European integration and the EU through a liberal lens

First slide: - Introducing the history of European Integration

 Roots of European Integration is from Enlightenment thinkers

 Voltaire - Christian Europe’ can be viewed as a large commonwealth of
different states, some of them monarchies and others having a mixed system
of government, but all of them interconnected
 Rousseau and Kant would be good setting up of an organization of European
nations based on the fundamental principles of international law
 Liberals of the time – Francois Guizot – Europe’s diversity is its power
 Concert of Europe 1815 – first signs of cooperation in the name of the balance
of power and peace
 Revolutions of 1848 – broke out to pursue liberal ideas extension of
democracy, equality
 After the WWI – cooperation and the prevention of war becomes the most
important (Kellogg-Briand Pact) - multilateral agreement attempting to
eliminate war as an instrument of national policy.
 Wilsonian dream of the League of Nations, it was a good idea however failure
was inevitable due to the self-interest of the member nations and jingoism
 After WWII’s losses and price both the US and Europe realize that
cooperation is a must – US pushing (to maintain peace and have a united
Europe)
 Determined to prevent another such terrible war, European governments
concluded that pooling coal and steel production would – in the words of the
Declaration – make war between historic rivals France and Germany "not
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". -----) ECSC
 Some key moments in European integration - 1957 - EEC, EAC, 1968 -
ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1973, 1986, 2004 -MAIN
ENLARGEMENTS, 1992 - THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, 2002-EURO -
You can look up these if you want to say sg. about them!!!

Second slide: - Now that we have an idea of European Integration, have just as
much of liberalism!!

 Age of Enlightenment – John Locke, Montesquieu (freedom, equality, human

rights) – Great thinkers of who introduced the first ideas of liberalism, making
it a distinct ideology
 In Europe, political movement that supports individual liberties,
constitutionally accountable government
 Limited government, free trade, state – safety net (state is not supposed to
intervene in the economy just present as a safety net) – It’s main idea is a
limited government with checks and balances institutions which keep each
other in check, Free market and free trade only the invisible hand guides it
(market equilibrium)
 European types :
  Classical (economical) : laissez – faire (Adam Smith) – like I said the free
market, free trade, supports capitalism, no governmental intervention - civil
liberties under the rule of law with especial emphasis on individual autonomy,
limited government, economic freedom, political freedom and freedom of
speech.

 Social : welfare liberalism, Keynesian liberalism, common good!! -  late 19th

and early 20th centuries, a group of British thinkers known as the New
Liberals made a case against laissez-faire classical liberalism. It argued in
favour of state intervention in social, economic, and cultural life. What they
proposed is now called social liberalism, More positive and proactive
measures were required to ensure that every individual would have an equal
opportunity for success.

 "classical liberals" and "social liberals" support cultural liberalism (ex. LGBT

rights issues including same-sex marriage, legalization of some drugs,
opening immigration, etc.), but most "conservative liberals",
including ordoliberals, Christian democrats and some agrarians

 Conservative : elements of classical + socially conservative values (Christian

family) - Conservative liberal parties tend to combine economically
liberal policies with more traditional stances and personal beliefs
on social and ethical issues. – "conservative liberalism" refers to classical
liberals who support a laissez-faire economy as well as socially
conservative principles (for instance, Christian family values).

 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (EP) – different political

groups, factions are in the EU some of them are liberal as this pro-European,
liberal internationalist faction

 EU is based on liberal ideas and values – Yes the EU is of course mainly based
on liberal values, ideas, aims… some of which I’m going to further explain

Third slide :

 Main ideas and values – just list them

 The EU has different documents which record these rights, aims, values, e.g.: EU
charter of fundamnetal rights, Treaty of Lisbon or if it is about a more transparent
decision making – the Treaty of Amsterdam (it contains decisions ont hat subject)
 EP elections are the prime example of transparent representative democracy in the EU
– and they also promote it through it and througgh the member states
 Rule of law – EU’s one of the most important pillar is the rule of law - every action
taken by it is founded on treaties approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU
member countries. All new countries joining the EU must also respect the rights and
obligations enshrined in: the European Convention on Human Rights.
Forth slide: - neofunctionalism and spill-over

