Policy and Society

ISSN: 1449-4035 (Print) 1839-3373 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpas20

Improving Administrative Performance in

Malaysia: The More Difficult Next Steps in Reform

Hong-Hai Lim

To cite this article: Hong-Hai Lim (2007) Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia:
The More Difficult Next Steps in Reform, Policy and Society, 26:2, 33-59, DOI: 10.1016/
S1449-4035(07)70107-8

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1449-4035(07)70107-8

© 2007 Policy and Society Associates (APSS)

Published online: 03 Mar 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 2359

View related articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpas20
Improving Administrative Performance in
Malaysia:
The More Difficult Next Steps in Reform

Hong-Hai Lim
Abstract
Despite past reforms, the Malaysian bureaucracy has lagged behind rising expectations. This paper
reviews past reforms and suggests changes in reform strategy and measures for improving both
the capacity and the will of public officials needed to raise administrative performance to meet
domestic and global pressures. Combining technological and political perspectives, it argues that
improving the will of public officials is both more important and more difficult than improving their
capacity. Improving the will to perform promises significant gains in performance, but it requires
reforms, mainly strengthening public control and making the bureaucracy more representative, that
entail significant sacrifice of the interests of entrenched elites and groups. Malaysia has reached a
juncture where she has to confront politically more difficult choices in administrative reform than
in the past.

Malaysia has devoted almost continuous attention to improving administrative

performance since independence in 1957. In terms of performance, the Malaysian
bureaucracy is generally rated high, even as a star, among developing countries.
However, of late, remaining deficiencies have attracted increased concern.
Besides palpable rising citizen expectations of administrative performance and
hence intolerance of deficiencies, the growing perception that the country is
losing its edge in the more competitive global economy has significantly added
fuel to this concern – not surprisingly in a country where continued economic
growth is seen as key to both regime security and sociopolitical order. Sensing
the need, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (who took over from Mahathir
Mohamad in October 2002) made improving administrative performance and
fighting corruption key pillars of his highly successful 2004 election campaign.
But there has followed widespread perceptions of tardiness in delivering on
these promises.
This paper is an attempt to look back in order to find ways to move forward.
Despite the risk of spurious learning, such an attempt at empirically-based
prescription is crucial to a field that seeks not only to understand but also to
improve practice. Where did past reforms fall short? What further reforms
seem necessary for pushing administrative performance to higher levels? These
questions, and the issue of reform strategy that they imply, are addressed in
this paper. But first some basic concepts and theoretical ideas merit brief
statement.
34 - Hong-Hai Lim

Reform as Improving Capacity and Will

How do we judge the performance of public administration? Or, what is good

public administration? Good public administration is responsive, i.e. endeavours
to produce the services that we want and to do the things that we (or political
leaders on our behalf) have decided they should do for us. It is effective, i.e.
succeeds rather than fails in producing what we want. It is efficient, i.e. produces
what we want at lower rather than higher costs (to the government or to us
separately). Responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency are widely used as basic
criteria for judging public administration or its performance. Responsiveness is
arguably the most basic: effectiveness and efficiency in doing something that is
not responsive to our wants is worthless at best. Responsiveness is also more
complex than effectiveness and efficiency. This is because the “we” or “public”
that public officials are supposed to be responsive to often consists not of a
single collective “we” but of many groups – or many “we’s” and “publics” –
that want different and often incompatible things. The question therefore is
which group and which of its wants public officials should be or are responsive
to and in what degree. This situation suggests the necessity and importance of
equitable responsiveness to all groups as a criterion or measure of performance.
Responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency are all reduced or perverted, and in
a particularly objectionable way, by corruption on the part of public officials.
Although logically implied by the three basic criteria, the level of corruption is
commonly and understandably highlighted as a separate performance criterion.
Good public administration would improve our lives in myriad ways. We are
also increasingly told, almost certainly correctly, that good public administration
would make our country more attractive to foreign investors and our businesses
more competitive in the global marketplace, which in turn would create more
jobs and make us richer. Conversely, bad public administration would cost us
dearly; it would burden us and injure our prosperity, as a Chinese phrase puts
it. Much therefore depends on administrative performance. So what determines
it?
Whatever the tasks, administrative performance (to the extent that it is
controllable) depends on the two broad factors of capacity and will – that is to
say, the capacity and will of those carrying out public administration, namely
bureaucrats and politicians in office. This formulation simplifies of course, but
not by too much; it is therefore one that I find useful. Improving administrative
performance therefore requires attention to the capacity and will of public
officials to be responsive (including equitably responsive), effective, efficient
and non-corrupt.
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 35

Capacity depends very largely on human resources (knowledge, skills, energy,

and creativity) and technology (methods, techniques, processes, and tools such
as computers and ICT or information and communications technology). These
resources are scarce or limited and thus limit capacity. The will to perform –
i.e. to perform assigned tasks and to perform them well or as well as capacity
permits – is also scarce. More pointedly, it is precarious because of what Selznick
(1966, 253) calls “the recalcitrance of the (human) tools of action”. People in
public administration have values and beliefs that make them want or have the
will to do other things besides their job, even though these things conflict with
job requirements or take time and energy away from performing their job. And
it is very difficult or costly to completely prevent them from doing what they
want, whether this is their job or otherwise.
All organizations must possess or develop sufficient capacity and achieve
sufficient influence over the will of their members in order to perform or
achieve goals. How to ensure they do so? The best one-word answer is pressure,
not management. Managers of organizations must of course ensure that other
organizational members have sufficient capacity and will to perform. This is
their job. But pressure is first needed to ensure that managers do their job – and
develop the capacity and will to do their job well. This pressure on organizations
to perform comes, primarily and indispensably, from the environment, which
differs very significantly between private and public organizations. For private
organizations, the environment is the market, supplemented by government
regulation. For public organizations, the environment is politics, possibly but not
always or even in most cases supplemented by the market, and primarily consists
of various mechanisms of public control or accountability that mobilize public
pressure on them to perform.
Reform consists of measures to raise capacity and will, and hence
administrative performance, above existing levels. These possible measures
cover a wide range, i.e. all measures that directly or indirectly affect capacity and
will, and include changes within the organization as well as in its environment.
For public organizations, or collectively the bureaucracy, they include, notably,
measures for strengthening the mechanisms of public control. It should
not surprise that reforms for improving administrative performance often
redistribute power within the political system as well as benefits and costs among
members of society.
Besides drawing upon established ideas in the study of public administration
and organizations, the above applies to the bureaucracy the ideas and principle
that James Madison enunciated in Federalist 51 for the larger purpose of
constitutional design. The basic principle is to match capacity and will with
function – in Madison’s terms, to match “constitutional means and personal
36 - Hong-Hai Lim

motives” with “the constitutional rights of the place” (Madison 1788; in Rossiter
1961, 321-322). It may be noted that contemporary (and heavily private-sector-
oriented) management theory continues to emphasize capacity and will in its
basic prescription that managers secure the right human resources or employees,
provide them with the right means, and create the right environment (for
individual employees) to induce them to perform.

