Environmental and Process Risk Management - ENS5161

HAZOP INVESTIGATION REPORT AND CASE STUDY OF PROCESS

FOR OIL PRODUCTION SAFETY OPERATIONS

Submitted to: Dr Muhammad Rizwan Azhar

Submitted by:
Muhammad Zaeem (10583934)
Yashkumar Dilipbhai Khunt (10622695)
Ronakkumar viradiya(10616674)

Department of Engineering
Edith Cowan University
Date of Submission: 19/05/2023
Contents
INTRODUCTION:.......................................................................................................................3
HAZOP HISTORY:......................................................................................................................3
HAZOP AND HOW ITS DIFFERENT THAN LOPA & QRA:..................................................4
HAZOP METHODOLOGY:........................................................................................................5
Definition Phase:......................................................................................................................5
Preparation Phase:....................................................................................................................5
Examination Phase:..................................................................................................................6
Documentation and Follow-up Phase:.....................................................................................7
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY:..........................................................................................................7
WHY & WHEN:...........................................................................................................................8
ADVANTAGES:...........................................................................................................................9
DISADVANTAGES:..................................................................................................................10
REPORTING OF HAZOP:.........................................................................................................11
CASE STUDY:...........................................................................................................................11
Background:...........................................................................................................................11
Methodology:.........................................................................................................................12
Classification of Risk:............................................................................................................13
Results:...................................................................................................................................13
REFERRNCES:..........................................................................................................................17
INTRODUCTION:
HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability Study. The investigation is an organized and
methodical assessment of a process or operation to detect and evaluate flaws that could
endanger persons or equipment. It involves breaking down the system into components and
analyzing deviations from normal operations to determine the causes and consequences. A
multi-disciplinary team systematically goes through the system to brainstorm potential
deviations and establish their sources and results.

The procedure was established in the 1960s by ICI chemicals (Kletz, 2009), to investigate
chemical process systems and has since been continued to other areas. HAZOP has become
one of the most widely used hazard identification techniques across various industries. This
report provides an overview of HAZOP, including its history, methodology, terminology,
advantages, and disadvantages. A detailed case study is presented to illustrate the application of
HAZOP in practice.

HAZOP HISTORY:
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) technique was created in the 1970s by Trevor
Kletz, a chemical engineer who worked for ICI in the UK (Kletz, 2009). Kletz saw the need for
an organized method to identifying possible dangers and operability issues related with
chemical processes, especially during the design phase of new plants. HAZOP was initially
used to analyse the model of new chemical plants, but it soon became clear that the technique
could also be used to enhance the safety and reliability of present plants.

Kletz's first published account of HAZOP appeared in a paper in 1977, titled "HAZOP &
HAZAN: A Technique for Hazard and Operability Studies" (Kletz, 1999). The paper described
the methodology and terminology used in HAZOP and provided several examples of its
application in practice.

After its initial development in the 1970s, HAZOP quickly gained popularity in the chemical
industry as a tool for detecting and modifying potential risks related with new process designs.
The technique was soon adapted for use in other process industries, particularly in the oil and
gas sector. Over time, variations of the HAZOP technique have been developed to address
specific needs or challenges. Since then, HAZOP has been widely adopted by the process
industries and has become a model practice for risk assessment. It is recognized as an efficient
tool for refining the safety, reliability, and efficiency of procedures and facilities, and is often
required by regulatory bodies as part of the design and approval process for new facilities.
HAZOP AND HOW ITS DIFFERENT THAN LOPA & QRA:
These are the three widely used methods in the field of process safety for identifying and
assessing hazards and risks associated with industrial processes. While all three methods are
used to distinguish possible hazards and evaluate the effectiveness of existing safeguards, they
differ in their approach and level of detail. In practice, HAZOP, LOPA, and QRA are typically
used in a sequence, with each method building on the results of the previous method.

The process typically starts with a HAZOP study, which systematically examining each
process parameter and identifying deviations from their intended design values. The outcome
of a HAZOP study is a list of identified hazards, their probable outcomes, and suggests for
moderating or removing the identified hazards.

