RESTORATION PLAN FOR EASTERN GRID OF BHUTAN AND

ISLANDED OPERATION OF BHUTAN POWER SYSTEM

A PROJECT REPORT

Submitted by

Abhishek Pokhrel (05180001) Sarda Chuwan (05180032)

Abiskar Chhetri (05170001)

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

JIGME NAMGYEL ENGINEERING COLLEGE

ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF BHUTAN

DEWATHANG
(June, 2022)
 འབྲུག་རྒྱལ་འཛིན་གཙུག་ལག་སོབ་སེ།།
འཇིགས་མེད་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་བཟོ་རིག་མཐོ་རིམ་སོབ་གྲྭ།།
Royal University of Bhutan
Jigme Namgyel Engineering College, Dewathang

Certificate
This is to certify that the project report titled ‘RESTORATION PLAN FOR EASTERN GRID
OF BHUTAN AND ISLANDED OPERATION OF BHUTAN POWER SYSTEM’

Submitted by:

Abhishek Pokhrel (05180001) Sarda Chuwan (05180032)

Abiskar Chhetri (05170001)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the BE in Power Engineering.

Supervisor(s):

(Mr. Hemlal Bhattarai) (Mrs. Yeshi Seldon)

Lecturer Assistant Lecturer
Department of Electrical Engineering Department of Electrical Engineering

(Mr. Sonam Dorji)

Head of Department
Department of Electrical Engineering

President: +975-07-260286, Facsimile: +975-07-260289, email: president@jnec.edu.bt , Dean AA: +975-07-260299,Dean SA:
+975-07-260298, Dean RIL: +975-07-260202, Admin.: +975-07-260302, Accounts: +975-07-260205
 DECLARATION

We declare that this project titled ‘RESTORATION PLAN FOR EASTERN GRID OF BHUTAN
AND ISLANDED OPERATION OF BHUTAN POWER SYSTEM ’ under the supervision of
Mr. Hemlal, Lecturer, Department of Electrical Engineering is a bonafide report of work done by
us. The report represents our original ideas and words including referred ideas from various
sources. We declare that all the sources referred are adequately cited adhering to the academic
regulation of academic dishonesty reflected in the Wheel of Academic Law (WAL), Royal
University of Bhutan (RUB). The material embodied in the project report has not been submitted
for any other awards.

Abhishek Pokhrel (05180001) Sarda Chuwan (05180032)

Abiskar Chhetri (05170001)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
On the very outset of this report, we would like to extend our sincere and heartfelt gratitude
towards all who have assisted us in this endeavor. It would not have been possible for us to
reach the completion of this work if it had not been for the conscientious guidance, support,
motivation, enthusiasm, and encouragement from our project guide, Mr. Hemlal Bhattarai
(Lecturer, DEE, JNEC). We are equally indebted to Mr. Bikram Chhetri (Lecturer, CST) who
guided us in the initial months before getting transferred. Mentoring us through and through,
Mrs. Yeshi Seldon (Asst. Lecturer, DEE) supported us in various ways, and we are ever grateful
for it.
We thank the following officials at Bhutan Power System Operator for providing us with not
only power system data but also valuable recommendations:
• Mr. Jigme (System analyst, BPSO)
• Mrs. Pingola Suberi (Employee, BPSO)
Positive change is a result of constructive feedbacks. We value the time sacrificed to help us in
developing and validating the model by the following:
• Mr. Mkhutazi Mditshwa (Research assistant, Cape Peninsula University of Technology)
• Mr. Karma Thinley (Student, CST)
• Mr. Roshan Chhetri (Lecturer, CST).
• Mr. Sonam Chophel (DGPC)
The comments from panel members had been crucial to the development of this research. We
owe the DEE our gratitude. We also appreciate the helpful comments made by our classmates.
Lastly, to all other, who we might have missed, we are grateful for all your help that contributed
towards the completion of this work.

i
ABSTRACT
The world has become completely reliant on power systems due to rising electrical energy
consumption, contemporary lifestyles, and energy usage patterns. As a result, the operators are
required to ensure high dependability and stability of the power system grid. Typically, the
system is built to manage just one outage at a time. However, multiple large blackouts have
been observed in the recent decade, each of which began with a single outage. Power system
repair and restoration is a novel problem in power system as it is concerned with the reliability.
However, it is a challenge to achieve a highly reliable power system due to various
contingencies occurring in it. These unpredictable events result in overloading of some part of
the system and sometimes it even followed by cascade tripping of transmission line, power plant
and result in a total shut down of the system. Therefore, it’s very important to have black start
plans for the system and prepare a black start operation procedure to recover the system in
minimum duration. This report presents some to strategies to restore the eastern grind of Bhutan
in the event of total black out.
Furthermore, this report presents a complete model of Bhutan Grid and discusses on possibility
of operating Bhutan grid under isolated mode using automatic generation control for frequency
and generation control.

Keywords: Restoration, blackstart, outage, islanding, dynamic response, frequency control,

Automatic Generation Control

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................... i
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... ii
List of figures................................................................................................................. iv
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. v
List of acronyms ............................................................................................................ vi
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Project Background .......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
1.2 Aim ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Objectives ........................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: POWER SYSTEM RESTORATION ................................................................. 2
2.1 Blackouts ............................................................................................................ 2
2.2 Restoration overview .......................................................................................... 5
2.3 The need for restoration ...................................................................................... 6
2.4 Power system restoration procedure ................................................................... 6
2.5 Constraints during restoration ............................................................................ 7
2.6 Restoration Strategies and guidelines ................................................................. 8
Chapter 3: RESTORATION OF THE EASTERN GRID OF BHUTAN ............................ 9
3.1 The eastern grid of Bhutan ................................................................................. 9
3.2 Outages in the eastern grid ................................................................................. 9
3.3 Modelling.......................................................................................................... 10
3.4 Outage creation ................................................................................................. 11
3.5 Restoration plans .............................................................................................. 12
3.7 Results .............................................................................................................. 13
Chapter 4: Islanded operation of Bhutan grid .................................................................... 14
4.1 The Bhutan power system ................................................................................ 14
4.2 Load sizing ....................................................................................................... 17
4.3 Primary governing system ................................................................................ 18
4.4 Automatic generation control ........................................................................... 19
Chapter 5: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................... 21
Chapter 6: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 22
Chapter 7: RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE SCOPE ............................................ 23
References ................................................................................................................................ 24
Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 26

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Players in the North American power system ............................................................. 2
Figure 2: Satellite image of 2003 US-Canadian blackout .......................................................... 3
Figure 3: Satellite image of 2003 Italy blackout ........................................................................ 4
Figure 4: Images depicting the extent of the 2012 Indian blackout ........................................... 4
Figure 5: Objectives of a power system restoration ................................................................... 5
Figure 6: Overview of restoration process ................................................................................. 6
Figure 7: Power system failures and restoration actions ............................................................ 7
Figure 8: Outages in the eastern grid of Bhutan ......................................................................... 9
Figure 9: Methodology used in the restoration process ............................................................ 10
Figure 10: Eastern grid of Bhutan modelled in DigSilent PowerFactory................................. 11
Figure 11: Frequency deviation upon disconnection with Indian grid ..................................... 11
Figure 12: Static and dynamic bus voltage profile .................................................................. 13
Figure 13: Model of Bhutan power system developed in DigSilent PowerFactory ................. 16
Figure 14: Frequency response of THP during load pickup of 30 MW ................................... 17
Figure 15: Frequency response on 2 %, 4 % and 6 % droop .................................................... 18
Figure 16: Frequency response with and without deadband .................................................... 19
Figure 17: Frequency response with and without AGC ........................................................... 20
Figure 18: Frequency response of THP on addition of 30 MW ............................................... 31
Figure 19:Frequency response of MHP on addition of 40 MW ............................................... 32
Figure 20: Frequency response of CHP on addition of 18 MW ............................................... 32
Figure 21:Frequency response of KHP on addition of 4 MW .................................................. 33
Figure 22:Frequency response of BHP (Upper) on addition of 1.5 MW ................................. 33
Figure 23:Frequency response of BHP (Lower) on addition of 2.5 MW ................................. 34
Figure 24: Frequency response of DHP on addition of 7 MW ................................................. 34
Figure 25 - 27: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan I ................................................... 35 - 37
Figure 28 - 30: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan II .................................................. 37 - 39
Figure 31 - 35: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I ............................................ 40 - 44
Figure 36 - 39: Pictorial representation of restoration plan II ........................................... 44 - 47

