelia were represented in the suit by Raquel
when it was not true; (2) failing to timely inform the court about the death of Gaudencio; (3) filing pleadings in court without
authority and despite the objections of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio; (4) failing to immediately remit the money he collected
to the clerk of court or to the heirs; (5) moving for the surrender of the owner's duplicate title and drafting and notarizing the deed
of conditional sale in favor of a party whose interest is in conflict with that of the heirs of Aurelia and Gaudencio. The seriousness
and gravity of these infractions cannot be denied.

It is the paramount interest of this Court to ensure that only those who possess and carry out the core values and exacting
standards established to preserve the honor and integrity of the Bar are allowed to practice law. In this case, the collective conduct
of Atty. Herrera tarnishes the integrity of the legal profession and is in clear disregard of his sworn duties in the Lawyer's Oath not
to "delay any man's cause for money or malice" and to conduct himself "as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."

Indeed, restraint must be exercised before imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment that should be reserved only for the most
serious and reprehensible acts. In Canillo v. Angeles,[55] We meted the penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyer who was found
to have represented conflicting interests involving a common parcel of land and for committing other fraudulent and deceitful
acts. Similarly, in Laurel v. Delute,[56] the erring lawyer was disbarred for selling out his client's cause in order to gain personal
benefit. In both cases, We determined that the acts the erring lawyers committed rendered them unfit to continue practicing law.
Atty. Herrera's collective acts are graver than in these cases.

We cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Herrera's repeated and brazen disregard of the provisions of the CPR, CPE, Rules of Court,
and the Lawyer's Oath that shows his indifference to the values a lawyer ought to live by for his continued membership in the Bar.
Atty. Herrera has been a lawyer for over 43 years already.[57] At this stage of his professional career, he is expected to have a
profound understanding of the duties expected of him and should demonstrate the moral fitness and probity demanded from every
member of the Bar. Accordingly, We impose the penalty of disbarment.

In view of the foregoing, We modify Resolution No. XXII-2015-68 of the IBP Board of Governors by imposing the more serious
penalty of disbarment from the practice of law on Atty. Herrera for violating the following: Canons 1, 5, 10, 15, 16 and 19 of the
CPR; Canon 11 of the CPE; and Section 16, Rule 3, and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
39
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors dated October 11, 2014 and
October 28, 2015 in Administrative Case No. 9457 are MODIFIED.

Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and the IBP for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy
of this Decision to Atty. Herrera's personal record.

SO ORDERED.

16. A.C. No. 5054           May 29, 2002

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner,

vs.ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact
Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized respondent to sell her
two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission.
Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant’s repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of
the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.

For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present ex-parte her
evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay
complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the commencement
of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay
the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution,
which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex "B" of Complaint). It
appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the
latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed
(Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing
complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(Annexes "F," "G," "H" and "I" of the Complaint).

In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent admitted
having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks
had already been encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi
City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he
would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his three motions for
extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite
respondent in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment
"smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean."

In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the filing of a
comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded
that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned
40
from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued
failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his
dealings with complainant" and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks
issued to the complainant.

In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Atty. San
Juan’s Report and Recommendation.

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP,
that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows
respondent’s grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.

There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence
that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property.
Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the
process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his
having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step
because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the
complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and
unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of
what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and
lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit
in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is
preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29
February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law
and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting
such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA
694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court
was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under
continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of making a
mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this
case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our
resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed
a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344
SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.1âwphi1.nêt

The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague and inadequate.
A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a
year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and
12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings
with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

41
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from
the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuñez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of
this resolution.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan;
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

17. A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021

EUSEBIO D. SISON, Petitioner, v. ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, Respondent., April 28, 2021

A lawyer-client relationship is established when lawyers consistently manifest to a person consulting them that they would provide
legal representation or assistance, regardless of the close ties between the parties, or the lack of a written contract, or the non-
payment of legal fees. Lawyers who later on decide not to represent their client have the duty to inform their client. Failure to do
so will be cause for administrative sanction.

For this Court's resolution is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao) alleging that she
committed misconduct when she did not attend to her client with required competence and diligence. 1

Sometime in July 2013, Dr. Eusebio D. Sison (Dr. Sison) consulted Atty. Dumlao, his friend, for the purpose of filing an
annulment case against his wife, Dr. Cynthia V. Cervantes-Sison (Dr. Cervantes-Sison). He deposited P35,000.00 in Atty.
Dumlao's bank account for the psychiatric evaluation fee.2

Dr. Sison alleged that after nine months, Atty. Dumlao failed to give any updates on the filing of the case. Since Dr. Sison already
lost interest in filing the case, he instead wrote a demand letter to Atty. Dumlao for the return of the deposited P35,000.00. 3 When
Atty. Dumlao refused, Dr. Sison then filed a verified Complaint4 charging Atty. Dumlao with violation of Canons 7,5 17,6 and
187 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath.

In her Answer,8 Atty. Dumlao alleged that she had referred Dr. Sison to Mr. Nhorly Domenden (Mr. Domenden), a psychologist to
whom the P35,000.00 was paid on July 29, 2013. Dr. Sison was able to meet and consult with him, and a Psychological
Evaluation Report9 was later emailed to him on November 2013.10

Atty. Dumlao alleged that Dr. Cervantes-Sison was her fifth-degree relative by consanguinity and that Dr. Cervantes-Sison's
mother, Celedonia V. Cervantes, approached her and asked her not to handle the case because it would offend the family. This
prompted her to decline Dr. Sison's case due to conflict of interest.11

In a February 16, 2015 Report and Recommendation,12 Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the
dismissal of the Complaint since there was no contract to engage in legal services between them 13 and that conflict of interest was
a valid ground to decline an engagement.14 He likewise found that Atty. Dumlao did not profit from Dr. Sison, considering that the
amount he paid was indeed used for the preparation of a psychological evaluation.15

On June 5, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2015-388,16 resolving to
adopt the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the Complaint.

On April 19, 2017, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2017-943,17 resolving to
deny Dr. Sison's motion for reconsideration.

Dr. Sison filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari18 before this Court, assailing Resolution Nos. XXI-2015-388 and XXII-2017-
943 and insisting that there was a lawyer-client relationship between him and respondent, since respondent accepted the payment
of the psychological evaluation fee along with the documents required for the filing of his case.19 Further, petitioner argues that
not only did respondent fail to inform him of the status of his case, but she also prejudiced him for abandoning his cause without
prior notice when she withdrew her engagement, which is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 20

In her Comment,21 respondent argues that no misconduct was committed since there was evidence that the full amount of
P35,000.00 was paid to the psychologist, who was able to meet with complainant and submit a psychological report. 22 She also
asserts that the Code of Professional Responsibility allows lawyers to refuse representation, especially when there is a conflict of
interest.23

The only issue in this case is whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Ethics when she failed to inform
complainant of the status of his case and refused to represent him due to conflict of interest.
42
It is settled that "[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his [or her]
client[,]"24 subject to the exceptions25 provided for m Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found that: (1) no lawyer-client relationship had been established between the parties, since no
written agreement was executed between complainant and respondent; (2) other than the psychological evaluation fee,
complainant did not pay an acceptance fee or any other amount to respondent; and (3) complainant did not give any documents
pertaining to the prospective annulment case to respondent.26

However, the text messages exchanged between the parties present a different picture. According to the date stamps, respondent
messaged complainant on August 29, 2013 "Good am pinsan. [Next] week file natin ung Complaint. Kailangan ko pala ung copy
nung annulment na file ni ching. [Thanks]. [ASAP] pinsan[.]"27 Another set of messages from the parties read:
Respondent: "P[i]nsan pw[e]de m[o] b[a] iwan sa [office] ung [documents]. Tapos k[i]ta tayo sa [Thursday]. Para
ma finalize n[a] ung complaint [Thanks] p[i]nsan" (Sent on September 24, 2013)

Complainant: "ok sige pi[n]san. Paki t[e]xt mo secretary mo doon." (Sent on September 24, 2013)

"pinsan mamaya k[i]ta t[a]yo [L]ingayen p[a]ra maibigay ko yon papers na kailangan mo. hindi ako nakapunta kahapon.
[Thanks.]" (Sent on September 25, 2013)

Respondent: "P[i]nsan paki iwan n[a] lang ung [documents] s[a] [office] kailangan [kasi yun] para ma finalize ung complaint.
[Thanks.]" (Sent on September 26, 2013)

Complainant: "pinsan iniwan ko nasa office mo yon mga [documents]." (Sent on September 26, 2013)

Respondent: "[Thanks] p[i]nsan. K[i]ta tayo [Saturday] lunch?" (Sent on September 26, 2013)

Complaint: "ok pinsan...[Text] me kung saan t[a]yo [magkikita] sa [Saturday] lunch." (Sent on September 26, 2013)

....

