DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD 1-V-104

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a system or unit operation is being evaluated (typically 5-20 major
Which is the size of study level? equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

steels occurring as a result of the process NO

Localized corrosion is occurring YES

General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

NO
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?
DETER
CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant

housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the

Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 10K-30K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
E CATEGORY
DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
according If a fluid is processed below its AIT

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be The isolation and associated instrumentation is protected from fires
controlled remotely, and explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks
If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,
Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid
HEALTH CONSEQUEN
POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population 10-100
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item 1-V-104
probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

3 1-V-104

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD 1-C-101

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

NO
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed
Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
SEQUENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be The isolation and associated instrumentation is protected from fires
controlled remotely, and explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks NO
If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,
Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid
HEALTH CONSE
POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item 1-C-101
probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

3 1-C-101

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Entra de Gas

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 30K-80K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Entra de Gas

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

5 . . . . .

4 . . . . .

Entra de
3 . . . .
Gas

2 . . . . .

1 . . . . .

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Deshidratación

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 300K-1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Deshidratación
probabilidad 3
consecuencia D

5 . . . . .

4 . . . . .

Deshidrat
3 . . . .
ación

2 . . . . .

1 . . . . .

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Deetanizadora

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 30K-80K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Deetanizadora
probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Deetaniza
3
dora

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Debutanizadora

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 300K-1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Debutanizadora
probabilidad 3
consecuencia D

Debutani
3
zadora

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Deisopentanizadora

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Deisopentanizadora
probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Deisopen
3 tanizador
a

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Compresion Gas Residual

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

NO
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Compresion Gas Residual

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Compresi
3 on Gas
Residual

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Filtracion Gas Residual

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

NO
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 300K-1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Filtracion Gas Residual

probabilidad 3
consecuencia D

Filtracion
3 Gas
Residual

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Almacenamiento Propano Tuberia

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Almacenamiento Propano Tuberia

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Almacena
miento
3
Propano
Tuberia

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Almacenamiento Propano Esferas

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 2-10 million
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a > 1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Almacenamiento Propano Esferas

probabilidad 3
consecuencia D

Almacena
miento
3
Propano
Esferas

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Almacenamiento Isopentano Tuberia

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 10K-30K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Almacenamiento Isopentano Tuberia

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Almacena
miento
3
Isopentan
o Tuberia

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Almacenamiento Isopentano Esferas

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 80K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Almacenamiento Isopentano Esferas

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Almacena
miento
3
Isopentan
o Esferas

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Refrigeracion con propano

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 1-2 million
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a > 1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Refrigeracion con propano

probabilidad 3
consecuencia D

Refrigera
3 cion con
propano

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Hot oil

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and YES
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 1
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 200K-700K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in 250 to 400
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 300K-1 million pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Hot oil

probabilidad 4
consecuencia D

4 Hot oil

A B C D E
 DESCRIPCION DE EQUIPO/UNIDAD Gas Combustible

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (EF)

a major section of an operating unit is being evaluated, (typically 20-
Which is the size of study level? 150 major equipment items)

EQUIPMENT FACTOR (DF)

YES/NO

Are known, active damage mechanisms that can

cause corrosion cracking in carbon or NO
low alloy steels?

Is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure,

including carbon steel materials due to low
temperature operation or upset conditions, temper NO
embrittlement, or materials not
adequately qualified by impact testing?

Are places in the unit where mechanically

thermally-induced fatigue failures occurred NO
and the fatigue mechanism might still be active?

Is known high temperature Hydrogen attack

NO
occurring

Is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

NO
steels occurring as a result of the process
Localized corrosion is occurring YES
General corrosion is occurring YES

Creep damage is known to be occurring in high

temperature processes, including furnaces and NO
heaters

materials degradation is known to be occurring,

with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, NO
carburization, spheroidization, etc.

Other active damage mechanisms have been

YES
identified

the potential damage mechanisms in the Operating

unit have not been evaluated and are not being
periodically reviewed by a qualified materials YES
engineer
DETERMINATION OF LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

INSPECTION FACTOR (IF)

Vessel Inspection: Gage the effectiveness of the
vessel inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Piping Inspection-Gage the effectiveness of the

piping inspection program to find the identified If there is no formal inspection program in place
failure mechanisms above.

