Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee

43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922]

Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed,
on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other
hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in
1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were
ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico
Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference
to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the
son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the
allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the
conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately
proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The
order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the
property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang,
and Rosalia.

Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and recognizable in the Philippines.

Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid.

Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that “All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the
same were contracted, are valid in these Islands.” To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant
to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of
Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so
clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged
prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the
same.

Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is “that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.”

Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard
society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the
legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative
power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they
took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.

The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will
mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage
of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion
and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows
that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to
local custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these
marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them
legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance
settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.

We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages
performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
In the Matter of Estate of Edward Christensen v. Helen Christensen GR No L-16749, January
31, 1963

Doctrine: If Conflict Rule of the country refers back the matter to the domicile country of
the decedent, the court has to accept the referring back.

Facts: The deceased, Edward  Christensen, was recognized as citizen of California,

died in the Philippines, it being his domiciliary. He acknowledged his natural daughter
Mary Lucy Christensen, as his only heir and just left a legacy sum of money to Helen
Christensen Garcia, who declared by SC, as acknowledged daughter of the deceased.
Counsel of Helen claims that under par. 2 of Article 16 of Civil Code, her share must be
increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine Law.
The counsel of Maria Lucy contends that the national law of the deceased shall prevail,
stating that no compulsory heirs and testator can disposed off his property by his
absolute dominion, that his illegitimate children are not entitled to such

Issue: Is the national law of California applicable?

Ruling: No. Since the conflicts of law rule of California refers back the matter to the
Philippines, being place of domicile of the deceased, our courts have no alternative but
to accept the referring back to us. If our courts will do the otherwise and throw back the
matter to California, the problem would be tossed back ad forth between estates and
concerned, resulting to international football. 
Lara v Del Rosario G.R. No. L-6339 April
20 1954
DECEMBER 19, 2016  / JURISMDBLOG

Plaintiffs:   Manuel Lara, et al

Defendant: Petronilo Del Rosario

Ponente:     Montemayor

FACTS:

Mr. Del Rosario owns “Waval Taxi” w/c employs 3 mechanics and 49
drivers. On Sep 4 1950 all of his 25 taxi Units was sold to La
Mallorca. La Mallorca failed to continue all the mechanics and
drivers in their employment. Case was filed (the 3 mechanics later
on withdrew from the case unconditionally) with the trial court and
subsequently dismissed on the basis of Art 302 of the code of
Commerce citing the drivers are considered “piece workers” hence
not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Plaintiffs filed an appeal
to the CA which the latter referred to the SC because the question
of law is involved. 

ISSUES: 

1. W/N Civil Code is applicable.

2. W/N plaintiffs are entitled to “mesada” & extra compensation for
work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and Holidays
included as per Art. 302 of the Code of Commerce.

RULING:

HELD. The services of the plaintiffs ended September 4 1950 when

the new civil code was already in force, it having become effective
August 30 1950 (or one year after it was released for circulation;
and not 1 year after it was published w/c was July 19 1949).  The
new CC in Art. 2270 repealed the provisions of the Code of
Commerce, one provision of which was Art 302. Hence, the plaintiffs
are no longer entitled to their 1-month severance pay.

Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457,

April 11, 2012
FACTS:  

Petitioner Anna Lerima Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. That the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and
received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under
the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection
to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable
period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said
company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said
collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid
amount of P131,286.97.

Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no

stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Lamberto Go and Karen
Guivencan.

The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch
manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City
since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as
a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming
from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in
Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue
and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would then remit;
that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation;
that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to
confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the
accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some
collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen
Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers
outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid
in Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents went to
his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and to plead for
him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her account on a
monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work.

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Meanwhile, on March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct examination and re-
cross examination were completed.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers
employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March
31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some
customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger
had still reflected outstanding balances for them; that she first conducted her audit by
going to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros Oriental,
and then in Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers
varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written
report denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997
marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated
the total amount of P131,286.92. 

In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioners counsel interposed

a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the
entries were not themselves presented in court.

Nevertheless, Prosecution offered the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers

allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives (like the
originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner),
the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by
petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies,
inclusive. After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead
rested its case. The Court then finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite
their not being duly  authenticated

HELD: 

No. 

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document

and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a)  The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;

(b)   Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments,
and

(c)  Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of
its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary
public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required
by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in
four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the
context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by
the adverse party;(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document

have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business
purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four
exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner
without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz: Section 20. Proof of private
documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a)    By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b)   By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in

various receipts. Go’s attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit
A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1)
immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a
mere machine copy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the
Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originals of the receipt
with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not
even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to authenticate
the signature of petitioner on the receipts through a different witness (though then still
unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
the machine copy of the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the
signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was
inexplicably forgotten and was no longer even included in the Prosecution’s Offer of
Documentary Evidence.

If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as
evidence. The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every
criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before
pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.