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CRIMINAL LAW 2
I. M. Gutierrez III
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
LAUREL v. MISA
BENGZON, J. / 1947
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United
States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with
the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over
to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the
respondent Director of Prisons.
The legality of the petitioner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of the United
States is now beyond question. 1 His present incarceration, which is merely a continuation of
his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his delivery to the
respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides in part as follows:
"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the
Commonwealth Government, the Office of the Special Prosecutors shall receive all
records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the
United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political
prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as
speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . . And,
provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one
hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as
they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are
concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court,
but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal
delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."
In view of this provision, and the statement of the Solicitor General that even on the date the
petition was presented his office had, ready for filing, an information charging herein petitioner
with treason, we fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed.
PAGE 1 OF
ISSUE: WON CA 682 violates the Constitution for being discriminatory, an undue
delegation of power and retroactive. NO.
RATIO:
It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being made operative
only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not denied the six-hour
limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is unexcusable
and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws.
It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate—so long as the classification is not unreasonable. 2 Instances
of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then is whether the
differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary.
One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte
(December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who voluntarily given aid, comfort
and sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to hold them in restraint for the
duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine Government for
its judgment upon their respective cases." When active hostilities with Japan terminated,
General MacArthur ordered the delivery to the Commonwealth of all the prisoners in
theretofore taken under his said proclamation. There were 6,000 in round numbers. The
problem was momentous and urgent. Criminal informantions against all were , or a
majority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the six-hour
period. They could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions of peace and
order, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of his
emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or
internees, having found such suspension necessary "to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and the
investigation, prosecution and disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that it
shall be in force and effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later
approved Commonwealth Act No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the Office of
Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national security
committed during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared
with the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months.
The Legislature chose to give the prosecutor's office sufficient time to investigate and to file
the proper charge—or discharge those who m it may find innocent. If time had not been
granted, the prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees
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indiscriminately: reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the liberation of those it –Ryan Oliva
may think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nor
desirable. We will allow that there be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of the PEOPLE V. PEREZ
extension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to decide. The only issue is the power
to promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and so TUASON, J. / APR. 18, 1949
long as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be careful not to deny it.
FACTS:
There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the suspension of article 125  Susano Perez was in the business providing the Japanese soldiers “comfort
is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid women” during the war
delegation of legislative powers; for as explained by the Solicitor-General, the result—some  Perez was then convicted of treason
informations filed before, afterwards—is merely the consequence of the fact that six thousand  Perez contended that the deeds committed did not constitute treason
informations could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one  The Solicitor General submits that the furnishing of women for immoral purposes
else, necessarily the last." The law, in, effect, permitted the Solicitor General to file the was treason because it kept up the enemy’s morale
informations within six months. And statutes permitting officers to perform their duties within
certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of legislative power. ISSUE: WON Perez’s deeds constitute treason
HELD: No they do not constitute treason
Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers to detention
after its passage-not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive RATIO:
statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure.  To be treasonous to the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and be
The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the Revised directly in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs
Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and,  The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactive intercourse between the invaders and the natives
and fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have o The occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations
asked for release after six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from of all sorts between the invaders and the natives
custody.(Raquiza vs. Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, it  Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend
is true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States
operation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from  Whatever benefit the enemy got from his undertakings were trivial, imperceptible
enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for and unintentional
duration of the war." So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable  However, Perez may still be punished for the rape of the women he brought to
collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal the enemy as principal by direct participation
Code. o Without his cooperation, these rapes could not have been committed
Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Had
it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on constitutional principles, as he –Ramon Parel
could claim no vested right to the continued enforcement of said section. 4 Therefore, a fortiori
he may not complain, if, instead of repealing section, our lawmaking body merely suspended PEOPLE V. PRIETO
its operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension TUASON, J.
must be general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding
classification and the equal protection of the laws. FACTS:
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 Eduardo Prieto (appellant) prosecuted for 7 counts of treason at the People’s Court. He
entered a plea of guilty for counts 1,2,3, and 7 and pleaded not guilty to counts 4,5 and 6
 Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows
 Count 1.
 Accused, being a member of the of the Japanese police and acting as an
undercover man with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy, led, guided and accompanied a patrol of Japanese
soldiers to apprehend guerillas and locate their hideouts apprehended
Abraham Puno and upon apprehending him, he was tied up and given fist
blows; thereafter Puno was taken away to the detention camp and was tortured
and detained for 7 days
 Count 2.
 Accused acting as an informer once again led, guided and accompanied a
group of Japanese soldiers and undercovers for the purpose of apprehending
guerillas and guerilla suspects. The accused and his companions were able to
apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Mariano Ponce from their house. Accused
and his companions then tied their hands behind their back and proceeded to
give the m fist blows on the face and body. They were then detained at the
Kempei Tai Headquarters. Guillermo Ponce was released the following day but
Mariano Ponce was detained and thereafter wasn’t seen or heard from again
 Count 3.
 Accused acting as an undercover led, guided and accompanied a patrol of 6
Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers for the purpose of apprehending guerillas
and guerilla suspects. The group apprehended as suspects Damian Alilin and
Santiago Alilin who were then detained and tortured for 6 days and that on the
7th day were executed.
 Count 7.
 Accused along with several other Filipino undercovers and with conspiracy with
the enemy caused the torture of Antonio Soco and the death of Gil Soco
 As to Count 4 Two witnesses gave evidence and testimonies, but their statements do not
coincide on any single detail.
 The first witness, Albano, testified that the accused with other Filipino undercovers
and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and that the witness had to carry
the American to town pulled by a carabao afterwhich he was taken to the Kampei
Tai HQ
 The second witness, Cuison, testified that he saw the accused following an
American whose hands were tied and that he saw the accuse strike the American
with a piece of rope.
 Counts 5 and 6 were dropped due to a lack of evidence to have them sustained
PAGE 3 OF
 The People’s Court found accused Eduardo Prieto guilty of on count 1, 2, 3 ,4 and 7
and was sentenced to death
 The Lower Court found him guilty of treason complexed by murder and physical
injuries regarding the murders and physical injuries not only as crimes distinct
from treason but also as modifying circumstances.
 The Sol. Gen agrees with the lower court except for the technical designation of
the crime which in his opinion should be a “complex crime of treason with
homicide”
ISSUES:
 Is appellant guilty of Count 4, satisfying the 2-witness principle?
 Are the acts of murder, physical injuries and torture, distinct and separate from the
crime of treason and are these acts also considered modifying circumstances? Is the
appellant guilt of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries or simply guilty of
treason?
HELD:
 Appellant is not guilty of Count 4.
 The execution of the other acts mentioned (murder, torture, physical injuries) are not
offenses separate from treason. Therefore, he is only guilty of treason.
RATIO:
 Appellant is not guilty in Count 4 since it fails to satisfy the 2-witness principle
expressed in the treason law.
 The witnesses referred to two different occasion and were unable to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it
 The execution of some of the guerilla suspects and the infliction of physical injuries
are not offenses separate from treason
 Under the Philippine Treason Law and under the US Constitution defining
treason there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not constitute treason
 In the nature of things the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action.
 This deed may be, and often is a criminal offense
 When the deed is charges as an element of treason it becomes identified with
the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or be used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty.
 Exception to the rule: If the government decides to prosecute the culprit
specifically for these crimes instead of relying on them as an element of treason.
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 It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as an element of treason that
they cannot be regarded separately general denomination
Judgment:
 1 aggravating circumstance of the brutality used in killing and torturing the victims
and 1 mitigating circumstance of entering the plea of guilty
 Appellant is found not guilty of Count 4 and guilty of treason in counts 1.2.3 and 7
accompanied by one aggravating and one mitigating circumstance.
–Jecky Pelaez
PEOPLE V. ADRIANO
TUASON, J. / 30 JUNE 1947
FACTS:
• Apolinar Adriano, a Filipno, was convicted for the crime of treason by adherence to
the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines as a member of the Makapili.
• Several witnesses gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizures of
personal property and performed sentry duties and military drills, but they all
referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses
coinciding in any one specific deed.
• The witnesses agree on only one item – that Adriano was a Makapili and was seen
by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.
ISSUE: Does the evidence in the present case meet the two-witness test?
HELD: No.
REASONING:
The mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the
enemy and giving him aid and comfort. It is not necessary that the dependent actually went to
battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen.
But to prove membership as a Makapili, the deposition of two witnesses to the whole overt act
is necessary.
Our law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so, turning to the American Constitution,
we would find that although criticisms have been raised against the two-witness rule as being
severely restrictive, the provision was in fact, adopted to make the prosecution of treasonous
acts difficult. The law is intended to give suspects a certain degree of protection given the
difficult circumstances during times of war.
PAGE 4 OF
JUDGMENT: Without the corroboration of two witnesses on the same overt act, the
convicted is ACQUITTED of treason.
–Raina Quibral
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO and SARAW
MALCOLM, J. / FEBRUARY 27, 1922
FACTS:
• On or about June 30, 1920 a boat left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. In the boat were eleven men, women, and children, who were
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-
four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too
for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch
boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes
were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these
people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were
Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were
able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
ISSUES:
• WoN Lol-lo and Saraw they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy
• WoN the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force
HELD:
• Yes. they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy
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• Yes. Those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines
RATIO:
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. It cannot be contended that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the
crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
• It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating
to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United
States. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime
of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited
meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but
only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands. Under the construction
above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. Those provisions of the
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in
the Philippines.
–Sam Rosales
PAGE 5 OF
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZ
PER CURIAM / MARCH 20, 1985
PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JAIME RODRIGUEZ
alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-
appellants.
FACTS:
 At night, Two or three hours after departing from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on
August 30, 1981, about 25 miles from the port, the vessel M/V Noria 767 has
been attacked by several armed men.
 On board the vessel were several traders and crew members.
 Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles,
started firing indiscriminately towards the passengers.
 The passengers and the other crew members were ordered to throw overboard
sacks of copra and some dead bodies. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed
with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
 About 10am of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four
appellants were able to secure pumpboats.
 They ordered the skipper to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases
which were full of money. The appellants boarded the pumpboats bringing with
them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of
water and some meat, as well as rifles.
 The Municipal Health Officer went aboard the vessel when it arrived at Cagayan
de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf 10 dead bodies.
ISSUES:
(1) death penalty should be imposed to the accused-appellants despite their plea of guilty;
YES
(2) accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; YES
(3) there was conspiracy YES
REASON:
1). Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides that the
mandatory penalty for piracy with the following circumstances … is death:
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 Rape, murder or homocide
 when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves,
 when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel
The plea of the defendants cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance because death
penalty is a single indivisible penalty. art.63 of the RPC states that single indivisible penaltIES
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
2.) The testimonies of 2 witnesses show that Peter Ponce fired his weapon indiscriminately at
the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and after the looting
and killing, he, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat
3.) The conduct of Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a
circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a
consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.
Decision: AFFIRMED.
–Fredda Rosete
PEOPLE V. SIYOH
ABAD SANTOS, J. / FEBRUARY 18, 1986
Certiorari
FACTS:
 Julaide Siyoh, Omarkayam Kiram, Namli Indanan, and Andaw Jamahali were
accused of qualified piracy with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder.
 On 14 July 1979, the accused, armed with weapons fired their guns into the air to
stop the pump boat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio, and
Antonio de Guzman were riding.
 De Guzman et al. were traveling merchants who were on their way to Pilas Island.
They obtained their wares from Alberto Aurea whom they promised to repay once
they have earned their profits.
 The group took lodging at Kiram’s place. Kiram and his companion Siyoh
transported the merchants from one island to another in order for them to sell their
goods.
PAGE 6 OF
 Prior to the unfortunate incident, de Guzman saw Kiram and Siyoh talk with the
other two culprits during one of their trips.
 On the day of the incident, Kiram (who was the boat operator), stopped upon
hearing the two gunshots. Another boat containing Indanan and Jamahali closed
into the boat containing the merchants. De Guzman and his companions were
robbed of their personal belongings and profits amounting to a total of PHP
18,342. In fact, one of the culprits took fancy on de Guzman’s pants that the
latter had to surrender it.
 The victims were later told to jump into the water where the accused fired at
them. Only Antonio survived.
 While waiting for the port for the bodies of his dead comrades, Antonio saw
Kiram and Siyoh (one of them was wearing Antonio’s) pants. The two were
immediately arrested while Indanan and Jamahali remained at large.
 The two apprehended culprits argued that they had no intention of robbing the
merchants. If they did, they should have done it while they were providing them
with food and lodging. Likewise, they denied assisting the other two in robbing
the merchants on their pump boat.
ISSUE: WON the two are guilty of piracy.
HELD: Yes, because the felony was committed over water.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 The claim that they did not know the other two culprits was rejected
because de Guzman had seen them talking with one another prior to
the ambush.
 The claim of the accused that they could have just robbed the
merchants inside their home was untenable since it would cause too
much commotion. Likewise, doing it during transport from one island to
another lessens the chance of them being caught and makes it easier
to dispose of the bodies.
Decision: The lower court found them guilty yet it also considered the provision
stated in section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, which recommended
life imprisonment instead of the death penalty because of their illiteracy,
ignorance and extreme poverty.
–Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
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CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
UMIL V. RAMOS
PER CURIAM
Nature: Petitions of Habeas Corpus
Summary:
The case involves 8 petitions of habeas corpus:
(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos; (2-3) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and
Montano; (4-5) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.; (6) GR 83162, Ocaya
and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.; (7) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes; (8) Nazareno v.
Medina, et al.
The respondents, in their respective Returns, assert that the privilege of the writ is not
available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of
valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations
filed against them are null and void.
The Court found, in its careful review, that the detainees have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus. It invoked Section 5, paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which justifies arrests without warrant.
“(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just be committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x”
And based on the records of the case, it shows that the detainees had freshly committed or
were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without warrant
were clearly justified.
FACTS:
(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos
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Based on a confidential information, CAPCOM found that a member of an NPA was being
treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. On verification, they found Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA, and responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before.
He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood
of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers in the car.
He was charged of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority,
docketed with no bail. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioners and a returns
were filed by respondents. With Dural were Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva, who, the
latter two, posted bail and was released.
(2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano
When Wilfredo Buenaobra was apprehended, he admitted that he was an NPA courier and
he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.
Amelia Roque, on the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission
(NUFC) and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister.
She was also in possession of ammunition and fragmentation grenade for which she had
no permit or authority to possess.
How these two were arrested were as follows. One Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of
the NPA, who surrendered to the military gave the latter information about his comrades
and also the location of a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino, which is used as
a safehouse of the NUFC and CPP-NPA.
Because of this, the house was placed under surveillance and pursuant to a search
warrant, they found several items in the house. Constantino, confronted, could not produce
any permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunitions, etc. Hence, he was arrested
and although he refused to give a written statement, he admitted that he was a member of
both NUFC and CPP.
Later that night, Buenaobra arrived and was accosted, readily admitting tthat he was a
regular member of the CPP/NPA. Among other items found in his possession was a piece
of paper containing information about Amelia Roque. From this lead, they went to the place
written in the paper, presented themselves as military, and was able to search, even
without warrant, the premises. The place was another safehouse and Roque admitted that
the documents found belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no
knowledge of them.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both Buenaobra and Roque.
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(3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.
Both arrived at the house of Constantino, which was still under surveillance. The military
agenst noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, they found them to be
carrying loaded guns. They also found a bag containing subversive materials. In both sets of
items, no permit or license to possess or carry were produced. Hence they were arrested.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both Anonuevo and Casiple, alleging that
they were unlawfully arrested without warrant and that the information filed against them are
null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation.
(4) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.
With a search warrant issued by the Judge of RTC of Pasig, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Command conducted a search at the house of Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. During
the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived with Danny Rivera. With them were found subversive
documents and firearms. As regards the firearms, since Ocaya could not produce any license
or permission to possess them, she, along with Rivera, were arrested.
Petition for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of the two.
(5) Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Roque alleged that the firearms and ammunitions
were “planted” by the military agents to justify the arrest.
(6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes
Espiritu claims that about 5am, he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of
men wanted to hire his jeepney. But once he came down, he was immediatel arrested. When
he asked for a warrant of arrest, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type
jeep. Upon petition for habeas corpus, the respondents claim that the detention was justified
in view of the Information filed against him. and that when he was arrested, he had in fact just
committed an offense that afternoon during the press conference but gave the lawmen the slip
when he was about to be arrested.
(7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.
Regala, arrested for killing, pointed to Nazareno when the former was questioned. Because of
this, Nazareno was also arrested without warrant. When Nazareno posted bail and petition for
habeas corpus, both were denied by the judge of the RTC.
PAGE 8 OF
ISSUE: WoN the arrest of the petitioners without warrant was justified.
HELD: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI:
(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos
The writ, concerning Umil and Villanueva, is already moot and academic and accordingly
dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has
been released on bail.
As to Dural, although he was arrested not during the commission of the crime but a day
after, his arrest without warrant not, as a whole, unjustified. The reason is that, as a
member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization, his offense is considered
continuing. Subversion, being a continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as
at can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested, that of being a member.
Furthermore, with the criminal case against him for “Double Murder, etc.” and in its
conclusion he was found guilty of the charged and sentenced accordingly, the writ of
habeas corpus is therefore no longer available to him.
(2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano
The contention of respondents that petitioners are officers and/or members of the NUFC of
CPP was not controverted or traversed. Hence, it must be deemed admitted. For the same
reasons as (1), their arrest without warrant was justified. Furthermore, as regards Roque,
her arrest without warrant was also additionally justified because she was, at the time of
arrest, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.
(3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.
Their arrest without warrant was justified because they were carrying unlicensed firearms
and ammunitions when they were apprehended. There is also no merit in the contention
about the information since, under Sec 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
“Sec 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.—When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the RTC the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer, or fiscal
without a preliminary investigation x x x”
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Both refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of RPC, in which case, no
preliminary investigation was conduction. After the informations had been filed however, they
also didn’t ask for such investigation. Hence, they cannot now claim that they have been
deprived of their constitutional right to due process.
(4) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.
Vicky Ocaya’s arrest without warrant is justified because at the time of the arrest, she was in
flagranti delicto. (There is no decision regarding Rivera)
(5) No evidence was given by the petitioners regarding this and that there was no ill-
motive on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting
officers in this cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. The arrest was not a product
of witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in
the reel movements. Furthermore, the petitioners, when arrested, were neither
taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a cap, but were arrested in such time,
place, and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were
up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
(6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes
Peittioner’s release upon petition of habeas corpus was unwarranted because his arrest wan
in accordance with Rule 113, Sec 5 (b) of the RoC and that the petitioner is detained by virtue
of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas
corpus, though bail may be allowed. But the bail must be lowered from P60k to P10k because
it is much too high.
(7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.
Nazareno’s arrest without warrant was justified. The judge’s decision was based on facts of
the law and so this Court will not disturb the same. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the
same greounds exist to elieve that the person sougth to be detained participated therein.
PAGE 9 OF
(8) The rule barring petition for habeas corpus is this—that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court. Every phase and
aspect of the petitioner’s detention must be inquired by the court—from the
moment the petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes
upon the merits of the petition and only after such scrutiny can the court satisfy
itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied
and this is exactly was the Court has done.
DECISION: The petitions are all DISMISSED except GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim.
–Kaye Tamayao
PEOPLE V. BURGOS
FACTS:
On May 12, 1982, Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, stating that he was forcibly recruited by Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA,
threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Immediately upon
receipt of said information, a team of PC-INP units was dispatched at Tiguman, Davao del
Sur to arrest Ruben Burgos.
Right in the house of the acused, the latter was called by the team and was
asked about his frearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied
possession of said firearm but later, the wife of the accused pointed to a place below their
house where the gun was buried. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise
pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of
cogon, at a distance of 3 meters apart from his house.
From his farm, the military personnel brought the accused to the PC Barracks
where he was interrogated and tortured, forcing him to admit ownership of the gun. Finally,
the accused yielded and was made to sign an extra-judicial confession.
ISSUE: Was the arrest of Burgos without a valid warrant lawful?
HELD: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
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There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed
by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of the appellant’s
arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was
he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his
field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. In arrests without a warrant, it
is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime first. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. In this
case, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok’s verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime, they were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on
the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an
arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened
or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful.
–Yan Yu
MILO V. SALANGA
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
FACTS:
• Petitioners allege that the 42 warrants issued by several judges, for the search of
persons and the premises of their offices or warehouse and for the seizure of
documents regarding business transactions related in the investigation of the
petitioners violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue
Code and the Revised Penal Code.
• According to the petitioners, the search warrants should be declared void since they
appear to be maliciously obtained and contravene the Rules of Court regarding such
matters.
o The warrants are not specific in describing the objects that need to be
searched.
PAGE 10
o The issuance of the warrants was a “fishing expedition,” an attempt to
find evidence against the petitioners regarding deportation cases filed
against them.
o Searches and seizures were done in an illegal manner and objects
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants.
o Money was seized even though it was not part of the warrants.
• According to the respondents, the warrants were validly obtained, the petitioners
gave consent to the search thereby curing any defect which may afflict the
warrants, and the evidence gained due to the warrants may be used as evidence
in court.
ISSUE: (1) WoN the warrants issued were valid,
(2) WoN if invalid these warrants can be used as evidence in court
HELD: (1) NO, (2) NO
RATIO:
• The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
• There should be probable cause before the warrant can be issued by the court
and the warrant should specifically or particularly state what it orders to be
seized.
• When the warrants were issued, there was no probable cause since it is obvious
that the reason for the warrants were too broad. Violating the RPC or laws such
as T and C Laws or Central Bank laws are to broad and thereby there is no
knowledge of which specific violation the court has in mind to charge the
petitioners.
• Stating that all papers and documents regarding all business transactions of the
petitioners should be seized makes the warrants general warrants and therefore
these are invalid. The overbroad reach of the warrants contravenes the Rules of
Court stating that such warrants should state particularly the thing to be seized
so as to avoid power-tripping interpretations.
• Regarding the second issue, seizures which are obtained against the
Constitution may not be used as evidence in court. There is an exclusionary rule
in Philippine jurisprudence to disallow the use of evidence unconstitutionally
obtained.
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– Carlo Alojado
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF
ESCOLIN, J. / DECEMBER 26, 1984
PARTIES: JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS
MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs.THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.,
respondents
FACTS:
 Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
 The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11
members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which
conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.
 It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not
have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant
may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
PAGE 11
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants are maliciously obtained. YES.
HELD:
 The SC finds petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar,
the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
 Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are
continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement
for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
 In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified
RULING:
The search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on
December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.
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– Wes Aquende
PEOPLE V. MANDORIAO
PEOPLE V. BAES
FACTS:
The Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Lumban, Laguna charged Villaroca,
Lacbay and del Rosario with an offense against religion for compelling him, with the use of
force and threats, to let their funeral pass through the former’s churchyard. The plaintiff
argued that it was notoriously offensive because the deceased was not a member of his
congregation but was in fact with the Church of Christ. When the case was filed in the
municipal court, it was dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. The priest filed an appeal.
ISSUE: WON the accused committed the felony charged
HELD:
Yes. The dismissal of the case in the municipal court was due to the fact that the fiscal left out
one important detail in the complaint – that the churchyard belonged to the church and that
the area was devoted to religious ceremonies. Whether or not the act was notoriously
offensive is a question of fact and should be judged according to the feelings of the Catholics
and not those of other faiths. The case should be remanded to the lower court, let the fiscal
file the complaint with the said additional facts.
MORAN: Because the churchyard was owned by and devoted to the religious ceremonies of
the said church, the use of the area for the funeral with ceremonies of another religion is
offensive. If it were similar to the churches in Manila where the yards were used by any
pedestrian or vendor, then the accused would not have been guilty.
LAUREL: Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Two elements must be present: (a) the
acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the
celebration of any religious ceremony; and (b) that the acts were notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. The acts were performed in the “atrio” or “patio” which, in Spanish,
means an open space, therefore not devoted to religious ceremonies. Also, offense to
religious feelings should not be made to depend on the narrow conception of a certain religion
– it should be gauged in view of the nature of the acts committed and through the mirror of an
unbiased judicial criterion.
– Anna Basman
PAGE 12
PEOPLE V. TENGSON
ESGUERRA, J. / MARCH 1, 1971
FACTS:
o Alfonso Tengson, a minister of the sect “Christ Is the Answer,” was asked to
perform a religious service by Leopoldo Cepillo because of a deceased family
member. Tengson and his assistant Olegario performed the religious rites in the
house of the deceased and in the barrio chapel.
o Since the family members already obtained a permit from the Roman Catholic
church to bury the deceased in the Roman Catholic cemetery, they proceeded
there after holding the religious service in the chapel.
o In the unfinished chapel in the cemetery, Tengson performed a religious rite
before the deceased was buried.
o He was sued for violating Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code or for performing
acts offensive to the feelings of a particular religion.
ISSUE: WON Tengson and Olegario performed acts notoriously offensive the feelings of a
Christian or a Roman Catholic faithful.
HELD:
No. The elements of the offense penalized in Art. 133 are:
(1) Acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or
during the celebration of any religious ceremony.
(2) The act must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in their religion.
In this case, the first element is present even if the act was done in an unfinished chapel
since it is still devoted to religious worship. However, the second element was not
satisfied. For an act to be notoriously offensive, it must be directed against a religious
practice for the purpose of ridicule.
Their act of performing burial rites in accordance with their religious sect is not notoriously
offensive provided that there was no intent to mock a particular religion. Their act might
have offended the Roman Catholic priest or some Catholics in that place but since there
was a burial permit, the religious rites are not offensive to the feelings of everybody who
professes the Christian faith.
JUDGMENT: Appellant was acquitted.
–May Calsiyao
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OF 141

PEOPLE V. NANOY
FERNANDEZ, J. / 1972

FACTS:
In 1969, during the afternoon services of the Assembly of God, Epifanio Nanoy entered the
chapel. He was apparently drunk. Nanoy attempted to grab the choir leader, Levita Lapura.
She ran away from him. He caused such a scandal that the members of the sect ran out the
door and their religious services were discontinued. Nanoy allowed himself to be escorted out
by one of the members. The accused was later found guilty of the grave offense of Offending
Religious Feelings under Art. 133 of the Penal Code.

ISSUE: Is Nanoy really guilty of the offense of Offending Religious Feelings?

HELD and RATIO:

No. Nanoy’s act does not constitute the said offense, but is in fact unjust vexation. It is clear
that there was no intention on his part to actually disrupt the services, and he simply made a
grab for Mrs. Lapura. This is shown by his willingness to be escorted out by one of the
members.

(In other words, he’s no inquisitor, just a perv. :P)

–Judith Cortez
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
ENRILE V. SALAZAR
NARVASA, J. / 1990
DOCTRINE: There is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder,
that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion
(People v. Hernandez).
FACTS:
On February 27, 1990, Senator Enrile was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued on the same
day by Judge Salazar charging Enrile, together with the spouses Panlilio (the only reason they
are included is because they served food at the Enrile household!) and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. Hence, Senator Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The prosecution alleges that Enrile’s case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because:
1. the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as
a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
not in furtherance, of rebellion
2. there is a distinction between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48, RPC, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the
compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply
ISSUES:
1. Is the Hernandez ruling still good law? YES.
2. Did Judge Salazar issue the warrant for Enrile’s arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause? YES.
3. Was a petition for habeas corpus the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? NO.
PAGE 14
HELD/RATIO:
First Issue
In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive
enough to warrant a complete reversal. Two other options were presented (and rejected):
1. abandon the Hernandez ruling
2. hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character
This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, President Aquino, exercising her
powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, Presidential Decree No.
942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by
enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code. The President in effect
by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law.
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. The information
filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable
phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Second Issue
Merely because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period
within which to comply with his duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could
not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Third Issue
The criminal case before Judge Salazar was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was
beyond the ability or competence of Judge Salazar — indeed such an assumption would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts.
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JUDGMENT: The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People v.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The
proceedings are remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail.
–Jahzeel Cruz
ENRILE V. AMIN
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. / SEPTEMBER 13, 1990
FACTS:
• Prosecution alleges that the Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by
giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything
to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the
petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No.
1829 and rebellion charges (RPC)
• He was charged with rebellion and violation of PD 1829 Sec 1 (c) (obstruction of
justice.)
• Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the case but Judge Amin denied the
motion on the theory that there was probable cause to hold Enrile liable for violation
of PD 1829.
ISSUE: WON Enrile could be charged for violation of PD 1829 separately, given he was
already charged with rebellion
HELD:
The charge for violation of PD 1829 should be quashed; alleged violation is absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes
RATIO:
• Apply Hernandez ruling: “the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom”
• All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
PAGE 15
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes
in themselves
–Steven Dayag
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODOLFO DASIG, ET.AL.
NOCON, J. / APRIL 28, 1993
REBELLION
Art. 134 RPC. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from
the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives. (as amended by RA 6968)
Art. 135 RPC. Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion
or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
(as amended by RA 6968)
(note:only the relevant portion of Art. 135 have been included in this citation of the
provision. Note also the difference between the penalty provided here and that of the
case)
NATURE: Appeal
FACTS: Police Officers Manatad, Tizon and Catamora were assisting in canning the
traffic. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility, Manatad manned the traffic and Catamora
acted as back-up. Catamora saw 8 person acting suspiciously. Two of these 8 persons
proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle. A series of
shots were issued by the other group which caused the death of Manatad. Thereafter, the
assailants fled from the scene. Nu ez was identified as one of the assailants.
On Aug.16, 2 teams of police officers conducted a surveillance on a suspected
safehouse of members of a sparrow unit (a liquidation squad of the NPA). Here they
captured Nu ez and Dasig. However, while attempting to escape, Dasig was shot and was
brought to the hospital. Here, he availed of the services of Atty. Parawan who was
requested by the military as Dasig did not have a lawyer. Also he was appraised of his
constitutional rights before the interrogation started. He then confessed that he and the
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group of Nu ez killed Manatad and that they were members of the sparrow unit. This extra-
judicial confession was signed and sworn to by Dasig.
During the course of the proceedings, Nu ez died thus extinguishing his criminal
liability. Dasig was convicted of murder with direct assalt.
ISSUES:
Main Issue: WON Dasig is guilty of rebellion or murder with direct assault to a person in
authority
Other Issues:
1.WON the taking of his extra-judicial confession was legally defective which violated his
constitutional rights.
2.What is the penalty to be imposed?
DECISION:
Main Issue: Guilty of Rebellion
Other Issues:
1. No violation of constitutional right
2. 8 years of prision mayor and to indemnify the family of Manatad
REASONING:
Main Issue:
Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other
means (Art. 135, RPC). Dasig did not only voluntarily confess his membership with the
sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. The
sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. Thus, the killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed
in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer (a person in authority) is a
mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge.
Other issues:
1. The evidence clearly shows that Dasig during his investigation was properly
informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his
intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person
of Atty. Fortunato. It was also shown that Dasig voluntarily subscribed and swore to his
confession which was couched in the visayan language, a language known to him. It is a
settled jurisprudence that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
PAGE 16
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency – which were not proven in this case.
2. Art. 135 of the RPC imposes prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000 to
any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, there is no evidence
that Dasig headed the crime committed. He merely participated in committing the act, or
just executed the command of an unknown leader.
–Tim Guanzon
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO
KAPUNAN, J. / NOVEMBER 29, 1995
FACTS:
1. Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was killed when a man suddenly walked
beside him and shot him in the head. The man was with three companions, one
of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After
taking the latter's gun, the 4 boarded a tricycle and fled.
2. Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder and police informant, was 9 meters away
when he witnessed the event. He said he knew both the victim and identified the
man who fired Elias Lovedioro, his nephew. He said that Lovedioro was identified
as a member of the New People's Army.
3. An information charging Lovedioro of the murder was filed before the RTC which
later found him guilty of murder.
4. Lovedioro asserts that he should be guilty of rebellion and not murder.
Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. He also
claims that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the
liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a
participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted
only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
5. According to the Solicitor General the crime committed by appellant may be
considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the
motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive
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ends." Moreover, he contends that even if appellant is convicted of rebellion, and
even found guilty merely of as a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable
penalty is not prision mayor reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187
as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion
temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a
rebellion.
ISSUE: Whether Lovedioro is guilty of murder or rebellion? If he is found guilty of rebellion,
should the penalty be prison mayor?
HELD: Lovedioro committed murder and not rebellion. The penalty should be reclusion
temporal. The trial court's decision dated is affirmed, in toto.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,
rebellion is committed in the following manner:
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of
the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
The crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government which by
its very nature is essentially a crime of masses involving crowd action. Another aspect in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are absorbed in the
crime. The decisive factor is the intent or motive to commit rebellion. Any ordinary act,
however grave, done with the intent to rebel assumes a different color by being absorbed in
the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. The theory of
absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses
under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the
crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
In the this case the evidence for the Lovedioro merely contains self-serving
assertions and denials not substantial enough to show political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. Nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did he mention that
PAGE 17
he was an NPA. Allegations relating to accused membership in the NPA surfaced almost
merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he
knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony,
Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. In
addition, no specific act that caused the killing of the policeman was ever given by the
accused. The victim being an informant was never sufficiently proven.
–Blanca Labay
PEOPLE V. CABRERA
FACTS:
• The Phil. Constabulary (PC) vowed revenge on the Manila Police for the alleged
arrest of one of the women in the household of a PC soldier and the death of a soldier
in an encounter between the two forces.
• Seventy-seven soldiers escaped from the barracks through a window. These soldiers
went on a shooting spree that killed 2 policemen and wounded 2 civilians. It ended
when the officers came to round them up from the streets.
• Two cases were filed: one for sedition (where they pleaded guilty) and one for murder
and serious physical injuries (where they pleaded not guilty).
• They were found guilty on both cases. The defendants appealed.
ISSUES / HOLDINGS / RATIO:
• WON fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions that
the court admitted as evidence.
NO. It was alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the
impression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to
Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they did
because of a desire to leave Manila; that others stepped forward "for the good of the
service"; while still other simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the
remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and
their declarations were sometimes taken in a language which was unintelligible to
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them. The court, however, believes that these confessions contain the statements that JUDGMENT: GUILTY of sedition and murder and serious physical injuries. THEY put
they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That such was barricades to block the entrance then shot at ever policemen that went to intramuros
the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been to see the barricades.
successfully impeached.
REMEMBER: Sedition does not absorb other offenses.
• WON conspiracy between the accused is essential to the crime of sedition
– Felman Magcalas
NO. Conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. The court, however,
proceeded to expound on this issue. Common design is required to prove conspiracy. It
is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which
was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of US V. TOLENTINO
resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was
followed. Therefore, there is conspiracy among them. FACTS:
 On May 14, 1903 Aurelio Tolentino staged his Tagalog theatrical work entitled
• WON it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party
“Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas”, written by him, at the Teatro Libertad
a public functionary in order for him to have violated the Treason and Sedition Law.
 This public staging of the drama happened less than 2 years after the
NO. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in establishment of the Civil Government by the Americans
the State. Act No. 292 penalizes all persons inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the
 It is contended that this Tolentino uttered seditious words and speeches and
person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or
make scurrilous libels against the US and Insular Government which tend to
Municipal Government for the crime of sedition. The Treason and Sedition Law makes no
incite people to rebellion, instigate others to meet together for unlawful purposes,
distinction between the persons to which it applies.
create hatred of the government, endanger public peace and order, among
others
• WON the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused.

NO. The prohibition against double jeopardy is against a second jeopardy for the same
ISSUE: WON this staging constitutes inciting to sedition or is merely a literary or artistic
offense. To entitle a defendant to plead successfully former jeopardy, the offense charge
production
in the two prosecutions must be the same in law and in fact. In this case it is obvious that
sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime not the same offense as
murder. The offenses charged in the two cases for sedition and murder are perfectly
distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of act. The gist of HELD: Tolentino is guilty of inciting to sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission; the manner and form as well as the time during which the play was
the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in
staged clearly shows that it is more than mere artistic production
order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate
and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in Provision summarized in the ruling:
several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that
the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that
gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were section, viz:
not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could not (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches;
have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
(2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands;
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(3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office;
(4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes;
(5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots;
(6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community, the safety and order of the Government;
(7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
 Considering the context of the times, the play did in fact tend to instigate people to
meet for unlawful purposes, and suggest or incite people to rebellious conspiracies
and riots, and disturb the peace and safety of the community and the government
 After nearly 2 years there were still embers of hatred smoldering in the hearts of
some people which need only suggestion of this manner to fan into flames of open
revolution
 During this time the Hong Kong junta of Aguinaldo was still plotting to overthrow the
civil government and was ready to pounce at the opportune time to start rebellion
ISSUE: WON it is sufficient to prove any one of the different modes of committing the offense
charged herein
HELD: Yes; since it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the work tended to instigate
others to meet for unlawful purposes, suggested or incited people to rebellious actions, among
others, then Tolentino is guilty of the offense charged
 well-settled rule that where an offense may be committed in any of several
different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the
offense committed in any one of them, provide that it be such as to constitute the
substantive offense
– Mico Cruz
PAGE 19
ESPUELAS V. PEOPLE
BENGZON, J. / DECEMBER 17, 1951
FACTS:
• Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in
truth he was merely standing on a barrel
• After securing copies of his photograph, he sent copies of the same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines and
abroad for their publication
• Along with the photographs, he sent a suicide letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by one Alberto Reveniera
• The letter, addressed to Reveniera’s supposed wife contained his displeasure
towards the Roxas administration
• Some important parts of the letter:
- “if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I
was not pleased with the administration of Roxas”
- “and if they asks why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to
them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio
Guillen and the banditry in Leyte”
- “write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis”
- “Tell the children to burn pictures of Roxas”
- “I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo
all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self”
ISSUE: Whether or not the words contained in the letter constitute scurrilous libel
(punishable under Article 142 of the RPC- Inciting to Sedition)
HELD: YES. The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
RATIO:
• It not only calls the government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested
with Nazis and Fascists but the communication also reveals a tendency to
produce a feeling of dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition
to remain loyal to the government
• The publication suggests rebellious conspiracies or riots and tend to stir up the
people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition
groups who may seek to silence the writer
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• It is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas
officials (by virtue supposedly of his mention of Juez de Cuchillo which to the
layman is the Law of the Knife; that the idea intended by Espuelas was the bloody,
violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of
Roxas and his men)
• Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to
weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public
peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of peace
but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself
• If it be argued that the letter does not discredit the entire governmental structure but
only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that the article punishes not only
libels against the government but also “libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof.”
TUASON, J., Dissenting:
• the message which the accused herein caused to be published contained no libel or
criticism against the instituted system of government as distinct from the
administration
• the gist of the message was that the author was desperate and was going to kill
himself because many of the men in government were following the practices of
absolute and despotic rulers in other parts of the world
• he pretended to have decided to kill himself because he was impotent to remedy or
suppress this deplorable state of affairs
• far from advocating the throw of government or change the present scheme of
polity. The article evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country
and its institutions
• the article was but a statement of grievances against official abuses and
misgovernment that already were of common knowledge and which more influential
and responsible speakers and writers had denounced in terms and ways more
dangerous and revolutionary
JUDGMENT: Conviction was affirmed.
–Joy Montes
PAGE 20
MARTINEZ V. MORFE
FERNANDO, J. / MARCH 24, 1972
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
- Manuel Martinez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, was arrested for
falsifying his date of birth in his certificate of candidacy. He claimed he was born
on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June
20, 1946. He was on his way to attend the sessions when he was arrested.
- Fernando Bautista, Sr., is the duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functions
of such office on June 1, 1971. Two criminal complaints against him were filed
with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet by Moises Maspil, a
defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th. The complaints said that he violated
Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that he gave and distributed free food,
drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings in Benguet, one held in Sablan and
the other in Tuba.
- Petitioners prayed that the warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on
the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates,
ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as construed
together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from
arrest.
- Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor; Bautista’s
alleged crimes are below prision mayor.
ISSUES:
- Are they immune from arrest? NO.
- Can they invoke the RPC, which says that Article 145 would impose upon any
public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special
session, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? NO.
RATIO:
Their reliance on the constitutional provision, supplemented by what is provided for in the
RPC, is futile. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does
not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is
a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any
breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit
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language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation, they cannot claim DISPOSITION: Dismissed.
immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a
provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on –Ryan Oliva
November 15, 1935.

- INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: On December 4, 1934, upon its PEOPLE V. QUIJADA

being considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so
that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." He defended
his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary
immunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary
immunity to members of the various state legislatures of the Union.
The history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of
the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into
these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government
places every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set
of persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. The
State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claim
privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim rivileges is
due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must also
remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal. Any
crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers
the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of the
principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. Also, in the Williamson case (US), it was
decided that the immunity from arrest would apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature.
- In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a
public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest
or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative. It is to be
remembered that the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the
present Constitution in 1935. The latter states: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such
laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution."
DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUL. 24, 1996
FACTS:
 Dec. 25, 1992 – at a benefit dance, a fist fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy
and Quijada as Quijada was annoying Diosdado’s sister, Rosita
 Dec. 30, 1992 – in another benefit dance, Rosita saw Quijada approach
Diosdado from behind and shot him. Diosdado was rushed to the hospital but the
injury sustained was fatal
 It was found out that the firearm used was not licensed and that per certification
issued on Apr. 26, 1993, Quijada was not a duly licensed firearm holder
 Quijada was charged by the Regional Trial Court of two offenses, murder under
Art.248 of RPC and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under PD
No. 1866
ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court’s judgment be sustained charging Quijana with 2 separate
offense
2. WON the trial court’s judgement is a violation of the constitutional mandate
against double jeopardy
HOLD:
1. The judgment of the trial court should be sustained in order to uphold the letter
and spirit of the laws considered
2. The judgment does not constitute double jeopardy as it talks about offenses
under different laws
RATIO:
 It is undisputed that Quijana committed murder and that he used an unlicensed
firearm
 To uphold the judgment means to uphold and enchance the lawmaker’s intent in
aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an unlicensed firearm
is used in the commission of murder or homicide
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 The offenses charged with are under different laws, the first under the RPC and the
second under a special law, therefore the bar against double jeopardy does not
apply
 Murder and homicide are mala in se while illegal possession of firearm is
a malum prohibitum
 The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense (not act)
 The 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD No. 1866 doesn’t intend to treat the illegal
possession and resultant killing as a single integrated offense of illegal possession
with homicide or murder
 This connotes that the killing is not the original purpose or primary
objective of the offender
 The wording of the 2nd paragraph is: “If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.”
 The killing, which requires a mens rea, is the primary purpose, and to
carry that out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm
 The unequivocal intent of the 2nd paragraph is to respect and preserve homicide or
murder as a distinct offense penalized under the RPC and to increase the penalty of
illegal possession of firearm where such firearm is used in killing a person
 There was no intention on the part of the lawmakers to repeal or modify
Art. 248 & 249 of the RPC
 The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the 1st
paragraph of Sec. 1
 The 2nd paragraph should not be considered as a qualifying circumstance of
homicide or murder because it was the intention of the lawmaker to include the term
“penalty” in the subject provision in order to mean to be the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder
– Ramon Parel
PEOPLE V. FELOTEO
SEPTEMBER 17, 1998
Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Br. 47
FACTS:
 May 6, 1993, the victim, Sonny Sotto and his friends, Arnel Abelada and Johnny Abrea
were walking along the highway on their way home after having had a few drinks earlier
that day. The group was in a playful mood as Abelada was playing “habulan” with Sotto.
PAGE 22
 The accused, Wilfredo Feloteo then appeared at the opposite side of the road and
walked past the two companions of Sotto. The accused was armed with an armalite
rifle. The two companions recognized the accused but did not pay much attention to
him as they were playing “habulan”. Without uttering a word, Feloteo aimed the
armalite at Sotto and fired, killing Sotto.
 The firearm used in the incident belonged to SPO2 Roman Adion. On May 6, 1993,
Adion went to the house of Teofisto Alaquin bringing with him his service firearm, an
M-16 armalite rifle. He spent the night in Alaquin’s house but was awoken by his host,
informing him that his gun had been stolen. The two men immediately looked for the
thief. Shortly after, the two men heard a gunshot coming from a distance of about
400m and the two men rushed towards the origin of the gunshot. They saw Sotto lying
on the road with a gunshot wound to the chest.
 SPO2 Adion suspected that his armalite was used in the shooting and continued his
search for the accused. AT 5:00 a.m. the next day, he nabbed the accused and
thereafter, the accused surrendered the armalite to him.
 SPO4 Jose Ansay, Chief of the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP of the province
of Palawan affirmed that the accused, Feloteo was not duly licensed to carry firearms
 The accused Feloteo gave a different account of the incident claiming that he denied
having stolen the armalite of SPO2 Adion and further alleged that the shooting of
Sotto was an accident. He averred that on May 6, 1993, he was at his sister’s house
when SPO2 Adion invited him over to the place of Teofisto Alaquin. When they arrived
at Alaquin’s house, Frank Adion dropped by the house and borrowed SPO2 Adion’s
tricycle. Frank Adion returned later on foot and told SPO2 Adion that his tricycle’s
engine broke down. SPO2 Adion then left to check on his tricycle leaving the armalite
and telling Feloteo to wait for him there. Shortly after that, Feloteo decided to follow
SPO2 Adion, taking with him the armalite. Walking along the road he saw Sonny Sotto
and his group and in jest he pointed the gun at Sotto and shouted “Boots, Don’t get
near me, I’ll shoot you.” And pulled the trigger. The accused claimed that he was
unaware that the gun was loaded and when Sotto was shot he fled but was caught the
following day after which, he told SPO2 Adion that he accidentally hit Sotto.
 The trial court found Feloteo guilty and convicted of the crimes of Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearm
ISSUE:
 The Trial Court erred in convicting the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm as a
separate criminal offense
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HELD:
 Yes, the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused of two separate crimes Murder and
Illegal Possession of Firearm when he should only be convicted for Murder with the
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
RATIO:
 Appellant Sotto was convicted of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and for Illegal Possession of Firearm under Section 1 of P.D. 1866
 Section 1 par. 2 of PD 1866 provides
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed
 Republic Act no. 8294 amended the PD reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated
forms of illegal possession of firearms
 RA 8294 provides the following
 Sec. 1 par. 3
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such
use of unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance”
 Sec. 5
Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm – the term unlicensed firearm shall
include:
 Firearms with expired licenses or,
 Unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of a crime
 Clearly the provision states that when an unlicensed firearm is used in consonance with
the crime of murder or homicide, such use of the unlicensed firearm shall merely be used
as an aggravating circumstance
 The enactment of RA 8294 may be given retroactive effect as it favors the appellant
 The appellant Sotto is therefore only liable for murder under the Revised Penal Code and
in view of the amendments introduced y RA 8294, the use of the unlicensed firearm in
killing the victim, Sonny Sotto is no longer considered as a separate offense, instead it is
considered as an aggravating circumstance only
FACTS:
• January 11, 1972 – Ernesto Alvarado and Calixto Urbi were riding a jeep and upon
passing Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted demeaning words pertaining to
their mother. The two ignored Beltran but reported the incident to Mayor Bienvenido
Quirolgico of Ballesteros, Cagayan. The Mayor told the Chief of Police that something
should be done about the rowdy Beltran and his companions, the others co-accused.
• The Mayor’s group went to the Puzon Compound to talk to Beltran and his
companions. Upon arriving in the Compound, there was a simultaneous discharge of
gunfire, which resulted in the death of Vicente Quirolgico (the Mayor’s son), and
injuries to the Mayor himself and a patrolman. Beltran and his companions were
charged with murder.
• Beltran gave an opposing story saying that he was on duty as a guard of the
compound and it was in fact the Mayor’s group which started firing and he merely
retaliated. The other appellants denied having to do with the incident.
• The trial court took the side of the prosecution after appreciation of the opposing
testimonies and convicted Beltran and the others of Murder. They appealed.
ISSUE (relevant one): Whether or not Beltran and his companions are guilty of the crimes
of direct assault.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Art. 148 of the RPC provides the two ways of how direct assault is committed: 1) by
employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining crimes of rebellion and sedition; and 2) by attacking, or employing force or by
seriously intimidating, or seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on the occasion of such performance.
Both instances should be without public uprising.

Generic aggravating = possession of firearms Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties
– Jecky Pelaez to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants
are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on the Mayor and the Patrolman is
PEOPLE V. NARVASA correct.

NOTE: Actually, the issue on direct assault is only the fifth assigned error by the
appellants. This is more a case of who gave a more credible testimony and who should be
PEOPLE V. BELTRAN
RELOVA, J. / 13 SEPTEMBER 1985
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believed by the court. The other five issues are also important in discussing the merits of this
case.
• The denial of the appellants on their participation in the crime cannot prevail over their
positive identification. The postmortem examination on Vicente also shows that several
firearms caused his wounds.
• There was a clear showing of conspiracy. The sequence of events that transpired from
the time the jeep passed the Puzon compound, their subsequent attack on the Mayor’s
party and attempts to flee the scene established the presence of conspiracy.
• The aggravating circumstance of event premeditation and treachery is also appreciated
since the time between 9:00 pm and 12:00 midnight gave ample time to the appellants to
mediate and reflect on their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the
Mayor, which they failed to do.
• Beltran cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense since the three
requisites (CRIM 1!) to invoke this was not present.
• The appellants should however be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender as in fact they presented themselves to the authorities. But this is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
– Raina Quibral
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEDRO DOLLANTES
PARAS, J. / JUNE 30, 1987
FACTS:
• Marcos Gabutero was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. There was a dance was held in said barangay in the evening of
April 21, 1983; while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the
dance, Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance
movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and
challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay
Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm. Accused Hugo Grengia held
the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the
hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. The accused Grengia then told Dionilo,
PAGE 24
"Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." Then
Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and Immediately thereafter,
accused Hamlet Dollantes, rushed towards the Barangay Captain and stabbed
the Barangay Captain at the back. The other co-accused also took turns in
stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not
armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused participated in
the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died,
the accused in this case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay
Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain
suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which
happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending
physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim
died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."
ISSUES: WoN Pedro Dollantes and the other accused are equally guilty of the complex
crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder”
HELD: Yes. They are guilty of the complex crime of “Assault upo a Person in Authority
Resulting in Murder”."
RATIO:
• the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify
Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed
to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the
case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay
captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If
in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority."
• Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of conspiracy. He pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the
incident. and that he had no participation in the commission ofthe felony except
the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to wrest the knife
from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy. The lower court
finds him equally liable as principals with the other accused in this case. He and
some of the other accused were found to be holding stones which they threw at
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the store owned by the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking and dancing
around the dead body of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter
succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do
not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan”, and while the
victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telling people not to listen to the
victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted that
although he was a compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he
was being stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the victim's family.
– Sam Rosales
ALBERTO V. DELA CRUZ
CONCEPCION, J. / JUNE 30 1988
PARTIES: ALBERTO vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of
Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents.
FACTS:
On September. 1968, Gov. Armando Cledera asked Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial
warden, to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house in Taculod (then
leased by the province and used as an official guest house).
Eligio Orbita, the Provincial Guard, handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the
Governor's house and was especially charged with the duty of keeping them under custody
and vigilance
Orbita left one of the prisoners, Denaque, unguarded while in the barrio. The prisoner
escaped.
Orbita was prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner
Orbita’s counsel claimed that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the Gov’s
note so Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense and should be
included as defendants
PAGE 25
The judge of CFI of Camarines Sur ordered an investigation. The Fiscal absolved both
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda
Eligio Orbita filed an appeal to the CFI which then ignored the findings of the Fiscal and
ruled that the governor and Esmeralda also be charged.
The Fiscal appealed to the SC
HELD:
1.) should Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda be included as defendants in
the case? NO. THEY WERE NOT charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and
the detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor.
2.) Were Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda guilty of connivance under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code? NO Gov. Cledera’s note to Jose Esmeralda
asking for five men to work in the guest house does not mention the names of the
prisoners to be brought there; it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to
compose the work party. There was no connivance or consenting to evasion.
3.) Did Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda violate Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code (ie., have they been negligent in their duties)? NO If there is any
negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the custody and guarding
of the prisoners
Relevant provisions
In issue 2: ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public officer who shall
consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished
Issue 3. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the public officer in whose
custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion,
amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.
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DECISION: The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case.
ADDL INFORMATION:
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum period to
prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person who shall
remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the
escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the
prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the
same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
The offense may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or
penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape.
To remove means: to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without
the active compensation of the person released.
To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means: to furnish
that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitates
his escape.
If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for
infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal
Code.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The case against Cledera and Esmeralda, if there is a prima facie case against them, can be
prosecuted separately and does not have to be included in the case against Eligio Orbita.
– Fredda Rosete
PAGE 26
TANEGA V. MASAKAYAN
SANCHEZ, J. / FEBRUARY 28, 1967
Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS:
 Adelaida Tanega was convicted of slander and was sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor as well as to indemnify the offended party Pilar Julio the amount of
PHP 100.
 The CFI of Quezon City directed that the sentence be set on January 17, 1965.
However, it was deferred to February 12 upon the petioner’s motion.
 Tanega failed to show up on the said date resulting in the respondent judge to
issue an alias warrant of arrest on March 23, 1965. However, Tanega was never
arrested.
 On December 10, 1966, Tanega, through aid of counsel, moved to quash the two
warrants on the ground that the penalty had already prescribed.
 Judge Masakayan ruled that “the penalty imposed upon the accused had to be
served” and therefore rejected the motion. He then issued another alias warrant
of arrest.
ISSUE: WON Tanega’s penalty had already prescribed.
HELD: No, prescription of penalties applies only to those who had been imprisoned in
the first place.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Under Art 92 of the RPC, a light penalty such as arresto menor shall
prescribe after one year from its imposition by final sentence. The
succeeding article provides that the prescription of penalties “shall
commence from the date when the culprit should evade his service of
sentence.”
 But Art. 157 of the RPC explains that Evasion of Service of Sentence
applies to any convict who shall evade service of his sentence during his
term of imprisonment. It elements would include:
1) The offender is a convict by final judgment.
2) He is serving his sentence, which consists in the deprivation of his
liberty.
3) He evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
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 From the foregoing, evasion of service applies to one who is fugándose mientras estuviere sufriendo privación de libertad por sentencia
serving a sentence and is different from evading a service of a firme; x x x.”
warrant.
 Prescription only begins to run once the convict escapes
confinement. That being the case, Tanega cannot invoke ISSUE:
prescription in her favor since she had yet to serve her
WoN the translation of Article 157 of RPC from Spanish to English was erroneous such
sentence.
that the interpretation must be construed as including destierro.
Judgment: Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition were denied.
HELD: Yes.
– Pat Sadeghi - Tajar

RATIO DECIDENDI:
PEOPLE V. ABILONG
MONTEMAYOR, J. The error lies in the translation of the phrase “sufriendo privación de libertad” used in
Spanish. Although destierro does not constituted imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
NATURE: Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
Hence, the Court finds and holds that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of
FACTS: sentence under Art 157 of RPC.

Florentino Abilong had been convicted for attempted robbery and was sentenced to destierro,
prohibiting him to enter any place within 100km from the City of Manila. However, he went DECISION: Affirmed.
beyond such limits and committed vagrancy. Abilong pleaded guilty upon arraignment and
was sentenced a penalty in pursuant of Art 157 of RPC. From this judgment, he appealed
from the decision on the ground that said article does not cover evasion of service of PERFECTO, J., Dissenting:
destierro. Article 157, they contended, refers only to person who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty. The contention was based on the word Although “privación de libertad” cannot be equated to “imprisonment”, Perfecto says that
“imprisonment” used in the English text of said article. this phrase, if applied solely, and which obviously include destierro, obliterated the
grammatical, logical, ideological function of the words “fugándose” and “by escaping”.
“Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence.—The penalty of prisión correccional in its Whatever meaning we may want to give the words “privación de libertad”, it has to be
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade
conditioned by the verb “fugándose”. “Privación de libertad” cannot be considered
service of his sentence by escaping during the terms of his imprisonment by reason of
independently of “fugándose”.
final judgment.”
There also doesn’t seem to be any sense in escaping from a sentence of destierro. “To
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, countered that had the original text of the RPC been
escape” means “to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free,
in English, then the theory of the appellant could be upheld. However, it is the Spanish text
or get clear from or out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from
that is controlling in case of doubt.
prison”.
“Article 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia.—Será castigado con prisión correccional
en sus grados medio y máximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, The diesterro imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to
stay in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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outside the country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he
is in any confinement from which he could escape.
Article 157 of RPC, therefore, is not applicable in this case. However, the act of the appellant
cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the sentence of destierro may be
punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up to the six months is provided.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal
Code, by an increase in the evaded penalty.
At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve.
BRIONES, J. concurs with the dissent.
– Kaye Tamayao
TORRES V. GONZALES
FACTS:
Sometime before 1979, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa. On April
18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to petitioner by the President of the Philippines on
condition that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law.” Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement.
However, evidence shows that on March 22, 1982 and June 24, 1982, Torres had been
charged with 20 counts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial. Record also shows
that on June 26, 1985, Torres had been convicted of the crime of sedition; this conviction was
then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. A letter from the National
Bureau of Investigation also showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last 20 years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other
forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives, malicious mischief and others. On September 8, 1986, the President
cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. Thereafter, Torres was arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
ISSUE: Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
PAGE 28
HELD:
Yes. What is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a
subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is
involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking
that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” for purpose of
reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. A convict granted
conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offenses can be imposed upon
him. Since Article 159 of the revised Penal Code defines a succinct, substantive, felony,
the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be
charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed in article 159.
However, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
who is alleged to have breached the condition of his pardon, the executive department has
2 options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64(i) of the revised Administrative
Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . Here,
the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64(i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
CRUZ, Dissenting Opinion:
Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies
the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still
necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a
crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered
to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by the
accused but by the judge.
The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to
prove it through indubitable evidence. To allow the President to determine in his judgment
whether or not a crime has been committed is an encroachment on judicial functions. The
courts are the only branch of the government which has exclusive jurisdiction under the law
to make a pronouncement on the conviction of an accused.
– Yan Yu
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PEOPLE V. DIOSO

PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEOFILO DIOSO and

JACINTO ABARCA, defendants-appellants

FACTS:
• Teofilio Dioso – convicted by final judgment of robbery.
• Jacinto Abarca – convicted by final judgment of homicide.
• Both Dioso and Abarca were serving their sentence in New Bilibid Prison in Munitglupa,
Rizal.
• While in prison, Dioso and Abarca became members of the Batang Mindanao Gang.
• A clash between Batang Mindanao and their rival gang Happy Go Lucky, resulted to the
death of one Balerio from the BM gang.
• In retaliation, Dioso and Abarca conspired and killed members of HGL gang Angelito
Reyno and Fernando Gomez. While Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the
prison hospital, Abarca stabbed Gomez and Dioso attacked Reyno with a knife. When
Gomez was dead, Abarca helped Dioso to finish off Gomez. Abarca and Dioso rushed
out of the ward when they met Prison Guard Aguilar. Both gave themselves up and
surrender their weapons.
• Both accused entered the plea of guilty.
• Circuit Criminal Court’s Ruling: Both guilty of murder aggravated by aleviosa and
sentenced to death

ISSUE:
• WON the death sentence should be imposed even though the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender with plea of guilty is present.

HOLDING AND RATIONALE:

• Death sentence could still be imposed because they are both quasi-recidivists.

JUDGMENT:
• But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the death
sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.

− Giselle Muñoz
−
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HELD: No. The requisite elements for the crime are:

 That the offender makes in a document false statements in narration of facts;
The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him/her;
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST The facts narrated by him are absolutely false; and
That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
PEOPLE V. KONG LEON
In this case, there was no criminal intent. As a lawyer, she was fully aware that her
presence in the court and appearance as counsel will be entered on record which shows
that there was no intent to hide it. Beradio made those representations in the DTR having
DEL ROSARIO V. PEOPLE in mind that the only purpose of the document was to determine the appropriate pay she
should receive for the given month. Since she was given clearance by her office to
perform her lawyerly duties and she appeared as counsel de officio in these instances,
what she was doing was public service which is even better than spending her 30 minutes
PEOPLE V. GALANO for coffee break. Also, she was only 2 meters away from office which is closer than where
other employees would usually go for snacks. Clearly, it was not presumptuous of her to
think that she deserved a whole day’s pay for the times she went to court. (Note:
COMELEC has a separate office – COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers – where its
PEOPLE V. ROMUALDEZ employees render free legal assistance to the public because some of them have nothing
better to do).

BERADIO V. CA
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Beradio was an election registrar of COMELEC and was thus required to keep a daily time
record (DTR) for the Manila office. During her incumbency, she got a clearance from her
office to appear as counsel in a Pangasinan RTC (2 meters away from her office) for her
cousin and cousin-in-law. Upon learning about this, Raymundo Valdez filed an administrative
complaint against Beradio for unauthorized practice of law. When the latter learned that
Beradio already resigned from office, he decided to file a criminal case against Beradio for
falsification of public documents claiming that on seven instances, Beradio made it appear in
her DTR that she was in office and was performing her duties when, in fact, she was in court
appearing as counsel for her clients. Beradio put up the defense that she was only away for
at most 45 minutes which she deemed equivalent to the coffee breaks she was allowed to
take.
The facts narrated in the DTR were also not “absolutely false”. There is some color of truth
in her claim because, the nature of her job is her exposure to field work, and, as
mentioned, she got a clearance from COMELEC and it would be impossible for COMELEC
not to consider the special circumstance of their employees who they even encourage to
render the services already being rendered by Beradio. Thus, even if she was frequently
out of her office, she was still working for the office which should be, as it is, reflected in her
DTR.
[Beradio, may even be exempted from filling out the DTR because she is covered by the 3rd
exemption (see page 579).]
– Anna Basman
LUAGUE V. CA
ABAD SANTOS, J./ FEBRUARY 22, 1982

ISSUE: WON Beradio is guilty of falsification of public documents. FACTS:

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Iluminado Luague is a teacher clerk who was on sick leave. The day before he died, the
principal visited him at the hospital and informed his wife that she can get Luague’s paycheck
from Florencio Guillermo to pay fro the hospital expenses. His wife, on that day, went to
Guillermo and signed the name of her husband. She was handed a treasury warrant which
she used to pay for the medical and funeral expenses.
She was tried and found guilty by the lower court of falsification. She appealed, saying that
she signed in good faith, believing that heirs of deceased government employees are entitled
to whatever unpaid salaries the deceased employee failed t receive.
ISSUE: WON good faith can be a valid defense in falsification?
(What is the effect of good faith to the crime of falsification?)
HELD:
The court sustained the appellant’s claim of good faith. Because of her good faith, criminal
intent is therefore absent. It was also found out that the government sustained no financial
loss due to the encashment. The absence of the damage is an element to be considered to
determine whether there is criminal intent. Lastly, since a compassionate attitude is urged,
the appellant Pilar Luague is acquitted.
– May Calsiyao
PEOPLE V. CABIGAS
JULY 3, 1987
FACTS:
Cabigas and Reynes were both public officers employed as Securities Custodian and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, a government-
controlled corporation.
The bank’s Fund Management Department delivered to them 112 pieces of treasury notes
and treasury bills worth Php 46 Million, for safekeeping. A copy of the Securities Delivery
Receipt (SDR) was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the original of the same was
retained by the pair.
Later, in the course of their inventory, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six treasury
bills worth Php 3 Million. Reynes corrected the SDR and Cabigas noted that it was an
“adjustment of erroneous entry.” Then, upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the
incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram. Meanwhile, Cabigas prepared his own
PAGE 31
report where he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills were in his possession at the time
of the preparation of said report.
Some time after, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central
Bank of the Philippines a Treasury Bill from the batch delivered to Cabigas. Upon
investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram
negotiated the said treasury bill with a company. Further investigation revealed that the five
missing Treasury Bills were also negotiated by Pigram to secure a loan.
Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, they were
arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt
and the Daily Report. Cabigas was convicted and Reynes was acquitted.
ISSUE: Is Cabigas guilty of “Falsification of Public Document”?
HELD AND RATIO: NO. First of all, the said felony has four elements:
The offender makes a document where he states untruths as a narration of facts;
He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts he narrated
The facts he narrated are absolutely false; and
The perversion of truth was made with the intent of injuring a third person.
In this case, the Daily Report that Cabigas made was not an official form of the bank. The
form was his own initiative. Ergo, he was under no legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts he narrated.
Further, The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual
number of Treasury Bills under custody was not falsification, as it was a correction made to
reflect the true number of bills. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if
there was no asterisk or footnote, which Cabigas actually put in the document.
Last, immediately upon discovery of the loss, Cabigas and Reynes reported the matter to
their immediate supervisor and the Branch Manager. This shows good faith and lack of
motive to conceal the said loss.
– Judith Cortez
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PEOPLE V. SENDAYDIEGO
AQUINO, J. / JANUARY 20, 1978
FACTS:
 Three cases on malversation through falsification were joined; the prosecution holds
that Licerio Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and
Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six forged
provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund a total of
Php 57,048.23
 Provincial Voucher No. 10724, which supposedly evidences the payment of Php
16,727.52 to Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for hardware
materials supposedly for repair of the Barrio Libertad bridge and another road, was
proven falsified, as evidenced by:
 The fact that there was no project for the repair of the Barrio Libertad
bridge
 The construction company never having received the alleged sum, and
consequently, the non-delivery of materials
 The fact that the signatures of several engineers in the issue voucher
were forged
 The imprint of the rubber stamp used being different from the genuine one
 The fact that the number of the charge invoice that refers to the payment
was actually issued by the construction company to a Mountain
Agricultural College, not the provincial government
…and others that have to do with forged signatures
 Five other provincial vouchers supposedly evidencing payments of certain amounts
to Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware for the supposed repair
of other bridges were also found to be falsified.
 Samson, who represented the construction company in dealings with the provincial
government, used to work at the provincial treasurer’s office. He handcarried the six
forged vouchers to be recorded by the ledger clerk at the provincial engineer’s office
and to be signed by the provincial treasurer and auditor.
 Sendaydiego, as treasurer, paid the amounts covered by the vouchers to Samson in
cash. He said he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that they were genuine,
as they had previously been signed by the other officials. Samson, for his part,
denies that it is his signature that appears on the vouchers, a fact refuted by
Sendaydiego.
 Sendaydiego, Samson, and Quirimit were charged with malversation through
falsification. Sendaydiego and Samson were found guilty, and Quirimit was
acquitted. On appeal, Sendaydiego died. His question of the propriety of the
PAGE 32
reclusion perpetua as the punishment and his claim that there is no complex
crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence were
rendered moot by Sendaydiego’s death. The court also dispelled his notion that
the trial was rigged with bias.
ISSUES:
1. Was guilt beyond reasonable doubt established with regards to Sendaydiego and
Samson acting in conspiracy with each other? YES.
2. Was the expert opinion of the handwriting expert enough to overthrow the
assumption that Samson was not the author of the falsification? NO.
HELD/RATIO:
 The fact that Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of his assistant, when
procedure dictates the reverse, points to conspiracy, because the assistant was
made to believe that his signature would merely be ministerial if it was already
signed by his superior. Also, the fact that Sendaydiego made the payment to
Samson in cash also points to conspiracy, because had the company received
the checks, it would have returned them as there was no reason why the
provincial government should be issuing them. Lastly, the assistant treasurer
testified that the payments were made in the treasurer’s inner office. Therefore,
there was collusion between Sendaydiego and Samson to execute the criminal
design.
 Further, conspiracy to defraud the government was determined to be present
given that Samson and Sendaydiego had conflicting stances: the former claims
that he did not sign the vouchers, while the latter says he himself signed them in
good faith. The fact that Samson hand-carried the vouchers contradicts his claim
that he did not sign them (otherwise, if he really didn’t sign them, and was not
aiming to commit malversation, he should have seen if the signatures on the
vouchers were really his).
 Although the handwriting expert testified that the signature on the six vouchers
was found not to be Samson’s, the rule remains that if a person had in his
possession a falsified document and made use of it, taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the forgery and its use are closely
committed in terms of time. As Samson was the one who hand-delivered the fake
vouchers to the different offices of the provincial government, it was logically
concluded that he merely used uniformly a fake signature, so as supposedly not
to implicate himself.
 In terms of penalties, if falsification was resorted to hide malversation,
falsification and malversation are separate offenses, not a complex crime. Each
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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falsification of a voucher and each act of malversation constitutes one crime each.
This is because falsification is not a necessary means to commit malversation, nor
are the two the result of just one act, as the meaning of complex crime
contemplates. Moreover, a private person conspiring with an accountable public
officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.
JUDGMENT: Sendaydiego is civilly liable with his estate, which is ordered to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan with Php 57,048.23, whereas Samson is convicted of six
crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation. In the
service of the 12 penalties, the threefold limit is applied, meaning that the maximum
penalty he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of 12-17 years, or 36-
51 years. Samson is also ordered to indemnify Pangasinan the same amount as
Sendaydiego’s indemnity.
– Jahzeel Cruz
SIQUIAN V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Jesusa Carreon, a 20 year-old resident of Isabela approached then incumbent Mayor
Manuel Siquian to ask for a job. The Mayor informed her that she can work as a clerk in
the Office of the Municipal Secretary
 She was appointed clerk on July 1975; accompanying her appointment is the certification
of the availability of funds addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, which was
issued by the accused mayor
 Previously, the Municipal Council failed to enact a new fiscal budget; thus by law the
previous budget is deemed re-enacted. In this budget there was no opening for clerkship
in the said office, nor was there funds appropriated therefor
 After working for 4 months without getting paid, she approached the Municipal Treasurer
who told her that there were no funds available; thereafter she went to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan where she was interviewed the Provincial Administrator who asked for her
complete appointment papers
 Hereafter, she filed her verified complaint against the accused, addressed to Governor
Faustino N. Dy
PAGE 33
 Accused former mayor contends that there was no criminal intent on his part when he
executed said documents; moreover he adds that he did not take advantage of his
position in executing said document. Lastly, he contends that the document which
states “Funds for the position are available” is not a narration of facts but a conclusion
of law
ISSUE: WON accused mayor’s act constitutes the crime of falsification by public officer
(Art. 171)
HELD: Yes, all the requisites of the felony are present. These are:
1. the offender is a public officer
2. offender falsified a public document by:
 making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
 officer had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of said facts
 said facts narrated by offender are absolutely false
 In this felony criminal intent to gain or injure a third person need not be proven
because the offense being punished is the betrayal of public faith and the
destruction of truth accomplished by falsifying a public document
 Good faith may be considered as a valid defense; in the instant case however, the
Mayor cannot be considered in good faith. He presides over meetings and
deliberations concerning such things as appropriations and the fiscal budget.
Therefore he is aware that there is no opening for the clerkship nor funds appropriated
for said position
 The declaration that “Funds for the position are available” cannot be considered as a
conclusion of law because it is not an application of artificial rules of law to a case in
order to arrive at a conclusion (e.g. There is P1000 deposited in the bank. Therefore
funds are available). To certify the availability of funds, the accused should have
referred to the Fiscal Budget and ascertained if such item exists and funds allocated
therefor.
 Accused is also legally obligated under the civil service rules to declare the truth with
regard to the availability of funds in Civil Service Form No. 203 which should be
signed by the competent authority, i.e. the mayor
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 Lastly, it is clear that the mayor abused his official position by using the influence and
ascendancy imbued by his office to create a false position and appropriation of funds
which he executed in a document
 “Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in
connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or
otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376
(1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who
was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of
Jesusa Carreon.”
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of due process against the accused
HELD: No. The accused was afforded the chance to present evidence but due to his
repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be
deemed submitted
 Thus he was deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial and his right
to adduce evidence on his behalf
 In his petition for change of venue with the SC he also failed to appear; thereafter his
counsel told the court that he was withdrawing representation for his client because said
client already went abroad and has made no contact with him
– Mico Cruz
PEOPLE V. VILLALON
REGALADO, J. / 21 DEC 1990
FACTS:
 Mariano Carrera (complainant) and Severo Carrera are co-owners of a parcel of
land.
 Severo asked Mariano to sign a special power of attorney authorizing Federico de
Guzman to mortgage half of the land which pertains to Severo
 February 13, 1964. The special power of attorney was registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Dagupan.
 However, de Guzman mortgaged the whole land including that of Mariano’s
PAGE 34
 After the expiration of the mortgage without having been paid, the mortgagee
bank foreclosed and sold the land.
 January 1972. The new owner filed for an ejectment of Mariano from the
premises
 March 29, 1974. Mariano filed a case vs De Guzman for complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
 CFI dismissed due to prescription. Mxn for recon denied.
ISSUE:
WON appeal is allowed from the dismissal order
WON estafa thru falsification has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact
WON offense has prescribed
HELD: Allowed.
Dismissal is not an acquittal or based on the merits of the case. Guilt or innocence, not yet
determined.
Estafa thru falsification exists in law and in fact.
In law. Falsification of public document may be a menas of committing estafa; damage not
being an element of the crime. The damage to another is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification. Falsification is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
In fact. Based on testimony of Mariano, de Guzman was supposed to mortgage only the
half portion belonging to Severo excluding Mariano’s.
Offense charged has prescribed.
Art.48. Complex crimes: the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its max.
Falsification is the more serious, punishable by prision correccional.
Crimes punishable by correctional prescribe in 10 yrs from discovery of the crime.
More than 10 yrs between registration of the special power of atty and the filing of the case.
Period commences from registration, not from the time Mariano was being ejected.
Registration in a public registry is a constructive notice to the whole world.
– Steven Dayag
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PEOPLE V. DAVA
PARTIES: MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. & THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents
Art. 172 RPC: Falsification of private individuals and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1.Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document; and
2.Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage,
shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in
degree.
FACTS:
Michael Dava, a holder of a non-professional driver’s license, bumped two
pedestrians causing to the death of one and physical injuries to the other. Due to this, his
driver’s license was confiscated, given to the fiscal of Pasig City and used as evidence in the
criminal case against him for homicide and serious physical injuries arising from reckless
imprudence.
About 3 years after the incident, the brother of the deceased (and at the same time
the father of the one injured) saw Daza driving, knowing fully well that Daza did not have his
driver’s license. Roxas sought the help of the Minister of Defense Enrile who indorsed the
request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).
Two officers of the CHPG saw the car of Dava parked and when he arrived, the
officers confronted him and asked for his license. They were shown a driver’s license with
official receipt issued by the Agency in Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When
asked about the source of his license, Dava said that his officemate had secured it for him. It
was discovered after subsequent investigation that the Driver’s License is a fake and a falsity
because when compared with the Xerox copy of Dava’s license (the one confiscated), the
signatures and the dates of birth did not tally.
Dava was charged with falsification of a public document. The prosecution witness,
Vinluan of the Angeles branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation, stated that although the
PAGE 35
form used of the license was genuine (since the branch had some missing forms that they
could not account for), the signature of the issuing official was fake. Also, he said that
while the form was issued by the Angeles City agency, the license appeared on its face to
have been issued by the San Fernando, Pampanga Agency.
RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed RTC’s decision. However, it was found out that
said court did not have jurisdiction, thus the proceedings were annulled and a new trial was
begun with the Pampanga RTC. The Pampanga RTC also found Daza guilty, which was
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Side issue: Daza alleges that the Pampanga RTC relied too much on the testimony of
Vinluan which should not be given credence since the proceedings in the case were
annulled. This court held that yes, Vinluan’s testimony is inadmissible as evidence, and
may as well be considered as non-existent.
ISSUE: Is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of Daza?
DECISION: Yes. Affirmed.
REASONING: The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in any transaction
are the following:
1. The offender knew that a document was falsified by another person
It was Daza himself who requested his friend, Manalili, to get him a license. He
misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver’s license. His
misrepresentation and the awareness of Manalili that Daza needed a license in his job as a
detailman, induced Manalili to deal with “fixers” in securing the driver’s license. The fact
that it was Manalili and not Daza who dealt directly with the fixers cannot exculpate Daza
since he is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of the
crime.
Having already obtained a driver’s license, Daza knew that it was not legally
possible for him to secure another one. Also, Daza cannot say that that he honestly
believed that Manalili would be able to secure a driver’s license through legal means in
only an hour. The patent irregularity in securing the license was more than sufficient to
arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and
authenticity. Even Manalili testified that he was surprised when the fixer handed him the
plastic jacket of the license a few hours after he had sought the fixer’s help.
2. The false document embraced in Art. 171 or in (1) or (2) of Art. 172
A driver’s license is a public document within the purview of Arts. 171 and 172.
The blank form of the license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished.
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Thus when the document was filled with Daza’s personal data and the signature of the
registrar, although the same was simulated, it became a public document.
3. The person used such document
This is proven by the fact that when Daza was apprehended, the fake license was in
his possession and it was presented to the officer to show that he had a license. Also, since
he is a detailman which entailed the use of a car, it is possible that he used such license.
4. The use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent
to cause such damage
The driver’s license being a public document, the proof of this element has become
immaterial. In the falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
– Tim Guanzon
PEOPLE V. CORTEZ
ERICTA, J.
FACTS:
 On August 10, 1971, accused introduced himself to Elizabeth Reyes as a
BIR agent while she was in her store in Malate, Manila called the “Mindoro House of
Beef”. The accused presented an ID in the name of S. Begunia together with some
BIR papers.
 Cortez told Reyes that he was authorized to examine the books and
receipts of the store. Thereafter, Reyes referred Cortez to her accountant Ms.
Milagros Lontok.
 However, Cortez was asking for a fee of P400 so that he would not
inspect the books and receipts. He claims he was sent out to raise funds for the
Director of BIR.
 On August 12, Reyes went to the BIR where she saw a picture of the real
S. Begunia. She was promised that the real S. Begunia will be presented a day
after.
On August 13 the real Soferacio Begunia with Jose Enriquez went to the store of
Reyes where they planned to catch Cortez.
PAGE 36
 In the morning of August 16 Cortez passed by the store in haste. The
next day Cortez entered the store and inquired about the money. Reyes handed
an envelope containing P30 in marked bills, P20 in unmarked bills and a check
for P150.
 After handling the envelope, Reyes asked clearance but Cortez replied
that he do not have the form. So Reyes got a coupon bond with the letter head of
her store and asked appellant to write the clearance on it. It was at this juncture
that Enriquez grabbed the hand of Cortez and arrested him.
 Cortez refused to give any statement. His hands when examined
showed that it contained fluorescent powder.
 Cortez defense was that he was framed up.
 The lower court convicted him of the complex crime of robbery thru use
and falsification of public and/or official document and with usurpation of
authority.
ISSUE: WON accused can be convicted of complex crime of robbery thru use and
falsification of public and/or official document and with usurpation of authority.
HELD: No. The accused is guilty only of the complex crime of usurpation of authority thru
falsification of a public document by a private individual. Judgement modified.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that it is hardly disputable that accused committed a
crime of falsification of public document by a private individual as well as a crime of
usurpation of authority. However, no robbery was committed.
In order that there is robbery, there should be either violence against or
intimidation. In this case there was no violence and no intimidation. There was no outside
force or act capable of producing fear in the mind of Reyes. When Reyes gave the money
to Cortez she was already aware that the latter was a fraud and that he was about to be
arrested.
– Blanca Labay
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GIGANTONI VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 June 20, 1980 - Gigantoni was suspended from PC-CIS pending charges of gross
misconduct against him in the Sandiganbayan. He received a letter informing him of
such.
 June 30, 1980 – Gigantoni was terminated from office per judgment of the
Sandiganbayan. Gigantoni was not informed.
 Sometime between 1980 and 1981 - Gigantoni became part of the Black Mountain
Mining, Inc.
 May 14, 1981 - as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made
by Black Mountain's officials; he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer
as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he be
shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-
Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981; his real purpose was to
verify some of the travels made by the employees of Black Mountain.
 Officials of PAL charged him with usurpation of authority. Lower courts convicted
him.
ISSUE: WON Gigantoni “knowingly and falsely” represented himself as a PC agent
HOLDINGS / RATIO:
NO. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that
the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. The failure of the prosecution to prove that
petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he
"knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption
of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere
disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that
petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that
official duty has been regularly performed." It is essential to present proof that he actually
knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from
the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not
be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the
accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power
to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he
knowingly was deprived of “. The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused
were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is
PAGE 37
charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information
charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely
representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency
of the Philippine Government."
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the
information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only
because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not
charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the
case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily
made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a
CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information,
that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
REMEMBER: Suspension only affected his authority but not his status.
– Felman Magcalas
LEGAMIA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
ABAD SANTOS, J. / AUGUST 28, 1984
FACTS:
 Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years (1954-1975) when
Emilio died. They had a son, Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes, born on October
18, 1971.
 From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon
was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio
introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
 Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit
Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's
death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was
also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
 For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima
Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's
prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that
which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau
of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local
civil registry and who have not been baptized have one year from the approval of this act
within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Corazon violated the law when she represented herself as Mrs.
Corazon Reyes
HELD: NO. Accused must be acquitted.
RATIO:
 It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife
and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is
married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is
it unduly frowned upon. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and
uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet
none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is
not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural
environment that the law must be construed.
 In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He
introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name
without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for
benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years
PAGE 38
was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to
criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably
had their own Corazons.
JUDGMENT: Decision of the IAC is set aside. Accused acquitted.
– Joy Montes
DIAZ V. PEOPLE
PARAS, J. / OCT. 31, 1990
FACTS:
Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document by the Court of First
Instance
Diaz was a senior clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School
He sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I
He filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, an official
document, as one of the requirement for appointment to the position
In the Form, he swore to the truth of the information found in the Form and indicated the
following:
His highest educational attainment was 4th yr. AB (Liberal Arts) obtained at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950-54
On the basis of what was found in the Form, he was extended an appointment as School
Administrative Assistant I
However, it was found out that he was never enrolled in the schools he mentioned in the
Form as certified by either the Registrar, President, or Executive Director of the schools
The name of Diaz was also not included in all the enrollment lists of college students
submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the
Harvardian and Cosmopolitan Colleges during the period which Diaz claimed to have been
enrolled
Diaz countered by presenting evidence of a transcript of record to show that he took up
collegiate courses at the Phil. Harvardian College
ISSUE:
WON Diaz’s allegation of having been a 4th year Bachelor Arts Student at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges is false
WON Diaz should be charged with falsification of Official Document of Perjury
HELD:
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I.Diaz’s allegation was false
II.Diaz is guilty of perjury
RATIO:
Even if Diaz presented a transcript of record, the records lack the authenticating marks ie.
the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college thus regarding
the transcript as coming from a spurious source
If he had indeed enrolled in the college, he could have presented corroborating pieces of
evidence (such as the testimony of any of his classmates/teachers ) to prove his stay in the
college
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter
Elements of the crime of perjury
The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter
The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath
In the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood
The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose
All the elements are present in the case at bar thus finding Diaz guilty of perjury
 The information against Kottinger charged him of having kept for sale in the store of the
Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures in violation of section 12 of Act no. 277
also known as the Philippine Libel Law
 The Philippine Libel Law provides:
“Any person who writes, composes…sells or keeps for sale, distributes or
exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book or other matter, or
who designs, copies…or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or
print,…shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished…”
 The pictures that were confiscated showed different Filipina women in their
traditional, native costumes
 The prosecution produced no evidence, other than the postcards, to which the
fiscal admitted that these “pictures represented the natives in their native dress.
 For the defendant, a U.P. professor testified that none of the poses in the
pictures were not something he had never observed when conducting studies,
and that the costumes worn were really the true costumes regularly worn by
them
 The trial court found Kottinger guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

– Ramon Parel ISSUE:

 Does the act defendant is charged with fall within the purview of Section 12 of the
OUANO V. CA Philippine Libel Law?
 Do pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in their native dress and as they
appear and can be seen in the regions which they live considered obscene and
indecent?
PEOPLE V. KOTTINGER
OCTOBER 29, 1923 HELD:
 Yes, the act charged falls within the acts enumerated in Section 12.
NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance  No, the pictures are neither indecent nor obscene.