Past Reforms: Achievements and Shortfalls

Since 1957, when Peninsular Malaysia became independent, the Malaysian

bureaucracy has more than doubled its strength to about a million at present
(for all levels of government but excluding the police and armed forces). This
is in line with the vastly expanded role of government, especially after 1970
and with the launch of the NEP (New Economic Policy) to eradicate poverty
and increase Malay participation in the urban-centred private sector. Beginning
in the mid-1960s, the government has also carried out a program of reform
to improve bureaucratic performance (see Lim 2006a for details). Based on
a strategy of reform crafted by two American professors (Montgomery and
Esman 1966), the reforms consist of changes within the bureaucracy for the
purpose of increasing its capacity.
Such a strategy has been characterized as “unbalanced” by scholars
of administrative reform because it neglects the strengthening of extra-
bureaucratic institutions for controlling the bureaucracy. A “balanced”
strategy is one that gives equal importance to developing control institutions.
Strengthening control institutions (that would also control politicians in power)
is clearly much less politically feasible, but proponents of balance argue that
strengthening bureaucratic capacity by itself would not increase performance by
much without strong control institutions capable of “extracting” performance
from the bureaucracy. The debate has rapidly led to a convergence of scholarly
opinion that while it is usually worthwhile and more politically feasible to begin
with reforms for enhancing capacity under the unbalanced strategy, movement
towards a balanced strategy is needed for substantially realizing the benefits of
capacity-enhancing reforms (see Riggs 1963, 1971; Esman 1967; Braibanti 1971;
LaPalombara 1963, 1971). This is clearly reflected in the justification provided
by Esman (a leading defender of the unbalanced strategy) for the strategy he
designed for Malaysia (Esman 1972, 8, 286-7):

Yet when societies are conflict-prone, especially along communal lines, the
development of these (i.e. participative-control) capabilities should be secondary
in time and emphasis to the capacity of authoritative institutions to govern
and control them. (The strategy) emphasizes the priority of strengthening the
operational capabilities of the Malaysian administration, recognizing that more
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 37

attention must also be devoted to building participative capabilities and processes

if administration itself is to become more effective. … In Malaysia externally
induced cultural transformation or political change were out of the question;
strengthening the administrative apparatus appeared to be feasible and to offer
early and assured returns in governmental effectiveness; attention to participative
institutions, while complementary, was secondary in time and importance.

The reforms so far undertaken under the unbalanced strategy largely consist
of personnel training, changes in the budgeting system, the improvement
of administrative processes and procedures, and the utilization of new
technologies. During the 1990s, some reforms then popularized by the New
Public Management have been added. These latter reforms give more attention
to the will or motivation of bureaucrats and include merit pay (or pay-for-
performance), client charters, and privatization. The system of merit pay (called
New Remuneration System) introduced in 1992 was plagued by problems of
measuring performance – in line with experience elsewhere – and was replaced
in 2002 by the present system (Malaysian Remuneration System) based on
competency as indicated by courses or examinations. Citizen charters setting
out standards of service delivery were also introduced and have remained, along
with inadequate efforts to monitor and correct failure to meet service standards.
The privatization program begun in the early 1990s (but recently slowed) has
transferred a large portion of public utilities and infrastructure to the private
sector. However, instead of fully bringing market competition to bear, it has
often created private monopolies and oligopolies for which effective regulation
remains both an acknowledged need and a continuing search.
Although attribution is hazardous and not all reforms have been adequately
or properly implemented, or even clearly useful, there can be little doubt that
the reform program as a whole has helped to shore up performance in the
rapidly growing Malaysian bureaucracy. However, dissatisfaction, including
among the country’s leaders, continues unabated and is even palpably mounting.
This reflects the pressure of higher domestic and foreign expectations, as noted
earlier, as well as glaring and persisting performance deficits. These deficits
include the following: delays and shortfalls in implementing development
plans and projects, unsatisfactory service delivery to citizens and other clients,
weaknesses in financial administration, unequal responsiveness and bias along
ethnic lines, and corruption.
Inheriting these problems, present Prime Minister Abdullah has made
improving the performance of the bureaucracy and fighting corruption high
priorities of his administration and taken some steps (to be noted later) toward
strengthening public control. However, performance has not noticeably
improved. Recent ratings of Malaysia by international bodies – now the object
of public attention in the country – have rapidly followed one another in
38 - Hong-Hai Lim

highlighting administrative shortcomings and corruption as serious dampeners

of good governance and national competitiveness. The TI corruption perception
index for the country continues to hover close to the average score of 5.0, with
the ranking slipping downwards. And seemingly confirming widespread feelings,
including among members of his own party, that his reform efforts have lost or
simply lacked steam, Abdullah himself has admitted that results have not met
expectations (New Straits Times, 24 November 2006).
The present Chief Secretary to the Government, the country’s top civil
servant, has acknowledged that “there is a lot to do” to check corruption and
to get bureaucrats to do “what they are supposed to do” (New Straits Times, 5
November 2006). Few would quarrel with his assessment – which only reiterates
what has been repeatedly said by the country’s top political and bureaucratic
leaders in recent years. Yes, there is a lot more to do to improve administrative
performance – but what? My answer is presented in the next three sections.

Strengthening Capacity: A Continuing and Broader

Challenge

Strengthening capacity is a continuing need not only because capacity has to

be replenished in order to be maintained, but also because new environmental
demands and technologies require new or increased knowledge and skills.
Meeting the challenges of globalization requires capacity to understand and track
changes in the global environment and to craft policy responses to overcome
obstacles and exploit opportunities. Exploiting new technologies for improving
performance also demands new skills. To cite but two examples in Malaysia,
the use of computers and ICT obviously requires new skills, while privatization
requires new capacities in regulation and contract management. The government
has also acknowledged the problem of poor management in the bureaucracy
and recently hired consultants (3 Harvard University professors) to recommend
ways to address it. The report has not been made public, but discussion with
the consultants indicates that the main recommendation is likely to be more
training, i.e. training tailored for those in or heading for managerial positions.
While the government continues to invest in ICT and personnel training,
there are increasing doubts about the ability of the bureaucracy to attract and
retain quality manpower, which is needed to realize the full benefits of training,
technology and other resources. To quote Abdullah, the present Prime Minister,
“without the best minds conceptualizing, adapting and driving public policies,
good governance would remain an elusive ideal” (New Straits Times, 23 June
2000). Many believe or fear that the bureaucracy is filled with “second-raters”
or worse. Examination of the bureaucracy’s ability to attract quality manpower
must consider two general factors: the attractiveness of public vis-à-vis private
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 39

employment and the pool of job-seekers from which manpower is drawn.

The bureaucracy has to compete for talent with the private sector. In this
regard, pay is widely seen as an important (although not only) factor – and a
problem for the bureaucracy. Pay in the public sector has long lagged behind
the private sector for most kinds of graduate manpower (Lucas and Verry 1999,
234-237). Serious doubts have been expressed as to whether the public sector
has been or will be able to attract its share of the best graduates, especially
from professional and specialist fields. Besides the significantly higher pay in
the private sector, the practice of tying pay to “status” in the bureaucracy, long
defended by elite generalist administrators benefiting from it, has also reduced
the public sector’s ability to attract professional and specialist manpower. The
gap between public and private sector pay for various categories of manpower
has to be reduced for the bureaucracy to compete more effectively for quality
manpower.
The public as well as other sectors depend on the educational system, or
schools and universities, to meet their manpower needs – or to provide the
pool of available manpower. The palpable decline in the quality of graduates,
including in English language proficiency, has caused concern, including among
foreign investors. Improving the educational system is now widely acknowledged
as another pressing need. Increasing the number of universities and their
intake is relatively easier and continues apace, but increasing the number of
graduates at the expense of quality has dangers of its own. There are already
tens of thousands – present estimates range from forty to eighty thousand –
of mainly Malay unemployed (and many believe low-quality) graduates, putting
tremendous pressure on the government to absorb them into the bureaucracy.
The government has recognized the need and begun efforts to improve the
educational system. The educational system is largely public and is hereafter
included in the bureaucracy.
Besides the two general factors just noted, public-sector personnel
policies and practices also affect capacity and need reconsideration. Reforms
so far have left the main personnel policies unchanged on grounds of political
feasibility. As Esman (1972, 145), the main architect of Malaysia’s reform
strategy, explains (italics in original):