The coming step is to use LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) to assess the threat associated
with the linked hazards and estimate the effectiveness of being safeguards. LOPA involves the
identification of process hazards, the determination of the liability and inflexibility of their
consequences, and the evaluation of the being safeguards to determine their effectiveness in
reducing the threat to a respectable position (Mishra, 2017). LOPA is generally used to assess
the threat associated with specific scripts or events. LOPA involves a simplified estimation of
the probability of circumstance of certain events and the inflexibility of their consequences.
LOPA uses a threat matrix to
determine whether the threat is
respectable or not grounded on the
liability and consequence of the
event.

QRA is a quantitative risk

assessment approach used to
evaluate the overall risk of a
Figure 1: RISK MATRIX
process or system. QRA entails
using mathematical models to predict the likelihood and consequences of potentially hazardous
events. Identifying potential hazards, analysing the likelihood and severity of their effects, and
assessing the overall risk associated with the process or facility are all part of the QRA process.
The study entails a thorough examination of the system's physical and operational
characteristics, prospective scenarios that could result in accidents or incidents, and the
potential implications of those events.
QRA is widely used in various industries, including chemical processing, oil and gas,
transportation, and nuclear power. However, QRA has some limitations and uncertainties
associated with it, including limitations in modelling complex systems, uncertainties in input
parameters, and difficulties in assessing human and organizational factors (Apostolakis, 2004).
Therefore, it is often used in combination with other qualitative risk assessment methods, such
as HAZOP, to provide a more comprehensive risk management approach.

HAZOP METHODOLOGY:
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) methodology is a risk assessment technique used to identify
potential hazards and operability problems in process systems. The HAZOP methodology
consists of four main phases, which are the Definition Phase, Preparation Phase, Examination
Phase, and Documentation and Follow-up Phase.

Definition Phase:
The first phase of the HAZOP methodology is the Definition Phase. This phase entails
establishing the scope and objectives of the study, specifying team members' tasks, and
selecting the team. The scope of the study should be clearly defined, including the system
boundaries, the equipment, and the processes to be studied. The objectives of the study
should also be identified, including the hazards and operability issues that need to be
identified and evaluated (Gonçalves et al., 2015). The duties and responsibilities of the team
members, including those of the team leader and other team members, should also be made
clear. Finally, the team members should be selected based on their expertise and experience
in the relevant fields.

Preparation Phase:
The second phase of the HAZOP methodology is the Preparation Phase. Planning the
research, gathering data, deciding on the recording technique, determining the amount of
time needed, and setting up a timeline are all part of this step. The team should develop a
plan for the study, including the procedures to be followed, the schedule, and the resources
required. The team should also collect data on the system, including the design
specifications, the process flow diagrams, and the operating procedures (Process Quality
Risk Management, 2015). The team should also agree on the style of recording, including the
format for documenting the results of the study. The team should estimate the time required
for the study, including the time required for each session. Finally, the team should arrange a
schedule for the study, including the dates and times of the sessions.
Examination Phase:
The third phase of the HAZOP methodology is the Examination Phase. This phase involves
examining the system in detail, identifying potential deviations from the design intent, and
evaluating the consequences and
causes of each deviation. The team
should divide the system into parts
and examine each part in detail. For
each part, the team should select a
parameter or element and define the
design intent. The guidewords are
used to systematically vary each
parameter and identify potential
deviations from the intended
process design (Process Quality
Risk Management, 2015). The team
should then use guide words to
identify potential deviations from
the design intent and evaluate the
consequences and causes of each
deviation. The team should also
identify any protection, detection,
and signaling methods that are in
place and evaluate their efficiency.
Finally, the team should identify
appropriate remedial/mitigating Figure 2: Examination Phase Flow Diagram

