Exploring the U.S.

strategic change in the Asia Pacific

In the past three decades, the world has witness the rapid growth of China. Its
economy’s growth has averaged about 10 percent growth yearly since the 70’s until
the first decade of the 21 st century.1 In this light, many countries see the growth of
China as a threat, most especially the United States. As the longstanding regional
power in the Asia-Pacific, the United States has great interests in the region which it
does not want to give up. This essay will argue that China’s assertive behaviour is
central to the strategic decision of the United States to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
region. This essay aims to discover what instigated the Untied States’ shift in foreign
policy toward the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, this essay will explore why China’s
ascendancy is viewed as a threat to the US’ influence in the region. This essay will
first lay the foundation by examining the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the US’
foreign policy. This essay will then compare and contrast the current international
order and the regional order that China seeks to implement in the region. Next, this
essay is going to explore the various narratives that have been used to describe the
US’ shift – is the policy about a pivot, rebalance or a reinvigoration? Lastly, this
essay will discuss the prospects and implications of the said shift of policy to the
region.

The Asia-Pacific region has historically been a significant factor in the US foreign
policy. Since the late 19th century, the region has seen a great ambitions of influence
by the United States. It was the US that pushed Japan to open up its market to the
world by practically intimidating with the use of the US navy. 2 Moreover, the US
initiated the Open-Door policy to China which was the cornerstone of US foreign
policy during the early 1900s.3 The latter policy opened the gates of China to global
trade. In the same light, after the United States defeated the Spanish in the Spanish-
American War, it successfully colonised the Philippines and Guam. We have seen
manifestations of continued interest of the United States in the region. During the
Second World War, the US with its allies liberated most of the Asia-Pacific region
from the occupation of the Japanese Empire. Likewise, to counter the spread of

1
Zheng Bijan, ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs Vol. 84 no. 5 (September –
October 2005): 18.
2
Kenneth G Henshall, ‘Building a Modern Nation: The Meiji Period (1868-1912)’, in History of Japan, Palgrave
Macmillan (2005): 68-69.
3
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Open Door Policy’, in Encyclopedia Britannica (December 2017),
accessed 23 May 2018. https://www.britannica.com/event/Open-Door-policy.
communism during the Cold War, the United States waged war in Korea and
Vietnam. A substantial amount of American history was written in the Asia-Pacific
region. Thus, it cannot be neglected that the region to the west of the US is indeed
important and significant.

The current international order in the Asia Pacific was designed by the United States
after the end of the Second World War. Immediately after defeating the Japanese,
the United States created a regional order based on a hub and spokes model. 4 This
model put the US as the hub and its allies, in the Asia and Pacific, as the spokes.
The US did this by reaching out to the countries in the region and making bilateral
security ties and trade arrangements. Countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and
the Philippines benefited from this model and continue to be the US’ traditional and
strong allies in the region. Ikenberry argues that the US-led order is unique in the
5
way that is liberal than imperial. This is certainly true in that it is made up of
institutions that are supported by democracy and free-market capitalism. This has
attracted many of the region’s countries seeking to benefit from the US economic
opportunity especially during the 60s and 70s. Moreover, China has benefitted the
most from this regional order founded by the US. After the shift in China’s economic
policy in the 70s under Deng Xiao Ping, China entered the global market capitalising
on its export economy and on cheap domestic labour. On the contrary, Arachya
suggests that China seeks to return into the tributary system, or order, that it enjoyed
before European powers entered the region during the 18 th and 19th century. 6
This
might be possible prospect, however, this would only happen if the notions of
sovereignty and equality should give way to Confucian ideals of hierarchy and
deterrence. 7 Indeed, this is true. The contemporary regional order is not only based
on the hub and spokes model of the US which has bilateral characteristics. But, it is
also rich in multilateral institutions such as the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Convention (APEC). Thus,
although the US-led regional order is easily accessible, it is rather much more
difficult to depose as Ikenberry puts it. 8 The United States is shifting its foreign policy
4
Amitav Acharya, ‘Consociational Security: Avoiding the Struggle for Mastery in Asia’, Harvard Asia Quarterly
16.2 (2014): 3.
5
G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign
Affairs Vol. 87. No. 1 (January-February 2008): 7.
6

Acharya, ‘Consociational’, 20.