The first principle was to work within the existing structure. This had two major
consequences: to accept the legitimacy of an elite corps of … policy officers
and generalist administrators, superior in power and status to other groups of
officials; and to acquiesce in Malay control of this elite corps through the existing
quota system. As a practical matter, the report (i.e. the proposed reforms) would
not have been accepted or even seriously considered if it had challenged either
of these arrangements.
40 - Hong-Hai Lim

The elite corps of generalist administrators is now called the PTD (Perkhidmatan
Tadbir dan Diplomatik; in English, the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic
Service). While accepting the superior status and policy-advising role of the
PTD, Esman clearly saw the need to strengthen its policy capacity. Towards this
end, he proposed that PTD officers specialize in broad functional or policy areas.
However, the proposal has not been seriously implemented by the generalist-
controlled central personnel agency (Esman 1972, 185-195). This oversight is
increasingly insupportable in today’s world. The integrative role of generalist
administrators remains valuable, but some functional-area specialization
within the PTD is urgently needed for strengthening the policy capacity of the
Malaysian bureaucracy.
The problem of improving bureaucratic capacity and performance generally
in multiracial Malaysia has importantly to do with race, or the need to balance
the interests of various races. As Malays lag behind Chinese and Indians in the
private sector, they (i.e. Malays) are given preferential access to public sector
jobs. Malay control of the PTD is an important part of this policy of preferring
Malays in staffing the bureaucracy. As Malays also lag behind Chinese and
Indians in educational achievement, this policy entails the dilution of the merit
system in the bureaucracy, a dilution that inevitably compromises bureaucratic
performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
The policy of Malay preference has not only diluted merit but also resulted
in a predominantly Malay bureaucracy and one that is more responsive to Malays
than to other races. This has produced effects that are increasingly worrisome,
not least to the racial groups not sufficiently represented in it. To reduce these
negative effects, the bureaucracy has to be made more representative of the
country’s multiracial society. This can be done – and can best be done ­– by
strengthening merit, which would also improve bureaucratic effectiveness
and efficiency. The need for and the complexities of strengthening merit and
representativeness in the country’s multiracial context is examined in more detail
in the next section.

Strengthening Merit and Representativeness

According to the last census (2000), Malaysia’s population of nearly 22 million

is made up of 53.4 percent Malays, 26.0 percent Chinese, 7.7 percent Indians,
11.7 percent other bumiputera, and 1.2 percent others. Malays and other native
groups in the states of Sabah and Sarawak are classified as bumiputera (literally
princes of the soil) and enjoy “special rights” over the other, non-bumiputra
races. These constitutionally provided special rights (see Article 153 of the
Federal Constitution) are meant to help the educationally and economically
disadvantaged bumiputera to catch up with the other races. They allow quotas
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 41

for reserving a “reasonable” proportion of various kinds of opportunities,

including positions within the bureaucracy, for bumiputera.
As Means (1986, 105) points out, what has been crucial are “hiring practices,
not formal quotas” (these exist for some important “services” or categories
of personnel but have long been exceeded): “As more Malays have acquired
education and qualifications …, the natural proclivity of the (multiracial
coalitional but Malay-dominated) government, particularly after the NEP, has
been to fill the positions with Malays if at all possible”. The result is a rapid
decline in non-bumiputra representation as shown by the following figures
from the Public Service Commission: “While Chinese accounted for 29.7
percent and Indians 9.8 percent of civil servants in the 1980s, their numbers
fell to 8.2 percent and 5.2 percent respectively in 2003”. Corroborating Means’
observation, the Commission’s secretary explains that this “drastic drop … was
due to the retirement of the post-Merdeka (i.e. post-independence) batch of
(non-bumiputra) civil servants, who were not being replaced” (New Straits Times,
26 July 2005).
There can be little doubt that the preference for bumiputera, particularly Malays,
is the most important factor that accounts for the presently unrepresentative
Malaysian bureaucracy. It is widely believed that in practice preference is carried
beyond recruitment into career development and promotion – even though this
is clearly constitutionally prohibited (see Article 136 of the Federal Constitution).
The policy and practice of preference thus greatly limits the intake of non-
bumiputera applicants as well as the promotion of non-bumiputra bureaucrats to
senior positions. These effects (together probably with lower pay in the public
as compared to the private sector) have in turn dampened the number of non-
bumiputera applicants. Figures released by the Public Service Commission show
that non-bumiputera applications for public service jobs have dropped to very
low levels in recent years (see New Straits Times, 26 July 2005 for 2001-4).
Table 1 presents the latest available data on the racial composition of the
Malaysian bureaucracy, i.e. in June 2005. The simple index of representation in
Table 2 is a racial group’s percentage in the bureaucracy (as in Table 1) divided by
its percentage in the population (given at the beginning of this section). Malays
are significantly over-represented not only in overall terms. Their representation
also increases with level, i.e. from the support group to the top management
group. (Indeed, Malays virtually monopolize all senior administrative positions –
for example, in universities, from deans upwards.) All other races are significantly
under-represented, including other bumiputera. The tables exclude the armed
forces and the police. These services are even more Malay-dominated, but
under-represents only the non-bumiputera races.
42 - Hong-Hai Lim

Table 1
Representation by Race in the Malaysian Bureaucracy: 2005

Ethnic Group Top Management Support Group Total

Management and
Group Professional
Group
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
Malay 1,370 83.95 155,871 81.65 535,495 75.77 692,736 77.03
Chinese 151 9.25 17,896 9.37 66,248 9.37 84,295 9.37
Indian 83 5.08 9,777 5.12 36,194 5.12 46,054 5.12
Other bumiputera 23 1.41 6,156 3.22 63,649 9.01 69,828 7.77
Others 5 0.31 1,203 0.63 5,129 0.73 6,337 0.70
Total 1,632 100 190,903 100 706,715 100 899,250 100

Source: Reply by Mohd. Johari Baharum, then Parliamentary Secretary in the Prime Minister’s
Department, to a question in the Senate (Dewan Negara) on 7 December 2005. It was reported in the
Chinese-language daily Oriental Daily News, 8 December 2005. The figures do not include the police
and armed forces.

Table 2
Index of Representation by Race in the Malaysian Bureaucracy:
2005

Ethnic Group Top Management and Support Group Total

Management Professional
Group Group
Malay 1.57 1.53 1.42 1.44
Chinese 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
Indian 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Other bumiputera 0.12 0.27 0.77 0.66
Others 0.25 0.51 0.59 0.57

Malay domination of the bureaucracy reflects the goals of providing jobs to

Malays and retaining administrative power in Malay hands. However, the pursuit
of these goals has compromised merit. Comprising merit in recruitment results
in recruits of lower capacity while compromising merit in promotion lowers
will and effort to perform. “There can be little doubt”, observes Esman (1972,
75), “that the country paid a price in reduced administrative effectiveness”. The
price due to lower capacity is likely to be especially significant when merit is
relaxed for a majority (as opposed to a minority) group and for pushing its over-
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 43

representation to high levels.