Complainant: "pinsan kinausap ako dito sa amin about sa annulment, [kasi] until now w[a]la pa nangyayari. Akala n[i]la di ko
binayad. [H]indi ko na alam sasabihin ko sa k[a]nila. [N]agdesisyon s[i]la pinsan na kukunin na yon 35K [kasi] gagamitin
n[i]la sa maintenance ni erpat ipagpapaliban muna daw yon annulment. [N]apagalitan aka, akala n[i]la ginastos ka sa ibang
bagay. [N]o hard feelings pinsan." (Sent on October 5, 2013)

....

Respondent: "[Makikita] naman n[i]la ung complaint pinsan eh[.] [U]ng 35K b[i]nayad sa psychologist[.] [T]ry ko

pa refund[.] [D]umating aka kanina[.] 6pm ang [nakalagay] sa [schedule] ko." (Sent on October 5, 2013)

Complainant: "pinsan [kasi] until now w[a]la pa nauumpisahan. Hindi ko na alam [kasi] [sasabihin] ko sa [kanila]." (Sent on
October 5, 2013)

....

Respondent: "Pwede ko [sila] kausapin para i explain[.]" (Sent on October 6, 2013)

Complainant: "ako n[a]lang pinsan. I trust you. kailan n[a]tin flle, this [Friday] [kasi] pinsan punta na ako [M]nila[.]" (Sent on
October 6, 2013)

Respondent: "[This week.] Pinsan[.]" (Sent on October 6, 2013)

....

Complainant: "[P]insan kumusta[?] Pupunta na ako [M]anila [this] coming Saturday for my review. [K]ailan n[a]tin file yon
complaint[?] Na dismiss na yon support kaka recieve ko lang results." (Sent on October 8, 2013)

Respondent: "Sa [Thursday]. Natin (sic) file [pinsan]. [Thallks.]" (Sent on October 8, 2013)

....

43
Complainant; "pinsan kumusta na[?]" (Sent on February 26, 2014)

Respondent: "Doc congrats[.] [M]atutukan n[a] natin annulment mo.)" (Sent on February 26, 2014)28

Their conversations did not appear like casual exchanges between friends about a theoretical legal issue. On the contrary, the
series of exchanges between the parties show that respondent voluntarily acquiesced to representing complainant in his
prospective annulment case, or at the very least, render her legal assistance in his suit. She asked complainant to submit to his
documents related to the case and repeatedly assured him that she would be filing the annulment complaint even after complainant
expressed hesitation due to the lack of action on respondent's part.

A lawyer client relationship is established when a lawyer voluntarily entertains a consultation; regardless of the close relationship
between the parties or the absence of a written contract or non-payment of legal fees. 29 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the client's
cause, the lawyer must serve the client with diligence and competence. A lawyer who is negligent in attending to a client's cause
may be grounds for administrative sanction.30

In Burbe v. Magulta:31

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding
the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-
bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare - and had actually prepared - at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. 32

While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she ws requested by complainant's mother-in-
law to refrain from interfering in complainant's domestic issues, it was still incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that
she would no longer be able to represent him. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.

When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014,33 respondent did not inform him that she
would no longer be connected with the case due to conflict of interest, even though she was approached by complainant's mother-
in-law sometime before November 2013.34 It was only when she filed her Answer35 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
that complainant learned of the reason why respondent would not be representing him.

This Court has stated that "[t]he fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of
consequence."36 Respondent's duty as a lawyer compels her to act not only with diligence, but with candor as well. She should
have been upfront with complainant once she decided that she would no longer interfere in complainant's troubles. In Gone v.
Ga:37

Respondent's sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The
moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires
44
that he exerts his best efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his client's cause. Those who perform that duty with
diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and
help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.38

The Investigating Commissioner was correct in finding that respondent did not profit from complainant, since Mr. Domenden
confirmed his receipt of P35,000.00 for the psychological evaluation fee.39 This circumstance, however, will not excuse
respondent from administrative liability for violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as well as her oath to render "all good fidelity"40 to her client. As in a similar case, 41 she must be made liable for her inexcusable
negligence.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a

repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Dumlao's record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

17. A.C. No. 13453 – Legal Ethics – Legal Profession – Code of Professional Responsibility – Rule 8.01 – Improper Social Media
Posts May Result in a Lawyer’s Suspension or Disbarment
In January 2019, Atty. Berteni Causing posted on his Facebook account a draft of a plunder complaint which he intended to file
against Jackiya Lao. Lao was a candidate in the 2019 elections (congressional seat). The post painted Lao as a corrupt politician
and the post subjected Lao to public ridicule.
Lao then filed a disbarment case against Causing. In his defense, Causing averred that his post was covered by free speech,
freedom of expression, and freedom of the press (because he is a vlogger) and that he eventually filed the plunder case against
Lao.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Causing should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Causing’s defense is not tenable. As a member of the Bar, Atty. Causing ought to know that Facebook, or any
other social medium, for that matter, is not the proper forum to air out his grievances, for a lawyer who uses extra-legal  fora, is a
lawyer who weakens the rule of law. In this case, Atty. Causing knew that the proper forum for his complaint is the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The fact that Atty. Causing subsequently filed the complaint for Plunder before the Office of the Ombudsman is of no moment as
the damage to the reputation of Lao had already been done.

Rule 8.01 of the CPR provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Since this is already Atty. Causing’s second offense of similar nature, the Supreme Court disbarred him.
18. [ A.M. NO. RTJ-22-022 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 19- 4966-RTJ]. August 23, 2022 ]
GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, VICE GOVERNOR JONAH PEDRO P. PIMENTEL, BOARD MEMBER RODOLFO V.
GACHE, BOARD MEMBER STANLEYG.ALEGRE,BOARD MEMBER RENEE F. HERRERA, BOARD MEMBER GERARDO G.
QUINONES, BOARD MEMBER REYNOR V. QUIBRAL, BOARD MEMBER ERWIN L. LAUSIN, BOARD MEMBER ARTEMIO
B. SERDON, JR., BOARD MEMBER JAY G. PIMENTEL, AND BOARD MEMBER RAMON R. BANING, COMPLAINANTS,
V.S. HON. WINSTON S. RACOMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 39, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAET, CAMARINES
NORTE, RESPONDENT.

Before the Court is a Verified Complaint[1] for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed with the Office of the Court Administrator against
Judge Winston S. Racoma, Presiding Judge, Branch 39, Regional    Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

The Verified Complaint was filed by Camarines Norte Governor Edgardo A. Tallado, Vice Governor Jonah Pedro P. Pimentel, and
Board Members Rodolfo V. Gache, Stanley B. Alegre, Renee F. Herrera, Gerardo G. Quinones, Reynor V. Quibral, Erwin L.
Lausin, Artemio B. Serdon, Jr., Jay G. Pimentel, and Ramon R. Baning.

