Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
CEBU CITY

SPECIAL FORMER EIGHTEENTH (18th) DIVISION

*****

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226

Petitioner,

- versus- Members:

HON. RAFAEL CRESCENCIO C.

TAN, JR., in his capacity as
1
INGLES, G. T., Ch.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional MONTEJO-GONZAGA, D.P., &
Trial Court in Dumaguete City, CORPIN, JR., B.G., JJ.
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, and
ROSALINDA MARTINEZ,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

29 September 2021
x--------------------------------------x

AMENDED DECISION
INGLES, G. T., J.:

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration 2 filed by petitioner People of the

Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) assailing Our
Decision3 promulgated on February 26, 2020, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

1
Only Member Left as per Raffle dated 20 October 2020.
2
Rollo, pp. 93-115.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Carlito B. Calpatura, with the concurrence of the undersigned New Ponente
and Associate Justice Emily R. Aliño-Geluz, Rollo, pp. 76-90.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 2

WHEREFORE, for failure of the Petitioner to show grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the Public Respondent, the Court RESOLVES to
DISMISS the petition.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.4

In compliance with the Court's Resolution 5 dated May 26, 2021, private
respondent, through counsel, filed her Comment6 to the pending motion.

After a second hard look, the Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration to
be impressed with merit.

Hence this Amended Decision.

The relevant antecedent facts are stated in the February 26, 2020 Decision.
We reproduce them, to wit:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City filed two (2)
separate Informations all dated September 21, 2016, charging the Private
Respondent Rosalinda Martinez y Tolentino (“Private Respondent” for
brevity) with Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, or R.A. No. 9165, the
accusatory portions thereof read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2016-23880

(Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs)

“That on or about the 6th day of September 2016, in the

City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused not being then authorized by
law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell
and/or deliver to a poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, otherwise known as a “SHABU”, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Sec. [5], Article II of R.A. 9165.”

Criminal Case No. 2016-23881

(Illegal [Possession] of Dangerous Drugs)

“That on or about the 6th day of September 2016, in the

City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused not being then authorized by
law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess
4
Rollo, p. 89.
5
Rollo, pp. 126-127.
6
Rollo, pp. 128-130.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 3

four (4) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets with a total net
weight of 0.43 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
otherwise known as a “SHABU”, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Sec. 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.”

During arraignment on October 7, 2016, Private Respondent pleaded

“not guilty” to the crimes charged.

Subsequently, on August 1, 2018, Private Respondent filed, through

counsel, a Motion for Plea Bargaining, and on even date, the prosecution
manifested that while it does not have any objection to the plea bargaining
proposal as to the possession of illegal drugs case, it cannot give consent
to the same plea bargaining for the illegal sale case, and also submitted a
written Comment.

In its Comment, the prosecution withheld its consent to the plea

bargaining proposal in Criminal Case No. 2016-23880 on the ground that to
enter a plea of guilt to the offense of Violation of Section 12, of R.A. No.
9165 is a lesser offense than that allowed under DOJ Circular No. 027. It
further argued that, when the prosecution has evidence to support a
conviction, then it is duty bound to always prosecute the proper offense,
and not any lesser or graver one.

After a finding that the drugs involved in both cases weigh only 0.05
and 0.43 grams of shabu, respectively, the Public Respondent considered
the plea bargaining proposal to be in accordance with a Supreme Court
Resolution, and issued the assailed August 8, 2018 Order.

Without delay, the Private Respondent was ordered re-arraigned in

both cases, to which she pleaded “guilty” to the lesser offense as
bargained. A Joint Judgment was promulgated on the same day, August 8,
2018, the dispositive portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court

hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2016-23880, the accused

ROSALINDA MARTINEZ y TOLENTINO is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt with (sic) the offense of violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years and one (1) day
as minimum term to four (4) years as maximum term and to pay
a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

xxx

2. In [C]riminal Case No. 2016-23881, the accused

ROSALINDA MARTINEZ y TOLENTINO is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt with (sic) the offense of violation of
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 4

Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to

suffer a straight penalty of one (1) year and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).”

xxx

Within 15 days, or on August 23, 2018, the prosecution filed its

Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, dated August 31, 2018, granting
the motion of the Private Respondent to enter a plea of guilt to the lesser
offense of Section 12 of R.A. No 9165, notwithstanding the prosecution's
lack of consent and vigorous objection thereto.