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Description of restoration plans ................................................................................. 12
Table 2: Check for voltage violation of buses for restoration plans ......................................... 13
Table 3: Maximum allowable pickup load of powerplants ...................................................... 17
Table 4: Sailent features of hydropower plants ........................................................................ 26
Table 5 Reactor data ................................................................................................................. 26
Table 6: Load data .................................................................................................................... 26
Table 7: Generator data ............................................................................................................ 27
Table 8: Transmission line data ................................................................................................ 28
Table 9: Transformer data ........................................................................................................ 30
Table 10: Outage data for 2017, 2018 and 2019 ...................................................................... 31

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

1. DEE: Department of Electrical Engineering

2. JNEC: Jigme Namgyel Engineering College
3. CST: College of Science and Technology
4. BPSO: Bhutan Power System Operator
5. DGPC: DrukGreen Power Corporation
6. kV: Kilo-Volt
7. MW: Mega-Watt
8. SCADA: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
9. KHP: Kurichhu Hydropower Plant
10. MHP: Mangdechhu Hydropower Plant
11. AGC: Automatic Generation Control
12. THP: Tala Hydropower Plant
13. CHP: Chukha Hydropower Plant
14. BHP: Basochhu Hydropower Plant
15. DHP: Dagachhu Hydropower Plant
16. FRC: Frequency Response Characteristics

vi
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem statement

Power security and dependability are regarded extremely crucial in today's environment.
However, no system can be guaranteed to be 100 percent reliable. System disruptions can occur
in an integrated power system owing to a variety of factors such as system faults, lightning
strikes, extreme weather conditions and so on. Such disruptions in a system might cause a
component of the system to collapse or even cause the entire system to shut down, resulting in
a system blackout, hence the capacity to recover from such catastrophic occurrences is essential.
It is thus vital to have a well-planned restoration strategy under various scenarios of partial
and/or total blackout of the system to restore the system in the shortest possible time. In the
case of a blackout, the first few minutes are crucial, and it is critical to make the proper decision
straight away to restore the system quickly. Any gap or delay in making the correct initial
selection might be quite expensive. As a result, it is critical that all operational employees and
authorities involved in grid operation have a complete understanding of the restoration method
to reduce the time it takes to restore the system after a blackout. During the restoration process,
system operators, and staffs must all work together to restore grid normalcy. Black Start is one
of the major activities involved during the restoration of the grid by bringing on bar the self-
starting generators, which are generally hydro and gas-based stations with local stand-alone
supply sources [1]. Black start in power system basically means restoring a generating unit with
its auxiliaries supplied by diesel generator set or battery and extending power supply to loads
after dead bus charging and energizing a transmission line to seek loads [2]. Hydro power plants
require relatively little initial power to start and thus are frequently categorized as black-start
sources.
As required under the course, research is supposed to be based on Problem Based Learning
(PBL). In this regard, it was noted that Bhutan does not have a restoration plan despite its
importance. Moreover, although recommended by Indian agencies, defense plan such as
islanding schemes, frequency control schemes and controlled separation schemes are yet to be
implemented. This research aims to takes a step forward in these aspects.

1.2 Aim
To develop a restoration plan for eastern grid of Bhutan and to study islanded operation of the
power system of Bhutan.

1.3 Objectives
• Study the power system of Bhutan.
• Develop an understanding of power system restoration and islanded operation of power
system.
• Propose effective restoration plans of the eastern grid of Bhutan.
• Analyze the islanded mode operation of Bhutan power system.

1
Chapter 2: POWER SYSTEM RESTORATION
Extended blackouts of the electric grid can and have been caused by equipment failures,
operator errors, natural disasters, and cyber-attacks as further exampled in this chapter. Even if
such catastrophes are uncommon, being prepared is thus essential, since prolonged power
disruptions put their human lives, national security, energy economy in jeopardy. Because most
of the generating units cannot resume without being connected to a live grid, the system operator
is reliant on a few units that can start. It is expensive to allocate and maintain these units. This
can have a significant impact on the restoration's security and timeliness. While optimizing the
restoration sequence and further studies are important, restoration plans are an absolute
necessity in a power system.[3]

2.1 Blackouts
Cascading failure is a process in which the failure of one or a few elements in a system of linked
parts can cause the failure of other sections, and so on, as seen in power transmission, computer
networking, banking, transportation systems, creatures, the human body, and ecosystems. A
single breakdown in an electric power system can result in a complete system blackout. These
are complex sequences of dependent outages that occur with a low probability yet are not
uncommon. Furthermore, as a source of significant economic loss, this is a problem that needs
to be remedied, or at the very least appropriately addressed, as flaws are unavoidable. To better
understand blackouts, some examples are provided below.

2.1.1 1996 Western North America blackouts

On July 2, 1996, a disruption occurred, resulting in the Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC) system dividing into five islands. and affecting over two million clients'
energy service. Except for some customers who were without power for up to 6 hours, most
consumers had their power restored within 30 minutes. A single phase to ground failure on a
345 kV transmission line caused by a flashover when the cable sagged near to a tree was the
first notable incident. A similar blackout happened the next day, July 3, which was similarly
caused by a tree flashover on the same line. [4]

Figure 1: Players in the North American power system

2
2.1.2 2016 Southern California disturbance:
The Blue Cut fire started in the Cajon Pass on August 16, 2016, and immediately spread to an
important transmission corridor consisting of three 500 kV and two 287 kV lines. Because of
the fire, the former experienced thirteen-line faults, while the latter experienced two faults. A
large quantity of solar generation was lost in four of these fault incidents: the most major
occurrence connected to the solar photovoltaic power loss resulted in a loss of almost 1200MW.
[12]

2.1.3 2003 U.S.‐Canadian blackout

A widespread power outage occurred throughout parts of the northeastern and midwestern
United States and the Canadian province of Ontario on August 14, 2003, affecting an estimated
10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states. The initiating events
were the out‐of‐service of a generating plant and the following tripping of several transmission
lines due to tree flashover. Key factors include inoperative state estimator due to incorrect
telemetry data and the failure of the alarm system at one of the control rooms. [5]

Figure 2: Satellite image of 2003 US-Canadian blackout

2.1.4 2015 Ukrainian blackout:

On December 23, 2015, a Ukrainian distribution company, reported service outages to
customers. The outages were due to a third party’s illegal entry into the company’s computer
and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems: seven 110 kV and twenty-three
35 kV substations were disconnected for 3 hours. According to later assertions, the cyberattack
disrupted further parts of the distribution grid, forcing operators to resort to manual mode. The
Ukrainian news media reported on the incident, conducting interviews, and concluding that a
foreign adversary remotely manipulated the SCADA distribution management system.
According to the distribution company, the disruptions were estimated to have affected over
80,000 people. However, it was eventually discovered that three distinct distribution firms had
been targeted, leading in several disruptions that affected around 225,000 people in various
places. [11]

2.1.5 2016 South African blackout:

