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As Western Liberalism Declines, Civilization States Return
As Western Liberalism Declines, Civilization States Return
As Western Liberalism Declines, Civilization States Return
Liberalism Declines,
Civilization States
Return
The civilization state is reemerging and
taking us beyond the opposition between
liberalism and nationalism.
Moonassi
By Bruno Maçães
JANUARY 31, 2023
Bruno Maçães was Portugal’s secretary of state for European affairs from 2013 to 2015
and is now a senior adviser at Flint Global and a member of the European Council on
Foreign Relations. His two most recent books are “History Has Begun” and
“Geopolitics for the End Time.”
In the 16th century, Ukrainian Cossacks achieved certain rights and freedoms
from various Eastern European rulers, paralleling the way Western European
nobles placed limits on monarchical power. And as the Ukrainian novelist
Andrey Kurkov likes to point out, the Cossack tradition of electing hetmans
(military commanders) accustomed Ukrainians to the idea that they chose
their leaders. In Russia, on the other hand, people believed the tsars were a gift
from God.
What Huntington and others — like Ross Douthat, who a few months ago
penned a New York Times essay arguing that “yes, there is a clash of
civilizations” — are unable to understand is that there is a difference between
identity and civilization. Civilization needs to be distinguished from any notion
of religious, ethnic or national identity. The former is an exercise in political
reason, the effort to organize collective life around principles that
express our fundamental relation to truth, to the world and to each other.
Identity, as we shall see, is something peculiar to liberalism; it is the mutilated
corpse of civilization.
The very word “civilization” was meant to express the state of political or social
existence — as opposed to life in a more primitive or natural condition — and,
later, the philosophical concept denoted the principles providing a foundation
for collective life. But civilization in this sense came under attack with the
ascent of liberalism. One could argue that liberalism was conceived as an
alternative to the civilization state, in which politics was permanently rooted in
an exclusive or particular outlook. Liberalism denounced life in a civilization
state as constricted and impoverished. After all, if the state is organized around
a certain outlook, it must exclude every possible alternative.
It was a misplaced ambition; it could never succeed. The failure of the liberal
program reveals that politics is not a science, nor can it ever become a science.
Neutrality sounded good in theory. But human life takes place on a limited
timescale, during which we are fated to place our bets on certain specific
understandings of the world. Truth across time and space does not operate in
this realm.
Moonassi
You might be able to argue that in the beginning, in the 19th century,
nationalism was a tool used to dethrone the old monarchies or churches. But
in time, it became clear that the national state would never give way to the
liberal state. Liberalism wanted to build a lasting edifice of reason and logic,
but it turned out to be incapable of reaching large areas of collective existence.
It remained, to a considerable extent, powerless over the brute facts of social
life to which no reasoning could be applied — nationalism, fascism, and
religious and racial bigotry being just a few examples.
These elements of political life not assimilated into liberal theory were
naturally relegated to an irrational core of feeling or tradition, varying from
political unit to political unit. The civilization state can interpret these
elements on a higher plane, like so many outlooks on political and social life.
The civilization state is built on ideas, not “blood and soil.”
There is an argument that the return of the civilization state was prepared by
Jewish thinkers in the 19th century. Leo Strauss and others learned to doubt
the promise of liberalism in the school of Zionism. The liberal state failed to
ensure the safety and dignity of European Jews. It failed to ensure their
physical survival, but it also seemed incapable of delivering on its promise that
Jews could be fully themselves in a liberal society, free of the fear of making
themselves different. We can detect in these 19th-century debates the germ of
the idea of Israel as a civilization state, even if Theodor Herzl, the father of
Zionism, remained a very imperfect guide.
As Jewish religious conservatives will readily point out, there is no reason why
the Jewish tradition should be made to fit within liberalism rather than the
other way around. After all, Judaism is thousands of years old, while liberalism
dates back at most two or three centuries. It is an argument often made in
India as well. And it is an argument to be taken seriously.