45
The Facts

In July 2015, an administrative charge against Punong Barangay Leslie B. Esturas (Punong Barangay Esturas) and Barangay
Kagawad Moises Delos Santos, Jr. (Barangay Kagawad Delos Santos) was filed before the Sangguniang Bayan of Capalong,
Camarines Norte (Sangguniang Bayan).[2]

On 30 July 2015, Municipal Mayor Senandro M. Jalgalado (Mayor Jalgalado) issued Memorandum Order No. 2015-02,[3] which
approved the recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan placing Punong Barangay Esturas and Barangay Kagawad Delos Santos
under a 60-day preventive suspension from office. [4]

Eventually, Punong Barangay Esturas and Barangay Kagawad Delos Santos appealed Memorandum Order No.2015-02 of the
Sangguniang Bayan to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Norte (Sangguniang Panlalawigan).[5] Attached to the appeal
was a complaint[6] against the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Jalgalado.[7]

On 28 July 2016, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan granted the appeal filed by Punong Barangay Esturas and Barangay Kagawad
Delos Santos and ordered their reinstatement.[8]

Mayor Jalgalado did not implement the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan reasoning that the same is void considering that
the Governor of Camarines Norte, Governor Edgardo A. Tallado (Governor Tallado), was under preventive suspension at that time
and had no authority to approve and enforce the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.[9]

On 18 December 2018, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 627-2018, [10] recommending to Governor Tallado
the preventive suspension of Mayor Jalgalado for sixty (60) days because of Mayor Jalgalado' s defiance of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to reinstate Punong Barangay Esturas and Barangay Kagawad Delos Santos[11]

On 19 December 2018, Governor Tallado issued a Notice of Preventive Suspension[12] against Mayor Jalgalado.[13]

Aggrieved, Mayor Jalgalado filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with a Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, [14] which was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 8374 of
Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte (Branch 41), presided by Judge Arniel A. Dating (Judge Dating). [15]

On 9 January 2019, Branch 41 issued an Order[16] granting the application of Mayor Jalgalado for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and ordered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Governor Tallado to cease from implementing Resolution
No. 627-2018, which ordered the preventive suspension of Mayor Jalgalado.[17]

On 24 January 2019, Branch 41 issued another Order[18] making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that it issued on 9
January 2019. [19] In the same Order, Branch 41 lifted the prohibition against further proceedings in Administrative Case No. 01-
2015.[20]

On 11 February 2019, Mayor Jalgalado filed a motion[21] with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the suspension of the
investigation in Administrative Case No. 01-2015, citing Section 62-C of the Local Government Code, which prohibits the
investigation of an elective official in an administrative complaint within 90 days prior to a local election, and providing that a
preventive suspension imposed, prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding local elections, shall be deemed automatically
lifted upon the start of the aforesaid period.[22] The motion was, however, denied by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which resolved
to proceed with the administrative investigation of the complaint.[23]

On 15 March 2019, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a Decision[24] in the Complaint filed by Punong Barangay Esturas and
Barangay Kagawad Delos Santos, Administrative Case No. 01-2015, finding Mayor Jalgalado guilty of Grave Abuse of Authority
and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months.[25] To implement the Decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Governor Tallado filed an Application for Request for Exemption from the Ban on
Suspension[26] under Section 62 (c) of the Election Code, with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which granted the
application of Governor Tallado for exemption for the preventive suspension of Mayor Jalgalado.[27]

On 4 April 2019, Governor Tallado issued a Notice of Suspension as Penalty[28] against Mayor Jalgalado, implementing the
Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to suspend the latter.[29]

Aggrieved, Mayor Jalgalado filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandmus with a Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and an Urgent Prayer for an Ex Parte 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order,[30] assailing the 15 March
2019 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Notice of Suspension as Penalty issued by Governor Tallado.
[31]
 Impleaded in the Petition were Governor Tallado and the Presiding Officer and the Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
[32]
 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8403 and was raffled to Branch 41, presided by Judge Dating, but it was re-raffled to
Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte (Branch 39), presided by respondent Judge Winston S. Racoma (Judge
Racoma), after Judge Dating inhibited from the case.[33]

46
Governor Tallado and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed a Manifestation with Motion for Inhibition and Comment on the
Petition,[34] praying for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground that, among others, it is the Court of Appeals, and not the
Regional Trial Court, that has jurisdiction over the case.[35]

During the hearing on 23 April 2019, the parties opted to no longer present any evidence and merely adopted their Comment and
other pleadings, and submitted the Petition for the resolution of the court. [36]

On 25 April 2019, Judge Racoma issued an Order,[37] granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction of Mayor Jalgalado.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the petitioner is bound to suffer grave and irreparable injury if the penalty of six-month (sic)
suspension, as ordered in the March 15, 2019 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Administrative Case No. 01-2015,
will be enforced, the Court hereby grants the application for a preliminary injunction. Let a Writ of Preliminary lnjuction issue.

The petitioner is hereby ordered to file an Injunction Bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand (PhP100,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.[38]
In granting the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Judge Racoma underscored that the gravest consideration
under the circumstances is the well-being of the constituents of Mayor Jalgalado.[39] He found that the penalty of suspension for
the period of six (6) months imposed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on Mayor Jalgalado will strip Mayor Jalgalado of his
rights and obligations to carry out the duty of his office and to serve his constituents.[40] Note that the suspension order against
Mayor Jalgalado fell within the 90-day period before the 2019 Local Elections.

On 26 April 2019, Judge Racoma issued an Order[41] granting the Motion for Inhibition[42] filed by Governor Tallado and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. In recusing himself from further participating in the case, Judge Racoma held that while the motion
fell short of demonstrating that he manifested arbitrariness or prejudice as to cloud his partiality in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, he was voluntarily inhibiting from further trying and deciding the case. [43]

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of the 25 April 2019 Order of Judge Racoma and notwithstanding his inhibition from
the case, Governor Tallado and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed this administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure and Gross Misconduct against Judge Racoma.[44]

Essentially, Camarines Norte Governor Edgardo A. Tallado, Vice Governor Jonah Pedro P. Pimentel, and Board Members Rodolfo
V. Gache, Stanley B. Alegre, Renee F. Herrera, Gerardo G. Quinones, Reynor V. Quibral, Erwin L. Lausin, Artemio B. Serdon, Jr.,
Jay G. Pimentel, and Ramon R. Baning (collectively, the Complainants), in their Verified Complaint, alleged that Judge Racoma
committed gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he took cognizance of the Petition for Certiorari filed by Mayor
Jalgalado, docketed as Civil Case No. 8403.[45]The Complainants argued that it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over
the Petition and not the Regional Trial Court.[46]

The Complainants further averred that granting arguendo that the RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari filed by
Mayor Jalgalado, it was gross ignorance of the law and procedure for Judge Racoma to act on the same considering that no motion
for reconsideration of the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was filed by Mayor Jalgalado.[47]

The Comment of Judge Racoma

In his Comment[48] to the Verified Complaint filed against him, Judge Racoma characterized the Verified Complaint as a threat and
harassment suit.[49]

Judge Racoma argued that even if the Local Government Code provides the remedy of appeal from the Decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to the Office of the President, the same is a long and arduous process.[50] According to Judge Racoma,
when public service to the electorate is at stake, a speedy remedy and the expeditious resolution of the case is of utmost
importance, and raising the case on appeal would just prolong the controversy until the matter is mooted by succeeding events.
[51]
 Judge Racoma explained that he is not new to cases tainted with political color and considers the same as an inevitable part of
his task to dispense rulings with justice even at the risk of being a political target.[52] Judge Racoma stressed that all the cases filed
in his sala are viewed under impartial lenses.