On September 28, 2016, there was a significant power outage in the South African electricity
grid, affecting around 850,000 consumers [13]. Before the outage, the overall demand on the
power system, including losses, was 1826 MW, with roughly 883 MW supplied by wind
production, indicating a high renewable penetration [14]. A violent storm occurred, damaging
numerous distant transmission towers. Within minutes, the grid had lost roughly 52 percent of
its wind power. This shortfall had to be made up by importing electricity from a neighboring
state via a tie link. The connections could not handle the drastically increased power flow. [13-
14]
3
2.1.6 2003 Italy blackout
On September 28, 2003, there was a major power outage that lasted 12 hours in Italy and 3
hours in portions of Switzerland. It was the largest in a series of blackouts that hit the country
in 2003, affecting 56 million people [6]. The tripping of a main tie line from Switzerland to
Italy due to tree flashover was the catalyst. Then, due to tree contact, a second 380 kV line
tripped on the same boundary. The consequent power shortage in Italy led Italy to lose
synchronization with the rest of Europe, and distant relays tripped lines on the France-Italy
interface. The 220kV link between Italy and Austria suffered the same fate. As a result, the final
380 kV line between Italy and Slovenia was overloaded and tripped. The frequency of the Italian
system began to decline due to a considerable quantity of power scarcity. The frequency decay
was not properly managed, causing the generator to trip owing to underfrequency. As a result,
the whole Italian system failed in a matter of minutes, resulting in a statewide blackout [7].

Figure 3: Satellite image of 2003 Italy blackout

2.1.7 2012 Indian blackout:

On July 30 and 31, 2012, there was a major blackout in India that affected over 600 million
people. On July 30, nearly the entire north region covering eight states was affected, with a loss
of 38000 MW of load. On July 31, 48 000 MW of load was shed, affecting 21 states. These
major failures in the synchronously operating North‐East‐Northeast‐West grid were initiated by
overloading of an interregional tie line on both days [8–10]. This blackout is infamously dubbed
as the biggest outage in the history of outages around the world: Outages are usually ranked on
person-hour of the disruption. The 1020 MW Tala hydropower plant of Bhutan played a vital
role in energizing the major transmission lines during the restoration process: yet another
reminder of the glorious Indo-Bhutan friendship.

Figure 4: Images depicting the extent of the 2012 Indian blackout. Affected states shown as
red in the Map.

4
2.2 Restoration overview
Modern power systems are designed to have a high level of reliability [15], which is why power
system operation should be closely monitored so that it operates within its safe operating limits.
Despite the high level of reliability, outages in the power system still prevail. Often, an outage
is only in a portion of the power system, and it can be restored using the power from the healthy
section. However, in case of an outage affecting a large area: a blackout, there may not be
neighbor to help the system. In this case, system restoration must begin from pre-selected
generating units with the ability to start themselves [15], called a blackstart generator. The
process of restoring a power plant to operational status without the need of external energy
sources is known as black start. The most common blackstart generators are hydroelectric
generators, diesel generators and gas turbine generator. Hydroelectric generators require small
amount of starting power, and they respond quickly to power other plants which do not have
blackstart capability.

Figure 5: Objectives of a power system restoration

In a primarily hydro system such as in the Bhutanese Power sector, focus is mainly given to
response of the prime mover to sudden load pickups. Off-line dynamic programs and
simulations are done to develop restoration plans depending on the prevailing generation,
transmission, and load data. Large hydroelectric generators are usually linked to on-site diesel
generator sets or a battery bank, which are started and used to power auxiliary buses as well as
start the generator. Small diesel generators can supply enough power to start bigger generators
of several MW capacity, which in turn can start other generators in the same powerplant and
then power other generators. Dispatchers use off-line restoration plans and available black start
capabilities to return the system to normal operation circumstances after a partial or total system
blackout. The supply of auxiliary power to other power stations and offsite power to critical
service loads, such as hospitals and other public health facilities; military facilities; transmission
lines that transport the cranking power to non-black start units or large motor loads; and
transformer units, including setup transformers, are all part of the typical black start scenario
[16].

5
Black start capability is critical for power system restoration to have a quick installation of a
new black start generator. During black start restoration, voltage and frequency management
must be ensure. Both should be kept within their nominal ranges to ensure that no equipment
breakdown would seriously impede the restoration process. As voltage stress is major hinder
for a blackstart during the power system restoration. The black start unit should be able to
absorb the produced reactive power from charging current produced by incoming generators,
transformers, and transmission line. Self-excitation could be caused by a higher charging
current indicating that it will result in an uncontrolled voltage rise. Installing shunt reactors will
reduce the amount of time as well as self-excitation. A blackstart must be tested both in steady
state and transient operating condition for feasibility test to operating voltage and power
flow.[17]

2.3 The need for restoration

Restoration studies are useful for illustrating the rationale behind certain activities, such as the
cause-and-effect reasoning behind the choice and sequence of operator operations, as well as
the effects of those actions on the power system.[18]
Blackouts in the power system are uncommon. It is, nonetheless, critical to have strategies and
mechanisms in place to deal with any situation, no matter how remote. After any power outage,
it's critical to restore power as soon and as reliably as possible. A successful system restoration
strategy minimizes the impact of an outage on consumers and the local economy while also
lowering the risk of equipment damage. [19]

2.4 Power system restoration procedure

Power system restoration is a complex problem involving many generation, transmission and
distribution, and load constraints [21]. A common approach to simplify this task is to divide the
restoration process into stages such as preparation, system restoration, and load restoration [22].
In a typical restoration procedure: The system state is analyzed, initial cranking sources are
recognized, and critical loads are determined in the first step. Restoration pathways are
discovered, and subsystems are ignited in the next stage. These subsystems are then linked
together to make the system more reliable. The majority of undelivered load are restored in the
final step. [21-23]

Figure 6: Overview of restoration process [23]

6
2.5 Constraints during restoration
The management of voltage and frequency, which must both be managed within a narrow band
around nominal levels to ensure no equipment breakdown would substantially impede the
restoration process, is one of the most important considerations in a restoration process. A
restoration plan analysis must be carried out to ensure that it is feasible in both steady-state and
transient operation situations. Restoration steady-state assessments include [20] load-
generation balance, voltage control, steady state overvoltage analysis and reactive power
absorption capability of blackstart units during charging of transmission lines. Other
assessments such large induction motor starting, and their sequencing must be considered as
well.
During black start, while energizing the lines charges currents could be very large causing black
start unit to absorb large reactive power leading to self-excitation of the black start generator.
Self-excitation will in turn lead to uncontrolled rise in voltage or equipment failure. Therefore,
reactive power capability of black start unit should be properly studied whin it is being operated
at leading power factor. Reactive power capacity of the blackstart unit when operated at a
leading power factor. The installation of shunt reactors, synchronization of generating units as
a block and minimizing the time between paralleling units online will help to reduce the
probability of exposing a generating unit to the condition of self‐excitation. It is also important
to validate a restoration plan by simulation both for steady state and dynamic operating
conditions.