measures if necessary and agree on activities to be done to resolve any severe concerns. The
team may encounter several difficulties throughout the Examination phase of a HAZOP
research, which might compromise the study's accuracy and thoroughness. To overcome
these challenges, it is essential that the HAZOP team is well-trained in the HAZOP
methodology, has sufficient expertise in the process being analyzed. The team should also
allocate sufficient time for the Examination phase and ensure effective communication
among team members. Regular review and validation of the HAZOP study findings by
independent experts can also help to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the study.
 Documentation and Follow-up Phase:
The fourth and final phase of the HAZOP methodology is the Documentation and Follow-up
Phase. In this phase, the study's findings are documented, approved, a report is produced,
actions are followed up on to ensure they are carried out, any system components are
restudied as needed, and a final output report is produced. The team should record the results
of the study and document the actions to be taken to address any significant problems. The
team should sign off on the documentation to indicate that it is complete and accurate. The
team should produce a report on the study, including a summary of the findings, the actions
to be taken, and any recommendations for future improvements. The team should monitor the
situation to make sure that the suggested steps are taken, and if required, revisit any system
components. Finally, the team should produce a final output report that summarizes the
results of the study and provides a record of the actions taken to address any significant
problems.

HAZOP TERMINOLOGY:
HAZOP terminology is a critical aspect of the HAZOP study as it helps to define the
terminology used during the study and to ensure a clear understanding among all team
members. The following are the key HAZOP terminologies:

1. Nodes: Nodes are specific points in the system under study, such as a valve, pipe, or
instrument. The study team examines each node in the system to identify potential
deviations.
2. Parameter: A parameter is a characteristic or property of a node that may be subject to
deviation. For example, flow, temperature, pressure, etc. HAZOP guidewords are
applied to each parameter to determine potential deviations.
3. Guide Words: Guide words are used to identify potential deviations in the system.
Guide words are selected based on the type of parameter being considered and are used
to prompt the study team to identify deviations from the design intent. Common guide
words include "more," "less," "no," "part of," and "reverse."
4. Deviation: A deviation is a departure from normal operating conditions that could lead
to hazardous or undesirable consequences.
5. Causes: Causes are the underlying reasons for the deviations identified during the
study. Causes can include equipment failures, human errors, or external factors such as
weather.
 6. Consequences: Consequences are the potential outcomes of the identified deviations.
Consequences can include safety hazards, environmental impacts, or impacts on the
operability of the system.
7. Safeguards: Safeguards are actions taken to stop or lessen the effects of the discovered
deviations. Protective gear, alarms, and procedures are some examples of safeguards.
8. Recommendations: Recommendations are proposed actions to address the identified
deviations and mitigate the potential consequences. Recommendations can include
design changes, operational procedures, or additional safeguards.

Figure 3: HAZOP Worksheet

WHY & WHEN:

HAZOP studies are commonly used in the process industries to systematically identify hazards
and operability problems for continuous processes, pipelines, control systems, procedures, etc.
The key objectives of conducting a HAZOP include:

• Identify possible risks and operability concerns in a system.

• Determine possible causes and consequences of identified issues.

• Evaluate the adequacy of existing safeguards & identify required improvements.

• Generate remedial actions to address identified issues.

• Promote an improved understanding of the system within the study team.

HAZOP is typically carried out at different stages of a system's life cycle:

•Conceptual or feasibility stage: Early identification of critical issues to aid in decision

making.
 •Design stage: Detailed analysis of the preliminary design to identify required changes
before construction. This is the most used application of HAZOP.

•Commissioning stage: Review the system prior to introduction of hazardous materials or

start-up.

•Operations stage: Used when making changes to an existing operating system or plant to
identify impacts.

•Decommissioning stage: Aid in planning the safe withdrawal of a system from operations.