In his “Vision 2020” speech, then Prime Minister Mahathir (1991, paragraph
68) stresses the importance of human resource development for Malays so
that Malay personnel would not be “a millstone around the national neck”.
“What may be considered a burden now” – i.e. vastly expanded educational
opportunities for Malays – “can … be the force that lightens our burden and
hastens our progress”. In other words, it is hoped that the loss of capacity
would be largely ameliorated as Malays make good use of the vastly expanded
educational opportunities afforded them to improve their capacity or merit for
employment. However, Malay and other leaders and educational staff continue
to lament that Malay students in schools and universities have generally not
strived hard enough to match their non-Malay counterparts in educational
performance. Preferential entry into the bureaucracy may even be a factor that
dampens motivation among Malay students.
Besides significantly sacrificing effectiveness and efficiency, the highly
unrepresentative Malay-dominated bureaucracy also has other effects that
are especially serious in a multiracial society. These effects are both symbolic
and substantive (Mosher 1968, 10-14). An unrepresentative bureaucracy not
only symbolizes unequal treatment to under-represented races. In a racially
divided society, it is also likely to lead to unequal substantive treatment of
under-represented races. The reasons for this are various (see Lim 2006b for a
systematic formulation) and can be recast in terms of capacity and will, i.e. the
capacity and will of the unrepresentative bureaucracy to be equitably responsive
to all races.
In terms of capacity, bureaucrats have more knowledge or understanding of
the needs and views of their own race than of other races; they are also more
able to attract clients, and induce desired behavioural changes in clients, from
their own race than from other races. In terms of will, bureaucrats have greater
will to serve their own race than other races. This can obviously arise from
their partiality or bias toward their own race. Even if they try to be impartial,
bureaucrats share more values and beliefs with, and have greater empathy for,
members of their own race. This would shape their will and lead them to behave
in ways that serve their own race better than other races. Bureaucrats from
different races also influence and moderate one another, but the moderating
influence of minority-race bureaucrats on majority-race bureaucrats is likely to
be weak in a bureaucracy dominated by the majority race.
For all these reasons, the substantive benefits that a racial group receives
from the bureaucracy are likely to be significantly related to its representation
in the bureaucracy. This proposition has been supported by empirical research
in the United States (most of it reviewed in Lim 2006b) showing that public
44 - Hong-Hai Lim

organizations with more representation of racial minorities also produce more

substantive benefits for those minorities. It follows that an unrepresentative
bureaucracy would result in unfair treatment of under-represented races and
that all races have to be fairly represented in the bureaucracy if they are to be
fairly served by it. This is of course the central argument for a representative
bureaucracy.
Similar research on the relationship between representation and substantive
benefits for a racial group has not been carried out in Malaysia. However,
there are frequent complaints that the Malay-dominated bureaucracy has not
treated non-Malays fairly. The police, in particular, have been a major and
constant target of such complaints. More recently, public concern has also
focused on national schools, where the mainly Malay heads and senior staff
have often adopted practices that are seen to be unfair or at least insensitive
toward non-Malay students. These pro-Malay/Muslim practices, a Minister has
pointed out, “are not part of the Government’s policy” but “are introduced by
overzealous principals and headmasters” (New Straits Times, 9 January 2006).
Unequal treatment in national schools and the declining enrolment of non-
Malay students in national schools have serious implications for national unity.
The government’s policy of eradicating poverty regardless of race has also been
given a strong racial slant by the bureaucracy. A recent study pointedly notes that
national development plans since the mid-seventies have contained provisions
for helping the increasing number of poor Indians but “there has been a
noticeable absence of programmes and budgetary resources” for this purpose
(Center for Public Policy Studies 2006). In other words, those provisions in
the development plans, which depend on programme design and funding
request by bureaucrats for their implementation, have been largely ignored by
the Malay-dominated bureaucracy. The school and antipoverty examples show
that ostensibly impartial policies have been effectively changed by bureaucrats
in the course of implementation – both by acts of commission and by acts of
omission.
What makes the above especially serious is the widespread belief, not just
among non-Malays, that the main reason is that Malay bureaucrats are partial
towards their own race and biased against other races – a belief that is supported
by the observations of scholars. According to Means (1972, 46-48), “the
built-in pro-Malay bias” of the bureaucracy has led to “the erosion of public
confidence in the public service, especially among non-Malays”. A prominent
Malay academic (Shamsul 1996, 25) notes that the Malay-dominated Malaysian
bureaucracy has “inevitably become highly ethnicised if not deeply pro-Malay”
and that Malay bureaucrats often reply to the charge of “racial discrimination”
by saying “we are simply implementing national politics”. More generally, Esman
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 45

(1999, 355) observes that bureaucrats in racially divided societies “are socialized
into a sense of professional obligation to members of their own community and
fear the sanctions of their community if they fail to comply”.
As explained earlier, unfair treatment of under-represented races is almost
inevitable and likely to be significant when the bureaucracy is dominated by
one race in a racially divided society, and this is not just because of bureaucratic
partiality. The problem becomes more serious when public control is inadequate,
as is the case in Malaysia. Occasional reminders by government leaders – such as
that by a Malay deputy minister to the mainly Malay staff in public schools and
universities “to be fair” to non-Malay students so as not to “alienate” the younger
generation of non-Malays (New Straits Times, 21 October 2003) – are unlikely to
be inadequate for countering built-in values and inclinations, especially in the
absence of specific machinery for investigating and correcting racial bias.
A highly unrepresentative bureaucracy, therefore, has serious implications
for equity in administration and consequently for trust in the bureaucracy,
government legitimacy and national unity (i.e. race relations) in the country. After
reports of blatant bias by Malay police in handling an outbreak of interracial
violence in 2001 (i.e. in Kampung Medan), then Prime Minister Mahathir has
reportedly acknowledged the need for a “sufficiently representative” bureaucracy
for promoting national unity (New Straits Times, 20 May 2001):

The Government wants an increase in non-Bumiputra representation in the

civil service to promote national unity. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad said today there was a need to ensure all races were sufficiently
represented in all levels in the service. “We are a bit worried that there are not
too many non-Malays – that is Chinese and Indians – in the government service”.
… Fair representation of the races should not only be restricted to government
service. It should be reflected in the private sector as well.

Mahathir’s call for a sufficiently rather than a fully representative bureaucracy in

the Malaysian context makes an important point that merits brief explanation.
While equitable treatment of all races by the bureaucracy is important, it should
be seen not in isolation but in the larger perspective of overall equity in society.
This requires taking into account the representation of various races in all sectors
and all the ways in which representation affects interracial equity. The reality
in Malaysia is that, notwithstanding considerable progress under the NEP and
successor national policies, Malays still trail behind Chinese and Indians in wealth
ownership and employment in the private sector. This is an important reason
why Malays are generally opposed to a representative bureaucracy. The present
high level of Malay preference and over-representation in the bureaucracy needs
to be reduced, but some degree of Malay preference and over-representation
is still needed in the interest of overall interracial equity. Malay satisfaction,
46 - Hong-Hai Lim

including with their economic position and employment opportunities, is

crucial for national unity. A fully representative bureaucracy would reduce jobs
for Malays and increase their economic disgruntlement to a level that could
pose an even greater threat to national unity than non-Malay grievances with an
unrepresentative bureaucracy. Thus a sufficiently representative bureaucracy (say,
with Malays comprising no more than two-thirds in each of the three groups
in the civil service), is more appropriate than a fully representative one in the
Malaysian context. In the longer term and as Malay participation in the private
sector increases, non-Malay representation in the bureaucracy should also be
increased so that eventually both sectors will become closely representative of
the country’s plural society.
To sum up, the case for strengthening merit does not rest solely on its
contribution to effectiveness and efficiency. No less important in Malaysia’s
multiracial society is its contribution to making the bureaucracy more
representative and hence more equitably responsive to all races. In the present
Malaysian context, however, some limits to merit and representativeness in the
bureaucracy are still needed to promote overall interracial equity; the goal of a
sufficiently representative bureaucracy thus seems appropriate.