Figure 7: Power system failures and restoration actions

7
2.6 Restoration Strategies and guidelines
According to the restoration stages, restoration strategies can be categorized into six types [22],
that is, build‐upward, build‐downward, build‐inward, build‐outward, build‐together, and serve‐
critical. [23]
• Build upward: Many grids characterize as an island with black start capabilities that
must be resynchronized as the restoration operation progresses. The key tasks involves
black start unit starting, island restoration, and island synchronization.
• Build downward: Some smaller or more closely knit utilities with a lower voltage
network to pool their black start power and provide it to nonblack start units, network
energization, and nonblack start unit startup.
• Build inward: Involves starting of central generation station first.
• Build outward: a ring transmission line is reenergized, and the restoration proceeds from
this ring outward.
• Build together: loads nearer to the generating units is picked up first.
Another way of classification of restoration strategies is as top-down and bottom-up.
• Top down: The high voltage system is energized by using the black start units. In this
method, a high voltage grid is established, and then using the sub-transmission network
selected plant is reached. However, energizing lines in the bulk transmission system first
is more difficult and will usually require larger generating units to be on-line but if
successful, it will generally lead to a faster restoration of critical systems and loads
• Bottom up: The sub transmission is energized by using the black start units and it
energize part to supply cranking power to larger units. Here, several simultaneous,
independent islands are formed which are eventually been synchronized and the extra
high-voltage grids are established when the lager plants are on-line. Although this
method can make used of smaller black start units to restore large grids however, this
method consumed longer duration to restore the system compared to top-down
restoration method.
Standards related to power system restoration are as follows [24]:
• EOP‐005‐1: System Restoration Plans
• EOP‐005‐2: System Restoration from Black start Resources
• EOP‐006‐1: Reliability Coordination – System Restoration
• EOP‐006‐2: System Restoration Coordination
• EOP‐007‐0: Establish, Maintain, and Document a Regional Black start Capability Plan
The key information carried in these standards is outlined as follows:
a) The plans, procedures, and resources should be available to restore the power system on
the occurrences of actual outage events.
b) The transmission operator’s system should have adequate black start resources and
reliable paths that reach the nonblack start units. Personnel should regularly drill the
procedures to start up the black start resources.
c) The control actions taken by various restoration participants must be coordinated to
ensure reliability in each phase of restoration.
d) The regional black start capacity plan plays a central role in enabling sufficient black
start capacity to function as expected, and therefore should be maintained and tested on
a periodical basis.

8
Chapter 3: RESTORATION OF THE EASTERN GRID OF
BHUTAN
In this chapter, the eastern grid of Bhutan is discussed. Two restoration plans developed are
covered including approach and results obtained.

3.1 The eastern grid of Bhutan

The transmission network of Bhutan consists of two grids: eastern grid, and western grid. They
were operating separately until the commissioning Jigmeling substation. Energy security has
been greatly enhanced due to the interconnection of east and west grid. Eastern grid of Bhutan
consists of two hydropower plants namely Kurichhu Hydropower Plant (KHP) and
Mangdechhu Hydropower Plant (MHP) of which KHP is owned by Druk Green Power
Cooperation (DGPC) and MHP being commissioned 2019, is under provisional period for
DGPC to takeover. Both the power plants have four number of generators of capacity 180 MW
and 15 MW for MHP and KHP respectively. Therefore, total designed capacity is 720 MW and
60 MW respectively, with 10 % overloading capability which is true during the monsoon
season. The power plant serves eastern dzongkhags of Bhutan, and the excessive power is being
sold to India via Jigmeling and Motanga. The system has 132 kV and 400 kV transmission lines
connecting Killikhar, Kanglung, Nangkor, Nganglam, Tingtibi, Gelephu, Dewathang, Motanga,
Yurmo and Jigmeling. Majority of the power generated from power plants is exported to India
after meeting the load demands of Bhutan via 400 kV twin moose line through Jigmeling and
132 kV panther line through Gelephu and Motanga.

3.2 Outages in the eastern grid

A study on power outages in eastern grid of Bhutan was carried out from the year 2017 to
2019. It was found out that most of the power outages were due to Earth faults and bad weather
conditions. However, in the year of 2017, minimal number of system outages in eastern grid of
Bhutan was recorded.

Figure 8: Outages in the eastern grid of Bhutan

9
3.3 Modelling
High quality modelling of hydro power plants for restoration studies with the continuous
deregulation process, it is becoming increasingly vital to verify existing strategies for network
restoration following blackouts in European electrical energy systems. High-quality computer
models of the electrical system are required for this verification, as well as the ability to generate
exact findings for all potential restoration scenarios. The power plants, which must be built with
extreme precision, are the most significant components of these models [25].

Figure 9: Methodology used in the restoration process

The model of the power system was developed as shown in figure. A rudimentary validation
process was used, i.e., checking the power flow to India in normal operation. The simulated
value resembled closely with the data obtained from Bhutan Power System Operator. Moreover,
the model was verified by various power system analysts.

10
 Figure 10: Eastern grid of Bhutan modelled in DigSilent PowerFactory

3.4 Outage creation

Bhutan Transmission network is strongly connected with Indian grid via six 400kV lines, three
220kV lines and two 132kV lines. In the event of Indian grid failure, it is likely that Bhutan gird
will blackout. To create an outage, the India grid was disconnected. This also checks for isolated
grid operation of Bhutan grid. Upon isolating the Bhutan grid, the grid frequency was seen to
over-shoot and the system collapsed.
Discussion: This shows that connection to Indian grid is essential for grid sustainability.

Figure 11: Frequency deviation upon disconnection with Indian grid

11
3.5 Restoration plans
Two restoration plans were developed and are discussed. The first plan connects MHP to the
Indian grid and gradually restores the system. The second plan connects both the power plants
and then proceeds with the restoration. In the restoration process, voltage profile of all the buses
and the grid frequency was monitored to not violate its limits.

Table 1: Description of restoration plans

Plan 1
t1 Start one unit of MHP and
establish connection to Alipurduar
via Jigmeling. Energize the 220 kV
Jigmeling bus as well.
t2 Connect western grid.
t3 Pickup Gelephu load.
t4 Pickup loads of Yurmo and
Tingtibi. Also establish a radial
loop by connecting Yurmo to
MHP.
t5 Pickup Nganglam load.
t6 Pickup loads of Nangkor, Kilikhar,
Corlung and Kanglung loads.
t7 Establish connection to Rangia and
pickup rest of the domestic load.
t8 Establish connection to Salakati.
Start all other generators and
gradually raise generation.
Plan 2
Establish connection of MHP to Alipurduar via
Jigmeling and KHP to Rangia via Nangkor. Start
one unit of both KHP and MHP and gradually
raise generation to maximum.
Connect to western grid. Start one more unit of
both KHP and MHP.
Raise KHP generation to pickup loads of
Nangkor, Kilikhar, Corlung, Kanglung and
Phuentshothang.
Start one more unit of both KHP and MHP and
gradually raise generation to half of rated power.
Establish connection of both MHP and KHP at
Jigmeling. Establish connection to Salakati.
Pickup Nganglam load.
Pickup rest of the load gradually by raising
generation of MHP.
Start the two generators remaining and gradually
raise generation to maximum capabilities.
-
-

12
3.7 Results
A static graph would not suffice the scope of a restorative process as the voltage profiles of all
buses needs to be checked for violation of it 5 % limits at each step of the restoration process.
If a plot of voltage of all the buses are taken, then the simulation must be done individually and
not cumulatively. To address this, dynamic voltage responses of each bus were taken.

Figure 12: Static and dynamic bus voltage profile (Left – Static :Voltage of all the buses at
an instance & Right – Dynamic : Voltage response of one bus for all instance)
Dynamic bus voltages of all the 20 buses were plotted and are compiled under Appendix x.
With the main aim being to not violate voltage limits at any point, the responses of the
restoration plans are as schemed in table 2 ( refers to voltage within limits).