 1950s Ernst Haas - the first European integration theory developed – PhD on ECSC –
The guy who developed neofuctionalism, he wrote part of his PhD research on the
European Coal and Steel Community, European Integration

 Free market (one liberal idea based on self-interest) ----) to the appliance of others in
cooperation - basically the idea is that from economic and business cooperation the
cooperation “spills over” to other areas, and this is how the EU developed according
to neo functionalists, the ideas of cooperation are based on self-interest, but they
benefit more than one actor/member (and the first idea as a free market or somewhat
close to it was liberal-so the liberal view could spread also)

 the perspective that all integration is the result of past integration

 Jean Monnet – integration in one sector of common policy ----) spillover!!-Jean
Monnet, one of the chief architects of European unity, believed that in achieving
integration in one sector of common policy amongst sovereign states, this would
eventually lead to a ‘spillover’ into other policy areas. 
 This would then lead to integration in these policy areas and in turn, more ‘spillover’. 
The Schuman Plan of 1950, influenced by Monnet, which led to the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, can therefore be viewed as a pragmatic
approach to closer integration by stealth, in the full knowledge that a rush to create a
United States of Europe could not be achieved.

 E.g.: From the Schumann plan to ECSC, and then taxation, trade, wages… - Schuman
had planned for much more to be integrated than merely coal and steel and saw the
ECSC as a first step on the road to further integration in many other areas.  If the six
nations cooperated in one policy sector, i.e. coal and steel, under the authority of
central institutions, this would result in pressure for the integration of neighbouring
policy areas such as taxation, trade and wages (Wallace 2004: 15).
 This first small step taken in pursuance of The Schuman Plan would, in theory,
snowball to the point where national political systems and economies would become
so entangled that ‘as functions were transferred, then so too could the loyalties of
Europeans as they became focused upon these new institutions’

 Entanglement of political and economic systems to the absolute cooperation in all

areas, and common « citizens »
 E.g.: Eurozone
 1985 – Internal Market Program – tariff barriers removed (more trade)
 Freedom of movement (people, services, capital)
 New internal market vulnerable to inflation, deflation of members’ currencies ----)
EURO
 Explanation: there is still no doubt that integration in one policy area will inevitably
lead to spillover into another.  One area where this can be seen is in the recent fiscal
union of the countries in the Eurozone. Neo-functionalism could explain this
phenomenon as follows.  In 1985, the European Economic Community created the
Internal Market Programme, in which tariff barriers that prevented the freedom of
movement of goods between member states were removed.  This led to much more
trade between the member states, e.g. today the United Kingdom’s biggest trading
 partner is the EU.  With the freedom of movement of goods, national laws that
discriminated against imports from other EEC countries were removed, and, in turn,
the freedom of movement was expanded to include people, services and capital. 
Furthermore, by the end of the 1980s a number of nation states around Germany
formed an Optimal Currency Area, which aligned their monetary policies with the
Deutschmark and the Bundesbank (Verdun 2004: 87).  However, this new internal
market was vulnerable to the inflation and deflation of the various members’ national
currencies, which resulted in the demand for a common currency.  This paved the way
for the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union between 1992 and 2002 which
made the establishment of the euro ‘a seemingly logical functional step to encourage
prosperity’ (Jenson 2010: 76). 
The spillover effect can quite readily be seen in the economic and monetary policies
of recent times, with neo-functionalism therefore explaining how the euro came about
within a period of less than twenty years due to the spillover effects from relatively
unrelated policy areas.