ADVANTAGES:
HAZOP analysis provides numerous benefits to industries, some of which are discussed below:

 Comprehensive hazard identification: HAZOP is a comprehensive method that can

identify a wide range of potential hazards, including those that may not be evident
during routine risk assessments. This is because HAZOP involves a team of experts
who can examine a process from different perspectives and identify potential hazards
and risks that might otherwise be missed.
 Improved safety: By identifying potential hazards and risks, HAZOP helps to improve
safety in the workplace. When risks and hazards are recognized, the right steps may be
taken to minimize or reduce them, decreasing the possibility of mishaps and
occurrences.
 Better operability: HAZOP can also help to improve the operability of a process or
system by identifying potential problems that could affect its performance. By
identifying these problems, the team can recommend modifications that will improve
the reliability, efficiency, and effectiveness of the process.
 Compliance: HAZOP is often a requirement of regulatory bodies and can help
organizations to demonstrate compliance with health and safety regulations. By using
HAZOP, organizations can identify potential hazards and risks and take appropriate
measures to mitigate them, reducing the risk of non-compliance.
 Increased efficiency: HAZOP can lead to increased efficiency by identifying potential
bottlenecks or inefficiencies in a process. By addressing these issues, processes can be
optimized to help the process design and reduce the likelihood of downtime and delays,
reduce waste, improve productivity, and increase profitability.
 Improves knowledge and communication: HAZOP study involves discussions among
people from various disciplines. This helps promote better understanding of the process
 and improves communication across teams. The interdisciplinary nature of the
discussions helps identify hazards that may otherwise be missed.
 Auditable record of analysis: The HAZOP report provides an auditable record of the
analysis including the assumptions made, deviations identified, risks evaluated and
recommendations. This record can be reviewed and updated periodically based on
changes made to the system. The report also helps communicate the key findings and
recommendations to stakeholders.

DISADVANTAGES:
While HAZOP has numerous advantages, it also has some limitations that need to be
considered, such as:

 Time-consuming: HAZOP can be a lengthy process that demands a significant time and
resource commitment. The team must thoroughly examine the process or system, and
this can take several weeks or even months, depending on the complexity of the
system.
 Expertise required: HAZOP requires a team of experts from different disciplines to be
effective. However, assembling a team with the necessary expertise and experience can
be challenging, especially for smaller organizations.
 Subjectivity: The effectiveness of HAZOP depends heavily on the expertise and
experience of the team members. Therefore, the results can be subjective, and there is a
risk that important hazards or risks may be overlooked.
 Difficulty in prioritization: HAZOP identifies potential hazards and risks, but it does
not provide a method for prioritizing them. This can make it challenging for
organizations to determine which hazards or risks require the most attention and
resources.
 Difficult to analyze complex systems: For large, complicated processes with many
interacting subsystems and complex cause and effect relationships, HAZOP can
become difficult to perform. It may miss some hazards or not fully unravel the links
between multiple failures and their effects. Additional techniques may be required for
such systems.
 Focused on hardware failures: HAZOP primarily deals with the effects of equipment
failures and deviations. It may overlook risks arising from software failures, human
errors, organizational weaknesses, and external events. Additional techniques like
FMEA, ETA, etc. are required to address these aspects.
  Cost: While HAZOP is cost effective in the long run, it requires an upfront investment
of time and resources. For smaller organizations and projects, the cost of conducting a
HAZOP study may be prohibitive.

REPORTING OF HAZOP:
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) reporting process is a critical component of the
risk assessment process. The HAZOP report is a formal document that presents suggestions for
risk reduction along with a summary of the study's findings. All pertinent material should be
provided in a logical and ordered way, and the report should be clear, succinct, and simple to
read. The HAZOP report typically includes the following sections:

 Introduction: The introduction should provide a brief overview of the process or system
being studied, the objectives of the study, and the scope of the study.
 Methodology: The methodology section should describe the HAZOP methodology used
to conduct the study, including the team composition, the study guide used, and the
study procedures.
 Results: The results section should provide a summary of the findings of the study,
including a list of the identified deviations, their associated consequences, and the
safeguards that are in place to prevent or mitigate the consequences.
 Recommendations: The recommendations section should provide a list of
recommendations for reducing the identified risks and improving the safety and
operability of the process or system. The recommendations should be prioritized based
on their importance and feasibility of implementation.
 Conclusion: The study's main conclusions and suggestions should be enumerated in the
conclusion section, which should also include an overall evaluation of the process or
system's hazards.
 Appendices: The appendices section should include any additional information that is
relevant to the study, such as detailed drawings, calculations, or data analysis.