At the very least, we should urgently disabuse ourselves of the notion that
every political value belongs to the liberal tradition, with every rival tradition
being the exclusive precinct of value negation. Judaism and Hinduism have,
for thousands of years, developed their own ways of dealing with diversity and
social conflict. It beggars belief that nothing on these matters can be learned
from those traditions, or that we had to wait for the Western value of tolerance
to finally see the light.
Read Noema in print.
In Israel or India today, the main challenge and task is to turn the revolt
against liberalism into a civilizational rather than a national project. The great
Hindu monk and philosopher Swami Vivekananda once said that Emperor
Akbar, the third Mughal emperor, could be regarded as “practically a Hindu.”
He was obviously a Muslim, but the broad spiritual and political order he stood
for embodied the principles of the Hindu tradition and the continuity of the
Hindu ideal. It is conceivable that a Muslim could live in a Hindu civilization
state, just as a Hindu can live in a Muslim civilization state, provided we keep
the distinction between a civilization state and a nation-state clear in our
minds.
Why does Huntington neglect the full character of civilizations? In the most
immediate respect, because he considers them well after their prime, surviving
as no more than cultural expressions. This predicament is made much worse
under liberalism, and Huntington is still writing from the point of view of
liberal hegemony. In a liberal society, different cultures are downgraded to the
status of anodyne expression, mostly present in the cheerful celebration of
exotic cuisines or national costumes. It is this decayed meaning of civilization
that Huntington takes up.
I find the suggestion implausible. Both the formal logic and practical appeal of
liberalism resulted from its universality. Once liberalism becomes a provincial
affair, it is no longer liberalism. Inevitably, it evolves into its own version of a
civilization state.
Today, every European politician with continental ambitions likes to speak
about European values and is not shy about proclaiming that Europe is the
best place in the world. These are civilizational ideas. European values are no
doubt connected to the liberal legacy, but they return us to its civilizational
core. They are rooted in an exclusive theory of the world and political life,
brimming with intellectual and moral content, sharply distinguished from rival
theories.
When Europeans talk about the sacred role of rules in political and social life,
these are specific ideals, whose validity is subject to permanent contestation
and whose appeal is both of a philosophical and personal nature. They help
make sense of the natural world and provide guidance in all matters of daily
life.
Above all, they are one way among many of making sense of the world and may
look strange or perhaps incomprehensible to an Indian or Chinese — maybe
even to an American, at least of the kind who has broken away from the core
elements of European civilization.
The European Union is perhaps the best example today of the rich dynamics
internal to a civilization state. On the one hand, it was directly created as a
response to European nationalism, an attempt to move beyond national
identity toward something closer to political reason. At first, this new form of
political reason was identified with universal liberalism, but it soon became
evident that no political unit can be based on strictly universal principles.
It is hardly surprising that, for a number of years, the EU has been stressing its
particular nature: European — not universal — values now provide the glue for
the difficult task of bringing more than two dozen countries together, possibly
including Ukraine.
The result is a third way, different from both nationalism and liberalism.
Organized around a set of principles, the EU no longer regards them as
universal. European values are the European adventure: a special path chosen
in the knowledge that other alternatives are available but guided by the image
of a distinctive and flourishing civilization.
Thomas Mann wrote during the darkest hour of World War II that the conflict
was ultimately between the dynamics of nature, of instinct, of blood, of the
unconscious — the primitive spontaneity of life on one side, pitted against
reason and civilization on the other. If Russia today represents the rule of
instinct and unreason, Ukraine is the affirmation of light and progress.
No city in the world today represents as well as Kyiv the permanent but fragile
attempt to place human reason in charge of human circumstance. Long ago,
Paris may have evoked the same feelings and aspirations. Today it is Kyiv that
best preserves the European legacy of revolution, the collective effort to build a
new future. It is up to us to rise from the primitive unconscious of blood and
nation to the future civilization state.