7
Ibid, 2.
8
Ikenberry, ‘Rise’, 10.
towards the Asia-Pacific in an effort to preserve the current regional order, that it has
created, which China seeks to alter.

The term ‘pivot to Asia’ was first coined in 2011 during the administration of Barrack
Obama.9 It was a response to then Secretary of the State, Hillary Clinton’s, call to
10
‘pivot to new global realities through increased engagement in the East Asia.’ As
the large troop deployments in the Middle East, which was the linchpin of the Bush
administration, began to decline, the Obama administration made the strategic
decision to pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. However, there has been a debate on
how to accurately describe the US’ move. During the security conference of the U.S.
Army War College, the term ‘Asian Pivot was no longer popular which implied that
11
the US never left the Asian-Pacific region.’ The term pivot defeats the purpose the
move, because it seems to suggest that the US neglected the region. Rather, as
Dews suggests, the ‘idea was to reinvigorate attention paid to the Asia Pacific
region.’12 In addition, as Mazza put it, there is a problem of how to perceive the term
pivot – thus the term evolved into rebalancing, then reinvigoration. 13 The central
thought among scholars was the strategic imperative, after the massive spotlight
fixated in the Middle East, was to the reinvigorate the US involvement in the Asia-
Pacific region. In the same light, Campbell argues that there was a lack of strategic
purpose and decline especially at a time when countries in the region sought for
more US presence.14

The strategic rebalance was sixfold – it sought to strengthen US alliances in the

region, improvement of relationship with emerging powers, boost engagement with
the region’s multilateral institutions, expansion of trade and investment, promotion of
democracy and human rights, and the development of a broad-based military
presence.15 During the 4 years after the announcement of the rebalance, the US has
9
Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21 st-Century National Security Strategy’, The
Washington Quarterly (Spring 2014): 123.
10
Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy (October 2011): 1, cited in Tim Law, ‘Rebalancing
what, exactly?: Analysing the united States’ Pacific Pivot’, Australian Defence Journal 198 (2015): 23. 8
11
Richard Weitz, ‘Pivot Out, Rebalance In’, The Diplomat (May 2012), accessed on 23 May 2018.
https://www.thediplomat.com/2012/05/pivot-out-rebalance-in.
12
Fred Dews, ‘Pivot, Rebalance, or Reinvigorate? Words Matter in U.S. Strategy toward Asia’, Brookings (April
2014), accessed on 23 May 2018. ttps://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2014/04/21/pivot-
rebalance-or-reinvigorate-words-matter-in-u-s-strategy-toward-asia/.
13
Michael Mazza, ‘US in the Asia-Pacific: toward a more effective Asia strategy’, American Enterprise Institute
(2015), cited in Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 23.
14
Kurt Campbell, Brian Andrews, ‘Explaining the U.S. “pivot” to Asia’, Americas 1 (2013): 2.
15
Amitai Etzioni, ‘The US Retreat from the Middle East and Pivot to the Far East is likely to Intensify’, Defense
and Security Analysis Vol. 30 no. 4 (2014): 305, cited in Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 23.
successfully reached out to its traditional allies, Japan, South Korea, Thailand,
Australia, and the Philippines, and reassured them of continued support. The United
States has also spearheaded a landmark economic project, one of which that is to
be considered as the largest economic deal the world has ever experienced, the
Trans-Pacific Trade Project (TPP). The economic deal will strive to assist the
participant state’s economies toward free-market reforms and also strengthening
these economies through offering different avenues for trade. This is one of the
manifestations of the Obama administration’s effort to maintain its leading role in the
region’s economic order. Nevertheless, out of the 12 countries that are included in
the project, China is not one of them. 16 Thus, as Chan argues, the purpose of the
ambitious trade deal was in fact more about geopolitics shrouded under economics.
17