The HAZOP report should be reviewed and approved by all members of the study team and
any other relevant stakeholders, such as the project manager, plant manager, or regulatory
agency. The report should also be updated as necessary to reflect any changes or modifications
that are made to the process or system.
CASE STUDY:
A HAZOP study of Process for Oil Production Unit Safety Operations (Penelas et al., 2021).

Background: In this study, the HAZOP team was responsible for conducting the analysis. The
analysis was conducted over a period of five days, with an average of 8 hours of analysis per
day. The installation was divided into 13 areas or key points designated by nodes and the first
node was analysed in this paper (Penelas et al., 2021).

Methodology: The means that include a HAZOP investigation are portrayed underneath:

 To carry out the HAZOP analysis, nodes were selected based on the functioning and
operation of the equipment and accessories in their vicinity. The HAZOP sessions
examined one node, which were chosen based on this criterion.
 HAZOP methodology uses guide words and process limits to describe process
parameters and variations from normal. The guide words include high, low, none,
inverse/reverse, and other. These words are combined to assign equipment functioning
indicators, identifying if they are operating within or outside the standard of operation,
allowing the identification of potential hazards.
 In the HAZOP analysis, the identification of hazard causes involves dividing the system
into smaller sections and testing the hypothesis of equipment malfunction. The
prediction of consequences is made based on identified parameters and keywords that
indicate probable deviations. Any hazard represented by a deviation is recorded, and its
impact is evaluated at a later stage.
 The analysis of frequency was conducted by estimating the likelihood of hazardous
scenarios occurring. These estimates were synthesized using frequency models. The
process of synthesizing the frequencies involved identifying possible combinations of
failures and circumstances that could lead to the hazardous scenarios, using a consulting
firm's procedure manual (Ibrahim & Syed, 2018).
 The impact of exposure was evaluated using statistical approximations of how a
particular population perceives risk and the associated health/safety effects. This
evaluation was done using a risk matrix that measured the severity of the consequences
with respect to safety, environment, and economy.
 Measures were implemented to reduce or eliminate identified risks and prevent
potentially disastrous situations. These measures, called barriers, were documented on
the HAZOP sheet.
The crude oil production and processing facilities are very large and complex, with many
different nodes and a great deal of information being processed. It is not possible to discuss all
the nodes in detail in this study. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and academic rigor, the study
will focus on the analysis of the first node in the unit, as shown in

Figure 4: Simplified PID of Node 1

Classification of Risk: During the process of risk classification, identified hazards are grouped
into low, medium, and high levels based on the extent of harm to people, environment, assets,
and influence on the company's status. The level of occurrence of the cause and the severity of
the results are determined based on the probability and severity, respectively, as per BS IEC
61882: 2001. It is important to note that the risk rating is used for qualitative prioritization and
not for quantification during the HAZOP studies. All sources of risks, their consequences, and
barriers to mitigate them, along with any recommendations, are documented on the HAZOP
registration sheets.

Results:
Node 1: The pressure parameter was analysed in two scenarios: high pressure and low
pressure. A circuit failure was identified as the likely cause for the deviation of pressure
beyond the acceptable range in both situations. The malfunction of the pressure valve (Pressure
Valve-101) was found to be responsible for the failure to act appropriately.
 Figure 5: HAZOP Sheet for Pressure Element

The second aspect examined was the flow rate, which was evaluated under four circumstances:
high flow rate, low flow rate, reverse flow (which did not occur), flow in a different direction.
In this case, the safety system's sensor for the maximum or minimum opening of the flow valve
was identified as the primary cause of failure.