Strengthening Public Control: The Will to Perform

The country’s past reforms and persisting performance shortfalls also strongly
point to the need to strengthen public control. Public control is used here
generally to refer to all forms and mechanisms of public pressure on the
government, including the bureaucracy, to improve performance. To repeat,
performance requires not just capacity but also the will to perform – the will to
make full or adequate use of available capacity and indeed to acquire or develop
more capacity if it is needed (and, as already argued, it is almost certainly
needed). Public control is as important for ensuring the will to perform in the
public sector as the market is in the private sector, or as regulation is in the
highly imperfect markets faced by privatized entities. Madison (1788; in Rossiter
1961, 322) famously stated both the need and the means of public control in
Federalist 51 as follows:

In framing a government that is to be administered by men over men, the

great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 47

A major problem in Malaysian public administration is insufficient will to

perform among many public officials. This has been allowed to persist – if
not exactly caused – by weak public control or deficiencies in the mechanisms
for obliging public officials to control themselves. Below I provide a brief
explanation of why public control is weak and the resulting negative effects (see
Lim 2002a for more discussion) before stating the case and noting key means
for strengthening public control.
In the fifty years of independence, the bureaucracy has more than doubled
its staff and greatly increased its role and powers. However, the mechanisms
of public control have failed to keep pace. Their development was not only
neglected or deferred in the unbalanced strategy of administrative reform,
but the role and capacity of most existing mechanisms of public control have
also been progressively diminished by the government. The weakening of
public control reflects the design of central ruling politicians to create a strong
executive-dominated government; that is to say, one in which the executive is
dominant in relation to both other branches of government and the governed.
Regular elections make for government dependence on the people, Madison’s
primary control. However, this electoral dependence has been significantly
lowered by two factors. The first is the dominant-party party system that exists
in the country. The ruling coalition – now called the National Front or Barisan
Nasional in Malay and led by UMNO (United Malays National Organization),
the main Malay party in the country – is highly dominant vis-à-vis other
political parties and has held power at the federal level (and in most states) since
independence. In the absence of any viable alternative – such as another durable
coalition and this has failed to materialize despite a few attempts – the ruling
coalition faces virtually no risk of electoral defeat.
The second factor is the electoral system and process. The government has
used its power to shape the electoral system and process and make their grip on
power even more secure and immune to challenge at the polls (for details see
Lim 2002b; Lim and Ong 2006). The “managed” electoral system and process
significantly disadvantages the opposition in both the campaign for votes and the
translation of votes obtained into seats won. The opposition is disadvantaged
in the campaign for votes by legal restrictions, unequal media access, the ruling
coalition’s use of government resources, and inadequate and poorly enforced
laws on electoral spending. Under the first-past-the-post electoral system used
in the country, the translation of votes into seats is inherently non-proportional
and favours the largest party. However, in Malaysia this feature of the
electoral system is further accentuated by the partisan delineation of electoral
constituencies. This is done in three notable ways. First, mal-apportionment in
constituency delineation greatly disadvantages the mainly non-bumiputra urban
48 - Hong-Hai Lim

areas and advantages the mainly bumiputra rural areas. Second is the supplemental
use of gerrymandering in the increasingly racially mixed urban centres to carve
out bumiputra-majority constituencies that favour the ruling coalition vis-à-vis
the non-bumiputra opposition. The ruling coalition is thus sheltered not only
from urban voters who probably care more about good governance than their
patronage-oriented rural counterparts, but also specifically from the opposition-
inclined non-bumiputra voters concentrated in urban areas. Third, the much
improved performance of the Malay opposition party at the expense of UMNO
in the 1999 election has led to the use of gerrymandering outside urban areas
against the Malay opposition party in the subsequent 2003 delineation exercise
(Ong and Welsh, 2006).
The fear of being ousted from power and being at the receiving end, therefore,
has not been an effective brake on the government’s drive to increase executive
powers (see Crouch 1996, 77-95 for a useful summary) and also to weaken and
exert its control over what Madison called the auxiliary mechanisms of public
control – parliament, judiciary, NGOs and the press – that also control the
executive and not just the bureaucracy. To control public officials (and others),
the executive has chosen to rely more on agencies that are formally and wholly
under its own direction or control. This strategy may simply be called executive
control in contrast to public control. Thus the government has set up the Anti-
Corruption Agency and Public Complaints Bureau and placed them directly
under the Prime Minister. It rejected a key proposal made in 1990 to set up an
independent, non-partisan commission for monitoring policy implementation,
even though the proposal came from a widely representative body (National
Economic Consultative Council) set up by the government to deliberate on
post-NEP national policy. To assist his anti-corruption campaign, the present
Prime Minister has increased the staff of the Anti-Corruption Agency and
set up the Malaysian Integrity Institute, which, like the others, are under his
office and staffed by bureaucrats. In line with executive control, he continues
to resist calls to make the Anti-Corruption Agency independent or responsible
to parliament and to set up an ombudsman in place of or in addition to the
Public Complaints Bureau. The most important recommendation of the royal
commission on the police set up by him is an independent commission to deal
with public complaints against the police. At the time of writing (mid-2007), or
more than a year after the proposal was made, the government is still considering
what to do with it.
Not surprisingly, Malaysia has long been regarded by scholars as a semi- or
quasi-democracy (Zakaria Ahmad 1989; Case 1993) – and now also as a “flawed
democracy” by The Economist in its 2006 Democracy Index. This index gives
Malaysia a rank of 81 among 167 countries, the lowest placing in the category of
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 49

“flawed democracies”: one slip and the country would lose its democracy label
altogether. More pointedly, of the 6 indicators in the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators: 1996-2005, the indicator that is similar to public control,
i.e. “voice and accountability”, is also the one on which Malaysia performs the
poorest in 2005, with a percentile score of only 34.3 compared to over 60 on all
the other indicators.
Government leaders have always contended – in fact, even before
independence (Lim, 1989) – that a strong government, i.e. one endowed with
wide powers and subject to minimum checks in its exercise of these powers, is
needed for ensuring order in the racially divided and therefore volatile plural
society. One does not need to doubt this argument or leaders’ belief in it to
note that weak public control also makes the lives of ruling politicians more
comfortable – and that, more probably than not, this is also part of the reason
why ruling politicians in Malaysia have weakened instead of strengthened public
control.
However, weak public control has predictable effects. It reduces pressure on
bureaucrats to perform. It also reduces pressure on political leaders to perform,
including in their important task of pushing bureaucrats to perform. The will
of public officials (politicians and bureaucrats) to perform their duties and not
to perform prohibited acts may remain inadequate or be lowered, as they can
neglect their duties and commit wrongdoing with a high degree of impunity
or little fear of punitive consequences. Weak public control therefore allows
and thus encourages public officials to slack, i.e. to not perform their duties or
perform them poorly and slowly, and indulge, i.e. commit wrongful actions such
as racial bias and corruption.
There are already ample signs of slack and indulgence among public officials
in Malaysia. These manifestations of inadequate will – as opposed to capacity –
largely account for the five main performance weaknesses identified earlier (and
repeated here): delays and shortfalls in implementing development plans and
projects, unsatisfactory service delivery to citizens and other clients, weaknesses
in financial administration, unequal responsiveness and bias along ethnic bias,
and corruption. Any doubts that will rather than capacity is mainly at issue
should be cleared by the following words of the former Chief Secretary before
his retirement (New Straits Times, 5 November 2003):