One of the key intentions of the US’ Asia-Pacific rebalancing is to expand trade and
18
investment in the region. China is leading the United States in this arena.
Compared to the China, the US’ economic preponderance in the region is in decline.
According to the Lowy Institute, China has scored better than the United States
when it comes to economic relationships, especially with reginal trade relations and
in its economic diplomacy.19 Indeed, this is apparent in the region, China is the
leading trading partner with most of the countries in the region. Due to this,
sentiments of the rebalancing of the US to China’s strategic periphery have not been
perceived as friendly, most particularly in China. Many in China believe that the
centrality of the move is to maintain the US’ domination and supremacy in the face of
the former’s rise.20 Indeed, they are not wrong to perceive this. Moreover, the US’
appreciation of the Chinese threat is not a recent perception. It was not always
viewed as negatively as it is now. Many were optimistic of China’s role in the post-
war order after the Second World War. Thus, it is not surprising how China booked a
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, although during that period
China was arguably not deserving of the title great power. Nevertheless, President
Roosevelt even exclaimed that it was vital to keep China as a friend for it had the

16
Ibid, 23.
17
Lai-Ha Chan, ‘Soft balancing against the US ‘pivot to Asia’: China’s geostrategic rationale for establishing the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 71 no. 6 (2017): 568.
18
Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 3.
19
Lowy Institute, ‘Asia Power Index’, accessed on 23 May 2018. https://www.power.lowyinstitute.org.
20
Chan, ‘Soft’, 658.
capacity to become very powerful in 50 years’ time. 21 Therefore, it could be argued
that the rise of China was made possible by the effort of the West to integrate it in
the system. However, it is also important to note that the China they wanted to see
was not the China that became. Nevertheless, despite of the difference in ideology
the United States created the ‘One-China’ policy in clear appreciation of the vast
economic opportunity of having China as a partner.

Today, the Trump administration is more pessimistic on the assertive actions of

China. Trump has repeatedly mentioned that he will impose considerable tariffs on
Chinese exports in clear retaliation for what he believes as Chinese currency
22
manipulation, theft on intellectual property, and protectionism. Indeed, these
threats have borne fruit which some analysts have called a “Trade War” between the
two countries. The Trump administration has imposed tariffs of 25 percent on over a
thousand of Chinese exports worth over 50 billion dollars. 23 On the other hand, China
answered by imposing the same amount of tariffs on over a hundred American
exports.24 Yet, the Trump administration believes that these trade measure are only
necessary to attain fair and reciprocal trade between the two countries. On the other
hand, according to Chan, this is part of China’s soft balancing in the region which
aims to redirect China’s foreign reserves away from US Treasury bonds, which will
25
then reduce the demand for the US dollar. China also feels that it is being
marginalised in its efforts to reform the Bretton Woods institutions. In response,
China has created institutions that are more attractive to emerging economies than
the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. In addition, China has also
created the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an
alternative to the TPP. Likewise, China has created the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
Initiative which aspires to give countries easier access to China which in turn will
spur economic development. It is certain that China acknowledges the danger of it
being too dependent of the US dollar which is also due to its economy being export
oriented. Further, the US has put itself on the disadvantage after it has pulled itself
out of the TPP, which Trump considers as an embarrassment to the American
21
Ikenberry, ‘Rise’, 28.
22
William T. Tow, ‘Trump and strategic change in Asia’, Strategic Insights, Australian Security Policy Institute,
(January 2017): 2.
23
Ali Wyne, ‘The Greater Danger of US-China Trade Tensions’, The Rand Blog (April 2018), accessed on 24 May
2018. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/05/the-greater-danger-of-us-china-trade-tensions.html?
adbid=999777818031546368&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453&adbsc=social_20180524_2369281.
24
Ibid.
25
Chan, ‘Soft’, 659.
working class as he believes it will take jobs out of the US. Thus, the US intends to
pursue bilateralism as the best means to attract trade and investments with it
regional partners in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, this reinforces the argument that
China’s assertiveness is central to the rebalancing strategy of the US in the Asia-
Pacific.

A positive effect of China’s economic miracle is it now has the capability to build up
its military, and it has. The world has seen a steady rise in Chinese military
expenditure which averages in the double-digits annually. 26 Further, the People’s
Liberation Army has seen massive procurements of sea-going vessels which it
intends to use to project influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 27 China has also
adopted a more assertive stance in the issues in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea compared to a more cooperative attitude in the past. However, as
Overholt believes, China’s cooperative attitude was not respected by its regional
partners.28 For example, when the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea was signed in 2002 China adhered to it. The declaration stipulated that
only joint-drilling in disputed waters should be permitted. However, ASEAN
countries, most notably Vietnam, have unilaterally engaged in drilling activities in
waters disputed with China. Nevertheless, the deciding factor can be found in the
sheer vastness of the territory that China claims. Indeed, it can be conceded that
signatories of these agreements might not have adhered to what it exactly stipulated.
However, it is also important to consider that everything China has done is
comparatively gigantic in scale in contrast to the activities of other nations. Thus, the
argument that China is considered as a victim does not justify its island-building
activities in the South China Sea, as well as the other efforts it has employed to
assert its arguable historical rights.