Figure 6: HAZOP Sheet for Flow Element

The third element analysed was the level, which was examined in two situations: high level
and low level. High level occurred when more liquid entered the separator vessel than what is
acceptable, and low level occurred when less liquid entered the separator vessel than what is
acceptable. The primary cause of both situations was the malfunctioning of the level valve, LV-
101.
Figure 7: HAZOP Sheet of Level Element

Figure 8: HAZOP Sheet of Level Element

System temperature can be excessive or low due to faults in controllers, flow lines, and valves.
Regular inspection and calibration of sensors is recommended to avoid uncontrolled heating of
the hydrocarbon and the risk of explosion. Low temperature deviation can cause hydrocarbon
crystallization and loss of production, so a temperature transmitter with an alert and a low
steam flow alarm should be installed in the storage tank's recirculation line.
 Figure 9: HAZOP Sheet for Temperature Element

The fifth element was the corrosion or erosion that may occur in some equipment elements:

Figure 10: HAZOP Sheet for Corrosion Element

This passage discusses how starting or stopping the installation can affect the production
operations of the unit. Misdirected flow during start-up and lack of heat in the lines can lead to
various issues such as line clogging, delay in starting, and damage to the pump. To prevent
these risks, the installation of protections such as low flow alarms and turning off the suction
pump if abnormal conditions are detected is recommended.

Figure 11:HAZOP Sheet of Start and Stop Procedure Element

REFERRNCES:

Kletz, T. A. (2009). ICI’s contribution to process safety - HAZARDS 21. Process Safety and
Environmental Protection in a Changing World. IChemE.

https://www.icheme.org/media/9503/xxi-paper-005.pdf

Kletz, T. A. (1999). Hazop and Hazan: Identifying and assessing process industry hazards.
Institution of Chemical Engineers.

https://dokumen.tips/documents/hazop-and-hazan-by-trevor-kletzpdf-568768d949a2b.html?
page=1

Mishra. (2017, October 31). What is a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)? -

safeopedia.com.

http://www.safeopedia.com/definition/408/layer-of-protection-analysis-lopa-process-safety

Apostolakis, G. E. (2004, June). How Useful Is Quantitative Risk Assessment? Risk Analysis,
24(3), 515–520.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00455.x

Gonçalves, Sá, & Azevedo. (2015, Feburary 02). Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study: A
systematic process to identify potential hazards and operability problems. Occupational Safety
and Hygiene III, 217–222.

https://doi.org/10.1201/b18042-43

Process Quality Risk Management. (2015, August). HAZOP Training Guide. Pharmaceutical
Quality Research Institute.

https://pqri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/pdf/HAZOP_Training_Guide.pdf

Penelas, A. de J., & Pires, J. C. M. (2021). HAZOP Analysis in Terms of Safety Operations
Processes for Oil Production Units: A Case Study. Applied Sciences, 11(21), 10210. MDPI AG.

http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app112110210

Ibrahim, & Syed. (2018). Hazard Analysis of Crude Oil Storage Tank Farm. International
Journal of ChemTech Research, Vol 11., 300–308.

https://sphinxsai.com/2018/ch_vol11_no11/2/(300-308)V11N11CT.pdf
Table of contribution
Tasks Allocated to Due Date Completed

Introduction Muhammad Zaeem 15/05/2023 Yes

HAZOP history Muhammad Zaeem 15/05/2023 Yes

HAZOP and how its different than LOPA Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes
& QRA Khunt
HAZOP methodology Ronakkumar viradiya 15/05/2023 Yes

HAZOP terminology Ronakkumar viradiya 15/05/2023 Yes

Reasons, why & when Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes

Khunt
Advantages Muhammad Zaeem 15/05/2023 Yes

Disadvantages Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes

Khunt
Reporting of HAZOP Muhammad Zaeem 15/05/2023 Yes

Case study Ronakkumar viradiya 15/05/2023 Yes

Background Ronakkumar viradiya 15/05/2023 Yes

Methodology Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes

Khunt
Classification of risk Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes
Khunt
Results Yashkumar Dilipbhai 15/05/2023 Yes
Khunt
References Everyone 15/05/2023 Yes