Likewise, Judge Racoma pointed out that the issues raised in Civil Case No. 8403 qualified as exceptions for dispensing with the
filing of a motion for reconsideration as there was an urgent necessity for the resolution of the case as any delay would prejudice
the interest of the Government and the electorate, considering that the elections were nearing [53]

The Report of the Judicial Integrity Board

In a Report[54] dated 20 April 2022, the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) recommended to the Court that Judge Racoma be found
guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure. The dispositive portion of the Rep01i reads:
47
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

(1)    The instant administrative complaint against Hon. Winston S. Racoma, Presiding Judge, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court,
Daet, Camarines Norte, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

(2)    Judge Racoma be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure; and

(3)    Judge Racoma be ordered to pay a FINE of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. (emphasis not ours)
According to the JIB, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is considered by the Local Government Code as a quasi-judicial body. [55] As
such, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari assailing the decisions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. [56]

The JIB held that it was a gross and patent error on the part of Judge Racoma to take cognizance of the Petition filed by Mayor
Jalgalado.[57] Such error, the JIB explained, produces an inference of bad faith, making Judge Racoma liable for gross ignorance of
the law.[58]

The Issue

The sole issue for the consideration of the Court is whether Judge Racoma is liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court rejects the recommendation of the JIB, and dismisses the charge of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Racoma.

The Complainants failed to avail

of the appropriate judicial remedies
under applicable rules

An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy is available.[59] The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.[60] A judge cannot be
civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith. [61]

The Complainants wrongly filed the present administrative case against Judge Racoma, as it is settled that an administrative
complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal,
or a petition for certiorari.[62]

The inquiry into the correctness of Judge Racoma's act of taking cognizance of the Petition for Certiorari filed by Mayor
Jalgalado, docketed as Civil Case No. 8403, is undeniably judicial in nature and which is best settled through the available
appropriate judicial remedies under the Rules of Court, and not by way of an administrative complaint.

Errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his or her adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. [63]

It is well-settled that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.[64] For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the
judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.[65] Besides, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. [66] To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [67] It
is only where the error is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice, or dishonesty that administrative sanctions may be imposed against
the erring judge.[68]
In the oft-cited case of Flores v. Abesamis,[69] the Court explained:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature
(i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal.
The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
48
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific
modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had caused him
"undue injury." This is impermissible, as this Court had already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that "administrative
or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the
result thereof" xxx Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they
should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of
statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and... also evidence of malice or bad faith,
ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. (underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Considering that the administrative complaint filed by the Complainants pertains to the exercise of Judge Racoma's adjudicative
functions, the Complainants should have first exhausted judicial remedies instead of immediately resorting to administrative
proceedings.

In any case, whether Judge Racoma gravely abused his discretion or otherwise erred in taking cognizance of the Petition for
Certiorari filed by Mayor Jalgalado, docketed as Civil Case No. 8403, does not necessarily translate to an administrative violation
unless there is a clear showing of bad faith on his part. [70] Basic is the rule that mere allegation is not equivalent to proof, and
charges based on mere suspicion, speculation or conclusion cannot be given credence. [71]

In administrative disciplinary
proceedings, the Court must
consider the entire context
of the case

Our judges do not perform their judicial duties in a vacuum. They, like us, assume their role in society and, as such, necessarily
interact and relate with other members of their communities.

The Court takes judicial notice that Judge Racoma is up against powerful individuals whom we can assume wield great power and
influence in his place of work. This is not the first case filed against Judge Racoma by the Complainants as there are other
administrative cases that have been filed against him by the same or related individuals:

  Complainant Docket Number Docket Date Charges Status

1.) Hon. Josefina B. 21- 086- RTJ 18 November Gross Ignorance Pending
Tallado 2021 of the Law or
Procedure

2.) Vice Governor 20- 5083- RTJ 23 October Ignorance of the Pending
Joseph Christopher 2020 Law and
Pantones, et al. Procedure, and  
Gross Misconduct

3.) Governor Edgardo A. RTJ- 18- 2536 (15- 7May 2015 Gross Ignorance Fined P
Tallado 4396- RTJ) and 2 October of the Law and 11,000.00
  2018 Procedure, with Stern
Violation of the Warning
  Code of Judicial
Conduct

The Court likewise takes note that Judge Racoma is not the only judge who has been sued by the politicians in his province. The
Executive Judge, Judge Amiel A. Dating, the Presiding Judge of Branch 41 of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, has also been
named a respondent in several cases filed by Complainants Tallado, et al.[72] Judge Dating was the first judge who acted in the case
subject matter of this Petition until he inhibited and the case was re raffled to Judge Racoma, and Tallado, et al. filed the present
49
administrative charge against him as a result. There are only three (3) RTC Judges in Daet, Camarines Norte, and one (1) Family
Court Judge. It should concern the Court that the Complainants, for this one case, had already 'eliminated' and sued two (2) of the
judges in the station, leaving only one more to act on it.

This kind of situation is to be decried, though not uncommon. The influence of both elective and appointive officials on our judges
is a fact we must not close our eyes to. We have our Code of Judicial Conduct to guide us in navigating the tenuous balance in our
relations with the officials from the two other branches of government. However, not even the Code can protect our judicial
frontliners from the hardships occasioned by discordant and moreso openly adversarial relations with the said officials.
Unfortunately, the filing of administrative charges against our judges has been unscrupulously resorted to. Whereas, the members
of this Court are no less vulnerable, we must acknowledge that our judges have to literally face and live in the midst of this
unhealthy environment, day in and day out. Certainly, in discharging the Court's duty of supervision, we must take these matters
into account, specially so in deciding administrative cases which may have been actuated by obviously long-standing strained
relations, if not outright animosity.

The JIB failed to consider the

badges of harassment attendant
in this case

The Court must be ever vigilant in protecting judges and justices against administrative cases filed against them that are meant
solely to harass, embarrass, or vex them. Recently, the Court promulgated issuances intended to protect judges and justices against
harassment suits. Rule X, Sections I and 2 of the Internal Rules of the JIB,73 provide:

RULE X
SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON DISCIPLINARY CASES
Section 1. Action Filed Before Compulsory Retirement. - If a disciplinary action is filed with the JIB within six (6) months
before the compulsory retirement of the respondent for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least one (1) year prior to the
filing of the complaint, and shown prima facie that it is intended to harass and embarrass the respondent, the JIB shall recommend
to the Supreme Court that the complaint be dismissed and that the complainant be cited for indirect contempt. xxx

Section 2. Complaint Filed by a Lawyer. - If the complainant is a lawyer and it is shown that the disciplinary action is intended to
harass and embarrass the respondent, the JIB shall dismiss the complaint and require the complainant to show case why he or she
should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar and as an officer of the Court and recommend the
referral of the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for proceedings under Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Corrolarily, Section 3(2) of Rule 140, as further amended,74 provides:
SECTION 3. Initial Acrion. -- xxx (2) Proceedings Initiated By Complaint. - xxx If the verified or anonymous complaint is not
sufficient in form and substance, it shall be dismissed. Moreover, if the complaint prima facie appears to be baseless and was filed
only to harass or embarrass the respondent, or to unduly delay the release of retirement benefits in case of his or her impending
compulsory retirement, the complainant shall be required to show cause why he or she should not be cited in contempt.
Furthermore, if the complainant is a lawyer, he or she shall also be required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar and as an officer of the Court.
Despite these issuances, however, the JIB itself failed to take notice of and to consider the badges that indicate that the Complaint
filed against Judge Racoma was intended to harass and vex the latter.