In effect, the United States is also beefing up its military capabilities in the region. In
a statement, the United States will increase its navy’s presence in the region by 10
percent and place 60 percent of its air force’s overseas-based forces in the region. 29
Moreover, military investment in the region has increased – most notably in Japan
and South Korea. Furthermore, the United States and the Philippines signed a new
defence pact which allows more US troop deployments and use of local military
26
IISS, The Military Balance, Routledge (2007): 213, cited in Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 26.
27
Ibid.
28
William H Overholt, ‘One Belt, One Road, One Pivot’, Global Asia 10 no. 3 (2015): 7.
29
Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 26.
facilities.30 Likewise, US Navy ships have been deployed to Singapore. It is no
surprise that China will consider this as a direct threat as most of the region’s trade
passes through the Malacca Strait which is right next to Singapore. An agreement for
a rotating deployment of US Marines to Darwin has also been signed with
Australia.31 Indeed, the US military’s growing involvement in the region is the most
evident aspect of the rebalance strategy. However, these increased manifestations
of hard power in the region should not be catalyst for war. The key thing, according
to Ikenberry, is that China may be able to overtake the US, but it will be unable to
overtake the whole Western order.32 Indeed, China might be the leading economic
partner in the region, but it is the United States who is leading in defence partners.
Therefore, even though China is dominant in the economic sphere, the US is still the
hegemon in terms of security in the region. 33 Further, due to the complex
relationships in the region, any disputes in the region will likely be resolved through
diplomacy rather than open conflict.

In conclusion, the argument of many pundits and scholars of an ascendant and

assertive China being the main catalyst for the United States’ strategic decision to
rebalance in the Asia-Pacific is therefore accurate. The US cannot allow China to
change the regional order that it has established after the Second World War.
Moreover, although China’s financial institutions look more attractive to emerging
economies, the regional order that has been established has deep foundations which
makes it difficult to overturn. The narratives that the US used to describe its shift in
foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific has evolved to strike a more appropriate meaning,
devoid of any false interpretations and perceptions, to its regional partners.
Moreover, the US stresses that it has not left the Asia-Pacific region. The US will
pursue bilateral agreements with its regional partners, most especially with China,
that will foster equal and reciprocal trade between the shareholders. Although China
has been muscle-flexing in the Asia-Pacific, any unilateral action that will result in
open conflict is not advantageous and any disagreements would likely be solved
across the table.

30
US Secretary of Defense Speech, ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’, McCain
Institute, Arizona State University, (April 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1929
cited in Law, ‘Rebalancing’, 25.
31
Ibid.
32
Ikenberry, ‘Rise’, 36.
33
Chan, ‘Soft’, 659.
References

Acharya, Amitav, ‘Consociational Security: Avoiding the Struggle for Mastery in

Asia’, Harvard Asia Quarterly 16.2 (2014): 1-25.

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5 (September – October 2005): 18 -24.

Campbell, Kurt, Andrews, Brian, ‘Explaining the U.S. “pivot” to Asia’, Americas 1
(2013): 1-9.

Chan, Lai-Ha, ‘Soft balancing against the US ‘pivot to Asia’: China’s geostrategic
rationale for establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Australian
Journal of International Affairs Vol. 71 no. 6 (2017): 568-570.

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Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Open Door Policy’, in Encyclopedia Britannica

(December 2017), accessed 23 May 2018. https://www.britannica.com/event/Open-
Door-policy.

Etzioni, Amitai ‘The US Retreat from the Middle East and Pivot to the Far East is
likely to Intensify’, Defense
and Security Analysis Vol. 30 no. 4 (2014): 305.

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Jentleson, Bruce W. ‘Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21 st-Century National

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Law, Tim, ‘Rebalancing what, exactly?: Analysing the united States’ Pacific Pivot’,
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danger-of-us-china-trade-tensions.html?
adbid=999777818031546368&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453&adbsc=social_20180524
_236928

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