FACTS:
 On Nov. 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the Camera Supply Co. wherein he
found and confiscated post cards which were subsequently used as evidence against the
manager J.J. Kottinger
REASONING:
 The act charged in the information is covered in the enumeration of Section 12 of the
Philippine Libel Law
 The inclusion of the term “or other matter” serves as a catch all phrase that, while
limited to that which is the same kind as its antecedent, is also intended to cover
kindred subjects.
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 Even if the phrase “or other matter” be construed as “or other matter of like kind”,
the pictures and postcards are not so far unrelated from to writings, papers, books
as not to be covered by the general words.
 Even if Section 12 is inapplicable, there are still other applicable articles from the
Penal Code and Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila
 The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in their native dress and as they
appear can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within
the meaning of the Libel Law.
 The word “obscene” and the term “obscenity” defined as meaning something
offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.
 “Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy.
 The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether something is
obscene is:
 Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.
 Another test is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as
an indecency
 Philippine statute does not attempt to define the terms obscene or indecent pictures,
writings, papers or books. But the words “obscene or indecent” are descriptive
enough and are words that are in common use and understood by any person of
average intelligence.
 Whether a picture is obscene or indecent depends on the circumstances.
 “Obscene” as used in US Federal Statutes signifies that form of immorality which
has relation to sexual impurity.
 In a US case the test of obscenity was stated as thus:
“Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,…and where it
would suggest to the minds of the young…thought of the most impure and
libidinous character.”
 Judge Thayer in a US case stated in talking about the test of obscenity:
“…rather the test, is what is the judgment of the aggregate \e sense of the
community reached by it? What is its probable, reasonable effect on the
decency, purity and chastity of society…”
 There are in the US in circulation, as well as other countries, illustrations similar to
the questioned photographs in this case and also publications of the Philippine
Government that have similar illustrations.
 A National Standard has been set up by the US Congress, and tested by this
standard, it would be extremely doubtful that the pictures challenged would be held
obscene or indecent in the Federal Courts.
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 The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without
attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate
judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people would
not be shocked by photographs of this type.
 The post-cards cannot be characterized as filthy, foul or offensive to chastity.
– Jecky Pelaez
PEOPLE V. APARICI
PEOPLE V. PADAN
MONTEMAYOR, J. / 28 JUNE 1957
PARTIES:
Respondents: Marina Padan, Cosme Espinosa, Ernesto Reyes and Jose Fajardo
FACTS:
1957 - Respondents all took part in what was supposedly an exhibition of a human "fighting
fish", which in fact was a live show.
A building used as a ping-pong court was instead used as the venue for the show. Tickets
were sold at P3.00 each. A steel bed was placed in the center of benches in tiers where 90
paying customers and 16 who were allowed to enter for free watched the accused Marina
and Cosme disrobe and do the act “in three different positions the Court deemed
unnecessary to describe.”
Police got wind of the pleasure show and bought tickets. After the show, they arrested the
actors, Jose as the manager and Ernesto as the ticket collector and or exhibitor. (Now, I
just wonder why the police had to finish the show and not just conduct the raid while the
deed was taking place... ).
Marina pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 6 months and one day of prision correccional
and a fine of P200.
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The three others were found guilty. Cosme and Ernesto were were sentenced each to 6
months - 1 year and a fine of P500. Jose was sentenced to 1 year, 1 month, 10 days - 1 year,
8 months, 20 days and a fine of P1,000.00
The accused appealed their respective penalties. Cosme and Ernesto's were dismissed for
being filed out of time.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the penalty meted out to Marina was reasonable.
2) Whether the extent of Fajardo's participation in the show rendered him liable
HELD: Yes to both.
RATIO:
1) This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction have encountered an offense against
moral and decency of this kind. (Remember, it was the 50's).
They have encountered offenses like the exhibition of nude women whether in still or moving
pictures. But even at that, one could still claim that it was all for art, for inspiration purposes.
But an actual exhibition of a sexual act with acts of lasciviousness can have no redeeming
feature. There is no room for art. Nothing but obscenity, indecency and offense to public
morals, inspiring and causing lust and lewdness and exerting a corrupting influence on the
youth of the land.
Given the nature of the offense, the penalty of P200 imposed by the judge to Marina was
already benevolent given that the fiscal recommended P600.
2) As for Jose Fajardo, he claimed that he was not the manager but simply an actor who
played the role of an innocent bystander and urged by the audience to pick the actors from the
audience because he had a reputation of a “siga”.
His story is however contradicted by the testimony of the arresting police officers and the
witnesses who claim that Fajardo in fact aroused the interest of the audience when he picked
out two girls from the audience (planted, I assume) and asked them who they'd like to see do
the deed. Besides his name was printed on the tickets. Clearly, he was in charge of the show
and derived the most profit or gain. He is the most guilty.
– Raina Quibral
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PEREZ V. NAVARRO-DOMINGO
BAUTISTA, J. / AUGUST 28, 1996
FACTS:
Jenny Perez y Roman was charged with vagrancy under Art. 202 par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Perez Filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that the law unconstitutional and void for two
reasons:
For being vague and overbroad
Because it proscribes ‘status criminality’
The lower court dismissed the Motion to dismiss on the ground that Art 202 was not
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and that they, being a lower court could
not declare a law unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
WoN a lower court can declare a law unconstitutional
WoN Art. 202 par 2 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes, the lower courts can make a determination that a law is unconstitutional
Yes, Art. 202 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional
RATIO:
Section (2) (a) of Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides for the power of the
lower courts to decide on the constitutionality of a law.
The dictum is that questions of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
which would mean that the issue of constitutionality must be raised at either the Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Courts.
The Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision regarding a law’s unconstitutionality may only
affect the parties and does not constitute a precedent.
The provision states that any person found loitering in public or semi-public places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets w/o visible means of support, if
convicted of all these elements shall be punished by fine or imprisonment.
The act of mere loitering is not attended by malice because the only person affected
would be the person himself and not any third party.
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The law impinges on the individual’s right of freedom of expression and freedom of
locomotion.
There is no need for the state to exercise its police power because there is nothing to
protect society from.
– Sam Rosales
MANIPON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNAN, J. / JULY 31, 1986
NATURE: petition for certiorari (seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction of direct
bribery).
Facts:
On Oct 31 Manipon, a deputy sheriff of the CFI of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was
assigned to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in an NLRC Case. The labor arbiter
ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to
pay P2,720.00 to Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors. The writ was required to be
returned w/in 30 days
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on Nov 9 garnished* Dominguez’ bank Comtrust in
Baguio. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the
garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately pay Tabek the money judgment
[*garnishment: A legal proceeding whereby money or property due a debtor but in the
possession of another is applied to the payment of the debt owed to the plaintiff].
On November 12, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished
account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence
and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy
the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year."
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Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount
for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the
afternoon.
After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA. They then planned to entrap
Manipon by paying him with P700 marked money (authenticated and dusted with
fluorescent powder)
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Dominguez went to Comtrust
as planned. Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Flora and
Pacis.
Manipon then lifted the garnishment from the bank. Then Dominguez withdrew P2,500.00.
He added 300 to the P 700.00 marked bills and handed the total of P l,000.00 to Manipon.
Then they all left the bank.
Dominguez walked over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked
down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the
P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and brought them to Camp Dangwa for
questioning.
Manipon was found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification
relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. He filed his sheriff's
return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days.
Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of PD No. 46 but was later changed to
direct bribery under the RPC
Manipon was released on bail and pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
Manipon’s defense:
Manipon claims that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge, since in 1978 he
levied execution against Dominguez vehicles. He said when he met Dominguez at the
NISA office on December 27, Dominguez requested Manipon to pay only 1k to Tabek, the
balance be paid after the New Year. So he visited Longog Tabek, an illiterate and the
leader of the creditors, who consented to the lesser amount because he needed money
badly. His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal.
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At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand
him a temporary receipt but Dominguez did not get it because he was in a hurry
ISSUES:
 the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery NO
 there was novation of the money judgment (ie., it was a payment in partial
satisfaction of the judgment to which Tabek had agreed) THERE WAS NO
NOVATION.
 evidence was illegally-obtained IT WAS LEGALLY-OBTAINED
REASON:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of
the following elements:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise;
(3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission
of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do, and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be
express or implied.
The fact that Manipon lifted the garnishment on December 28 after which he received P
l,000.00 from Dominguez is backed by evidence.
2.) Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Manipon’s defense theory is so incredible
 It is very strange that they would not bother to write down the agreement.
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 Manipon says that he trusted Dominguez but earlier he said that Dominquez
wanted to frame him up. Manipon didn’t inform the labor arbiter who had issued
the order of execution either.
 it is incredible that Dominguez would not get the temporary receipt because he
was in a hurry; that receipt was the proof he needed to show that he had partially
complied with his legal obligation.
 Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and his testimony is biased. Tabek is a rehearsed
witness. Manipon says he is the leader of the creditors but Tabek cannot even
mention any of the names of the others
 As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of
Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the bank
could pay the garnished amount and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy
the judgment. He also didn’t inform the labor arbiter of the novation allegedly bec.
He was very busy. The writ was returnable w/in 30 days but he returned it
unsatisfied only on February 20.
 Manipon also allegedly “misplaced the temporary receipt” which he allegedly
prepared on December 28, 1979
) The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction.
These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure
of evidence in plain view.
The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon fallS within the first exception.
DECISION: the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against
petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 30, 1981 is affirmed.
– Fredda Rosete
DACUMOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CRUZ, J. / APRIL 16, 1991
FACTS:
 Alfonso Dacumos was a revenue examiner at the BIR in San Pablo City. He
offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla Interiors which amounted to PHP
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73,307.31 by pulling out its assessment papers from the office of the BIR
Commissioner and procuring a tax clearance for a sum of 35K for his services.
 Gregorio Samia, manager of the firm, agreed to meet with him but also notified the
NBI, which arranged an entrapment. They met at the Rizal Café where Samia [as
down payment] gave him an envelope containing 1K. Little did Dacumos know that
both the bills and the envelope were dusted with fluorescent powder.
 Dacumos went outside and the NBI began to close in. He threw away the envelope
however the powder on his hands were enough to implicate him.
 In his defense, Dacumos claimed that he was incapable of making such an offer
inasmuch as he had no access to the office of the Commissioner. Likewise, the
firm’s tax liabilities had yet to be ascertained. He argued that he met with Samia
because the latter had been insistent on securing a tax amnesty. Finally, he averred
that it was Samia who urged the envelope on him but he returned it twice—1st inside
the café, 2nd when they were outside.
ISSUE: WON Dacumos was guilty of taking a bribe.
HELD: Yes, there was prima facie evidence against him.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Although he claims it was unlikely for him to steal the documents, there was still a
possibility for him to accomplish such a task because he had been working in the
bureau for over 29 years already.
 If Samia wanted to discuss an official business with him, then the two should have
met at his office instead of a private café.
 The Court dare said that Samia would not be so vindictive to incriminate him with
bribery merely because he refused to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla
Interiors because Samia had not even been involved in the assessment.
 The fluorescent powder on his hands was sufficient evidence. In the same manner,
he only got rid of it when the cops began to approach him.
 He opined that the conviction was rendered against him because of his occupation
as a tax collector but the Court ruled that he was convicted because he took a bribe
regardless of what his occupation may had been.
 Burden of proof is on him but he was unable to discharge it by mere contentions that
the decision was based on “speculations, conjectures, and assumptions” and that
the conclusions therefrom were “mistaken, absurd, and fallacious.” Although he
claimed to be innocent, he was unable to rebut the evidence through mere self-
serving statements.
– Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
PAGE 44
ALMEDA V. PEREZ
LABRADOR, J.
NATURE: ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injuction.
FACTS:
Villegas and Mendoza filed a complaint with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano
Almeda, Sr. with having acquired during his incumbency, cash and properties from
unknown sources that are out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income, and
therefore, in violation of the provisions of RA 1379 (aka Anti-Graft Law). A preliminary
investigation was held and it was certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that
Almeda, Sr. did acquire such properties and cash out of proportion to such salary as public
officer as well as other lawful income.
Hence, Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, filed petition for forfeiture against Almeda,
Sr. Petitioners herein filed their answer. Then Solicitor General filed a “Motion for Leave to
Amend Petition for Forfeiture”, which the judge granted. The amended petition had in it
additioner counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisition, thus increasing the original
amount. From this the Almeda objected on the ground that the new counts or charges had
already been investigated and dismissed after the investigation and that no new
preliminary investigation was made. RA 1379, Almeda said, is criminal in nature so that the
petition cannot be amended as to substance without their consent. Also, Almeda said that
this amendment cannot be invluded because 1 year had already elapsed after the general
election in violation of the provisions of the Act.
The court ruled, however, that Almeda’s contentions has no merit. As to the preliminary
investigation, there was no showing that such dismissals of these items have been made;
that the iinvestigation was for the purpose of determining whether there is reason to believe
that graft has been committed; and that these new items merely amplify this suspicion.
Hence, the amendment dates back to the original petition and so the general application of
the 1-yr rule cannot apply. As to the amendment in substance without herein petitioners’
consent, this only applies to criminal cases and as the case at bar is civil in nature, this
contention cannot hold.
ISSUE: WoN the Anti-Graft Law is penal in nature.
HELD: No
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RATIO DECIDENDI:
The principal contention is that since RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, the
presentation of amendment without the benefit of a previous investigation cannot be allowed.
However, the proceeding for forfeitur is civil in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the
petitioners. On one hand, it does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely a
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired. On the other hand, the procedure outlined in the
law is that provided for in civil action.
Regarding the preliminary investigation said in the Act, it expressly provided that it’s one
similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. if it is only similar, but the others steps
in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, ithen it stands to reason that the
proceeding is not criminal. Furthermore, criminal proceedings have pleas of guilty or not guilty,
a reading of information and a trial; all of which are not present in the law.
Finally, comparing the Act to Section 12 of RPC, the penalty imposed in the latter is that on
the act of transferring or conveying of unlawfully acquired properties; what is penalized is the
transferring or conveyance and not the acquisition. Whereas with the Anti-Graft Law, it merely
imposes forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired.
DECISION: Petition denied.
– Kaye Tamayao
CABAL V. KAPUNAN
FACTS:
Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a
letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an
officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and
liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President
of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint. The Committee requested Cabal to take the witness stand
but the petitioner refused, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Hence,
the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he
may deem proper.
ISSUE:
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Whether the Committee had the power to order Cabal to take the witness stand, inasmuch
as said order violates Cabal’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.
HELD:
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to
answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand. Hence, the issue
before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned
Committee is civil or criminal in character.
Although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the
removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose
of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the
nature of a penalty.
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation
to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
REPUBLIC V. CA
PARTIES: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, SIMPLICIO BERDON, GAUDIOSA BERDON and LUIS BERDON,
respondents
FACTS:
 The Republic filed a petition against Simplicio Berdon, Assistant Staff Civil Engineer
assigned to the Bureau of Public Highways Cebu for having acquired unexplained
wealth totaling P124,495.82 from 1963-1969. The complaint included his wife
Gaudiosa and his father Luis.
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 Republic’s Evidence:
 Deed of absolute sale of a parcels of land worth P3,700 and P15,825.
 Contract to sell by installments of a parcel of land totaling P9,000.
 Deed of absolute sale of an agricultural land worth P3,000and P25,000.
 Deed of sale with right to repurchase an agricultural land worth P3,000.
 Deed of sale with right to repurchase of lands worth P5,000 and P10,000.
 Deed of extrajudicial partition of a parcel of land acquired by Luis Berdon, even
though he has no income to speak of.
 Declaration of real property of a residential house with an assessed value of
P34,480.
 Respondent’s Defense:
 P3,000 donation and P5,000 loan from Gaudiosa’s parents.
 P14,000 loan from GSIS.
 P6,000 loan from DBP.
 P100,000 loan from Congressman Ramon Durano.
 The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
 WON Berdon is guilty of violating RA 1379, An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of
the State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing the Procedure Thereof
HOLDING AND RATIONALE:
 Not guilty.
 RA 1379: Property Unlawfully Acquired – Property acquired by a public officer,
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary. This shall become property of the
State.
 The law creates a presumption against the public officer or employee, but this
presumption may be rebutted by showing to the satisfaction of the court that his
acquisition of property was lawful.
Berdon was able to explain his wealth satisfactorily.
− Giselle Munoz
− holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to
MORFE V. MUTUC
FACTS:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in
PAGE 46
public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public
office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." Nor was it the first
statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately
has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in
favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public
officer or employee.
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960
is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as
well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office
to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar: . . ."
ISSUE: WoN the provision is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The intention of the Act and its provision is to minimize the opportunities for
corruption to prosper in government and to maintain a transparency that will allow the
people to be vigilant regarding the leaders that they choose. This requirement of periodical
submission of statements of assets and liabilities seem to have a rational fit with the
objectives of the statute and since it is well within the power of the government to impose
such a requirement, then the statute and its provision is valid.
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged
statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an
objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he
such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of
the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
The provision is not violative of the rule against self-incrimination because if the
law which makes a person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been
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caused a person or property, stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to
the injured party or to a police officer is invalid, because such information, although in itself no
evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police
regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. This is
untenable.
The provision cannot be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to
its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel,
"does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." As expressed
by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it
within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." For they,
according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never
inquire into the wisdom of the law."
– Carlo Alojado
JARAVATA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 873
 Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
 The crime was committed allegedly on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25,
1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines.
 Jaravata was the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High
School. Using his influence as a public official and taking advantage of his moral and
official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberate intent did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments from
other classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA
BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00,
P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused
having officially intervened in the release of the salary differentials of the six classroom
teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS
PAGE 47
 Jaravata was charged before the Sandiganbayan where he found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 and sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE (1) YEAR, is minimum, to
FOUR (4) YEARS, as maximum, and to further suffer perpetual special disqualification
from public office and to pay the costs.
 No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing that the money given to the
accused was already refunded by him.
The petition raises factual and legal issues but for obvious reasons Our decision shall deal
with the legal issue only.
The Sandiganbayan states in its decision the following:
A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense shows
that there is no dispute that [complainants] Ramos, Lloren, Lopez, Dacayanan,
Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones Barangay High School
with accused as their assistant principal and [Conrado Baltazar as the
administrator; that on January 5, 1979, accused informed the classroom teachers
of the approval of the release of their salary differentials for 1978 and to facilitate
its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up
the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to
reimburse the accused of his expenses; that accused incurred expenses in the
total amount of P220.00 and there being six classroom teachers, he divided said
amount by six or at the rate of P36.00 each; that the classroom teachers actually
received their salary differentials and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the
exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts but as
Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to
him by Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista, and accused complied (Pp. 7-8.)
The decision also recites that "the evidence is overwhelming to show that accused
received more than the rightful contribution of P36.00 from four classroom teachers,
namely: Lopez, Dulay, Dacayanan and Bautista. Lopez categorically declared that he gave
the accused P100.00 (TSN, p. 5, August 21, 1980 hearing) after he received his salary
differential or an excess of P64.00. So with Dulay, that he gave P70.00 to the accused
(TSN, p. 16, supra) or an excess of P34.00; Dacayanan, that he gave to the accused
P118.00 (TSN, p. 26, supra) or an excess of P82.00, and Bautista, that he gave to the
accused P50.00 (TSN, p. 38, supra) or an excess of P14.00. In short, the total amount
received by the accused in excess of the share of the classroom teachers in the
reimbursement of his expenses is P194.00. " (P. 9.)
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ISSUE: Whether or not, under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the provision
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
HELD: No.
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides,
inter alia the following:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
 There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer"
as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even normal from the government."
 It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from
each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit.
 The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high
school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It
should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment
accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila
with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his
expenses.
 The Court opined that Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official
intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.
 There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of
the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising
any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to
expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal
PAGE 48
he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials.
Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he
exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is set aside. Costs de oficio.
– Wes Aquende
TRIESTE, SR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN
ALAMPAY, J. / NOVEMBER 13, 1986
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Trieste, Sr. was charged with 12 violations of Sec. 3, par. H of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) by the Sandiganbayan. Trieste as Municipal Mayor and member
of the Committee on Award of Numancia, Aklan, Trieste had administrative control of the
funds of the municipality and his approval is required in the disbursements of municipal
funds. It was alleged that as mayor, he awarded the purchase, supply and delivery of
construction materials by his municipality to Tri-gen Agro-Industrial Corporation, of which
he is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder. He authorized the
payment to said corporation by affixing his signature to certain vouchers.
ISSUES:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting
papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer
without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier,
and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and
consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? NO
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention
of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law? NO
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3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law,
caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in
question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting
corporation? NO to both
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? YES
HELD: Held in favor of acquittal.
RATIO:
1-2. Petitioner’s signature is not the kind of intervention contemplated by Sec 3(h). There
should be active intervention to the transaction to which one has financial or pecuniary interest
in order for liability to attach. The transaction in this case was an emergency contract (there
was no bidding held hence no room for petitioner to intervene in Trigen’s favor. There is no
evidence that he used his influence or his authority in having the transactions given to Trigen
particularly since he signed the vouchers only after payment.
3. Trigen also did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction. Trigen has been dealing
with the municipal gov’t even before the petitioner assumed mayorship. Also, personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen’s offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and
advantageous to the community.
4. Petitioner has already divested himself of his interest in Trigen by selling his shares to his
sister before assuming office, and there is no requirement to report to the SEC.
RA 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(h) Director or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
DISPOSITION: The decision and resolution of Sandiganbayan is reversed and petitioner
is acquitted of offenses charged against him.
– Anj Balacano
PAGE 49
MEJORADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CORTES, J.
FACTS:
Mejorada was the right-of-way agent of the Office of the Highway District Engineer tasked
to facilitate negotiations regarding the compensation to be received by property owners
affected by highway constructions or improvements. The widening of the proposed Pasig-
Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road affected the house and lot of 8 property owners and were thus
approached by Mejorada to work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots. He
made them sign a blank “Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real
Properties” and “Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct Improvements”. In the
said documents, he made it appear that the values of the properties and improvements
therein were higher than their actual values. After processing their claims, he
accompanied the property owners to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to claim
their PNB checks. He also went with them to the PNB to encash these and then led them
to his car where he divested all of them of the amounts paid leaving only P1,000 per
person except to one to which he left P5,000. He told the property owners that the
payments made to them were to be shared to other persons as well. The claimants were
helpless at that point because according to them, Mejorada was accompanied by armed
individuals.
The Fiscal filed 8 informations stating these facts accusing him of violating RA 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. the Sandiganbayan found him guilty and sentenced
him to 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment.
ISSUE: WON the elements of the crime were present
HELD:
Yes. Mejorada quotes Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 arguing that it cannot be applied to him
because it only mentions that: “This provision shall apply to offices and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.” The Court said that before the enumeration in Section 3, the reference to
“any public officer” was unqualified. The last sentence in paragraph (e) is intended to
make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations
which under the ordinary concept of public officers, may not come within the term. (FIRST
ELEMENT)
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Mejorada also alleges that his actions have not caused any injury or damage to the
Government because the payments were made on the basis of the document made by the
Highway District Engineer to which the petitioner had no hand in preparing. The Court said
that the inflation of the true claims of the property owners caused damage to the Government
in the form of added expense in the compensation released from its budget. It cannot be said
that he had no participation in the preparation of the document because as right-of-way agent,
it was his job to accomplish these documents during or after negotiations with property
owners. (SECOND ELEMENT)
Finally, Mejorada claims that the acts complained of must be done in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence for him to be liable. According to him, his acts would merely
constitute robbery as he was no longer in the discharge of his duties when he performed the
acts. the court ruled that his actions were all part of the scheme he concocted and that he
couldn’t have done all those if he was not using his position as right-of way agent.
– Anna Basman
LABATAGOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
PADILLA, J./ MARCH 21, 1990
FACTS:
 Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of Mindanao State University
from 1978-1980. During March-May of 1978, she was on leave.
 Francisco Rivera was designated leader of a team to conduct examination of the cash and
accounts of petitioner Labatagos. The team found out that there was a shortage in the
amoutns she remitted to DBP and the amounts that she collected. The shortages amount
to P34, 336.19 and P71, 361.75.
 When Labatagos failed to copme up with an expalnation of the shortages, the
Tanodbayan filed charges of malversation of public funds against her.
 Petitioner's defense was that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that the
shortage would only amount to P2, 000. She added that she was on maternity leave for
some time, and that several disbursements were not credited in her favor by the auditors
and that some of the receipts were lost. Lastly, she avers that she did not put the missing
funds to her personal use.
ISSUE: WON petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
PAGE 50
HELD:
Yes. The amounts which she allege were disbursed were not valid disbursements as the
copies are incompetent evidence. As for her maternity leave, she was still able to have
control over the money during that time as the officer in charge reported to her in her
house. Malversation of public funds consists not only in misappropriation or converting
funds to one's personal use but also by knowingly allowingothers to make use or
misappropriate them. Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed.
– May Calsiyao
ESTEPA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FELICIANO, J. / FEBRUARY 15, 1990
FACTS:
Estepa and nine other paymasters of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, went
with Marcelo, their Supervising Paymaster, to the Philippine National Bank to encash
checks for cash advances they were requisitioning.
However, the cash value of those checks was not available. So, they proceeded to the
Central Bank. Cash was counted out and placed inside two duffel bags which were sealed
and immediately deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurer's Office.
There was a "brownout" in the afternoon so Marcelo decided, with the division head, to
distribute the cash to the paymasters in the latter's room, since it was well-lit through a
window. The door was closed and a guard was posted outside.
The bills were segregated and bundled. Some of the paymasters were assigned to take
charge of the bundles of money, one paymaster for each denomination. Estepa was not
one of them. As each paymaster was called, each paymaster in charge of a denomination
handed to the asker the number of bundles of that denomination corresponding to the
amount being asked for.
Marcelo asked if there were any problems. There being no reply, they left the room
assuming all was well. However, ten minutes later, Estepa reported to Marcelo that he was
missing P50,000 from his cash advance. The latter immediately called back all ten
paymasters. It turned out that the amount each of them received, except Estepa’s, was
correct.
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Later receiving a formal letter from the City of Manila demanding the amount, Estepa
submitted a written explanation denying his liability for it. Unconvinced, the Legal Office of the
City of Manila filed a complaint against Estepa charging him with the crime of malversation
through negligence.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Do the facts described constitute malversation?
HELD and RATIO:
YES. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the
accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his
failure so to account.
Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation
where the accountable public officer fails to duly produce any public funds with which he is
chargeable upon demand by a duly authorized officer.
In the present case, Marcelo could not produce the missing amount nor adequately to explain
his failure to produce that amount.
By his own admission, he placed the money on one side of a sofa which was three meters
away. Because some of the paymasters were already going out and accused was afraid that
the public might enter the office he decided to bring the money with smaller denominations to
a table three to four meters away leaving the bigger denomination at the sofa. He did this he
could not carry the whole amount.
rd
Clearly, he was very lax about the money, as there were two clear opportunities for a 3 party
to take the money and run.
And even barring his explanation, Estepa should have counted the money right then and there
when Marcelo was distributing it, and voiced the deficiency of his funds when Marcelo asked if
there were any problems.
– Judith Cortez
PAGE 51
ILOGON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CAMPOS, JR., J. / February 3, 1993
 Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in
Cagayan de Oro City from 1978 to 1986. He performed the task of receiving
payments and effecting disbursement because there was no cashier employed
during his incumbency.
 On Sept. 19, 1983, the Commission on Audit conducted an examination of
Ilogon's accounts during the period Sept. 8, 1983 to Sept. 13, 1983. The
examination revealed a shortage of P118,871.29 out of the P191,999.42 that
Ilogon certified in his cash book. The amount, which was later reduced to
P118.003.10, represents vales or cash advances, cash shortage already
reimbursed, cash items disallowed (paid vouchers), and an actual shortage.
 Ilogon was charged with Malversation of Public Funds on Nov. 27, 1984. He put
up the defense before the Sandiganbayan that
 As to the vales, they consist of salaries paid to postal workers for which he
received reimbursement checks on around the Sept. 20-25, which in turn he
remitted to Land Bank
 As to the cash shortage already reimbursed, these also consisted of paid
salaries, but the reimbursements had not yet arrived, and it they were, they
only arrived partially, therefore he had not recorded it in his cash book yet.
 As to another category of cash items already reimbursed and received by
individual creditors, he says the employees who got their cash advances
from it encashed their reimbursement checks without turning over the
proceeds to him.
 As to the actual shortage, he claimed that he forgot to tell the auditors that it
was with the teller, and he had remitted the same on Sept. 19, 1983.
 After all this, he was still found guilty. Now, Ilogon argues that he
never misappropriated the amount he is accused of having
malversed for his own personal use and asserts that it was largely
given to his financially-strained co-employees as cash advances.
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ISSUES / HELD:
1. WON there is a need for direct evidence of personal misappropriation to be
convicted of the crime of malversation – NO.
RATIO:
 In the crime of malversation, it is only necessary to prove that the officer had
received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when
demand for those funds was made. In this case, Ilogon himself admitted the
shortage of cash, but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same other
than humanitarian reasons. The case of Cabello v. Sandiganbayan serves as a
precedent for the notion that the issuance of vales is a violation of postal rules and
regulations.
 The fact that Ilogon's superiors have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash
advances for convenience does not legalize the disbursements that the latter made.
Also, the fact that the entire amount was eventually all accounted for is not a
defense; it is at best a mitigating circumstance.
JUDGMENT: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed.
– Jahzeel Cruz
AZARCON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
PARTIES: ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents
Malversation of Public Funds or Property
Art. 217. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer…
PAGE 52
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
FACTS: Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling “dirt and ore”.
He engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
former’s premises.
On May 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the BIR
addressed to the Regional Director or his representative to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a subcontractor of Azarcon and a
delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to
transfer or remit to the BIR, the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
signed the “Recepit for Goods, Articles and Things Seized Under Authority of the National
Internal Revenue” and acknowledged receipt of an Isuzu dump truck. Azarcon wrote a
letter to the BIR’s Regional Director stating that it is his desire to immediately relinquish
responsibilities over the truck and reported the taking of the truck to the security manager
of PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines), Mr. Delfin Panelo and
requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession.
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter saying that failure of Azarcon to observe
the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment does not relieve Azarcon of his responsibility.
On June 11, 1986, Mrs. Marilyn Calo, Revenue Document Processor sent a
progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump
truck and that Ancla was renting the truck to a contractor. She suggested that a warrant of
garnishment be reissued against the said contractor for whatever amount of rental is due
from Ancla until such time as the latter’s tax liabilities hall be deemed satisfied. However,
instead of doing so, Director Batausta filed a complaint against Azarcon and Ancla after
more than 1 year from the time of Mrs. Calo’s report. Thus, Azarcon was charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property.
Sandiganbayan found Azarcon guilty of malversation of public funds. Azarcon filed a
motion for new trial which was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Azarcon can be considered as a public officer by reason of his being
designated as a depositary of distrained property (which would determine if
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over him to decide the case)
DECISION: NO. Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan set aside and declared
null and void for lack of jurisdiction
REASONING:
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Art. 203 of the RPC reads:
"Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election,
popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer."
Thus,
"(to) be a public officer, one must be —
(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing
in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority."
While the BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. It is true that Sec.
206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive
distraint by requiring "any person to preserve a distrained property, thus:
“The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or
any person having possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the
property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to
dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner”.
However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason
of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary
cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
Article 222 of the RPC reads:
"Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or
property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a
private individual."
"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
PAGE 53
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 42 This is particularly observed in
the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as to
carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." 43 The language of the foregoing
provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or
property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions
of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same
penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied
that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
Thus, Azarcon did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as
depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Ancla for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was charging 2 private
individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore
all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
– Tim Guanzon
ALFREDO RODILLAS V.SANDIGANBAYAN
GUTIERREZ, JR., J..
FACTS:
Rodillas is a patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City and
assigned with the Jail Section thereof.
On March 27, 1980, when he reported for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal
Victor Victoriano, Officer-in-Charge in assigning police officers to escort prisoners, to escort
Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of
the Court of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato Building, Caloocan City, to
face trial for an alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
While waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat. Orlando Andres, who
happened to be in the court and a relative of the husband of said detention prisoner
Zenaida, approached the accused and requested the latter if he could permit Zenaida to
talk to her husband. The accused consented and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her
husband.
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After a short while, the presiding judge deferred the decision against her because of a new
Presidential Decree revising some provisions regarding violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to allow
them to have lunch and Rodillas consented.
While eating, the husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife to the comfort
room as she was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida
and a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second floor of the building.
Zenaida and her lady companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the
alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the door thereof. Not long after, the lady companion
of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she was going to buy sanitary
napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go
out of the comfort room.
After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the accused
became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no
longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of said comfort room was not
provided with window grills.
He immediately went out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of Pat.
Andres but they were not able to see her.
The accused borrowed the car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to house of Andres. Upon
their arrival,Andres was not there.
He formally reported the matter to his superior officer, Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused
declared further that as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by his superiors
regarding the manner of delivering prisoners.
Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc was convicted of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru
Negligence by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner through
negligence penalized under Art. 224 of the Revised Penal Code
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The questioned decision of the
Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
PAGE 54
The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based
merely on his admissions without the prosecution presenting evidence to prove his
negligence. But the records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner
was convicted are present. The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article
are: [a] that the offender is a public officer; [b] that he is charged with the conveyance or
custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and [c] that
such prisoner escapes through his negligence.
The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention
prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such
definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the
guard. It is evident that petitioner acted negligently when he permitted his charge to create
the situation which led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations
compelled him to grant Andres' requests but as a police officer who was charged with the
duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation
of the regulations. In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the
prisoner and her family when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even
allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary
precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these
precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate
non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her
companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a
person of ordinary prudence.
Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts and
circumstances which were not foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of things. Not
only should they have been foreseen but they should have been guarded against.
The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for evasion
through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that
connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of
prisoners.
-Blanca Labay
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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PEOPLE VS. JUMAWAN
FACTS:
 Rodolfo Magnaye was married on to Presentacion Jumawan.
 Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister
Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his
mother Trinidad Alcantara.
 Presentacion made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a
document agreeing to a separation so that both he and his wife will be free to marry
again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.
 Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told her that he was going to the public market
because his wife asked him to fetch her. He asked his mother to prepare food because
they are going to talk about their lives. He left home at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening.
 At 9:30 pm, a witness saw accused Francisco Jumawan holding the hands of Rodolfo
Magnaye while accused Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm
around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye while Cesario Jumawan was infront of Rodolfo
Magnaye with his left hand holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and in his right hand
he was holding a small pointed bolo with which he stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye below the
right nipple.
 At about 11 pm, another witness saw Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan with
Rodolfo Magnaye between them while they were crossing the national highway towards
the south to a road opposite the Emil Welding Shop. They went on walking after crossing
the highway. At that time the head of Rodolfo Magnaye was bowed infront while his two
(2) arms were on the shoulder of Cesario and Manuel Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye was
not walking.
 At 11:45 in the evening Presentacion reported to Patrolman Marcial Baera and
Patrolman Albufera that the store of Bastiana (Sebastiana) Jumawan where she works is
threatened to be robbed by Rodolfo Magnaye. When asked by Patrolman Baera
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye denied being related to Rodolfo Magnaye. Patrolman
Baera entered the report of Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye in the police record book.
 The body of Rodolfo was found in a nearby body of water.
 The three men and Presentacion were charged with murder. (The information against
Presentacion did not allege her relationship with the deceased.)
ISSUE: WON Presentacion can be charged with parricide at this level of the trial.
PAGE 55
HOLDING / RATIO:
NO. Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship
to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of
murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should
be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but
Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-
in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime
REMEMBER: Relationship should be alleged in the information for the accused to be
convicted of parricide.
– Felman Magcalas
PEOPLE V. JAIME TOMOTORGO
ALAMPAY, J. / APRIL 30, 1985
FACTS:
Jaime Tomotorgo and Magdalena de los Santos are spouses. Months prior to the day of
Jaime’s crime, Magdalena had been pestering him to sell their conjugal home in Siruma,
Camarines Sur, so that they could live with their in-laws in Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Jaime refused because he had many plants and had made a lot of improvements to their
home.
In the morning of June 1977, Jaime went out to his field to farm. At 9AM he came back to
their house, only to find that Magdalena and their baby were gone. He went after them and
he caught up with his wife and baby around 200 meters from their house. After begging
and pleading with his wife to return, she refused. Jaime tried to wrench the baby from
Magdalena’s arms and thereupon she threw the baby on a patch of grass near where they
were standing. At this, Jaime took a piece of wood and struck his wife repeatedly until she
on the ground, complaining of chest pains. Jaime then carried her back to their house and
returned for their baby shortly. Despite his efforts to alleviate his wife’s pain, she died soon
thereafter.
Jaime reported himself to the barangay captain who took him to the police. He voluntarily
surrendered and submitted the piece of wood he used to hit his wife to the authorities. He
was tried for the crime of parricide to which he initially pleaded not guilty, but then changed
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his plea to guilty. The trial court found 3 mitigating circumstances in his favor: voluntary
surrender, plea of guilt, and passion and obfuscation. Thus he was sentenced to a penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
After sentencing, Jaime and his counsel appealed in order to secure a lesser sentence. They
invoked Art. 49 of the RPC, saying that Jaime is entitled to a penalty one degree lower
because the felony he committed was different from that which he intended. They argued that
he intended to inflict physical injuries only, but because of his wife’s death, was able to commit
parricide. Thus, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods. In this premise, the penalty prescribed by law for his offense is divisible and he
should thus be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
ISSUE: WON Jaime is guilty of parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC, which carries a penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death?
HELD:
Yes, Jaime is guilty of parricide and not mere physical injuries. The fact that his wife died
shortly thereafter makes this contention untenable. Jaime’s invocation of Art. 49 is unavailing
because it only applies to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended (not
a direct and natural consequence) and where the felony committed befalls a different person
(Poor Aim) (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150). But under Art. 4, Jaime is liable for all the
direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. At best, he can invoke the mitigating
circumstance of “lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.”
Parricade is punishable with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, which are two
indivisible penalties. Since there are 3 mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances in favor of Jaime, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be
imposed.
The court recognized the fact Jaime had been detained for 7 years already pending this
decision. It recommended Jaime for executive clemency, or for commutation of his sentence
so that he will be eligible for parole.
– Mico Cruz
PEOPLE V. ABARCA
SARMIENTO, J./ SEPTEMBER 14, 1987
PAGE 56
FACTS:
 Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had an
illicit relationship which apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations
 On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar,
to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip. He was
also not able to take the 2:00 o'clock trip because the bus had engine trouble and
could not leave. The accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after
which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in
Tacloban City at around 6:00 pm
 Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in
the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the
wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then
peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away
 The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of
a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was
not able to find his wife and Koh there.
 He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh.
The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times
with his rifle and caused the latter’s death.
 Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room
where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused
 He was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder and was sentenced to death
(though the trial court also recommended executive clemency)
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be
appreciated in the case
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
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These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to
their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living
with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this article.
HELD:
 YES. Article 247 of the RPC must be applied.
RATIO:
 There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the
victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to
kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following
elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in
this case.
 Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and
the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
 The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both
of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does
not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that
the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the
killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and
must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the
direct by-product of the accused's rage.
Article 247
 does not define an offense
 People vs Araque:
…the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants
a privilege or benefit amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate
punishment to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or
daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any
PAGE 57
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries,
considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused
who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide,
murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only with
destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended
more for the protection of the accused than a punishment…
…Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all….
…Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a
specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of
another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned...
Judgment Modified. Accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to
six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement
shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss
of earning capacity.
– Joy Montes
PEOPLE V. BUENSUCESO
PARTIES: PEOPLE vs. JOSE BUENSUCESO, RODOLFO AGUILAR, CONRADO IZON
and ERNESTO JOSON
FACTS:
 Patrolman Rodolfo Aguilar was forcing Pariseo Tayag to surrender his fan knife,
to which the latter refused. They proceeded to the office of the chief of police,
wherein a heated argument between the two took place. Tayag hurriedly left the
office. Aguilar followed and fired a warning hot. On pursuit, Aguilar fired at Tayag,
hitting him above the right knee. Another patrolman, Mallari helped Aguilar
pursue Tayag. More or less nine shots were fired. Tayag was then seen lying
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prostrate. Patrolman de la Cruz took Tayag’s knife and gave it to Patrolman
Buensuceso, who had a revolver in his holster. Patrolmen Izon and Jose were also
in the crime scene.
 Sgt. Espiritu’s Examination
 Aguilar’s revolver: three empty shells; gun recently fired
 Buensuceso’s revolver: four empty shells; gun recently fired
 Autopsy
 4 Gun Shot Wounds
 Wound 1 – from a .38 caliber; fatal
 Wound 2 – from a .38 caliber; fatal; position of shooter same as in wound
1
 Wound 3 – from a .38 or .32 caliber
 Wound 4 – inflicted when victim was lying down
 Lunge’s Diphenylamine (Paraffin) Test: Izon positive; de la Cruz negative; Joson
positive; Mallari negative
 Mallari’s Testimony: De la Cruz grabbed Mallari’s gun and ran outside the building
following the other patrolmen. Mallari heard 5 shots. Thereafter, dela Cruz returned
his gun when they were already inside the building.
 Trial Court: Buensuceso, Aguilar, Izon and Joson guilty of murder; Mallari and dela
Cruz not guilty due to reasonable doubt
ISSUE: WON the evidence are sufficient for conviction of the accused. YES
RATIONALE:
 Evidence presented:
 All four appellants were seen by the witness, Apolonio Salvador to have been
present at the crime scene with .38 caliber revolvers
 Autopsy showed that victim died because of 4 gunshot wounds inflicted by .38
caliber revolvers
 Revolvers of Aguilar and Buensuceso have been fired
 Paraffin test
 There is ample evidence establishing that Aguilar, Buensuceso, Izon and Joson had
fired their guns at the victim. Although it has not been established as to which
wound was inflicted by whom, SC has held that where the victim died as a result of
wounds received from several persons acting independently of each other, but it has
PAGE 58
not been shown which wound was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants
are liable for the death of the victim.
 Aggravating circumstance of treachery present
 Victim was already retreating backwards
 Victim was hit on the right knee and was already immobilized when he was
subjected to the successive shots by the assailants
JUDGMENT: Aguilar, Buensuceso, Izon and Joson guilty of murder qualified by
treachery.
– Giselle Munoz
PEOPLE V. PUGAY
MEDIALDEA, J. / 1988
FACTS:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
The accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived at the fair. These
persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the
deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance
by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on
the body of the former.
Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
Both Pugay and Samson were stunned with the result of their acts.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment but it did succumb to
death as a result of the injuries he sustained.
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There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused
Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear
that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
ISSUES:
1. What is the criminal liability of accused Pugay?
2. WON the accused Samson has the intent to kill so as to qualify his criminal liability into
murder.
HELD:
1. Pugay is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. The
court agrees with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some
reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.
For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on
the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not
have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to
set the deceased's clothes on fire.
His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a
felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as
what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
PAGE 59
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined
and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The court, however, credited in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact
from which such conclusion can be drawn.
– Ryan Oliva
PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
PADILLA, J. / MAR. 30, 1988
FACTS:
 Pedro Salufrania testified against his father, petitioner Filemon Salufrania, who
was charged with Parricide and Intentional Abortion
 he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo
quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, in their small
house at a far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during
said quarrel, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and,
once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze
from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where
she fell
 he further testified that after killing his mother, petitioner went out of the house to
get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed
how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were
already asleep when the horrible incident happened; that their father arrived early
the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the
hammock, carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of
his sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan
the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
 Another witness, Narciso Abuyo, testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania
and his sister, the deceased Marciana Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband
and declared that his sister was more or less seven months pregnant when she
died
ISSUE: WON Filemon’s act constitute intentional abortion
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HELD: It was unintentional abortion
RATIO:
 Salufrania alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to
show that he had the intention to cause an abortion
 Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom
 The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an
abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to
fall and then strangled her. However, appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not
been sufficiently established
 Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the
victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause
an abortion
 The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused
by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being
voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.
– Ramon Parel
PEOPLE V. ORITA
APRIL 3, 1990
NATURE: Forwarded case from the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 9, paragraph 3 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with the Judiciary Act of 1948
FACTS:
 On March 20, 1983, Cristina Abayan, a 19 year old student went home to her boarding
house at around 1:30am after coming from a party with her classmates.
PAGE 60
 Upon knocking on her door, appellant Lito Oreta suddenly appeared and poked a
knife to her neck.
 Appelant then took Cristina to a room in the second floor and there instructed her to
remove her clothes
 He then asked her to lie down after which he asked her to guide his penis into her
vagina which she followed because appellant still had the knife pointed at her.
 Appellant however, was unable to fully insert his penis into her in that position due to
the girls incessant moving
 Appellant Oreta then instructed the girl to mount him instead and asked her once
again to guide the penis in. However, only a portion was able to penetrate again.
 At this stage, appellant had his hands laid down flat on the floor and Cristina took this
opportunity to make a run for it.
 Cristina dashed into the next room but appellant gave chase and she continued
through another room until she finally jumped out a window to escape.
 The victim then ran towards the municipal building still naked until she was seen by
Pat. Donceras, a police officer.
 The medical examiner noted that the hymen was intact but that there were
erythemateous areas surrounding the vaginal orifice and that the examining finger
could barely enter.
 The RTC convicted Orita of the crime of frustrated rape.
ISSUES: Was the crime committed rape or frustrated rape?
HELD: The crime is rape. There is no such thing as frustrated rape.
RATIO:
 Art. 335 of the RPC defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of Rape
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under 12 years of age, even though neither of
the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.
 Carnal knowledge in turn is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily
connections with a woman (Black’s Law Dictionary)
 Art 6 of the RPC defines consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
“Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. – Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted are punishable.”
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“A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.”
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
 In the crime of rape only consummated and attempted rape can apply.
 2 Requisites needed to give rise to a frustrated felony
 Offender has performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony
 The felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will
 In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. The felony is
consummated
 The Court has set the rule that perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ, by the male organ is sufficient.
 Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rapture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction
 Rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all the acts
of execution were performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts.
 Although Dr. Zamora (a physician who testified) declared that the findings do not give
conclusive evidence that there was penetration, he did not rule out the possibility. He
merely testified that there was uncertainty on whether there was or wasn’t any
penetration.
 The fact remains that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted on the
sole basis of the victim’s testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element.
 The evidence is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Lito Orita
is guilty of the crime of Rape
DECISION: Decision of RTC MODIFIED. Lito Orita is found guilty of the crime of rape
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
– Jecky Pelaez
PAGE 61
PEOPLE V. MANGALINO
SARMIENTO , J. / FEB 15 1990
"Lust is no respecter of time or place."
FACTS:
 53-year old Semion Mangalino, the accused and his wife are the neighbors of
Tomas and Bernardine Carlos and their 6-year old daughter Marichelle, the
alleged victim.
 One morning on March 1984, while his wife was away, the accused led
Marichelle into his bedroom, as the girl was playing in the ground floor of his
apartment. There, he gave the girl P2.00. made her lied down on the bed,
removed her panties, fondled the young girl's breasts, inserted his finger in her
vagina and tried to insert his organ sexual organ, too, but to no avail. This only
stopped when Marichelle's cousin came looking for her as it was time for her to
go to school.
 The whole time the act was being committed, Mangalino's 16-year old grandson
and nephew was supposedly in the sala of the apartment and playing chess.
Later on, they testified that they heard nothing or did not see the accused lead
the girl to his bedroom.
 After telling her mother of what "Mang Semion did", Marichelle's mother brought
her to a physical and genital examination where "the doctor opined that the
vestibular mucosa contusion could have been caused by a hard object like an
erected penis and such bruises at such part of the girl's vagina if caused by an
erected penis would be an indication of an unsuccessful penetration. He
discounted the probability of an accident, like bumping at an edge of a chair, or
any blunt object, since there was no contusion of the labia". (Too technical, so i
copied it verbatim.)
 Marichelle also positively identified Mangalino during the confrontation.
Curiously, she stated that she did not feel any pain when Mang Semion was
allegedly trying to insert his thing.
 RTC convicted Mangalino which gave rise to his appeal.
 The defense vigorously argues against the probability of the rape having been
committed on two points: 1) The commission of the crime was impossible, taking
place as claimed, in broad daylight, when anyone could have easily seen it; and
2) there were at least eight persons including the accused and the complainant
on the ground floor where the rape was supposedly consummated and it would
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have been impossible that not one saw the accused lead the victim to his bedroom.
 The defense also alleged the place where the alleged sexual abuse took place was
not even a room, he asserts. The apartment had neither a door nor walls, and what
divided the so-called room from the living room was a wooden folding divider which
was "butas-butas."
ISSUE: Did the court err in appreciating the positive identification of the accused and the
results of the physical examination over the alleged impossibility of the commission of the
crime?
HELD: No. Statutory rape had been committed without a shadow of a doubt.
RATIO:
The medico legal officer's findings concluded that rape had been perpetrated. He certified the
existence of recent general trauma and discounted the probability that it was caused by an
accident. It has also been held in the past that a full penetration is not required and even the
slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
The allegations of the defense that the commission of the rape is belied by the fact that
Marichelle did not cry out or struggle against Mangalino is explained by the relationship of the
two neighbors. Marichelle knew Mangalino and had a high regard for him so he did not put up
any struggle when he lead her to her bedroom and forced her into the sexual act.
In view of her very tender age and her little formal schooling, it is also inconceivable for
Marichelle to concoct a serious charge of rape, and to narrate, in unhesitating and simple
terms the events that transpired that day.
The heart of the matter is the violation of a child's incapacity to discern evil from good. She
had no awareness of the wrongfulness of the action of the accused. Her willingness to lie
down on and accept the P2.00 given her by the accused, whom she looked up to as an elder
person, a neighbor, and a friend of her family, indicate not naivete, but the absolute trust and
confidence of the very young in an older person. She was incapable of reading malice or evil
in his intentions. Only when she saw how distraught her mother was at her telling of her story
and the flurry of police and judicial activity stirred up by her narration that her young and
innocent mind was violently exposed to the reality of the existence of evil in the hearts of men.
The moment of truth, dawning so violently upon young and innocent minds is contemptible.
The older persons in the community should set themselves up as models of proper decorum
and high moral purpose for young children; it is they who should guide the young, teach them,
and nurture them in the way of the righteous. A 53-year-old man who instead corrupts and
PAGE 62
violates the purity and dignity of a minor is morally depraved and should be punished to the
limits of the law.
It is even more difficult to conceive of Mrs. Bernardine Carlos trumping up a charge of the
rape of her daughter and subject herself and her daughter to humiliation, to fear, and
anxiety, and community censure that she and her daughter will have to bear for the rest of
their lives for the exchange of mere P50,000.000 which is the amount asked for in moral
damages.
The accused claims it was impossible for him to have raped the victim in the presence of
other people, more so, in a place without privacy. We do not agree.Rape was in fact
committed. It is quite possible for an experienced man, like the accused, to consummate
rape in just one minute, without attracting the attention of the people inside the apartment.
The three people who were also inside the house were found to be busy doing some other
things (playing chess, doing laundry) that they might have been to engrossed to notice
what else was happening in the house. Marichelle's complete innocence may have
facilitated the perpetration of the crime, and the divider, although "butas- butas," was
sufficient to conceal the commission of the bestial act.
The Court has held in the past that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate: in parks, along the road side, within school premises, and even inside a house
where there are other occupants. The apartment of the accused was no exception. Lust is
no respecter of time or place.
JUDGMENT: Trial court's decision affirmed. The moral damages is however modified
from P50,000.000 to P20,000.
– Raina Quibral
PEOPLE V. BALBUENA
GUERERRO, J. / APRIL 27, 1984
FACTS:
 On August 28, 1975, Elvira Polintan, single, 20 years of age joined appellant
Juanito Torres, a friend of long standing, and 4 of his friends in a drinking spree.
 They proceeded to the home of Abelardo Balbuena which was located at P.
Zamora St., Caloocan City, adjacent to the house of appellant Juanito Torres and
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near the house of Elvira Polintan. The ground floor of the apartment was formerly
used as a billiard hall. This was where they had their drinking session.
 There, Torres introduced Balbuena to Elvira Polintan
 After Elvira Polintan downed half a glass of gin, she felt dizzy and went to lie on one
of the benches.
 Balbuena undressed the complainant by removing her pants and briefs and dragged
her on top of a billiard table and raped her. During this time, Torres was holding
Elvira's hands. Balbuena kept on threatening Polintan and her family even as she
feebly tried to escape. After Balbuena got down from the table, Torres took his turn
while Balbuena held Polintan’s hands.
 After her rape, Balbuena once again threatened her and her family. Once the
accused were distracted, Polintan escaped.
 October 19, 1975, she related her sad experience to her mother
 , October 20, 1975, she went to the police headquarters at Caloocan City and went
to the City Fiscal's Office at Caloocan City to filed a complaint for rape
 On the same day she was examined by a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The
medical conclusions were:
 No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the
subject.
 She could have had sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged
date of commission
 Torres says that he was not with her that night and that Polintan, who was a
tomboy, had a grudge against him because he encouraged his cousin to break up
with her.
 Balbuena says that he did not take part in the drinking that night.
ISSUES: WoN the accused, base on the testimony of Balbuena, could be found guilty of
rape.
PAGE 63
HELD: Yes, the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
RATIO:
 The arguments of the accused were the ff:
 lower court should have declared complainant Elvira Polintan as an
incredible witness in her narration of being raped by the accused bec:
 there was a delay of more than one month before the
incident was reported
 complainant used to go with male friends, imbibing alcoholic
beverages
 no bodily injuries were noted
 neither her dress nor underwear was not torn
 she was able to give a detailed description of what transpired
during the night
 Elvira Polintan was a willing victim in the crime of rape, hence, the
element of force is absolutely wanting
 The delay in filing the complaint was reasonable because "it is not easy for a
Filipina to easily decide whether to come out in the open in a situation where
public contempt and ridicule would result in the prosecution of a case.” The very
fact that she came forward in the case is persuasion that the act had been
committed. The complainant stands to gain nothing with her revelation and the
consequent punishment of the accused.
 She was fearful over the threats of the accused appellants that they would kill her
and her parents should she report the matter to the police, especially so since
she resides near the houses of the accused-appellants and she has to pass their
houses in going out.
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 She worried that her ongoing classes at school would be disrupted upon her filing of dark cloud on her claim that she was raped successively by Torres and Abelardo
the complaint Balbuena