The Court thus deems it proper to remind the JIB that in evaluating administrative complaints before it, it is not just the
allegations in a complaint that must be evaluated. It is incumbent upon the JIB to appreciate such allegations in the context
surrounding the complaint and the parties involved. Here, Judge Racoma himself unerringly alleged that the complaint was a
"threat or harassment suit."[75] He also categorically called attention to the fact that he has been a victim of suits "tainted with
political color."[76]

Thus, to safeguard against the abuse of the administrative disciplinary mechanism against justices, judges, and court personnel,
the JIB must be guided by the following rules in evaluating administrative disciplinary cases:
(1)    If a judicial remedy is still available to the complainant, the administrative complaint shall be dismissed outright, without
prejudice to re-filing should the complainant succeed in a judicial action in proving that the public respondent's assailed act or
omission was indeed wrong and ill motivated.

(2)    If the administrative case is meant to harass, threaten or merely vex the public respondent. In determining this, the following
factors may be considered:
(a)    the existence of other cases filed against the public respondent by the same complainant or related complainants;

(b)    the pos1t10n and influence of the complainant, particularly in the locality where the public respondent is stationed;
50
(c)    the number of times that the public respondent has been charged administratively and the corresponding dispositions in these
cases;

(d)    any decisions or judicial actions previously rendered by the public respondent for or against the complainant;

(e)    the propensity of the complainant for filing administrative cases against members and personnel of the Judiciary; and

(f)    any other factor indicative of improper pressure or influence.

The JIB is reminded to treat with the same careful consideration as any accusation of wrongdoing against anyone under its
jurisdiction, allegations of harassment and filing of malicious and baseless charges.

The Complainants are directed to

show cause why they should not
he cited for indirect contempt

Indeed, unfounded criticisms against members of the Judiciary degrade the judicial office and greatly interfere with the due
performance of their functions in the Judiciary.[77] They not only needlessly drain the resources of the Court in resolving them,
they sow the seeds of distrust of the public against members of the Judiciary.[78] Hence, the Court deems it proper to direct the
Complainants to explain their act of filing a premature complaint against Judge Racoma intended to harass or vex the latter.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Fernando Castillo Against Associate Justice Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, Court of Appeals, Manila,
[79]
 the Court directed the complainant therein to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt because he
"miserably failed to sufficiently substantiate his grave accusations" against a member of the Court of Appeals, which he charged
of committing acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, and which he sought to be disbarred and removed from her position.

In Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land, Inc. (Represented by Joseph B. Usita) Against Court of Appeals
Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,[80] the Court directed the
complainants therein to show cause why they should not be held in indirect contempt "for bringing the unfounded and baseless
charges against [members of the Court of Appeals] not only once but twice." The complainants in this case resorted to an
administrative disciplinary action against the respondents prior to the final resolution of the judicial issue involved in a case
pending before the Court of Appeals.

The Court therefore directs the Complainants to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt.

In Bank of Commerce v. Borromeo,[81] the Court reiterated that contempt of court is willful disregard of public authority that tends
to, among others, impair the respect due such body:
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of, its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due
such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a
court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. [82] It lies at the core of
the administration of a judicial system. [83] Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very
creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. [84] The power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. [85] The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of
the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. [86]

A final word

The Court is cognizant of the sacrifices of our judges, who risk their very lives and even those of their loved ones, in order to keep
our courts open and render the services our people need. None of them is perfect. Just as none of us are. When they commit errors,
it is our duty to correct them. But when their circumstances call out for consideration, we must not tum a blind eye.

Judge Racoma has not been previously convicted of the charge against him, that is, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure.
Judge Racoma, more notably, has never been found guilty of committing any corrupt act in all his past cases. That should merit
great weight.

Concededly, Judge Racoma was convicted twice for insubordination for failing to file his comment in two of the cited
51
administrative cases. It is disturbing to think and would be truly tragic if Judge Racoma's reason for not submitting a comment in
those cases (where he was acquitted of the charges and cited for insubordination instead for such non-filing of a comment) is his
loss of hope, his despair over the pressures of his work and the seeming lack of recognition of such plight. A judge who discharges
his or her duties despite being beset with external pressures, and who manages to fend off corrupt influences and remain true to
his or her oath, save only for an occasional error in judgment, should be extended consideration and commiseration, not
condemnation.

WHEREFORE, the administrative Complaint against respondent Judge Winston S. Racoma, Presiding Judge, Branch 39,
Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte is DISMISSED.

The Complainants, Governor Edgardo A. Tallado, Vice Governor Jonah Pedro P. Pimentel, Board Member Rodolfo V. Gache,
Board Member Stanley G. Alegre, Board Member Renee F. Herrera, Board Member Gerardo G. Quinones, Board Member Reynor
V. Quibral, Board Member Erwin L. Lausin, Board Member Artemio B. Serdon, Jr., Board Member Jay G. Pimentel, and Board
Member Ramon R. Baning are ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be held for
indirect contempt of court for filing a premature complaint against Judge Winston S. Racoma intended to harass or vex the latter.

SO ORDERED.
19. [ A.C. No. 13332. August 10, 2022 ]
ALOYSIUS R. PAJARILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARCHIMEDES O. YANTO, RESPONDENT.

This administrative disciplinary case involves the Complaint[1] filed by complainant Aloysius R. Pajarillo against respondent Atty.
Archimedes O. Yanto before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and the Rules on Notarial Practice.

The diegesis of the case is synthesized as follows:

Complainant was one of the plaintiffs in a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages then pending before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Norte, Branch 41, docketed as Civil Case No. 8028. Respondent, on the other hand,
was the legal counsel of therein defendants Ronnie Pimentel (Ronnie), George Pimentel (George), and Roweno Pimentel
(Roweno).[2]

In the pre-trial brief submitted by defendants for Civil Case No. 8028, they alluded to a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
notarized by respondent authorizing Roweno to represent his brothers, Ronnie and George, in filing the case. The SPA, however,
was not attached to the pre-trial brief. During their formal offer of exhibits, defendants adduced the SPA, which the RTC admitted.
Sensing irregularity in the sudden emergence of the SPA, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court to verify whether
such a document existed in respondent's notarial regist1y. Complainant discovered that the SPA was not recorded in the notarial
registry of respondent. Instead, a different SPA was registered bearing the same document number, page number; book number,
and series.[3] This impelled complainant to file a criminal case against respondent for Falsification of Public Documents before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. He also lodged the instant administrative disciplinary case before the IBP docketed as CBD
Case No. 18-5757.

In riposte, respondent refuted the allegation against him. He denied falsifying the subject SPA. [4] Instead, he proffered that on 5
February 2015, defendants, his clients, went to his office bringing several copies of two different SPAs: one intended for the civil
case before the RTC of Camarines Norte Branch 41, and the other for a case to be filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Both SPAs contained similar provisions authorizing Roweno to represent his brothers, Ronnie and
George.[5]

As it happened, defendants signed the SPAs and respondent notarized the same. Thereafter, he forwarded the copies of the two
SPAs to his office staff. Believing that the documents consisted only of one SPA as they looked identical, his staff assigned only
one notarial detail to both SPAs. The copy which was kept by the staff and submitted to the Clerk of Court for reportorial purposes
was the SPA intended for the DENR case. Meanwhile, the copy which respondent retained and filed before the RTC of Camarines
Norte, Branch 41 was the SPA for the civil case. Respondent stood pat on his stance that he never falsified the two SPAs. [6]

Ensuingly, the RTC of Camarines, Norte, Branch 41 rendered an adverse decision against complainant on the civil case. [7] On the
other hand, the provincial prosecutor found no probable cause to charge respondent with Falsification of Public Documents. [8]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

On 5 June 2021, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution [9] recommending the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against respondent. The IBP Board reversed the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner finding respondent
liable for violating the Rules on Notarial Practice. The IBP Board was convinced that since respondent's mistake was honest and

52
isolated, no bad faith may be attributed to him. Likewise considered credible were the affidavits of the two members of
respondent's staff who explained the mistake in recording the notarial details of the SPAs.