I am still receiving complaints of officers who go missing from their seats, misuse
office vehicles, chat incessantly, don’t answer telephones, deal roughly with clients
and ask for bribes. There are also many other negative activities going on in
government departments that the public are not aware of, such as cheating on
punch-in cards, truancy, avoiding work, doing personal work during office hours
and incessantly being on the phone.
50 - Hong-Hai Lim

The same Chief Secretary has also questioned, but more politely, the
performance of public managers by noting that “what happens behind the
counter determines the quality of service at the counter” (New Straits Times, 3
March 2004). Evidently, many public managers are not managing (practicing
“management-by-default”?) and neglecting to ensure that their subordinates
perform their assigned duties. Another former Chief Secretary has lamented
the reluctance of department heads to take disciplinary action against errant
staff (Ahmad Sarji 1996, 253-258). Figures on disciplinary cases from the
Public Service Commission for the period 1989-98 bear this out: The cases
in each of these years amounted to less than a quarter of one percent of total
bureaucrats; they also decline in absolute numbers, even though the number of
bureaucrats and of public complaints has increased over the period (Abdullah
Sanusi Ahmad, Norma Mansor and Abdul Kuddus Ahmad 2003, 137). As
pointed out by a senior officer of the Anti-Corruption Agency (New Straits
Times, 3 February 2007), departmental heads even ignore recommendations by
the Anti-Corruption Agency to take action against staff believed to be corrupt
(but not brought to court because of insufficient evidence). Failure to enforce
basic discipline among subordinates largely reflects inadequate will rather than
inadequate capacity on the part of public managers. Increasing management
training, it may be noted, addresses the latter cause more than the former.
One should also ask why public managers are slacking and follow the chain
of causation right up to their political superiors or ministers. Ministers have
often publicly complained of poor management by public managers and that
bureaucrats are under-performing relative to their capacity. In response to
the latest call by the umbrella public sector union for more staff and pay, the
Human Resources Minister has pointedly replied that, notwithstanding staff
shortage in certain categories, the public sector is generally overstaffed and that
“the important thing is to increase productivity and not increase the number
of workers” (New Straits Times, 18 December 2006). Ministerial heads, past or
present, cannot be unaware of corruption in the customs department, the road
and transport department or the police, to cite some prominent and persisting
examples. Corruption is not confined to bureaucrats and may even be more
serious among ruling-party politicians. Money politics is common, especially
in UMNO, along with self-serving political influence on most important
distributive and regulatory decisions in the government. However, ministers
have not made enough effort to overcome these problems. Most Malaysians
believe that some ministers may be guilty of more than just omission in making
public managers manage and checking corruption within their departments,
although few have been as bold as the reporter who responded to a minister’s
complaint about bureaucratic corruption by asking (and dumbfounding) her
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 51

“how it was supposed to eradicate corruption when leaders themselves were

allegedly corrupt” (New Straits Times, 27 June 2003).
The Report of the Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management
of the Malaysian Police (2005, 119-20) attributes police corruption and abuse
of power to the “culture of indifference, permissiveness and tolerance for
corruption” and “culture of impunity” in the Malaysian police. There is little
reason to believe that the level of permissiveness and impunity differs very
much for other bureaucrats or politicians in government office – or even for
non-governmental actors engaged in government projects, such as Malay
businessmen who are favoured in government contracting and whose poor
performance is a major source of implementation weakness. All too commonly,
administrative weaknesses and scandals, including those exposed by the Auditor-
General and the press, are either ignored – by closing one eye, to use the phrase
made infamous by one such recent case – or “managed” in ways that leave those
responsible insufficiently punished and insufficiently deterred, and the problem
unsolved. While higher-level officials often remind other officials to perform
duties and not to abuse power, and even warn of punitive action, these have
been inadequate to correct problems. As a newspaper editorially reacted to a
recent instance, such warnings only serve as admissions that “internal control
mechanisms have been less than adequate” if there is no follow-up action
(New Straits Times, 25 January 2007) – and it is action, not verbal reminders or
warnings, that has been lacking. The problem is or strongly seems systemic:
Lower-level public officials slack and indulge with impunity because higher-level
officials responsible for taking corrective action fail to do so, as they too slack if
not also indulge with impunity. And this situation is allowed to persist because
of weak public control.
The clear need is to replace impunity with consequentiality, i.e. negative
sanctions against those who slack or indulge in order to deter such misbehaviour
in future. This in turn needs effective public control. Effective public control
is needed to reliably visit adequate negative sanctions on those who slack and
indulge, in large part by pushing various responsible others in the political-
administrative hierarchy ­– the Prime Minister, other ministers, executive control
agencies, bureaucratic managers – to act against those who slack and indulge.
These points merit amplification with an important example: the campaign
against corruption.
The campaign was launched by the present Prime Minister prior to the 2004
election with the arrest of two prominent persons and indications of more to
come. Since the impressive electoral victory, the Anti-Corruption Agency has
been given more staff and has increased its annual number of arrest from 300
plus to 400 plus – there is talk that this is its new quota. Glaringly, however, those
52 - Hong-Hai Lim

arrested are almost all small rather than big fish. The government has pleaded
the difficulty of obtaining evidence. It has also stressed the primary importance
of values, pleaded for more time to change values through courses and seminars,
and set up a new executive agency (the Malaysian Integrity Institute) primarily
for this purpose. However, these measures are widely seen as inadequate. The
country’s rating by Transparency International has continued to slide and public
disappointment has set in. There is even reason to doubt whether the campaign
is on the right track. Posing “the question of whether the motives and ethics of
public servants can be intentionally changed – re-designed by politicians and/or
by management”, Pollitt (2003, 146) provides the following sobering summary
of available evidence: “The short answer seems to be: ‘only by a considerable
effort, on several fronts and using different tactics, over a sustained period of
time.’” (Even shorter: tough and demands too much time and effort. Note
that the difficulty of changing values also underlies the need for making the
bureaucracy more representative.) Pollitt (2003, 147) also observes: “Rascals
will be rascals, and the existence and vigorous use of disciplinary procedures
are likely to be a much more important curb on their activities than codes of
ethics”. In other words, only punitive action, not talk or preaching of values, can
replace impunity with consequentiality and stem corruption.
Why is the campaign long on preaching values and short on punitive action?
One reason is belief that efforts to change values will work. A more probable
reason is the Prime Minister’s fear of losing political support i.e. the support
of other leaders in his party and the support that most Malay bureaucrats have
long shown for UMNO. An UMNO leader and also “close family member” of
the Prime Minister has explained as follows: “We can’t take on the whole system
– that’s too hard” (Vatikiotis and Jayasankaran 2004, 22). Even more pointed is
the reply of the Prime Minister himself when asked about “the need to reform
the political culture in UMNO to combat corruption”: “That’s easier said than
done, and it’s just not practical. The person leading the government must also
be leader of the party” (Vatikiotis and Jayasankaran 2004, 22). Opinion can
differ as to whether the Prime Minister was (or is) in a position to act against the
corrupt within his party and whether the 2004 runaway electoral victory, which
must have bolstered his position, has not also weakened his will. The challenge,
however, is clear: Public control must be strong enough to overcome the Prime
Minister’s reluctance or to make good any deficit in his political will, including
by overcoming the political forces that account for his reluctance.
There is no adequate substitute to effective public control for overcoming
existing deficiencies in will and hence slack and indulgence among public
officials. Strengthening public control may not produce results immediately, but
it would probably do so in less time than it takes to change the values of public
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 53