Table 2: Check for voltage violation of buses for restoration plans

Bus location Bus voltage Plan 1 Plan 2

(kV) t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Kurichhu 11 – – – – – – –       
132 – – – – – – –       
Mangdechhu 13.8              
132              
400              
Jigmeling 132              
220         –     
400              
Gelephu 66 – –       – – – –  
132 – – – – – –   – – –   
Yurmo 132 – – –      – – – –  
Tingtibi 132 – – –      – – – –  
Nganglam 132 – – – –      – –   
Nangkor 132 – – – – –         
Dewathang 132 – – – – – –        
Motanga 132 – – – – – –        
Phuentshothang 132 – – – – – –   –     
Kanglung 132 – – – – –    –     
Corlung 132 – – – – –    –     
Kilikhar 132 – – – – –    –     
13
Chapter 4: ISLANDED OPERATION OF BHUTAN GRID
As concluded in 4.2, eastern grid does not sustain upon disconnection with the Indian grid. This
was also practically observed during the initial testing phase of MHP. As for the whole power
system, Bhutan too experienced blackout during 2012 blackout of India [26] as mentioned in
2.1.7. Thus, islanded operation of Bhutan grid seems of relevance.
To maintain stability in an islanded system, it is very crucial to maintain the balance between
load and generation. The system frequency must be maintained within permissible limit through
governor control system and the automatic generation control (AGC) system. In an AGC, tie-
line power and system frequency are typically used as the inputs to calculate and change the
setpoint. However, tie-line power input is ignored under the islanded mode. While primary
control loop has a simple proportional feedback control system, the AGC has proportional-
integral feedback control system.
The rate of change in frequency during a loss of generator event is severe in an isolated power
grid, and the inertia of the rotating masses of the isolated system is relatively low compared to
the interconnected system, making frequency stability more fragile.[27]. Furthermore, in an
isolated system, the magnitude of the generation that could be lost compared to the total
rotational generation is significant.
In this chapter, Frequency responses of both primary governor control and secondary automatic
generator control are discussed.

4.1 The Bhutan power system

Bhutan generates around 2300 MW of power using 6 run-of-the-river type hydro power plants
with huge seasonal variations in generation. It consists of Basochhu hydropower plant, Chukha
hydropower plant, Tala hydropower plant, Dagachhu hydropower plant, Kurichhu hydropower
plant and Mangdechhu hydropower plant with installed capacity of 24 + 40 MW, 336 MW,
1020 MW, 124 MW, 60 MW and 1020 MW respectively. The national peak load of the country
is less than 400 MW, and rest of the power is exported to India via 9 transmission lines at
multiple voltage levels: four 400 kV lines, three 220 kV lines and two 132 kV lines. Being
connected by ac lines, Bhutan grid is directly affected by fluctuations or disturbance in India.
Although one of the most important recommendations after the 2012 blackout of India
blackouts was to develop a defense plan for each region in India and other regions including
Bhutan and Nepal power grids with an appropriate islanding schemes and frequency control
arrangement [26], such schemes were never developed. In Bhutan, this work is under progress:
SCADA, which is must to install Secondary Automatic Generation control, is being
implemented in various powerplants.
In Bhutan power grid, there is currently no AGC system to carry out the secondary frequency
control. With the islanding operation mode, it will be vital to implement the AGC to restore the
frequency of the islanded Bhutan power grid.
To develop the frequency control schemes for the islanding operation of Bhutan power grid, the
grid previously developed through the course of this research was extended to develop a model
as shown in figure 15.

14
Figure 13: Model of Bhutan power system developed in DigSilent PowerFactory

16
4.2 Load sizing
Load frequency control dictates that frequency drops with addition of load or removal of
generation as vice-versa. The load size and the nadir frequency are inversely related thus
quantifying the load that can be picked up by a powerplant is of importance to both islanding
and restoration of power system. While restoration concerns with load pickup, islanding
resonates more towards sudden loss of generation. However, load pickup and generation loss
of same magnitude results in the exact frequency response. Frequency response such as that of
figure 16 was plotted for all the powerplants to determine the maximum allowable load pickup.

Figure 14: Frequency response of THP during load pickup of 30 MW

Table 3: Maximum allowable pickup load of powerplants

Name Maximum allowable load size in MW

THP 30
MHP 40
KHP 4
CHP 18
BHP (Upper) 1.5
BHP (Lower) 2.5
DHP 7

17
4.3 Primary governing system
Governor is one of the most important parts of the frequency control system. By appropriately
configuring three primary parameters in the governor: reset time, temporary droop, and
permanent droop, the governor may considerably improve the stability of the power system
[27]. The other important setting of governor is deadband setting.
The HYGOV model was applied with actual parameters from the hydro power plants. This
model is a conventional mechanical-hydraulic nonlinear governor with a rudimentary hydraulic
approximation of a typical hydro power plant's unconstrained head race and tail race.[27].
Dynamic data of power plants were taken from documents such as [28-29] and a few internal
documents of the powerplants.

4.3.1 Droop Setting

The governor (permanent) droop curve signifies the relationship between the generator MW
output and the system frequency. Droop settings are necessary to enable many generators to
operate in parallel in the AC power grid [31]. Generally, droop setting for hydro power plants
ranges from 2% to 6%. In case of Bhutan power grid, it is set at 4%. The simulations were done
for 2%, 4% and 6% droop settings to check the sensitivity of system response. An event was
created by tripping two 15 MW generator of Kurichhu power plant.
Figure 15 shows the frequency response under different droop settings.

Figure 15: Frequency response on 2 %, 4 % and 6 % droop

18
4.3.2 Deadband Setting
Deadband is inserted deliberately in the governor droop characteristic so that turbine or primary
frequency control will not activate until it reaches a preset value. Figure 16 shows the
comparative plot of frequency response associated with and without the deadband.

Figure 16: Frequency response with and without deadband

Currently, some of power plants in Bhutan set their deadband at ±20 mHz [32] whereas some
other plants set their deadband at ±30 mHz. Thus, simulations were done for the isolated Bhutan
power grid by setting a common ±30 mHz deadband.

4.4 Automatic generation control

Automatic generation control is a secondary frequency control that is fundamentally used to
restore the system frequency by monitoring frequency error and tie-line.
The main function of AGC is to solely restore the frequency to specified nominal value [32].
AGC comes to operation after the primary governor control action by adjusting the MW load
reference setting of those generating units under AGC.
About the setting of AGC system, it is important to determine the frequency response
characteristic (FRC) of the isolated Bhutan power grid. This FRC, also known as frequency
bias, represents the relationship between the MW change over the frequency change. It is the
ability of the system to react when there is frequency disturbance (mismatch in load and
generation). Typically, system frequency response is characterized into three arrangements,
which are inertial response, primary response, and secondary response [33]. Inertial response
reacts at instant of disturbance and is the time when the frequency depends on the stored kinetic
energy in the rotating masses i.e., generators and turbine. This is one of the important factors
contributing for stability of grid as lower system inertia increases the requirements for primary
governor control to arrest frequency following the sudden loss of a conventional generator [34].
19
As illustrated in figure 17, the inertial frequency response reacts immediately after the
disturbance and thus the starting indicates the inertial response. The next response is the primary
response or governor response starts right after the inertial response when the frequency falls
outside the deadband setting until fully deployed. The frequency nadir which is minimum
frequency, and it depends on both inertia as well as governor control. When one of the 15 MW
unit was tripped for the case without AGC, the system responses with frequency settling at
around 49.96 Hz. The FRC can then be calculated by dividing the MW change by the frequency
15
change, which is 50−49.96 = 37.5 𝑀𝑊/0.1 𝐻𝑧

Figure 17: Frequency response with and without AGC

Input to AGC will be 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟, 𝐴𝐶𝐸 = 10 × 𝐹𝑅𝐶 × (𝑓 − 𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ) where, 𝑓 and
𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 are the actual frequency and scheduled frequency in Hz, respectively.
To bring back frequency to the nominal value of 50 Hz, the calculated ACE signal will be sent
to generators equipped with AGC to adjust their power output setpoints to diminish the ACE to
zero.