RULING OF THE COURT

This Court deviates from the IBP's dismissal of the Complaint. Respondent must be held liable for his violation of the Rules on
Notarial Practice and the CPR.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit, and as such, notaries public are obligated to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties.[10] A violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice taints the public's confidence in the integrity of the notarial system.
[11]

In keeping with the faithful observance of their duties, notaries public shall keep, maintain, protect, and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages.
[12]
 Section 2, Rule VI of the Notarial Rules requires that every notarial act must be registered in the notarial register, viz.:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of
notarization the following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 2(e), Rule VI of the same Rules requires that:

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions of the Notarial Rules, it can be distilled that: one, the act of recording in the notarial register all
information that needs to be recorded is the duty of a commissioned notary; and two, each document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before notaries public is etched with unique notarial details.

Here, there was a stark irregularity in the notarization of the SPAs. Instead of affixing different notarial details for each of the two
documents, which involved two separate cases, respondent's office staff mistakenly thought that only one and the same document
was notarized. Thus, only the SPA intended for the DENR case was reported to the Clerk of Court. The SPA filed before the RTC
of Camarines Norte, Branch 41 carried the same notarial details as the first.

In a plethora of cases, the Court reminded lawyers that they cannot simply pass the blame to their secretaries and office staff
whenever there are errors in recording the necessary information regarding documents or instruments they have notarized.
Commissioned notaries are charged by law with the obligation to personally record the notarial details to avoid any error that a
non-lawyer may commit. Verily, the office staff or secretary who is not well-acquainted with the Notarial Rules cannot be
expected to labor with the same level of meticulousness that a diligent commissioned notary would exhibit out of fear of possible
revocation or suspension of his or her notarial commission.

Notaries public are expected to observe the highest degree of compliance with the basic requirements of notarial practice in order
to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the notarial system.[13]

Discernibly, respondent's omission is a ground for the revocation of his notarial commission-
RULE XI

Revocation of Commission and Disciplinary Sanctions

SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. - (a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for any
ground on which an application for a commission may be denied.

53
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any
notary public who:
xxxx
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudence provides that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted out the following
penalties: (1) revocation of notarial commission; (2) disqualification from being commissioned as notary public;
and (3) suspension from the practice of law - the terms of which vary based on the circumstances of each case.[14]

By failing to record proper entries in the notarial register, respondent not only violated the Notarial Rules but also the CPR.
Specifically, he failed to comply with his duty under Canon 1 of the CPR to uphold and obey the laws of the land, i.e., the Notarial
Rules, and to promote respect for law and legal processes. So, too, respondent's delegation to the office staff of his notarial
function is a direct violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing."[15]

Based on the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who
failed to discharge his duties as such but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard for the integrity and dignity owing to the
legal profession.

It cannot be stressed enough that notarial duties, as with lawyer duties, ought to be carried out with not just a modicum of
competence. When lawyers applied to be commissioned notaries, and when they were subsequently appointed as such, they swore
under oath to preserve the sanctity of the notarial process. The legal effect of notarization - how it transforms a private document
into a self-authenticating public document that provides evidentiary convenience - should constantly remind notaries public that
there is a need on their part to be particularly thorough in keeping the accuracy, integrity, and truthfulness of their notarial records.
Not holding fast to this solemn duty will undermine the public's faith and confidence in the notarial system and the legal
profession in general.

In synthesis, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice and the CPR. Consequently, his
notarial commission is revoked, and he is hereby disqualified from being appointed as notary public for one year. Considering that
respondent's negligent recording of the notarized SPAs did not cause harm to the substantive rights of complainant and such was
made without malice and devoid of any desire to dupe or defraud the latter, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of three months against respondent is commensurate.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Atty. Archimedes O. Yanto GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED.
He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of one year. He is likewise suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three months. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
20. [ A.C. No. 11304. June 28, 2022 ]
LEONARDO L. SARMIENTO AND RICHARD G. HALILI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. GREGORIO C. FERNANDO,
JR., A.K.A. JERRY FERNANDO, RESPONDENT.

This resolves the petition for disbarment[1] filed by complainants Leonardo L. Sarmiento and Richard G. Halili (complainants)
against respondent Atty. Gregorio C. Fernando, Jr. (respondent).

Complainants are business associates engaged in buying, developing and selling real estate. In 2013, they came to know of
respondent during a meet-up set up by one of their broker friends.[2]

During the meet-up, respondent proposed the sale to the complainants of a 374-square meter parcel of land (subject land), located
in Parañaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 68952.[3] In order to entice the complainants to push
through with such sale, respondent made the following representations:
1. He is the absolute owner of the subject land. This is true even though TCT No. 68952 was still in the name of his
parents—i.e., the spouses Gregorio and Natividad Fernando. His parents already conveyed the subject land to him by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) [4] dated 14 April 2012. Only an SPA was executed to effect the
conveyance in order to avoid payment of taxes for the transfer from his parents to him, and another payment of taxes
from him to his buyer.[5]
54
 2. Both his parents are still alive, and their signatures in the SPA are genuine.[6]

3. He is the sole heir of his parents. Hence, no other person will make a claim of ownership over the subject land that is
contrary to his.[7]
Persuaded by the foregoing representations, the complainants agreed to purchase the subject land for P3,740,000.00. To evidence
the agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale [8] (deed of sale) was executed between the respondent, as the supposed attorney-in-fact of
his parents Gregorio and Natividad Fernando, on one hand, and Sylvia Sarmiento (Sylvia), the wife of complainant Leonardo
Sarmiento, on the other. Subsequently, TCT No. 68952 in the name of the spouses Gregorio and Natividad Fernando was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 010-2013000507 [9] in the name of Sylvia.

Not long after, however, a complaint seeking the nullification of the SPA, Deed of Sale and TCT No. 010-2013000507 was
brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against Sylvia, complainant Leonardo Sarmiento and the
respondent. The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 14-040, was filed by no other than respondent's mother
Natividad Fernando and the heirs of respondent's father Gregorio Fernando.

In Civil Case No. 14-040, the complainants learned of the falsity of respondent's representations, to wit:
1. Respondent is not the absolute owner of the subject land, and the same was never conveyed to him. The SPA dated 14
April 2012, upon which respondent bases his claim of ownership, is falsified.

2. Gregorio Fernando could not have signed the SPA since the latter already died as of April 4, 1997, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Death[10] issued by the County of Contra Costa in California. On the other hand, the forgery of
Natividad Fernando's signature in the SPA is made apparent from a comparison between such signature and the
latter's legitimate signature as appearing in her Office of the Senior Citizen Affair (OSCA) card. [11]

3. Respondent is not the only heir of his parents. He has no less than four (4) living siblings, namely Samuel, Clifford,
Mildred and Rene Fernando. Samuel, Clifford and Mildred, along with Natividad Fernando, even designated Rene as
their attorney-in-fact in prosecuting Civil Case No. 14-040.[12]
Hence, to preserve TCT No. 010-2013000507 and to put an end to Civil Case No. 14-040, Sylvia and complainant Leonardo
Sarmiento were constrained to enter into a settlement with Natividad Fernando and the heirs of Gregorio Fernando for
P2,992,000.00. The complainants equally shared the burden of paying the settlement amount. The settlement was eventually
approved by the RTC in an Order[13] dated 4 November 2014.

The complainants demanded reimbursement of the P2,992,000.00 settlement amount from the respondent, but the latter ignored
the same.