Fifth slide:

● The Eastern enlargement is the best example of the EU’s application of liberal
values:
q Any state that subscribes to liberal values, may apply
q Overcame the reluctance of fearful member states (cost of enlargement)
q Principles of liberal community vs. national interest or political/economic cost
q Democratic consolidation! - only important aspect, if not ----) hypocrisy
q The Copenhagen criteria – 1993
Ø Based on liberal norms of community membership
● Was this after all a wise choice ? (Poland, Hungary)

Explanation:

Eastern enlargement
 According to the EU treaty and in line with the expectations of liberal
community, any European state that subscribes to the liberal values of the EU
may apply to become a member state (Article 49 TEU).
 The CEECs and their supporters in the EU invoked this membership norm to
overcome the reluctance of those member states that feared the costs of
enlargement and to commit the EU formally to Eastern enlargement.
 They framed enlargement as an issue of community identity and argued that it
ought not to be seen and decided from the vantage point of national interests
and material cost-benefit calculations. They invoked the principles of liberal
community, pointed to their achievements in adopting these principles, and
predicted dire consequences for the democratic consolidation of Eastern
Europe should membership be denied.
 In addition, they demanded that the community organizations stick to their
past promises and practices of enlargement to democratic European countries
and accused reticent member states of acting inconsistently and betraying the
fundamental values and norms of their own community
 This framing and shaming made it very difficult for the member states to
reject enlargement on legitimate grounds. Together with their main supporters
– the European Commission,
  Germany, and Britain – the Eastern European countries were thus able to
commit the EC to offering membership to liberal Eastern European countries
at the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 under conditions (the
“Copenhagen criteria”) that were predominantly based on liberal norms of
Community membership – rather than economic cost-benefit criteria
 Was this after all a wise choice if we watch current political stances,
stands of these so called now „liberal and democratic” Eastern European
states? – ending question

Sixth slide:

 Security policy always focused on the promotion of democracy

 Soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce,
 Shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction
 Strengthening international institutions, protection of HR
 But it’s filled with dilemmas, questionable implementations, bureaucracy
 Unseeable consequences
 Hard finding the balance between altruistic motives and strategic moves
 Displays true Wilsonian internationalism ----) proactive and preventive
diplomacy (globalization)
 Keep the dark side of globalization away
 No geographic boundaries as to Europe’s security strategy, emphasis on
regional and global challenges

Explanation:

 The third feature of Europe's liberalism in world affairs is its emphasis on human rights
protection and human security. Two specific and closely related elements, among many
others, stand out: EU rhetoric about "human security" and its relation to the newly
established responsibility to protect. As far as the first is concerned, the human security
agenda, originally developed by the UN to focus on the protection of civilians in conflicts
 SOFT POWER ILLUSIONS A security policy focused on the promotion of democracy,
on th strengthening of international institutions, and on the protection of hum rights is
filled with moral and strategic dilemmas, complex an unsatisfactory implementations,
unintended consequences, and collater damage. It demands a difficult equilibrium
between ends and means, strategic interests and altruistic motives, legitimacy a
 In its selection of cases for intervention, it often reveals double standards, if no manifest
hypocrisy. In its implementation, it may be limited to effects rath than causes, prolonging
rather than ending human rights abuses. The dilemmas are inherent to liberal internationa
 Yet there are some specifically European flaws in the conception and implementation of
th liberal agenda
 Europe's liberalism is based on an acute sensitivity to globalization, whereby troubles in
one remote part of the world can have a direct impact on Europe. In this sense, Europe
displays a true Wilsonian internationalism that demands a proactive and preventive
diplomacy
to keep the dark side of globalization from reaching its territory. In the European security
strategy, no geographic boundaries are defined to limit Europe's role; on the contrary, the
emphasis is put on global challenges rather than regional issues.
 EU is using soft-power as well – trying to ahpe preferences of member states or outsiders
throuh appeal or attraction, or just co-opting, promoting democracy (can’t have violnace
and army suggestions are quite laughable – caricatures on PPT)