20
Chapter 5: DISCUSSION
Although power system blackouts are a rare occurrence, it does occur. A large area blackout is
usually caused due to cascading failure. Most cascading failures are caused due to tripping of
major high voltage transmission lines which is most likely caused by single line-ground faults
on it. Other causes of a system wide outage could be physical harm or cyber-attack on the power
system for reasons mostly relating to socio-politics. These outages cause adverse economic and
social effects. Most outages in the eastern grid as due to line to earth fault: an outage is a
possibility however small it may be. The restoration of a system under blackout is rather a
daunting task. If not planned, a restoration process could lead back to a cascading failure, further
lengthening the restoration time. In actual restoration of power plants in the eastern grid, MHP
is usually started by field flashing and thus is blackstart capable. KHP, on the other hand, is said
to requires around 10 MW of power from other powerplants, thus is a non-blackstart unit.
During the initial stages of this research, the authors had treated KHP as a blackstart unit due
to lack of information on it. However, upon several attempts of parallel restoration starting from
both the power plants, the interconnection failed due to power swings. To choose between
restoration strategies, an outage had to be first created. Keeping in mind that most outages have
happened in the past due to tripping of major transmission lines, Jigmeling to Alipurduar line
was tripped. This sudden loss of load resulted in a frequency overshoot. In absence of a defense
plan or controlled separation scheme, such an event would inevitably trip most/all the
generating units due to rotor pole slip. This was further verified by an official at MHP: to test
for the islanding capability of MHP disconnection with India was coordinated. All the
generating units of MHP and KHP were found to trip due to over-speeding of machine. It was
concluded in the internal documents of MHP as well that islanded mode operation of the MHP
is not possible. This means that a top-down strategy is less likely to fail as compared to a bottom-
up strategy, in the case of the grid under consideration.
Restoration plans were developed by hit and trial method, i.e.., if the dynamic responses of
voltage and frequency are not within limits, that step is re-evaluated. In this way, two bottom-
up restoration plans were finalized. A top-down plan was also tried on but is not a part of the
report as a sustained system was not achieved.
To restore the eastern grid of Bhutan from total blackout, plan II seems more effective. This is
evident in table 2 as a greater number of ‘’ relates to a faster restoration. This is because in
plan II both the powerplants are used right from the first instance whereas in plan I only MHP
is used. Moreso, dynamic responses of plan II were noticed better than that of plan I.
The study now focuses on islanding of not just the eastern grid but of the whole Bhutan grid.
Droop setting and Deadband setting are the two main parameters of a governor affecting
frequency response and thus system stability. It is evident that both nadir frequency as well as
final settling frequency improves with the reduction in droop setting. Moreover, figure 16
clearly indicates that the governor response and frequency nadir improve when there is no
deadband setting. This is however not preferable because the governor control will activate all
the times even under small changes in load, which may cause more stability issues.
It is worth noting that the frequency responses in figures 15 and 16 did not return to nominal
because the governor control only arrests and stabilize the frequency, but its function is not
designed for restoring the frequency back to nominal. It can be clearly observed that AGC action
brings back the system frequency to 50 Hz in both scenarios. The more AGC units, the quicker
frequency is restored. However, too many AGC units’ interactions may potentially cause the
low frequency oscillation.
21
Chapter 6: CONCLUSION
Due to increased electrical energy use, modern lifestyles, and energy usage patterns, the
dependence on electric power have been increasing exponentially. This demands the power
system operators to ensure that the power system grid is very reliable and stable. The entire or
partial failure of the system can occur at any moment owing to a variety of events related with
the electrical system, affecting the system's dependability at any time. Unpredictable
phenomena like as lightning, earthquakes, floods, landslides, and other natural disasters might
cause a system outage at any time of the year. As a result, a comprehensive black start study is
necessary for system restoration to return the system back to normal functioning. The black
start procedure is difficult since the operator must return the system to normal in a short period
of time. The studies that should be included in the system black start planning process are
discussed here. Two restoration strategies have been proposed for the case of total blackout in
Bhutan's eastern grid. Of two proposed plans, plan two seem to have shorter restoration time as
compared to plan one as it facilitates the simultaneous restoration from both MHP and KHP.
Furthermore, a complete model development of Bhutan Power System grid has been presented
and discussed. A comparative study on droop characteristics and frequency control during
islanded operation of Bhutan grid have also been discussed here. It also presents the possibility
of operating Bhutan grid in isolated mode with the use of secondary controller that is Automatic
Generation Control scheme.

22
Chapter 7: RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE SCOPE
Based on the work carried out in this project, following recommendations are made:
Use different strategies for different outages: Power system restoration is dependent upon
power availability. Therefore, depending on the power availability and the type of outages in
the power system grid, different kind of restoration strategies should be used. Therefore,
implementation of Wide Area Measurements typical of a smart system must be explored.
Furthermore, a restorative approach that is able to devise plans in accordance with the extend
of the outage, such as an intelligent system that generates a restoration plan taking in inputs
from the Wide Area Measurement System, should be looked into.
Preparedness: All the findings in the project is exclusively simulation based. Restoration plans
must be put into test to enable preparedness of operators. Absence of a restoration plan in
Bhutan could render havoc during blackouts, thus must be necessitated in the Bhutan power
system.
Secondary Frequency response scheme: In absence of AGC in Bhutan, India in essence acts
as the AGC for Bhutan. This deprives Bhutan of island mode operation. As recommended in
reports after the 2012 India blackout, Bhutan should explore into frequency control schemes
and controlled separation schemes. The AGC discussed could be used in the development of
such schemes, for disconnecting Bhutan grid from Indian grid under the extreme emergency to
avoid further system outages in Bhutan due to disturbances from Indian power grid. Moreover,
since SCADA is essential for AGC, its implementation must be sped up.
Communication Scheme: Developing a more dependable communication scheme for power
system operators, which could make disaster recovery activities more efficient.
Further studies: Similar work can be done using other platforms for power system studies.
Furthermore, more sophisticated approaches such as Artificial Intelligence.

23
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25
APPENDICES
Table 4: Sailent features of hydropower plants

Capacity (MW) MVA rating No. of units Turbines

MHP 720 200 4 Pelton
THP 1020 200 6 Pelton
CHPC 336 93.33 4 Pelton
KHP 60 20 4 Kaplan
BHP (U) 24 15 2 Pelton
BHP (L) 40 26.5 2 Pelton
DHP 126 70 63 Pelton

Table 5 Reactor data

Bus No. G-Shunt (MW) B-Shunt (Mvar)
Kurichhu 132.00 2 0 5
Tala 400.00 1 0 63
MHP 400.00 1 0 80
Jigmeling 400.00 2 0 80

Table 6: Load data

Substation Aug-2020 Peak Dec-2020 Peak
Corlung 1.98 2.20
Deothang 2.74 2.85
Gelephu 8.60 8.40
Jigmeling 0.79 1.00
Kanglung 5.24 5.83
Kilikhar 4.66 5.97
Motanga 16.88 25.00
Nganglam 18.67 22.19
Nangkor 2.21 2.68
Tintibi 2.41 1.08
Yurmo 7.00 6.50
Dagapela 2.11 3.04
Samtse 5.29 11.16
Dechecholing 9.02 17.96
Gedu 2.22 3.96
Gomtu 8.16 11.83
Haa 2.22 3.03
Jemina 2.28 4.92
Lobeysa 8.12 11.13
Malbase 73.00 71.40
Olakha 13.00 34.90
Pangbesa 0.70 1.13
Pling 7.24 5.93
Paro 7.95 14.87
Semtokha 7.16 25.59
Singhegaon 99.00 99.00
Tsirang 2.96 3.65
Watsa 0.81 0.88