 The fact that she used to go with male friends, imbibing alcoholic beverages is not  If there was sex it was with her consent. Her inhibitions were lowered by the
unusual, considering that she is a "tomboy" consumption of alcohol.

 The absence of any injury is explained by the fact that the physical examination of  There was no determined resistance by Elvira nor did she shout for help
the victim was made after more than one month had elapse from the commission of
the crime and from the statement there was nothing to indicate that complainant  She had no signs of extragenital injury nor any kind of injury for that matter
was injured in her struggle to resist the acts of the accused
 The unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint against the appellants
 There was no torn dress or underwear because she was then wearing pants and
 The presumption that Filipino women are modest and would not falsely say that
brief at the time of the incident.
she was raped does not apply because Elvira is not a typical Filipino woman.
 The general rule on the credibility of the victim's testimony in a rape case
 The defense of denial and alibi are weak but the prosecution must rely on the
"In weighing the testimony of the complainant in an accusation for rape, strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense
the rule often applied by the courts is that the testimony of the victim,
whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded credence
because such offended party would not have fabricated facts that could – Sam Rosales
bring shame and dishonor on her. Nor would she disclose her humiliating
experience it in public trial, and thus give rise to gossip and slander,
unless her motive was to bring to justice the person who grievously
wronged her."
PEOPLE V. CASTRO
 The complainant narrated the incident in a straight forward and convincing manner. PADILLA, J. / MAY 6, 1991
She was steadfast in the fact that she was the victim of rape. The very fact that she
came out forward in this case is in itself a silent but persuasive evidence of an FACTS:
outrage done upon her honor
 Diana Rose Castro was playing with a neighbor outside their house, in the Castro
 Complainant is a "tomboy" and as such, she is sexually attracted to persons of her compound, sometime on 4 October. Then she was pulled by her Kuya Delfin, first
own sex rather than to the male specie. She would not willingly submit herself to a cousin of her mother, inside a bathroom
sexual intercourse with a male person as suggested by the appellants
 He prevented her from going out, and made her stand on the toilet bowl.