Seventh slide: Liberal intergovernmentalism

● Popular because its focus on explaining European integration, as

neofunctionalism (Andrew Moravcsik – 1993)
● States principal drivers of integration (self-interest based on economic gains)
● Interstate negotiations, bargaining follow, results depend on the balance of
power
● Institutional choice to ensure future compliance!
● It’s liberal : member states are acting to advance the preferences of a domestic
social group (representative democracy)
● States pool their sovereignty to coordinate their policies and establish
commitments
● they create such institutions in the expectation that they will shape state behavior
● Best example : The agricultural sector is an important interest group in France

Explanation:

 Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) has gained popularity due to its focus on explaining
the intergovernmental negotiations propelling EU developments.6 LI was first developed
and subsequently updated by Andrew Moravcsik. The theory is state centric whereby
nation states are
 regarded as the principal drivers of integration. These states engage in three phases which
lead to integration: national preference formation focused on economic gains, interstate
bargaining whereby the results depend on power relations, and the institutional choice to
ensure future compliance (also see Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009)
 Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) views states as the main political actors in political
interactions, and sees the EU as an international institution that can be studied by viewing
states as the main actors in a situation of anarchy, where each state achieves their goal
through negotiations and bargaining.
 "EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national
leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the
economic interests and relative power of powerful domestic constituents, the relative
power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role of institutions
in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments."
  LI is a liberal not a realist theory, and thus all states are understood as representative
institutions acting to advance the pre-strategic preferences of some (usually biased)
coalition of domestic social groups with a stake in the way social, cultural or economic
interdependence is managed. So, while states are superficially the primary actors or
"transmission belts" whereby social interests are aggregated, advanced and enforced, the
most fundamental actors in LI remain transnationally active individuals and social groups.
Second, LI posits, following conventional regime theory, that states delegate or pool
sovereignty in regional institutions in order to coordinate their policies and establish
credible commitments. This the critical third step in the theory. So while states ultimately
are in anarchy (as Brexit shows), at any given moment, they are often making decisions
 within an institutionalized international environment and they create such institutions in
the expectation that they will shape state behavior 

Example: Let’s take an example in order to understand this process better.

 The agricultural sector is an important interest group in France, with a high potential
for influence at the governmental level.
 They managed to influence the national preference of France regarding the sector at
the EU level, favouring the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This
would enable French agricultural surpluses to be exported in a liberalised market.
 The transfer to a supranational institution is exemplified by the French government
pushing for a highly centralised CAP, in order to ensure compliance by other
members.

Eigth slide: Current issues of the EU that might concern its liberalist future

 Hungary and Poland since the late 2000s – illiberal path, populism (used 2008,
2015 crisis for EU liberalism rejection)
 1990’s were leading the Eastern European shock therapy, reforms! (but
conservative)
 Both parties same policies : media, courts and parliament filled with
progovernment politicians, judges and journalists
 Driving out liberal NGO’s, academics, universities
 Violating the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
 Banning or making difficult to access abortion
 No legal recognition to transgender people
 Ignoring accountability
 Copycat liberalism – adopt habits, norms, institutions – but not the same
outcome(history, culture)
 NO EXAMPLE OF THROWING A COUNTRY OUT OF THE EU - with
holding subsides

Explanation:

The revolt against liberalism: what’s driving Poland and Hungary’s nativist turn?

• Orbán’s enthusiasm for American economics and indifference to American cultural