Public Respondent denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its

second assailed Order, dated October 31, 2018, and explained that
consent requirement is a mechanism given to the prosecution to challenge
the proposed plea bargaining if it would detract the court from its duty to
administer justice in a manner consistent with the objective for the
enactment of R.A. No. 9165, the ruling in Estipona vs. Lobrigo, and the
Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases or A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, dated
April 20, 2018.7 (Citations omitted.)

As previously adverted to, We rendered a Decision on February 26, 2020

dismissing the present petition. The ruling was predicated on the finding that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved private respondent's plea bargaining proposal sans
the consent of the prosecution. We held that the RTC was duly guided by and
strictly adhered to the Supreme Court mandate on the plea bargaining
framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and other related issuances. We also
explained that other than the absence of the prosecution's consent, petitioner
failed to show any other circumstance that would have warranted the
disqualification of private respondent from availing the benefits of A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration arguing in

the main that under the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence, the prosecution's consent is required in plea bargaining. Petitioner
asserts that there is nothing in the case of Estipona v. Lobrigo nor in the
Supreme Court's plea bargaining framework in drugs cases that dispenses with
the prosecutions consent as a requirement for a valid plea bargaining
agreement. Furthermore, petitioner points out that the offense of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia which private respondent pleaded guilty to and
which the RTC convicted her of, is not necessarily included in the charge of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It is petitioner's position that the RTC violated its
right to due process in granting a plea bargaining proposal despite the
prosecutor's vehement objection. Petitioner maintains that the RTC committed

7
Rollo, pp. 76-79.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 5

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which is

correctible by certiorari.

In her Comment to the pending motion, private respondent avers that

petitioner's allegations are mere reiterations of its previous arguments which the
Court already considered. According to her, no new matters were introduced to
warrant a reconsideration of the Court's Decision.

The pivotal issue is whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved a plea
bargaining proposal without the consent of the prosecution.

In the landmark case of Sayre y Malampad v. Xenos ,8 the Supreme Court

already made it clear that plea bargaining in drug offenses requires the consent
of the prosecution. The Supreme Court decreed that a trial court's rejection of a
plea bargaining proposal by reason of the lack of consent from the prosecution
does not amount to grave abuse of discretion, thus:

The provision in DOJ Circular No.

27 pertaining to plea-bargaining
under Section 5 to Section 11 of
R.A. 9165, penalized with
imprisonment ranging from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, did
not contravene the Plea Bargaining
Framework found in A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC.

The rule-making authority of the Court under Section 5 (5), Article

VIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. x x x
8
G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 6

In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure

established pursuant to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court that
serves as a framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining
violations of R.A. 9165.

Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the

parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment,

the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his
plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information
is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)

The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion
whether to allow the accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Moreover, plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, offended
party, and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is
necessarily included in the offense charged.

Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a

lesser offense, We find it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to
adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing
objection that should be resolved by the RTC. This harmonizes the
constitutional provision on the rule making power of the Court under the
Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases.
DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining
Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable

plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making
authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal
guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to
proposed plea bargains.

Presiding Judge Xenos did not act

without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he disregarded
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 7

the provisions of OCA Circular No.

90-2018.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is: (1) done contrary
to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Manifest
disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion. In this case, Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction in not approving the plea bargain of Sayre. There
was a continuing objection on the part of the prosecution. Because of this
continuing objection, the parties failed to arrive at a "mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case" that may be submitted for the court's approval. The
RTC correctly ordered the continuation of the proceedings because there
was no mutual agreement to plea bargain. (Citations omitted.)

In People v. Borras y Lascano,9 the Supreme Court categorically declared

that a trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction should it approve a plea of guilt to a lesser offense without the
consent of the prosecution, thus:

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process where the accused and

the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant pleading guilty
to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At

arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused
may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint
or information is necessary.

The provision ordains that with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, plea bargaining to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged, may be allowed.

Contrary to the position taken by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, the conformity of the prosecutor to the proposed plea bargaining
in drugs cases is not optional, nay, to be disregarded. For the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what
the evidence on hand can sustain. As guardian of the rights of the people,
the State files the criminal action in the name of the People of the
9
G.R. No. 250295, March 15, 2021.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 8

Philippines. The prosecutor who represents the government is duty bound

to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is
as though he or she were the person directly injured by the offense.
Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e., the State, will
have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts on its behalf.

As early as the 1992 case of People v. Villarama, Jr., the Court

already clarified that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the trial court's sound discretion. The
Court ratiocinated:

x x x Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the

Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious.
The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions.
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his
hands can only sustain the former.

It would not also be correct to state that there is no

offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the
acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are
made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others.
The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity
of society is malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is
felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families.
As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit,
the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is,
therefore, the offended party in this case.