26
Table 7: Generator data
Generating Station Name THP CHP KHP BHP (U) BHP (L) DHP MHP
MVA Rating 200 93.33 20 15 26.5 70 200
MW Rating 170 84 15 12 20 62 180
Rated Voltage in kV 13.8 11 11 11 11 11 13.8
Number of Units 6 4 4 2 2 2 4
Minimum Reactive Power in Mvar -17 -8.5 -1.5 -1.2 -2 127
Maximum Reactive Power in Mvar 100 45 8 6 10 140
Armature Resistance 0.002 0.001979 0.0069 0.00404 0.0037 0.00147
Negative Sequence Reactance 0.13 0.1868 0.147 0.17 0.153 0.15
Zero Sequence Reactance 0.1 0.104 0.037 0.09 0.081 10.77/9.16 0.105
Direct Axis Reactance (Xd) 1.02 0.8656 0.93 1.04 1.05 109.81/98.94 1.01
Direct Axis Sub- Transient Reactance (Xd") 0.14 0.165 0.125 0.155 0.161 23.51/19.98 0.13
Direct Axis Transient Reactance (Xd') 0.24 0.215 0.19 0.275 0.22 29.16/26.93 0.24
Quadrature Axis Reactance (Xq) 0.65 0.6 0.56 0.694 0.75 0.65
Quadrature Axis Transient Reactance (Xq') 0.65 0.23 0.56 0.694 0.694 0.65
Quadrature Axis Sub- Transient Reactance ( Xq") 0.145 0.2083 0.204 0.204 0.2 0.16
Direct Axis Transient Open Circuit Time Constant (T'do) 11.8 8.12 4.73 3.9 6.86 9.32/8.46 12.4
Direct Axis Sub - Transient Open Circuit Time Constant (T"do) 0.07 0.0235 0.055 0.03 0.0199 0.084/0.082 0.078
Quadrature Axis Transient Open Circuit Time Constant (T'qo) 0.5 9 5 0.5 0.5 2.40/2.28
Quadrature Axis Sub - Transient Open Circuit Time Constant (T"qo) 0.1 0.1 0.036 0.036 0.33
Inertia Constant (H) ( Gen. + Exciter +Turbine/engine ) in MJ/MVA 3.8 4.09 4.62 1.1796 1.378 4
Neutral Grounding Resistance in Ohms 0.197
AVR Control Block with details for transient stability studies Type-1 Type-1 Type-1 Type-1 Type-1 Type-ST5B
Governor Control Block with details for transient stability studies. Hydro Hydro Hydro Hydro Hydro Hydro-Digital

27
Table 8: Transmission line data
Line Voltage (kV) Length (km) Line R (pu) Line X (pu) Charging B (pu) R-Zero (pu) X-Zero (pu) B-Zero (pu)
Chukha – Semtokha 220 54 0.007776 0.044388 0.07614 0.0228474 0.148878 0.0477522
Chukha – Malbase 220 29.84 0.00429696 0.02452848 0.0420744 0.0126253 0.08226888 0.026387512
Chukha – Birpara *2 220 70.21 0.01011024 0.05771262 0.0989961 0.02970585 0.19356897 0.062086703
Semtokha – BHP 220 44.9 0.0064656 0.0369078 0.063309 0.01899719 0.1237893 0.03970507
BHP – Tsirang 220 46.6 0.0067104 0.0383052 0.065706 0.01971646 0.1284762 0.04120838
Tsirang – Dagachhu 220 20.2 0.0029088 0.0166044 0.028482 0.00854662 0.0556914 0.01786286
Tsirang – Jigmeling 220 33.8 0.0048672 0.0277836 0.047658 0.01430078 0.0931866 0.02988934
Malbase – Singhigoan 220 1.21 0.00017424 0.00099462 0.0017061 0.00051195 0.00333597 0.001070003
Malbase – Samtse 220 40.15 0.0057816 0.0330033 0.0566115 0.01698747 0.11069355 0.035504645
Malbase – Birpara 220 40.77 0.00587088 0.03351294 0.0574857 0.01724979 0.11240289 0.036052911
Singhigoan – Samtse 220 41.15 0.0059256 0.0338253 0.0580215 0.01741057 0.11345055 0.036388945
Dagapela – Dagachhu 220 9.7 0.0013968 0.0079734 0.013677 0.00410407 0.0267429 0.00857771
Dagapela – Jigmeling 220 57.7 0.0083088 0.0474294 0.081357 0.02441287 0.1590789 0.05102411
Kurichhu – Kilikhar 132 10.06 0.00936586 0.00826932 0.0141846 0.00425639 0.02773542 0.008896058
Kurichhu – Nangkor 132 31 0.028861 0.025482 0.04371 0.0131161 0.085467 0.0274133
Nangkor – Dewathang 132 23.31 0.02170161 0.01916082 0.0328671 0.00986246 0.06426567 0.020613033
Nangkor – Nganglam 132 34.07 0.03171917 0.02800554 0.0480387 0.01441502 0.09393099 0.030128101
Dewathang – Motanga 132 10.5 0.0097755 0.008631 0.014805 0.00444255 0.0289485 0.00928515
Motanga – Rangia 132 46.4 0.0431984 0.0381408 0.065424 0.01963184 0.1279248 0.04103152
Nganglam – Tingtibi 132 83.33 0.07758023 0.06849726 0.1174953 0.03525692 0.22974081 0.073688719
Tingtibi – Yurmo 132 32.63 0.03037853 0.02682186 0.0460083 0.01380575 0.08996091 0.028854709
Tingtibi – Jigmeling 132 45.74 0.04258394 0.03759828 0.0644934 0.01935259 0.12610518 0.040447882
Yurmo – MHP *2 132 1.84 0.00171304 0.00151248 0.0025944 0.0007785 0.00507288 0.001627112
Jigmeling – Gelephu 132 15.4 0.0143374 0.0126588 0.021714 0.00651574 0.0424578 0.01361822
Gelephu – Salakati 132 50 0.04655 0.0411 0.0705 0.021155 0.13785 0.044215
Corlung – Kilikhar 132 45.209 0.042089579 0.037161798 0.06374469 0.01912793 0.124641213 0.039978319
Corlung – Kanglung 132 23.702 0.022066562 0.019483044 0.03341982 0.01002832 0.065346414 0.020959679
Nikachhu – MHP *2 132 10 0.00931 0.00822 0.0141 0.004231 0.02757 0.008843
Kanglung – Phuentshothang 132 58 0.053998 0.047676 0.08178 0.0245398 0.159906 0.0512894
28
Phuentshothang – Motanga 132 22 0.020482 0.018084 0.03102 0.0093082 0.060654 0.0194546
Phuentshothang – Motanga 132 22 0.020482 0.018084 0.03102 0.0093082 0.060654 0.0194546
Motanga – Nganglam 132 34.7 0.0323057 0.0285234 0.048927 0.01468157 0.0956679 0.03068521
Tala – Malbase 400 24.01 0.000432 0.01973622 0.0338541 0.01015863 0.06619557 0.021232043
Tala – Siliguri *2 400 146 0.002628 0.120012 0.20586 0.0617726 0.402522 0.1291078
Tala – Siliguri 400 149.5 0.002691 0.122889 0.210795 0.06325345 0.4121715 0.13220285
Malbase – Siliguri 400 125 0.00225 0.10275 0.17625 0.0528875 0.344625 0.1105375
MHP – Jigmeling *4 400 84.345 0.001518 0.06933159 0.11892645 0.03568637 0.232539165 0.074586284
Jigmeling – Alipurduar *2 400 4.76 0.000044 0.00391272 0.0067116 0.00201396 0.01312332 0.004209268
Chukha – Watsa 66 21.88 0.081481 0.01798536 0.0308508 0.00925743 0.06032316 0.019348484
Chukha – Gedu 66 20.4 0.07597 0.0167688 0.028764 0.00863124 0.0562428 0.01803972
Watsa – Chumdo 66 15.1 0.056232 0.0124122 0.021291 0.00638881 0.0416307 0.01335293
Chumdo – Paro 66 24.01 0.089413 0.01973622 0.0338541 0.01015863 0.06619557 0.021232043
Chumdo – Jemina 66 11.78 0.043869 0.00968316 0.0166098 0.00498412 0.03247746 0.010417054
Jemina – Olakha 66 17.66 0.065766 0.01451652 0.0249006 0.00747195 0.04868862 0.015616738
Olakha – Semtokha 66 1.7 0.006331 0.0013974 0.002397 0.00071927 0.0046869 0.00150331
Semtokha – Dechencholing 66 11.5 0.04264 0.009453 0.016215 0.00486565 0.0317055 0.01016945
Semtokha – Lobesa 66 24.33 0.090605 0.01999926 0.0343053 0.01029402 0.06707781 0.021515019
Lobesa – Kewathang 66 21.8 0.081183 0.0179196 0.030738 0.00922358 0.0601026 0.01927774
Kewathang – BHP (L) 66 1.5 0.005586 0.001233 0.002115 0.00063465 0.0041355 0.00132645
BHP (L) – BHP (U) 66 3.08 0.01147 0.00253176 0.0043428 0.00130315 0.00849156 0.002723644
Gedu – Phuentsholing 66 16.7 0.062191 0.0137274 0.023547 0.00706577 0.0460419 0.01476781
Phuentsholing – Malbase 66 8.98 0.033442 0.00738156 0.0126618 0.00379944 0.02475786 0.007941014
Phuentsholing – Gomtu 66 26.9 0.100176 0.0221118 0.037929 0.01138139 0.0741633 0.02378767
Gomtu – Samtse 66 14.8 0.0551152 0.0121656 0.020868 0.00626188 0.0408036 0.01308764
Jemina – Changedaphu 66 9.7 0.010443699 0.0079734 0.013677 0.00410407 0.0267429 0.00857771
Jemina – Changedaphu 66 9.7 0.010443699 0.0079734 0.013677 0.00410407 0.0267429 0.00857771
Pangbisa – Chumdo 66 13.07 0.014072077 0.01074354 0.0184287 0.00552992 0.03603399 0.011557801
Pangbisa - 66 23.78 0.025603213 0.01954716 0.0335298 0.01006132 0.06556146 0.021028654