Overall Inspection Program-How comprehensive is

the inspection program design, and are the If the inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the previous
inspection results evaluated and used to modify the paragraph
inspection program?

CONDITION FACTOR (CCF)

DETE In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant
housekeeping be judged (including painting and About industry standard
insulation maintenance programs)?

The quality of plant design and construction is: About industry standard, where typical contract standards were used

In a review of the effectiveness of the plant

maintenance program, including fabrication, PM About industry standard,
programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged

PROCESS FACTOR (PF)

The number of planned or unplanned process

interruptions in an average year. (This is intended more than 12
for normal continuous process operations).

Assess the potential for exceeding key process Only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to
variables in the operation being evaluated escalate into an unsafe situation

Assess the potential for protection devices, such as

relief devices and critical sensing elements, to be
Clean service, no plugging potential
rendered inoperative as a result of plugging or
fouling of the process fluid

MECHANICAL DESING FACTOR (MDF)

All equipment being considered is designed and maintainted to the
Equipment maintenance
Codes in effect at the time it was constructed

Process conditions The process is common, with normal design conditions

LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY
TOTAL LIKELIHOOD FACTOR
LIKELIHOOD CATEGORY

CHEMICAL FACTOR (CF)

Determine “Chemical Factor.”
Determine a “Flash Factor,” using the NFPA
Flammable Haz ard Rating (the RED diamond on the 4
NFPA Hazard Identification System sign).

Determine a “Reactivity Factor,” using the NFPA

Reactivity Hazard Rating System (the YELLOW
1
diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System
sign).

QUANTITY FACTOR (QF)

For amount of material released, use the largest

amount of flammable inventory that can be lost in a 10K-30K pounds
single leak event.

STATE FACTOR
Select a State Factor based on the normal
(atmospheric pressure) boiling temperature (Tb) in <-100
degrees Fahrenheit
UENCE CATEGORY

AUTOIGNITION FACTOR (AF)

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE CANSEQUENCE CATEGORY
If the fluid is processed above its AIT, determine AF
If a fluid is processed below its AIT
according

PRESSURE FACTOR (PRF)

If the fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at pressure of greater
According to pressure conditions of the fluid
than 150 psig.

CREDIT FACTOR (CF)

Gas detection in place which would detect 50% or
NO
more of incipient leak

Process equipment is normally operated under an

NO
inert atmosphere

Fire-fighting systems are “secure” in the event of a

major incident (e.g. fire water system will remain YES
intact in the event of an explosion)

The isolation capability of the equipment can be There is no protection for the isolation capability from fires or
controlled remotely, explosions.
Blast walls around the most critical (typically
NO
highest pressure) equipment

If there is a dump, drain or, blowdown system

which will deinventory 75% or more of the material YES
in 5 minutes or less, with 90% reliability.

Fireproofing of cables and structures. is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables

Fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours YES

Fixed foam system in place YES
Firewater monitors which can reach all areas of the
YES
affected unit

DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
DAMAGE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOXIC QUANTITY FACTOR (TQF)

For amount of chemical released, use the largest
amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 10K-100K pounds
single leak event

Based on the BLUE diamond in the NFPA Hazard

2
Identification System.

DISPERSIBILITY FACTOR (TQF)

Taking into account the boiling point <30
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

CREDIT FACTOR (CRF)

Detectors in place for the process fluid of interest

NO
that would detect 50% or more of incipient leaks

If major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically,

Taking into account the isolation system and isolation is initiated from a high reading from a toxic material
detector
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CA
System in place (water curtains, etc.) that has
proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of NO
the fluid

POPULATION FACTOR (PPF)

Estimate the Population Factor from the chart

below. This is based on the number of people, on
the average, within one-quarter mile of the release
10-100
point. Consider both onsite and offsite population
within the plant boundaries, use daytime
population counts

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

TOTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCE FACTOR
HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

HEALTH CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

item Gas Combustible

probabilidad 3
consecuencia C

Gas
3 Combusti
ble

A B C D E