The same doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Sayre v.

Xenos, where the Court emphasized that a plea bargain still requires
mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of
the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is
not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Verily, the trial court here acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it disregarded the prosecutor's vigorous objection to private respondent's
plea bargaining proposal. In view of the parties' failure to strike a mutual
agreement on the matter, the trial court should have ordered the
continuation of the proceedings instead of rendering a verdict of conviction
based on private respondent's invalid pleas of guilty to two (2) counts of
Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Considering the foregoing irregularity, the Court is constrained to

declare as invalid both pleas of private respondent and the consequent
verdict of conviction and reinstate the charges against private respondent
for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 9

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear. The

conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information if the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was
made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party.

In closing, to dispel any lingering doubts on the validity of DOJ

Department Circular No. 027-18 which superseded Department Circular No.
061-17, the Court takes this opportunity to reiterate Sayre:

x x x DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea
Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to

acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the
rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as
an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give
their consent to proposed plea bargains.

So must it be. (Citations omitted.)

The same ruling is echoed in the most recent case of People v. Sabater y
Ulan: 10

Verily, the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before

an accused may validly plead guilty to a lesser offense. As Associate Justice
Rodil V. Zalameda explained in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Sayre v.
Xenos: The reason for this is obvious. The prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently, it is his duty to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.

Where the prosecution withholds its consent, the trial court cannot
proceed to approve a plea bargain. There is no meeting of the minds,
hence, there can be no plea bargaining "agreement" to speak of. Should
the trial court nevertheless approve the plea bargain over the prosecution's
objection, it would be doing so in grave abuse of discretion. Justice
Zalameda further explained:

In choosing to respect the prosecution's discretion to give or

withhold consent, the Court is not surrendering any of its powers.
Instead, it is an exercise of sound judicial restraint. Courts cannot
forcefully insist upon any of the parties to plead in accordance with
the Plea Bargaining Framework. To emphasize, when there is no
unanimity between the prosecution and the defense, there is also
no plea bargaining agreement to speak of. If a party refuses to
enter a plea in conformity with the Plea Bargaining Framework, a

10
G.R. No. 249459, June 14, 2021.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 10

court commits grave abuse of discretion should it unduly impose

its will on the parties by approving a plea bargain and issuing a
conviction based on the framework.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be grave
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. It must also be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Here, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or without
jurisdiction when despite the vehement objection of the prosecution, it
peremptorily, in clear violation of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
approved respondent's proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12, RA 9165, in lieu of the original charge of violation
of Section 5 of the same law.

Otherwise stated, the trial court acted without or beyond its

jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed Judgment dated September 12,
2018. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Sps. Huang teaches that such judgment
is actually void, hence, has no legal or binding effect, thus:

Void judgments produce "no legal [or] binding effect."

Hence, they are deemed non-existent. They may result from the
"lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter" or a lack of
jurisdiction over the person of either of the parties. They may also
arise if they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (emphases added)

Consequently, the Judgment dated September 12, 2018 is void,

ineffectual, and could never lapse into finality. (Citations omitted.)

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, it is Our considered view

that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the Motion for Plea Bargaining 11 of private respondent
Rosalinda Martinez over the vigorous objection of the prosecution. As
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Sayre, "plea bargaining requires the
consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor." Private
respondent's plea of guilt to a lesser offense and her subsequent conviction on
the basis thereof was effectively made without the consent of the prosecution
hence, the plea bargaining is void. For this reason, the judgment of the court a
quo anchored on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment
has no legality from its inception. 12 In this regard, it is only proper to resume

11
Rollo, pp. 31-32.
12
People v. Reafor y Comprado, G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020.
CA-G.R. CEB SP. NO. 12226
AMENDED DECISION 11

with the trial of Criminal Case No. 2016-23880 without violating private
respondent's right against double jeopardy.13

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The

Court's Decision promulgated on February 26, 2020 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order
and Joint Judgment both dated August 8, 2018, and the Order dated August 31,
2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, Dumaguete City,
insofar as Criminal Case 2016-23880 is concerned, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The RTC is ORDERED to proceed with the said criminal case against
private respondent Rosalinda Martinez, with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
GABRIEL T. INGLES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ORIGINAL SIGNED ORIGINAL SIGNED

DOROTHY P. MONTEJO-GONZAGA BAUTISTA G. CORPIN, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
GABRIEL T. INGLES
Chairperson, Special Former Eighteenth Division

13
People v. Reafor y Comprado, G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020.