 He put up her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite
ABAD SANTOS, J., Dissenting: her efforts to pull away, he inserted his private part into her causing pain.
 The Filipino woman as a rule is an abstainer even after she has reached maturity.
Elvira's conduct in joining a group of men she didn’t know in a drinking spree casts a  Then he told her to go home
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 At home, she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because it
was hurting and painful.
 After 2 days, Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother, was asked by her husband
to find out why Diana was crying. She inspected Diana’s private parts and saw that
they were swollen. At first Diana said "nasabit sa hiyero." Then Diana told her the
above narration.
 Because of the revelation, Diana’s grandmother brought her to the NBI. The NBI
doctor discovered that the genital parts were contused or bruised meaning that it
was subject to some amount of force or it could have come in contact with a hard
object, the trauma has to be recent, just matter of days before the date of the
examination, the hymen was NOT lacerated, and the injury or trauma could have
been caused by the insertion of a male organ.
 They filed a case against Delfin.
 Delfin's alibi and the RTC’s refutation:
 A day before the day Diana was “raped”, Diana went to his house while he was
taking a bath. She was crying and went inside the bathroom. When asked by
the accused why, she replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose
two (2) hind legs were limping, chased her and so she tripped. He told Diana to
go out, he proceeded to dress up and saw the victim playing outside. court’s
reply: dog whose two hind legs are limping chasing Diana while she was going
down the stairs? If this were so, the fall would cause abrasions, not hymenal
contusions.
 morning of 4 October= he went to school and went to Dolores Rivera, a
godsister who worked in the treasurer's office of Adamson Univ to ask her to
type a term paper which was due that day. After submitting the term paper, he
treated his godsister to lunch. Around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he went
home. term papers are usually submitted at the end of the semester, not at the
beginning of the semester,
 Mrs. Teresita Castro's testimony said his son indeed arrived and ate lunch at
home and they talked of enmity between Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's
grandmother and their family. it was not physically impossible for him to be at
the place of the incident on October 4 as, by his evidence, he returned to his
PAGE 65
house after noontime no concrete proof that Diana's grandmother Jacinta
filed the case out of envy and malice since it would be unthinkable for
Jacinta to alienate her in-laws, the Castros, who stay w/ her in the
compound
 Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October, he was coerced and
tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape, which he did. Then he
decided to leave home and came back again after a few days if he was
innocent why would he leave home? what was he fleeing from?
ISSUE:
1. there is no rape because
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated and the victim is still a
virgin.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed. a finger could
have been used is absurd.
Held: for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that
there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the
female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime
of rape.
RATIO:
1 a.) usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter, making
it compatible with, or easily penetrable by an average size penis. Since Diana was only 6,
the male organ could not penetrate deeply and could go only as deep as the labia.
Hence hymen was not lacerated.
In any case, for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that
there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female
organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
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Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the
offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female
organ is sufficient.
Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
1 b.) Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not
improbable. Diana was made to stand on the toilet bowl so delfin could easily do that act as
she was too small and their private parts would not align unless she was elevated to a higher
position.
That a finger could have been used” suggestion is absurd. For if it were only a finger there
would have been no need to let Diana stand on the toilet bowl
Other points addressed by the court:
2. the alleged sinister motive of Diana's grandmother engendered by envy- what grandmother
would exact vengeance on her enemies at the perpetual humiliation and disrepute of her six
(6) year old granddaughter?
3. the issue of credibility- The prosecution's evidence is simple and straightforward. Delfin’s
counsel did not even offer proof of delfin’s enrollment at Adamson University where he was
supposed to have submitted a term paper. He can’t even identify the topic of his alleged term
paper.
4. diana’s propensity to tell lies- Court’s reply: Diana's testimony’s flaws are minor and only
with respect to dates. She is a young girl. Her testimony-delivered 4 times at the witness
stand- was consistent
5. coerced and tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape- not proven. Besides, this
allegedly coerced admission of guilt cannot negate the other positive evidence pointing to his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision: statutory rape w/ aggravating circumstance of moral ascendancy. reclusion
perpetua
– Fredda Rosete
PAGE 66
PEOPLE V. ATENTO
CRUZ, J. / APRIL 26, 1991
FACTS:
 Cesar Atento, a 39 year old storekeeper with a wife and 8 children, raped Glenda
Aringo (16) on 5 separate occasions.
st
 The 1 time was in April 1986 when she went to his store to buy some bread; he
was able to coax her into coming inside his home and succeeded in deflowering
her, given that it was just his 3 year old child with him that time. Afterwards, he
gave her PHP 5.
 When asked during trial regarding the subsequent carnal acts over her, she
described them as “masarap.”
 She claimed that she could not disclose such acts to her parents because the
accused threatened to kill her if she did. However, she got pregnant and
therefore had to reveal the truth. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy Hubert
Buendia Aringo.
 Atento denied the accusations arguing that it was a harassment complaint by one
of her relatives who wanted his property. Moreover, he described Aringo as a
female of loose morals who slept with other men and that she offered her body to
his 13 year old son for PHP 5.
 Aringo’s description of the act as pleasurable would have destroyed the case
against Atento except for one important fact: she was a mental retardate.
 Tests showed that she had a mental capacity of someone from 9-12 years of
rd
age. Her parents claimed that she stopped studying afer 3 grade. In addition
she would play games with younger children even after she had already given
birth.
ISSUE: WON Atento is guilty of rape there no being proof of coercion.
HELD: Yes, he may still be convicted of raped under either section 2 or 3 of Article 335 of
the RPC.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 According to Chief Justice Aquino’s book, in the rape of a woman deprived
of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will
determines the existence of rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when
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the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is
suffering from a mental deficiency her reason or free will. In that case, it is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to sexual
intercourse.
 Based on the tests conducted, it was declared that she was bereft of reason or
at the least, she had the mental development of someone below 12 years of
age, therefore qualifying her as a victim under section 3 of Article 335.
Furthermore, the court noticed that the child bore a resemblance to the
accused.
 Finally, the court cited past decisions wherein, the rape victims were mentally
deficient and that the accused were held liable for rape regardless of the age of
the victims; what factored more than their age was their retarded condition or
1 to escape. Upon her shouts for help, Primo was apprehended and was detained by the
deprivation of reason.
st
JUDGMENT: Atento convicted of rape but only on the 1 count.
− Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
− she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
BELLOSILLO, J:
HISTORICAL FACTS:
03 April 1990 – People v Orita. This case did away with frustrated rape, allowing only for
attempted rape and consummated rape in the statute books.
Consummated Rape – committed from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim. Perfect penetration is not essential; that any penetration of the female organ by a male
organ, however slight, is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina also warrants conviction.
Attempted Rape – no penetration but overt acts prior to penetration has been committed.
Penetration – entry into the labia or lips of the female organ. The “touching” of the penis to the
labia (or any external genitalia) must be viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part
of, the process of penile penetration. It is not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. The
touching must be tacked to the penetration itself.
1 See People v. Atutubo, People v. Palma, People v. Sunga, People v. Asturia.
PAGE 67
INSTANT FACTS:
25 April 1996. At 4pm, Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of 4-yr old victim Crysthel
nd
Pamintuan, went down from the 2 flr of their house to prepare Milo drinks for her 2
children. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was
busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting
Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children’s room
kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
Corazon’s testimony is that Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina. She then
cursed Primo and tried to box him to which the latter evaded, pulled his pants up, and tried
barangay officials. However, upon examination of Crysthel, no evident sign of extra-genital
physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer as her hymen was intact and its orifice
was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
There were no other witnesses so Primo testified for his own defense, assailing that the
charge was Corazon’s mere scheme against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He
asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical.
RTC found him guilty of statutory rape.
Primo’s contention is that the narration of Corazon was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He
claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel’s
younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing
Milo drinks for her daughters; that it was in the family compound where assistance is
almost readily available; that the door of the room was wide open for anyone outside to see
inside; and that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have
possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim.
In People v De la Peña - touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the
penis, are by their natural location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
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2 Although she may be young, her story appears to be true. Based on the child’s testimony,
consummated rape. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to
be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. plus the fact that the prosecution failed to proved their charge beyond reasonable doubt,
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, there can be no Primo cannot thus be held liable for consummated rape nor be sentenced to death.
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Lastly, the finding of the medico legal showed that there were no signs of physical injuries
nor were there any contact between the genitals that have happened. Hence, penetration
ISSUE: WoN based on the testimony given by Corazon, consummated rape can be deduced. could not have been made. This finding should be given due regard especially in rape
cases. To rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance
in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results.
HELD/RATIO:
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Primo’s penis did indeed and was able to penetrate
Crysthel’s vagina however slight. Corazon said that she saw Primo poking his penis on her DECISION: Modified to ATTEMPTED RAPE.
child’s vagina without actually explaining her relative position to them so as to enable her to
see clearly and sufficiently the “contact point”.
– Kaye Tamayao
But upon demonstration, she showed that the Primo’s chest is pinning the child down, while
his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim. It can
hence be inferred that unbridled observation is impossible for the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the fact that Primo’s
right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon’s view. It is
required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in
this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital PEOPLE V. GALLO
contact was at all achieved.
Crysthel herself clearly answered the questions asked to her:
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ? FACTS:
A: Yes, sir. The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ? Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond
A: No, sir. reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by this Court in its decision
promulgated on 22 January 1998.
Corazon also did not hint in any way that Primo’s penis was erect at the time but even
narrated that he had to hold his penis, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection. On 24 August 1999, Romeo Gallo filed a "Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court)"
Furthermore, Crysthel herself asserted that she resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
close together; consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line with the new Court rulings which
what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the
2 The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is
the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer ISSUE:
is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner 1) Whether Gallo’s relationship to the victim can be considered as a qualifying
surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner circumstance
surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora.
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2) Whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction
of accused-appellant.
HELD:
(1) information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or sometime the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force or intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13
year old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia.
The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim's father;
accordingly, accused-appellant's relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial,
cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance.
(2) decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and
effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is,
favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence
has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of
Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellant's prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. The motion to re-open the case is
GRANTED and the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by imposing on
accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetuain lieu of the death penalty and ordering
him to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
– Yan Yu
PAGE 69
PEOPLE V. BERANA
PART II. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
PEOPLE V. MAIDA TOMIO AND NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO
DAVIDE, JR., J. / SEPTEMBER 30, 1991
FACTS:
 Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-day
vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn
 On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having lunch alone at the coffee shop of the hotel,
2 Japanese men approached his table and asked him if he were a Japanese to which
he answered in the affirmative
 Later, he came to know one of the men as Maida Tomio and the other as Mitamura.
They joined him at his table and informed him that they have been in the Philippines
for quite a time and offered themselves as his guides in Manila
 Mitamura brought him to the sauna bath of the hotel and a department store in Manila.
Eventually, they ended up at the Leo's Restaurant located along Roxas Boulevard at
around 7:30 o'clock in the evening where they had dinner
 Before leaving the restaurant, Nagao's companion placed a pack of cigarettes on his
(Nagao's) shirt pocket and him to just wait because he has to talk to a taxi driver. After
taking few steps from the restaurant, Nagao was approached by 5 plainclothesmen
who identified themselves as policemen. They bodily searched him and found the
pack of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen claimed contained marijuana.
Thereafter, the policemen brought him to the Southern Police District Station
 At the police station, accused-appellant Tagahiro Nakajima arrived. Later, Maida
Tomio also arrived. Both acted as interpreters for him. One of them inform him that if
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he is found guilty of possession of marijuana, he can sentenced from 6 to 12 years
imprisonment. The 2 then suggested that Nagao give money to the policemen who, they
claim, demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed. Thereafter, Maida
and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced the payment of the bribe money to
the policemen who, accordingly, agreed to release him
 Nagao returned to his hotel escorted by the appellants and a policeman. While there, his
escorts did not allow him to leave the hotel. They also demanded that he immediately call
up his parents in Japan for the money they allegedly advanced. Instead of calling up his
parents, he called up a friend and told him of his predicament. The three escorts stayed
with him in the hotel up to 10:00 o'clock the following morning. Thereafter, they checked
out and transferred to the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Appellants again ordered
Nagao to call up his parents. Later, appellants transferred Nagao to the Philippine Village
Hotel where they again asked him to call up his father in Japan about the money.
Nagao's father refused to pay the amount demanded but when Sato talked to him over
the phone, he agreed to pay three million yen
 From the Philippine Village Hotel, Nagao was brought by the appellants to the Virra
Condominium in Makati. When he called up his father upon orders of the appellants, he
learned that his father had already remitted money to the Rizal Commercial and Banking
Corporation (RCBC) in Makati. Appellants then brought Nagao to RCBC where he
withdrew U.S. $1,850.00 and gave it to them. Upon leaving the bank, they were met by
policemen from the Western Police District whose help had been earlier sought on May
8, 1986 by the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Appellants and Nagao were brought to the
Western Police District for investigation
 Appellants were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention
 On 27 May 1986, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the
death penalty and to pay the costs
 Maida and Nakajima alleged that they were only acting as interpreters for Nagao and
lending assistance as Nagao is only a tourist with no friends or family in the Philippines.
They further alleged that they themselves are victims as they were beaten up and robbed
by the police
ISSUE: Are Maida and Nakajima guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention?
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HELD:
 Yes Maida and Nakajima are guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention .
 The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully
designed plan to kidnap Nagao in order to obtain ransom from him
 The Court was not persuaded by the theory of the appellants that money involved was
not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills (as claimed by Nakajima) or for
reimbursement of the sum they advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel
accommodations and additional expenses spent for complainant (as claimed by
Maeda). In the first place, none of them claimed that either or both of them advanced
the money to the police. As a matter of fact, Nakajima testified that he saw the
complainant counting the money
 If indeed the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the money "paid" to the police,
and that they were merely motivated by a desire to help a fellow Japanese in distress,
why did they have to bring him from one expensive hotel to the other, thereby
incurring more expenses? Why did they not bring him to their homes, as the trial court
asked, if only to show their genuine concern for him?
 Even if there was created a simple loan contract between appellants and Nagao, as
asserted by Maida, the deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have
been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. It was not
necessary for Maida and his co-accused Nakajima to deprive the complainant of his
liberty to compel him to pay the alleged loan
 This should not, however, end the story of Nagao. As adverted to earlier, other
parties, Mitamura, a Japanese national, and the five policemen from the Southern
Police District, could be deeply involved in the conspiracy to kidnap Nagao for
ransom. Our examination of the records fails to show that Mitamura and the
policemen were investigated or prosecuted in connection with this case. This Court
would be remiss in its duty if it were to close its eyes on this matter, more specifically
on the alleged involvement of the policemen. Policemen are supposed to enforce the
law, protect the people, and maintain peace and order. At the people's expense, they
don the uniform of authority and are allowed to carry the instruments of legal violence.
As such, they are bound to faithfully adhere to the Constitutional directive to be at all
times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency. When they fail in that sacred duty and become the lawbreakers,
they have no business staying a minute longer in their offices and wearing their
uniforms. They deserve nothing but the severest criminal and administrative penalties
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the law provides. The people's taxes should never be used to maintain and support
scalawags in our law enforcement agencies who may use their uniforms and their
lawfully issued weapons as convenient shields or instruments for the perpetration of their
evil deeds. Accordingly, We direct the Philippine National Police to conduct a thorough
investigation, if none has been done so far, into the involvement of the five policemen of
the Southern Police District and, should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate
criminal and administrative cases against them. As regards Mr. Mitamura, if he is still in
the Philippines, efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in
coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and
prosecuted, should the evidence warrant. No alien should be allowed to abuse Philippine
hospitality and make our country a happy hunting ground for his criminal activities.
RULING: Upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the guilt of the accused for
the crime charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the trial court committed
no error in convicting them accordingly. In view, however, of Section 19(1) of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which abolishes the death penalty and provides that any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, the penalty imposed
by the trial court is deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua.
– Wes Aquende
PEOPLE V. MERCADO
RELOVE, J. / AUGUST 30, 1984
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Rizal
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version (upheld by the court):
Accused was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant Yvonne
Baylon. Susan left the family residence for an unknown place. The accused suspected that it
was Yvonne who instigated her to leave. While Yvonne was walking on a road, the accused
came from behind her, grabbed her by the neck, pointed a knife on her throat, and dragged
Yvonne to the house of Norma Guerrero, a friend of his. Upon reaching the porch of the
house, Yvonne asked the accused why he was acting that way. The accused replied that he
was angry with her and demanded that she produce her sister, Susan. At this juncture, the
accused dragged Yvonne this time to the road side. Then the brothers of Yvonne and some
neighbors arrived asking the accused to release Yvonne. But instead of doing so, the accused
raised the blouse of Yvonne and inserted his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her
PAGE 71
breast. Thereafter, the accused dragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police and
some policemen talked to him. The accused told the Chief of Police that he wanted to see
Susan and also demanded that he be given transportation and money. This situation lasted
up to about 12:00 noon with the policemen surrounding the accused and Yvonne about 15
meters away. After being given some food to partake, the barrio captain arrived and he
was able to take hold of the accused and subdue hint him. Yvonne, becauseof the
traumatic experience she was subjected to, lost consciousness and was brought to the
hospital. Her fingers suffered injuries, abrasion on her neck and a small wound on her
stomach.
Mercado maintains that it was Yvonne who wanted to stab him and he was able to grab the
knife from her. Also, that he did not ask for any money.
TC convicted Mercado of illegal detetion and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
SC HELD:
 Mercado’s argument that he should be convicted of grave coercion only is
without merit.
 In the People vs. Ablaza case, “the victim was actually restrained or deprived of
her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of herein accused, under
Art. 267 of the RPC. The surrounding circumstances make it clear that the main
purpose of Annabelle’s detention was to coerce her into withdrawing her previous
charges against appellant Ablaza, thus obstructing the administration of justice.”
 Evidence shows that “the accused held complainant because he wanted her to
produce her sister, Susan, who was the common-law wife of the accused.”
 Mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be invoked in favor of
the accused because relationship with her was illegitimate.
 Mercado should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment.
NOTE: Deprivation of liberty in this case is incidental but it is still under Art. 267.
DISPOSITION: Decision appealed from is affirmed with costs.
*Elements of the crime of Illegal Detention
1. Offender is a private individual
2. That he kidnaps and detains another or in any manner deprive him of his liberty
3. the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal
In the commission of the crime, ANY of the ff. circumstances is present:
(a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or
(b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or
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(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
– Anj Balacano
PEOPLE V. DEL SOCORRO
PEOPLE V. LIM
GUTIERREZ, J. / OCTOBER 18, 1990
FACTS:
 One morning, Aida (10 y/o) and her sister Avelyn (7) were sent on an errand by their
father to buy rice in Masbate. The two went to the pier to wait for their mother but
since she did not arrive, they proceeded to a movie house to see a picture. They
were called by Carmen Lim whose house was in front of the movie house. She took
the two, fed them, bathed and dressed them.
 For 15 days, Aida stayed with Lim, while Avelyn was taken by Lim’s sister to Cebu
th
on the same day that the two met Lim. On the 15 day, Aida’s father went to Lim
and asked Lim to let Aida go with him, but he failed. The next day, he came again
accompanied by Sgt. Ariate. This time, Aida went with her father.
 Lim was charged and convicted for kidnapping but she contends that the kids said
that they were driven away by their father and that she only took them in as she was
concerned for their safety. And when Aida’s father came, it was Aida who refused
to go with him because she was afraid that her father might beat her up.
ISSUE: WON there was a kidnapping in this case
HELD:
No, there was no kidnapping. The two minors entered Lim’s residence voluntarily and the fact
of detention, an essential element in kidnapping was not clearly established. There was no
actual confinement of the person of the minor, as there was no indication that Aida was
physically restrained of her liberty. She had free access going in and out of Lim’s residence.
PAGE 72
Another circumstance was Aida’s actuation when her father came. She did not cling
immediately to him but she just observed her father and Lim as they talked for some time.
The father also executed an affidavit of desistance saying that his children were not
kidnapped after all. Lastly, there is no motive for Lim to detain the two and keep them to
do household chores. She is a woman of sufficient means and if she wanted to employ
another maid, she could have done so without having to kidnap the two kids. Lim is
acquitted.
– May Calsiyao
PEOPLE V. PADICA
PEOPLE V. RAMOS
PER CURIAM / OCT. 12, 1998
FACTS:
 On July 13, 1994, 6:30 a.m., while driving his daughter Michelle to school, Malcolm
Bradshaw, an American pastor, saw a Alicia Abanilla struggling to break away from
the arms of Benedicto “Bennie” Ramos. Bradshaw stopped his car and blew his horn
to attract Abanilla’s attention. She was able to run away from Ramos and into
Bradshaw’s car, but Ramos caught up with her and squeezed himself into the same
car.
 Bradshaw turned into White Plains Avenue, where Ramos held Bradshaw at gunpoint
and told him to go straight ahead. While they were driving along, Abanilla gave her
wallet to Michelle and told her to look for some medicine. Ramos and Abanilla had a
conversation about a certain Cecil, whom they both apparently knew.
 Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue, Ramos told Bradshaw to stop at Project 4, where
he (Ramos) got off. While being pulled out of the car, Abanilla was able to whisper to
Bradshaw, telling him to inform her family of what happened.
 Bradshaw saw a receipt that fell out of Abanilla’s wallet during the car trip; it contained
her name and residence phone number. He dropped off his daughter at school and
then called the number on the receipt; the maid told him that she had already left for
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work at Meralco. Bradshaw later learned that from someone at Meralco that Ramos was
apparently holding Abanilla for ransom.
 In the meantime, Abanilla was able to call her boss informing the latter that she needed
P200,000 without telling him why. She instructed it to be delivered to Glori Supermarket
at Sikatuna Village by Inday, a lady messenger at Meralco.
 Abanilla and Ramos took a taxi driven by Antonio Pineda from Project 4 to Glori
Supermarket. Ramos gave Pineda P700 to wait so that the latter can take them to
Norzagaray, to which Pineda agreed.
 Inday arrived at the scene and handed the money to Pineda, who had Abanilla’s ID as
proof that Abanilla was with him. He also allowed Inday to see Abanilla through the taxi
window.
 After the delivery was made, the three (Abanilla, Ramos, and Pineda) sped off to
Norzagaray. On the way, Ramos changed his mind and decided to head for Bocaue.
During the entire trip, Abanilla began to feel uneasy and pale.
 During an interval where Pineda was asked to leave the taxi by Ramos during a stopover
at a hospital, Pineda noticed that Abanilla appeared to be trying to escape. He looked
closer and saw Ramos trying to strangle Abanilla in the taxi. Despite Pineda’s pleas that
the two leave his taxi, Ramos ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway
where they would take another ride.
 On the way, Pineda saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, so he stopped, got off, and
informed Domanais of what happened. Domanais peeped into the taxi, and Abanilla told
him that Ramos was trying to hurt her. At that moment, Ramos pulled out his gun, and
Domanais and Pineda ran for cover. Ramos then started the car, and as Abanilla tried to
jump out of the cab, her blouse was caught. Ramos stopped the car and shot Abanilla
twice in the nape, killing her. Ramos was arrested the same day and was charged with
kidnapping for ransom with murder.
 Ramos claims that the whole incident arose out of him accosting Abanilla, his ninang, at
EDSA that day to demand the financial support that the latter promised for Ramos’ wife
Cecil, who was about to give birth. They were on their way to visit Cecil when they were
PAGE 73
stopped by a traffic aide for reasons he does not know, eventually leading to the fatal
shooting by an unknown person.
 Ramos was found guilty of two separate crimes, kidnapping for ransom and murder,
instead of the complex crime alleged in the information.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the incident resulted in the victim’s deprivation of liberty and detention so as to
amount to a guilty charge for kidnapping – YES.
2. WON there is sufficient proof that the incident was perpetrated by Ramos for money,
and that he in fact received such money – YES.
3. WON the crime committed is two separate crimes or a special complex crime,
punished by the RPC as amended by RA 7659 – IT IS A SPECIAL COMPLEX
CRIME.
RATIO:
 The crime of kidnapping involves actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty with intent to
effect such restraint on the person’s liberty. In this case, the actual restraint on the
victim’s liberty was evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by Ramos
from going to work and taken to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was restricted by
the threat of a gun.
 From the narration of the witnesses, there are at least 3 instances when Abanilla tried
to escape (at EDSA, the hospital incident with Pineda outside the taxi, and the last-
ditch effort at MacArthur Highway). If there was really no restraint, there would have
been no reason to attempt to escape.
 Also established by witnesses is the imminent threat on Abanilla’s life. This makes
evident the fact that she was at the mercy of Ramos.
 The defense that such acts were only a matter of persuasion is untenable because the
methods of force and pressure employed by Ramos indicate otherwise.
 By his own admission, Ramos did indeed ask for money from Abanilla, and that this
was in the tenor of a demand, not a favor. Also, the sum of P200,000 is too hefty if
Ramos’ only aim was to cover his wife’s hospital expenses.
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 In cases of kidnap for ransom, it is not necessary that the accused himself make the
ransom call for him to be convicted, nor that he himself receive the money.
 Where the victim was kidnapped for a purpose other than killing him, the old provision in
the RPC punishes the offender with two separate crimes. However, this was amended by
RA 7659, which provided that “when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention, is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed”. This case falls under this classification.
***The court discusses the credence accorded to witnesses Pineda and Domanais. I don’t
think it’s all that relevant, but read it anyway, just to prove we read the case in the original.
JUDGMENT: Ramos found guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder.
– Jahzeel Cruz
PEOPLE V. VICENTE TY AND CARMEN TY
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: In 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter, Arabella (7 months old) for
treatment at Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic which was owned by the appellants.
Arabella was confined for 3 days, after which she was ready to be brought back home but
Johanna was not around to take her. A week later, Johanna came back but did not have
enough money to pay the bill. Johanna confided to Dr. Ty that no one would take care of the
child at home because she was working. Upon learning about the rate of the nursery, she
decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was
transferred from the ward to the nursery. Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and
accumulate. A yaya for Arabella was hired upon the suggestion of Dr. Ty. Arabella was then
transferred from the nursery to the extension of the of the clinic which served as residence for
the hospital staff.
From then on nothing was heard of Johanna. Efforts to get in touch with her were
unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number. Eventually, the hospital staff took
turns in taking care of Arabella.
2 years after Arabella was abandoned, She was entrusted to a guardian named
Lilibeth Neri. In 1992, Johanna came back to claim her daughter. She filed a petition for
habeaus corpus but it was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, she filed a
criminal case against the appellants. She then filed another petition for habeas corpus
PAGE 74
against the alleged guardians of her daughter: Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Alviar which
was granted by the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision which
the SC affirmed.
ISSUE: WON respondents are guilty of kidnappying and failure to return a minor.
DECISION: No.Acquitted.
REASONING: It is to be noted that in this Court has held that Johanna does not have the
right of custody over Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed, Cristina has not been
shown to be her daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not
warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. In this case, the
testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of
Arabella from Cristina.
It is noted the Dr. Trono (Johanna’s own witness) testified that together with
Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic so she could not be certain whether it
was Arabella or some other baby given to respondents. Even Johanna claims that she
saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the clinic which corroborates the
testimony of Dr. Ty that Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November 1987
to April 1989. Thus, when respondents obtained custody of Cristina in April 1988 and had
her baptized in the same month, this leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.
Since, Johanna has not established that she is entitled to the custody of Cristina,
it cannot be said that respondents are unlawfully withholding from her the rightful custody
of Cristina.
However, even if Cristina were Arabella, the criminal case against the accused
must still fail. Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor can be had, 2
elements must concur:
a.the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor
b.the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians.
It is to be noted that what is being punished is the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. This refusal must
be deliberate and persistent. Corpus Juris Secundum defines deliberate
As a Verb
The word is derived from two Latin words which means literally 'concerning' and 'to weight;'
it implies the possession of a mind capable of conceiving a purpose to, and the exercise of
such mental powers as are called into use by the consideration and weighing of the
consequences of the act; and has been defined as meaning to consider, reflect, take
counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed course of action; to
consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon,
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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or weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh the motives for an act
and its consequences, with a view to a decision thereon.
As an Adjective
The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the end
proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and is
based upon an intention accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully
conscious of its own purpose and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully
considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed purpose, formed after
careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or consequences of an act
or measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable
consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and arguments
with a view to a choice of decision; well-advised.
In the case, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure of the accused
to restore the custody of Arabella to Johanna. When the accused learned that Johanna
wanted her daughter back after 5 years, they tried their best to help her find the child since the
latter was no longer under the clinic’s care. Dr. Ty was the one who personally went to the
guardian’s residence and informed them that Johanna wanted her daughter back. When the
guardians refused to return the child, Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the NBI which conducted
a conference among the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody remained
with the guardians. The efforts taken by the accused to help Johanna in finding the child
clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore
the child to her mother. It is also worthy to note that their conduct from the moment the child
was left in the clinic’s care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was
motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child.
– Tim Guanzon
ANTONIO A. LAMERA V. COURT OF APPEALS
DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUNE 5, 1991
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro
Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle
then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes
and Paulino Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries and an
PAGE 75
information on abandonment of one's victim. The MTC found them guilty of the crime of
abandonment of one's victim. Petitioner appealed but the RTC affirmed with modification
the decision by reducing the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months. On
review, the Court of Appeals dismissed petition.
ISSUE: WON there could be a valid charge for alleged abandonment when he was
previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
physical injuries”.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually
invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically
state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant
absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely
that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile
exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294
before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former
was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27
April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must
have been arraigned in the previous case. In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Since the informations were for separate offenses the first against a person and the second
against public peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule
on double jeopardy.
Moreover, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element
of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information
against petitioner in this case does not so allege.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the
two informations against petitioner.
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– Blanca Labay
PEOPLE V. TIMBOL
FACTS:
 Nicolas Timbol, introducing himself to be a member of the CID, went to Rufino
Flores’ house (with the alleged intention of investigating Flores’ alleged membership
to the HUKs).
 As part of the “investigation”, Timbol asked that he be left alone with Flores’ wife,
Francisca, for questioning.
 As Timbol was asking questions, he started to make sexual advances on Francisca,
attempting to kiss her and touch her private parts. Francisca, of course, refused
Timbol’s advances.
 Timbol told her that her husband will be killed if she won’t submit to what he wants.
 In the end, Timbol left attempting to take Rufino with him. Francisca, as an attempt
to stop the “arrest”, (while being alone again with the accused) promised that she
will go with him the next day
 Francisca filed charges of acts of lasciviousness against Timbol. Tombol alleges
that he was “pardoned” by Francisca’s husband.
 The lower court convicted him of acts of lasciviousness and grave threats,
nonetheless.
ISSUE/S:
WON Timbol can be convicted of Grave Threats.
WON the “pardon” extinguishes Timbol’s liability.
HELD / RATIO:
 NO. The threats made, by Timbol, not to the offended party but to his wife who was
abused, cannot be considered a separate and independent crime. At most, it forms
part of the element of intimidation that the accused used to succeed in his lewd
designs. The acts of lasciviousness is aggravated by the circumstances of craft
(pretending to be a CID officer) and dwelling.
 NO. Pardon which was not given by the offended party herself, but by her husband,
ad that the same was granted by the latter after the filing of the complaint, cannot
extinguish the criminal liability of the accused, for it was already held in People vs.
Infante that even a pardon given after the presentation of the complaint will not
operate in favor of the excused and exonerate him.
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– Felman Magcalas
REYES V. PEOPLE
JOSE TIMONER V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CA
ESCOLIN, J. / NOVEMBER 25, 1983
FACTS:
 At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, Timoner, then Mayor of
Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel
Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along
Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of
petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence
off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among
the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the
complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.
These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal
Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements.
 Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their
stalls. The complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well
as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
 Petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the
offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. The court
exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as
principal by inducement. The CA affirmed.
 Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was
done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by Timoner was under lawful authority as they
were in abatement of a public nuisance
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HELD: YES. The act of Timoner in sealing off Dayaon’s barbershop was legal and does not
constitute grave coercion.
RATIO:
 Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as
defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one
that is not included in the foregoing definition.
 The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main
thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil
Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se (... there is no
semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a
stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does
not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the
street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the
unsightly and ugly structures in the said place.. even if it is claimed and pretended
that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and
living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a
nuisance per se.. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that
the structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded
defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to demolish
the stall and vacate the premises immediately ... )
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 even without the judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted
for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code
authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings.
ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
[2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
 In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the
aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in
good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
 Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall
by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." The
three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or
compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such
display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the
offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of
another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not
made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
 The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held
guilty of grave coercion.
Judgment of CA set aside. Timoner is acquitted.
– Joy Montes
LEE V. CA
PARTIES: FRANCIS LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
PELAGIA PAULINO DE CHIN
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FACTS:
 Maria de Chin’s Version: De Chin is an employee of Pacific Banking Corporation. At 10
am of 20 June 1984, Lee, branch manager of the bank, summoned her to go to the
office. Lee confronted her about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check, which
de Chin allegedly deposited to the account of one Honorio Carpio. During the
confrontation, Lee shouted and threatened to file charges against her unless she
returned all the money subject to the cashier check. Se was then forced to prepare a
withdrawal slip and was made to admit in an affidavit that she had swindled the bank and
had returned the money equivalent of the spurious check. She was watched by the
guards and was not allowed to leave until 6 p.m. She was 5 months pregnant during this
incident.
 Francis Lee’s Version: De Chin told Carpio to open a savings account with the bank.
After which, she presented a Midland National Bank Cashier’s check payable to Carpio in
the sum of $5,200. De Chin assured PRO manager Cruz that the check would be
honored and so the former accepted the check and credited the money to Carpio’s
account. On the same day, de Chin withdrew from the same account P12,607, saying
that Carpio allegedly left abroad. On 13 June 1984, she withdrew P80,000 and closed
the account. She deposited P50,000 to her own account and received in cash the
remaining P30,000. Because of these events, Lee invited de Chin to his office and he
merely informed her about the subject fake dollar check that was deposited with said
bank account upon her assurance that it was genuine. He did not compel her to sign any
withdrawal slip and return the money nor to execute the affidavit.
 MTC: Lee guilty of grave coercion
 RTC: Lee guilty of light coercion
 CA: Lee guilty of grave coercion
ISSUE: WON Lee is guilty of light or grave coercion. NEITHER.
RATIONALE:
 Art 286. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 shall be
imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel
him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
 De Chin is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures.
 Lee’s threat to file charges was not a proof of coercion. He was merely enforcing his right
as the bank manager in facilitating the operations and protecting the bank from
fraudulent transactions. There is nothing unlawful in threatening to sue.
 Art 1335. There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled
by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his
PAGE 78
person or property or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of
the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in
mind. A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority if the
claim is just or legal does not vitiate consent.
 The circumstances reveal that the complainant despite her protestations, indeed
voluntarily consented to all the aforementioned acts. There is a difference in giving
consent reluctantly, and not giving it at all due to an irresistible force.
 De Chin herself admitted that not one of the bank guards or officers manifested any
overt acts in preventing her to leave. She was even allowed to eat her snack outside
and return to the office.
 De Chin also refused to sign the promissory note in spite of alleged threats of Lee.
Intimidation must be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to her
person during all of the time the act is being committed.
JUDGMENT: Acquitted.
– Giselle Munoz
PEOPLE V. REYES ET AL.
HULL, J. / AUGUST 23, 1934
NATURE: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.
In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel
where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. As stated by the
lower court, "the term pabasa is applied to the act of the people, professing the Roman
Catholic faith," of assembling, during Lent, "at a certain designated place, for the purpose
of reading and chanting the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ. The pabasa in
Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any
interruption whatsoever, until Good Friday.
While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock,
the defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes
Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying
bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel.
Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to
persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it
was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the
evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
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When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard
thereof noticed what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in
such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over.
Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old
chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now
a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the
Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of the Clemente family. Appellants were
convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for offending religious feelings.
ISSUE: WON they should be convicted of offending religious feelings of unjust vexation.
HELD: They are guilty of unjust vexation.
RATIO: The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old
Penal Code war, denounced by article 671 and -was punished by arrest from one to ten days
and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal
Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as
an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or
both.
The act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The
fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which
the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the
parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many
of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi.
– Ryan Oliva
PEOPLE V. AÑONUEVO
FACTS:
 March 9, 1993 – at about 7:30 pm the family of Rufino Ereño (victim) was preparing
to retire for the night
 Fe Ereño was towards the rear of the house at the kitchen’s yard transferring the
small pig to a place inside the house for the evening. She was around three or four
brazas to where her husband was
PAGE 79
 she heard a gunfire and saw the accused at a distance of around one-half meter
to the house and at the side thereof where her husband lay
 she saw the accused, who was around three brazas to her, carrying a long gun
as he withdrew and ran away
 She dashed inside the house and saw her husband vomiting blood with injuries
at the left of the neck and towards the nape
 During the trial, Fe positively identified Añonuevo as the killer in her testimony
because it was a full moon and that she was able to see his whole body as he
began to retreat
 The trial court found the accused guilty of murder
ISSUE: WON there was treachery on the part of Añonuevo
HELD: There was no treachery
RATIO:
 the evidence fails to show that appellant's attack on Rufino Ereño was committed
with treachery
 The most that can be said in this case is that the victim was reclining at one side
of his one-room dwelling hut when he was shot, with the killer firing from outside
the hut
 there was no evidence, not even from the testimony of Fe Ereño, that the victim
was asleep, or that his back was turned to the accused when the latter fired the
shot, or was otherwise in a defenseless position
 All that Fe Ereño saw was her husband vomiting blood as she was outside the
hut when the killing happened
 It is elementary that alevosia, to be appreciated, must be proven as clearly as the
elements of the crime or crimes it is alleged to qualify. This the prosecution had
failed to do
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Decision appealed from
is hereby MODIFIED, in that the accused-appellant Pedrito Añonuevo y Boral is
found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE, and that the penalty imposed upon him is
the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum penalty,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as maximum
penalty. The P50,000.00 civil indemnity for the victim's death is hereby AFFIRMED,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. No costs.
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– Ramon Parel
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
NAPOLIS V. COURT OF APPEALS
FEBRUARY 28, 1972
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
 The spouses, Ignacio and Casimira Penaflor are the owners of a store that is adjoined to
their house.
 On October 1, 1956 at about 1:00 am, Mrs. Casimira Penaflor woke up to use the
bathroom. After using the bathroom she heard a few dogs barking which indicated that
there were strangers nearby. Casimira then woke up her husband and the latter upon
getting a flashlight and his .38 caliber revolver proceeded to the store to take a look.
 As he approached the door of the store, the door suddenly gave way, having been
pushed by 4 men, one of them holding a machine gun.
 Ignacio then fired his revolver but missed and he was subsequently given a blow to the
head knocking him down. Ignacio however did not lose consciousness but instead he
pretended to be dead. The men then hogtied Ignacio.
 The men then proceeded up to the house and one of the robbers asked Mrs. Penaflor for
money.
 Mrs. Penaflor took from under the mat a bag containing P2, 000 in cash and 2 rings
worth P350.00 and gave it to them. The robbers also ransacked the wardrobe of the
couple and took the revolver of Mr. Penaflor which was valued at P150.00
 The robbers then tied up Mrs. Penaflor along with the couple’s 2 sons and they were
then told to lie down and after doing so they were covered by blankets.
 After the robbers left, the spouses called for help and their neighbor, Councilor Almario
responded and untied them. The incident was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa
and the Philippine Constabulary.
 Chief of Police Delfin testified that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground
floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance.
 At the trial, the following were tagged as defendants: Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana,
Apolinario Satimbre, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Sonny Casimiro and Domingo
Flores. There were other defendants included in the information filed but they were
granted a separate trial, while others were not yet apprehended.
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 Napolis tried to establish an alibi, stating that he was in his house in Zambales
because he had a tooth extracted by a certain Dr. Maginas.
 The court dismissed the case against De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and Flores and
convicted Satimbre, Malana and Napolis for the crime of robbery in band
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUES:
 Was Napolis sufficiently identified?
 Was the extrajudicial confession of Napolis made under duress?
 Was the evidence presented by the prosecution contradictory?
 What is the character of the crime and what should the penalty be? (this is the
important issue)
HELD:
 Yes. Appellant Napolis was sufficiently identified.
 No. Confession was not tainted with duress
 No. Evidence is not contradictory
 The crime is Robbery in an Inhabited Place under Art. 299 of the RPC and the penalty
is the one prescribed under Art. 299 following Art. 48 of the RPC
RATIO:
 Napolis was sufficiently identified
 Appellant argues that the identification made by Mrs. Penaflor was due to a
picture taken from the police files of Olongapo, Zambales and shown to her
before appellant was apprehended and that his identification was the result of the
suggestion of the police officer who showed her the picture is devoid of factual
basis.
 The record shows that the authorities were notified immediately and that based
on the description Mrs. Penaflor gave, 2 individuals were presented to her which
she both exonerated as not being the thief.
 Lt. Sacramento, the police officer who showed the police files did not in any way
suggest appellant to be the thief. In fact, it was Mrs. Penaflor who told Lt.
Sacramento that the person in the photo was the thief.
 The fact that Mrs. Penaflor exonerated 2 suspects shows that appellant would
not have been identified by her if she were not reasonably certain about it.
 Mrs Penaflor’s identification can be given ample weight since it was the appellant
who directly demanded the money from her and it was to him that the money and
rings were delivered. It was also appellant who tied her and her children up as
well as the one who ransacked the wardrobe.
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 Since the time it all took place was around 10-20 minutes, Mrs. Penaflor’s eyesight
had ample time to adjust to the existing conditions.
 Confession was not made under duress.
 The findings of fact of the lower court established that the extrajudicial confession
was not tainted with duress and should not be disturbed.
 Appellant testified before the provincial fiscal of his extrajudicial confession and that
the same was valid and he was not coerced in doing so. The provincial fiscal even
examined the appellant and found no signs of physical violence on the person.
 Prosecution evidence not contradictory.
 Appellants contention that the testimonies are contradictory since Mr. Penaflor said
the thieves entered his house by forcing it open while Mrs Penaflor said that their
entrance was effected through an excavation on the side of the house and the
Police affirmed her statement by stating that the malefactors removed a piece of
wood and an adobe stone to get into the house, does not hold.
 The house of the Penaflors consisted of 2 parts. One is the store and the other is
the dwelling proper. Mrs. Penaflor testified that the culprits entered the store by
removing the adobe stone from a wall which was affirmed by the police. Mr.
Penaflor on the other hand, testified that the door the thieves broke was the one
leading into the dwelling proper and not the store.
 The crime committed is Robbery in an Inhabited Place pursuant to Art. 299 of the RPC
and not Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons pursuant to Art. 294 of
the RPC. The penalty to be applied is the one prescribed in Art. 299 of the RPC following
Art 48 which provides for the penalty in complex crimes
 The Court of Appeals and the RTC convicted Napolis and his co-accused with the
crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein
having been made by breaking a wall as provided in Article 299(a) of the RPC. In
addition however, the malefactors also used violence and intimidation against the
spouses Penaflor thereby infringing Art. 294 of the RPC under conditions falling
under sub-paragraph (5) which provides for a lighter penalty than that of Art. 299.
The CA and the Trial Court therefore ruled that although the robbery committed was
in an inhabited house, it is likewise characterized by intimidation or violence, which
factor supplies the controlling qualification. The lower courts therefore applied Art.
294 based on the theory that robbery which is characterized by violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed
by force of things because there is greater disturbance of the order of society and
the security of the individual even though the penalty to be applied in Art. 294 is
lighter than that of Art. 299.
 The above-mentioned view of the RTC and the CA defies logic! Pursuant to the
above view, aside from performing one of the acts punishable under Art 299, the
thief lays a hand upon any person, without committing any of the injuries mentioned
PAGE 81
in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294, the imposable penalty under
subparagraph (5) shall be much lighter than that of Art. 29.
 The argument of the CA that the violence or intimidation supplies the controlling
qualification is not sufficient to justify the resultant penalty. The CA correctly
stated that “violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed upon force upon things”, but precisely for this
reason, the Supreme Court cannot accept the conclusion that the penalty be
reduced pursuant to Art. 294 even though what was committed was more
serious.
 It is more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only when robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an
inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299.
 It is more logical to hold that when the elements of both provisions are present,
the crime is a complex one as provided for in Art. 48 of the RPC.
 The penalty to be imposed then is the more serious offense in its maximum
period.
 The penalty to be applied to the case at bar then should be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period.
JUDGMENT: Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION of
the penalty.
– Jecky Pelaez
PEOPLE V. BIRUAR
CONCEPCION, JR., J. / 25 JULY 1984
PARTIES:
Respondents: Biruar, Ruslin, Lim, Dy Caturan, Seneres, Raboy Galliano
FACTS:
 Review of the decision of the CFI of Davao finding Lim, Dy, Caturan, Seneres,
Raboy and Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson and Robbery
with Homicide and Physical Injuries.
 1966 - Raboy and Seneres entered the house of the Mosendes, pretending they
were relatives. Upon entering, they were able to take away a shotgun and
P170.00. They left and headed towards the house of George Kalitas.
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 The accused started firing at the house of Kalitas. They were joined by Lim, Galliano
and Dy who started to set fire to the house. The men broke open the door with an
axe. Once inside, they stole P40,000.00 and some old coins.
 When the crime was reported to the authorities, the police ran chased a green Buick
which was identified as the getaway car. Dy, who was found inside the car, claimed
that Biruar owned it. The police eventually apprehended all the accused.
 Summary of the defenses of the accused:
 Biruar - His involvement with the crime lies solely in being the owner of the
getaway car. He claimed that he came to Davao City only to renew a license;
that he stayed in a hotel where he met Lim who borrowed his car, allegedly to
bring his pregnant wife to the hospital.
 Lim - he claimed that he in fact used his car to bring his wife to the hospital. But
in addition, he used Biruar's car to go to Mati, Davao Oriental without Biruar's
permission. With all the accused, including Gallano who was supposedly only a
guide, they went to the house of Kalitas to collect P15,000 which the latter
owed to Lim. That Kalitas became agitated and drew his pistol which resulted
in a struggle between them. He claimed the neighbors even fired upon them,
but Kalitas shouted to his men that they should just surrender their firearms to
Lim's group. They left Kalitas bleeding. In short, he raised self-defense.
 Dy - he was simply helping out guarding Biruar's car when Lim was in the
hospital with his wife. He self-contradicted himself, however, with some
material facts during cross examination.
 Raboy - he claimed he just went to Davao to take a vacation; that Biruar called
him to help him find his missing car; that when they didn't find it, he slept with
Biruar in the hotel to look for it again the next day and it was during this time
that they were accosted. He denied knowing the other accused.
 Gallano - general denial.
 Caturan - he was asked by his employer Lim to accompany him to Mati to
supposedly bring that latter's wife to the hospital. That he didn't know that that
true purpose of Lim was to rob a house; that he stayed in the car to guard it
while the group walked towards the house and he just heard gunshots.
 Seneres - he claimed he only went to Davao City to deliver shrimps for a public
market; that like Raboy, he was just called by Biruar to help him find his
missing car.
 Trial court rejected the denials and excuses of the defendants except that of Biruar's
and Ruslin's, who was just sleeping with Lim when the latter was arrested. Their
claims of alibis are unavailing against the positive identification of the witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the defendants of ...
PAGE 82
HELD: NO convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
RATIO:
 The claim of Lim is improbabale and unbelievable.
 Why would he bring four armed men just to collect money from an old man?
Why go there at midnight?
 If indeed Kalitas owed Lim the money, why would he provoke the four
armed men when he's a lone sickly, old man who is also a paraplegic? The
fact that Kalitas was shot during he struggle was true, as confirmed by other
witnesses. If so, how could he have drawn his pistol?
 As for the claim that the neighbors also started firing upon them and Kalitas
ordered them to stop and surrender their firearms, how could a sick man,
shot at a vital part of his body shout and give orders? Its is also illogical as
our natural instinct would tell us to flee from a scene where there is a
dangerous foe, instead of surrendering.
 The testimony of Mosende regarding the robbery in his house is also impugned
as improbable because he had testified that the accused Raboy and Señeres
had announced their presence before coming to the house, which they need not
have done in order to rob the couple.
 While it may be true that the accused had made known their presence to
Mosende and that the latter had invited them to come up his house,
Mosende did so because he thought that the callers were relatives of his
wife. It does not render his story improbable considering that the incident
happened in the rural areas where the people are generally more
hospitable. Besides, Mosende is a poor man and he had no reason to
expect that he would be robbed.
 Defense counsel also claims that no robbery was committed in the house of
Kalitas since there is no positive evidence presented to show the existence of the
money allegedly taken as well as the act of taking the same. To support his
contention, the testimony of the wife of George Kalitas was quoted which shows
that the trunk where the money was kept was burned without its being opened.
Counsel further stated that the accused were apprehended within 48 hours after
the commission of the crime and yet the money stolen or a part thereof was not
traced to, nor recovered from the accused, much less presented in court.
 The contention is devoid of merit. It had been positively established that
Kalitas had kept money in a trunk placed under his bed which the accused
took on the night in question, which his daughter confirmed.
 The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion thereof, should
have been presented in evidence in order to make the transportation
credible, is untenable. Where the property stolen was not recovered, it
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would be impossible to present it in evidence. Besides, there is no law nor
jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to
prove that it had been taken away. The money could have been with the other
persons who were part of the crime but have not yet been apprehended.
 Moreover, the accused were not apprehended immediately after the
commission of the crimes, but a day later. The accused could have disposed of
the money before their arrest. The failure of the prosecution to present in
evidence the money stolen does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.
 It is also contended by the accused that only one offense was committed since the
robbery in the houses of Mosende and Kalitas is one continuing offense, committed
at the same time and on one occasion, and arising out of one criminal resolution,
and the burning of the house of Kalitas was the means to commit the crime of
robbery.
 The contention is without merit. The accused, after committing the crime of
robbery in band in the house of Mosende, went to the neighboring house of
George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries. Accused performed different acts with distinct
purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes. The burning of the
house of George Kalitas was not the means in committing the robbery.
 The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the defendants guilty of the crimes of
Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries.
 The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of motor vehicle, use of
unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The
use of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries since
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely
applicable to robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED, with some modifications on the damages. For lack of the
necessary affirmatory votes, the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
– Raina Quibral
PEOPLE V. MANGUBANAN
FELIX, J. / SEPTEMBER 28, 1956
PAGE 83
FACTS:
 11:00 o'clock in the evening of November 5, 1953 sounds of gunfire woke the
spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana's
mother, Monica del Mundo
 Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons
were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling
 someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, entered the
dining room and shouted that the door leading to the living room be opened.
When no one obeyed, the intruder removed 3 board pieces in the wall and
through the opening thus made he entered the living room
 The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana
Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door
leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 unknown persons entered.
 Agustin approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace
valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver
coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of
Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued
at P200. But not contented with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica
del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for
this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the
small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and that
unidentified personmade a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off
the blow with her right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put
his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling.
Afterwards, appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place.
 After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and
receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face
downward already dead.
ISSUE: WoN the crime committed was robbery with homicide
HELD: Yes. The crime committed was robbery with homicide
RATIO:
 In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery.
 It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that
the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as
it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
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circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime, that has to be taken into consideration
 The crime committed in the case at bar is the crime of robbery with homicide and
punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the offense was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior
strength and with the aid of armed men
 Appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment However, as the required
number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this
case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in
degree or reclusion perpetua
– Sam Rosales
PEOPLE V. CALIXTRO
ABAD SANTOS, J. / JULY 15, 1983
This is a case of robbery in band with homicide. Strangely enough the two persons who were
killed were not robbery victims, innocent bystanders or mere strangers; they were members of
the band. The amount stolen was the paltry sum of P150.00.
FACTS:
 At 2pm on Feb 6, a jeep with seven men stopped in front of the Rural Bank of San
Luis, , Batangas. Six men alighted from the jeep, while one man was left behind the
steering wheel. 3 proceeded to the bank and the rest took positions in front of the
bank
 Pio Cuevas, then Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon wearing a PC uniform and
armed w/ a carbine, entered first, followed by Calixtro and Mercado who were both
in civilian attire and were armed with short firearms.
 As Cuevas entered, he told the security guard of the bank, Julian Agojo, that the
Lieutenant, at the same time pointing to Calixtro, was going to apply for a loan.
Agojo then told them to proceed to the manager. Calixtro proceeded directly to the
cashier's table.
PAGE 84
 Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro, immediately grabbed the service
carbine of Agojo which rested on the wan near the door and poked it to the guard
shouting, 'dapa kayo, holdup ito, mamamatay kayo.'
 the bank manager and cashier who saw what had transpired, ran inside the
bank vault to hide
 Meanwhile Mercado poked a gun at one of the clients of the bank. As Agojo
grappled with Cuevas for the carbine, some shots which were not fired by
Cuevas or Agojo were heard from outside and inside the bank
 After the firing, both manager and cashier peeped from where they were hiding
and saw Calixtro take money from the cashier's table. They also saw Cuevas and
Agojo still grappling for the carbine
 The money taken from the cashier's table amounted to P150.00
 As Agojo, already wounded, continued to struggle with Cuevas for the carbine,
Cuevas shouted to his companions for help and another burst of shots were
fired. This time the three deployed outside the bank were seen firing towards the
bank while Calixtro and Mercado were shooting at Agojo as he grappled with
Cuevas.
 Cuevas, apparently hit, jerked, loosened his hold on the carbine, enabling Agojo
to wrest it from Cuevas. Cuevas, at that time, was near the door, facing the
interior of the bank with his back towards the street and was moving backwards
towards the latter. then Cuevas staggered to the jeep, his back smeared with
blood
 As Agojo tried to Chase Cuevas, Cuevas’ companions fired at Agojo. Cuevas
and his companions then boarded their jeep which sped away. the bank manager
and some people chased the jeep, which was finally sighted at Lemery,
Batangas, near the BTCO station. On reaching a dead end street, it stopped and
its occupants scampered in different directions leaving behind, Obrador, who fell
dead from the vehicle.
 the trailing volkswagen also stopped. Agojo fired his carbine in the air to attract
attention and to call policemen to come to their aid. Policemen from Lemery,
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Batangas and PC men arrived. Cuevas and his five other companions were later, all of the appellants claim ignorance of any plan to rob the Rural Bank of San Luis, deny
apprehended in diff. places in Lemery. participation in the robbery and assert that each of them was a mere accidental by-stander.

 Cuevas and Juan Mercado were brought by Acting Chief of Police of Lemery to the
Hospital for treatment
 As Cuevas was breathing irregularly and bleeding profusely the Chief of Police
Razon, in the presence of Chief Doctor of the Hospital, took the antemortem
statement of Cuevas who thumbmarked it, w/ Dr. Abjelina’s signature as witness.
 when they asked who shot him, Cuevas answered “Mga kasama ko po”. when
asked “Sino ang pangalan nila?” Cuevas replied, “Hindi ko alam ang pangalan nila.
Sila ay taga Lipa City”. he also said there were 6 of them that met in Calamba to rob
a bank
ISSUE:
1. who killed Cuevas and Obrador? Cuevas was shot and killed by one of his
companion robbers. based on testimony of Agojo and witnesses. Obrador- court did
not say, but appellants are not liable since it was not charged in the information
2. if they were killed not by security guard Agojo but one of the appellants, does it mean the
appellants can at best be guilty of robbery in band only (and not robbery w/ homicide)?
No. still robbery w/ homicide because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says
so. “in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery”

 the police investigation showed that 5 empty carbine shells were found outside the
bank building, 5m away from the bank door. No shell was found inside the premises
of the bank.

 on February 18, 1970 Cuevas died RATIO:

alibi of the defense: Calixtro, 29: rode in a jeep with Cuevas to cattle market in batangas, 1. Who killed Cuevas? The trial court found that Cuevas was shot and killed by one of
hitched a ride in a jeep, later, in Lipa, three more persons boarded the jeep, cuevas took him his companions.
to the bank, inside bank he saw Cuevas and a security guard wrestling for the gun. Martinez,
33: he was in Calamba, Laguna and decided to go to San Juan, Batangas, to visit his
 when Cuevas said that he did not know the names of his companions (in the ante
children, while waiting for transportation Cuevas arrived in a jeep with two persons. he rode
mortem statement), he meant to say he did not know who of them shot him.
jeep w/ them. When they reached Lipa, Mercado joined the group. In Taal Katigbak joined the
From the testimony of the appellants it is clear that except for Petronilo Mercado
group. The rest of his testimony is mostly about the incident at the Rural Bank of San Luis.
who was offered a ride by Obrador, each of them had previously known Cuevas.
Petronilo Mercado, 31: 1:00 p.m. on Feb 16, was in front of his house in Lipa waiting for a bus
 Julian Agojo did not shoot Cuevas- this fact is shown by his testimony that
bound for Lemery, he is going to San Luis to take up something with his compadre . While
Calixtro and Juan Mercado were firing at him as he grappled with Cuevas. He
waiting for a bus Obrador, the driver of a jeep, asked him to join the group and he did. then
also Identified Petronilo Mercado, Katigbak and Martinez who were outside but
Cuevas called Katigbak who also boarded the jeep. The jeep proceeded to San Luis and
firing in the direction of the bank. he said when Cuevas asked for help from his
stopped in front of the bank. (There followed the robbery.) Juan Mercado, 35: Pio Cuevas
companions, there were more shots at them then he saw Cuevas jerk and then
asked him to drive the jeep, the destination was San Luis to follow-up a case involving a jeep.
they ran away and the back part of his clothes was wet with blood
w. Cuevas were the other guys. Katigbak, 34: he was at the Sea Breeze Resort in Butong,
Taal. At about 1:00 p.m. he decided to go home and while waiting for a tricycle he was offered
a lift by Pio Cuevas to go to Taal. He boarded the jeep which went to the poblacion of San Who killed Obrador? - the appellants have a point when they claim that they should
Luis. There Cuevas and Calixtro entered the rural bank. (There follows a narration of the not be held liable for the death of Obrador. The information does not charge them for
incident.) the death of Obrador nor were they tried thereon.
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2. Did the appellants commit robbery in band with homicide considering that Cuevas was one
of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger? The answer is Yes
because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so.
 Art. 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. —
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
 The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
In People vs. Mangulabnan, the court held “in order to determine the existence
of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would
result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery” also, it is immaterial that
the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained that has to be taken into consideration
DECISION: the appellants committed robbery in band with homicide aggravated by
craft and the use of a motor vehicle. penalty is reclusion perpetua (not death penalty
lack of the necessary number of votes)
not related w/ the topic: 1). there was conspiracy. The evidence for the prosecution
describing minutely the different steps in the commission of the crime from the entry of
Cuevas, Calixtro and Juan Mercado into the bank, the shout, the grappling for the guard's
gun, the hasty departure, the pursuit and the apprehension of the appellants in Lemery all
point to a common plan, a unity of purpose and a concerted action. 2.) Did Pio Cuevas
execute a dying declaration- Cuevas sustained a serious injury which turned out to be fatal;
when the declaration was made he was breathing irregularly and bleeding profusely; and he
said, "Masama ang lasa ko." 3)Inocencia and Flora Cuevas, widow and daughter,
respectively, of Pio testified that he confided to them it was a guard who shot him- Their
testimony cannot prevail over that of disinterested witnesses.
– Fredda Rosete
PEOPLE V. PECATO
SARMIENTO, J. / JUNE 18, 1987
FACTS:
PAGE 86
 In Gigaguit Surigao del Norte, Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victorino and Ereneo
Peruda managed to gain entry into Felix Larong’s house. They were armed with
2 shotguns and 2 pointed instruments.
 Felix was shot in the head while he was lying face down after he had been asked
if he recognized any of the intruders to which he admittedly said yes.
 After killing him, they demanded money from his wife Loviana and his daughter
Uldarica. They gave them PHP 350 and they were left unharmed.
 The two positively identified the intruders in their police report inasmuch as they
were their relatives. Thus, the Pecatos were arrested on the same day at their
residence in Lahi. Peruda was arrested the day after. However, Victorino
remained at large.
 Arturo Pecato died during the pendency of the trial. Hence it was just Felix and
Ereneo who were tried. Felix in his defense claimed that he was ill the night of
the incident and therefore was at home with his family. Whereas, Peruda claimed
that he was also at home that night in order to be at his younger sister’s birthday
party. The latter’s averment was corroborated by defense witnesses Bayla and
Lafore who claim to have spent the night at his place.
 Encarnacion Peruda stated that she went to Larong’s place after the tragedy.
She claims that Uldarica mentioned that they were unable to recognize the
malefactors since they wore masks.
 Nevertheless, the accused were convicted of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person under Art. 294 of the RPC and sentenced to death due to
the presence of several aggravating circumstances.
ISSUE: WON they are guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD: Yes, because Felix was shot in the course of the robbery.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 As to their identity, they were positively identified due to the lighted kerosene
lamp inside the house while the robbery was being perpetrated. Likewise, the
victims were certain that they wore no masks.
 It is a well settled rule that an alibi by the defense cannot prevail over positive
identification; more so when the accused is positively identified by one who has
no reason to falsely charge the accused with a crime punishable by death.
Worse, Pecato’s alibi was dubious because it was corroborated by his own
relatives, above all his mother. Furthermore, their residence was not far from the
victim’s abode.
 As to the claim of the defense that the complaint was borne out of bad blood
between the families, the court held that such motivation is belied by the fact that
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the accused and the victims were relatives. Hence, a false imputation of a crime
which would carry the death penalty would be too much.
 The court held that as long as homicide occurred during or because of the robbery,
even if death was by mere accident, robbery with homicide is still committed.
Moreover, whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals to the same are also
guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide even if
they did not take part in the killing unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide.
JUDGMENT: CA decision affirmed with modifications. Accused sentenced to reclusion
perpetua instead of death pursuant to Art. III Sec. 19 (1) of the Constitution which
abolished the death penalty.
– Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
PEOPLE V. TAPALES
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
 January 20, 1995
 6am – The lifeless body of Mildred Calip was found sprawled on a grassy
portion of the western shoulder of Lira Street, Lores Country Homes, Antipolo,
Rizal, some 110 to 120 meters away from the subdivision’s water reservoir.
The autopsy showed that Mildred sustained 25 punctured wounds, 3 stab
wounds, 6 contusions, 2 linear abrasions and fresh hymenal lacerations.
 5:30 am (Ferdinand Calip, Mildred’s brother) – Mildred left their house to attend
her classes at the Far Eastern University. He accompanied her to the gate of
the Santos Compound to board a tricycle that would take her to the bus
terminal. He claimed that when they reached the gate a white tricycle with
black mudguard, an antenna and a stereo stopped in front of them. There he
noticed a person, whom he later identified as Rene Tapales, already on board.
After Mildred had boarded the tricycle, he returned home and slept again.
PAGE 87
 5:45 am (Randy Ejara, tricycle driver) – said that he was walking along Lira
Street when three (3) tricycles coming from the direction of the subdivision’s
water tank slowly overtook him. It had a white sidecar with a black
mudguard and an antenna. The tricycle driver was pushing his vehicle
forward with his left foot. Ejara also claimed that he saw Rene Tapales on
board the sidecar and the latter appeared afraid and agitated, looking at
different directions, and back to the direction of the water tank. Ejara further
alleged that when Tapales realized his presence, Tapales immediately
faced the windshield and touched the right arm of his driver who forthwith
revved his engine and sped away.
 6:30 am (Fiscal Calip, Mildred and Ferdinand’s father) – said that a
newspaper reporter informed his family that the lifeless body of Mildred was
found near the subdivision’s water reservoir. He rushed to the scene and got
his daughter to the hospital but the latter was already dead on arrival.
 January 21, 1995
 3 – 3:30 am, next day (Rogelio Adan and Nelson Bara, barangay tanod) –
said that while patrolling, they saw Tapales walking by and getting
suspicious, they followed him until they reached the very spot where the
body of Mildred was found the day before. Adan and Baran asked Tapales
why he was there at such an unholy hour. Tapales answered, according to
them, that he was there to light a candle for Mildred so her parents would
forgive him, and when prodded to explain why he wanted to ask
forgiveness, Tapales vaguely answered that he knew Mildred and the
identity of her killers.
 From Tapales’ response, they arrested him; that they passed by the fiscal’s
house to have Tapales identified and the fiscal told them to proceed to the police
station; that on their way there, Tapales tried to jump out of the vehicle; that at
the police station, Tapales was found to have abrasions and hematomas on his
right elbow, contusions on his right lower knee and several scratches on both
arms and neck, but did not explain how he sustained them; and that his briefs
were said to be inverted and stained with blood.
 Tapales denied everything; that the whole day of January 19 (day before the
crime) was spent by him with his uncle; that he went home at 9pm, fell asleep 15
minutes later and did not wake up until 7:30am the next day.
 But Tapales admitted to having gone to the scene of the crime but denied that he
was there to ask for forgiveness. Instead, he stated that it was his practice to
pray for the souls of the dead and that day was for him to light a candle for
Mildred’s soul. He also denied the imputation about the blood in his briefs.
 The trial court found him guilty of rape with homicide based only on
circumstantial evidence.
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 (1) that some 30 minutes before she was found dead at about 6:00 o’clock in
the morning of 20 January 1995, Mildred Calip was last seen alive in the
company of the accused as a co-passenger in a tricycle;
 (2) that minutes before the corpse of Mildred was discovered, the accused was
seen fleeing on Lira Street away from the general direction of the water tank of
Lores Country Homes towards the exit road of the subdivision;
 (3) that shortly after the accused ha[d] gone, the lifeless body of Mildred was
discovered sprawled on a grassy and cogonal spot, more or less one and one-
half meters from the cemented edge of Lira Street, and about 110 to 120
meters away from the said water tank;
 (4) that on January 21, 1995, between 3:00 and 3:30 in the morning, the
accused was again seen in the vicinity of the scene of the crime, visibly
remorseful and intensely disturbed by his conscience; and
 (5) that when he was physically examined, the accused was found with
extensive physical injuries consisting of scratches, lacerations, hematomas and
contusions mostly sustained on the arms, neck and legs, which he failed to
account how he sustained them x x x x
 Trial court disregarded the defense of alibi because they it was easy for Tapales to
get to the area from his house in 30-40mins. They found it absurd that Tapales
would go to the scene of the crime at 3am just to light a candle for Mildred’s soul –
and interpreted it as troubled conscience. They gave full credence on the
testimonies of the 5 witnesses (2 interested and 3 disinterested).
ISSUE: WoN the circumstances when assembled together could form a pattern that would
clearly and positively implicate the accused to the victim's tragedy.
HELD/RATIO:
 No. Elements of sufficient circumstantial evidence:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and,
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
 The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person. But this is not the case here.
PAGE 88
 First. Defense witness’s (Venancio Medina) testimony was unrebutted. He said
that while he was cleaning taxis, someone told him of a certain white object lying
around. And since it was dark at 5:30am, he brought a flashlight with him to the
area and found the body. He contacted the police and subsequently told it to a
newspaper reporter present at the police headquarters. This last part coincides
with Baran’s testimony and especially that of the two Calips hearing the news
from a reporter.
 If this should be the case, that this testimony coincide with 3 of the prosecutor’s
witnesses and should be given credence, then this will put doubt on Ferdinand
Calip’s testimony. It can hardly be believed that at 5:30 in the morning of that day
two (2) persons saw Mildred: Ferdinand Calip, while she was still alive, and
Venancio Medina, when she was already dead.
 It should also be noted that Ferdinand didn’t immediately identify Tapales as the
culprit and was even confused as to why the same was being shown to him the
next day after his sister’s death. Another thing is that if Ferdinand was watching
out for the safety of his sister, then shouldn’t he have chosen a tricycle that is not
filled with male strangers?
 Second. Randy Ejara’s testimony about seeing Tapales is doubtful because at it
was still dark at that time – 5:30am – and that the latter was seen against the
light of a lamppost. Also, the area was one wherein there were no lights yet as
told by the president of the homeowners because he was constantly sending
letters to MERALCO regarding the matter of light installation.
 Third. Regarding Tapales’s arrest the next day, the barangay tanods only
arrested him based on stipulations – saying that the former was “visibly
remorseful and intensely disturbed by his conscience”.
 Fourth. Regarding Tapales’s injuries, he was never really asked how he got
them. The prosecution merely presumed that such injuries were incurred in a
scuffle with the deceased without exerting any effort on its part to find tangible
proof or telltale signs that could lead to a reasonable inference that indeed the
accused acquired those injuries during his brutal assault of the victim. As the
defense is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution failed to prove, this
piece of evidence must of necessity be disregarded.
 Also, the scratches were not as severe as they were told. There were no actual
scratches on the arms and neck. And besides, he could have gotten them the
day before the crime.
 As to the inverted briefs, this was highly unlikely for if there was a struggle during
the rape and the killing – 25 punctured wounds, 3 stab wounds, 6 contusions, 2
linear abrasions and fresh hymenal lacerations – then the killer must have blood
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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all over his clothes as well. What killer in his right mind would go home, change his
clothes but not his underwear?
 Fifth. Regarding the identification of the tricycle, the prosecution did not try to locate
the same. Even the father, who is a public prosecutor, did not use his resources for
this purpose.
 Sixth. From 5:30 am when Mildred boarded the tricycle to 6am when her body was
found, 30mins is but long. The rape and murder could have been perpetrated in
much shorter a time.
 Finally. Of the other 2 unknown accused, nowhere in the records is it shown that the
prosecution attempted to establish such cabal and Tapales’ actual participation
therein. In fact, the records show that the only basis for the imputation of the crime
on the three (3) accused was the alleged statement of Rene Tapales to barangay
tanod Nelson Baran "kutob ko ay tatlo ang dumali doon." Even the autopsy did not
show whether there could have been more than one killer.
DECISION: Judgment REVERSED and Tapales ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
– Kaye Tamayao
PEOPLE V. QUINONES
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco,
Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and bore various
contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were
later positively identified as Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana.
In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against Adolfo
Quiñones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., Santiago Solarte,
Armando Buitre and one John Doe.
The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue
Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were
intercepted along the Maharlika Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused, who
PAGE 89
had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods
where they were killed. According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time
carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with
pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22 caliber
handgun. All this, together with the other articles belonging to the victims, were taken by
the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was recovered
without the stereo and the spare tire.
ISSUE: Whether the accused should be convicted of robbery with homicide.
HELD:The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple
homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there
is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge
should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that three persons
were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of
persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of
the said Code. As held in People v. Cabuena:
But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life imprisonments each as if
3 separate crimes had been committed. The complex crime of robbery with
homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed. As was said by
this Court in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime
does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of
human being in excess of that number punishable as separate individual offense
or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite,
integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings were
perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
– Yan Yu
PEOPLE V. PATOLA
PEOPLE V. EMETERIO DINOLA
CORTES, J.
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FACTS:
 On or about the 21st day of October, 1977 in the Municipality of Alangalang, Province of
Leyte, Dinola, armed with a deadly weapon, and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge with one Marilyn
Caldosa, and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, by the use of force upon
the same Marilyn Caldosa, and with intent to gain, did then and there wilfully and
feloniously take and carry away the wrist watch of Marilyn Caldosa worth P300.00
 Dinola pleaded not guilty but the tria court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with rape and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim P12,000.00 and to pay the costs
ISSUE: Was Dinola correctly charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape?
HELD:
 No. Dinola was incorrectly charged and convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape
 Dinola, in this case, was not satisfied in abusing the complainant. After satisfying his
criminal lust and upon seeing the watch on the girl's wrist, he again threatened to kill the
complainant if she did not hand over the watch. The complainant refused to give it but he
forcibly grabbed it from her. The accused was charged and convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape
 However, it does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered
the house of the complainant, he already had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact,
the complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused, the latter lit a candle,
saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly
took it from her
 Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even
accidental. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also
committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed
 However, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape
also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should
be viewed as two distinct offenses.
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RULING: The Court finds the accused guilty of two independent crimes of rape and
robbery. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of not
less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, to
not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor [Art. 294, par. 5, RPC in relation to Act
No. 4103, as amended] for the crime of robbery and to restore to the victim the watch
which was taken or to pay its value in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00).
As for the crime of rape, since it was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the
accused must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua [Art. 335, Revised Penal Code
in relation to Art. III, Sec. 9 (1) of the 1987 Constitution] and indemnify the victim the
amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
With costs against the accused.
– Wes Aquende
PEOPLE V. MORENO
CAMPOS, JR., J. / MARCH 22 1993
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Manila
FACTS:
At around 4:00-4:30 am, Juan Moreno, Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez, broke into
the Mohnani’s family home by destroying a window. They took appliances, jewelry, and
personal effects worth about P98,550. 2 of them, namely Deloria and Maniquez, raped the
2 maids emplowed by the Mohnani spouses, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo.
During the trial, all 3 of them jumped bail. Only Maniquez was reapprehended.
TC decision:
Juan Morno – convicted for robbery only
Reynaldo Maniquez – convicted for robbery with rape (victim: Mary Anne Galedo)
Paulino Deloria – convicted for robbery with rape (victim: Narcisa Sumayo)
Maniquez appealed, alleging that the trial court convicted him on the basis of Galedo’s
affidavit, without hearing her testimony in open court. (She was not presented as a witness
during trial).
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HELD: Galedo’s affidavit is admissible even if Galedo did not testify it it is part of res gestae.
Also, the affidavit was not the only evidence that led to Maniquez’s conviction. The Mohnani
spouses testified that their maids told them that they were raped by the accused immediately
after the 3 accused left the house. Also, Sundri Mohnani testified that she saw the accused
enter the bathroom with Galedo and come out later with his pant zipper open (SC Held that
evidence of rape may be based on circumstantial inference).
Note: There may be carnal knowledge without rupture of hymen (since the medical exam of
Galedo showed that her hymen was intact)
DISPOSITION: Reynaldo Maniquez is found guilty of robbery with rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, and use of
motor vehicle (they had a jeep waiting to take their loot away.)
*Res Gestae – statements spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as
the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for or threat to their lives.
– Anj Balacano
PEOPLE V. BALACANAO
PEOPLE V. SALVILLA
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. / APRIL 26, 1990
FACTS:
 Four armed people, including the appellant, staged a robbery at New Iloilo Lumber
Yard at noon time. They announced a hold-up and told Severino, the owner that
they needed money so Severino handed them P20, 000 in cash and pleaded them
to go but Canasares, one of the accused, took Severino’s wallet and wristwatch.
The accused then herded Severino, his two daughters and Rodita, an employee to
the office wherein they too them as hostages and demanded that they be given
P100, 000 but Severino told them that he could not because it was a Saturday and
the banks are closed.
PAGE 91
 Meanwhile, the police and military surrounded the premises and appealed to the
accused to surrender. In the negotiations, the accused were given P50, 000
which they received through Rodita, whom they freed. Because of the refusal of
the accused to surrender, the police and military launched an offensive resulting
to injuries to the girls as well as to two of the accused.
 Appellant now avers that the crime of robbery was not consummated but only
attempted, because the third stage was not carried out. In robbery, the three
stages are: 1) giving 2) taking and 3) carrying away or asportation.
ISSUE: WON there was asportation
HELD:
Yes. In robbery, the essence of asportation is taking a thing out of the possession of the
owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi. In this case, the
taking is sufficiently proved as the money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch were
within the dominion and control of the appellant and his co-accused and therefore,
completed the taking. That there was no opportunity to dispose of the personalities does
not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession of the
thing, the unlawful taking is completed.
There is no mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because it was not spontaneous
and was motivated by the intent to secure their safety.
It was a complex crime of robbery with serious illegal detention because the detention was
necessary to commit robbery. They resorted to detention not because they were trapped
by the police but it was a means for getting more money. Judgment affirmed.
– May Calsiyao
PEOPLE V. APDUHAN, ET AL.
CASTRO, J.: / AUGUST 30, 1968
FACTS:
On 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Mabini, Apduhan and five other people armed with different unlicensed deadly weapons,
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unlawfully entered the dwelling of the spouses Miano and their children, Geronimo and
Herminigilda.
Once inside they did attacked Geronimo and another person named Aton, who happened to
be in the house, inflicting upon them injuries which caused their death.
Afterwards, Apduhan et al carried away from said dwelling house cash amounting to Three
Hundred Twenty-two Pesos belonging to the spouses Miano and Geronimo.
Later caught, Apduhan pled guilty to the charge of Robbery.
ISSUE: What penalty should be imposed on Apduhan?
HELD and RATIO: RECLUSION PERPETUA
After analysis of the provisions of art. 296, the opinion is that the said article is only applicable
to the provision of art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in turn, is limited in scope
to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294.
Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance
under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to
robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.
Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in
the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all
the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the
corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last
three subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within art. 295.
Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on
robbery in band which is nowhere to be found but in art. 295 in relation to sections 3, 4, and 5
of art. 294.
So, in order that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be
used to justify imposition of the maximum period of the penalty, it is a condition that the
offense charged be robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295.
Since art. 295, does not apply to sections 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating
factor in question 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with
PAGE 92
homicide under art. 294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms.
That, plus one mitigating circumstance results in reclusion perpetua.
– Judith Cortez
PEOPLE V. JARANILLA
AQUINO, J. / FEB. 22, 1974
FACTS:
 At around 11 p.m. of Jan. 9, 1966, in Iloilo, Suyo, Jaranilla, and Brillantes hailed a
pickup truck being driven by Gorriceta. Jaranilla requested that Gorriceta bring them
to Mandurriao, another district in the city. Gorriceta refused, saying he was on his way
home, but Jaranilla insisted until finally Gorriceta agreed.
 At Mandurriao, Jaranilla and company got off the truck and instructed Gorriceta to wait
for them; after 20 minutes, the 3 of them came running back, each carrying two
fighting cocks. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being
chased. Gorriceta drove the group to Jaro, another district.
 On the way, Gorriceta saw two patrolmen, Jabatan and Castro, running towards them
in the middle of the road. Gorriceta stopped the truck upon hearing warning shots from
Jabatan. Jabatan approached them and ordered all the occupants of the truck to get
down, but nobody did. Suddenly, Jaranilla shot Jabatan. Gorriceta, frightened, started
the truck and drove straight to his home in La Paz, yet another district. Jaranilla kept
firing towards Jabatan.
 At Gorriceta’s house, Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes got off. Jaranilla wearned
Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. After a while, policemen appeared at
Gorriceta’s door asking him to come down, but instead he hid in the ceiling. He
surrendered to the police the next day.
 Trespeces, a witness who saw the event at Mandurriao, testified that he saw 3 men
emerging from the canal in front of a certain Baylon’s house, carrying roosters and
heading for a red pickup truck. He informed Jabatan and Castro of what happened.
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Trespeces joined in the pursuit, eventually ending in Jabatan being shot. Castro and
Trespeces brought Jabatan to the hospital, where he eventually died.
 Baylon, the owner of the cocks, positively identified those recovered by from Jaranilla
and company as his.
 Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes were charged with robbery with homicide with 5
aggravating circcumstances. During the pendency of the trial, Jaranilla escaped from jail,
so the court convicted only Suyo and Brillantes of robbery with homicide.
 The two contend that the crime could not have been robbery with homicide because the
robbery had already been consummated when Jabatan was killed.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the taking of the roosters was in fact theft, and not robbery – YES.
2. WON there was conspiracy between Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes to kill Jabatan,
therefore making them all equally liable as principals – NO.
RATIO:
 First (though unrelated), the court rejected the claim that Gorriceta was the one who shot
Jabatan and that it was Jaranilla who was driving because Gorriceta was drunk.
Gorriceta would not have had the consciousness to shoot Jabatan if he was drunk.
 The taking of the roosters was theft because it did not involve a force upon things.
Neither could it be considered a robbery in an inhabited place under Art. 299 of the RPC
because Baylon’s coop was not in his house. It is also not a robbery of an uninhabited
place or a private building under Art. 302 because the chicken coop cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of the article.
 A building in the context of Art. 302 is construed as embracing any structure not included
in Art. 299 (meaning, not a inhabited place, public building, devoted to worship) used for
storage and safekeeping of personal property. Also, Art. 302 connotes 5 means of
committing robbery in a manner whereby the perpetrator actually enters the place The
coop, not having been intended for persons, is not capable of “entrance” in this sense.
PAGE 93
 However, the conduct of the perpetrators suggests a single criminal impulse to steal
the roosters.
 With respect to the killing of Jabatan, there is no evidence that Jaranilla, Suyo, and
Brillantes conspired to kill him. Also, the theft was in fact consummated when the
culprits took possession of the roosters. It is not reasonable that the 3 conspired to kill
anyone who would forestall their enjoyment of that possession. Further, instead of
refuting Gorriceta’s testimony that he shot Jabatan, Jaranilla chose to escape, which
the court took as an admission of guilt.
**for a discussion on the aggravating circumstances, please see the original nalang... :-)
JUDGMENT: Suyo and Brillantes are acquitted of homicide, but are found guilty as
co-principals with Jaranilla in the theft of the six cocks. As to Jaranilla’s liability, the
trial court should render a new judgment consistent with this opinion.
– Jahzeel Cruz
PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Sec.2 (2) RA 6539: Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by making force upon things.
Sec.14 RA 6539: Any person who is found guilty of carnapping as this term is defined in
Se.2 of this Act, shall, irrespective fo the value of motor vehicle taken be punished by…the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death…when the owner, dirver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course for the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. DANILO DELA CRUZ,
ROMEO SALVADOR, DANTES BELOSO, defendants-appellants
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st
FACTS: Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were acquaintances. Dela Cruz claimed to be a 1
lieutenant of the Army as well as a customs broker while Beloso and Salvador were
unemployed.
-April 1984: Beloso met Dela Cruz and had stayed in Dela Cruz’s house for several months
thereafter
-November 1984: Dela Cruz met Salvador, Beloso met Salvador
-Nov.29, 1984: Beloso caused the placing of an advertisement in the Bulletin Today posing as
a person who wanted to buy a car.
-Dec.1984: The 3 gathered together at a restaurant to discuss a car deal that would take place
the following day.
-Anthony Banzon was among those who responded to the advertisement
-Dec.5, 1984: the mother of Anthony received a call from “Mike Garcia” who said that he was
the buyer of her son’s car. Anthony was informed of this and they both left for “Garcia’s” office
at the Centrum Condominium, Makati on board the car (a Telstar). Beloso posed as “Mike
Garcia”, the person interested in buying the car. Anthony was then left at the Centrum by his
mother.
Anthony and Beloso discussed the price of the car. Beloso told Anthony to wait for
Dela Cruz as he would be the one to decide WON to buy the car. When Dela Cruz arrived, he
and Anthony left to go to Dela Cruz’s house where Anthony brought with him an envelope
containing the certificate of registration, official receipt and other papers. Upon arriving at the
house, Salvador was already there
Thereafter, a shot was released and Anthony was sprawled on the floor surrounded
by blood.
Beloso, who was still at the Centrum, was instructed by Dela Cruz to proceed to
Dela Cruz’s house where he was handed the key to the car and instructed to drive Salvador to
Mr. Hernandez who was interested in buying the car. However, it was only Salvador who was
able to go to Hernandez since Beloso was hungry and had to eat.
At Hernandez’, Salvador introduced himself as Anthony and Hernandez brought him
to Patrolman de la Rosa, who is the brother of the owner of the pawnshop interested in buying
the car. Salvador offered to sell the car for 130,000 which left de la Rosa suspicious due to
the low price. When told that he would be paid the next day, Salvador insisted that they pay
100,000 in advance and he even left the car behind. De la Rosa reported his suspicions to
Sgt. Roldan who dispatched patrolmen to P.Campa St. where they waited for Salvador to
arrive. When he did, he arrived with Beloso who started shouting that he was Anthony
Banzon. Thus, the policemen took the two the the Police HQ for questioning.
Meanwhile, a boarder of the house of De la Cruz found the body of Anthony and
thought it was her landlord, Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz went to the Makati police station and
reported that his house was ransacked by someone where he was held for further
questioning. Beloso and Salvador were later turned over to the same police station where the
victim’s identity was straightened out.
PAGE 94
Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were tried and convicted for the crime of
carnapping with homicide with the sentence of reclusion perpetua. This is an appeal by
Beloso and Salvador.
(other facts to be noted: when the police went to Dela Cruz’ house, all his things were in
proper order contrary to his claim of being ransacked, Beloso and Salvador confessed their
modus operandi as follows: 1) blank residence certificates were secured and kept by the
three accused; 2) their "business" of buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3)
the ads yielding fruitful results, prospective sellers would be asked about their respective
certificates of registration and other documents; 4) when the portion for the signature of the
owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to test the car, demand the
certificate of registration, and fill in the signature space with their own signature; 5) present
the same certificate of registration bearing their own signature, along with the residence
certificate supplied by Dela Cruz which is made to coincide with the name and signature
appearing in the certificate of registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test
the car although, in fact, just waiting for the opportunity to leave the owner of the car
behind so that the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.
ISSUE: WON Beloso and Salvador were in conspiracy with Dela Cruz in the crime of
carnaping with homicide
REASONING: The facts clearly show that there was conspiracy.
Beloso and Salvador shared the same purpose with Dela Cruz in carnapping the
vehicle with a view of selling it at a low price and making money which they badly needed.
There were united in its execution. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence
of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
condition and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished.
With regard to the killing of Anthony, there is no question that he was killed in the
commission of the carnapping. The physical evidence show that Beloso and Salvador
were found positive for nitrates which means that they were within the vicinity when the gun
was fired. The gunman, being Dela Cruz, tested negative for nitrates which only meant
that he knew how to protect himself since he was a member of the Army. Beloso and
Salvador claim that the nitrates found on them were due to their being chain smokers.
However, the physical evidence shows that nitrates from cigarettes are different from
nitrates of powder burns. It is of no moment that the participation of Beloso and Salvador in
the killing is not clearcut. Conspiracy having been proven, all the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because the act of
one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation by each of the conspirators is
immaterial.
It is evident in the case that the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the
commission of the carnapping obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration
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certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus facilitate its sale
rd
to a 3 party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
DECISION: Yes. Judgment affirmed.
– Tim Guanzon
IZON V. PEOPLE
PEOPLE V. PUNO
ADAPT-ed
FACTS:
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City
called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does. At
around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband arrived at the bakeshop & told Mrs. Socorro that
her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so he would temporarily take
his place.
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo at the wheel. Later, while at a corner, a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car. Once inside, Enrique poked a gun at the
victim Mrs. Sarmiento. The two robbed the victim of her money & other valuables and further
on they told her they wanted P100,000 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would
they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money was.
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo asked Ma. Socorro to
issue a check for P100,000. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of
two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she
refused.
PAGE 95
Isabelo turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the
car then crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored
her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because
according to her she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the
car. Her dress was torn too.
Both accused were arrested a day after.
ISSUE: Whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom; or a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974); or the offense of simple robbery. SIMPLE ROBBERY.
RATIO:
It is an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the
accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of
variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion on the case.
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other
than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This
much is admitted by both appellants.
However, the Solicitor General contends that the crime is a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 532 of the Brigandage Law. In fine, however, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia,
indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants.
Further, Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts
of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, which is the same with the case at hand.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to
expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of substantive criminal law. The
court says:
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“For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location
of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where the
subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being
herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the
accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard
the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?”
– Felman Magcalas
PEOPLE V. PULUSAN
JORGE TAER V. PEOPLE O FTHE PHILIPPINES AND CA
SARMIENTO, J. / JUNE 18, 1990
FACTS:
 In the evening of December 5, 1981, Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his
compadre, Jorge Taer at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, whereat he was
benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, December 6, 1981, Emilio Namocatcat and
Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which
Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place.
 Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered in the
morning of December 6, 1981 that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4 years old,
were missing at the different grazing grounds whereat they tied the same the
afternoon preceding.
 After searching in vain for the carabaos at the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported
the matter to the police. On December 15, 1981, one Felipe Reyes of Hinopolan,
Valencia, Bohol, informed Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag,
Garcia-Hernandez.
 Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on that day to Datag and there they found their
missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer who was
then not in the house as he was in Napo, Garcia-Hernandez, attending the fiesta
where he cooked for the accused Saludes.
PAGE 96
 Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their carabaos were found at his place,
accused Taer, according to Dalde and Palaca replied that the carabaos reached
his place tied together without any person in company. According to accused
Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to his
place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for
them that they just strayed thereat.
 The 2 carabaos were taken by Dalde and Palaca from accused Taer's
possession on that day, December 15.
 After the required preliminary investigation,an information was filed in the then
Court of First Instance of Bohol. After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and
Cago were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but Taer and Namocatcat were
convicted of theft of large cattle and appreciated against them the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. The Court of Appeals, finding the evidence of the
prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and
Jorge Taer, affirmed in toto the decision appealed from.
 Taer interposed these twin arguments: 1. That the extent of his participation did
not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Cirilo Saludes and
Mario Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial
court should also lead to his acquittal; 2. That the only evidence proving the
alleged conspiracy between him and Emilio Namocatcat was the confession of
his co-accused Emilio Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as
admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta.
 The Court of Appeals would consider these as proof of the existence of
conspiracy: Although accused Taer admitted that before December 6, 1981, he had not met
accused Namocatcat since 1975 and had not previously tended any carabao belonging to
Namocatcat, it is unbelievable that Taer was not suspicious of the origin of the 2 male carabaos
which to say the least were delivered to him to be tended under strange circumstances, at the unholy
hour of 2:00 o'clock dawn after a travel of 14 kilometers' in the dead of the night.. He unreservedly
accepted the charge of tending them with the agreement as to the sharing of the produce out of said
carabaos use. If, as he asserted, Namocatcat left the carabaos with him with the word that if anybody
would look for them he was to tell that the carabaos just strayed into his other carabaos (sic), the
more Taer ought to be more suspicious as to the origin of said carabaos, yet, since that dawn delivery
on December 6, 1981, until they were retrieved from his possession, he never apprised the barangay
captain, living just 2 kilometers away from his house, about the matter. He continued to hold on to the
stolen carabaos until they were recovered 10 days later... Ordinarily, one would not hold on to a thing
he suspects to be stolen to obviate any criminal responsibility or implication. But accused Taer did the
opposite-a clear indication that he and accused Namocatcat did have some kind of an unlawful
agreement regarding the stolen carabaos. He did not even reveal immediately to the authorities that
the carabaos delivered to him by Namocatcat were stolen and he tried his best to keep under cover
Namocatcat's Identity.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Taer did conspire with Namocatcat and committed cattle theft/ to what
extent was Taer’s participation in the said crime
HELD: NO. The findings were mere suspicions and speculations. The circumstances adverted
to did not establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIO:
 There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the
commission of an offense and decide to commit it. Although the facts may show a
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective, essential
however is an agreement to commit the crime and a decision to commit it.
Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy
absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose.
 At most, the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without
having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not
participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the
commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus
only an accessory after the fact. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime;
 Any person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the
same property had been stolen is guilty as an accessory because he is profiting by
the effects of the crime." By employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer was
profiting by the objects of the theft.
 On the conspiracy charge, the most cogent proof that the prosecution could ever
raise was the implication made by the accused Namocatcat (he did not appeal his
conviction to the Court of Appeals) in his affidavit of confession. However, the
settled rule is that the rights of a party can not be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
PAGE 97
or omission of another. Since this is the only evidence of the prosecution to prove
the conspiracy with Namocatcat, this uncorroborated testimony can not be
sufficient to convict Taer.
 The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308, 309, and 310,
as amended by "The Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.” The penalty imposed on
the principal for the crime of cattle rustling is:
Sec. 8. Penal provisions. Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein
defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished
by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a
person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the occasion of the
commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed.
 Inasmuch as Taer's culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact, under
Art. 53 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed. The penalty two
degrees lower than that imposed under the first sentence of Section 8 of PD No.
533 is arresto mayor maximum or 4 months and one day to 6 months to prision
correccional medium or 2 years 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In
addition, the Revised Penal Code provides that when the penalties prescribed by
law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, the courts shag observe the rule that when there are
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period. Hence the imposable penalty would be
prision correccional minimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months
imprisonment
Judgement is modified. JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of the crime of
cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533 amending Arts. 308, 309, and
310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within the
range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and
the maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.
– Joy Montes
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CONSTANCIO ORDONIO V. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Anastacio Pajunar’s Version: Pajunar discovered that his 11month-old cow was missing.
He asked his neighbor Ordonio if he saw the cow. The latter denied having seen it and
when Pajunar heard the mooing of a cow and saw that it was in fact the missing cow,
Ordonio said that it was his brother’s cow. Pajunar asked the assistance of the barangay
captain and 2 PC soldiers. They brought with them the mother of the missing cow and
once they were at Ordonio’s place, the missing calf ran and approached his mother. At
this time, Ordonio was still claiming that it was his brother’s cow.
 Constancio Ordonio’s Version: Ordonio saw the cow in his farm and tied it near his
house. He recognized the cow to be Pajunar’s and left instructions to his wife to return it.
 Trial Court: Ordonio guilty of cattle rustling; sentenced to 4y2m1d to 6y.
 CA: affirmed in toto
ISSUE: WON Ordonio is guilty of cattle rustling. YES
RATIONALE:
 Review limited only to errors of law, not errors of fact.
 PD 533 Sec 2. Cattle rustling is taking away by any means, methods or schemes,
without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above mentioned animals
whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things.
 “Taking away by any means, methods or schemes” includes deliberate failure
to deliver the lost property to the proper owner. Ordonio clearly failed to deliver
the cow to Pajunar, and even denied seeing it and made up a story about
tending to his brother’s cow.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
– Giselle Munoz
PEOPLE V. GULINAO
PARAS, J. / 1989
PAGE 98
FACTS:
On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, Isagani Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr.
Chua) and some politicians were having a caucus in Malabon. At about 11:00 P.M., the
group of Dr. Chua proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House.
Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine
pistol, swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. He then
tucked the .45 caliber pistol in his right waist. Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked
the .45 caliber pistol. He then returned to his seat beside Dr. Chua.
While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at
close range with the .45 caliber pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the disco house,
he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds.
Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua.
Poking the gun at Caguioa (driver) who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to
leave the car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed.
On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but
the Ingram jammed.
Gulinao was charged and convicted of the crimes of Illegal Possession of Firearm with
Murder, Robbery and Carnapping.
ISSUES: Was Gulinao guilty of Robbery or Theft? THEFT.
RATIO:
Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Art. 308, Revised Penal
Code, not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5,
Art. 294 Revised Penal Code. The taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an
afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of
his ring.
HELD: Judgment modified. Affirmed the conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm with
Murder and Carnapping, modified the conviction for Robbery. Gulinao was convicted of
Theft instead.
– Ryan Oliva
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PEOPLE V. SANTOS
HIZON V. COURT OF APPEALS
DECEMBER 13, 1996
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
 In September 1992, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan,
received reports of illegal fishing. In response, the mayor organized Task Force Bantay
Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators.
 On September 30, Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP that a boat and several small crafts
were fishing by “muro ami” within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto
Princesa.
 The police, headed by SPO3 Enriquez, and Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo Jr.,
proceeded to the area and there found several men fishing in motorized sampans as well
as a big fishing boat identified as the F/B Robinson.
 The police and the task force then boarded the boat and inspected the same with the
acquiescence of its captain and found the following:
 Two foreigners in the captain’s deck who, upon examination of their passports by
SPO3 Enriquez, found them to be mere photocopies.
 A large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu fish and assorted fish weighing approximately
1 ton at the bottom of the boat.
 The license of the boat and the fishermen were all in order.
 Nonetheless, the police brought the boat, the captain and its crew back to Puerto
Princesa for further investigation and thereafter an Inspection/ Apprehension Report was
made and charged the boat, its crew and fishermen with the following violations:
 Conducting fishing operation without a mayor’s permit
 Employing excess fishermen on board (36 instead of the authorized 26)
 2 Hong Kong nationals on board without original passports
 The following day, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of
fish from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson for laboratory examinations.
 The boat engineer, Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office (4) live lapu-lapu fish
inside a plastic shopping bag filled with water.
 SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and, in the presence of Andaya, placed them
inside a large transparent bag without water which he then sealed using heat from a
lighter.
PAGE 99
 The fish were then brought to the NBI sub-office. The receiving clerk noted that
the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag inside the office freezer to
preserve it.
 The receiving clerk, upon orders of the chief of the sub-office, directed her to take
the specimens with her to Manila to have it examined there.
 The receiving clerk arrived in Manila on October 5 (5 days after submitting the
fish to SPO3 Enriquez). 2 days later, the forensic chemist conducted tests on the
fish samples and found that they contained SODIUM CYANIDE
 In light of these findings, the PNP filed the complaint against the petitioners namely,
the operator and owner of F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, the
boat captain, the boat engineer, two other crew members, the 2 Hong Kong nationals
and 28 fishermen of the boat.
 The petitioners pled not guilty and claimed the following:
 That they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Fishing Industries Inc.,
a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing
 The fishermen only catch fish using the hook and line method
 That the original passports were not with the Hong Kong nationals at the time
since the originals were in the company’s head office in Manila.
 That on October 1, the day after they were apprehended, the number of fish
given to the police were actually 5 and not 4 and the only reason the captain
signed the “Certification” that there were only 4 pieces of fish was because he
was threatened by Marcelo after the captain submitted all the pertinent
documents of the boat, its crew members and the Hong Kong nationals.
 The Trial Court found the petitioners guilty of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance. The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUES:
 Can the evidence obtained during the search and seizure be admissible despite the
fact that there was no search warrant at the time of the inspection?
 Does the presumption of guilt in the illegal fishing statute violate the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution?
 Are petitioners guilty of the crime of illegal fishing based on the prosecutions
evidence?
HELD:
 Yes, the evidence is admissible.
 No, the presumption of guilt is not contrary to the Constitution.
 No, petitioners are not guilty of the crime of illegal fishing.
RATIO:
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 The evidence is admissible
 As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial search warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; however, there are exceptions
 Exceptions to the general rule is when:
 The search is made incident to a lawful arrest.
 The seizure of evidence is in plain view.
 The search is made on a moving motor vehicle.
 The search is conducted for the purpose that the custom laws are not violated.
 Search and seizure without search warrants of vessels and aircrafts for violations of
customs laws have been the traditional exception since these vessels can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction.
 Same exception ought to apply to fishing boats suspect of breaching our fishery
laws.
 Presumption of guilt in the illegal fishing statute does not violate the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
 Par. 3 of Sec. 33 of PD 704 provides:
 “The discovery of dynamite, other explosives…or obnoxious or poisonous
substance…in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall
constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this
Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance…shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, operator, or fisherman were fishing with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity”
 The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person takes, catches or gathers
or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous
substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when
 Explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for
electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman
 When a fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat.
 Validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases has generally been
conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can
constitute prima facie evidence on the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden
of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
 To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other
must not be arbitrary and unreasonable.
PAGE 100
 The 3rd paragraph of Sec. 33 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts
proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible.
 The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or
fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to
arise from the discovery of the substances and contaminated fish in the
possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat.
 The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved.
 The statutory presumption; however, is merely prima facie and it cannot operate
to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact
presumed.
 The petitioners are not guilty of the crime of illegal fishing. The evidence is not enough
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners are guilty of the crime.
 At the trial court level, petitioners had the fish specimens taken from the boat
reexamined.
 A random sample of 5 live lapu-lapu were taken from the fish cage. The
specimens were packed and transported in the usual manner of packing
and transporting live fish.
 The NBI forensic test results showed NEGATIVE signs of sodium cyanide in
the fish samples.
 The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory results and this omission
raises a reasonable doubt that one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the
use of sodium cyanide.
 The absence of sodium cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports
petitioners claim that they did not use the poison in fishing.
 Furthermore, the claim that the fishermen used only the hook and line method is
buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself.
 One of the apprehending officers testified that he did not witness or see any
evidence of muro ami type fishing.
 The apprehending officers also did not find any sodium cyanide or any
poisonous substance in the boat. They also did not find any trace of the
poison in the possession of the fishermen.
 The inventory prepared by the apprehending officers also shows that all the
materials accounted for and used for fishing were hooks and lines.
 The only basis relied on by the apprehending officers is the result of the first NBI
test results. This finding however does not warrant the infallible conclusion that
the fishes in the F/B Robinson were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
 The circumstances and time interval of how the first set of fish specimens were
tested also fail to secure the integrity of the specimens.
 The first set of specimens got to Manila days later and were dead for quite
some time now.
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 The specimens were taken to Manila without the presence of petitioners or
their representatives.
 The specimens were simply packed in plastic bags and were not sealed
properly and were just kept in freezers.
 Authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal
fishing. All the documents were in order and it was only after the fish specimens
were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged
with illegal fishing.
JUDGMENT: Petition GRANTED. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal
fishing
– Jecky Pelaez
EMPELIS V. IAC
RELOVA, J. / 28 SEPTEMBER 1984
PARTIES:
Petitioners: ELPIDIO EMPELIS, MAMERTO CARBUNGCO, SALVADOR CARBUNGCO and
EMILIO CARBUNGCO
Respondents: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 1979 - Guillermo Catarining, owner of a coconut plantation, was frequently losing
coconuts in his plantation due to thievery.
 One morning, he saw four persons within the premises of his plantation gathering
and tying some coconuts.
 When he inspected the scene with his neighbors, they found the appellant, Elpidio
and Emilio, carrying coconuts on a piece of wood on their shoulders while Salvador
and Mamerto were carrying coconuts with their bare hands. As the four persons
noticed the presence of Catarining and the latter's companions, they dropped the
coconuts they were carrying and fled leaving behind about 50 pieces of coconuts
valued at P50.00 and two poles, one made of bamboo and the other of wood.
PAGE 101
 Catarining invited the barangay tanod to witness the counting of the coconuts
abandoned by the four men. Upon the advice of said tanod, Catarining reported
the incident to the barangay captain who accompanied him and his companions
to the police station.
 The Municipal Circuit Court convicted the four of qualified theft and sentenced
them to 4-8 years. IAC affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed is simple or qualified theft. QUALIFIED THEFT.
REASONING: Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of theft shall "be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively expressed in
the next preceding article ... if the property stolen ... consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, ... ." Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree
or deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft. When the coconuts are
stolen in any other place, it is simple theft.
People vs. Isnain: "[i]n the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is
to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of
our national economy. Coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the
nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of
property, of will be as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves."
Petitioners were seen arriving away fifty coconuts while they were still in the premises of
the plantation. They would therefore come within the definition of qualified theft because
the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation.
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were
not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a
consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to
the timely arrival of the owner.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED but modified in the sense that the crime committed is only
frustrated qualified theft.
– Raina Quibral
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MUSTANG LUMBER, INC.V. CA
DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUNE 18, 1996
FACTS:
 Mustang lumber Inc. was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD). Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
 On 1 April 1990, the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR
acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard
 The team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with
Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions
 Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents,
the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound
 On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof,
the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of
narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa. 3
 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
ISSUES:
 WoN the information validly charges an offense
 WoN lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended
HELD:
 Yes. The information validly charges an offense
 No. lumber is not excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended
PAGE 102
RATIO:
 Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
 The section prohibits the ff:
 The cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and
 Possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations
 The word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But granted that this omission
amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, lumber is not the
only item covered by the information.
 A cursory reading of the information shows us that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. The respondent is said to allegedly possess the ff. without a warrant:
 almaciga and lauan; and
 approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
 Even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted
above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information
validly charges an offense.
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 The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber
 the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage
 In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber
 Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
 Possession of lumber without the required legal documents is penalized in the said
section because lumber is included in the term timber.
– Sam Rosales
MANAHAN V. CA
VITUG, J. / MARCH 20, 1996
FACTS:
o May 10 1976 IFC and Manahan signed a contract of lease. IFC leased an Isuzu
dump truck to Manahan for a period of thirty-six (36) months from May, 1976, at a
monthly rental of P3k. The dump truck was delivered to Manahan on 30 April 1976.
The contract says the lessee “agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease,
pledge, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased equipment”
o Manahan did not pay so IFC, on March 15, 1983 charged him w/ estafa, claiming
that Manahan misappropriated and converted to his own personal use and
benefit the said equipment
o the lease agreements and the original registration certificate of the Isuzu
dumptruck were presented during trial. the payloader had in fact been recovered
by IFC and later disposed of by it.
o Manahan admitted the lease contract, receiving and failing to return the dump
truck. he said it’s because he subleased it to one Mr. Gorospe. After the
sublease was terminated, Manahan tried to get it back. But in June 1983, around
10 malefactors, allegedly "men of Gorospe and Espino," dismantled the truck,
loaded the parts into another truck, and left only its chassis. The matter was
reported to the barangay captain but "nothing happened." Manahan was furious
when informed of the incident but there was not much, he said, that he could do.
o On 27 July 1989, the trial court convicted Manahan of estafa and sentenced him
to 10 years of prision mayor
o Manahan appealed to the CA contending, among other things, that the fourth
element of estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the accused of
the thing received to the prejudice of another, was not present. He said his failure
to return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond his control, and that it
was not he but other persons, particularly Gorospe and Espino and their men,
who unlawfully detained the vehicle.

o on 16 September 1976 IFC again leased another equipt. to Manahan, this time one o CA affirmed the decision. for its flawed reasoning, see ratio
unit of Payloader for forty-eight (48) months beginning September of 1976 at a
monthly rental of P5k.
ISSUE:
o On 15 March 1977, IFC filed a civil case against Manahan saying that Manahan
1. estafa has been committed NO. there was no criminal intent here. the
incurred "several defaults" and owed, as of that month, in rentals and expenses, a
accused was just inept.
total of P400k