officials. For top leaders, strengthening public control is also more practical or
feasible than taking punitive action against politically important offenders. More
effective public control would then help top leaders to check these offenders
and even strengthen the hand of top leaders in taking action against them.
However, top leaders must also be willing to pay a price. More effective public
control would also subject top leaders to more scrutiny and pressure to perform.
Their lives too would become more difficult – or have to be better able to
stand scrutiny. This is a potentially powerful disincentive for all power-holders
to strengthen public control – even if they believe in it in principle and desire
its benefits. However, not to strengthen public control entails a big price for the
country, a price that threatens to get bigger with globalization and hence also to
redound upon the reputation and position of political leaders.
In welcome contrast to his predecessors, Prime Minister Abdullah has taken
some steps towards strengthening public control since assuming the post in 2002.
He has acknowledged the role of NGOs as society’s watchdogs and sentinels
to inform the government of weaknesses in public administration. Under him,
the press has become palpably freer, even bolder in exposing government
weaknesses. Some changes have also been made to reinvigorate parliament.
Select committees have been set up to examine pressing national problems –
these are not to be confused with the select departmental committees found
in some parliamentary countries for shadowing and scrutinizing particular
government departments or ministries. For the first time the deputy chairman
of the Public Accounts Committee has been appointed from the opposition
– although, contrary to widely established parliamentary convention, the
committee’s chairman continues to be a government member.
These changes are a useful start, but much more needs to be done to make
public control effective. Existing mechanisms of public control need to be
strengthened or allowed to play their role by removing or relaxing the executive
controls on them that have accreted over the years and that inhibit their will
and capacity. The present tight legal controls on NGOs and the press should
be relaxed. Parliamentary scrutiny of administration should be strengthened by
various reforms within parliament, including revising rules and practices that
restrict scrutiny by opposition members (see Ong 1987), requiring ministers
to provide more adequate answers, introducing bipartisan select departmental
committees, and appointing an opposition member to chair the Public Accounts
Committee. Secrecy in government has to be reduced, as it seriously hampers
public control, whether inside or outside parliament. On many matters, it is
doubtful whether secrecy does anything more than protects their handling from
public scrutiny. For example, in a recent controversy, the agreements between
the government and companies operating toll highways and public utilities
54 - Hong-Hai Lim

under the privatization programme were held to be secret and denied to NGOs
questioning tariff increases (The Sun, 5 February 2007). The importance of
reducing secrecy is also well explained by Madison (1822; in Padover 1953, 337):
“… a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with
the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information
or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps
both”.
Scholars of public administration typically confine their attention to
auxiliary controls, but Madison reminds us that public control also includes the
government’s primary dependence on the people through elections. As Scott
(1996, 425) has noted in his examination of the British parliament, auxiliary
controls may have to rely for their effectiveness primarily on informing and
influencing voters when they exercise their primary control over the government.
In Malaysia, public control through elections is weak, for reasons already
explained. Since independence, the government has held over two-thirds of
parliamentary seats with between half and two-thirds of total votes. The last
election in 2004 has increased its parliamentary majority to a record 90.9 percent
(199 of 219 seats) on the basis of 64.3 percent of total votes. With such a
dominant position, is it any wonder that the government has not felt compelled
to do more to curb corruption and improve administrative performance, or to
strengthen auxiliary controls for these purposes?
Scholars generally agree that elections in Malaysia are free but not fair, and
that reform is needed to enhance fairness (see Lim 2005; Lim and Ong 2006).
Making elections fairer would not lead to a change in government because of the
lopsided party system. However, it would reduce the ruling coalition’s majority
in parliament. Two main approaches to making elections fairer in Malaysia
have been identified. The first, replacing the first-past-the-post electoral system
with some form of proportional representation, would lead to a much bigger
reduction in the government’s majority, i.e. from 90 to about 65 percent of seats
in the last election in 2004. The second approach, “cleaning up” or removing
unfair practices in the existing first-past-the-post electoral system, would effect
a much less drastic but probably still non-trivial reduction in the government’s
majority.
Making elections fairer would improve government performance, besides
other important benefits for the political system. The government’s reduced
majority under fairer elections would mean more opposition voice and therefore
more effective scrutiny of government in parliament. It would also make the
government’s two-thirds majority – this is required for amending the constitution
and therefore considered important by the government – more vulnerable to the
swings in voter support that have occurred in the past. The government would
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 55

thus be under more pressure to perform in order to safeguard its two-thirds

majority. It would have to address, and address more effectively, any problem
that concerns significant numbers of voters – including urban voters who care
more about corruption, poor service delivery, inadequate accountability and
weak auxiliary control mechanisms, but whose electoral importance is presently
significantly reduced by means of constituency delineation.

Conclusion: Extending Reform Strategy and Rebalancing

Competing Values

“The new reality of globalization is that a nation’s standard of living as well as

its independence depends upon its capacity to compete successfully in the world
economy. Globalization is forcing convergence around the most competitive
practices”. “Convergence”, however, “does not come easily; it is fraught with
conflict”. A major reason is because it requires the “destruction of old and
often cherished ways”. These quotations from Lodge (1995, 10-11) now enjoy
widespread acceptance, including by Malaysians and their leaders. Despite past
progress, most Malaysians realize that their country’s public administrative
performance is still not good enough and has to be brought up to par to help
the country compete – even as some still cherish the old ways that benefit
them. Malaysian leaders have to grapple with the conflicts involved in further
improving administrative performance.
From a survey of past reforms and results, this paper argues the need to
reexamine the strategy of administrative reform in order to produce the needed
improvement in Malaysia’s administrative performance. The reform strategy
that has been followed is called unbalanced as it focuses on capacity-enhancing
reforms within the bureaucracy and neglects public control. Continued support
for this strategy has been expressed by a former head of the government’s
reform agency (Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management
Planning Unit): “Esman’s view that the Malaysian civil service be strengthened in
all dimensions … rings as true today as when it was first asserted” (Muhammad
Rais Abdul Karim 1999, 32). Strengthening capacity requires more reforms to
be undertaken under the unbalanced strategy. The government has to strengthen
the ability of the bureaucracy to compete for desired manpower and also the
ability of educational institutions to supply desired manpower. The unbalanced
strategy also has to be broadened by relaxing the constraints imposed in the
past, especially the strong preference for staffing the bureaucracy with Malays
and the compromise of merit that it entails. Greater emphasis on merit would
significantly boost capacity as well as the will to perform. Importantly for
national unity, it would also make the bureaucracy more racially representative
and thus enhance the capacity and will of bureaucrats in ways that would ensure
56 - Hong-Hai Lim

more equitable treatment of the country’s various races.

The unbalanced strategy not only has to be broadened; it also has to be
transcended or balanced up by strengthening the institutions of public control.
More effective public control is needed for improving public officials’ will
to perform. Esman, the main architect of Malaysia’s unbalanced strategy
of administrative reform, can hardly be faulted for seeking the “early and
assured returns” of improved administrative capacity (see his defence of the
strategy quoted earlier). He acknowledges that strengthening public control
is eventually needed “if administration itself is to become more effective” in
actual performance. However, his claim that strengthening public control “was
secondary in time and importance” has been increasingly and seriously belied
by subsequent experience. While the capacity of bureaucrats needs continuous
improvement and renewal, existing capacity is significantly underused and misused
because of deficiencies in will. Even without further increases in the capacity of
public officials, effective public control can provide the needed boost to their
will to lift the system to a significantly higher level of performance. Arguably,
in the present situation, improving the will to perform by strengthening public
control (and representativeness) would provide better returns in performance
than would further efforts to increase capacity.
This paper also identifies needed reforms for improving capacity and will.
Most of these reforms are harder than those already attempted, as they require
the revision of old ways or existing political-bureaucratic arrangements that are
still cherished by those benefiting from them. While all Malaysians would benefit
to some extent from the improved administrative performance produced by
reform, some Malaysians, i.e. those who receive specific benefits from the
old ways, would have to pay the price or most of it. This arises from the fact
that existing political-bureaucratic arrangements reflect the pursuit of other
interests and therefore goals besides administrative performance as earlier and
conventionally defined. The weak mechanisms of public control reduce pressure
not just on ruling politicians but also on bureaucrats to perform. The preference
for Malays and the compromise of merit in staffing the bureaucracy – and in
contracting and privatization – also dampens administrative performance,
including in terms of equitable responsiveness to the other races. However, it
contributes to the important goal of narrowing interracial economic disparities
in the Malaysian context. It is for this reason that a sufficiently representative
rather than a fully representative bureaucracy is an appropriate goal for the
country.
Formulating and reformulating political-bureaucratic arrangements for
conducting public administration in Malaysia are thus good examples of
what Vickers calls “multi-valued choices” that involve “optimizing-balancing”
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 57