Prejudiced by the turn of events, the complainants filed two (2) cases against the respondent: an estafa complaint,[14] docketed as
NPS Docket No. XV-08-INV-15A00026, before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa City, and the instant
disbarment petition, docketed as CBD Case No. 15-4471, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). [15]

Attached to the complainants' petition for disbarment are copies of, among others, TCT Nos. 68952[16] and 010-2013000507,[17] the
SPA dated 14 April 2012,[18] the Deed of Absolute Sale between Sylvia and respondent,[19] the Certificate of Death of Gregorio
Fernando issued by the County of Contra Costa in California,[20] the OSCA card of Natividad Fernando,[21] the SPAs executed by
Samuel, Clifford, Mildred Fernando in favor of Rene Fernando[22] and the Order dated 4 November 2014 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 14-040.[23]

On 9 January 2015, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued an Order [24] requiring respondent to file, within
fifteen days from his receipt of the said order, an answer to the complainant's petition.

In response to the Order, the respondent filed a letter,[25] claiming that the petition for disbarment merely reiterates the estafa
complaint before the OCP and had been filed solely for the purpose of harassment. The respondent then urged the IBP-CBD to
dismiss the complaint and award damages in his favor in an amount no less than One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00).

On 24 March 2015, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[26] setting the hearing of the case at 1:30 PM of 25 May 2015, and requiring the
complainants and the respondent to appear thereat.

The complainants attended the 25 May 2015 hearing, but the respondent did not. Thus, in an Order[27] of even date, the IBP-CBD
regarded the case already deemed submitted for decision.

Yet, on 27 May 2015, the respondent filed an Answer[28] praying for the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds:
1. The complainants lack legal personality to file the petition for disbarment as they do not come to IBP-CBD with
clean hands. The complainants themselves are guilty of perjury when, in the petition's verification/certification, they
stated that: "[they did not] commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in xxx

55
 any [other] forum."[29] Such statement is clearly false, however, in light of the pendency of the estafa complaint before
the OCP.[30]

2. The SPA dated 14 April 2012 is not a falsification; it is merely a reiteration of an SPA [31] dated 22 December 2002 and
another SPA dated 22 November 1978. The SPA dated 22 November 1978, however, is currently in the possession of
his brother, Rene Fernando.[32]
In a Report and Recommendation[33] dated 2 June 2015, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of the respondent based on
the following findings and ratiocinations:
The evidence submitted by the complainants sufficiently established that[:]
a) the Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by respondent's parents in April 2012 at Mayantoc, Tarlac, was a forgery.
Respondent's father died already in 1997, and respondent's mother's signature thereon was not hers;

b) the Deed of Sale in question was executed by the respondent purportedly in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of his parents,
who were the registered co-owners of the subject parcel of land in San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; as
indicated earlier, respondent was not an attorney-in-fact of his parents;

c) respondent received and pocketed the [P]3,740,000.00 paid by the buyers of the subject parcel of land;

d) the buyers of the subject parcel of land, when sued by respondent's mother and siblings for the recovery of the subject
parcel of land, paid an extra [P]2,992,000.00 to respondent's mother and siblings so that the earlier sale of the subject parcel
of land to them (buyers) will be honored and respected by the true owners thereof; respondent refused to return to the
buyers of the subject parcel of land this [P]2,992,000.00 in spite of proper demands therefor.
The respondent failed to meet the issues squarely. He also failed to discredit/impeach the evidence against him.

That the respondent employed chicanery in his dealings with the buyers of the subject parcel of land is beyond question. Equally
beyond question is that the respondent tried to cheat out of their inheritance his mother and siblings. Not the least of respondent's
sins is his dishonesty.

By all measures and standards, the respondent is a legal misfit. He cannot be allowed to practice the legal profession. [34]
On 20 June 2015, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-531[35] adopting the recommendation
of the IBP CBD. Hence, this administrative case.

OUR RULING

The Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP-CBD and IBP-BOG.

The evidence on record is damning against the respondent. Taken together, the complainants' evidence engendered reasonable
conclusions that the SPA dated 14 April 2012 was falsified, and that respondent used such falsified SPA, along with other deceitful
representations, in order to sell and profit from a property that he knew was not his or his to sell. Worse, as the established facts
disclose that he was the only one who benefited from his use of the falsified SPA, respondent may also be presumed to have been
the material author of the falsification himself.[36]

Respondent, on the other hand, was unable to repudiate the evidence against him. We fail to see how the existence of an SPA dated
22 December 2002, or of any other prior SPA for that matter, can prove that the SPA dated 14 April 2012—the very deed he used
to convince the complainants to push through with the purchase of the subject land—was genuine. Even assuming the existence of
previous SPAs in respondent's favor, the fact remains that the SPA dated 14 April 2012 was still executed after the death of
Gregorio Fernando in 1997 and, just the same, bears the forged signature of Natividad Fernando.

Neither could respondent's attack against the personality of the complainants to file the present administrative case be given
serious consideration. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the complainants did not perjure when they stated in their petition's
verification/certification that they did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any other form.
The reason is obvious. Though they may be based on the same facts, the preliminary investigation for estafa initiated by the
complainants is distinct from and does not involve the same issues as the present administrative case. The purpose of the
preliminary investigation proceedings is the determination of whether there is probable cause to file a criminal indictment against
the respondent for estafa, while the issue underlying this administrative case is whether the respondent may be administratively
sanctioned as a lawyer. Hence, the complainants' mere filing of an estafa complaint against the respondent cannot, as it did not,
56
preclude them from instituting disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.[37]

It is indubitable that respondent's actions constitute gross violations of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), viz:
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Brennisen vs. Contawi,[38] (Brennisen) We meted the ultimate penalty of disbarment against a lawyer who used a falsified SPA
to mortgage, sell and profit from the property of another. In justifying the imposition, the Court held in that case, thus:
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the
proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-
incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's
signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the
subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and custody during
complainant's absence.

xxxx

In Sabayle vs. Tandayag, the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a
false and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also — and even worse — sharing in the
profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

In Flores vs. Chua, the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false representations that the vendor
appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was found guilty of grave misconduct.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a
member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the
exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to
lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer
to administrative liability."

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant will
not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private
or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by
Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. x x x[39] (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).
The respondent deserves the same fate. As said, respondent's employment of deceit and use of a forged SPA to gain personal
wealth at the expense of the complainants was well substantiated by the evidence. The evidence on record too left no doubt that
respondent's dishonest actions inflicted, not only grave inconvenience to his own mother and siblings who were forced to file a
suit just to undo what he had done, but also tremendous prejudice to the complainants who practically had to pay for the subject
land twice over. Yet, despite all these, respondent made no attempt to right his wrongs, and showed absolutely no remorse. Indeed,
he even failed to appear at the hearing set for the present administrative case in clear disobedience to the IBP-CBD's order.

Like the lawyer in Brennisen, respondent exhibited his unfitness to remain a member of the legal profession. Respondent showed
himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. Hence, We abide by the recommendation of the IBP-CBD and IBP-BOG.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Gregorio C. Fernando, Jr. a.k.a. Jerry C. Fernando GUILTY of gross violations
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and furnish copies thereof to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

57
SO ORDERED.
21. [ A.C. No. 13118. June 28, 2022 ]
MONICA M. PONTIANO, ROSALYN M. MATANDAG, ELSIE R. BALINGASA, CRISELDA J. ESPINOZA, MIGUEL R.
PANGLILINGAN, MARLON A. VILLA, AND LOUIE T. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANTS VS. ATTY. FABIAN A. GAPPI,
RESPONDENT.
This resolves the administrative complaint [1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by Monica M. Pontiano,
Rosalyn M. Matandag, Elsie R. Balingasa, Criselda J. Espinoza, Miguel R. Panglilingan, Marlon A. Villa and Louie T. Dela Cruz
(complainants) against Atty. Fabian A. Gappi (respondent).