concerns was a sign of the direction Hungary and Poland would eventually take in the
coming decades.
• In the 1990s, the two countries led eastern Europe in economic shock therapy, pushing
market reforms beyond what their western advisers demanded. But in cultural terms, the
Polish and Hungarian right chose a more conservative course.
• both countries have continued to see themselves as deeply European, even as they
have steered further away from EU-style liberalism.
• Orbán’s Fidesz party commands a supermajority of two-thirds of the seats in the
Hungarian parliament. Both parties have enacted similar policies: filling the courts and media
with pro-government judges and journalists; driving out leftwing and liberal NGOs,
academics, and universities; violating the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by restricting or
banning access to abortion and denying legal recognition t transgender people; and ignoring
attempts by European institutions to hold them accountable for these provocations.
• At the same time, four out of every five citizens of Poland and Hungary support their
country’s EU membership. For the anti-liberals in Budapest and Warsaw, the goal is
autonomy within Europe, not independence outside of it.
• Ivan Krastev and US law professor Stephen Holmes made the case for the rebellion
hypothesis. They argue that the transition from communism to capitalist democracy was
driven by “copycat liberalism”
• Eastern Europeans took it upon themselves to adopt the habits, norms and institutions
of the western world, whose prosperity and freedoms they wanted to enjoy. The problem,
according to Krastev and Holmes, was that submission to this “imitation imperative” was
“inherently stressful” and “emotionally taxing”. Modelling oneself after an external ideal was
bound to produce feelings of shame and resentment when the outcome fell short of an
unattainably perfect original.
• Faced with the humiliation of perpetual inferiority, Orbán and Kaczyński used the
2008–2015 economic and migration crises to reject western liberalism and advance an
illiberal alternative.
 BUT how will the EU react? There’s no example of throwing out a member?
Recently the EU tried with holding money/subsidies from Hungary

Last slide : - Brexit explanation:

● Many think UK road was road block in political integration

● Opportunity for further political integration (EU defense or security reform)
● But in need of cooperation and public truest across the EU (Hungary)
● Globalism: broad post-nationalism, cross-border values
● Populism:
q „serving natives in society who hold grievances against the establishment”
q Culture, nation, civilization under threat!!! (EU)
● Threatening the EU? What’s the answer?
● Cooperation, not forcing on each other ideas (globalization or populism)

 For many pro-European politicians, the UK has long been a block on further

integration. Its departure, they suggest, might allow the EU 27 to go further, and do so
faster, than would otherwise have been possible. To them, the UK has been a powerful
opponent of a ‘political Europe’, of normative concepts such as Ever Closer Union,
and attempts to afford the EU a defence and security character. Perhaps, it is often
intimated, Brexit carries with it the chance of further political integration. This vision,
in its extreme form, sees the Union rid of a most troublesome family member, and,
following a spate of integrationist reforms, able to realise the vision of a pan-
European federal state.An exciting vision, if only it were so simple. While tempting to
perceive the European project as if on a linear road to statehood, and Brexit as the
removal of an important road block, pro-Europeans would do well to see reality. Any
future reform of the EU must be predicated on renewed public trust across the
continent. Today, such trust appears in short supply. Socially conservative and
nationalist forces are amassing with increasing resolve and efficiency. And they seem
to be winning.
Perhaps the biggest error of some EU commentators is to view Brexit as a
phenomenon unique to the UK. In his final speech as an MEP, Nigel Farage spoke of
different models of identity-based politics. The future of the EU, he claimed, will be
decided by a winner-takes-all contest between the two. This is an argument that has
increasing weight among both pro- and anti-Europeans. Whereas previously
determined by class and income, politics, it is suggested, is now expressed in terms of
identity and culture. There are the globalists; and there are the people. Globalists are
neither left, nor right-wing, rich nor poor. What connects them is a broad post-
nationalism. These are individuals who identify with cross-border civic values, who
perceive a public sphere beyond the nation state, and think in global terms on
economics. In Europe, such globalists are typically associated with strong support for
the EU. It is claimed that the antithesis of globalism is populism, and populists exist
to serve natives in society who hold certain grievances against the establishment. In
contrast to globalists, ‘nativists’ are concerned with the pace of change and dislike
globalisation in its present form. They generally live in towns or rural areas, though
there is no clear demographic pattern. Like globalists, they do not fall easily into a
single economic stratum, or social class. Broadly, nativists view the local community,
or traditional nation-state, as the primary unit of self-identification, whose culture,
values, and civilisation are under threat from the global forces of homogenisation and
one-size-fits-all. Nativists are generally associated with Euroscepticism, expressed in
varying degrees of hostility towards European integration. But there is a further factor
that defines this Faragist world view. The perspective sees globalists as a single group
with a monolithic set of international interests; interests that are under threat by the
nativist wave. Similarly, nativists are a single, united, force with one will, one set of
concerns, and most importantly a direct opponent in the elites, whose destruction it is
their mission to bring about. In Harry Potter-esque terms, ‘neither can live while the
other survives’. It is a prophecy long made by the populist right, keen to view the
contest as civilisational in nature.The biggest mistake for liberal pro-Europeans is to
dance to this tune. In the past, centrist pro-Europeans have resisted the temptation.