RATIO:
o the CFI of RIzal ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering Manahan to pay the said
amounts + interest&atty’s fees
1. Manahan, in subletting the dump truck, violated the lease contract with IFC. The contract
says the lessee “agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or otherwise
o Instead of asking for an execution of the decision, IFC on 23 June 1981, sent a
encumber or dispose of the leased equipment”
letter to Manahan about his still unsettled accounts under the two contracts.
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Thus, IFC’s options after winning the civil case was 1.) cancel its lease contract or 2.) see to
the execution of the decision. But he failed to do either, so the contract remains in force in
accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil Code*.
The decision was promulgated on 03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for
thirty-six months from May 1976 or until April 1979.
IFC's agreeing to Manahan’s continued possession was, in effect, a continuation of the
contract under the concept of an implied new lease on a month to month basis.
The contract subsisted until IFC demanded the return of the equipment on 23 June 1981.
From that moment, Manahan becomes liable as a possessor in bad faith
did petitioner commit estafa?
CA’s flawed reasoning:
Article 315, subdivision 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are:
1) that money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same;
2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt;
3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
All the elements are present in this case.
Even if Manahan has no intention of defrauding IFC, he certainly committed abuse of
confidence when he sub-leased it without the knowledge and consent of the owner. In sub-
leasing it, he assumed the right to dispose of it as if it is his thereby committing conversion.
PAGE 104
The words "convert" and 'misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's
property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon.
Manahan’s received IFC's demand letter on July 6, 1981. The judgment in Civil
Case was rendered on April 3, 1978. The alleged taking of the vehicle was in
June, 1983. Had he returned the truck to IFC upon the latter's demand, such
taking of the dump truck by Gorospe, if it were true, would not have occurred.
Clearly, accused's unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all
the long time that he undisputably could have done so constituted abuse of
confidence and virtual conversion.
During the time that the truck remained in Manahan, IFC had been deprived of its
right to use the same. In other words, there had been a disturbance of the
property rights of the offended party.
SC’s comment:
CA’s "unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long time that he
indisputably could have done so constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion." is
incorrect. Although, clearly, Manahan has incurred default in his obligation to return
the truck, he did exert all efforts to recover and retrieve, albeit belatedly and to no
avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. This is different from refusing to return the
property on account of misappropriation or conversion.
this felony falls under the category of mala inse offenses that require the attendance of
criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to be a felony.
Petitioner’s ineptitude in possessing the dump truck from Gorospe should not be
confused with criminal intent.
At any rate, any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Indispensable
for conviction is “the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it."
Manahan must still, however, be held responsible for the value (P55,000.00) of the lost
dump truck.
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DECISION: ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised
Penal Code but he shall pay IFC P55,000.00 representing the value of the lost dump
truck with 12% interest per annum from July 1981 (the month following the demand of
23 June 1981) until full payment of said amount. Costs against petitioner.
*"Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in
articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract and
indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.
– Fredda Rosete
SADDUL V. CA
GRINO-AQUINO, J. / DECEMBER 10, 1990
FACTS:
 Jose Saddul Jr. was a VP of Amalgamated Motors Phils. (AMPI), which was the
sole distributor in the Philippines of British and Japanese heavy equipment, trucks,
farm implements, and other automotive products and machines manufactured by
Leyland Int’l, Land Rover Ltd.
 He eventually became EVP and GM and therefore was in charge of the operations
of the company and delegated to make sales of some units and spare parts.
 In 1985, Land Rover supplied 1.5 M worth of spare parts to the AFP but the
merchandise was returned because they were not those which were needed by the
AFP.
 In a letter, Area Manager Lyndsay authorized Saddul to dispose of the returned
parts at the best possible prices and that 20% of the sale be retained by AMPI as a
handling charge and that such balance be placed into a separate client account.
 Saddul sold some of the spare parts to Rover Motor Parts for PHP 143,085.
However, he did not deposit the proceeds of the sale in AMPI’s account. He held
them in trust for Land Rover claiming that he was directed to hold onto the money
until an account could be opened.
 Saddul was terminated in 1986 so he decided to start his own business, Multiport
Motors Int’l. Lyndsay wrote to AMPI President Cuevas requesting for an inventory of
the British Leyland spare parts. Cuevas replied saying that some of the parts had
been sold by Saddul who did not turn over the proceeds to AMPI, hence he filed a
complaint for estafa.
 Lyndsay wrote to Cuevas requesting that all British Leyland parts in possession of
AMPI be delivered to Saddul’s Multiport Motor Phils, which was now their new parts
PAGE 105
distributor. Moreover, in view of the change in distributorship, AMPI would not be
held liable for the proceeds of the spare parts sold by Saddul to Rover. Despite
this, AMPI prosecuted the estafa case against Saddul and won judgment in their
favor.
ISSUE: WON Saddul is guilty of estafa
HELD: NO, there was no proof that he embezzled the money for personal gain.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 The appropriations/ conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner thereof is the essence of estafa thru
misappropriation, this denotes using the property for one’s personal
advantage.
 The elements of estafa are:
 Personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the duty to make the delivery of or to
return the same.
 That there was conversion or diversion of such property by the person who
has received it.
 That such diversion, conversion or denial is to the injury of another.
 That there be a demand for the return of the property.
st
 In this case, the 1 element did not exist because Saddul did not
receive the spare parts from Cuevas or AMPU, in trust, on
commission, for administration, or under duty to make delivery of,
or return the same. Rather, he received the spare parts.
nd
 The 2 element was not also present because his failure to
deliver the proceeds of the sale to AMPU or Cuevas did not
constitute a conversion or diversion to the injury of the latter who
was no its owner and hence did not incur any loss.
rd
 As to the 3 element, Saddul complied with the directive to place
proceeds is a separate client account, therefore he was not
obligated to give the proceeds to AMPU.
th
 As to the 4 element, Cuevas made no demand for the return of
the spare parts sold by Saddul because he knew those parts were
to be sold for the account of Land Rover.
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 Concerning the 20% commission, Saddul received instructions from
Land Rover to hold onto it until AMPI shall have given and
accounting of the remaining spare parts still held by AMPI.
 Saddul cannot be liable for estafa because he did not receive the
money from AMPU; it was the price he received from Rover.
 AMPI’s recourse in order to recover the 20% handling charges
should have been to file a civil action to collect the same amount
from its former principal, Land Rover
JUDGMENT: Decision of the CA reversed.
– Pat Sadegi-Tajar
ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. ORDONEZ
LEE V. RODIL
GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
Rosemarie Lee, being then the duly authorized representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc.,
after opening letter of credit with the Philippine Bank of Communications under L/C No. 63251
dated July 26, 1982, for the amount of P 154,711.97, coveting the purchase price of a certain
merchandise consisting of 23 ctns. Lab. Culture Media in favor of said bank, received from the
latter the necessary document and thereafter the said merchandise and forthwith, executed
trust receipt for, the aforesaid merchandise dated July 26, 1982, by virtue of which, the said
accused obligated herself to hold said merchandise in trust with liberty to sell the same in
cash for the account of the said bank and to account for the proceeds of the sale thereof, if
sold or of returning the said merchandise to said bank in case of failure to sell the same, on or
before October 24, 1982. But the said accused, once in possession of the said merchandise,
far from complying with her aforesaid obligation and despite the lapse of a long period of time
and repeated demands made upon her to that effect, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the said
PAGE 106
merchandise or the value thereof, to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Philippine Bank of Communications in the amount of P154,711.97.
The accused moved to quash this information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the violation of a trust receipt agreement constitutes the crime of
estafa.
HELD:
Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 provides:
The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods,
documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods,
documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with
the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable
under the provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b) of
Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is
committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the
penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense
without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.
A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endorsed with its own distinctive features and
characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank extends a loan covered by the letter of credit,
with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a
loan feature represented by the letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the
covering trust receipt.
Therefore, the loan feature is separate and distinct from the trust receipt. The violation of a
trust receipt committed by disposing of the goods covered thereby and failing to deliver the
proceeds of such sale has been squarely made to fall under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:
... Swindling (estafa).-Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
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xxx xxx xxx
a. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by
a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
The fact that the bank does not become the factual owner of the goods does not make the law
unconstitutional. The language of the abovementioned penal provision has been clarified by
P.D. 115. The person who is prejudiced through the misappropriation or conversion of the
goods need not be the owner, thereof; if such had been the intention of the authors of the
Code, the phrase "to the prejudice of another" would have read "to the prejudice of the
owner." (People v. Yu Chai Ho, 53 Phil. 874, 877-878).
− Yan Yu
PAGE 107
CELINO V. CA
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA V. PEOPLE
FERNAN, C.J.
FACTS:
 Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of
hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco
Filipino, Tacloban Branch.
 Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an
employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. On several occasions,
petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have drinking
sprees. They became close friends. Balo even became the godfather of Abejuela's
daughter. Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding
business, claiming that he was expecting a large sum of money out of the insurance
policy of his late father.
 On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's
passbook. Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use
his passbook. Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of
his father's insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela's account
with Banco Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account.
However, Balo explained that he was prohibited from opening an account with Banco
Filipino since he was employed with that bank as a savings bookkeeper.
 Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead with another bank but Balo insisted
that he wanted the checks deposited with Banco Filipino so that he could facilitate
their immediate encashment as well as avail himself of some privileges. Balo assured
Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to use his passbook and even
reassured Abejuela that he would accompany him to the bank to make the deposit.
 Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances Abejuela entrusted his passbook to
Balo. On August 8,1978, Balo returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit in the
amount of P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that
there was nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of his
checks. On the same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the
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former's behalf, money from his account with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from
Balo, Abejuela reluctantly agreed. He went to Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of
P15,000.00 which he gave to Balo at a restaurant called Felisa's Cafe.
 Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook
continued for quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela
with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of
P175,607.96.
 Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from August 9, 1978.
But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook, Abejuela decided to
pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and taking the
other P10,000.00 from his business profits. Abejuela also closed his account with Banco
Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of his deposit.
 Later, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between
the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest
bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He
also notice that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected 4
large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling
P176,145.25, but the deposits slips thereof could not be located.
 After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest
bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the
savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account
ledger. They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the
fictitious deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and
cleared by the bank accountant.
 The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the
accusations, but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuela was
also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in
accomplishing his fraudulent scheme. On December 5,1978, an information was filed
against Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification
of commercial documents. Separately arraigned, both pleaded not guilt to the crime
charged.
 On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an
order of preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr.
and Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly
embezzled or misappropriated.
 On September 4,1979, the Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of service and
submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which goods were
PAGE 108
placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the refrigerator
and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a good
pace on account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at
P62,295.00.
 In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reportedly killed by members of the
New People's Army in the mountains of Mati Balangkayan Eastern Samar, on
suspicion that he was a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a
rattan gatherer and former NPA member whose testimony before the court was never
impeached.
 Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against
Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without
prejudice to a civil action for recovery of damages arising from the offense which may
be instituted by Banco Filipino and without prejudice also to the reinstatement of the
instant criminal action in the event the accused would turn out to be alive.
 On January 11, 1984, the lower court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty.
 On appeal Abejuela argued that he had no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-
accused, Glicerio Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, be cannot be convicted
as principal, neither as accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime,
hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory.
 That the lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith,
and after he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is necessary
because as employee of Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said bank
ISSUE: Was Abejuela guilty of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents?
HELD:
 No. The Court believed that petitioner Abejuela was completely unaware of the
malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who deceived
Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and parties and cajoled him
into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have
questioned Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance
proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to
be his father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo
indeed had money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate
the encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were
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close friends and "compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against petitioner's
understandable properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil
obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made
 The Court takes notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to deposit in an
permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
account even without the owner's passbook, as long as the account number is known.
Thus, even without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been posted FELICIANO, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
by Balo in the savings account ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record of the
I quite agree with the holding of the Chief Justice's ponencia that Benjamin Abejuela must
bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is the record of the
be held civilly accountable and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued
depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and up-to-date.
by the trial court against Abejuela's properties and those of his coaccused Glicerio Balo, Jr.
This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded
to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P 176,145.25.
transactions like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank
charges. At the same time, I submit, with respect, that Abejuela should not be completely
exonerated of criminal liability. The facts in this case appear so similar as to be practically
 In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who
on all fours with the facts in Samson v. Court of Appeals (103 Phil. 277 [19581). In
had posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the one who wisely
Samson, the Court held the accused guilty of "estafa through falsification of commercial
manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his
documents by reckless negligence." Two (2) out of ten (10) members of the Court
Balo disposal, Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the amount he had
dissented: Reyes, J.B.L., J. and Concepcion, J. As far as I can determine, however,
earlier placed in the latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually
Samson has not been overruled, expressly or impliedly. Upon the other hand, the doctrine
believed that the money was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that
in Samson was explicitly followed in People v. Rodis, et al. (105 Phil. 1294 [1959]), where
he was interested in it. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the Court held that the accused could be held liable for the crime of "malversation of public
that Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be
funds through falsification of a public document by reckless negligence." Much the same
attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
doctrine has been applied in both earlier and subsequent cases:
 Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is
Finally, it might be noted that the ponencia explicitly found Abejuela to have acted with
essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime
reckless negligence:
of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice,
there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered
knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior – Wes Aquende
cognizance of the offense intended to be committed.
 It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount
of P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and KOH TIECK HENG V. PEOPLE
systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although REGALADO, J. / DECEMBER 21, 1990
Abejuela, was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless
unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his
NATURE: Petition for certiorari to review decision of CA
passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise
prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable.
FACTS:
Koh Tieck Heng had an account in security Bank and Trust Company where he deposited
a check from Dycaico for P18,060 by altering the original amount of P225. SBTC was
RULING: Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of estafa thru alerted when Dycaico complained to his bank that he did not issue a check for such a huge
falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of preliminary attachment amount. When Koh Tieck Heng came back to the bank to encash another spurious check,
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 110
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he was apprehended. He was convicted of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents
(for the first check) and Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. (for the
second check)
SC HELD:
There was Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents because,
1. the fraud or deceit was proven by the possession of the spurious check;
2. since there was only an intent to cause damage or injury, and not actual
damage because of his timely apprehension.
Koh Tieck Heng commenced the commission of the crime of estafa. But he failed to perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own
spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could
obtain the amount.
*Both fraud or deceit and damage or injury (two essential elements of estafa) must be
established for the crime of estafa to be established
As regards the falsification, since he was the only person who stood to be benefited by the
falsification that was found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of
such falsification.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Nierras is a customer of Phil. Shell Corporation who paid 9 bouncing checks.
He was charged of violating BP 22 and was also charged under Art. 315 of RPC.
 He contends that there is double jeopardy because the elements of the two crimes are
identical.
ISSUE: WON the two crimes are one and the same
HELD:
No. Damage and deceit are essential elements in Art. 315 but are not required in BP 22.
Under Art. 315, if it is issued for a pre-existing obligation, it is not criminal but BP 22
punishes the same. Estafa is a crime against property but BP 22 is a crime against public
interest. BP 22 is mala prohibita and Art. 315 is mala in se.
While the complainants refer to identical acts, prosecution cannot be limited to one offense
because a single act may give rise to multiplicity of offenses. Thus, there is no double
jeopardy.
– May Calsiyao
PEOPLE V. GROSPE

DOCTRINE: The attempted stage of Estafa thru falsification of Commerical Documents exists
when the person commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but was stopped before
causing the injury.
QUE V. PEOPLE
DISPOSITION: Judgment of CA is affirmed. PARAS, J. / SEPT 21, 1987

– Anj Balacano FACTS:

PEOPLE V. ONG  Victor Que was conficted of violating BP Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) by the
Quezon City RTC, which the IAC and SC affirmed.

 He now files a Motion for Reconsideration here on the following grounds:

 That there was no other reason for the dismassal of his appeal thru a minute
NIERRAS V. DACUYCUY resolution other than for “lack of merit
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 That the IAC erred in not considering the material facts and the principal element of
the crime showing that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case (the facts
include that Que claims he issued the checks merely to guarantee the payment of the
purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc., of which he is the Manager)
 That the IAC erred in failing to consider one of the most important elements of the
crime punished by BP Blg. 22, the place of the issuance of the check, is absent in his
case.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the denial of the petition thru minute resolution was valid – YES.
2. WON the IAC erred in not considering the material facts of the case – NO.
3. WON the IAC erred in not considering the place of the issuance of the check – NO.
RATIO:
 As stated in the case of In re Almacen, minute resolutions are not decisions within the
meaning of the constitutional requirement mentioned in Art VIII, Sec. 12 of the
Consititution that would entail a prohibition of a “lack of merit” resolution. A petition to
review the decision of an appellate court is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
so there is no need to explain the court's denial. Anyway, the facts are already in the
appellate court's decision.
 The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is already
punishable under BP Blg. 22, as indicated by the statute's framers. The purpose of
issuing such checks does not exculpate the offender from criminal liability.
 The findings of the trial court reveal that the checks in question wre issued at Quezon City,
as admitted by Que himself in his answer when he was sued for civil liability. It does not
matter where the checks were deposited; the determinative factor being the place of
issuance, the QC RTC therefore has jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT: Motion for Reconsideration denied.
– Jahzeel Cruz
PAGE 111
PEOPLE V. NITAFAN
BELLOSILLO, J.
PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. HON. DAVID NITAFAN, Judge
RTC and K.T. LIM, respondents
FACTS: The accused, K.T. Lim made , drew and issued to Fatima Cortez Sasaki a
Philippine Trust Company Check in the amount of Php143,000, knowing that at the time of
issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Thus, such check
was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds and despite receipt of notice
of dishonor, Lim failed to pay Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment within 5 banking days after receiving said notice.
Lim moved to quash alleging that BP22 was unconstitutional and that the check
he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, thus
not covered by BP22.
-RTC: BP22 unconstitutional, issued the order quashing the information. Thus this petition
for review by certiorari
Note that constitutionality of BP22 has already been sustained by the Court in 8
other cases.
ISSUE: WON the memorandum check issued is within the coverage of BP22
DECISION: NO. Petition is granted. The order of the Judge is set aside and hereby
directed to proceed with the hearing of the case.
REASONING:
A memorandum check is an ordinary check, with the word “memorandum”,
“memo” or “mem” written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to
pay the bona fide holder absolutely. This check is an evidence of debt against the drawer
and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary
rd
check, and if passed to a 3 person, will be valid in his hands like any other check. Thus,
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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a memorandum check is still drawn on a bank and should be distinguished from a promissory
note, which is a mere promise to pay.
Definition of memorandum check: bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of BP22 which does not
distinguish but merely provides that “any person who makes or draws or issues any check
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds…which check is
subsequently dishonored..shall be punished by imprisonment.” It must be remembered that
where the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. One can also glean that the
BP members intended it to be comprehensive as to include all checks drawn against banks.
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. It
does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of
indebtedness or whether it was issued in partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what
the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be
presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due.
However, with BP22, such private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal
sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions
of BP22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for
which the law was enacted – to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. To determine the
reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
– Tim Guanzon
LIM LAO V. CA
IDOS V. CA
FACTS:
 Eddie Alarilla supplied chemicals and rawhide to the accused-appellant Irma L. Idos for
use in the latter's business of manufacturing leather.
PAGE 112
 In 1985, Alarilla joined the Idos' business and formed with her a partnership under the
style "Tagumpay Manufacturing," with offices in Bulacan and Cebu City.
 In January, 1986 the parties agreed to terminate their partnership. Upon liquidation of
the business the partnership had as of May 1986 receivables and stocks worth
P1,800,000.00.
 Alarilla’s share of the assets was P900,000.00 to pay for which Idos issued four
postdated checks, all drawn against Metrobank Branch in Mandaue, Cebu.
 The complainant was able to encash the first, second, and fourth checks, but the third
check was dishonored on October 14, 1986 for insufficiency of funds. The
complainant demanded payment from the accused-appellant but the latter failed to
pay.
 Accordingly, on December 18, 1986, through counsel, he made a formal demand for
payment.
 In a letter dated January 2, 1987, the accused-appellant denied liability. She claimed
that the check had been given upon demand of complainant in May 1986 only as
"assurance" of his share in the assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed
to be deposited until the stocks had been sold.
 Complainant then filed his complaint in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
which on August 22, 1988 filed an information for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
accused-appellant.
 Complainant denied that the checks issued to him by accused-appellant were subject
to the disposition of the stocks and the collection of receivables of the business.
 But the accused-appellant insisted that the complainant had known that the checks
were to be funded from the proceeds of the sale of the stocks and the collection of
receivables. She claimed that the complainant himself asked for the checks because
he did not want to continue in the tannery business and had no use for a share of the
stocks.
ISSUE: WON Idos issued the subject check knowing at the time of issue that she did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank and without communicating this fact
of insufficiency of funds to the complainant.
HELD / RATIO:
NO. Evidence on record would show that the subject check was to be funded from
receivables to be collected and goods to be sold by the partnership, and only when such
collection and sale were realized. Thus, there is sufficient basis for the assertion that the
petitioner issued the subject check to evidence only complainant's share or interest in the
partnership, or at best, to show her commitment that when receivables are collected and
goods are sold, she would give to private complainant the net amount due him
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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representing his interest in the partnership. It did not involve a debt of or any account due and
payable by the petitioner.
Since the partnership has not been terminated, the petitioner and private complainant
remained as co-partners. The check was thus issued by the petitioner to complainant, as
would a partner to another, and not as payment from a debtor to a creditor. Absent the first
element of the offense penalized under B.P. 22, which is "the making, drawing and issuance
of any check to apply on account or for value", petitioner's issuance of the subject check was
not an act contemplated in nor made punishable by said statute.
Since petitioner issued these four checks without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds, she could not be held liable under B.P. 22 when one was not honored right away. The
element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds has to be proved by the prosecution; absent
said proof, petitioner could not be held criminally liable under that law. Moreover, the
presumption of prima facie knowledge of such insufficiency in this case was actually rebutted
by petitioner's evidence. In the instant case, petitioner intimated to private complainant the
possibility that funds might be insufficient to cover the subject check, due to the fact that the
partnership's goods were yet to be sold and receivables yet to be collected.
To recapitulate, the SC find the petition impressed with merit. Petitioner may not be held liable
for violation of B.P. 22 for the following reasons: (1) the subject check was not made, drawn
and issued by petitioner in exchange for value received as to qualify it as a check on account
or for value; (2) there is no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner, at the time of issue of
the check, had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and (3) there was no notice of
dishonor of said check actually served on petitioner, thereby depriving her of the opportunity
to pay or make arrangements for the payment of the check, to avoid criminal prosecution.
– Felman Magcalas
VILLAFLOR V. CA
JOSE VELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CORTES, J. / JULY 16, 1990
FACTS:
 For defrauding the Government in the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty- Two
Thousand Two Hundred Seven Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60) through
PAGE 113
the illegal and unauthorized issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments and
Cash Disbursement Ceilings and the tampering and falsifications of General
Vouchers and supporting documents, the following officials and employees of the
Ministry of Public Highways Central Office, Regional Office No. VII and the
Siquijor Highway Engineering District, together with contractors Clodualdo
Gomilla, Juliana de los Angeles and Manuel Mascardo, were charged with forty-
six (46) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents:
(1) Rolando Mangubat, Angelina Escano, Chief Regional Accountant and Regional
Finance Officer, respectively, of the 7th Highway Regional Office in Cebu City; Wilfredo
Monte, Zosimo S. Dinsay, Cresencia L. Tan, Isaac T. Mananquil, Trinidad T. Manloloyo,
Aurelio M. de la Pena Eugenio S. Machan, Ediltrudes Kilat Jose R. Veloso, Regino
Junawan Arsenio Pakilit Juan Sumagang, Francisco Ganhinhin and Urbano Arcamo, the
Civil Engineer, Senior Civil Engineer, Accountant I, Highway District Engineer II, Assistant
Highway District Engineer, Administrative Officer, Property Custodian, Auditing Aide
Auditor, Auditing Examiner, Senior Civil Engineer, Crewman and Auditing Aide
respectively, of the Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED) in Crim. Cases Nos.
20732095, and
(2) Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, Basilisa Galwan Budget Officer, Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, Josefina Luna, Accountant II, Jose Sayson, Budget
Examiner, of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Region VII, Cebu City;
Leonila del Rosario, Chief, Finance and Management Service, Engracia Escobar, Chief
Accountant, Abelardo Cardona, Asst. Chief Accountant and Leonardo Tordecilla,
Supervising Accountant, of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Central Office,
Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 3323-3345
 Petitioner, together with accused Mangubat, Mananquil, Monte, Machan Tan,
Ganhinhin, Manloloyo, de la Pe insay, Kilat Jumawan, Pakilit Arcamo,
Sumagang and Gomilla were found guilty as co-principals and sentenced in each
of twenty-three cases to suffer imprisonment of from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P1,500.00) in each case and to indemnify the government in amounts varying
from case to case.
 Petitioner does not dispute the finding that there were anomalies in the Siquijor
Highway Engineering District (SHED) Neither does he dispute the existence of a
conspiracy between the suppliers and certain government officials and
employees. What he vehemently denies is the Sandiganbayan's finding that he
was a conspirator.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Veloso should be convicted as co-principal/ comspirator in the said
criminal cases
HELD: YES. Veloso is a co-principal in the crimes.
RATIO:
 The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner's liability, as District Auditor,
emanated from his irregular and improper processing, pre-audit and approval
of all the general vouchers and checks in question, based on irregular or fake
supporting papers. The graft court found that he also signed and passed in
audit the vouchers and checks knowing that these were illegally funded and
improperly charged to "Fund 81-400" (the prior year's obligations), and
engaged in "splitting," so that he would be the one to pass the vouchers in
audit when such should have been forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA) Regional Auditor for action or review
 The Sandiganbayan described the details of the "splitting" resorted to as follows:
..based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the accused district officials resorted to "splitting" of RSEs,
POs (Purchase Orders) and GVs in order to avoid review or approval by higher authorities. Under COA
Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, in relation to COA Circular No. 16-16A, dated February 10,
1976, of which the Court takes judicial notice, it is provided that "Resident Auditors of bureaus, offices
and agencies of the National Government in Metropolitan Manila, as well as other Auditors 3 for
District/City Highway, Public Works/School, State Colleges and Universities, Military Areas and Zones
outside Metropolitan Manila, are authorized to countersign checks and warrants in amounts not
exceeding P50,000.00 in each case". Consequently, all GVs in amounts exceeding P50,000.00 must
have to be processed, pre-audited and approved by the Regional Auditor of the COA, instead of (SHED)
resident auditor Jose Veloso, one of the accused herein.
Thus, in the very wording of COA Circular No. 76-41, "to avoid action, review or approval by higher
authorities", the district officials herein resorted to the splitting of the RSEs, POs and the GVs involved in
the fake LAA dated October 6, 1977 in the amount of P200,000.00. Said LAA evolved into three (3)
separate transactions involving the amounts of P48,480.00, P48,480.00 and P48,189.60 as evidenced by
three GVs dated December 21, December 21 and December 23, 1977, respectively. Otherwise, if such
transactions were to be reviewed and pre-audited by the Regional (COA) Auditor, who might be averse to
joining the conspiracy, then the GVs and supporting papers may be found to be the result of (1) inexistent
programs of work, (2) illegal funding, (3) irregular or non-existent bidding, (4) fictitious deliveries and
inspection, and other anomalies. Consequently, the Court considers such "splitting" as an integral and/or
essential element or link in the conspiracy to defraud the Government inasmuch as such practices was
(sic) consciously and deliberately resorted to in order to hide the massive and stupefying
misappropriations being undertaken by the accused herein. [Decision, pp. 75-76; Rollo, pp. 105-106;
underscoring in the original...
PAGE 114
 But petitioner vigorously argues his innocence, alleging his non- participation in
the conspiracy and his good faith in attaching his signature to the documents
involved. He contends that it has not been shown that he falsified any of the
documents which the Sandiganbayan found to be falsifications.
 Thus, while he admits that he signed the general vouchers, he claims that his act
of doing so was merely ministerial considering that all the supporting papers and
documents were submitted and attached to the vouchers. He continues that he
could not question the veracity of the prepared Letters of Advice of Allotments
(LAA) and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) since these
documents, with the program of work accompanying them and other inspection
reports, gave him the go-signal to pass them in audit.
 Thus, he claims that the vouchers would have been cleared even without his
signature as they were supported by the required documents and
certifications.This argument cannot be given much weight.
 Clearly, given his acts and omissions in auditing the documents, which
related not only to one but to several transactions, petitioner's participation
in the conspiracy to defraud the Government has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that there need not be direct evidence of
the existence and details of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individual
offender, the existence of a conspiracy and a conspirator's participation
may be established through circumstantial evidence
 Petitioner, as resident auditor of the SHED was tasked with ensuring the
regularity of all transactions that are subject to his review. In these cases,
he had before him, for his signature, vouchers that were patently irregular,
supported by similarly irregularly issued documents, which he should not
have passed in audit. Instead of refusing to affix his signature and
reporting the irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty bound to do, he
turned a blind eye and signed the documents, completing the process that
led to the consummation of the crime.
 He can not rely on the excuse that his subordinates have already initialed the
documents for his signature because his function, as their superior, is to check
on their work and to ensure that they do it correctly. Otherwise, if his signature
was a superfluity, petitioner would be serving no useful purpose in occupying his
position of resident auditor.
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 The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved and the magnitude of the
amount involved also prevent a reasonable mind from accepting the proposition that
petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of his functions He
passed in audit twenty-four (24) general vouchers which resulted in the issuance of
twenty-three (23) checks amounting to Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand Two
Hundred Seven Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60).i?t?c-a?CITE> Moreover,
the irregularities were not of the kind that could have gone unnoticed by the trained
eyes of an auditor.
 Finally, it may be that petitioner has already been administratively penalized for his
malfeasance, as in fact he was suspended for one (1) year without pay but such will
not bar his conviction under the general penal laws. Administrative liability is
separate and distinct from penal liability.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED.
– Joy Montes
CABALLES V. DAR
PARTIES: YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
HEHERSON ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON
FACTS:
 1975, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of Andrea Millenes’ land.
Millenes received P2/month as rental and she also allowed Abajon to plant on a portion
of the land, whereby they share the produce 50-50.
 1979, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes bought the property from Millenes. The spouses
asked Abajon to vacate the property. Abajon refused to leave and instead offered to pay
them rental, but the new owners refused. Yolanda then executed an affidavit stating that
immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill-intent, cut down the
banana plants on the property worth about P50.
ISSUE: WON Abajon is guilty of malicious mischief. NO.
PAGE 115
RATIONALE:
 Malicious Mischief – any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of
another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be
guilty of malicious mischief
 Elements:
 Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another
 Damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving
destruction
 Damage was caused maliciously by the offender
 Abajon cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana
trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of
the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof.
 Whatever Abajon planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and
not to the landowner. Thus an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief,
which is “damage deliberately caused to the property of another” is absent because
Abajon merely cut down his own plantings.
JUDGMENT: Criminal case dismissed.
– Giselle Munoz
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
PEOPLE V. FAMULARCANO
FELIX, J. / 28 FEBRUARY 1947
NATURE: Appeal from CFI Baguio
FACTS:
 Fernando Famularcano, 34 years old and married, works as a driver for Camp
John Hay. His duty includes driving the employees to their respective homes.
 On April 4, 1946, around 9:30 PM, a group of Camp John Hay employees were
being taken home. It was raining hard.
 Cashier Dionisia Florague alias Navarro, 19, is one of the employees. She was
the only one left in the weapons carrier truck driven by Famularcano.
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 Upon reaching Lukban bridge, Famularcano told her that they ran out of gas.
Navarro got off the truck and started to walk. The man followed.
 While they were alone walking along the road towards Aurora Hill, Famularcano
held Navarro by the waist, held her to his breast and hugged her with the intention
of kissing her, abusing her and touching her breast and private parts, and hugged
her without her consent and with the use of force. She was able to escape and she
spent the night at her friend’s house.
Famularcano’s defense:
1) The woman is the daughter of a famous Filipino Japanese spy, Antonio Florague,
connected with the Kempetai. Antonio was responsible for the arrest of
Famularcano’s wife. Florague attempted to rape the woman. Famularcano wanted
revenge. This is a mitigating circumstance.
2) He has no intention of having sex with Navarro. He only wanted to kiss her and
touch her nipples and private parts.
3) It was just unjust vexation; there are no frustrated acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUES: WON Famularcano is guilty of unjust vexation or acts of lasciviousness? He is
guilty of acts of lasciviousness.
RATIO:
In all acts of lasciviousness, as in all cases of crimes against chastity, from the moment the
offender performs all elements necessary for the felony to exist, he actually attains his
purpose, and from that moment, all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. There can be no frustration of acts of lasciviousness because the felony is
produced when his participation amounts to performing all acts of execution.
The motive of the accused is of no consequence; the essence of lewdness is in the act itself
(Article 336 of the RPC).
Famularcano claimed that he had no intention to rape the girl; he just wants to avenge his
wife. Though accused has not invoked in his favor any mitigating circumstance on this ground,
for said purpose of revenge does not come within the provisions of any of the first 9
paragraphs of Art. 13, yet the alleged grievance may have produced a state of mind and a
sentiment equivalent to passion or obfuscation. The motive that impelled Famularcano’s
offense is sufficient to consider in his favor a circumstance similar in nature and analogous to
the mitigating circumstance defined in Art 13 par. 5 and 6.
DISPOSITION: Famularcano is sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcional
and to pay the costs.
PAGE 116
– Ryan Oliva
PEOPLE V. FONTANILLA
BABANTO V. ZOSA
FEBRUARY 28, 1983
NATURE: Appeal from the deciosion of the Court of First Instance
FACTS:
 At dawn on October 24, 1969 petitioner Eusebio Babanto, a policeman, approached
Leonida Dagohoy, a 13 year old who was considerably of low mentality, while she was
sitting leisurely in the market of Orquieta.
 Babanto grabbed her and told her that were going to the municipal building.
 Babanto however did not take her to the municipal building. He took her to the ABC
hall where it was dark and empty.
 Babanto then made her lie down and he took of her panty and then proceeded to rape
her.
 Leonida tried to kick herself free, but she was held down by Babanto. She also
couldn’t scream because Babanto was also covering her mouth.
 Babanto was in uniform and with a sidearm when the incident happened.
 Babanto then told her if that she told anyone he would shoot her.
 Her parents eventually found out since they noticed she was acting strange, and she
finally admitted to the incident.
 A charge of rape was filed against Babanto
 Babanto denied the rape charge and interposed the following version:
 Babanto avers that he was with patrolman Apos when he saw a girl and boy
going to the public market coming from the bakery.
 The two officers followed the young couple.
 They reached the police station where they saw the girl, Leonida Dagohoy sitting
there alone.
 They investigated the girl who did not answer so they decided to ring her to the
municipal building in order that she can be protected.
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 On the way to the Municipal building, a patrol car approached them and talked to
patrolman Apos. Babanto who was walking further ahead stopped to listen to the
conversation.
 Leonida dagohoy however did not stop and proceeded to the ABC hall.
 Since he (Babanto) was unable to catch up with her, he went directly to the
municipal building and when he asked if the girl passed by or showed up, the guard
said that no one came to pass.
 Babanto then recorded the incident in the police blotter.
 The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s version.
 It stated that Babanto’s alibi was not strong enough since the ABC Hall is an annex
to the Municipal Building and that it is established that the accused brought the girl
to the municipal building.
 The trial court however, did not convict the Babanto of Rape but found him guilty of
the lesser offense of qualified seduction.
ISSUES:
 Is the crime Rape or Qualified Seduction?
 Can the accused be convicted of a crime in which he wasn’t charged?
HELD:
 The crime committed is RAPE
 No, the accused can’t be convicted if a crime he wasn’t charged with. However, based on
the evidence on record, the accused can still be convicted of the crime of rape as
charged.
RATIO:
 The crime is RAPE.
 Under Art. 337 of the RPC, the elements of Qualified Seduction are:
 The offended party is a virgin
 She must be over 12 and under 18 years of age
 The offender had sexual intercourse with her
 The offender is aperson in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic,
guardian, teacher, one entrusted with the education or custody of the offended
party, or a brother or ascendant of the latter.
 In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proven by the testimony that the crime was
committed.
 There is no reason for the victim to come up with such a story unless it really
happened.
 There is no evidence on record to show evil motive.
PAGE 117
 The trial court erred in saying that there was no physical intimidation that
preceded the intercourse which is an essential element in rape.
 It is well settled doctrine that in order to consider the existence of rape it is
not necessary that the force and/or intimidation employed in accomplishing
it be so great or of such character, it is only necessary that the force and
intimidation used by the culprit be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind.
 In the case at bar, considering the age, the mental abnormality and the fact
that the accused was in uniform with a sidearm is sufficient intimidation to
convict for rape. The fact that the victim tried to kick her way out negates
and consent to the act.
 Petitioner’s last ditch effort of saying he was castrated does not hold.
 No proof was shown other than his testimony that he was. There was no
medical certificate to attest to the fact.
 There was neither any evidence that if he was in fact castrated, that the
castration was successful.
 The accused cannot be convicted of a crime he wasn’t charged with in the
information. However, he can still be convicted of Rape based on the evidence since
that was the crime charged against him.
 The complaint against petitioner stated that the victim was a 13 year old girl and
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant. It also alleged that
the accused was a police officer. However, the complaint did not state that the
victim was a virgin.
 It is true that virginity is presumed if the girl is between 12 and 18 years old.
However, virginity is still an essential element of the crime of qualified seduction
it must be alleged in the complaint.
 A conviction for the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of virginity
would violate petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
 Petitioner however can still be convicted of rape as recommended by the
Solicitor General.
 The Solicitor General recommended that the merits of the criminal case be
certified by the proper appellate court and petitioner cannot be discharged
and instead be made to pursue his Petition for Review in the form of an
ordinary appeal.
 Petitioner was given time to file a reply to the memoranda and
recommendation of the Solicitor General but petitioner opted to stay silent
and therefore the case was tried based on the information charged.
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JUDGMENT: Petitioner found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as ISSUE: (PROCEDURAL) WON Perez correctly filed the petition for certiorari and
defined in Art. 335 of the RPC prohibition in the CA from the decision of the RTC. NO
RATIO:
Perez claims that what he filed with the RTC was not an original petition for certiorari and
− Jecky Pelaez
prohibition but an appeal from the resolutions of the MTC denying his motions to quash
and for reconsideration. However, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer.