The Antecedents of the Case

The complaint accuses the respondent of gross negligence, gross inefficiency in the performance of duties and dishonesty based
on the following allegations:[2]
1. Complainants are among the sixteen (16) complainants in an illegal dismissal case, docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 12-16403-13 and 01-00057-14, before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Respondent was the counsel of complainants in
that case.

2. Respondent failed to attend a single scheduled hearing of the illegal dismissal case.

3. Prior to 11 March 2014, which was the deadline for the submission of their position paper, complainants went to
respondent's office to inquire about the status of their position paper. Respondent, however, merely told them, "Ako
na ang bahala."

4. Respondent did not submit any position paper on 11 March 2014. Thus, on the same day, complainants went to
respondent's office again and asked that he withdraw as counsel for them. Respondent then prepared a document that
would supposedly formalize his withdrawal as counsel and handed the same to complainants for their signature.
Upon reading the document, however, complainants discovered that the same speaks not of the withdrawal of
respondent as counsel but rather the withdrawal by complainants of their illegal dismissal complaint. Hence,
complainants did not sign the document.

5. Because of respondent's failure to file a position paper for complainants, the illegal dismissal complaint was
dismissed by the LA in a Decision[3] dated 7 April 2014.
Respondent failed to file an answer to the administrative complaint as required by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) in its Order,[4] dated 5 September 2017.

On 2 March 2018, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference[5] ordering complainants and respondent to appear
before the commission on 6 April 2018. Both complainants and respondent, however failed to appear during the scheduled
conference. Hence, the IBP-CBD ordered a resetting of the mandatory conference on 1 June 2018.

Only complainants[6] attended the mandatory conference on 1 June 2018. The respondent did not.[7] Thus, in an Order[8] of even
date, the IBP-CBD required complainants and respondent to file their respective verified position papers within 15 days from their
receipt of the said order.

Complainants filed their Position Paper[9] on 13 June 2018. Respondent, however, did not file any.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation[10] dated 21 November 2018, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violations of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 11, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On 15 February 2019, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) issued a Resolution[11] adopting the findings and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD albeit with modifications: (a) increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to be suffered by the
respondent to three (3) years, and (b) adding a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 against the respondent for the latter's failure to
attend the mandatory conference and to file the required pleadings before the IBP-CBD.

On 27 September 2019, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[12] from the IBP-BOG Resolution essentially asking for his
absolution on the following grounds:

58
 1. His failure to attend hearings and to submit the position paper in the illegal dismissal case was due to complainants'
indecisiveness on whether they want to replace him as their counsel or not.

2. The long process of reading and evaluating evidence for all the 16 complainants of the illegal dismissal case also
contributed to his failure to submit the required position paper.
On 22 August 2020, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. CBD-2020-08-36[13] denying respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this administrative case.

OUR RULING

The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD, as modified by the IBP-BOG.

The established facts tell that respondent, as counsel of complainants in an illegal dismissal case, failed to appear in any of the
scheduled hearings for the said case. He also failed, despite being reminded by his own clients, to file a position paper for them
within the reglementary period. Respondent also tried to deceive complainants when he presented for their signature a document
that stipulated their withdrawal of their illegal dismissal complaint, when what complainants requested was merely a document to
formalize respondent's withdrawal as their counsel. As a consequence of respondent's actions or omissions, the illegal dismissal
complaint was dismissed—to the prejudice of complainants. Respondent never repudiated these facts and even implicitly admitted
them by the explanations he proffered in his motion for reconsideration.

The foregoing facts, to no controversy, speak of respondent's gross negligence and gross inefficiency in the performance of his
duty as counsel of complainants, as well as of his propensity to disobey lawful processes of the LA. The facts also testify to
respondent's dishonesty in his dealings with complainants. We, therefore, agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD, as approved by
the IBP-BOG, that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for violation of Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, Canon 11, and Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR. The IBP-CBD's exhaustive discussion on these points bears repeating:
Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession's exacting standards. A lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer's oath, the
rules of the profession and the [CPR]. The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he owes
to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and
subject to the Court's disciplinary authority.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 provides:

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence. It is axiomatic in the
practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

By failing to attend the scheduled hearing of his clients, [respondent failed to employ his best efforts in the protection of his
clients' interests. Due to [respondent's lack of diligence in the performance of his duties as legal counsel, his clients gravely
suffered and resulted to the dismissal of their case.

xxxx

A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. The
lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds
of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management
of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.

Under the foregoing provisions, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 11 provides:

Canon 11 -A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

xxxx
59
By deliberately failing to attend the scheduled hearing ordered by the [LA], [r]espondent reflects his willful disregard for [c]ourt
orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. Respondent's absence during the
scheduled hearing is an obvious disregard or refusal and disrespect to comply with the [c]ourt's orders.

When [r]espondent was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. In the facts of this case, [r]espondent clearly violated the canons and
his sworn duty when he deliberately misrepresented the documents he submitted to his clients for signature. Had [c]omplainants
failed to notice the false stipulations on the document presented by [r]espondent, they would have been prejudiced and would have
caused the withdrawal of their labor case.

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when
[he] committed the [aforecited] acts of deception against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and
dishonorable to the legal profession: they reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to practice law.

When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights of their client, but also of
their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as
reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding the
ideals and principles embodied in the [CPR]. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

Respondent repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearing as well as to submit position paper, xxx. He is therefore liable for
violation of the [CPR] Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 8.[14] (Emphases in the original, citations
omitted)
Anent the appropriate penalty imposable, We likewise adopt the IBP-BOG's recommendation for the respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) years. In Olvida vs. Gonzales,[15] (Olvida) We imposed the same penalty against a lawyer who was
found to be grossly negligent in the performance of his duty as a counsel (when he failed to file a position paper on behalf of his
client) and dishonest in his dealings with his client (when he concealed from his client the adverse decision that resulted from his
negligence), thus:
In administrative complaints against lawyers, the Court has exercised its discretion on what penalty to impose on the basis of the
facts of the case. Thus, for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading, the Court had imposed penalties ranging from
reprimand, warning with fine, suspension, and in aggravated cases, disbarment.

In the present case, the IBP Board of Governors imposed a four-month suspension from the practice of law on the respondent for
his negligence in filing the required position paper. The established facts, however, show that the respondent was not only
grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as the complainant's lawyer; he was also downright dishonest and
unethical in his dealings with the complainant, an aspect of the case glossed over during the IBP investigation.

For the injury he caused to the complainant and his family because of his malpractice, the respondent must be made to suffer the
commensurate penalty, despite the fact that there was no motion for reconsideration of the IBP resolution. In this light, We deem
a three-year suspension from the practice of law an appropriate penalty for the respondent's gross negligence and
dishonesty in his handling of the complainant's tenancy case. [16] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Like the lawyer in Olvida, respondent was established to have committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty as
counsel by failing to attend any of the scheduled hearings in the illegal dismissal case and by failing to file complainants' position
paper despite being reminded by the latter to do so. He was also dishonest in dealing with his clients as he attempted to make them
sign a document for the withdrawal of their illegal dismissal complaint on the pretense that the same merely formalizes his
withdrawal as their counsel. Hence, We find no qualms in applying the penalty of suspension as recommended by the IBP-BOG.

Finally, We also adopt the IBP-BOG's recommendation of imposing a fine against respondent for the latter's failure to attend the
mandatory conference and to file the required pleadings before the IBP-CBD. The mentioned acts of the respondent reflect his
willful disregard of the IBP-CBD's authority and disrespect of the board's proceedings that, in turn, constitute clear infractions of
Canons 11 and 12 of the CPR.[17] We find the imposition of a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 for such infractions to be
reasonable and supported by jurisprudence.[18]

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WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Fabian A. Gappi GUILTY of violations of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is also ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 for failure to comply with the directives of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

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