Yet, many now speak in the same apocalyptic terms. There is no other way, they
claim. Yet, in a binary pitched battle between centrist and far-right populists, the latter
will always have the upper hand. For the pitched battle is fought on populist home
terrain, arenas such as referenda, establishment vs anti-establishment general
elections, and the exchange of slogans, in which simple populist messages hold
greatest sway. When liberals have tried to take populists on at their own sport, they
have lost almost every time.Thus, the phenomenon we are witnessing across the EU –
the great threat to its survival – is not the presence of Farage and others, nor the
catchiness of their ideas. It is a crisis at the heart of liberal pro-Europeanism that if not
resolved will spell dark days for the European project: to be or not to be populist?
With alarming frequency, I see friends and colleagues falling into this elephant trap.
To reverse the trend, pro-Europeans must quit dabbling in populism. They must play
to their strengths. Politics and civil societies are by their nature pluralistic. As such,
there are several parallel continuums upon which identities are formed – economic,
social, and identitarian. Opinions and world views are never static. In most cases
(1945 and 1989 notwithstanding) identities have evolved not through conflict – one
side defeating the other – but through dialogue. In such a setting, grievances of the
other side must be acknowledged and taken seriously, and an accommodating solution
arrived at.Any ‘victory’ for pro-European forces will not be achieved by borrowing
from the populist playbook, nor by strong-arming opponents from power, and
 isolating their constituencies. Instead, it will occur through reaching out and trying to
identify innovative policy solutions to the concerns of others. Their aim should be to
rebuild communities that have been left behind, to more equitably share the benefits
of technological change, whilst safeguarding – indeed treasuring – local and national
cultural identities. Importantly, reforms must allow citizens across the EU to feel
much greater control, a matter which the Vote Leave campaign exploited to the full,
with its now infamous slogan. For this to take place pro-European leaders must avoid
the temptation to wage war on nativism; to blot it out, and carry globalism to total
victory. They must resist the increasing tendency within liberalism to adopt populist
slogans and ways of thinking. They must understand that pro-European voices are
pluralistic; that liberalism and globalism are not political movements, but world
views, which can be expressed in myriad political forms, on the left and on the right.
In fact, they need to be. Without the presence of several distinct ‘liberal’ options on the
left and on the right, concerned voters might be driven towards the extremes. This does
not mean that such parties should not coordinate, especially given the presence of a
common foe. Failure of pro-European parties to do so may have severe consequences in
the long-term. Yet, in the interests of maintaining a rich democratic fabric, they must
maintain distinct messages.So, what next? First, pro-Europeans must transform political
debate from a series of battles between slogans to a contest of ideas. Next, they must
change the field on which public debate occurs, creating forums for exchange and
democratic participation. Most importantly, efforts must be made to address the
underlying causes of populists’ appeal through the introduction of innovative policy. To
this end, pro-European parties and governments must strengthen local communities with
increased devolution, fiscal autonomy, and democratic rights. These need not come at the
expense of integration in some areas, but may need to in others.Whether a Farage 2.0 can
help bring about a second EU exit depends on the wider international context, the world
economy, and prospects for the European neighbourhood. However, it depends as much
on pro-European politicians’ success in shifting the debate from a binary and adversarial
playing field, in which the populists flourish, to one of dialogue, and substantive policy
reform. This is the message that pro-European leaders must take from Brexit. Listen
carefully, and act accordingly, and the EU will have prosperous days ahead. Choose to
ignore the signals, and prepare for more sad goodbyes.