This is the wrong remedy under the law. From a denial of a petition for certiorari and
PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS prohibition by the trial court, as in this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal
CORTES, J. / NOVEMBER 29, 1988 to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
judgment or order appealed from. Failure to appeal within fifteen (15) days from rendition of
judgment renders the appealed decision final and executory. A petition for review of a
FACTS:
judgment of the regional trial court is proper only when the judgment sought to be reviewed
 On October 21, 1974, Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio
is an appeal from the final judgment or order of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal
Perez for Consented Abduction. The CFI convicted Perez. On appeal, the CA
circuit trial court.
reversed the CFI's decision and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented
Abduction.
ISSUE: (SUBSTANTIVE) Whether there was double jeopardy in the filing of the Qualified
 Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal for Consented Abduction, Mendoza filed another
Abduction case after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction, I.e. WON there was
criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for Qualified Seduction
identity of the 2 offenses involved. NO
with the Municipal Trial Court. Perez filed a motion to quash invoking double
RATIO:
jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of the complainant. However, this
Applicable legal provisions
motion and his motion for reconsideration were denied.
 Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court
Constitution (Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987
questioning the denial of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the
Constitution)
Municipal Trial Court. The Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”
Court.
The term "same offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same
 The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its
or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. Complying with this, Perez filed a petition
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”
for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court. Upon evaluation of the
case, the court dismissed this petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration.
Rules of Court ( Sec. 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of
 Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which the CA
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure)
which was denied for being inappropriate, aside from the fact that the decision
“Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. -- When an accused has
sought to be reviewed had become final and executory. The CA explained that
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
Perez should have filed an appeal from the dismissal of the RTC decision and not a
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
petition for review. For failing to file a notice of appeal from the RTC decision within
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
the 15-day reglementary period, the RTC decision has become final and executory.
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
Perez filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but said motion was
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
denied.
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.”
In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction
is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented Abduction, petitioner maintains that since
the same evidence would support charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one,
after he was acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise,
petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of double jeopardy.
The filing of 2 informations based on the same set of facts is not precluded if from those facts,
2 distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated in U.S. v.
Capurro, citing In re Hans Neilsen,
A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under
the other.
As stated in People v. Doriquez, (G.R. Nos. 24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163, 171-
172):
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear
to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double
jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act
may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does
not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same
facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other.
An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have
arisen from the same set of facts, they are not Identical offenses as would make applicable
the rule on double jeopardy.
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely:
1. that the offended party is a virgin, and,
2. that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age.
PAGE 119
However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to
the two common elements, requires that:
(1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or
cajolery from the offender, and,
(2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.
On the other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also requires that:
1. the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and,
2. the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them.
As this Court has stated in (U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913)):
... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own
consent, who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm
and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the
infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in cases of seduction, the
gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced. ...
ISSUE: WON the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on
the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter having opted to consider the case as Consented
Abduction. NO.
The complainant's filing of a subsequent case against him belies his allegation that she has
waived or is estopped from filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she
be deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective,
must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.]
On the allegation that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case
against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party, the length of time it took her to
file the second case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the ten (10)-year
prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes
punishable by a correctional penalty such as Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the
Revised Penal Code.]
DECISION: Petition is DENIED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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– Raina Quibral
RATIO:
PEOPLE V. SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO
CORTES, J. / 1988 JUNE 30
FACTS:
 Juanita Angeles was 43 years of age, single, a registered pharmacist by profession
and a rice merchant doing business in Hagonoy, Bulacan
 On October 23, 1964, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, as Juanita Angeles,
accompanied by Benita Fabian, left her house to get rice from the RCA warehouse
of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto, Bulacan. She was abducted by Arsenio Calayag,
Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel.
 The men rode a car driven by Arsenio and overtook the jeep ridden by Juanita and
Benita. They forced the jeep to stop and boarded the jeep, after which Silvestre
Sunpongco ordered its driver to proceed to the old road. Arsenio Calayag followed
in the car he was driving.
 Upon reaching an uninhabited place on the old road, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered
the jeep to stop and the three accused got out. Silvestre and the other men
managed to drag Juanita out of the jeep and into their car despite her struggles and
Benita’s efforts.
 They proceeded towards Manila, then to the Hilltop Hotel in Tagaytay City. Upon
reaching the hotel Silvestre pushed her into a room and locked the door. There he
managed to have sexual intercourse with her twice before her brother accompanied
FACTS:
by CIS agents found her.
 She was physically examined the next day by Dr. Ramon Pascual, captain in the
Medical Corps of the Philippine Constabulary
 Benita Fabian corroborated the testimony of Juanita Angeles up to when she was
left behind at Tabang, after the car carrying all the accused and the offended party
sped towards Tagaytay City.
ISSUES: WoN the crime of forcible abduction with rape was committed
HELD:
 Yes. The crime of forcible abduction with rape was committed and the appellants
are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
PAGE 120
 The elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
 Silvestre Sunpongco says that he and complainant were sweethearts who
agreed to elope but such defense is belied by the manner in which the so-called
"elopement" was carried out.
 The accused argue that Juanita could have called out for assistance however
she could not have done so because four men suddenly confronted them and
positioned themselves in such a way that resistance would be impossible and
during their travel to Tagaytay City Juanita Angeles was rendered practically
helpless
 the crime of rape is difficult both to prove and to disprove. The final resolution of
the trial court would hinge on whose version is more credible
 The conduct of the complainant after the incident strengthens her case. She lost
no time the following day to have herself examined at the Philippine
Constabulary Central Laboratory Office at 8:30 in the morning, she went to the
Criminal Investigation Service office at Camp Crame to give her testimony, and
she filed her complaint before the fiscal's office.
PEOPLE V. JOSE
February 6, 1971
o at about 4:30 am of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the
ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., was driving her bantam car accompanied by her
maid Helen Calderon when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men
aboard tried to bump it. she was already near the gate of her house then.
o the Pontiac bumped the car again so she got down from her car, annoyed.
Pineda jumped out of the Pontiac and rushed towards her then grabbed her arm
& pulled her out (though she screamed and tried to hold on to the wheel)
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o the maid jumped out and tried to help her but Pineda was able to drag De la Riva
toward the Pontiac. the 3 men inside helped pull her inside: one of them held her by
the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. They pushed her in and they
sped away. The maid was left behind.
o inside the car she begged them to release her; but they jeered at her and
threatened to throw acid on her face if she did not keep quiet. The two men on each
side of her tried to kiss her and lifted her skirt, touched her thuighs,etc.
o The car stopped at Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, then they blindfolded De la Riva&
led her to one of the rooms. Inside the room she was told to strip, Pineda pushed
her around& took off her clothes and brassiere.
o the four men kneeled in front of her and feasted their eyes on her for 10mins, & she
was asked twice or thrice to turn around.
o then Jose reentered the room, undressed and pinned her down on the bed, hit her
several times on the stomach & raped her. The other three took their turns (while
one is raping, the other 3 are jeering at her). The girl was in a state of shock twice
so twice they threw water on her face. “so she would know what was happening”
o they hit her in the diff. parts of her body
o Afterwards, they warned her not to inform the police or else they will just post bail
and hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid.
o they dropped her off in front of the Free Press Building not far from EDSA near
channel 5 to make it appear thatshe had just come from the studio. Canal
accompanied her to the taxicab at a little past 6:00am.
o inside the cab, she broke down & kept asking the driver if a car was following them
o when she reached home, her mother, her brother-in-law & several PC officers,
policemen and reporters, were at the house.
o Upon seeing her mother, she ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have
been raped. All four of them raped me." The older woman instructed her daughter to
douche to prevent infection and pregnancy. a policeman attempted to question her,
PAGE 121
but the bro in law requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could be
ready for it
o At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
o June 29, on the fourth day after the incident, they went to the QC police& filed a
complaint. she underwent an NBI physical examination, the results of which
showed that multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the body, as
well as of genital injuries probably administered by a closed fist. there was no
sperm
o the 4 were finally apprehended. de la riva described the men and the tattoo in
one of them. she identified the men from a line-up. true enough one man had the
tattoo she described
o Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded guilty.
main issue: what crime was committed? answer: complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape
Art. 342. Forcible abduction. — The abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd
designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under twelve
years of age.
the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City,
was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the
various and the successive acts of rape. even while the first act of rape was being
performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of
the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still
connected with the abduction. in other words, the rape should be detached from, and
considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former
can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, provides as follows:
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ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is definitely the more serious; hence,
pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed
shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the
extreme penalty of death.
other Issues:
1. they were not motivated by lewd designs= yes they were/ all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction, they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will;
she did not know them personally; while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, , toyed with her
body,that meaningful and knowing glances were exchanged among the four; all of them later
took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has
not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes
charged in the amended complaint.
PAGE 122
2. the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape= the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration
being penetration
3. the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities – understandable as she
was confused then. Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy,
which lay her open to risks of future public ridicule
4. Jose and Canal extrajudicial statements secured from them by force and
intimidation,- The statements were given in the presence of several people and
subscribed and sworn to before the fiscal of QC;, are replete with details which could
hardly be known to the police; no trace of injury on Canal in spite of the claims that he was
boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter.
5. Jose was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations- The only
instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests,
are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).
6. there was a mistrial for Pineda bec. the charge is a capital offense w/c
penalty could be death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his
presence during all stages of the trial. =it matters not that the offense is
capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime it was not incumbent upon
the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court.
7. the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the
trial- in spite of the publicy, 3 of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. Jose
himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and
unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of
innocence and to fair trial."
addl stuff:
aggravating circumstances:
(a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the
commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the
appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about
ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle.
Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to
be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances
remaining. still death penalty for him
4 counts of death penalty is a mere formality since a person has only one life= The
imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related,
concepts. The imposition of multiple death penalties has practical importance. The sentencing
of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
perversity, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an
improvident grant of pardon
version of the defense: the four said that they chased her car after de la riva’s small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them, they wanted to "let us teach her a lesson," sped after
her, the "boss" was Pineda. Pineda suggested that she do a strip tease for 1k and she
consented. they went to Swanky Hotel, Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief to cover her
face, de la riva stripped and the three got naked “bec. it was hot”. they agreed that they will
pay only P100 and remaining P900 to be paid later
FACTS:
after the performance, Pineda was left w/ de la Riva in the room to discuss the payment. they
said it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would
appear as if she had just come from her work.
o court’s reply: after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, why would
Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily
consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her.
o besides, what woman would be willing to perform first for a measly down-payment of
P100.00 and be paid later?
o odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during
their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person
who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel.
PAGE 123
o what kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that
they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a
strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience?
o Boy Pineda must’ve hit her when they were left behind in the hotel
room=But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three
after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for
Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries;
o Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just
to make out a case against the accused= Was P900.00 which she had failed
to collect worth that much self-torture? The telltale injuries, however, discount
this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were
located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause
by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to avoid torture
-Fredda Rosete
PEOPLE V. ALBURO
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. / APRIL 26, 1990
 In the evening of January 26, 1986, Evelyn Cartina, along with 2 of her high
school friends, was offered a ride home by Romilo Alburo, a jeepney driver. At
first she was hesitant to hitch a ride but due to persuasion, she eventually
hopped in and sat beside Alburo in the passenger’s seat.
 When her two friends alighted, Alburo prevented Evelyn from disembarking. He
sped off when the light turned green. But his route would eventually lead him
back to the same spot where the 2 girls were waiting.
 When he finally returned to the same point, Evelyn had the chance to get off
again because the light was red; however, a certain Rodriguez (another
passenger aside from the 3 girls) blocked her exit using his leg as a barricade.
The 2 girls tried to pull Evelyn out of the vehicle but Alburo sped off the moment
the light turned green.
 The 2 girls went to Evelyn’s mom to report the incident. They sought help from a
neighbor whose husband was a jeepney driver who had known Alburo. As a
result, a search of reclamation areas and motels ensued.
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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 Alburo took Evelyn to a secluded area and threatened to stab her with a butcher’s
knife if she resisted his advances. She refused to yield thus prompting his to knock
her head on the steering wheel rendering her unconscious.
 Evelyn woke up to find see her vagina bleeding. She also saw Alburo putting his
pants back on. He gave her a ride back home and picked up passengers to make it
appear as if nothing had happened. The jeepney was spotted and Alburo was
signaled to stop.
 Evelyn got out immediately and told her mother what had happened. Her irate
mother confronted Alburo but the latter refused to go to the police station. As a
result, Evelyn’s family reported the matter to the Fuente Osmena Police Station.
 Alburo claimed that he and Emily were sweethearts and that sex between them was
consensual. Moreover, he presented witnesses and adduced evidence in support of
this claim, e.g., pictures, love letters, testimonies that they were usually seen
together. Emily was quick to deny these averments.
ISSUE: WON Alburo is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD: Yes, he had abducted her against her will and gained carnal knowledge over her sans
consent.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Anent the absurd claim that they were sweethearts, it was found out that the pictures
came from an ex and that the letters were spurious. Likewise, if he really was her lover,
there would be no need for her to ask her friends to accompany her when she had been
offered a ride nor should she have exerted much effort to escape from the jeepney.
Finally, she would not be filing a complaint of this gravity if she really did love him
because it would jeopardize the relationship.
 The court enumerated three principles in reviewing the crime of rape. First, an accusation
of rape can be made with facility; although it is difficult to prove, it is much harder for the
accused to disprove. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only 2 persons are
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be cautiously scrutinized. Lastly,
evidence for the prosecution must stand/fall on its merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense’s evidence.
 In conclusion, the court held that he took the Evelyn away against her will, with lewd
designs, subsequently forcing her to submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in
the process, thereby justifying his conviction for the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape under Art. 48 in relation to Arts. 335 and 342 of the RPC.
– Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
PAGE 124
PEOPLE V. GODINES
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERRA
REGALADO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married
to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. A motion to quash
was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is
a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
HELD:The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision
is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule
in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to
do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases,
is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have
been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by
the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or
to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery.
This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
the time of the filing of the criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he
is without the legal capacity to do so.
PAGE 125
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
– Yan Yu
CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
PEOPLE V. SANGALANG
PEOPLE V. PROCESO S. ARAGON
LABRADOR, J. / FEBRUARY 28, 1957
FACTS:
 On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu.
While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of
Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27,
1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City
 After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo.
As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea
died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939. After Maria Gorrea's death, the accused brought
Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse
 In 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent
Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain
Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu
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 The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such
marriage
 Aragon argues that section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613 makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annullable marriages
ISSUE:
Was the CFI correct in in ruling that defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa
C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the
latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage?
HELD:
No. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's
prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second
bigamous marriage
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
REYES, A.J., Dissenting:
I dissent.
Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved."
Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says,
PAGE 126
'La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por
si mosmos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del
Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo
entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion
esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que
contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de nulidad, no puede menos de
incurrir la pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose
Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule
established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final
judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and
the attack on the family exists."
I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy
would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
– Wes Aquende
MALIT V. PEOPLE
RELOVA, J. / MAY 31, 1982
NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the city court of
Caloocan
FACTS:
It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth Fernandez in an
administrative case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on
January 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac Identified certain exhibits on the witness stand. On cross-
examination by herein petitioner, Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a certain
exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did not understand the word
"made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying that it means "prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr.
Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for clarification. This prompted
Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how did you become a Doctor." As a consequence, Dr.
Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander against herein petitioner with the Fiscal's Office
of Caloocan City. TC denied petitioner’s motion to quash.
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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ISSUE: WON the act complained of constitute an offense
HELD: NO. It does not constitute an offense
RATIO: Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for
words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.
Petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when Dr. Macaspac
would not answer the question as to who prepared the document presented to her, and when
the witness repeatedly evaded the question by saying that she did not understand the word
"made."
Utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged. This privilege is granted for the advantage of
the administration of justice.
DISPOSITION: TC orders are reversed and set aside. TC should desist and refrain from
proceeding with trial.
– Anj Balacano
MERCADO V. CFI, RIZAL
FERNANDO, J.
(got this fr the CD)
NATURE: Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the decision of the Court
of First Instance
FACTS:
Rafael Mercado (Rafael) sent a telegram to Department of Public Works and Communications
Secretary David Consunji requesting an investigation of Virginia Mercado (Virginia) of the
Public Service Commission. According to Rafael, he had reason to believe that Virginia had
enriched herself through corrupt practices, and that he is writing as an answer to President
Marcos’s appeal that information be given on undesirable employees in government service.
PAGE 127
Virginia filed a complaint for libel against Rafael. Rafael sought to quash the information on
the ground that the telegram was privileged communication. The motion to quash was
denied by the lower court, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the landmark case of US vs. Bustos (enunciating the doctrine that the free speech
and free press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel
arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a
subordinate) can be invoked here.
RATIO:
Although US vs. Bustos provides a standard by which constitutional rights can be protected
against arbitrary libel prosecutions, qualified privilege maybe lost by proof of malice.
An example of qualified privilege would be a complaint made in good faith and without
malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. The statements must be made with
an honest sense of duty; self-seeking motive is destructive. What casts doubt on the good
faith of Rafael is a summary of his conduct viz Virginia. Rafael, in addition to the telegram
in question, had sent other communications to other bodies regarding Virginia, with the
collective effect of harassing and maligning the good character and reputation of the
private respondent.
It need only be alleged and proven that the offensive communication was made with
malice. Such burden of doing so is on the prosecution.
HELD: Petition dismissed. Certiorari to annul the order denying the motion to quash does
not lie. Neither should the criminal complaint for libel be dismissed.
– Anna Basman
AGBAYANI V. SAYO
AQUINO, J. / 1979
FACTS:
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 Mahinan is the manager of the Cagayan Valley branch of GSIS. He filed a complaint for
written defamation against 4 of his subordinates. He was resigned from service but was
subsequently reinstated after he appealed to the Civil Service Commission.
 The provincial fiscal filed the defamation case against the 4 accused (petitioners) in Nueva
Viscaya. The four filed a motion to quash saying that Nueva Viscaya has no jurisdiction
and that Isabela has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the venue of the criminal action is Isablea or Nueva Viscaya
HELD:
Art. 360 in it orignal form provided that the action may be instituted in any jurisdiction where
the libelous article was published irrespective of where it was written. However, RA 4363 laid
down specific rules as to the venue of criminal action.
Following RA 4363, Isabela has jurisdiction because Mahinan was stationed in Isabela and
the libel was allegedly committed when he was still in service. Although the allegation was
that it was committed in Nueva Viscaya, it is not sufficient to show that Nueva Viscaya had
jurisdiction over the case. Case dismissed.
– May Calsiyao
NEWSWEEK V. IAC
LACSA V. IAC
SARMIENTO, J. / MAY 23, 1988
FACTS:
 Pedro Lacsa, a CPA volunteered to act as auditor for the Philippine Columbian
Association, an association of which he was a member, representative, and former Board
of Directors member, in connection with the association's move to offer pre-emptive rights
to its members.
PAGE 128
 In the course of his work, which gave him access to records of the association's
members, he says he discovered that their president, Ponciano Marquez, was a mere
associate member when in fact only proprietary members can be voted to the said
position.
 Purporting to espouse the welfare of the PCA, Lacsa wrote a letter to their Board fo
Directors impugining the status of Marquez, saying that the issuance of a certificate for
proprietary membership to Marquez was erroneous.
 Lacsa also wrote to Marquez asking the latter to relinquish the presidency for having
failed to show that he met the requirements for the position. He also circulated a
newsletter to the PCA's members entitled “Doubt As To the Legitimacy of the
Incumbent President”.
 Due to these imputations, Marquez instituted a criminal complain and civil action
against Lacsa, claimint that he was maligined and defamed as a result fo Lacsa's
actions.
 Lacsa claims that the term “de facto president”, which he used to describe Marquez, is
not libelous per se. Even assuming that it was, his letter and newsletter were privileged
communication. Lastly, he claims that he had a moral, social, and legal responsibility to
do what he did.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON Lacsa is guilty of libel – YES.
RATIO:
 US v. O'Connell: Direct and express imputation is not necessary; ords calculated to
induce suspicion are sometimes more effective than false charges directly made. The
test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component
phrases...but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary
reader.
 US v. Sotto: To determine the meaning of a publication alleged to be libelous, adopt a
construction that would give it a meaning as is natural and obvious to the ordinary
person. Also, it must be construed as a whole.
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 In this case, considering that there are only two classes of membership in PCA (associate
and proprietary), an imputation of de facto presidency against Marquez obviously
insinuates an imperfection on his status as a proprietary member, thereby exposing him to
ridicule. That imputation is equivalent to calling Marquez a fraud, an impostor, claiming
rights to which he is not entitled.
 For a matter to be classified as privileged communicaiton, it has to be free from malice.
The letter and newsletter are not privileged communication because Lacsa already knew
before he even wrote the letter and the article that Marquez was a proprietary member. In
fact, Lacsa marked his initials in the minutes of a meeting in which Marquez's status was
converted from associate to proprietary.
 Even if the materials were privileged, they lost that status once Lacsa started circulating
them. He was under the obligation to keep his findings in strict confidence between him
and the Board fo Directors.
 Lacsa cannot contest the authenticity of the minutes of the meeting, which has already
been established by the testimony of the PCA's former secretary..
JUDGMENT: Petition denied, IAC decision affirmed.
– Jahzeel Cruz
SORIANO V. IAC
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. V. HON JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL, ET.AL.
FELICIANO, J.
Art. 353 RPC. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
FACTS:
In the June 22 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of Bulletin
Publishing Corp, an article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled “A changing of the guard”
was printed with the following excerpt:
PAGE 129
"The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature of
Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself confined to a small circle of
the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more. These are
big, royal families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you better
be a certified bona fide member of one or several of these clans. About the only time that
one who was not of any royal house became a leader of consequence in the province was
during the American era when the late Amir Mindalano held some sway. That was because
Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an American family and was therefore
fluent and literate in English. But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings o f the
transplanted American public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and
write in English, political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There
must be some irony in that."
21 people (the respondents), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir
Mindalano sued the corporation saying claiming that:
1.The Mindalano clan belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur
(this allegedly injured their good family name and reputation) and
2.Amir Mindalano never lived with an American family (the claim that living with an
American family has a repugnant connotation in Maranao society in that during the
American time, the royal families hid their children from the public school system and the
Americans. Only the lowliest commoners were allowed to live with any American family.
Consequently, Amir Mindalano received his education at the Lumbatan High Schoo).
They contended that the petitioner had with malice inflicted so much damage
upon their social standing as to irreparably injure the Mindalano name and reputation and
thus asked for damages, etc amounting to P2.35M.
ISSUE: WON the said article constitutes libel
DECISION: No. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition granted. RTC ordered to set aside
denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and to dismiss the libel case.
REASONING:
The essay “A Changing of the Guard” is in essence an essay on the general
nature and character of Mindanao politics and the emergence of a new political leader in
Lanao del Sur. The essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. The
identification f Amir Mindalano is merely incidental in the course of the development of the
article. The language appears declaratory or expository in character, matter of fact and
unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory implications appear detectable at all. There
is also no evidence of malevolent intent on the part of the author or the publisher.
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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With regards to the two claims of the respondents:
1.Although titles of royalty or nobility is accorded value among members of cultural groups in
our society, no such titles are generally recognized socially, as the Constitution expressly
forbids the enactment of any law conferring such titles. Thus, the status of a commoner
carries with it no legal disability. At the same time, the description that Amir Mindalano as not
belonging to a royal house is not defamatory since the publication does not disparage
Maranao titles of royalty, neither do they scorn or disrespect those who are commoners. It is
to be noted that what the author ascribes to Amir Mindalano is shared by the overwhelming
majority of the Filipinos, both Maranao and non-Maranao,Muslim and non-Muslim. Such asn
ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory.
2.From the viewpoint of the average person in our present day community, the statement
complained of is not defamatory. Personal hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not,
automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one’s interest in
acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation “as good as one’s character and conduct
warrant” in the community and it is to community standards that a court must refer in
evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory. The more general meaning of community
must be adopted in the ascertainment of standards because it is rooted in our Constitutional
law. This reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of
free speech and expression. A newspaper should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being charged
with criminal or civil suits for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing in the community. Any other rule on defamation, in
a community like ours with many diverse cultural, social, religious and other groupings, is
likely to produce a chilling effect upon the consti. proclaimed operations of the press and other
instruments of information and education.
– Tim Guanzon
SANTOS V. CA
SAZON V. CA
FACTS:
PAGE 130
 Fernando Sazon and Abdon Reyes were both residents of the PML Homes in East
Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro Manila. They were likewise members of the PML-
Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of
homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML-
Homemaker, of which the Sazon was the editor.
 On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its board
of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the Reyes and the Sazon.
Sazon was elected as a director. He was likewise elected by the new board as
president of the homeowners' association. Reyes lost in said election.
 Unable to accept defeat, Reyes wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the
Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting the election of Sazon as a
director and president of the homeowners' association. He alleged that the election
was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of authority of the petitioner to call for such an
election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and (3) lack of the required notice to the
homeowners.
 On January 18, 1984, the Reyes wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his
election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other
members who won in the election.
 Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered-the PML-BLCA
to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. Reyes then notified his
co-homeowners about this development and requested them to attend a general
meeting with the representatives of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the
referendum.
 Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the "PML Scoop"
were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled "Supalpal si Sazon,"'
obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in connection with
the private respondent's election protest. At about the same time, the phrase "Sazon,
nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the
entrance gate of the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was
responsible for these writings.
 Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner Sazon
started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-homeowners,
culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984 issue of the PML-
Homemakers.
 Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, Reyes initiated the necessary complaint against
the petitioner.
ISSUES / HELD / RATIO:
WON the Newsletter Article is in the nature of a privileged communication and hence,
protected and not actionable.
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NO. In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was
vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to
investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous
matter cannot be classified a privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.
WON the words in controversy are defamatory of private complainant as they are non-
actionable epithets written without malice.
YES. In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the
words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner
are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be
adduced to prove it. Sazon used the following words and phrases in describing the private
complainant: "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may
kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na kabulastugan,"
"mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc.
WON it is necessary that malice be proven.
NO. When the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the
defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant
to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before
us.
WON the Newsletter Article constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations of a public
official falling under the second exception of Article 354
The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers
which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant
proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public
officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may
constitute libel. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved
on matters completely unrelated to his official functions.
DISPOSITION: GUILTY!
– Felman Magcalas
RODOLFO VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
MENDOZA, J. / SEPTEMBER 15, 1999
PAGE 131
FACTS:
 Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in
April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National
Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint
against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with
Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and
interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their
complaint
 The next day, April 22, 1986, the following news article appeared in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa
Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul 1980.
Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone
6, Tondo Foreshore Area, sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14
na lote ng lupa sa naturang lugar.
"Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni
Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA," sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS
Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya
"nakalusot" ang mga ginawa nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga
ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok.
 Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against
petitioner alleging that the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and
damaged his reputation
ISSUE: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for the crime of libel by virtue of the
pronouncements he made
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HELD: NO. Vasquez is not guilty of libel.
RATIO:
 To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
 An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of
a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
 There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not
required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark.
What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for
"a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him in, not the good opinion
which he has of himself."
 On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at
least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the
defamatory statement.
 Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance
of any legal, moral or security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
 In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The
statements that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain
title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in a number of illegal
activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were clearly
defamatory. Nor is there any doubt that the defamatory remarks referred to
complainant and were published. Petitioner caused the publication of the
defamatory remarks when he made the statements to the reporters who interviewed
him.
PAGE 132
 The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory,
malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to
overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if
the defamatory statements is made against a public official with respect to
the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends.
 In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of
Appeals relied, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against
the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials,
complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area
was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to
petitioner's counsel
 In addition, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda, both dated
November 29, 1983, of then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias
recommending the filing of administrative charges against the NHA officials
"responsible for the alleged irregular consolidation of lots [in Tondo to Jaime and
Victoria Olmedo.]"
 With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it
must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted
murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the
residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed.
 Petitioner was able to show that Olmedo's involvement in the theft of fighting
cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, dated October 19, 1983, signed
by Fernando Rodriguez and Ben Lareza, former barangay tanods of Barangay
66, Zone 6, Tondo. Likewise, petitioner presented a resolution, dated March 10,
1988, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694, stating that
charges of malversation and corrupt practices had been filed against Olmedo
and nine (9) other barangay officials but the same were dismissed. Indeed, the
prosecution's own evidence bears out petitioner's statements. The prosecution
presented the resolution in TBP Case No. 84-01854 dismissing the charge of
attempted murder filed by petitioner against Jaime Olmedo and his son-in-law,
Jaime Reyes. The allegation concerning this matter is thus true.
A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS
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 It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the
complainant [barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused,
however, has not proven that the complainant committed the crimes." For that is not
what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had
been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue.
 In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents
of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging
in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully
and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and
duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on
him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
 For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can
attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statements was made with actual malice, that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to
prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner
made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they
were false or not.
 A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such
allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It
would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-
governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most
abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public
discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people."
 In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or
concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his
charge, he should be acquitted.
 Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges
against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass
petitioner. Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Persons responsible : Any
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person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same...The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation's contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof. . . .
 Yet, in this case, neither the reporter, editor, nor the publisher of the newspaper
was charged in court.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. Vasquez is acquitted of the crime charged.
– Joy Montes
ROSAURO REYES V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Rosauro Reyes was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point,
whose services were terminated on 6 May 1961. On 6 June 1961, he led a group of
20-30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the US Naval
Station at Sangley Point. They were carrying placards saying “Agustin mamatay ka,”
believing that it was Agustin Hellare who caused his dismissal. Reyes and company
followed Hellare to his residence, wherein the former yelled “Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita.” Reyes’ company then left
the premises.
ISSUE / HOLDING / RATIONALE:
 WON Reyes is guilty of grave threats. YES.
 Elements of Grave Threat
 Offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his
person of a wrong
 That such wrong amounted to a crime
 That the threat was not subject to a condition
 Reyes’ actions and threats were made “with the deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would
be carried into effect.” Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he
sought the protection of Col. Monzon who ha to escort him home, wherein
he stayed while the demonstration was going on.
 It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely
in a temporary fit of anger.
 WON Reyes is guilty of oral defamation. NO.
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 The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of “Agustin, putang
ina mo.” However, this is a common enough expression in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure.
– Giselle Munoz
PEOPLE V. PELAYO
VILLAMOR, J. / 20 SEPTEMBER 1966
NATURE: Appeal from Davao CFI
FACTS:
Pantaleon Pelayo, a city councilor of Davao City, told Atty. Clapano (a fellow councilor), that
Governor Alejandro Almendras receives bribe money from Lim Peng (a Chinese gambling
operator). Three people heard the conversation.
It was alleged that Almendras received 500 pesos monthly and he also demanded that Lim
Peng should double the amount. Lim Peng gave his watch which costs 250 pesos. Pelayo
said that Almendras later raided Lim Peng’s place when the latter was unable to pay.
Pelayo later delivered a privileged speech during the session of the council. In it, he
denounced gambling in the area; although without directly mentioning the governor as
receiving “tongs,” reference to the latter became obvious during interpellation.
Pelayo’s defense:
1) The conversation was privileged and he uttered those words in confidence;
2) He was just intriguing against Almendras’s honor;
3) It was a form of self-defense against Almendras’s speech a few days before.
ISSUES: WON Pelayo is guilty of slander or just intriguing against honor? He is guilty of
slander.
RATIO:
The court said that the contention of self-defense does not lie. If the communication
was for self-defense, it should be public, and not done in private. Also, he made a speech
about it the next day. Three people also heard him; he could not have given the information in
confidence.
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Slander is committed when the source of the information can be determined, and
the accused, adopting as his own the information he has obtained, passes the same to the
other for the purpose of causing dishonor. Intriguing against honor is where the source of
the information can’t be pinpointed and the accused borrows the same and, without
subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it on.
Self-defense in libel and slander may be invoked. However, the accused should
not retaliate with scurrilous words that are entirely independent of, and apart from, the
alleged imputation or he should not go beyond explaining what has been said of him/her.
DISPOSITION: He is ordered to pay a fine of 100 pesos with subsidiary imprisonment
not to exceed 15 days in case of insolvency; to pay nominal damage of 200 pesos to
Almendras and the costs of the suit.
– Ryan Oliva
PEOPLE V. PRIETO
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA
FEBRUARY 8, 1977
NATURE: Appeal from a Judgment of the Court of First Instance
FACTS:
 About noon on July 26, 1971, in barrio San Roque, Southern Leyte, complainant
Victoria Jamelo had just called her maid to get ready for lunch when the former heard
accused-appellant Cristina Mendoza, a neighbor saying: “Waray is backbiting me and
teaching her maid to be mad at me.”
 Complainant Victoria Jamelo knew that Cristina Mendoza was referring to her when
she heard the latter utter the word “waray”.
 Both Jamelo and Mendoza are public school teachers and both were in their
respective houses (their houses are a meter apart from each other) when Jamelo
heard Mendoza.
 Victoria Jamelo went to the porch of her house and from there she saw Cristina
Mendoza facing the provincial road.
 Victoria Jamelo then said to Cristina Mendoza: “Why will you interfere in my house
helper when we have a separate family?”
 Upon hearing this, Cristina Mendoza shouted in response:
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 “You, when you were still single many had sexual intercourse with you because you
are confident that you will not bear a child!”
 “Your vagina is odorous, a woman with leucorrhea.”
 “Your husband is a homosexual, uncircumcised, he is under your command and
henpecked”
 Victoria simply countered by saying: “Is yours perfumed?”
 The incident happened with the husband of Victoria Jamelo and some pupils around, the
place of the incident being near the school premises.
 The prosecution provided three witnesses to attest to the facts and the witnesses
testified that accused did in fact state those words.
 Accused-appellant on the other hand, claimed that it was complainant Victoria Jamelo
who defamed, dishonored and discredited her
 Accused-appellant avers that when she got home from school at noon that day, her
maid told her that Mrs. Jamelo had scolded her maid telling the latter not to fetch
water from her (accused-appellants) house and if the maid would insist she would
break the pail; that Mrs. Jamelo told her maid not to eat in accused-appellant’s
house because they would not be able to repay them.
 Accused further alleges that when she asked Mrs. Jamelo why she had scolded her
maid, Mrs. Jamelo closed the door to her house and went to the balcony where she
said, referring to Mrs. Jamelo, “You have leucorrhea, many have succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with you and you had sexual intercourse with a man sick
with syphilis”
 Reacting on what Mrs. Jamelo said to her, she asked who that man was and all Mrs.
Jamelo said was “Basts, basta.”
 Accused-appellant also presented witnesses to corroborate her testimony.
 The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and witnesses and rejected
the claim of the accused and her witnesses as unbelievable.
 The trial court convicted her of simple slander under Art. 358 of the RPC instead of grave
oral defamation as charged by the prosecution.
ISSUES:
 Is the evidence by the prosecution enough to convict accused of slander beyond
reasonable doubt?
 Can the accused be acquitted by claiming self-defense if in fact it was complainant who
first uttered the slanderous words?
HELD:
 Yes, evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt.
 No, accused cannot claim self-defense even if it may be argued that complainant was
first at fault.
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RATIO:
 Evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt.
 Trial court observed the testimonies of the witnesses and found that they were
delivered in a straightforward manner and were clear, positive and natural. This
was not said about the witnesses for the defense.
 Fact that the witnesses presented by the prosecution were volunteer witnesses
does not imply that they gave perjured testimonies.
 The witnesses went up to volunteer because of the desire to have the guilty
punished and the innocent vindicated.
 A circumstance that militates against the pretension of innocence of the accused-
appellant is her offer to give P100.00 to one of the prosecution witnesses in
exchange for not testifying against her.
 It is strange also, that if it was accused-appellant who was defamed, she never
filed any criminal complaint against complainant.
 The evidence of the prosecution is credible enough to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of accused.
 Claim of self-defense by accused cannot acquit her.
 The plea of self-defense in stating that it was complainant who hurled the first
stone and therefore the accused was justified in hurling a back at the
complainant in an equally or more slanderous statement does not hold.
 The contention is based on its own appraisal of the evidence of the
accused, which the Trial Court and This Court rejected.
 The defense isn’t even sure who hurled the first stone.
 In the defenses brief it stated: “…it is virtually difficult to tell a war of words
among womenfolk…who hurled the first stone, it may well be in the best
tradition of justice to take the posture that since no clear, positive and strong
evidence as to who started the quarrel….therefore that doubt attendant
thereto which should, as it is be resolved in favor of the accused.”
 Contrary to the above statement, the evidence of the prosecution is clear
that it was the accused who slandered the complainant.
 Even if it is true that complainant uttered first slanderous statements to the
accused, the latter would not be justified in slandering the former.
 Person slandered may be justified to hit back with another slander, only if
his reply is made in good faith, without malice and is not necessarily
defamatory of his assailant.
 Retaliation or vindictiveness cannot be a basis of self-defense in
defamation.
 To repel an attack on his reputation, the defendant may make an
explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if by explaining, he must
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of necessity have to use scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may be
legally allowed to do so without placing himself under criminal prosecution.
JUDGMENT: Decision appealed from affirmed with the modification that the fine be
fixed at P100.00
– Jecky Pelaez
VICTORIO V. CA AND PEOPLE
BIDIN, J. / MAY 31, 1989
PARTIES:
EXEQUIEL VICTORIO and his son Daniel, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
 Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace
and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for
sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of
petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases since 1953.
 1963 – Exequiel decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in
place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang
 Victorio and his wife filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang, which
was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena for investigation and disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Ruiz.
 January 9, 1964 - During the hearing of the administrative case, in the sala of Judge
Avancena, Atty. Castillo presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancena
to hear the administrative case. Judge Avancena was apparently taken aback,
called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for
respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be
cited for contempt of court.
 After the said hearing, Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, overheard the Victorio father and son to have
uttered the following defamatory words:
PAGE 136
 Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman
ang utak, suwapang at estapador."
 Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanats abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador,
paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador."
(Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na
iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
 The accused were separately charged with the crime of Serious Oral
Defamation. They were convicted in a decision of the the City Court with Grave
Oral Defamation.
 October 1974 - counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss the
criminal case on the ground that Exequiel died on April 14, 1974. The Court
resolved to dismiss the criminal case only insofar as Exequiel Victorio is
concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the words uttered by the petitioners in conversation with each other
and while in the heat of anger constitute grave oral defamation instead of merely light oral
defamation.
HELD: The crime committed was Grave Oral Defamation.
RATIO:
 The term oral defamation or slander has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood.
 Article 358 of the RPC spells out the demarcation line, between serious and
slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is
of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos."
 Balite v. People: To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight
oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines:
 "x x x We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada
puts it, 'x x x upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time:
x x x'".
 The appellant-petitioner admitted having utterd the defamatory words against
Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which
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attributes to the the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated
by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these
statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation xxx. No circumstances
need to be shown to upgrade the slander."
 Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, de with office,
trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are 'slanderous per
se.'
 Kleeberg v. Sipser: “Where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional
capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such
construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per
se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage,
states cause of action."
 Pollard v. Lyon: The court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of
action, into several classes, as follows:
 "(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the
commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which
the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished;
 "(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected
with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude
the party from society;
 "(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party
unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of
integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment;
 "(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in
his or her profession or trade; and
 "(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in
themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage."
 The Victorios imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer-one time
Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a
professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association.
As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special
circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered
grave oral defamation. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the
totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador",
imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper
practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.
 Petitioner argues that this Court has ruled in some cases that defamatory words
uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation:
 Said cases cited by peititioner were decided not by this Court but by the
respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.
PAGE 137
 Even so, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended
party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his
client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused. In addition, the
defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation by Atty.
Ruiz. As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the
respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the presence of at
least 10 persons taken seriously by the offended party and without
provocation on his part.
JUDGMENT: Petition denied and decision affirmed.
– Raina Quibral
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. ANTONIO A. ORCULLO
FERNANDEZ, J. / 1982 JAN 30
FACTS:
 On September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City filed an information with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro
charging the Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral defamation
 on August 17, 1978, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Gumamela Extension
Street, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro CityPeralta Peralta, shouted the following
words towards Lydia Flores, `A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis
had penetrated your vagina,' in the presence and with the hearing of many
people
 Peralta filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime alleged constituted
an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
 Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No.
40117 on the ground that the offense alleged in the information is a private crime
which can be instituted or filed only by the offended party
ISSUES:
 WoN the remark imputes adultery or prostitution
HELD:
 Yes. The derogatory remark imputes the crime of prostitution. Therefore, the
information for libel can be filed without the complaint of the offended party.
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RATIO:
 Peralta says that the remarks imputed adultery, because the word `paramour' was
mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a married woman who was carrying
on an affair with a man not her husband
 Since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as married, she
should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as
imputing prostitution, and not adultery
 It is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements
constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended party be
necessary to commence prosecution
PEOPLE V. MOTITA
CAPISTRANO, J. / SEPTEMBER 11, 1962
FACTS:
 Pilar Latada went to a public market in order to buy fish for her family. While
selecting, her attention was called to the laughter of the crowd whose eyes were
directed at her.
 To her shock, she saw Benjamin Motita with a mirror in his hand while holding it
between her legs thus allowing him to see the reflection of her private parts.
 Enraged, she took the mirror away from him although he managed to regain and
this time threatened her if she acted any further.
ISSUE: WON the offense committed was slander by deed.
HELD: Yes, in addition to the irritation or annoyance, there was attendant publicity which
brought dishonor or contempt upon the complainant.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 The court was caught in a predicament as to which offense should Motita be
convicted of whether it be unjust vexation, act of lasciviousness, or slander by
deed. The commonality among the three is irritation or annoyance.
 Without any other concurring factor in the offense, then the act would be
merely considered unjust vexation, which is associated with anything that
merely annoys or irritates another without justification.
PAGE 138
 The paramount consideration is whether the offender’s act caused
annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind
of the person whom it is directed to.
 The acts of the accused certainly irritated and annoyed the complainant.
 There was attendant publicity inasmuch as it happened in a public market.
In relation to that, there was dishonor and contempt which as a
consequence of the act insofar as the people looked at the complainant with
derision to the point of even laughing at her.
 The court was moved by consideration of public policy and morals; hence it
ruled that the act was slander by deed.
-Pat Sadeghi-Tajar
PEOPLE V. ALAGAO
GANAAN V. IAC
RAMIREZ V. CA
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in
the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
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prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes."
ISSUE:
1) Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
2) Whether the nature of the conversation should be material to constitute a violation of
the said provision.
HELD:(1) Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
(2) The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of
a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
PAGE 139
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed."
– Yan Yu
QUASI – OFFENSES
PEOPLE V. CANO
CONCEPCION, J. / MAY 24, 1966
FACTS:
 On Sept. 21, 1960, at the National Highway at San Fernando, Pampanga, a La
Mallorca Pambusco bus driven by Ambrosio Cano bumped into a Philippine Rabbit bus
because of Cano's speeding and driving on the wrong side of the road. The information
listed the amount of damages to the prejudice of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and the
persons on both buses who suffered physical injuries.
 Cano pleaded not guilty. Then, months later, he filed a motion to quash the information
on the grounds that:
 The crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence had prescribed;
 The CFI of Pampanga had no jurisdiction of the crime charged; and
 The crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed
with damage to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence (note: the ponencia would later say that the information did not purport
to complex the crimes anyway...)
 The lower court granted the motion to quash, saying that the crime of slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with grave or less grave
felonies and ordering the prosecution to amend the information by deleting all
reference to slight physical injuries. Hence, the prosecution appeals.
ISSUES/HELD: WON criminal negligence can be complexed – YES.
RATIO:
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 It is merely alleged in the information that thru reckless negligence of Cano, the bus driven
by him hit another bus, causing varying degrees of physical harm and property damage.
The assumption of the lower court was that these offenses should not be complexed
because they are effects of Cano's negligence, when in fact it is the negligence itself
that is punishable in such offenses, negligence that has resulted in the felonies
described.
 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga: Criminal negligence in our RPC is
treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt with separately from wilfull offenses. In
intentional crimes, the act is punished. In negligence and imprudence, the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of
foresight or care, is what is penalized. If criminal negligence were only a modality in the
commission of felonies, serving to reduce the penalty therefor, it should be under Art. 13.
However, the RPC fixes a penalty for criminal negligence. Therefore, it bears no relation
to the individual wilfull crime, but is set in relation to a whole class of crimes.
 Regardless of the answer to the above issue, the lower court should have waited until
after the case has been decided on its merits, when a decision has been rendered and
when there is no question that the court has jurisdiction. The court added that it is doubtful
whether the prosecution should split the actions against Cano because the same evidence
would be required for all the charges anyway. Lastly, Art. 48 is intended to be favorable to
the accused.
JUDGMENT: Motion to quash set aside. Case remanded to lower court for trial on the
merits.
– Jahzeel Cruz
IBABAO V. PEOPLE
BUERANO V. COURT OF APPEALS
RELOVA, J. / 1982
FACTS:
 Buerano was the driver of the LTB bus which collided with the delivery truck of Mabuhay
Bakery. He was convicted of slight and less physical injuries through reckless
PAGE 140
imprudence. In the meantime, he was charged of damage to property through reckless
imprudence because of the same incident.
 He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. It was denied by CFI and
CA on the basis of People vs. Estipona, a pre-war case.
ISSUE: Can he be tried again for the same incident?
HELD: No. In People vs. Buan (1968), the court held that the essence of the quasi-offense
under Art. 365 is to punish the negligent act, that if done intentionally, would be punishable
as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the act and not the result. The offense cannot be split
into different crimes. Appelant acquitted on the second charge.
– May Calsiyao
GAN V. CA
FERNAN, C. J.
(got this fr the CD)
NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Hedy was driving her car and while in front of a house, there were 2 vehicles- a truck and a
jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about 2-3 meters from
each other.
As the car driven by Hedy approached the place where the 2 vehicles were parked, there
was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake and bypass the one in front of it, thereby encroaching the lane of Hedy.
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, Hedy swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney.
 A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 141
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The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the THE END - WOOH!
parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the car was damaged on its front, the
jeep was damaged on its rear and front parts and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden
portion of its rear. The body of the old man (Isidoro Casino) was immediately brought to the
hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Trial Court: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
CA: Modified the judgment to GUILTY of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence. YES, CA erred.

RATIO:
The TEST for determining negligence: “Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer
to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence.

EMERGENCY RULE – one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.

Hedy Gan is NOT GUILTY of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence as there was no showing
that she had sufficient time to analyze the situation and ponder on which course of action
would result in the least possible harm. The appellate court in finding the accused guilty by
suggesting that she should not have swerved and instead stepped on the brakes failed to take
into account the amount of time afforded Hedy to react to the situation she was in. Clearly,
there was no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerful
instinct of self-preservation.

– Anna Basman

CARILLO V. PEOPLE