competing values or interests. As Vickers also notes, changing conditions and

requirements mean that a satisfactory solution or settlement cannot be achieved
“once and for all but, like the mariner’s course, must constantly be sought anew”
(Vickers 1968, 115-116). Past reforms have shown up the limits of exploiting
possibilities within the existing political-bureaucratic system that political leaders
since independence have contrived to put in place. The challenge facing Malaysia
and her leaders at this juncture is that that system has to be revised in important
respects to boost administrative performance to meet changing domestic needs
and global demands. If this challenge is of a different order from the past,
so probably are the consequences for the country of failure to meet it under
present and prospective conditions.

References
Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad, Norma Mansor, and Abdul Kuddus Ahmad 2003. The Malaysian Bureaucracy:
Four Decades of Development. Kuala Lumpur: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Ahmad Sarji 1996. The Chief Secretary to the Government, Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk
Publications.
Braibanti, R. 1971. ‘Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth’. In Frontiers of
Development Administration, ed., F.W. Riggs, 227-246. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Case, W. 1993. ‘Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change’. Pacific
Affairs 66(2): 183-205.
Centre for Public Policy Studies 2006. ‘Ensuring Effective Targeting of Ethnic Minorities: The
Case of Low Income Malaysian Indians’. In Proposals for the Ninth Malaysia Plan. Kuala
Lumpur: Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute.
Crouch, H. 1996. Government and Society in Malaysia. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin Australia.
Esman, M.J. 1967. ‘The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration’. Public Administration Review
27(3): 271-8.
_______. 1972. Administration and Development in Malaysia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
_______. 1999. ‘Public Administration and Conflict Management in Plural Societies: The Case for
Representative Bureaucracy’. Public Administration and Development 19(4): 353-66.
LaPalombara, J. 1963. ‘An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development’. In Bureaucracy
and Political Development, ed., J. LaPalombara, 3-33. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
_______. 1971. ‘Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging
Nations’. In Frontiers of Development Administration, ed., F.W. Riggs, 171-226. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Lim, H.H. 1989. ‘The Eve-of-Independence Constitutional Debate on Fundamental Liberties and
Judicial Review: A Window on Elite Views and Constitutional Government in Malaysia?’
Kajian Malaysia (Journal of Malaysian Studies) 7 (1 & 2): 1-37.
_______. 2002a. ‘Public Administration: The Effects of Executive Dominance’. In Democracy in
Malaysia: Discourses and Practices, eds., Francis K.W. Loh and B.T. Khoo eds, 165-197.
Richmond: Curzon Press.
_______. 2002b. ‘Electoral Politics in Malaysia: ‘Managing’ Elections in a Plural Society’. In Electoral
Politics in Southeast and East Asia, eds., A. Croissant, G. Bruns and M. John, 101-148.
Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
58 - Hong-Hai Lim

_______. 2005. ‘Making the System Work: The Election Commission’. In Elections and Democracy
in Malaysia, eds., M. Puthucheary and Norani Othman, 249-291. Bangi: Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia Press.
_______. 2006a. ‘Malaysia: Distilling the Lessons of Forty Years’. In Re-thinking Administrative
Reforms in Southeast Asia, ed., K.L. Ho, 1-53. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.
_______. 2006b. ‘Representative Bureaucracy: Rethinking Substantive Effects and Active
Representation’. Public Administration Review 66 (2): 193-204.
Lim, H.H., and K.M. Ong 2006. ‘The 2004 General Election and the Electoral Process in Malaysia’.
In Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia,
eds., A. Croissant and B. Martin, 147-214. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
Lodge, G.C. 1995. Managing Globalization in an Age of Interdependence. Kuala Lumpur: Golden Books
Centre.
Lucas, R.E.B., and D. Verry 1999. Restructuring the Malaysian Economy: Development and Human Resources.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Mahathir Mohamad 1991. ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’. Speech at the inaugural meeting of the
Malaysian Business Council, 28 February, 1991, Kuala Lumpur; reproduced as an
appendix in A.B. Shamsul. 1992. Malaysia’s Vision 2020: Old Ideas in a New Package,
Working Paper 92-4, Monash-Melbourne Joint Project on Comparative Australian-Asian
Development.
Means, G.P. 1972. ‘Special Rights as a Strategy for Development’. Comparative Politics 5 (1): 29-61.
_______. 1986. ‘Ethnic Preference Policies in Malaysia’. In Ethnic Preference and Public Policy, eds., N.
Nevitte and C. Kennedy, 95-118. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
Montgomery, J., and M.J. Esman 1966. Development Administration in Malaysia: Report to the Government
of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
Mosher, F.C. 1968. Democracy and the Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press.
Muhammad Rais Abdul Karim 1999. ‘Introduction: Two Decades of Managing Change’. In
Reengineering the Public Service: Leadership and Change in an Electronic Age, ed., Muhammad
Rais Abdul Karim, 15-32. Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications.
Ong, K.M., and B. Welsh 2006. ‘Electoral Delimitation: A Case study of Kedah’. In Elections and
Democracy in Malaysia, eds., M. Puthucheary and Norani Othman, 316-345. Bangi:
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press.
Ong, M. 1987. ‘Government and Opposition in Parliament: The Rules of the Game’. In Government
and Politics of Malaysia, ed., Zakaria Haji Ahmad. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Padover, S.K., ed. 1953. The Complete Madison. New York: Harper.
Pollitt, C. 2003. The Essential Public Manager. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Report of the Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysian Police. 2005.
Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
Riggs, F.W. 1963. ‘Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View’. In Bureaucracy and
Political Development, ed., J. LaPalombara, 120-167. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
_______. 1971. ‘Introduction’. In Frontiers of Development Administration, ed. F.W. Riggs, 3-37.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Rossiter, C., ed. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York: Mentor.
Scott, R. 1996. ‘Ministerial Accountability’. Public Law Autumn: 410-426.
Selznick, P. 1966. TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. New York:
Harper and Row.
Shamsul, A.B. 1996. ‘The Construction and Transformation of a Social Identity: Malayness and
Bumiputraness Re-examined’. Journal of Asian and African Studies 52: 15-33.
Vatikiotis, M., and S. Jayasankaran 2004, ’Softly, Softly Go Reforms’. Far Eastern Economic Review
June 3: 20-23.
 Improving Administrative Performance in Malaysia - 59

Vickers, G. 1968. ‘The Multi-valued Choice’. In Value Systems and Social Process, ed., G. Vickers, 112-
132. New York: Basic Books.
Zakaria Ahmad 1989. ‘Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society’. In Democracy in Developing
Countries, Vol. 3: Asia, eds., L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset, 347-381. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Reinner.