29
Table 9: Transformer data

From Bus To Bus No. MVAR Specified R (pu or watts) Specified X (pu) Rate A Rate B R01 (pu) X01 (pu)
Chukha 11 Chukha 220 4 105 0.0031 0.1142 105 105 0.0031 0.1142
BHP (U) 11 BHP (U) 66 2 15 0.0481 0.8653 15 15 0.0481 0.8653
BHP (L) 11 BHP 220 2 30 0.0173 0.433 30 30 0.0173 0.433
Dagachhu 11 Dagachhu 220 2 72 0.005 0.12 72 72 0.005 0.12
Kurichhu 11 Kurichhu 132 4 20 0.0281 0.6184 20 20 0.0281 0.6184
Tala 13 Tala 400 6 210 0.0015 0.0686 210 210 0.0015 0.0686
MHP 13.8 MHP 400 4 225 0.0013 0.0667 0 0 0.0013 0.0667
Chukha 220.00 Chukha 66 2 20 0.0267 0.5864 10 20 0.0267 0.5864
Semtokha 220 Semtokha 66 2 50/63 0.0061 0.1961 50 63 0.0061 0.1961
Tsirang 220 Tsirang 66 2 10 0.053 0.8473 10 10 0.053 0.8473
Jigmeling 220 Jigmeling 132 2 63/80 0.0049 0.1565 63 80 0.0049 0.1565
Jigmeling 220 Jigmeling 400 3 167 0.0017 0.0748 167 167 0.0017 0.0748
Malbase 220 Malbase 400 1 200 0.00276154 0.124269 200 200 0.0083 0.2499
Malbase 220 Malbase 66 3 50/63 0.0066 0.1983 0 0 0.0066 0.1983
Singhigoan 220 Singhigoan 66 2 50 0.01 0.2996 50 50 0.01 0.2996
Samtse 220 Samtse 66 2 50/63 0.0061 0.1951 50 50 0.0061 0.1951
Kilikhar 132 Kilikhar 33 2 5 0.008097 0.097163 5 5 0.008097 0.09716
Kanglung 132 Kanglung 33 2 5 0.008097 0.097163 5 5 0.008097 0.09716
Nangkor 132 Nangkor 33 2 5 0.008097 0.097163 5 5 0.008097 0.09716
Dewathang 132 Dewathang 33 2 5 0.008097 0.097163 5 5 0.008097 0.09716
Nganglam 132 Nganglam 33 2 3 0.009751 0.097514 0 0 0.009751 0.09751
Tintibi 132 Tintibi 33 2 3 0.009751 0.097514 3 3 0.009751 0.09751
Yurmo 132 Yurmo 33 2 20 0.009751 0.097514 0 0 0.009751 0.09751
MHP 132 MHP 400 3 67 0.0058 0.1865 67 67 0.0058 0.1865
Gelephu 132 Gelephu 66 2 25 0.0171 0.3928 25 25 0.0171 0.3928

30
Table 10: Outage data for 2017, 2018 and 2019

Faults 2019 2018 2017 Total

Earth Fault 10 3 2 15
Insulation Puncture 3 2 0 5
Line Fault 1 1 1 3
Transient Fault 2 2 0 4
Over Current 7 9 0 16
Bad Weather
9 6 4 19
Condition
Direct trip from India 4 0 0 4
Over Voltage 1 0 2 3
3 Phase fault 2 0 0 2
Due to Fullt in CB 0 1 0 1
Disc Blast 0 2 1 3
Over Loading 0 1 0 1
Grid Failure 0 0 1 1
Others 0 15 3 18
Emergency Shut Down 0 0 1 1
Total 39 42 15 96

Figure 18: Frequency response of THP on addition of 30 MW

31
Figure 19:Frequency response of MHP on addition of 40 MW

Figure 20: Frequency response of CHP on addition of 18 MW

32
 Figure 21:Frequency response of KHP on addition of 4 MW

Figure 22:Frequency response of BHP (Upper) on addition of 1.5 MW

33
Figure 23:Frequency response of BHP (Lower) on addition of 2.5 MW

Figure 24: Frequency response of DHP on addition of 7 MW

34
PLAN 1 VOLTAGE PROFILE

Figure 25: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan 1

35
Figure 26: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan 1

36
 Figure 27: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan 1

PLAN 2 VOLTAGE PROFILE

Figure 28: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan II

37
Figure 29: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan II

38
Figure 30: Bus voltage profile of restoration plan II

39
PLAN 1

t0

t0

t1

t1

Figure 31: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I

40
 t2

t2

t3

t3

Figure 32: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I

41
 t4

t4

t5

t5
Figure 33: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I

42
 t6

t6

t7

t7
Figure 34: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I

43
 t8

t8
Figure 35: Pictorial representation of restoration plan I

PLAN 2

t0

Figure 36: Pictorial representation

t0 of restoration plan II

44
 t1

t1

t2

t2

Figure 37: Pictorial representation of restoration plan II

45
 t3

t3

t4

t4
Figure 38: Pictorial representation of restoration plan II

46
 t5

t5

t6
Figure 39: Pictorial representation of restoration plan II
t6

47
Glossary
Restoration: Is the process of restoring a part of or a total electric power grid into normal
operation after a partial or total blackout.

Blackout: A total loss in power generation in the system or in grid due to internal or external
factors.

Cascading Failure: is the process in a power system of interconnected parts in which the failure
of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on.

Outages: Is a short term or long-term state of electric power loss in each area or section of power
grid.

Overload: A system is said to be overloaded when the connected electrical loads exceed the
ability of the source to maintain supply continuously.

Nadir: It is defined as the minimum value of frequency reached during the transient period.

Excitation: Is the process of generating magnetic field by the means of electric current.

Disruption: It is an unplanned event that causes a system to be inoperable for unacceptable

length of time.

Transient: Power system transient is the outward manifestation of a sudden change in circuit
conditions as when a switch opens or closes, or a fault occurs in a system.

Dynamic stability: Is the ability of power system to return to steady state of operation after
significant disturbances.

Islanding: Is the intentional isolation of a part of power system during external grid
disturbances.

48